14.01 guazo vs de villa 181 scra 623

8/16/2019 14.01 Guazo vs de Villa 181 Scra 623

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 80508 January 30, 1990

EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETASEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIAMACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO,ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN, VERIDIANFLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO, ROSALINADOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES, ESTRELITA ESTARES,BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL,ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO, ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDOGARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA, RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA.RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO, ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDERLABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO REYES, ROSARIO SESPENE, ROSAMARTIN and JAIME BONGAT,petitioners,vs.MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN.RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUSGARCIA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military andpolice officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal TargetZonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.

The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents ofMetro Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. Theymaintain that they have a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of

law, protection of their human rights and the reign of peace and order in theircommunities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila who have similarinterests and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before thisCourt."

The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petitioncontending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they arenot the proper parties to institute the action.


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According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in MetroManila:

1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and Magdalena Streets,Tondo, Manila.

2. June l9, 1987 at about l0:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira Extension and San

Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.

3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.

4. August 11 to l3, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks along AromaBeach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila.

5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and PachecoStreet, Tondo, Manila.

6. August 28, 1987 at l0:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan Navotas, Metro Manila.

7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village, Tondo,Manila.

8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon City.

9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.

10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila International Airport,

Pasay City.

11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.

12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City, Metro Manila.

According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or saturation drives" are incritical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives arehiding. The arrests range from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive inBangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on

November 3 during the drive at Lower Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claimthat the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. In all thesedrives, it is alleged that the following were committed:

1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or earlymorning hours, police and military units without any search warrant orwarrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence andsometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most ofthem are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.


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2. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on thewalls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open(destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents within tocome out of their respective residences.

3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows,the men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo

marks and other imagined marks.

4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted bythe raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way intoeach and every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed toconduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from theneighborhood.

5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raidersransack their homes, tossing about the residents' belongings without totalregard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings aredamaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating evidence.

6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasingfrequency that their money and valuables have disappeared after the saidoperations.

7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcomeintrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that

take them to detention centers where they are interrogated and 'verified.'These arrests are all conducted without any warrants of arrest duly issuedby a judge, nor under the conditions that will authorize warrantless arrest.Some hooded men are used to fingerpoint suspected subversives.

8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration ofthe period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at all. Inother instances, some arrested persons are released without charge after afew days of arbitrary detention.

9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at theresidents during these illegal operations.

10. Many have also reported incidents of on-the-spotbeatings, maulingsand maltreatment.

11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders aresubjected to mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tacticalinformation. (Rollo, pp. 2-4)


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The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted astheir Memorandum after the petition was given due course.

First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second,they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard forhuman rights are total lies.

Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureausand offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed . (Emphasissupplied )

They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the

Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out sucharmed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion....

There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of thenature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of theexpress guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must conductconcerted campaigns to flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must beconsistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected by suchactions.

There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the ChiefExecutive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabatedcriminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitutiongrants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements whichwould bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individualliberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State.However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. TheGovernment cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems

both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it istrying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are notin the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections whichare their distinguishing features.

In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986]), the Court stated:

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right tobe left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots,


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dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in theirfortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle wherehe was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble cottage fromwhich he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarianregimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the

onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able againto enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherishand protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973Constitution:

SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures ofwhatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may beauthorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describingthe place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film

Corporation v. Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 655; 660- 661 [1988]):

This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonableinvasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. Wehave explained in the case of People vs. Burgos(144 SCRA 1)citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but itcould be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protectedarea, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa

v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded is aman's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In thathaven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice ofwho shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants aroundhim. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have accessexcept under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditionalformulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed anyunwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain fromany invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf.


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Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan J. and Boyd v.United States, 11 6 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in hisauthoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]),could fitly characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritualconcept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and toafford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government isno less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be

disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only understringent procedural safeguards. (ibid , p. 74.)

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165;96 L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that police actions should not becharacterized by methods that offend a sense of justice. The court ruled:

Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the presentcase, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which thisconviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidioussqueamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime tooenergetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breakinginto the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth andremove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contentsthis course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence isbound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close tothe rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.

It is significant that it is not the police action perse which is impermissible and which

should be prohibited. Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words of the court,methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities." InBreithaupt v. Abram (352 US432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the same court validated the use of evidence, in thiscase blood samples involuntarily taken from the petitioner, where there was nothingbrutal or offensive in the taking. The Court stated:

Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case,under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver here wasunconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious

consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation ofa constitutional light; and certainly the rest was administered here wouldnot be considered offensive by even the most delicate. Furthermore, dueprocess is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or thesphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that whole communitysense of 'decency and fairness that has been woven by commonexperience into the fabric of acceptable conduct....


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The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "faroutweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by thepolice action.

It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on thedetermination of the exact facts surrounding a particular case.

The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderlyprocedure ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutionswould immediately issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale andgross abuse of civil liberties, as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.

On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by thepetitioners are a complete lie.

The Solicitor General argues:

This a complete lie.

Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to humanrights. Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully planned monthsahead of the actual operation. They were executed in coordination withbarangay officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselvesvoluntarily for character and personal verification. Local and foreigncorrespondents, who had joined these operations, witnessed and recordedthe events that transpired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports:November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far conducted, thealleged victims who numbered thousands had not themselves complained.

