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Identities, Interests, and ImportsAuthor(s): David M. RankinSource: Political Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 351-376Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558372

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PoliticalBehavior, Vol. 23, No. 4, December2001 (? 2002)

IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTSDavid M. Rankin

There is increasing attention to the mass public in the politics of trade debate, yet westill know little about how Americans formulate opinion on trade. Scholars are puzzledby the ineffectiveness of traditional dispositional beliefs to account for trade policyjudgment, while an emerging economic self-interest perspective contends that opinionon trade is based on material concerns. This article demonstrates how symbolic predis-positions provide critical information shortcuts for Americans on trade in which therelationship between trade policy and economic self-interest may be unclear. Symbolicpolitics theory explains how citizens can rely on accessible symbolic predispositions,including conceptions of national identity, in an unfamiliar and evolving trade policyenvironment often subject to multiple and conflicting cues, limited political informa-tion, and changing economic circumstances.Key words: symbolic processing; national identity; opinion on trade.

INTRODUCTIONThe contentious political debate over the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA), grassrootsmobilization and protest around the WorldTrade Organization(WTO), and widely reported conflict at major meetingson the topic of trade liberalizationraise a litanyof questions about the role ofthe mass public in trade politics. An increasing number of scholars contendthat the politicalenvironmentof trade debate is more open and salient to thebroader U.S. society (Cohen, 2001; Destler and Balint, 1999; Mayer, 1998;Verdier, 1994; Yankelovich and Immewahr, 1994). However, we still knowlittle about how Americans formulateopinion on even the most general tradepolicies.Bauer, Pool, and Dexter's (1963) classic study of Americanpublic opinionon trade described Americans as largely protectionist,uninformed,and unin-

volved on the subject of trade policy. The quadrennial Chicago Council onDavid M. Rankin,AssistantProfessor,Departmentof PoliticalScience, State Universityof NewYork,Fredonia, Fredonia, NY 14063 ([email protected]).

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Foreign Relations elite-mass surveyson U.S. foreign policy opinion providedfurther evidence that the mass public continued to be much more protection-ist than free tradingAmericanelites and leaders throughoutthe next severaldecades (Reilly, 1991, 1995). Because the public was viewed as largely de-tached from trade politics, inquiry focused on what determines elite tradeinterests, elite commitment to free trade ideology, and elite decision making(Cohen, Paul,and Blecker, 1996; Goldstein, 1993). However, there have beenrecent indications that Americansprovide reasonable responses to the tradepolicy environment,are relatively supportiveof free tradeprinciples,and can-not be cast as inherentlyprotectionist(Shapiroand Page 1994; Uslaner, 1998).The Programon InternationalPolicy Attitudes (PIPA) reports in Americanson Globalization(2000) that a majorityof Americansconsistentlysupportthegrowthof internationaltrade and liberalizationwhile recognizing positive andnegative elements of trade.Still, scholarsremainpuzzled by how Americansconsider the circumstancesarisingfrom the tradepolicy environmentand are able to effectively formulateopinion on trade. In particular,an attemptto consider trade within the foreignpolicy belief system has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of such models toaccount for trade opinion (Eichenberg, 1998;Powlickand Katz, 1998). Studiesfind that trade opinion does not associate stronglywith fundamentalforeignpolicy attitudinal dimensions like militant and cooperative internationalism(Holsti, 1996; Wittkopf, 1990), or postures such as isolationism(Hurwitz andPeffley, 1987). Hermann,Tetlock, and Diascro, (2001) confirms the relativelyweak influences of traditionaldispositionalbeliefs like internationalism andisolationismas well as limited liberal and conservativeideological guidance inhow Americans think about trade.The formationof tradeopinion is understandablypuzzlingwhen consideredas a strictly foreignpolicy issue or in traditionalideologicalterms. Tradepolicyintersects foreign and domestic considerations,and trade debate crosses tradi-tional political divisions. Foreign policy dispositionalbeliefs of international-ism and isolationismconceptualize the value of external ties and involvementabroad,whereas the contemporary rade debate emphasizeshow to restrictorliberalize nationalboundariesto emerging transnational orces. The tradepol-icy environment is less likelyto evoke values associated with U.S. involvementabroad and instead stimulates more accessible and affective response to thesymbolicboundariesand concerns of the nationcommunity.The more imme-diate domestic economic linkage to trade policy also makes the materialcon-cern of self-interest, a relativelyinsignificantpredictor of opinion on foreignpolicy (Holsti, 1996), a more importantconsideration in how Americans for-mulate opinion on trade (Scheve and Slaughter,2001).The economic self-interest approach reflects similar studies of Europeanpublics and trade liberalization(Gabel, 1998), but has been increasinglychal-

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,ND IMPORTSlenged by a culturalperspective in studies of Canadianand Europeanopinionon trade (De Master and Le Roy, 2000; Mendelsohn and Wolfe, 2000). Theconsideration of cultural values and identities on U.S. opinion in the tradepolicy domain has also been gainingmore attention.Citrin,Haas, Muste, andReingold (1994, p. 23) argue that "the foreign policy agenda is increasinglycrowded by issues such as immigrationor foreign trade and investment thatseem likely to engage firmlyheld mass conceptions of national or groupiden-tity" (p. 23). Inglehart,Nevitte, and Basanez (1996) point out "freetradedoesnot attractwidespread public interest because the general public has suddenlydeveloped a new appreciationfor the intricaciesof comparativeeconomic ad-vantage.... Free trade galvanizespublic concern for a much wider set of is-sues, such as culturalintegrityand nationalidentity" (p. 166).There has been increasingreference to the symbolicnature of tradepolitics(Cohen, 2001; Destler and Balint, 1999; Mayer, 1998), but we know little ofhow symbolic politics construct American opinion toward trade policy. Thisarticle explores symbolic politics theory as especially relevant to opinion ontrade, a policy environment with limited public informationyet accessible af-fective symbols. While a self-interest perspective assumes that opinion isbased on material concerns, symbolic politics theory stresses the importanceof culturalattitudesand symbolicpredispositions(Sears, 2001). Symbolicpoli-tics theory presumes that symbolic predispositionsare more stable and pro-vide greater explanatorypower than self-interest on public opinion across arangeof issues (Citrinand Green, 1990; Sears and Funk, 1991). The economicself-interestperspective assumes that citizens understandthe costs and bene-fits of policy to their materialself-interest, but one of the major questions intradepolitics is how Americanswith limited attention andpoliticalinformationcan consistently formulate opinion on related policy. Symbolic processingallows citizens to rely on more accessible attitudessymbolicallyevoked in thepolicy environment.Symbolicpredispositionsutilized in symbolicprocessingacrosspolicy issuesinclude partisan and ideological identification, as well as ethnic, racial, andnationalidentity (Citrin,Reingold,and Green, 1990; Sears, 2001). In this arti-cle, the influence of partisanand ideological identification on trade opinionwith a specific focus on the effects of particularconceptions of nationaliden-tity is examined. The political environment on trade, consisting of atypicalcrossover in ideological and partisan leadership, makes political predisposi-tions such as partisanand ideological identificationpotentiallyless stable andaccessible for citizens formulatingtrade policy judgment. Symbolic concep-tions of national identity, however, may be evoked and even reinforced bypolitical debate concerning the relationshipbetween trade liberalization,na-tional sovereignty, and cultural integrity. This article explores the symboliceffects of partisanship, deology, and nationalidentityon Americanopinion on

