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S T R AT E G I C F O R E C A S T I N G , I N C .STRATFOR is the world’s leading private intelligence firm providing corporations, governments and individuals with intelligence and analysis to anticipate the political, economic, and security issues vital to their interests. Armed with powerful intelligence-gathering capabilities and working in close collaboration with STRATFOR’s experienced team of professionals, our clients are better able to protect their assets, diminish risk, and increase opportunities to compete in the global market.

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ii© 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

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A b o u t S t r at f o r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i i

L at i n A m e r i c a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

E x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 J u n e : T h e M o n t h i n R e v i e w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 K e y I s s u e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 T h e M o n t h A h e a d : F o r e c a s t s f o r J u l y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 T r e n d s , S t a t s a n d I n d i c a t o r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 N o t e w o r t h y E v e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8

S t r at f o r S e r v i c e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6

C o n ta c t S t r at f o r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8

iii© 2005 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

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STRATFOR is the world’s leading private intelligence firm providing corporations, governments and individuals with geopolitical intelligence and analysis to manage risk and anticipate the political, economic and security issues vital to their interests. Armed with powerful intelligence-gathering capabilities and working in close collaboration with STRATFOR’s expert team of analysts, clients are better able to protect their assets, diminish risk, compete in the global market and increase opportunities. STRATFOR has an unparalleled record for accuracy and clarity in its forecasts and has been called “the Shadow CIA” by Barron’s.

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erious security concerns in Latin America reached the U.S. border in June, when Mexican President Vicente Fox ordered hundreds of troops to border cities in an attempt to wrest control from the drug cartels. Although Fox’s initiative will fail, it serves to highlight growing lawlessness in the region. Failures by Latin American governments to address crime and to deal effectively with social, economic and political discontent

are inhibiting growth and stifling foreign investment. Taxation issues relating to foreign oil companies in Venezuela and Bolivia, meanwhile, could backfire. On the political front, the rise in populism is drawing some countries’ militaries back into the government arena.

T h i s M o n t h ’ s H i g h l i g h t s : I n E v e r y I s s u e : • Growing Insecurity Stifling Foreign • Trends, Stats and Indicators Investment • Noteworthy Events • Fox Tries ‘Operation Safe Mexico’ • Election Season Begins • Weak Brazilian and Argentine Economies • Foreign Oil Companies Taking Hits

S


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IE x e c u t i v e S u m m a r y

nsecurity was the main geopolitical driver in Latin America in June, and will remain so in July. Growing regional insecurity is being fueled by many different forces. Across the region, crime-related insecurity is the biggest problem, although many countries also confront growing economic, political and social insecurity.

Slower economic growth, high poverty rates and rising social discontent with the inability of Latin American governments to stimulate stronger economic growth, deliver efficient public services, control soaring violent crime rates and improve living standards is affecting the business environment. In some countries — most prominently Bolivia and Venezuela — economic policies also are closing opportunities for private enterprise.

Growing regional insecurity is undermining economic growth and driving foreign direct investment away. In June, Toyota Motor Corp. suspended a $445 million project in Mexico. The multinational Gerdau Group suspended plans to invest $1 billion in the steel industry through 2007. Repsol-YPF SA shelved planned investments in Bolivia until the political situation stabilizes. In Venezuela, some foreign oil companies also are reconsidering their investment plans. The private investment climate will deteriorate further in July.

Countries where security-related problems and political instability will increase in July include Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Weak economies will draw more attention to Brazil and Argentina. Also, energy insecurity will remain the top regional economic concern of the countries that form the Mercosur South American customs union. Venezuela’s confrontation with the United States will persist. Nicaragua could experience more anti-government protests in July. It also will become evident in Mexico that the government’s Operation Safe Mexico is having little impact on reducing crime.

July will see the start of increased electoral activities across Latin America. Between July 2005 and December 2006, municipal, gubernatorial, congressional or presidential elections will be held in 11 countries, starting with gubernatorial elections in Mexico in July. The advent of the electoral season will see more corruption accusations against ruling political parties and incumbent presidents. Starting in July, many governments also will confront increasing popular pressures to loosen monetary policy and increase public spending to stimulate economic growth ahead of Election Day.


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J u n e : T h e M o n t h i n R e v i e w

B o l i v i a ’ s C h i l l i n g E n e r g y L a wAs we forecast, insecurity was a major geopolitical driver and social concern throughout Latin America in June.

Protests in Bolivia finally forced President Carlos Mesa to resign June 6. Mesa was replaced by Supreme Court President Eduardo Rodriguez, who assumed power with a pledge to hold new general elections before the end of 2005. As of June 30, however, Rodriguez and congressional leaders had not reached an agreement on early elections. Impeding progress is the fact that, constitutionally, Rodriguez can call early elections for president and vice president only, not for Congress, whose members were elected in 2002 to five-year terms. Special legislation would be needed to include early congressional elections as well, which is a top demand of opposition leaders capable of mobilizing large street protests against the government.


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Almost daily protests and road blockades by rural peasants, miners and labor groups – which had paralyzed La Paz and isolated Bolivia regionally for three weeks — stopped after a June 11 truce between protesters and the new government. July could bring further protests, however, as indigenous leader Evo Morales presses his demand for a constitutional assembly.

To keep a lid on political tensions and improve the government’s fiscal profile, Rodriguez on June 27 enacted the Hydrocarbons Law that his predecessor had returned to Congress unsigned. Rodriguez also issued three presidential decrees with instructions on calculating and collecting the new 32 percent hydrocarbons tax and the 18 percent royalty fees on oil and gas production. Rodriguez also ordered the armed forces and national police to safeguard Bolivia’s oil and gas facilities against occupation by radical groups — and to send nationalist Bolivian votes a message that the government is taking action to protect Bolivia’s sovereign rights to these facilities. Enactment of the new Hydrocarbons Law, however, also has deepened the chill on foreign direct investment in oil and gas projects.

U n c e r t a i n t y G r o w s , E c o n o m y S l o w sIn Ecuador, President Alfredo Palacio, who was appointed by Congress on April 20, admitted after only two months in power that his government is weak and faces an uncertain future. Since Palacio became president, Ecuador’s relations with Colombia, Peru and the United States have deteriorated. Palacio has no political support in Congress, the military’s support for his government is uncertain, oil production at national oil company Petroecuador is falling because of poor management and insufficient investment, and the economy’s growth is slowing. Moreover, Ecuador’s northern provinces are being destabilized by the armed conflict in southern Colombia between Colombian army forces and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) militant group. The Bush administration suspended U.S. military aid to Ecuador on June 29 because Palacio refused to sign an agreement guaranteeing U.S. government

Serious cracks are appearing in the still-fresh foundation of Palacio’s government.

Political turmoil calmed in Bolivia in June a�er Mesa resigned and the new government capitulated on the Hydrocarbons Law — though tensions likely will flare again.


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personnel in that country immunity from prosecution by the International Court of Justice.

B r a z i l ’ s P o l i t i c a l S c a n d a lBrazilian President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva was hammered in June by continued signs of slowing economic growth, and detailed accusations that senior officials in the ruling Workers’ Party (PT) and da Silva’s government conspired to bribe dozens of legislators with millions of dollars in secret cash payments between the start of 2003 and the start of 2005 to ensure passage of da Silva’s legislative proposals. The corruption scandals forced the resignation of Cabinet Chief of Staff Jose Dirceu, who was the president’s closest political adviser and is regarded as the PT’s top political strategist and ideologue. The scandal also forced da Silva to the center politically in a deal with the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) that will give the PMDB four to five seats in the president’s Cabinet — more Cabinet positions than those held by PT members. Da Silva expects this agreement will keep his congressional agenda on track in the months leading up to national elections in October 2006. Only part of the PMDB accepted the deal, however. A greater number of PMDB leaders around the country rejected a political alliance with the government because they intend to campaign against da Silva and incumbent PT candidates in the 2006 elections.