In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp Aguinaldo, President Aquino branded all accusations of deliberatedisregard for human rights as 'total lies'. Here are excerpts from herstrongest speech yet in support of the military:

All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human rights have been

shown- up to be total lies.

...To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight, fight with every assurancethat I will stand by you through thick and thin to share the blame, defendyour actions, mourn the losses and enjoy with you the final victory that I amcertain will be ours.

You and I will see this through together.

I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.


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introduces another aspect of the problem and illustrates quite clearly why those directlyaffected by human rights violations should be the ones to institute court actions andwhy evidence of what actually transpired should first be developed before petitions arefiled with this Court.

Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go inforce to the combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected

rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure searchwarrants and without violating the Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in theWhite Plains Subdivision and the commercial center of Makati during the first week ofDecember, 1989.

The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives andcriminal elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officersand police officials by elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the"drives" were conducted.

It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that therewas no rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. Thereappears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrestbefore any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested.There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be attained by the "arealzoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of squatter and low income familiesare fully protected.

Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is

involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even theawesome power of the state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It isthe duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petitionwhere the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions,where no names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and where theprayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the Court isconvinced that the event actually happened.

The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed.This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of

residents "to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." Wecannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the petitions and admittedby the respondents, being undertaken without some undisciplined soldiers andpolicemen committing certain abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all policeactions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in policemaking their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots orviolent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force issometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated . Ablanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions


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to one on one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests againstspecific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the policedecide to sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show of force ispresent are totally prohibited.

The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit.Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem

is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departmentsand for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of theevents cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military,and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for allevils. The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedurein the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our policy makers sustain thecontention of the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essentialto maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policyguidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they

should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifyingviolators is necessary.

The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high levelconference should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Departmentof National Defense and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions todevise procedures for the prevention of abuses.

Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policemanwhom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an

orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigationof the petitioners' charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policyimplications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.

In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses wereprobably committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have totemporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding ofhalf-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation ofresidences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged actswhich are shocking to the conscience.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts ofManila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidencesupporting their allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed andprosecuted.

Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights,the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, and the CommandingGeneral PC-INP for the drawing up and enforcement of clear guidelines to govern


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police actions intended to abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminalelements, and subdue terrorist activities.

In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners ascommitted during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rulesto govern such actions are promulgated.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., I join JJ. Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento's dissents.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually find ourselves together onthe side of liberty. It saddens me that in the case at bar he is on the side of authority.

This is not to say that liberty and authority are irreconcilable enemies. The two must infact co-exist, for only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly enjoyed. Implicitin that theory, however, is the other imperative: that the highest function of authority isto insure liberty.

While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the majoritypractically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper parties.Second, there is no proof. Therefore, the petition is dismissed.

The approach is to me too much simplification. We do not choose to see the woods for

the trees. The brutal fact is staring us in the face but we look the other way in search ofexcuses.

The majority says it cannot act against the drives because no one directly affected hascomplained. Such silence, if I understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect purgedthe drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.

(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are conducted not in the enclaves ofthe rich but in the deprived communities, where the residents have no power or


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influence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little people. Theycannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only hope is in thisCourt, and we should not deny them that hope.)

The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction.We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there areconstitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions applying this

doctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481;Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals;154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.

I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he maynot be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makeshim a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right tocall the firemen. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire fromspreading even if he lives in the other block.

The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor General's assertion that theclaimed abuses are "complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket denial is notenough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers and on radio and television,That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as "complete lies."

The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the "zona" of the JapaneseOccupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed out oftheir houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his head. This

man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were immediately arrested and eventually ifnot instantly executed.

To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important difference is that it isno longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is now1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic and safeguarded by the Billof Rights.

Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:

Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizuresof whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or thingsto be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)


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The provision is intended to protect the individual from official (and officious) intrusions,no matter how humble his abode and however lowly his station in life. Against themighty forces of the government, the person's house is his castle, his inviolate refugeand exclusive domain where he is the monarch of all he surveys.

Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's door and command him atgunpoint to come out so he and his neighbors, who have also been rounded up, can all

be placed on public examination, as in a slave market. This is followed by the arrestand detention of those suspected of villainy, usually on the basis only of the tattoos ontheir bodies or the informer's accusing finger.

Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest required by the Bill of Rights?Where is the probable cause that must be determined personally by the judge, and byno other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination under oath or affirmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce to establish the probable cause?Where is the particular description that must be stated in the warrant, of the places tobe searched and the persons or things to be seized? And where, assuming all thesemay be dispensed with, is the admissible exception to the rule?

Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or an arrestmay be made without warrant. They come under the concept of the fishing expeditionsstigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority is really introducing the"zona" as another exception to the rule, it must not equivocate. It must state thatintention in forthright language and not in vague generalizations that concede thewrong but deny the right.

To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup attempt is, in my view, to becloudthe issue. The "zonas" complained of happened before the failed coup and had nothingwhatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was no "large scale mutiny or actualrebellion' when the saturation drives were conducted and there were no "combatareas" either in the places where the violations were committed. The failed coupcannot validate the invalid "zonas' retroactively.