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trade, while also examiningthe influence of supranationalattitudes, age, andvariablesof economic self-interest.BEYONDSELF-INTERESTN TRADE

An economic self-interest perspective asserts that Americans formulatetrade opinion based on the materialimpact of trade policy on oneself or one'sgroup (Scheve and Slaughter,2001). While there is intense debate over theactual economic impactof trade on Americans(see, Cohen, 2001; Cohen et al.,1996, for a full descriptionof perspectives),a greatdeal of scholarship ontendsthat there are socioeconomic groups positioned to gain and lose from tradeliberalization.This perspectiveis largelybased on the classic Heckscher-Ohlinmodel in which the relativeabundanceof skilledAmericanworkerswouldbene-fit from trade liberalization,whereas lower skilledAmericanworkerswould beharmed by the relative abundance of unskilled labor across more liberalizednationalboundaries(Kapstein,1999; Rodrick, 1997).1The threat of low-wage economic competition or job loss from freer tradeis considered to mostly impact the low-skill, low-wage occupations, includingthe importcompetingindustriesemployingthe semi-skilled,traditionalassem-bly line or American blue-collarworker (Lawrence, 1996). The labor move-ment has consistentlyarguedthat free trade threatens U.S. industryandtrans-fers U.S. jobs outside of the country (Hughes, 1978), and labor has shiftedconsistently against freer trade and free trade agreements and disseminatedthis informationto its members. Armedwith the belief that a bargainingposi-tion with management is substantiallyweakened as the economy is increas-ingly liberalized, unionized labor has shown tremendous solidarity n opposi-tion to trade liberalization in recent decades (Conybeareand Zinkula, 1996;Shoch, 2000). Viewing trade liberalization as a threat to their self-interest,union members should be expected to be resistant to the perceived negativeconsequences of trade liberalization(Rogowski,1989).Union membershiphas, in fact, decreased as the traditionalmanufacturingsector has been rapidlysubsumed into a more amorphousinformation econ-omy. With the "newgeography"of the U.S. economy, historicalregionalbul-warkslike the industrial Mideast are less likely to maintain cohesive regionalprotectionist interests. Large sections of these traditionally manufacturing-based regions have moved toward high-tech revitalizationand growth whileothers have lagged behind. Situationalfactors,includingthe rapidly changinggeographic diversificationof the new economy, and mobility of the highlyskilled workforce make regionaleffects less consistent and predictable(Holsti,1996).Thus, we would expect geographic location to be less significantthan themore portablepackageof higher education and skills when it comes to views

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,ND IMPORTSon trade. Rodrick(1997), for example,arguesthat globalization avorsinterna-tionallymobile factorsin production,includinghuman capital,over immobilefactors like unskilled labor. Highly skilled individualsmay be less bound toterritorialspaces within and across national boundaries and more willing torelocate for furtheropportunities.The term symbolic analyst, coined by for-mer Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (1991), defines individualswith thetransnationalmobilityof educational credentials and skills associated with pro-fessionals such as bankers, lawyers, management consultants, software engi-neers, and executives. These "knowledgeworkers"are presumablymore opento fluid economic borders and the opportunityto benefit from a less restrictedmarketplacethan are lower skilledworkersdependent on an establishedman-ufacturing plant in a particularregion and more likely to face more extensivecompetition for lower paying jobs in a more open labor market (Drucker,1989).The most competitive and skilledjobs require the highest levels of special-ized education creating professionals prepared to utilize their talents in di-verse internationalsettingsandto adaptto globaleconomic changes (Marshall,1994). These are professionals high in human capitalwho are better preparedto apply their skills with fewer geographicalboundaries.Thus, from an eco-nomic self-interest perspective, the most skilled and educated Americanspoised to benefit from trade liberalizationshould then favor freer trade,whilethe less skilled and less educated Americansthreatenedby freer trade shouldsupport greater trade restrictions and protection (Midford, 1993; Rogowski,1989). Scheve and Slaughter's(2001) applicationof the economic self-interestmodel to a study of American views on trade concludes that education andskill levels largely determine trade policy preferences. Importantly,Scheveand Slaughterfind that economic self-interest is a more potent and consistentpredictor of trade opinion for lower skilled workers than for higher skilledworkers,and I conduct my analysiswith a similarassumption.In general, Scheve and Slaughter'sfindings support Gabel's (1998) utilitar-ian account of European mass publics in which higher educated and moreskilled Europeans are more likely to supportregionaltrade liberalizationandeconomic integration.Gabel contends that economic self-interest has been astronger influence on trade opinion than has supranationalaffective attach-ment since subjective connections to the European Union are relativelylow.The economic self-interest perspective with a focus on material concern hasbeen a challenge to culturalapproaches,including Inglehart'stheory of post-materialism.Inglehart (1997) has argued that in postindustrialsocieties, suchas European countries and the United States, perceptions have transformedfrom an emphasis on material economic gains to postmaterialareas of auton-omy and cultural independence. Inglehart et al. (1996) apply this reasoningto the North American continentby contendingthatincreasinglycosmopolitan

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views, particularlyamong younger cohorts,are developing supranationalaffec-tive ties to the broader continent. According to this perspective, we wouldexpect these more cosmopolitan, younger Americans to more willingly em-brace more liberalizedtrade flows across national boundaries.There has been little consideration of the impact of American cultural atti-tudes and values on trade opinion even as the primary explanatorypower ofthe economic self-interest model has been challenged in comparativestudies(Cichowski, 2000; Mendelsohn and Wolfe, 2000). De Master and Le Roy(2000) point out how on a relativelycomplextopic like tradepolicy, "aculturalframeworkof values and beliefs simplifies the process of decision-making byproviding points of reference from which to comprehend, evaluate,and reactto one's environment"(p. 422). Economic self-interest, on the other hand,involves a deliberate calculation of the personal costs and benefits of tradeand requires a degree of interest, awareness,and knowledge of the politicalissue counter to the widely held findings of a less informed public. The pres-ent study examines to what extent economic self-interest falls short in theexplanationof tradeopinion, an opinion environment often subjectto multipleand conflicting cues, limited information, and changing economic circum-stances.THESYMBOLICPROCESSINGOF TRADE