E x - P r e s i d e n t i a l D e a l - M a k i n gIn Central America, Nicaraguan President Enrique Bolanos confronted intense congressional pressures to resign during June from a coalition of the Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC), of which Bolanos is a member. Nicaragua is not scheduled to hold presidential elections until November 2006, but FSLN leader and former Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega wants to force Bolanos’ resignation to advance new elections that the Sandinista leader expects to win. PLC leader and former President Arnoldo Aleman has aligned his party with the FSLN in Congress because Ortega has promised to pardon Aleman for his corruption conviction and 20-year prison sentence if Ortega is elected president.

Two former Nicaraguan leaders have united in an effort to force Bolanos’ resignation.

The bribery scandal has forced da Silva to dole out Cabinet seats to the opposition.


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C a l l i n g i n T r o o p sPolitical violence increased in Haiti during June. Senior U.S. State Department officials said June 7 that U.S. troops could be deployed soon to Haiti to control the escalating political violence the U.N. peacekeeping force has been unable to quell. Finally, Mexico’s escalating security crisis became more obvious in June as Fox deployed more than 1,000 army soldiers and federal police agents to Nuevo Laredo and seven other cities where drug traffickers have corrupted and taken control of local law enforcement agencies. Mexican officials claimed unrealistically that Fox’s security initiative, called Operation Safe Mexico, will end a two-year war between rival drug cartels for control of Mexico’s $50 billion a year illegal narcotics industry.

A l t e r n a t i v e E n e r g y S o u r c eAs Stratfor forecast, energy insecurity was a growing concern of South American governments in June. Bolivia’s political crisis and its new investor-unfriendly Hydrocarbons Law have aggravated current and future natural gas-supply insufficiencies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. As a result, the Chilean government proposed the creation of an “energy ring” to supply natural gas to Chile and Argentina from Peru’s Camisea deposits via a broad network of pipelines. With Peru on board, Chile directed its proposal only at Argentina, though the governments of Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay also embraced the concept, turning it into a broader regional initiative that will be implemented through the Mercosur South American customs union.

Ve n e z u e l a n M i l i t a r y D i s c o n t e n tVenezuela’s oil export revenues increased during June thanks to higher international oil prices, ensuring President Hugo Chavez a substantial cash flow that he is spending freely to maintain the popularity of his Bolivarian Revolution among the poor. However, discontent also increased significantly during the month within the national armed forces (FAN) and National Guard (NG). For the first time since April 11-13, 2002, when a military revolt toppled him from the presidency for less than 48 hours, Chavez’s control over the FAN and NG appeared to weaken slightly.

Chavez canceled the FAN’s annual Army Day parade in June, claiming the government had intelligence of a plot to assassinate him at the parade

Chile’s proposed ‘energy ring’ with Argentina and Peru a�racted immediate interest from Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.


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grounds in Carabobo state near the city of Valencia. Instead, Army Day was celebrated June 24 at the Military Academy’s small parade grounds inside Fort Tiuna, where Chavez announced across-the-board military pay increases of 50 percent to 60 percent for all personnel. However, economic issues are only one element driving discontent within the FAN and NG. Venezuelan professional military personnel also are upset by Chavez’s growing military align-ment with Cuba. Increasingly, the FAN is being drawn into Cuba’s military orbit as a subordinate ally, while the Cuban presence in Venezuela has increased to about 35,000 people today from roughly 7,000 in April 2002, when the FAN rebelled against Chavez. Many career military personnel also object to Chavez’s creation of an all-volunteer Bolivarian military reserve that will total more than 80,000 members by the end of 2005.

The political confrontation between the Chavez government and the Bush administration also intensified in June, as we forecast. The confrontation played out at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) on June 5-7 in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the OAS assembly June 6, where he outlined his administration’s goals in Latin America. Bush reaffirmed U.S. support for Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez, called on the U.S. Congress to approve his proposed free trade agreement with Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), and proposed a structural reform of the OAS to make it a stronger monitor and enforcer of democratic governance in the region. The proposed reforms form part of the Bush administration’s strategy to contain the regional spread of Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution. The reforms, however, were rejected by Mexico, Brazil and most of the region’s governments as an attempt by Washington to create mechanisms to facilitate increased U.S. intervention in the sovereign affairs of other countries. On June 29, Chavez threatened again to break diplomatic relations with the United States after the State Department circulated a letter to Caribbean and Central American governments describing Chavez as a threat to Venezuelan democracy and regional stability.

OAS members, fearing increased U.S. intervention in their countries, rejected Washington’s a�empts to reform the organization.

The Venezuelan armed forces is being drawn into Cuba’s military orbit as a subordinate ally, angering Venezuelan military professionals.


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K e y I s s u e s

T h e L a t i n A m e r i c a n T i n d e r b o xInsecurity in all respects — crime-related, economic, political, legal and social — is worsening regionally and is starting to affect private investment decisions and economic growth in many countries. Toyota cited crime-related problems as its reason for suspending in June a planned $445 million investment in northern Mexico. Toyota decided instead to make that investment in the Canadian province of Ontario. The Gerdau Group, one of the world’s largest steelmakers, postponed more than $1 billion in planned investments in Brazil until the political environment improves in that country. In Bolivia, Repsol YPF SA and other foreign oil companies withheld planned investments because of the new Hydrocarbons Law and the

The growing security crisis is affecting the political stability of many Latin American countries.


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country’s acute political instability. In Venezuela, the Chavez government has broken existing contracts with foreign oil companies, and is demanding more than $4 billion in back taxes and fines from foreign oil companies that collectively have more than $26 billion invested in crude oil production ventures that account for 1 million barrels per day (bpd) of Venezuela’s total production of approximately 2.5 million bpd.

Moreover, the region’s general insecurity will continue to increase. Latin America’s security crisis, which is affecting the political stability of many countries to varying degrees, is driven regionally by high levels of poverty and unemployment, weak government and judicial institutions, corrupt or inadequate law enforcement, regional spillover from the Colombian conflict, the growing economic power of international drug trafficking organizations, the collapse of traditional political parties, and the rapid growth in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador of populist tactics that employ violent street protests by the poor to press political demands and topple unpopular presidents.

P o p u l i s m a n d M i l i t a r i s m Although politics and populism always have gone hand in hand, populism has become the driving force in regional electoral politics since the end of the 1990s. This trend parallels the collapse of traditional political parties in most countries and the rise of a new generation of leaders that won power by campaigning as independent outsiders against the ruling establishments in their countries. As populism has grown in the region, the armed forces of some countries are being drawn back into politics and governance — a situation that had largely ended with the advent of democracy in the 1980s. Venezuela’s Chavez has deliberately militarized his government, while in Bolivia and Ecuador the military is responding to weak governments, the fragmentation of traditional political parties and citizen street power.

Increasing security problems also are forcing the militaries in several countries to engage more directly in activities that normally are carried out by civilian law enforcement agencies. This happened in Mexico during June when Fox deployed more than 1,000 soldiers to eight northern cities that reportedly are controlled by drug cartels and corrupt local police. An

Since the end of the 1990s populism has become the driving force in regional electoral politics.