The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of the facts and figures given bythe petitioners regarding these saturation drives conducted by the military and policeauthorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take judicial notice of the saturation

drives themselves which are not and cannot be denied by the government.

I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per se unconstitutional. Iurge them to accept that even without proof of the hooded figure and the personalindignities and the loss and destruction of properties and the other excesses allegedlycommitted, the mere waging of the saturation drives alone is enough to make thisCourt react with outraged concern.


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Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up ourhands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead declarecategorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rightsand individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately . While they may beallowed in the actual theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Courtshould also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.

The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who openly defy the authorityof the government and violate its laws. The greater menace is in those who, in thename of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as in this case and soundermine democracy itself.

Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are degraded and diminished.Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to every one. We should realize that when the bell tollsthe death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all of us.

PADILLA, J., separate opinion:

This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with individual rights. Thatthe State, acting through the government and its forces, has the authority to suppresslawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The exercise of that authority is

justified when viewed from the standpoint of the general welfare, because the Statehas the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a peaceful life and existence forits citizens. A government that loses its capability to insure peace and order for itscitizens loses the very right to remain in power.

But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the means and methods tosuppress lawless violence, the right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his personand the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be violated, unless there is, in aparticular case, a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has acompelling duty to suppress or abate.

Petitioners' vivid description of the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drives" allegedlyconducted by police and military units in Metro Manila, obviously intended to ferret outcriminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned areas, while vigorously denied byrespondents, deserves an effective and immediate response from this Court.

I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this case involves certainty offacts alleged by petitioners and denied by respondents — this case should be referredto a proper trial court where the petitioners can present evidence to support and provethe allegations they make of such brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of militaryand police units.

More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by this Court as a generalproposition during abnormal times,** and which involve the right of military and police


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forces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through certain fixed points for thepurpose of apprehending criminals and/or confiscating prohibited articles likeunlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and "saturation drives", as described inpetitioners' allegations, are actual raids on private homes in selected areas, and arethus positive assaults against the individual person and his dignity. The individual is, asdescribed, yanked out of his home, without any arrest warrant, to face investigation asto his connections with lawless elements. In short, the sanctity of the home is

pulverized by military and police action. Thus, while the checkpoint is a defensivedevice, on the part of government, the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drive" is adirect assault against, an intrusion into individual rights and liberties.

Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners' allegations of such brutality, astotal lies. It is indeed difficult to even contemplate that such methods reminiscent of a"police state" can exist in a society built on a republican and constitutional system.Respondents Must be given a chance to face their accusers and prove that they areindeed fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes I submit, are too high for this Court, as

the guardian of individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with the issue.

I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue requirements) to theExecutive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him —

1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of thepetitioners' allegations;

2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to review bythis Court;

3. to report to this Court on action taken.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

There is only one question here: Whether or not the police actions (saturation drives)complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power.

The fact that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the militaryconducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no question. The Solicitor

General admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done, except that they hadbeen done "with due regard to human rights." "Not only that," so he states:

... they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actualoperation. They were executed in coordination with barangay officials whopleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily forcharacter and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, whohad joined these operations, witnessed, and reported the events thattranspired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987,


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Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14).That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims whonumbered thousands had not themselves complained.

The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question lawfuland legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests werenot accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1

Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in coordination withTondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which Idoubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes them, per se illegal.

According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including theessential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making theirpresence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the petitioners have not come to courtto "stop all police actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which are, undoubtedly,beyond police power.

That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated 3 is a contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way ofsaturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered by a judicialwarrant.

In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the issues:

...A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of peopleare protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought bythe petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontationswhere search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individualsare easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decideto sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show offorce is present are totally prohibited. 4

As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the properarrest or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding beforehim, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority would have the

exception to be simply, the general rule.

The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by police officers on the beator prowl cars on patrol. What we have and I suppose that everybody is agreed on it-are lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and summary arrests ofpersons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution. If this is a "show of force", itcertainly has no place in a constitutional democracy.


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I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case, our men in uniformhad all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The instant case isquite different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather, police officersfishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed, As I said, in that event,a court warrant is indispensable.

That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is to me, an abdication of

judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is purely one of law the facts beingundisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not theExecutive.

Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise,arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (whichpresumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to makethe Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.

I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only second handknowledge of the events ... keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -of theExecutive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repositoryof all remedies for all evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand", they areundisputed:Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have trooped tothe highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military).

The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the lower courts and the variousechelons of the Executive for investigation is to admit that walls have indeed beenbanged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do not see therefore why we

can not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of these facts.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

Mr. Justice Gutierrez and I are kindred spirits and usually find ourselves together onthe side of liberty. It saddens me that in the case at bar he is on the side of authority.

This is not to say that liberty and authority are irreconcilable enemies. The two must infact co-exist, for only in a well-ordered society can rights be properly enjoyed. Implicitin that theory, however, is the other imperative: that the highest function of authority isto insure liberty.

While acknowledging that the military is conducting the saturation drives, the majoritypractically blinks them away on mere technicalities. First, there are no proper parties.Second, there is no proof Therefore, the petition is dismissed.


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The approach is to me too much simplification. We do not choose to see the woods forthe trees. The brutal fact is staring us in the face but we look the other way in search ofexcuses.