A critical weakness of the self-interestperspective in opinion on trade andother complex policies is that personal material impact, costs, and benefits,need to be clear and understoodby the individual for self-interest to functionas an importantdeterminant of mass opinion (Citrinand Green, 1990; Citrinet al., 1990; Sears and Funk, 1991). Numerous studies show that citizens donot pay much attention to policy issues, and most Americans continue to havea limited and inconsistentgraspof most public policy details (Converse, 1964;Zallerand Feldman, 1992). Thus, citizens often rely on informationshortcuts,many affective in nature, in order to formulatepolicy judgments (Delli Car-pini, Huddy, and Shapiro,1994;Kuklinski,2001; Lupiaand McCubbins, 1998;Marcus,Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000).Citizens do demonstratestrongand stable attitudestowardpoliticalsymbolsin the information environment and are able to more readily access relatedcultural attitudes (Sears, 1993). Symbolicpolitics theoryfocuses on the utiliza-tion of cultural attitudes and, more specifically, the influence of persistentsymbolicpredispositionson policy judgment (Citrinet al., 1990). Sears (2001)explainsthat symbolic processing consists of "reflexive,affective responses toremote attitude objects, rather than calculations of probable costs and ben-efits... The symbolic meaning of an attitude object automaticallyevokesparticular symbolic predispositions and thereby influences evaluations of it"(p. 17).

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,ND IMPORTSRecent literature on trade politics describes an environment of the typeconducive to symbolicprocessing. Cohen (2001) states "globalizationnevita-bly challenges some of the fundamentalvalues, narratives,and symbols that

have held communities together"(p. 160). One does not need detailed under-standing of trade policy to respond emotionally to the symbolic politics ofthe trade policy environment. I argue that several symbolic predispositions,includingpartisanand ideological identification,are relevantto the trade pol-icy environment,but I expect conceptions of national identification to be themost accessible in the symbolic processing of trade. The debate over tradeliberalization nvolves affective national symbols that I contend evoke relatedsymbolicpredispositionsof national identification.Emotionalattachmentsto symbolsare central to the "imaginedcommunity"of the nation (Anderson, 1991), yet global economic and culturalchanges re-shaping U.S. society raise questions about the symbolic cohesiveness of thenation (Huntington, 1997). Cohen (2001) arguesglobalization pens up the boundaries etween states and weakens he sense ofshared nterestsandobligationswithin he national ommunitywhichworks o un-derminelong-established olitical dentities.In response,globalizationeems togeneratea backlash,nwhichcitizensattempto reasserthe cohesionandvalueofthe nationaldentityand cultureagainsthesepressures. p. 145)The psychological construct of American national identity amidst the di-verse challenges of a rapidlychangingworld has been a subject of increasingresearch (Citrinet al., 1994; de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia, 1996; Sidanius,Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto,1997). Within a largerconstructof national den-tity there are subdimensionson which individualspossess a weakeror strongerorientationto relevant nationalsymbols.Individualsvaryin the affectivevalueattached to national symbols activated in each dimension and demonstratewhat I describe as less or more restrictive conceptions of national identity.For example, a commonly identified dimension of nationalidentity has beenpatriotism,consisting of emotional attachment and devotion to one's countryand its symbols (Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992; Sidanius et al., 1997). I describea more restrictiveconception of patriotismas the highervalue attached to thelove and devotion to one's country,whereas I describe a less restrictive con-ception of patriotism to attach less value to the strict emotional bonds tocountryin the construct of nationalidentity.There are multiple conceptions of nationalidentity, and different issue ar-eas are bound to evoke certain dimensions of nationalidentity. Symbolicpoli-tics theory presumes that citizens will rely on the most accessible predisposi-tions automaticallyactivatedby the issue environment,and there maybe morerelevant dimensions of national identity than patriotismin the symbolicpro-cessing of trade. Patriotism has been associated with the shape of foreign

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policy opinion in largely securitymattersthreateningnationalsurvival(Peffleyand Hurwitz, 1992), but patriotism may be less relevant in how Americansformulate opinion toward transnationaleconomic forces. In particular,theopening of U.S. society to globaltrade exposes the nation's distinctiveculturalattributes and cultural integrity to diverse linguistic, ethnic, and immigrantinfluences (Cohen, 2001; Goff, 2000; Inglehartet al., 1996; Shulman,2000),and I expect citizens to thus activatea cultural dimension of nationalidentityin the symbolic processing of trade policy. Like all dimensions of nationalidentity,there are divergent conceptions of the culturalidentityof the nationalcommunity. Some segments of the populationwill hold a less restrictivecon-ception of the cultural identity of the nation as more diverse and inclusive,while other segments more restrictivelyconceive culturalhomogeneity to bea vital component of nationalidentity. Similardistinctionshave described na-tivists and cosmopolitanliberals to be at opposing ends of American culturalidentity (Citrinet al., 1990; de la Garza et al., 1996).The relaxationof national economic boundaries may not only trigger cul-turalconceptions of the nation but also provokesymbolicpredispositionscon-cerningnationalexposureto externalinfluence or conceptions of national sov-ereignty.Trade liberalizationraisesquestions about a nation'ssovereigntyandits ability to determine its own course (Haus, 1995; Sassen, 1996), to assert,promote, and protect its unique identity and purposes (Goff, 2000; Shulman,2000). Conceptions of sovereigntycan also stretch beyond material concernsto encompass the cultural, social, and economic forces that draw attention tothe sovereign abilityof the nation to control activities and outcomes within itsborders (Sassen, 1996). Cohen (2001, p. 104) contends that without visibleand tangibleeconomic consequences clearlylinked to relativelycomplextradepolicies, free trade opponents most effectively frame trade liberalizationas athreat to Americansovereignty.