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estimated 600 to 900 people have died since January in battles between drug cartels for control of Mexico’s narcotics industry. Central American presidents, meanwhile, agreed at the end of June to create the region’s first international rapid-deployment military force to battle drug traffickers and powerful regional street gangs, called “maras.”

The military’s increasing profile in Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela also is fueling tensions across borders — and beyond. In June, Ecuador’s armed forces commander warned that Peru’s acquisition of two used Lupo-class Italian missile frigates threatened Ecuador’s national security. Also, on June 29 Chile’s defense minister said Chile has no outstanding territorial or maritime claims pending with any other country. His remarks were directed specifically at Peru and Bolivia, which are trying to press territorial claims against Chile. In Venezuela, Chavez has aligned the FAN with Cuba against the United States, and is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to buy new weapons and build up his combined active military and volunteer civilian reserve forces to about 160,000 personnel by the end of 2005.

T h e K i c k - o f f o f E l e c t i o n S e a s o nNo elections were held regionally in June, but Brazil got a jump on the 1 ½-year election season when accusations of corruption were hurled against President da Silva’s government. Opposition political leaders hoping to weaken governments in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Nicaragua — and thus improve their own chances at the polls — also levied corruption charges against those countries’ presidents. Between July 2005 and December 2006, many Latin American and Caribbean countries will hold local, state or national elections for president or Congress. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Ncaragua and Venezuela are all slated for elections during this time. Haiti also will hold elections under U.N. supervision before the end of 2005. The election season will increase pressures on governments in many countries to adopt more expansionary monetary and spending policies. It also will test the depth of support for the current generation of socialist or left-leaning leaders that came to power in some countries since Chavez was elected president of Venezuela in December 1998.

Election season will test the depth of support for the generation of socialist or le�-leaning leaders that has risen to power since 1998.


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T h e M o n t h A h e a d : F o r e c a s t s f o r J u l y

H i g h l i g h t s : • Foreign Oil Companies Cornered • Bush Strategy to Contain Chavez • Mexico’s Security Crisis • Instability in the Andes • Realities of the Energy Ring

The top five security concerns in Latin American in July are Venezuela, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. As Chavez radicalizes his Bolivarian Revolution, internal tensions will grow in Venezuela, and tensions between Caracas and Washington also will increase. Crime-related violence in Mexico will persist in July despite Operation Safe Mexico. Bolivia and Ecuador likely will experience new anti-government protests. In Nicaragua, Congress will try to impeach the president. T h e Ta x a t i o n A p p r o a c hTensions between the Venezuelan and U.S. governments will continue to heat up in July. The Bush administration will continue trying to build a regional containment strategy against Chavez, regardless of whether other Latin American countries cooperate. Chavez will reiterate his threats to break relations with Washington, and also could threaten again to cut off Venezuelan oil exports to the United States. Whether he actually does so depends on how aggressively Washington seeks to contain Chavez. U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela William Brownfield said June 29 that the United States buys 60 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports and that the Bush administration wants to maintain good commercial relations with Venezuela. As a result, the U.S. government likely will apply more pressure but not push Chavez all the way to a rupture in relations.

A new element in U.S.-Venezuela tensions likely will become more visible in July, however, as Chavez presses his demands on foreign oil companies to pay close to $4 billion in back taxes and related fines the government claims

Chavez mistakenly believes foreign oil companies will accept whatever terms he dishes out in order to continue working in Venezuela’s rich oil fields.


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is owed. Chavez said in June that the foreign companies, which jointly produce about 1 million bpd of crude oil in Venezuela, can pay up or leave the country. The Chavez government appears confident that the oil companies ultimately will do whatever he demands because Venezuela’s oil and gas reserves are so large. Chavez is mistaken. Some foreign oil companies could start disengaging in Venezuela as soon as July.

Venezuela also will experience more political uncertainty in the lead-up to municipal elections scheduled for August. Although Chavez controls the country’s election authorities and the political opposition is disarticulated and seemingly leaderless, the ruling chavista coalition is experiencing internal power struggles. Ultimately, however, Chavez is heading for another landslide victory in the municipal elections because he controls the digitalized electoral systems that were adopted in 2004. We expect more saber rattling in the armed forces (FAN), but no imminent coup attempts against the president. Chavez made a fuss throughout June about alleged plots to assassinate him, and we can expect presidential claims of conspiracies against him in July.

G r o w i n g M i l i t a r i z a t i o nMexico’s security crisis will get more attention as Fox expands Operation Safe Mexico to the state of Mexico, Mexico City itself and several states in southern Mexico, including presumably Chiapas, Guerrero and the Yucatan Peninsula. The militarization of the largest cities in northern Mexico, includ-ing Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana, will not end the war between rival drug cartels that has killed as many as 1,500 people since 2003. The militarization will be more perceptible in July, even if the Mexican government claims progress against the drug cartels by releasing data about arrests, arms and drug seizures and other numbers to show Mexico is more secure.

In fact, Mexico’s security crisis will continue to worsen month-on-month. The drug cartels generate more than twice as much foreign exchange as the country’s oil exports. The drug lords have the means — mainly better weapons and plenty of cash to bribe officials — to resist the government’s security offensive while it lasts. We expect more signs of the Mexican government’s inability to contain the country’s crime-related security crisis in July, and more tense exchanges with Washington as the crisis increasingly affects U.S. commercial and security interests along the U.S-Mexican border.

Mexico’s security crisis, caused by wars between rival drug cartels, will continue to worsen.


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A R e s u m p t i o n o f P r o t e s t sThe Andes region will remain unstable. Bolivia’s Rodriguez could reach an agreement with Congress allowing general elections — including elections for a new Congress — by December 2005. If the deal is sealed, some protests likely will erupt in July as some radical groups continue pressing their demands for a constitutional assembly and full nationalization of the oil and gas industry. If Rodriguez does not get an agreement, large-scale protests are likely to occur again during the latter half of the month.

Ecuador’s political instability will worsen in July. Palacio is in trouble because he lacks the political base and the military support needed to stay in power until a new elected government takes office in January 2007. Palacio unlikely will leave the presidency in July, but it is doubtful he will make it to January 2007.

F u t u r e o f E n e r g y R i n gThe big regional issue in July will be the energy ring initiative to build a pipeline to transport natural gas from Peru to several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Brazil is making this a new flagship issue for Mercosur in its drive to achieve regional integration. Despite the enthusiasm over this initiative, Peru lacks the gas reserves to meet the region’s needs. This will become more evident in July.

T h e F A R C ’ s S t r a t e g i c T r i a n g l eThe Colombian conflict will intensify in July, particularly in the southern part of the country along the border with Ecuador. The FARC views the departments of Caqueta, Narino and Putumayo as a strategic triangle and will fight the army to retain control of the region. Clashes in Putumayo particularly will spill across the border into Ecuador’s northern province of Sucumbios. Tensions between Bogota and Quito will rise, although both sides will seek ways to cooperate in joint border security operations. Ecuador’s commitment to this process, however, will turn out to be all talk and no action. In the end, Quito will not involve itself in the FARC problem.

Renewed protests are likely in Bolivia, even if an agreement is reached for elections later in the year.


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T h e B o l a n o s D e c r e eWe expect more instability in Nicaragua during July. Bolanos has refused to resign and call early general elections, and instead has issued a decree placing the Central American Court of Justice legally above Nicaragua’s Su-preme Court. We expect more protests during the month in Managua against Bolanos. His opponents in Congress also will try to impeach Bolanos.