The majority says it cannot act against the drives because no one directly affected hascomplained. Such silence, if I understand the ponencia correctly, has in effect purgedthe drives of all oppressiveness and washed them clean.

(The reason for the silence is fear. These raids are conducted not in the enclaves ofthe rich but in the deprived communities, where the residents have no power orinfluence. The parties directly aggrieved are afraid. They are the little people. Theycannot protest lest they provoke retaliation for their temerity. Their only hope is in thisCourt, and we should not deny them that hope.)

The ruling that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious pretext for inaction.We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where there areconstitutional questions that must be met. There are many decisions applying thisdoctrine. (Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603; Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 41SCRA 702; Philconsa v. Jimenez, 65 SCRA 479; Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481;Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835; Lagunsad v. Court of Appeals;154 SCRA 199; Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.

I believe that where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he maynot be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makeshim a proper party. It is not only the owner of the burning house who has the right tocall the firemen. Every one has the right and responsibility to prevent the fire from

spreading even if he lives in the other block.

The majority seems to be willing to just accept the Solicitor General's assertion that theclaimed abuses are "complete lies" and leave it at that. But a blanket denial is notenough. The evidence is there on media, in the papers and on radio and television,That kind of evidence cannot be cavalierly dismissed as "complete lies."

The saturation drive is not unfamiliar to us. It is like the "zona" of the JapaneseOccupation. An area was surrounded by soldiers and all residents were flushed out oftheir houses and lined up, to be looked over by a person with a bag over his head. This

man pointed to suspected guerrillas, who were immediately arrested and eventually ifnot instantly executed.

To be sure, there are some variations now. The most important difference is that it isno longer 1943 and the belligerent occupation is over. There is no more war. It is now1990, when we are supposed to be under a free Republic and safeguarded by the Billof Rights.

Article III, Section 2, clearly provides:


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Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizuresof whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things

to be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)

The provision is intended to protect the individual from official (and officious) intrusions,no matter how humble his abode and however lowly his station in life. Against themighty forces of the government, the person's house is his castle, his inviolate refugeand exclusive domain where he is the monarch of all he surveys.

Yet in the dead of night, armed soldiers may knock on one's door and command him atgunpoint to come out so he and his neighbors, who have also been rounded up, can allbe placed on public examination, as in a slave market. This is followed by the arrestand detention of those suspected of villainy, usually on the basis only of the tattoos ontheir bodies or the informer's accusing finger.

Where is the search warrant or the warrant of arrest required by the Bill of Rights?Where is the probable cause that must be determined personally by the judge, and byno other, to justify the warrant? Where is the examination under oath or affirmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce to establish the probable cause?Where is the particular description that must be stated in the warrant, of the places tobe searched and the persons or things to be seized? And where, assuming all these

may be dispensed with, is the admissible exception to the rule?

Saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or an arrestmay be made without warrant. They come under the concept of the fishing expeditionsstigmatized by law and doctrine. At any rate, if the majority is really introducing the"zona' as another exception to the rule, it must not equivocate. It must state thatintention in forthright language and not in vague generalizations that concede thewrong but deny the right.

To justify the "zona" on the basis of the recent coup attempt is, in my view, to becloud

the issue. The "zonas' complained of happened before the failed coup and had nothingwhatsoever to do with that disturbance. There was no "large scale mutiny or actualrebellion' when the saturation drives were conducted and there were no "combatareas" either in the places where the violations were committed. The failed coupcannot validate the invalid "zonas' retroactively.

The ponencia says that "we cannot take judicial notice of the facts and figures given bythe petitioners regarding these saturation drives conducted by the military and police


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authorities." Maybe so. But we can and should take judicial notice of the saturationdrives themselves which are not and cannot be denied by the government.

I urge my brethren to accept the fact that those drives are per se unconstitutional. Iurge them to accept that even without proof of the hooded figure and the personalindignities and the loss and destruction of properties and the other excesses allegedlycommitted, the mere waging of the saturation drives alone is enough to make this

Court react with outraged concern.

Confronted with this clear case of oppression, we should not simply throw up ourhands and proclaim our helplessness. I submit that this Court should instead declarecategorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rightsand individual liberty and so should be stopped immediately . While they may beallowed in the actual theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Courtshould also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a battleground.

The danger to our free institutions lies not only in those who openly defy the authorityof the government and violate its laws. The greater menace is in those who, in thename of democracy, destroy the very things it stands for as in this case and soundermine democracy itself.

Where liberty is debased into a cruel illusion, all of us are degraded and diminished.Liberty is indivisible; it belongs to every one. We should realize that when the bell tollsthe death of liberty for one of us, "it tolls for thee" and for all of us.

PADILLA, J., separate opinion:

This case is another classic instance of state power colliding with individual rights. Thatthe State, acting through the government and its forces, has the authority to suppresslawless violence in all its forms cannot be denied. The exercise of that authority is

justified when viewed from the standpoint of the general welfare, because the Statehas the elementary and indispensable duty to insure a peaceful life and existence forits citizens. A government that loses its capability to insure peace and order for itscitizens loses the very right to remain in power.

But, in the exercise of such authority, i.e., in the choice of the means and methods to

suppress lawless violence, the right of the individual citizen to the dignity of his personand the sanctity of his home cannot and should not be violated, unless there is, in aparticular case, a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has acompelling duty to suppress or abate.