Despite all of the discussion of how sovereignty s threatenedby tradeliber-alization,nationalsovereigntyhas not been considered as a criticaldimensionof nationalidentity. With related symbols evoked in the trade environment,Ipropose that conceptions of national sovereigntyprovide accessible attitudesin the symbolic processing of trade. Like patrioticand culturalconceptions ofnationalidentity, I expect citizens to attachhigher or lower affective value tosymbolsof nationalsovereignty.Conceptions of national identity provide consistent symbolic guidance in atrade environment characterizedby conflicting partisan and ideological sig-nals. Partisanidentification, for example, would be expected to activate Re-publican dispositionstoward freer enterpriseand marketsin a more favorableevaluation of freer trade, whereas Democratic partisanswould likely be lessfavorable toward free trade because of a disposition toward protecting vul-nerable economic groups through governmentalinterventionin the economy

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTS(Jacoby, 1997). Such partisan symbols are presumablyevoked in a trade envi-ronment in which Republican Partyleaders were perceived to be more sup-portive than Democrats of free trade (Destler, 1995; Hughes, 1978). In thepost-Cold War era, however, the sharp partisancleavages on other issues offoreign policy contrast with much stronger points of convergence across elitepartylines on trade (Holsti, 1996; Holsti and Rosenau, 1994).For example, the "New Democrat"policy direction embodied by the Clin-ton administrationsupport of less restricted markets and trade liberalizationdemonstrated less symbolicadherence to traditionalcore Democratic constit-uencies, such as organizedlabor, alienatingsubstantialsegments of the party.The centrist New Democrat direction leans more toward free trade and pro-market than the liberal Democratic base, and as partymembers cross over insupportof free trade, so will certainpartyconstituents(Midford, 1993). Thereis also substantialconvergence acrosspartylines by trade opponentswho feelabandonedon the left from labor and environmental movements and on theright from conservative nationalistswho had been more likely to align them-selves in recent decades with the Republican party(Shoch, 2000). Diverse andshifting political coalitions contribute to inconsistent partisanand ideologicalguidancefor citizens in the trade environment,and recent studies find limitedeffects of ideological and partisanidentification on trade opinion (Herrmannet al., 2001; Rahn, 2000).

Symbolsof nationalidentity may transcendpartisanand ideological predis-positions in an environmentin which elite leaders like Ralph Nader from theleft, Pat Buchananon the right,and Ross Perot from the Independent centerevoke affective imagery concerningthe perceived impact that trade liberaliza-tion has not only on Americanjobs but on the symbolic integrity of the na-tional community.In a multivariateanalysis,I examine how tradepolicyjudg-ment is formulated by political predispositionsand symbolic conceptions ofnational identity while considering the relative impact of supranationalatti-tudes, demographicdifferences, and economic self-interest.DATAAND METHODS

Data for my analysiscame from the Aspects of National Identitymodule ofthe InternationalSocial Survey Program(ISSP) fielded in 1995-1996 in 23countries, includingthe United States. The data were made availablethroughthe Inter-UniversityConsortium for Political and Social Research. The U.S.data consists of 1,367 respondentsand were collected by the NationalOpinionResearch Center from Februaryto May 1996. The data were drawn from afull probability sample of the U.S. population, and fieldwork methods con-sisted of a self-administeredsupplement completed after the main GeneralSocial Survey questionnaire.The data set provides valuable measures of na-

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tional identity, affective attachments,economic self-interest, and opinion ontrade. The dependent variablesmeasured Americanopinion toward the morespecific trade arrangement,NAFTA, and general trade policy concerning for-eign imports.Economic self-interest is operationalizedin this study with socioeconomicvariablesdescribedhere and in the appendix.Education, income, and occupa-tional skills have been used as proxies for personal gains and losses due totrade liberalization(Gabel, 1998), while union membershipand regionalloca-tion are important control variables in the economic self-interest model(Scheve and Slaughter,2001). Occupationalgroupswere constructedfrom theISSP InternationalLaborOrganization ILO) descriptions,which providedforoccupational skill but not sectoral distinction.2A professional distinction, orwhite-collarworkers, ncludes positionssuch as scientists,engineers, surgeons,economists, lawyers, journalists,managers,and academics. A service distinc-tion, sometimes referred to as pink-collarworkers, includes positions suchas hospitality employees, sales and clerical workers,and clerks. A blue-collardistinction includes positions such as manual and assembly line laborers andheavy equipment operators.Dummy variableswere constructed for the socio-economic and demographicvariableswith the exception of education,income,and transnationalmobility. The question wording and coding for all of thevariablesis shown in the appendix.An ordinal level variable measuring affective attachment to the NorthAmerican continent was included to test if supranational ies affect tradeopin-ion, while a measure of age was included to examine if younger Americansare more predisposedtoward freer trade. Symbolicpredispositionsof partisanand ideological identification were measured by standard(left-right) 7-pointvariables.In order to construct dimensions of nationalidentitya factoranalysisincluded measures of previously identified items central to conceptions ofnational identity.3The items are similar to previous measures of patriotismand nationalism(Peffley and Hurwitz, 1992; Sidanius et al., 1997), as well asculturalconceptions of the American nationalcommunity (Citrinet al., 1994;de la Garza et al., 1996). The factor analysis also included items that havebeen regularlyidentified with the globalizationdebate over national sover-eignty (Cohen, 2001; Goff, 2000; Shulman, 2000), yet never operationalizedas psychological conceptions of nationalidentity.

RESULTSConceptions of National IdentityThe factor analysisidentified three significantdimensions of Americanna-tional identity that accounted for 56% of the variance(see Table 1). I definethe first factor as a patriotic dimension of national identity, which measures

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTSTABLE 1. Factor Analysis of American National IdentityItem Patriotic Sovereign CulturalAmericaa better countrythan others .831Rather be citizen of America than any country .696World better place if other countries like US .676Foreigners not be allowed to buy US land .758TV prefer US films/programsover others .757America follow interests even if causes conflict .563Help ethnic minoritiespreserve traditions .692Increase number of immigrantsto America .655Schools teach more foreign languages .595

Eigenvalue 2.58 1.27 1.19VarianceExplained= 56% 29% 14% 13%Note:N = 1367.Principal omponent nalysiswith varimax otationn whichfactor oadingsless than .40 are not shown. The replacement of the missing values with the variable mean mayunderstate the item coefficients and varianceexplained.

the value of devotion and loyalty to the nation, the nation's relative impor-tance, uniqueness, and even superiority.Patriotism is commonly defined as acentral component of nationalidentity involvingone's love of countryand itsmajor symbols (Dowley and Silver, 2000; Sidanius et al., 1997). Americansattach lower or higher affective value to the nation's importance and to thelove of the United States above other countries.The second factor,what I call the sovereign dimension, measures the valueattached to the nation's autonomyas well as the protection of territorialandculturalsymbols from externalcontrol and influence. The nation'spossessionand control over the geographic, cultural,and political space within nationalboundaries have largelydefined the importanceof sovereigntyin the modernation-state(Krasner,2001). Sovereignty s also defined as the nation'sabilityto determine its own course without outside interference (Haus, 1995) andthe nation's ability to assert its identity and purpose (Cohen, 2001). In themoder global media age, the control over cultural expression is a criticalsymbolof sovereignty n which domestic films andprogramsreinforceconcep-tual borders held in place by cultural particularity(Goff, 2000; Shulman,2000). For example, the controversialJapanese purchases of American realestate and media icons in the 1980s were largely debated in terms of thenation's sovereignty (Reinsch, 1994). More restrictive sovereign conceptionsof national identity differ from traditional measures of isolationism,in whichisolationism indicates a desire for the country to stay home and not concernor involve itself with other parts of the world. Sovereignconceptions indicatehow much value citizens attach to restrictingexternal influence on domesticautonomy, includingterritorialspace, culturalexpression,economic and politi-cal control.