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T r e n d s , S tat s a n d I n d i c at o r s

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Bahamas, The

Barbados

Belize

Brazil

Bolivia

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico

Netherlands Antilles

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent & the Grenadines

Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

n/a = not available

All data are provided by the governments of respective countries, unless otherwise noted

0.760

151.9

5.495

2.840

1.050

599.8

9.400

93.70

95.20

18.51

0.260

19.40

29.90

15.80

0.430

26.10

0.770

3.600

7.400

8.710

676.5

2.940

4.400

13.80

7.000

67.90

0.400

0.710

0.390

1.110

12.54

12.00

107.5

0.08

37.9

0.30

0.30

0.30

179

8.80

16.0

45.3

4.20

0.10

8.80

13.4

6.70

0.10

12.7

0.80

8.10

7.00

2.60

106

0.20

5.60

3.20

6.00

27.5

0.05

0.20

0.10

0.40

1.30

3.40

26.2

761.10

3,912

17,486

10,380.92

3,976.88

3,417

1,125

5,856

2,099

4,361

3,643.08

2,190

2,145

2,335

4,241.07

1,953

1,024.33

419

1,035

3,237.22

6,506

16,758.83

788

4,524

1,155

2,349

9,522.75

4,021.24

3,512.22

2,400.93

9,743.88

3,543.00

4,148.00

4.10

9.0

3.30

3.00

3.00

5.2

3.80

6.0

4.0

4.20

1.00

2.00

6.60

1.50

-3.20

2.60

1.60

-3.50

4.20

2.50

4.4

1.00

4.00

6.00

2.10

5.1

5.10

2.00

2.80

4.60

6.20

12.00

17.3

N/A

0.795 Q1 ‘05

0.095 2003

0.018 2003

0.038 2003

7.2 May ‘05

0.567 2003

0.244 Jan/Feb ‘05

2.739 2004

0.585 2004 Forecast

N/A

0.31 2003

0.013 Apr. ‘05

3.113 2004 prelim.

N/A

0.104 2003

0.055 2003

(-0.142) 2003

0.198 2003

0.521 2003

3.772 Q1 ‘05

(-0.074) 2003

0.201 2003

1.017 2004 prelim.

1.1 Sept ’04 preli

1.3924

0.053 2003

0.032 2003

N/A

-0.066 2003

0.808 2003

0.271 2003

1.144 2004

N/A

13.8

N/A

10.6

11.60

11.5

9.50

8.8

12

6.7

N/A

17.0

11.0

6.3

N/A

3.40

N/A

N/A

8.0

13.0

4.2

N/A

10.20

15.60

11.20

9.5

N/A

19.70

N/A

N/A

7.8

13.0

15.3

0.392 2002

3.559 Apr ‘05 prelim.

0.425 2003

0.256 2003

N/A

43.5 May ’05

0.752 Apr ’05

9.202 Q1 ’05

1.363 Jan ’05

2.817 May ’05

N/A

5.75 2004

2.822 Apr ‘05

3.295 2004 prelim.

N/A

4.167 2003

0.186 2003

0.342 3

1.534 2004 prelim.

0.11 Jan ’05

189.2 2004

N/A

1.017 2003

0.302 Q1 ‘05 prelim.

0.889 Jan ’04 prelim.

2.345 Feb ‘05

N/A

0.046 Q3 ’04

N/A

0.487 2003

4.77 2004

0.707 Q1 ‘05

11.333 Q1 ‘05

0.175 2002


1.628 2003

1.055 2003

N/A

27.8 May ’05

0.495 Q1 ‘05

7.297 Q1 ‘05

1.367 Jan ‘05

3.744 May ‘05 CIF

N/A

5.369 2004

2.586 Apr ‘05

6.269 2004 prelim.

N/A

6.649 2003

0.205 2003

0.997 2003

3.922 2004 prelim. CIF

0.296 Jan ’05

197.303 2004

N/A

1.521 2003

0.856 Q1 ‘05 prelim.

1.171 Jun ’04 prelim.

1.711 JFeb ’05

N/A

0.314 JQ3 ‘04 CIF

N/A

0.448 2003

3.687 2004

0.868 Q1 ‘05

4.969 Q1 ‘05

-1.30

4.4

1.50

1.50

2.70

6.6

4.40

1.10

5.90

12.30

2.30

51.50

2.70

4.50

2.30

7.00

4.70

27.10

8.10

11.50

4.70

2.50

8.20

0.5

5.20

3.70

2.40

1.00

2.00

9.00

3.90

9.20

21.70

0.121 Dec ‘04

20.904 Apr ‘05

.491 Dec ‘03

.940 Sep ‘04

.085 Dec ‘03

59.291 Jun ‘05

1.713 Apr ‘05

16.99 Apr ‘05

13.969 May ‘05

2.267 Jun ‘05

0.043 Dec ‘04

1.127 May ‘05

1.437 Dec ‘04

1.74 May ‘05

0.123 Dec ‘04

3.785 May ‘05

.276 Dec ‘03

.062 Dec ‘03

33.663 Apr ‘05

2.074 May ‘05

60.536 May ‘05

.372 Dec ‘03

0.231 Dec ‘03

2.22 Dec ‘04

1.085 Jun ‘04

14.097 Jun ‘05

0.079 Dec ‘04

0.131 Dec ‘04

0.075 Dec ‘04

.106 Dec ‘03

2.976 Dec ‘04

2.221 Apr ‘05

28.704 Jun ‘05

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

billio

ns US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

sIn

com

ing

FDI

contr

acted

billio

ns US

D

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Bahamas, The

Barbados

Belize

Brazil

Bolivia

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico


Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia


Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

n/a = not available


0.760

151.9

5.495

2.840

1.050

599.8

9.400

93.70

95.20

18.51

0.260

19.40

29.90

15.80

0.430

26.10

0.770

3.600

7.400

8.710

676.5

2.940

4.400

13.80

7.000

67.90

0.400

0.710

0.390

1.110

12.54

12.00

107.5

0.08

37.9

0.30

0.30

0.30

179

8.80

16.0

45.3

4.20

0.10

8.80

13.4

6.70

0.10

12.7

0.80

8.10

7.00

2.60

106

0.20

5.60

3.20

6.00

27.5

0.05

0.20

0.10

0.40

1.30

3.40

26.2

761.10

3,912

17,486

10,380.92

3,976.88

3,417

1,125

5,856

2,099

4,361

3,643.08

2,190

2,145

2,335

4,241.07

1,953

1,024.33

419

1,035

3,237.22

6,506

16,758.83

788

4,524

1,155

2,349

9,522.75

4,021.24

3,512.22

2,400.93

9,743.88

3,543.00

4,148.00

4.10

9.0

3.30

3.00

3.00

5.2

3.80

6.0

4.0

4.20

1.00

2.00

6.60

1.50

-3.20

2.60

1.60

-3.50

4.20

2.50

4.4

1.00

4.00

6.00

2.10

5.1

5.10

2.00

2.80

4.60

6.20

12.00

17.3

N/A

0.795 Q1 ‘05

0.095 2003

0.018 2003

0.038 2003

7.2 May ‘05

0.567 2003

0.244 Jan/Feb ‘05

2.739 2004

0.585 2004 Forecast

N/A

0.31 2003

0.013 Apr. ‘05

3.113 2004 prelim.