Petitioners' vivid description of the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drives" allegedlyconducted by police and military units in Metro Manila, obviously intended to ferret outcriminals or suspected criminals in certain cordoned areas, while vigorously denied byrespondents, deserves an effective and immediate response from this Court.


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I submit that since this Court is not a trier of facts and this case involves certainty offacts alleged by petitioners and denied by respondents-this case should be referred toa proper trial court where the petitioners can presentevidence to support and prove theallegations they make of such brutal and inhuman conduct on the part of military andpolice units.

More than the military and police checkpoints sustained by this Court as a general

proposition during abnormal times,** and which involve the right of military and policeforces to check on vehicles and pedestrians passing through certain fixed points for thepurpose of apprehending criminals and/or confiscating prohibited articles likeunlicensed firearms, the "areal target zoning" and "saturation drives", as described inpetitioners' allegations, are actual raids on private homes in selected areas, and arethus positive assaults against the individual person and his dignity. The individual is, asdescribed, yanked out of his home, without any arrest warrant, to face investigation asto his connections with lawless elements. In short, the sanctity of the home ispulverized by military and police action. Thus, while the checkpoint is a defensive

device, on the part of government, the "areal target zoning" or "saturation drive" is adirect assault against, an intrusion into individual rights and liberties.

Respondents, fortunately, have branded petitioners' allegations of such brutality, astotal lies. It is indeed difficult to even contemplate that such methods reminiscent of a"police state" can exist in a society built on a republican and constitutional system.Respondents Must be given a chance to face their accusers and prove that they areindeed fabricating falsehoods. But the stakes I submit, are too high for this Court, asthe guardian of individual liberties, to avoid a judicial confrontation with the issue.

I vote, therefore, to refer this case (dispensing with normal venue requirements) to theExecutive Judge, RTC of Manila, for him-

1. to receive the evidences of all the parties, in support and in refutation of thepetitioners' allegations;

2. to decide the case expeditiously on the bases of the evidence, subject to review bythis Court;

3. to report to this Court on action taken.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

There is only one question here: Whether or not the police actions (saturation drives)complained of constitute a valid exercise of police power.

The fact that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the militaryconducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no question. The Solicitor


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General admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done, except that they hadbeen done "with due regard to human rights." "Not only that," so he states:

... they were intelligently and carefully planned months ahead of the actualoperation. They were executed in coordination with barangay officials whopleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily forcharacter and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who

had joined these operations, witnessed, and reported the events thattranspired relative thereto. (After Operation Reports: November 5, 1987,

Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987, Annex 14).That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims whonumbered thousands had not themselves complained.

The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the saturation drives in question lawfuland legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No, because the arrests werenot accompanied by a judicial warrant. 1

Therefore, the fact that they had been carefully planned, executed in coordination withTondo's barangay officials, and undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which Idoubt), will not validate them. The lack of a warrant makes them, per se illegal.

According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including theessential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police making theirpresence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " 2 But the petitioners have not come to courtto "stop all police actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which are, undoubtedly,beyond police power.

That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated 3 is a contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way ofsaturation drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered by a judicialwarrant.

In all candor, I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the issues:

...A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of peopleare protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by

the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontationswhere search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individualsare easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decideto sit down in their offices because all concerted drives where a show offorce is present are totally prohibited. 4

As a general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the properarrest or search warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before


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him, in which case, action is justified and necessary. The majority would have theexception to be simply, the general rule.

The fact of the matter is that we are not here confronted by police officers on the beator prowl cars on patrol. What we have and I suppose that everybody is agreed on it-are lightning raids of homes, arbitrary confiscation of effects, and summary arrests ofpersons, the very acts proscribed by the Constitution. If this is a "show of force", it

certainly has no place in a constitutional democracy.

I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case, our men in uniformhad all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The instant case isquite different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather, police officersfishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed, As I said, in that event,a court warrant is indispensable.

That "the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court 5 is to me, an abdication of judicial duty. As I indicated, the controversy is purely one of law the facts beingundisputed. Law, needless to say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not theExecutive.

Worse, it is passing the buck. The petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise,arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower offices of the Executive (whichpresumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem, so I hold, is to makethe Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter.

I am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only second hand

knowledge of the events ... keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems -of theExecutive, the military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repositoryof all remedies for all evils." 6 First, the facts are not "second-hand", they areundisputed:Ther had been saturation drives. Second, the petitioners have trooped tothe highest court with a legitimate grievance against the Executive (and military).

The fact that the majority would "remand" the case to the lower courts and the variousechelons of the Executive for investigation is to admit that walls have indeed beenbanged, doors kicked in, and half-naked men herded. I do not see therefore why wecan not issue a writ of prohibition as prayed for, in the midst of these facts.

Footnotes

Padilla, J.

** Valmonte vs. Gen. de Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83988, 29 September 1989.

Sarmiento, J.


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1 CONST., art III, sec. 21; People v. Burgos, No. 68955, September 4,1986, 144 SCRA 1.