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A third factor, described as a cultural dimension of national identity, con-sists of attitudes concerning the linguistic, ethnic minority, and immigrantcomposition of the nationalcommunity. How citizens view language use, thepromotion of minoritycultures, and immigrationare considered critical ele-ments of the nation's cultural identity (Anderson, 1991; Citrin et al., 1994),and Americansdiffer in the value attached to culturalhomogeneity and diver-sity.4The three factorswere used to construct cumulative scales scored 1 to15, in which higher values indicate a less restrictive affective orientation onthe patriotic, cultural,and sovereign dimensions of national identity (see ap-pendix for question wording and alpha reliability).Researchershave argued that beyond self-interest,higher educated, higherincome, and younger citizens are likely to possess a more cosmopolitanvalueorientation that stretches beyond a restrictedconception of national member-ship (Inglehartet al., 1996; Norris, 2000). Cosmopolitanswould presumablyembrace a less restrictiveconception of citizenship, open national economicborders,and transnationalinterchange throughregionaland globaltrade liber-alization.In particular,Citrin et al. (1994) found that higher educated, higherincome, younger individuals were less likely to possess ethnocultural and ex-clusionary conceptions of American identity. Table 2 demonstrates that thehigher educated are significantlymore likely to hold less restrictivepatrioticand sovereign conceptions of national identity, but education is not signifi-cantly related here to cultural conceptions, and income is actuallypositivelyrelated to more restrictive cultural conceptions. The OLS results also showTABLE2. OLSAnalysisof NationalIdentityVariable Patriotic Sovereign CulturalConstant 6.94*** (.384) 6.61*** (.429) 7.77*** (.369)Education .358*** (.072) .727*** (.271) .053 (.069)Income -.015 (.027) .076** (.030) -.091*** (.026)Professional .161 (.141) .125 (.157) -.006 (.135)Blue Collar -.175 (.138) -.344* (.154) .045 (.133)Age -.024*** (.003) -.001 (.004) .011*** (.003)Partisan -.001 (.030) -.019 (.034) .152*** (.029)IdentificationIdeological -.273*** (.045) -.255*** (.050) -.140*** (.043)IdentificationAdjusted .111 .130 .062R-Square

Note: N = 1357.Table entries are ordinaryeast squares OLS)regression oefficientswithstandardrrorsnparentheses.Highervalueson the dependent ariablesndicateessrestrictiveconceptions f nationaldentity.***p< .001,**p< .01,*p< .05.

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,ND IMPORTSthat younger citizens are somewhat more likely to demonstrate more restric-tive cultural conceptions, while slightly more likely to have less restrictivepatrioticconceptions.These inconsistent resultsmayindicateweakerconceptsof identity overall (Rahn, 1998), rather than a cosmopolitan generation eagerto embrace more open borders.The argumentthat higher skilled professionals place less affective value inthe nationalcommunityin their embrace of the global economy (Lind, 1995;Reich, 1991), fracturing he nationalidentity along occupational ines, receiveslittle supportfrom the multivariateregression.Blue-collar workers are slightlymore likely to embrace a more restrictive conception of sovereign identity,but there is no significant mpactof the professionaldistinction on conceptionsof nationalidentity.A more consistent determinantof nationalidentityis ideo-logical identification. Citrinet al. (1990) found that conservativesand Republi-cans were more likely than liberals and Democrats to have more patrioticconceptions of Americanism.The regressionmodel shows that while Republi-can partisan dentifiersdo have more restrictive culturalconceptions, ideologi-cal conservatism s significantlyrelated to more restrictivepatriotic,sovereignand cultural conceptions of national identity. These three dimensions of na-tional identitygenerallytranscendoccupationaland age differenceswith morepronounced educational and ideological cleavages in the affective valueattachedto symbolsof nationhood.

Determining Opinion on Imports and NAFTAIn order to examinethe influence of symbolicpredispositionsof ideological,partisan,and national dentificationas well as socioeconomic and demographicvariableson trade opinion, I analyzed opinion toward the general area of im-port policy and on the specific trade agreement, NAFTA. The explanatory

variables are introduced sequentiallyin successive models in order to initiallyestimate a model with variables of economic self-interest and supranationalattitudes and then to account for the added explanatoryvalue of politicalpre-dispositionsand conceptions of national identity. In Table 3, import opinionwas measured with a 5-point Likert question, "How much do you agree ordisagree that the United States should limit the import of foreign products inorder to protect its national economy?" Sixty-four percent of respondentsagreed strongly (21%) or agreed (43%), 22% neither agreed nor disagreed,and 13%disagreed (10%) or disagreed strongly(3%)when asked if Americashould limit the import of foreign products to protect its national economy.The ordinal level dependent variablewas coded (1 = stronglyagree on limitingimports,5 = stronglydisagreeon limiting imports) in which higher value indi-cates less restrictiveopinion.Orderedprobit regressionresults show that there are statisticallysignificant

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TABLE 3. Ordered Probit Analysis of Opinion on Import PolicyVariable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3DemographicandEconomicVariablesProfessionalBlue CollarUnion MemberNortheast RegionMidwest RegionSouthwest RegionPacific RegionEducationIncomePersonal EconomicEvaluationAgeSupranationalAttitudesTransnationalMobilityNorth AmericanClosenessPolitical PredispositionsPartyIdentificationIdeologicalIdentificationConceptionsofNational IdentityPatrioticSovereignCulturalCut 1Cut 2Cut 3Cut 4-2 log likelihoodPseudo R-Square

.132 (.075) .138 (.075) .102 (.076)-.214** (.076) -.213** (.076) -.191** (.077)-.386*** (.100) -.360*** (.101) -.261** (.102).261** (.087) .234** (.088) .123 (.089).274*** (.084) .266** (.084) .256** (.085).117 (.094) .106 (.094) .047 (.096).267** (.098) .247** (.098) .128 (.100).213*** (.040) .212*** (.040) .080* (.041)

.025 (.015) .030 (.015) .012 (.015)

.041 (.039) .035 (.039) .035 (.039)-.002 (.002) -.002 (.002) -.001 (.002)

.089*** (.024) .084*** (.024) .021 (.025)

.006 (.023) .008 (.023) -.066 (.024).049** (.016) .065*** (.017)

-.108*** (.024) -.058* (.025)