N/A

0.104 2003

0.055 2003

(-0.142) 2003

0.198 2003

0.521 2003

3.772 Q1 ‘05

(-0.074) 2003

0.201 2003

1.017 2004 prelim.


1.3924

0.053 2003

0.032 2003

N/A

-0.066 2003

0.808 2003

0.271 2003

1.144 2004

N/A

13.8

N/A

10.6

11.60

11.5

9.50

8.8

12

6.7

N/A

17.0

11.0

6.3

N/A

3.40

N/A

N/A

8.0

13.0

4.2

N/A

10.20

15.60

11.20

9.5

N/A

19.70

N/A

N/A

7.8

13.0

15.3

0.392 2002


0.425 2003

0.256 2003

N/A

43.5 May ’05

0.752 Apr ’05

9.202 Q1 ’05

1.363 Jan ’05

2.817 May ’05

N/A

5.75 2004

2.822 Apr ‘05

3.295 2004 prelim.

N/A

4.167 2003

0.186 2003

0.342 3

1.534 2004 prelim.

0.11 Jan ’05

189.2 2004

N/A

1.017 2003

0.302 Q1 ‘05 prelim.


2.345 Feb ‘05

N/A

0.046 Q3 ’04

N/A

0.487 2003

4.77 2004

0.707 Q1 ‘05

11.333 Q1 ‘05

0.175 2002


1.628 2003

1.055 2003

N/A

27.8 May ’05

0.495 Q1 ‘05

7.297 Q1 ‘05

1.367 Jan ‘05

3.744 May ‘05 CIF

N/A

5.369 2004

2.586 Apr ‘05

6.269 2004 prelim.

N/A

6.649 2003

0.205 2003

0.997 2003


0.296 Jan ’05

197.303 2004

N/A

1.521 2003

0.856 Q1 ‘05 prelim.


1.711 JFeb ’05

N/A

0.314 JQ3 ‘04 CIF

N/A

0.448 2003

3.687 2004

0.868 Q1 ‘05

4.969 Q1 ‘05

-1.30

4.4

1.50

1.50

2.70

6.6

4.40

1.10

5.90

12.30

2.30

51.50

2.70

4.50

2.30

7.00

4.70

27.10

8.10

11.50

4.70

2.50

8.20

0.5

5.20

3.70

2.40

1.00

2.00

9.00

3.90

9.20

21.70

0.121 Dec ‘04

20.904 Apr ‘05

.491 Dec ‘03

.940 Sep ‘04

.085 Dec ‘03

59.291 Jun ‘05

1.713 Apr ‘05

16.99 Apr ‘05

13.969 May ‘05

2.267 Jun ‘05

0.043 Dec ‘04

1.127 May ‘05

1.437 Dec ‘04

1.74 May ‘05

0.123 Dec ‘04

3.785 May ‘05

.276 Dec ‘03

.062 Dec ‘03

33.663 Apr ‘05

2.074 May ‘05

60.536 May ‘05

.372 Dec ‘03

0.231 Dec ‘03

2.22 Dec ‘04

1.085 Jun ‘04

14.097 Jun ‘05

0.079 Dec ‘04

0.131 Dec ‘04

0.075 Dec ‘04

.106 Dec ‘03

2.976 Dec ‘04

2.221 Apr ‘05

28.704 Jun ‘05

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

billio

ns US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

sIn

com

ing

FDI

contr

acted

billio

ns US

D

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us


J U L Y 2 0 0 5


Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Bahamas, The

Barbados

Belize

Brazil

Bolivia

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico


Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia


Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

n/a = not available


0.760

151.9

5.495

2.840

1.050

599.8

9.400

93.70

95.20

18.51

0.260

19.40

29.90

15.80

0.430

26.10

0.770

3.600

7.400

8.710

676.5

2.940

4.400

13.80

7.000

67.90

0.400

0.710

0.390

1.110

12.54

12.00

107.5

0.08

37.9

0.30

0.30

0.30

179

8.80

16.0

45.3

4.20

0.10

8.80

13.4

6.70

0.10

12.7

0.80

8.10

7.00

2.60

106

0.20

5.60

3.20

6.00

27.5

0.05

0.20

0.10

0.40

1.30

3.40

26.2

761.10

3,912

17,486

10,380.92

3,976.88

3,417

1,125

5,856

2,099

4,361

3,643.08

2,190

2,145

2,335

4,241.07

1,953

1,024.33

419

1,035

3,237.22

6,506

16,758.83

788

4,524

1,155

2,349

9,522.75

4,021.24

3,512.22

2,400.93

9,743.88

3,543.00

4,148.00

4.10

9.0

3.30

3.00

3.00

5.2

3.80

6.0

4.0

4.20

1.00

2.00

6.60

1.50

-3.20

2.60

1.60

-3.50

4.20

2.50

4.4

1.00

4.00

6.00

2.10

5.1

5.10

2.00

2.80

4.60

6.20

12.00

17.3

N/A

0.795 Q1 ‘05

0.095 2003

0.018 2003

0.038 2003

7.2 May ‘05

0.567 2003

0.244 Jan/Feb ‘05

2.739 2004

0.585 2004 Forecast

N/A

0.31 2003

0.013 Apr. ‘05

3.113 2004 prelim.

N/A

0.104 2003

0.055 2003

(-0.142) 2003

0.198 2003

0.521 2003

3.772 Q1 ‘05

(-0.074) 2003

0.201 2003

1.017 2004 prelim.


1.3924

0.053 2003

0.032 2003

N/A

-0.066 2003

0.808 2003

0.271 2003

1.144 2004

N/A

13.8

N/A

10.6

11.60

11.5

9.50

8.8

12

6.7

N/A

17.0

11.0

6.3

N/A

3.40

N/A

N/A

8.0

13.0

4.2

N/A

10.20

15.60

11.20

9.5

N/A

19.70

N/A

N/A

7.8

13.0

15.3

0.392 2002


0.425 2003

0.256 2003

N/A

43.5 May ’05

0.752 Apr ’05

9.202 Q1 ’05

1.363 Jan ’05

2.817 May ’05

N/A

5.75 2004

2.822 Apr ‘05

3.295 2004 prelim.

N/A

4.167 2003

0.186 2003

0.342 3

1.534 2004 prelim.

0.11 Jan ’05

189.2 2004

N/A

1.017 2003

0.302 Q1 ‘05 prelim.


2.345 Feb ‘05

N/A

0.046 Q3 ’04

N/A

0.487 2003

4.77 2004

0.707 Q1 ‘05

11.333 Q1 ‘05

0.175 2002


1.628 2003

1.055 2003

N/A

27.8 May ’05

0.495 Q1 ‘05

7.297 Q1 ‘05

1.367 Jan ‘05

3.744 May ‘05 CIF

N/A

5.369 2004

2.586 Apr ‘05

6.269 2004 prelim.