2 Decision, 15; emphasis supplied.

3 Supra; emphasis supplied.

4 Supra.

5 Supra; emphasis supplied.

6 Supra.

$ + GRSI ® Copyrightregno N94-027{bmr footnote.bmp}75909_2_5_90_footnotes>mainG.R. No. 75909 February 5,1990RAMON FRANCISCO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75909 February 5, 1990

RAMON FRANCISCO and CRISTINA MANALO, petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. BERNARDO P. PARDO, PresidingJudge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XLIII, andSPS. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN and EMILIANA BANGAYAN, respondents.

Manuel B. Dulay for p et i tioners .

Natal io M. Panganiban fo r pr ivate respon dents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

Petitioners spouses Ramon Francisco and Cristina Manalo seek a review of thedecision dated August 29, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC),now Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 06866, entitled "Ramon Francisco, etal., Petitioners vs. Hon. Bernardo Pardo, etc., et al., Respondents", denying due


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course to their petition, thereby affirming their ejectment from the subjectpremises as decreed by both the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) and theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

The facts as found by the RTC and adopted by the IAC are as follows:

The premises in question located at 1512 Antipolo St., Sta. Cruz,

Manila, consist of a lot and a two-storey building owned by AntonioChua. Defendant (herein petitioner) Ramon Francisco leased theground floor and a room in the second floor of the said building since1961, (and) used (the same) as an auto spare parts store andresidence. . . . (T)he latest rental as of June, 1982 was Pl,500.00 dulypaid to Antonio Chua.

In 1978, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents) acquired theownership of the premises by purchase from the former ownerAntonio Chua but it was agreed between the plaintiffs and the formerowner that the tenant defendant Ramon Francisco would continue topay to the former owner the monthly rental of P1,000.00 until the endof 1978 and that thereafter the rentals shall accrue to the plaintiffs.Nonetheless, starting January, 1979, plaintiffs received the monthlyrentals not from defendants but from the former owner Antonio Chuawho agreed to assume responsibility in paying the rental on behalf ofRamon Francisco. Because Antonio Chua failed to remit the rental tothe plaintiffs, since September, 1979 and effective January, 1981 atthe increased rate of Pl,500.00 a month, on February 3, 1982, plaintiffs

wrote former owner Antonio Chua to pay the unpaid rentals thenamounting to P35,000.00. Parenthetically on July 3, 1982, plaintiffscounsel sent a letter of demand to the defendant Ramon Francisco byregistered mail but the latter was returned unclaimed.

Another letter dated January 24, 1983 was addressed to defendantCristina Manalo but was also returned unclaimed.

In fact, however, defendants were paid up to the month of June, 1982and defendants stopped paying rentals when they received a copy of

the letter of plaintiffs to the former owner Antonio Chua. 1

On March 7, 1983, private respondents Benjamin and Emiliana Bangayan filedbefore the MTC of Manila a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners on thefollowing grounds: a) non-payment of the agreed monthly rental of P2,000.00;and b) subleasing of the premises in violation of the condition of the lease.

Petitioners denied the existence of the grounds for ejectment. They asserted thatAntonio Chua, the previous owner of the leased property assumed the


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responsibility of paying the rentals. They further stated that there was noexisting sublease but only a change of name of their auto parts business fromImpala Auto Supply to Starlet Supply Center. They likewise denied knowledge ofthe transfer of ownership of the property involved from Antonio Chua, theprevious owner, to the private respondents.

The MTC, after due hearing, rendered judgment declaring petitioners to have

defaulted in the payment of the rent. The dispositive portion of the decisionreads:

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendantsRamon Francisco and Cristina Manalo and all persons claiming rightsunder them to immediately vacate the premises . . . and to restorepossession thereof to plaintiffs; and for the said defendants to pay

jointly and severally the herein plaintiffs the amount of Pl,500.00 asmonthly rentals of the premises from August 1982 and every monththereafter (less any amount they have paid to the plaintiffs) until theyhave actually vacated the premises and the costs of the suit. 2

On appeal to the RTC, the lower court's decision was affirmed with modification.The RTC pronounced:

WHEREFORE, the court affirms the decision subject of the appealwith modification so as to make the decision definite and certainbecause in the appealed decision, the lower court authorizeddeduction of any amount they have paid the plaintiffs which being

undetermined, makes the decision uncertain and void (Cf. del Rosariovs. Villegas, 49 Phil. 634). Defendants and all persons claiming rightsunder them are ordered to immediately vacate the premises . . . and torestore possession thereof to plaintiffs, to pay plaintiffs the sum ofPl,500.00 a month as rental for the premises from July, 1982 and everymonth thereafter until they actually vacate the premises, and costs.

SO ORDERED. 3

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals also denied due course to petitioners'

petition for review. Hence, this recourse, petitioners contending that theappellate court committed the following errors in its decision:

I

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WASNO CONTRACT OF LEASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES;

II


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RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATERESPONDENTS MERELY STEPPED INTO THE SHOES OF THEPREVIOUS OWNER;

III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NON-

PAYMENT OF RENTALS FROM JULY, 1982 UP TO JANUARY, 1983WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO EJECT PETITIONERS;

IV

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEMANDALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PRODUCEDTHE EFFECT OF NOTIFICATION

V

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LOWERCOURT DID NOT EXERCISE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT FIXINGA LONGER PERIOD OF LEASE. 4

Petitioners allege that when private respondents finally disclosed to them inJuly, 1982 that they, private respondents, were the new owners and lessors ofthe leased premises, a confrontation occurred because of the disagreementregarding the rate of rental. Since no agreement as to the rate of rental wasarrived at, no contract of lease was created. This being the case, petitioners averthat they could not have violated the lease contract as there was no contract tospeak of in the first place.