.065*** (.017).188*** (.015).031* (.016)-.1111.1321.9222.764

3588.07.117

.247 -.343.248 .912.250 1.709.258 2.5613529.83.133

.261 1.221 .319.262 2.597 .324.264 3.475 .327.271 4.437 .3363291.40.283

Note: N= 1,361. Table entries are ordered probit coefficients with standard errors in paren-theses.***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

occupational effects on import opinion, but the occupational relationship isprimarilynegative rather than positive in the Americanworker'sview of trade.Blue-collarworkers are significantlymore likelyto supporta restrictiveimportpolicy,while there is no significanteffect forprofessionals.Scheve and Slaugh-ter (2001) found that economic self-interest plays a largerrole on trade opin-

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTSion for threatened groups, such as lower skilled, blue-collarworkers,than forgroups likely to benefit from trade liberalization; he results are similar here.Union leadership has been a vocal opponent of freer trade because of theperceived detrimental effect on union wages and jobs, and union membersalso exhibit significantlynegative opinion towardgreater imports.Other mea-suresof economic self-interestprovidelittle substantiveimpactwith no signifi-cant influences from income and subjective personal economic evaluation.The regionalvariables ncluded exhibitsignificantpositive effects relativetothe southernregion of the United States,but there is no discernible differencebetween the traditionallymore industrial and manufacturing ntensive "RustBelt"regions of the Northeast and Midwest and the quickly developing high-tech "Sun Belt" regions of the Southwest and Pacific coastal states. Despitegreater job losses and foreign import competition in particulargeographicregions, high-tech revitalizationthroughout the country and the mobility ofthe skilled workforcewithin an increasinglyinformation-basedeconomy maydiminish regional differences in how citizens view trade policy. Americanworkerswilling to cross national borders for job opportunities may be morelikely to supportfreer trade regardlessof geographic region, demonstratedbythe significant positive effect of transnationalmobility on less restrictiveim-port opinion.The significanceof transnationalmobility does not necessarilyillustrate anincreasinglycontinental, transnational,or cosmopolitan American. Both ageand supranational eelings of closeness to the North American continent haveno significanteffect on import opinion. Moreover, the inclusion of variablesof symbolicpredispositiondemonstratesa lack of robustness for transnationalmobility,region, and education variables.Educationis positivelyrelated to lessrestrictiveimport opinion, but is less significantwhen conceptions of nationalidentity are considered. Beyond self-interest, more educated Americans havebeen found to demonstrategreater openness to foreign peoples and cultures,which could make the transnationalinterchangeand diversityassociated withless restrictiveconceptions of nationalidentity more desirable for these indi-viduals.The conflictingeffects of partisanandideologicalidentification demonstratethe complex cueing environment for Americanson trade policy. Republicanpartisan dentifiersare more likely to favorless restrictiveimport policy whileideological conservatives are less likely. Ideology is also less significantwhenconceptions of national identity are considered, which suggests trade policymay speak to an ideological conservatismconcerned with cultural integrity,nationalloyalty,and sovereignty.Less restrictivepatriotic,sovereign, and cul-turalconceptions of nationalidentityare all significantlyrelated to less restric-tive import opinion, with culturalconceptions providingthe least significanteffect. While there is no adjusted R-squaredvalue to providea more accurate

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explanationof variance, the pseudo R-squaredvalue suggests a substantiveincrease in explanatorystrengthwhen conceptions of nationalidentity are in-cluded.In Table 4, opinion on the more specific trade agreement, NAFTA, wasmeasured with the question, "Generallyspeaking, would you say that the

TABLE 4. Logistic Regression of Opinion on NAFTAVariable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

ConstantDemographicandEconomic VariablesProfessionalBlue CollarUnion MemberNortheast RegionMidwest RegionSouthwest RegionPacific RegionEducationIncomePersonal EconomicEvaluationAgeSupranationalAttitudesTransnationalMobilityNorth AmericanClosenessPolitical PredispositionsPartyIdentificationIdeologicalIdentificationConceptionsofNational IdentityPatrioticSovereignCultural-2 log likelihoodPercent correctlypredictedPseudo R-Square

.865 (.729) 1.88 (.776) 2.78 (.985)

.361 (.216) .369 (.219) .335 (.232)-.649** (.217) -.629** (.220) -.642** (.236)-.631* (.270) -.819** (.281) -.633* (.298).409 (.268) .307 (.273) .210 (.293)-.086 (.240) -.154 (.245) -.233 (.259).036 (.263) -.015 (.268) -.048 (.283).123 (.278) .031 (.284) -.126 (.303).157 (.120) .160 (.122) .029 (.132).025 (.042) .047 (.043) .033 (.046)

.130 (.111) .136 (.113) .153 (.121)-.011 (.006) -.010 (.006) -.011 (.006)

.146* (.067) -.123 (.069) -.042 (.077)

.016 (.067) .006 (.068) -.011 (.074)-.098* (.049) -.074 (.052)-.174** (.069) -.098 (.075)

-.089 (.049).260*** (.044).266*** (.050)821.01

65%.116

800.3666.6%.153

724.8470.9%.284

Note: N = 647. Table entries are logistic regressioncoefficients with standard errors in paren-theses.***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTSUnited States benefits or does not benefit from the NAFTA?"There was amuch higher level of uncertaintyabout the NAFTA and its benefits than formore general import policy, which is not uncommon for questions of specifictrade policy (Rahn, 2000; Scheve and Slaughter,2001; Uslaner, 1998). Forty-seven percent of respondentswere uncertain about NAFTA or did not knowwhether the United States would benefit or not from the NAFTA. TheNAFTA representsthe type of issue citizens are not likely to pay a great dealof attention or have detailed views of the policy impact. In the 1996 ISSPsurvey, 43% of the respondents had heard or read quite a bit (30%) or a lot(13%) about the NAFTA, while 57% had not heard or not read much (42%)or nothing at all (15%) about NAFTA. For respondents stating a negative orpositive position on the effects of NAFTA, 58% felt that the United Statesbenefits from the NAFTA. These results resemble the pluralityof supportforNAFTA since the ratificationof the agreement.A 1999 PIPApoll showed that44% of Americansthought that NAFTA had been good and 30% bad for theUnited States.In order to estimate the effects of the explanatoryvariableson favorableorunfavorableopinion toward the NAFTA, a dichotomous dependent variablewas coded where 0 = the opinion that NAFTA does not benefit the UnitedStates, 1 = the opinion that NAFTA benefits the United States. Logistic re-gression results in Table 4 show that the relative impact of conceptions ofnational identity is even more pronounced on opinion toward the NAFTAthan towardgeneral importpolicy. Onlyblue-collar status and union member-ship are statistically significant among demographic and economic variables,and economic self-interest effects are negatively related to opinion onNAFTA. Professionals,possessing the skills to compete in a more extensivemarketplace,should view the benefits of NAFTA in a more favorablelight,but it is the threatened groups that demonstrate the more consistent effecton trade opinion. We might expect the Southwest region to exhibit more sig-nificant effects on NAFTA due to the proximityto the Mexican border andthe potential impact of lower wage Mexican workers, or the Northeast todemonstrate significant regional effects because of regional interests tied toCanada.However, in a new economy characterizedby an increasinglymobileworkforce,the opinion gap on trade cuts more across skill than region.The complicated cueing environment on trade policy is again evident inwhich Democratic partisan dentifiers and ideological liberals are significantlymore favorableto NAFTA. The Democratic Clinton administrationwas a visi-ble proponent of the NAFTA, providing a presidential cue for Democraticpartisanand left-leaning identifiers despite widespread opposition from orga-nized labor. Partisan and ideological identification are not significantwhenconceptions of nationalidentity are considered in which less restrictive sover-eign and cultural conceptions of national identity are positively related to