N/A

6.649 2003

0.205 2003

0.997 2003


0.296 Jan ’05

197.303 2004

N/A

1.521 2003

0.856 Q1 ‘05 prelim.


1.711 JFeb ’05

N/A

0.314 JQ3 ‘04 CIF

N/A

0.448 2003

3.687 2004

0.868 Q1 ‘05

4.969 Q1 ‘05

-1.30

4.4

1.50

1.50

2.70

6.6

4.40

1.10

5.90

12.30

2.30

51.50

2.70

4.50

2.30

7.00

4.70

27.10

8.10

11.50

4.70

2.50

8.20

0.5

5.20

3.70

2.40

1.00

2.00

9.00

3.90

9.20

21.70

0.121 Dec ‘04

20.904 Apr ‘05

.491 Dec ‘03

.940 Sep ‘04

.085 Dec ‘03

59.291 Jun ‘05

1.713 Apr ‘05

16.99 Apr ‘05

13.969 May ‘05

2.267 Jun ‘05

0.043 Dec ‘04

1.127 May ‘05

1.437 Dec ‘04

1.74 May ‘05

0.123 Dec ‘04

3.785 May ‘05

.276 Dec ‘03

.062 Dec ‘03

33.663 Apr ‘05

2.074 May ‘05

60.536 May ‘05

.372 Dec ‘03

0.231 Dec ‘03

2.22 Dec ‘04

1.085 Jun ‘04

14.097 Jun ‘05

0.079 Dec ‘04

0.131 Dec ‘04

0.075 Dec ‘04

.106 Dec ‘03

2.976 Dec ‘04

2.221 Apr ‘05

28.704 Jun ‘05

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

billio

ns US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

sIn

com

ing

FDI

contr

acted

billio

ns US

D

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Bahamas, The

Barbados

Belize

Brazil

Bolivia

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico


Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia


Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

n/a = not available


0.760

151.9

5.495

2.840

1.050

599.8

9.400

93.70

95.20

18.51

0.260

19.40

29.90

15.80

0.430

26.10

0.770

3.600

7.400

8.710

676.5

2.940

4.400

13.80

7.000

67.90

0.400

0.710

0.390

1.110

12.54

12.00

107.5

0.08

37.9

0.30

0.30

0.30

179

8.80

16.0

45.3

4.20

0.10

8.80

13.4

6.70

0.10

12.7

0.80

8.10

7.00

2.60

106

0.20

5.60

3.20

6.00

27.5

0.05

0.20

0.10

0.40

1.30

3.40

26.2

761.10

3,912

17,486

10,380.92

3,976.88

3,417

1,125

5,856

2,099

4,361

3,643.08

2,190

2,145

2,335

4,241.07

1,953

1,024.33

419

1,035

3,237.22

6,506

16,758.83

788

4,524

1,155

2,349

9,522.75

4,021.24

3,512.22

2,400.93

9,743.88

3,543.00

4,148.00

4.10

9.0

3.30

3.00

3.00

5.2

3.80

6.0

4.0

4.20

1.00

2.00

6.60

1.50

-3.20

2.60

1.60

-3.50

4.20

2.50

4.4

1.00

4.00

6.00

2.10

5.1

5.10

2.00

2.80

4.60

6.20

12.00

17.3

N/A

0.795 Q1 ‘05

0.095 2003

0.018 2003

0.038 2003

7.2 May ‘05

0.567 2003

0.244 Jan/Feb ‘05

2.739 2004

0.585 2004 Forecast

N/A

0.31 2003

0.013 Apr. ‘05

3.113 2004 prelim.

N/A

0.104 2003

0.055 2003

(-0.142) 2003

0.198 2003

0.521 2003

3.772 Q1 ‘05

(-0.074) 2003

0.201 2003

1.017 2004 prelim.


1.3924

0.053 2003

0.032 2003

N/A

-0.066 2003

0.808 2003

0.271 2003

1.144 2004

N/A

13.8

N/A

10.6

11.60

11.5

9.50

8.8

12

6.7

N/A

17.0

11.0

6.3

N/A

3.40

N/A

N/A

8.0

13.0

4.2

N/A

10.20

15.60

11.20

9.5

N/A

19.70

N/A

N/A

7.8

13.0

15.3

0.392 2002


0.425 2003

0.256 2003

N/A

43.5 May ’05

0.752 Apr ’05

9.202 Q1 ’05

1.363 Jan ’05

2.817 May ’05

N/A

5.75 2004

2.822 Apr ‘05

3.295 2004 prelim.

N/A

4.167 2003

0.186 2003

0.342 3

1.534 2004 prelim.

0.11 Jan ’05

189.2 2004

N/A

1.017 2003

0.302 Q1 ‘05 prelim.


2.345 Feb ‘05

N/A

0.046 Q3 ’04

N/A

0.487 2003

4.77 2004

0.707 Q1 ‘05

11.333 Q1 ‘05

0.175 2002


1.628 2003

1.055 2003

N/A

27.8 May ’05

0.495 Q1 ‘05

7.297 Q1 ‘05

1.367 Jan ‘05

3.744 May ‘05 CIF

N/A

5.369 2004

2.586 Apr ‘05

6.269 2004 prelim.