Such contention is clearly fallacious. The property subject of the controversywas sold by the former owner Antonio Chua to private respondents while thelease was subsisting. Under Article 1676 of the New Civil Code,

The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is notrecorded in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save

when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale, orwhen the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.

In the case at bar, private respondents chose to allow the lease to continue.Despite the change of ownership then, the contract of lease subsisted. As aptlyheld by the appellate court:

As buyers of the premises, private respondents merely stepped intothe shoes of the previous owner. The change of ownership did notaffect the contract of lease between the petitioners and previous


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owner. Petitioners still had the same obligations, including thepayment of rentals, under the contract without the necessity ofentering into another agreement with the new owners. 5

Having shown the existence of the lease, all the other issues can be easilyresolved.

No error was committed by the appellate court in ruling that the failure ofpetitioners to pay the rentals from July, 1982 to January, 1983 was sufficientground to eject them. It is a basic tenet that if the lessor raises the rent at theexpiration of the lease, the tenant has to leave if he does not pay the newrental. 6

As held in the case of Vda . de Roxas vs . Court of A ppeals , 63 SCRA 302, it is theowner's prerogative to fix the rental for which he wishes to lease his propertyand the occupant has the option of accepting the rent as fixed or negotiatingwith the owner and in the event of failure to come to an agreement, to leave theproperty so as not to be liable for the rental fixed and demanded by the owner.

The rent in this case was being paid monthly. The lease was therefore on amonth-to-month basis, which expires at the end of each month and at whichtime, either party may opt to terminate or continue the lease under the same orunder new terms and conditions.

Private respondents having opted to increase the rate of rentals, petitionerseither have to accept the new rate or leave the premises if no agreement is

reached. But they cannot excuse themselves from paying rentals altogether justbecause the negotiation as to such increase failed to materialize. For the fact isthat they still occupy the leased property. They derive benefit from suchoccupation. NEMO CUM AL TERIUS DETRIMENTO LOCUPLETARI PROTEST . Noone shall enrich himself at the expense of another.

Petitioners' argument that no demand to vacate was given them deserves scantconsideration. As found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents' counselsent petitioners two (2) letters of demand, one addressed to Ramon Franciscoand the other to Cristina Manalo. These letters were returned unclaimed despite

the fact that they were properly addressed to the petitioners and despite noticegiven to the addressees of the letters. In the case of Gaspay v s . Hon . Sangc o , etal ., L-27826, December 18, 1967, we held that therein petitioners' claim that theywere not served with notice is belied by proof that they had refused to receivethe same. No person is entitled to profit from his wrong act of commission oromission.

As to the issue of whether the appellate court erred in not fixing a longer periodof lease, we find no cogent reason to depart from the aforesaid court ruling.


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Article 1687 of the New Civil Code empowers the courts to fix the period of lease.Such prerogative is addressed to the court's sound judgment. 7And suchdiscretion was certainly judiciously exercised in the case at bar for, again, asobserved by the appellate court:

. . . Certainly, the default of petitioners in the payment of the rentalscould not have inspired the court to extend any further their stay in

the premises as this would have imposed more unjustifiable burdenon the part of the owners. 8

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr ., Feliciano, B id in and Co rtés, JJ ., co nc u r.

Footnotes

1 pp. 20-21, Rol lo .

2 p. 25, Rol lo .

3 pp. 21-22, Rol lo .

4 p. 5, Petition, p. 7, Rol lo .

5 p. 28, Rol lo .

6 46 Phil. 184.

7 F.S. Divinagracia Agro Commercial, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104SCRA 180.

8 p. 29. Rol lo

$ + GRSI ® Copyrightregno N94-027{bmr footnote.bmp}77867_2_6_90_footnotes>mainG.R. No. 77867 February 6,1990ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila


30/122

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990

ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,

vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA,respondents.

Isabel de la Puerta for and in her own behal f .

Gi lbert D. Camal igan for pr ivate respond ent.

CRUZ, J .:

The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private respondentCarmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional lights to the estate of heralleged grandmother.

Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will leaving herproperties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, allsurnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to herlegitime and was appointed executrix of the will. 1

The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by herbrothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of theexecution of the will and did not fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, someof the properties listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to themexclusively. 2

Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the probatecourt. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. 4

On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First Instance ofQuezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the petition wasgranted. 5 However, the decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for thedismissal of the case 6

On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in theprobate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthlyallowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. 7 At the


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hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed statusto which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.

On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion, declaring that itwas satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita was a natural child ofVicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support.The court added that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was)

too weak to discredit the same. 8

On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the respondentcourt, 9 which is now in turn being challenged in this petition before us.

The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child ofVicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 andremained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are JuanitaAustrial and Gloria Jordan.

Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that Carmelita was thelegitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were legally orpresumably married. Moreover, Carmelita could not have been a natural child ofVicente de la Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth in1962.