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NAFTA opinion. These symbolicpredispositionsof nationalidentity may pro-vide more accessible attitudeson a trade issue with high levels of uncertaintyand limited information in which ideological conservatism may be morebroadlyevoked as a restrictiveaffective value attachedto the national commu-nity than as an expressionof free market values.Conceptions of nationalidentity are also triggered by the symbolsdrawn inthe NAFTA debate where the sovereign and cultural impact of the NAFTAon the nationalidentity appearsto be more salient and emotionallyaccessiblethan the symbolicconnection between NAFTA andpatriotism.A majorsourceof opposition to the NAFTA potentially stems from the perceived threat tothe distinctive cultures of participatingnations (Goff, 2000; Inglehart et al.,1996). Although "Buy USA" product campaigns tend to link the reductionof U.S. foreign imports with a symbolic patriotic devotion to U.S. industry(Destler, 1995), NAFTAopponentshave been more prone to frame the agree-ment as a threat to national economic and culturalsovereigntythan as a patri-otic campaign (Mayer, 1998). Thus, patrioticconceptions of nationalidentitymay be more accessible on the import question and cultural conceptions ofnationalidentity more accessible attitudes for NAFTA opinion. On both tradeissues, the inclusion of conceptions of nationalidentity increases the explana-tory power of our model beyond a more limited economic self-interest per-spective. Based on limited and inconsistent effects of economic self-interestrelative to symbolic predispositionsin our models, it appears that economicself-interest falls short as a sole explanationof Americanopinion on trade.DISCUSSION

The economic costs and benefits discussed by political leaders in a morevisible tradepolicy environment makeseconomic self-interest a logicalconsid-eration in how Americans formulate opinion towardtrade policies. However,there is a substantial debate as well concerningthe perceived impact of moreopen economic borders on the symboliccohesion of the nationalcommunity.Comparativestudies suggest that cultural attitudesmay actuallybe more influ-ential than economic self-interest when market liberalizationpolicies evokesymbolic conceptions of identity (Cichowski,2000; De Master and Le Roy,2000). Still, there has been little attention to the role of symbolicattitudesontrade opinion. In this study, variables of economic self-interest and symbolicpredispositionare both found to play a role in Americanopinion on trade.There remains a great deal of debate over what effect policies such asNAFTA actuallyhave on the economic fortunes of Americans,yet leaders andgrassrootsactivistsmayreinforce certaineconomic associationsthroughvisibleaction and arguments.Overall, I found personal economic evaluation had nosignificanteffect on opinion towardmore specific or general trade issues, sug-

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTSgesting that Americansdid not relate personal economic well-being over thepast few years with the effects of NAFTA or import policy, nor were profes-sionalssignificantlymore likely to favorpolicies of greatertrade liberalization.On the other hand, blue-collarworkers and union members were significantlymore likely to favor more restrictivespecific and general trade policy. Highlyskilled workersappear to possess more ambivalentopinion towardtrade pol-icy, whereas lower skilled workers are consistently opposed to greater tradeliberalization as a threatened group. Individuals have been found to weighnegative information more than positive when they form impressionsof situa-tions (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). On trade issues such as NAFTA, impressionsformed on the basis of negative informationtend to be more lastingand resis-tant to change (Cobb and Kuklinski,1997).An importantconsideration in citizens' economic evaluation of trade policymay be how much perceived economic self-interest is drivenby the symbolicpolitics of the trade policy environment. The argumentthat trade liberaliza-tion threatens the wages and jobs of the American union member and lowerskilled Americansin general is the type of symbolismmore prone to affectiveresponses than the less provocativeperspective that free trade benefits higherskilled professionals. Scholars argue that opposition to trade policies likeNAFTA are based less on actual economic impact and more on what theseconcerns symbolize: the decline of the working and middle class in a morefluid economic environmentin which certain skills are more readilyreplace-able (Cohen, 2001; Mayer,1998). Such concerns appearto stretch nationwideacross the traditionally ndustrial Midwest and Northeastern "Rust Belt" tothe developing high-tech regions of the "Sun Belt," with no discernible re-gional pattern to opinion on trade policy. Lower skilled workerspresumablyperceive themselves to be disadvantagedacross regionalboundaries in an in-formation-based,new economy dependent less on geographic location andmore on the globally transferable skills of a mobile workforce (Kapstein,1999). However, there is no evidence that highly skilled, mobile professionalsare simply abandoningmore cohesive symbols of national community in theembrace of transnational economic opportunities. Income and professionalstatus are not significantlyrelated to less restrictive conceptions of nationalidentity or to more positive views of free trade.Despite recent patternsof globalization, here is no indicationthat youngerAmericans are any more likely to currentlyembrace supranationalties andtrade liberalizationthan are their older nationalcohorts. Youth does not en-sure more cosmopolitanviews, particularlyf youngerworkers feel threatenedby uncertain transnationaleconomic forces. YoungerAmericansmay also bein lower skilled positions, less secure in their positions, and similarlythreat-ened by import competition and low wage jobs overseas. While Inglehart(1997) expects citizens in affluent postindustrialsocieties such as the United