N/A

6.649 2003

0.205 2003

0.997 2003


0.296 Jan ’05

197.303 2004

N/A

1.521 2003

0.856 Q1 ‘05 prelim.


1.711 JFeb ’05

N/A

0.314 JQ3 ‘04 CIF

N/A

0.448 2003

3.687 2004

0.868 Q1 ‘05

4.969 Q1 ‘05

-1.30

4.4

1.50

1.50

2.70

6.6

4.40

1.10

5.90

12.30

2.30

51.50

2.70

4.50

2.30

7.00

4.70

27.10

8.10

11.50

4.70

2.50

8.20

0.5

5.20

3.70

2.40

1.00

2.00

9.00

3.90

9.20

21.70

0.121 Dec ‘04

20.904 Apr ‘05

.491 Dec ‘03

.940 Sep ‘04

.085 Dec ‘03

59.291 Jun ‘05

1.713 Apr ‘05

16.99 Apr ‘05

13.969 May ‘05

2.267 Jun ‘05

0.043 Dec ‘04

1.127 May ‘05

1.437 Dec ‘04

1.74 May ‘05

0.123 Dec ‘04

3.785 May ‘05

.276 Dec ‘03

.062 Dec ‘03

33.663 Apr ‘05

2.074 May ‘05

60.536 May ‘05

.372 Dec ‘03

0.231 Dec ‘03

2.22 Dec ‘04

1.085 Jun ‘04

14.097 Jun ‘05

0.079 Dec ‘04

0.131 Dec ‘04

0.075 Dec ‘04

.106 Dec ‘03

2.976 Dec ‘04

2.221 Apr ‘05

28.704 Jun ‘05

GDP

bil

lions

USD a

t 200

4 mar

ket p

rices

Popu

latio

n mi

llions

GDP

per

cap

ita

billio

ns US

D at 2

004 m

arke

t pric

es

GDP

gro

wth

%

chan

ge fr

om ye

ar pr

eviou

sIn

com

ing

FDI

contr

acted

billio

ns US

D

Unem

ploy

men

t % Ex

ports

billio

ns US

D

Fore

ign

Curr

ency

Res

erve

s

billio

ns US

D

Impo

rts

billio

ns US

D

Infla

tion

CPI %

chan

ge fr

om m

onth

previo

us


J U L Y 2 0 0 5


Antigua and Barbados

Argentina

The Bahamas

Barbados

Belize

Brazil

Bolivia

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

*Closing Rates

Beginning

2.7200

2.8825

1.0050

2.0300

1.9750

2.4105

8.1100

584.00

2,341.0

475.35

2.7200

29.500

25,000

8.7570

2.7200

7.6300

179.50

Low

2.7200

2.8650

1.0050

2.0300

1.9750

2.3555

8.1100

577.50

2,314.5

475.35

2.7200

28.700

25,000

8.7570

2.7200

7.6270

179.50

High

2.7200

2.8960

1.0050

2.0300

1.9750

2.4992

8.1100

593.70

2,360.0

478.50

2.7200

30.689

25,000

8.7570

2.7200

7.6450

179.50

End

2.7200

2.8950

1.0050

2.0300

1.9750

2.3555

8.1100

579.50

2,331.0

478.50

2.7200

29.786

25,000

8.7570

2.7200

7.6270

179.50

Haiti

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico


Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia


Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

Beginning

39.770

19.660

80.100

10.890

1.7686

16.370

1.0050

6,270.0

3.2540

2.7200

2.7200

2.7200

2,502.4

6.1980

24.050

2,150.0

Low

39.740

19.481

61.620

10.763

1.7686

16.370

1.0050

6,080.0

3.2515

2.7200

2.7200

2.7200

2,502.4

6.1845

23.725

2,148.8

High

40.685

19.944

80.100

10.895

1.7686

16.370

1.0050

6,270.0

3.2555

2.7200

2.7200

2.7200

2,502.4

6.2552

24.675

2,150.0

End

40.685

19.748

61.710

10.763

1.7686

16.370

1.0050

6,085.0

3.2550

2.7200

2.7200

2.7200

2,502.4

6.2260

24.625

2,150.0

Regional Currency Rates


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

N o t e w o r t h y E v e n t s

June 1, BRAZIL: Brazil will start large-scale uranium-enrichment activities in July to produce fuel for the country’s two nuclear power reactors, Angra I and Angra II, at the Resende centrifuge facility west of Rio de Janeiro. Brazil plans to build seven more nuclear power reactors in the coming years.

June 3, CHILE: Representatives from Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore have reached a free-trade agreement to eliminate duties on more than 90 percent of goods. Pending ratification by each country, the pact will take effect Jan. 1, 2006.

June 5, BOLIVIA: Cardinal Julio Terraza meets with President Carlos Mesa and the presidents of the Senate, Chamber of Deputies and Supreme Court to discuss the possibility of holding early elections as one way of ending more than three weeks of road blockades by anti-government protesters.

June 6, BRAZIL: At least 59 percent of Brazilian voters think President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva has abandoned the social reform proposals that got him elected president in October 2002, a new survey shows. The poll also found that 65 percent of voters believe da Silva’s government is corrupt.

June 6, BOLIVIA: President Carlos Mesa resigns.

June 7, BRAZIL: Roberto Jefferson, a former congressional ally of President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, accuses da Silva’s government of bribing opposition leaders to move the president’s legislative agenda through Congress.

June 7, VENEZUELA: Foreign Minister Ali Rodríguez Araque “categorically and indignantly” denies that the government of President Hugo Chavez is supporting groups in Bolivia that are trying to force a regime change. He is responding to a U.S. charge that the Chavez government is actively “influencing” events in Bolivia.

June 8, MEXICO: Billionaire businessman Carlos Slim says his new investment venture, Promoter of Economic Development in Latin America, will be listed on the New York City and Mexico City stock exchanges in August with an initial capitalization of $720 million.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

June 9, VENEZUELA: Foreign oil companies owe Venezuela about $3 billion in taxes, says the director of the National Customs and Tax Service (Seniat), without identifying the companies. Seniat is auditing other companies.

June 9, COLOMBIA: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has become the largest auto parts smuggler in the country, according to a new report by the Colombian Auto Parts Manufacturers Association. The report also claims that the smuggling business is managed by top FARC chieftain Jorge “Mono Jojoy” Briceno, and is used to launder the proceeds of FARC’s international cocaine sales.

June 10, BOLIVIA: Congress names Supreme Court President Eduardo Rodriguez as the country’s interim president. The Bolivian Constitution requires him to call for elections later in 2005.

June 10, URUGUAY: A central bank report says Uruguay’s economy grew 0.1 percent in the first quarter 2005 as compared with fourth quarter 2004. Agriculture gross domestic product fell 7.40 percent, construction and electricity generation were down 3.9 percent, and gas and water production dropped 1.20 percent, the bank reports. The government forecasts the economy will grow between 5 percent and 6 percent in 2005.

June 11, BOLIVIA: Miners, indigenous leaders and unions cease the almost daily protests that have cut off La Paz and isolated Bolivia.

June 12, BOLIVIA: New President Eduardo Rodriguez says general elections will be held within six months for president, vice president and members of Congress, including 27 senators and 130 deputies.

June 13, VENEZUELA: U.S. Army Gen. Bantz Craddock, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, says Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s growing regional influence is creating “a destabilizing situation” that represents a threat to the Americas.

June 13, EL SALVADOR: Human Rights Defense Solicitor Beatrice de Carrillo says death squads are engaged in “social cleansing,” a term used to describe the systematic execution of criminals, homeless people, street urchins and anyone the squads deem an enemy of public order. Death squads usually are staffed by active and former military and police officers who are paid by private economic interests.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

June 14, ANDES REGION: A new report by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime says South American cocaine production grew 2 percent in 2004 after declining for five consecutive years. Cocaine production in Colombia fell 11 percent in 2004, but rose 35 percent in Bolivia and 23 percent in Peru.

June 14, NICARAGUA: Defense Minister Jose Adan Guerra will resign June 15, says President Enrique Bolanos. A successor has not been chosen.

June 15, NICARAGUA: Comptroller General Jose Pasos Marciac requests that Congress depose President Enrique Bolanos for “disobedience of the law.” The Comptroller General’s office is controlled by the Liberal Constitutionalist Party and the Sandinista National Liberation Front, whose leaderships have formed an alliance to force the president’s resignation.

June 16, ECUADOR: Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary-General Jose Miguel Insulza rejects requests by former Ecuadorian President Lucio Gutierrez to apply the OAS Democratic Charter against the new government of President Eduardo Palacio.

June 17, PARAGUAY: President Nicanor Duarte says his country’s membership in Mercosur has hurt its economic development. Separately, the Federation of Production, Industry and Commerce calls on Duarte to pull Paraguay out of Mercosur.

June 18, VENEZUELA: Petroleos de Venezuela signs a one-year contract with PetroChina to sell fuel oil to China. The deal, amounting to 30,000 barrels per day, is expected to help China meet its growing energy demands.

June 19, MEXICO: President Vicente Fox arrives in Ukraine with a delegation of Mexican business leaders, one day before a June 20 summit with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and Parliament Speaker Vladimir Litvin.

June 20, BRAZIL: President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva names Energy Minister Dilma Rousseff as Cabinet chief.

June 20, ARGENTINA: President Nestor Kirchner says Argentina will never again be the “courtesan of interests” that sank the country. He is responding to a private International Monetary Fund document that criticizes Kirchner


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

as a president who demonstrates “animosity” toward foreign investors and private companies operating utilities.

June 21, PERU: The regional government of Peru’s Cuzco province formally decrees that coca can be grown freely by indigenous peasants. The decree recognizes the Cuzco valleys of La Convencion, Qosnipata and Yanatile as “zones of legal traditional production of coca leaf.”

June 21, VENEZUELA: The Venezuelan subsidiary of ExxonMobil is considering taking a dispute with the Venezuelan Ministry of Energy and Petroleum over royalty and income tax increases to international arbitration.

June 22, CENTRAL AMERICA: A coalition of 23 U.S. manufacturing associations representing about 18,000 companies launches a lobbying effort in Washington to oppose Congressional approval of a proposed free-trade agreement with Central America and the Dominican Republic. Leaders of the coalition describe the proposal as “a suicide pact” that will accelerate the destruction of jobs and industries in the United States.