To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who testified that hewas a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to him, the two were living ashusband and wife and had three children, including a girl named "Puti,"

presumably Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple waslegally married. 10

Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as Vicente de laPuerta's wife but said they separated two years after their marriage in 1938 andwere never reconciled. In 1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de laPuerta in his house, which was only five or six houses away from where sheherself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship between her husbandand Gloria was well known in the community. 11

In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:

. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court thatshe was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh. A);that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is GloriaJordan who were living as common law husband and wife until hisdeath on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was married to, butwas separated from, his legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta; that uponthe death of Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without leaving a


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last will and testament, she was the only child who survived himtogether with his spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he did notbeget any child; that she was treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a truechild from the time of her birth until his father died; that the fact thatshe was treated as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by thefamily pictures showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as

her parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoptioncase in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court atMauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in courtthat Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. Band B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spentfor her subsistence, support and education; . . . 12

This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent any of thosecircumstances we have laid down in a long line of decisions that will justify

reversal.

13

Among these circumstances are: (1) the conclusion is a findinggrounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inferencemade is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the

judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact areconflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and itsfindings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) thefindings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence onwhich they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in thepetitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)

the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposedabsence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The petitioner insists on the application of the following provisions of the CivilCode to support her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of Vicente de laPuerta but the legitimate child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days followingthe celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred daysfollowing its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall bepresumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other thanthat of the physical impossibility of the husband's having access tohis wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the threehundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:


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The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having beendestroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof toshow that the two were legally married. She did not.

Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private respondent's filiation,we reject the petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the Civil Code is notavailable to Carmelita. It is error to contend that as she is not a natural child but

a spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, awill, a statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On thecontrary, it has long been settled that:

The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other thannatural children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterouschildren or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabitingwith a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabitingwith a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support andsuccessional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be dulyproven.(Ibid , Art. 887)

How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Codeallows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spuriouschildren under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284 ofthe Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsoryrecognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural

children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the ruleon voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural childrenmay be applied to spurious children. 16

This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the privaterespondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That status wassufficiently established by the sworn testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at thehearing of the petition for adoption on September 6, 1976, where he categoricallydeclared as follows:

Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de laPuerta?

A She is my daughter. 17

Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita de la Puertaclaim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga Revuelta?

According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:


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Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtueof which the representative is raised to the place and the degree ofthe person represented, and acquires the rights which the latterwould have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first reason isthat Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the second is that

Carmelita is a spurious child.

It is settled that—

In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take placeonly in the following cases: first, when the person represented diesbefore the testator; second, when the person represented is incapableof succeeding the testator; and third, when the person represented isdisinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is avacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendantsof the person represented to succeed by right of representation. 18

xxx xxx xxx

The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of adeceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he wouldhave had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceasedhad already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a factthat at the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still

alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon hisdeath, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuisonet al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In otherwords, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed tothe right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of thelegatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property. 19

Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right toinherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of representation wasinvolved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death, which

came after his own mother's death. It would have been different if Vicente wasalready dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inheritedfrom her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the privaterespondent was a lawful heir.

But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelitais barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code,which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Thisarticle provides quite clearly:


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Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato fromthe legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shallsuch children or relatives inherit in the same manner from theillegitimate child.

Applying this rule in Leonardo v . Court of A ppeals , 20 this Court declared:

. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, stillhe cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate leftby the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again bythe Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by thefact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and motherwere not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's firstmarriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be anillegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab in testato from thelegitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceasedFrancisca Reyes.

The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz v. In termediateAppel late Court , 21 thus:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain inthat it prohibits absolutely a succession ab in testato between theillegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the fatheror mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie ofblood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.

Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there ispresumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. Theillegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimatefamily; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latterconsiders the privileged condition of the former, and the resources ofwhich it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimatechild nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemishbroken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, byavoiding further ground of resentment. 22

Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheritingfrom Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between themand consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr.Arturo M. Tolentino:

If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the lattercannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents orascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to thedeceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is


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exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, theadopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus makeone for their kindred. 23

The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta,has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the estateof Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should therefore be

filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father'sestate 24 and cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed decision is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is soordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco , Griño-Aqu ino and Medialdea, JJ ., conc ur.

Footnotes

1 Original records, p. 1, Ibid ., pp. 43-44.

2 Ibid ., pp. 6-7.

3 Ibid ., p. 31.

4 Ibid ., p. 108.

5 Annex "E"

6 Ibid .

7 Original records, p. 7.

8 Annex "F".

9 Rol lo , p. 48. Penned by Francisco, J. with Lombos de la Fuente and

Benipayo, JJ., concurring.

10 TSN, March 5, 1982, p. 6; Ibid ., p. 9; Ibid ., p. 13.

11 TSN January 21, 1982, pp. 3, 7; Ibid ., p. 13.

12 Rol lo , p. 49.


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13 Malaysian Airline System Bernad vs, Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA321; Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 82; Sacayvs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593.

14 Umingan vs. Umingan, CA-G.R. No. 8193-R, December 16, 1952;Bell vs. Territory, 56 P 853, 8 Okl. 75; Estrada vs. Reyes, CA-G.R. No.4835-R, February 24, 1951; Andal vs. Macaraeg, L-2474, May 30, 1951,

89 Phil. 465; Sudario vs. Acro Taxi Cab Co., Inc., CA-G.R. No. 3677-R,August 2, 1951.

15 TSN January 21, 1982, pp. 23-24.

14.01 guazo vs de villa 181 scra 623

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