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Stateswill increasinglyembrace transnational ies, he also expects insecuritiesto fuel nationalism and identification with the nation-state. Cohen (2001)notes, "for all the talk about the pressures on the state as a result of globalchange, it is clear that no form of communityhas emerged to challenge thenation-stateas the basic source of common identity in contemporarypolitics"(p. 150).There are profound national symbols triggered by the trade environmentthat may be more accessible than supranational ies or even economic self-interest.Nationalidentityhas the added significanceof cuttingacrossmultiplecleav-ages in which patterns of trade liberalization evoke symbolic predispositionsacross skill and educationallevels. The trade environment also confounds as-sumptions about partisansymbols and cuts across traditionalconceptions ofliberal-conservativeideology (Hermannet al., 2001; Holsti, 1996). Divergencewithin parties and convergence across parties diminishes the accessibilityofpartisanidentification in the symbolic processing of trade. Because partisanidentification is split by mixed partisan signals on trade, conceptions of na-tional identity play a more pertinent role in organizingopinion on trade. Ideo-logical guidance on trade is further confused by conceptions of nationaliden-tity that transcend left-right political predispositions (Citrin et al., 1994).Ideological conservatives are more attached to a restrictiveconception of thenation'ssovereignty,the devotion to its symbols, and the maintenance of thenation'sperceived historicalculturalintegrity.Thus, restrictiveconceptions ofnational identity may conflict with ideologically conservativesupport for thefree market when economic policy opens nationalboundaries.Liberalsand conservatives can also possess deep national loyaltyand whatit representswith respect to its citizens and the nationalcommunity,whereina heightened sense of patriotismmay lead many Americans to embrace tradeliberalizationas a mechanism for disseminatingAmerican values across na-tional borders. Emotional loyaltyto symbolicAmerican values of free marketdemocracy may reinforce a free trade ideology among not only elites (Gold-stein, 1993), but also the mass public. Higher levels of patriotism,moreover,do not necessarily represent the type of restrictive value attached to morerestrictive sovereign and cultural conceptions of national identity. One maystill attach high value to American symbols of patriotismand national pridewhile embracing more open economic borders. On the other hand, a higheraffective value attached to restrictiveconceptions of nationalsovereigntyandcultural integrity appears to conflict with more positive views toward freertrade, a process symbolicallyassociated with diverse transnationaleconomicand cultural forces impingingon the nationalcommunity.In the symbolic processing of trade, Americans may rely on affective na-tional symbols that are simply unique to trade politics. Previous studies note

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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTSthe shortcomingsof traditionaldispositionalbeliefs when it comes to a morecomplete explanationof American opinion on trade (Herrmannet al., 2001;Holsti, 1996). The economic self-interest perspective provides an importantpiece in the puzzle of American tradepolicyjudgment (Scheve and Slaughter2001), but questions remain about the psychology of the collective responseto trade liberalization. This article seeks to expand our understanding ofAmericanopinion on trade throughan examinationof the symbolic politics oftrade and the accessible role of nationalidentity.CONCLUSION

In an unfamiliar and evolving trade policy environment, Americans willevoke more familiar and longstanding symbolic predispositions in order toformulatepolicy judgment. The symbolicconcern for the nation activatespre-dispositionsof nationalidentity despite differences in economic self-interest,evoking shared beliefs and values. The nation is also split between citizenswelcoming the integrativeforces of trade liberalizationand citizens more re-strictivein their views of nationalidentityand the threatof tradeliberalizationto these symbols. It is not surprisingthat the inabilityof traditionalforeignpolicy dispositionalbeliefs to explainthe formation of trade opinion has puz-zled scholars. Tradeprovidesthe type of environment suited to symbolic pro-cessing because of the emotional and symbolic component and the complexityof the information. Trade politics do not begin and end at the water's edge,the debate dances on the edge, blurring ines with new conceptionsof nationalboundaries.The symbolic politics perspective does not discount the perceived economicinterests of Americansconcerning the effects of trade policy. In many ways,the trade debate focuses a great deal on the symbolic divide between thoselikely to gain and those likely to lose from trade liberalization.The economicattentionby the trade debate has made perceptions of economic self-interestsalient and accessible. By adoptinga symbolicpolitics model of trade opinionit does not assume that interests and identities cannot coexist (Citrin et al.,1990). In fact, it is suggested that material and symbolicdimensionsof politicsare increasingly ntertwinedon trade (Cohen, 2001). Symbolicpredispositions,particularlyconceptions of national identity, provide accessible attitudes fortrade policy judgment when the relationshipbetween trade policy and eco-nomic self-interest is unclear and uncertain.Symbolic politics theory assumes that "stronglyheld affective predisposi-tions are triggered automatically by attitude objects with relevant symbolicmeaning"(Sears, 2001, p. 30). A symbolicpolitics model of trade opinion doesnot exclude the influence of partisanand ideological identification,but thesepredispositionsmaynot be as accessible as nationalidentityin a citizen's trade

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policy judgment. Symbolic predispositions of national identity provide long-standing, stable, and accessible attitudes utilized to formulate opinion on tradepolicy amidst rapid global change, shifting boundaries, conflicting partisancues, and uncertain economic impact.APPENDIX

Demographicand Socioeconomic Variables. Demographic and socioeconomic vari-ables were coded as dummy variablesunless otherwise indicated. For example, unionmembershipwas coded 1 for those indicatingthat they "area member in a trade unionat present," and 0 otherwise. Education was coded where 1 = less than high school,2 = incomplete high school, 3 = completed high school, 4 = some college/university,5 = college graduateor higher. Income was coded 1 =


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IDENTITIES,NTERESTS,NDIMPORTSCultural(Cronbach'salpha= .61)1. Ethnic minorities should be given governmentassistanceto preservetheir customs

and traditions.(1 = disagree strongly,5 = agree strongly)2. Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be, 1=reduced a lot to 5 = increased a lot.3. American schools should make much greater effort to teach foreign languagesproperly. (1 = disagree strongly,5 = agree strongly)

NOTES1. The Heckscher-Ohlin odelassumes hatfactorsare mobilebetweensectors n whicha re-

ductionn tradebarriershreatenswagesandjobsfor unskilledworkersn all sectors.2. Anobjective f thisstudys to examine he effectof occupationalkillas a proxyoreconomicself-interest cross ectors.ScheveandSlaughter2001)demonstratehat ndustry f employ-ment s notsystematicallyelated o tradepolicypreferences. orexample,hoseworkingn"trade-exposed"ndustries,uchas textilesandapparel,werenotmore ikely o oppose reertradewhen controlled or their skill levels. With no significant ifferenceby sectorwhencontrollingorskill, hesefindingsendsupporto the Heckscher-Ohlin odel.3. Rotated actoranalyses recommonly sed to distinguish nderlying imensions f nationalidentity.Factoranalysisdentifies ariableshat are correlated ndprovides ubsets hatarerelativelyndependent f one another, helpful tepin the constructionf appropriatecalesfrommultipletems.One should aution hattheunderlyingimensions rea function f theitemsutilizedandmaynot account or otherconceptionsf nationaldentitywere other temsemployed.However, he Aspectsof National dentitymoduleprovidesan unusually ichsourceof nationalitytemsandexploratoryactoranalysiswas utilized o define he mostsub-stantive actors.4. Citrin t al. (1994), orexample, iscusscosmopolitaniberalism ersusnativism, ithnativistsembodying morerestrictive efinition f nationalityelyingon the importancef culturalhomogeneity.ornativists,oreign ulturalnfluencesviewedasthreateningo thecomposi-tionof U.S.society.

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