June 22, CENTRAL AMERICA: U.S. Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez says U.S. approval of the proposed free-trade agreement with Central America and the Dominican Republic is “vital” for the reactivation of broader hemispheric negotiations on the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.

June 23, ARGENTINA: Economy Minister Roberto Lavagna says his country is prepared to initiate talks with the International Monetary Fund regarding a new loan accord.

June 24, CENTRAL AMERICA: The free-trade agreement with Central America and the Dominican Republic is formally submitted to the U.S. Congress for a vote.

June 25, COLOMBIA: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia militants kill 25 soldiers and wound 11 in two fights. Another 19 soldiers are reported missing.

June 26, MEXICO: Authorities have seized 2.7 tons of cocaine in a container shipped to the Mexican port of Veracruz from Venezuela.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

June 27, COLOMBIA: Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) chieftain Raul Reyes says the FARC is willing to discuss peace directly with the U.S. government. A U.S. Embassy spokesman in Bogota immediately rejects the offer because FARC is listed as a terrorist organization.

June 28, BRAZIL: Gerdau Group, one of the world’s largest steelmakers, announces the postponement of planned investments in Brazil of more than $1 billion through 2007 until the Brazilian political situation calms down.

June 29, CHILE: Defense Minister Jaime Ravinet says Chile has no pending territorial or maritime reclamations with any country and is not developing offensive plans against any country, though he warns that Chile “is not willing to give up even one square centimeter” of the country’s national territory.

June 30, HONDURAS: Central American presidents meet in Tegucigalpa with senior U.S. State Department official Dan Fisk to discuss plans to create a regional fast-deployment military force to battle drug traffickers and street gangs, called “maras.”

C h a n g e s

MexicoJose Luis Luego Tamargo was appointed secretary of the environment and natural resources June 23. His previous post in the government of President Vicente Fox was director of the Office of the Federal Prosecutor for Environmental Protection. Luego Tamargo, 51, is a chemical and metallurgical engineer. In 1988 he was elected federal deputy for the National Action Party, and was a member of congressional commissions on the environment, industry and trade.

BrazilDilma Roussef was appointed chief of staff in President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva’s Cabinet on June 21. Her previous job in da Silva’s government was as minister of energy and mines. Roussef, 57, battled Brazil’s military government in the 1960s as an armed militant and spent three years in prison as a result. Her public-sector career, however, has earned her a reputation as a competent professional manager. The Brazilian news media call her “Lula’s Iron Lady.” Roussef’s main responsibilities will include conducting relations between the president and Congress, and getting da Silva re-elected. Roussef already is pressuring Economy Minister Antonio Palocci to ease his tight monetary policies.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

ParaguayVice Minister of Agriculture and Cattle Gustavo Ruiz Diaz was promoted to minister June 9. Ruiz Diaz is an agronomist who has worked with multilateral organizations in Europe and the United States.

Army Division Gen. Ruben Alberto Alviso Gonzalez was named interim army commander.

Adm. Miguel Angel Caballero Della Logia was appointed interim navy commander.

Brig. Gen. Cecilio Perez Bordon was appointed interim commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

EcuadorIvan Rodriguez was named minister of energy and mines June 16. Rodriguez was president of Ecuador’s College of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. His main task is to maintain and expand Ecuador’s crude oil production.

Carlos Pareja Yanuzelli was appointed president of state oil company Petroecuador. He is a chemical engineer with many years of experience in Ecuador’s state-owned and private oil sectors.

Sergio Andres Seminario was appointed secretary-general of State Communications. He is an advertising executive from Guayaquil who hosts radio and television talk shows. Before his appointment he was first director of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce.

NicaraguaNew Defense Minister Avil Ramirez is an attorney and close associate of President Enrique Bolanos who is well-regarded by the military. His previous posts in the Bolanos government were as vice minister of government (Interior Ministry) and director of immigration.

HaitiNew Interior Minister Paul Gustave Magloire was a personal political adviser to Prime Minister Gerard Latortue.

New Justice Minister Henri Dorleans is a lawyer and judge.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

Frank Charles, named minister of social affairs, was proposed for his new job by the moderate wing of the Lavalas Family party, led by former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

BoliviaSupreme Court President Eduardo Rodriguez was named president of Bolivia on June 10 to serve in a caretaker capacity until new general elections are held before the end of 2005. He became president after Senate leader Hormando Vaca Diez and Chamber of Deputies leader Mario Cossio agreed to transfer their constitutional rights of presidential succession to Rodriguez. Rodriguez’s new Cabinet appears to be made up largely of political independents who have until now been inactive in Bolivian politics.

New Foreign Minister Armando Loayza Mariaca is a career diplomat who joined the Bolivian Foreign Service in 1968. Throughout his diplomatic career, Loayza Mariaca has held posts in Latin America and Europe. He was Bolivia’s ambassador to the Vatican from 1994 to 1998.

Ivan Aviles Mantilla was named minister of the presidency, a post similar to the U.S. president’s chief of staff. He is a journalist, anthropologist and teacher. He previous served as secretary-general of the Supreme Court in Bolivia’s constitutional capital, Sucre.

New Government (Interior) Minister Gustavo Avila Bustamante studied business administration in Bolivia. Since 1991, he had been general adviser to the Defense Ministry. He is well regarded by the Bolivian armed forces.

New Defense Minister Gonzalo Mendez is an economist and expert on economic development. Mendez is from Cochabamba. He has worked with the World Bank and the United Nations, and also is a university professor.

Irma Elizabeth Peredo Obleas, minister of sustainable development, is an economist with post-graduate degrees in development planning.

New Finance Minister Luis Carlos Jemio Mollinedo is a Ph.D. economist who has worked with international economic organizations in Latin America, Washington and Europe.

Carlos Melchor Diaz Villavicencio, minister of economic development, is an economist and banker from Santa Cruz.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

Guillermo Rivera Cuellar, minister of peasant and agricultural affairs, is an agricultural business manager from Santa Cruz.

New Minister of Indigenous Affairs Pedro Ticona Ruiz is an Aymara indigenous highlander.

Mario Avelino Moreno Viruez, new minister of public works, is a businessman from Santa Cruz.

Education Minister Maria Cristina Mejia Barragan is a high school teacher who has worked extensively with international organizations in the field of education.

New Health Minister Alvaro Rafael Munoz-Reyes Navarro is from Tarija. He is a pediatrician and surgeon.

Labor Minister Carlos Antonio Laguna Navarro is a lawyer from the highland department of Chuquisaca

Jaime Eduardo Dunn Castellanos is the new minister of hydrocarbons. He is a petroleum engineer from Tarija, where most of Bolivia’s natural gas reserves are located. He worked 34 years with national oil company Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Boliviano. In 1983 he was vice president of Bolivia for a year.

Minister of Mining and Metallurgy Dionisio Jorge Garzon Martinez is a geologist, consultant and former president of the College of Bolivian Geologists. He is an experienced promoter of mining ventures who has worked in Bolivia with many of the world’s largest mining companies.

Naya Ponce Fortun is the new minister of popular participation. She was born in Mexico to Bolivian parents. She is an electronic engineer who has worked extensively with international organizations such as the United Nations.

Jorge Lazarte Rojas, new presidential delegate for political affairs, has a doctorate in political science from the Sorbonne. He also is a university professor and in the 1980s was an adviser to the Bolivian Workers Central, one of the groups that protested to force the resignation on June 6 of President Carlos Mesa.


J U L Y 2 0 0 5

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