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    JournalftheEconomicndSocialHistory ftheOrient, ol. XX, PartII

    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF AND THEREVOLT OF 1740 IN ISTANBULSOCIALUPHEAVALAND POLITICALREALIGNMENTINTHE OTTOMANEMPIRE

    BYROBERT W. OLSON

    (Universityof Kentucky)The originsof the 1740 rebellion n Istanbulare imbedded n thePatronaHalilrebellionof 1730. Despite he lackof definitive esearchon the rebellionof 1730 evaluationof and its subsequentnfluenceon Ottomanhistory, he causesof the originsand some of the conse-quences of the PatronaHalil rebellion are well established1). I havedealtwith thesocio-economicactorswhichcontributedo thePatronaHalilrebellionn 1730oin anotherarticle ), but a briefrecapitulationof these factors s in order as the continuedrebellions n Istanbulfollowing he Patrona ebellionweredirectlynvolved n precipitatingthe revoltof 1740.The treatiesof Karlowitz1699) and Istanbul 1700) turneddirectOttoman attentionfrom southeasternEuropefor the first time inover threecenturies.Whilethe Ottomanswereto be engaged n warin the Balkans gainstVenice,the Habsburgs,he Papacy,as well asRussiaduring he nexttwo decades,hisperioddid allow timefor anI) The best work on the PatronaHalil rebellion, although it suffersfrom a veryweak conclusion, is that of Munir Aktepe, PatronaIsyan: 1730), (Istanbul, 1958).Also see Niyazi Berkes, The Developmentf Secularismn TurkeyMontreal,1954),pp. 23-63.z) Robert W. Olson, The Esnaf and the Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: ARealignment in Ottoman Politics? , Journalof the Economic nd SocialHistory oftheOrient JESHO) 17 (1974),

    PP.329-344.

    Since this articlehasbeen in pressI have published,TheSiegeof MosulandOttoman-PersianRelations 718-1743: A Studyof Rebellionn theCapitaland War n theProvincesof the OttomanEmpire (IndianaUniversity, 1975)which touches on the topic of thisarticle,especially pages, 141-164.I wish to expressmy thanksto my colleagues,ProfessorsBetts, Tucker, Mayfieldand Forandfor their commentswhich greatlyimprovedthe article.

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    i86 R.W. OLSONadjustmentndadaptationf Ottomanpolicies o the closingof thefrontier n Europe ). After 1718 with AhmetIII (I703-1730) morefirmlyn controlof the Sultanatendunder he tutelageof his GrandVizier,NevsehirliIbrahimPapa, he Ottomanswereable to embarkon a peace policyof no more wars with Europeanpowers. TheTreatyof Karlowitz ndtheTreatyof Passarowitz1718)alsoresultedin increasinghe tradebetweenthe lands under Ottomandominionand the lands of the Habsburg Empire4). The peace and prosperitypolicy of IbrahimPasa was to cause economic growth and a culturalflowering that has been characterizedby the term Tulip Period(Lile Devri), which also indicates the craze for tulips developed bysegments of Ottoman society. The increased trade with Europe re-sulted in an acceleratedgrowth of capitalamong the merchants andesnaf6) of Istanbul, especially in the building-trades industries 6). Theincrease n free enterprise nd the accumulation f capitalwere noteffectively ontrolledby the statecapitalism r the governmentallycontrolledmonopolistic pparatusn which the majority f Ottoman

    3) RifaatAbu El-Haj, OttomanDiplomacyat Karlowitz ,Journal f theAmericanOrientalSociety,87 (1967),pp. 498-512.4) Virginia Paskaleva, Osmanh Balkan Eyaletlerin'nin Avruplah DevletlerleTicaretleriTarihine Katki 1700-1850o ,IktisatFakiltesi MecmuassIFM), 27, no. 1-2(November, 1967-March,1968),pp. 37-74.5) The term esnafas it is used in this article follows the definition I used in myarticle, The Esnaf and the PatronaRebellion of 1730: A Realignmentof OttomanPolitics? ,JESHO, 17(1974),PP. 329-344,whichis based on the works of H. A. R.Gibb and HaroldBowen, IslamicSociety ndtheWest,partI (Oxford, I965), pp. 28i-313 and the article by Gabriel Baer, The Administrative, Economic and SocialFunctions of Turkish Guilds , Internationalournalof MiddleEast Studies IJMES)I, no. x (January,1970), pp. 28-5o0.6) Halil Sahilliogul. Slvig Year Crises in the Ottoman Empire, in Studies ntheEconomicHistoryof theMiddleEast (London, 1970), p. 246. On Ottomanattemptsand failures to industrializeduring this period see the sameauthor's XVIII YiizyllOrtalanrindaanayiB8lgelerimiz ve Ticari Imkanlan , BelgelerleTirk TaribDergisi(BTTD) no. iI (August, 1968), pp. 61-67 and also his XVIII YiizyildaEdirne'ninTicarImkanlari , BTTD), no. I3 (October, 1968), pp. 60-68.7) For some of the causes of these rebellions see Halil Sahillioglu, SlvlsiYearCrises in the Ottoman Empire , pp. 230-25 5; also see the Turkish version of thisarticlewhich is fuller and has accompanyinggraphs, Slvls Ylh Buhranlanr ,FM,27 (October, 1967- March, 1968), pp. 75-Ill.

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 187

    industries were based. Corruption and bribery of governmentalofficialsadded to the lack of control. The increase n free enterprisealso contributed to the frustrations of Ottoman attempts to in-dustrialize; he domesticoppositionwas aidedby foreign opposition7).While many high officials apparently participated through briberyin the economic boom, the Porte did not. The arrearsof ulzfe(wagesof the soldiers) caused rebellion in 1717, I718 and 1719 8). Duringthis same period the Ottomans fought a major war with Russia in1711, and with Venice and Austria in 17I5. Inability to pay the soldieryfurther decreased those who answered the call for mobilization intime of war. In 1715 the roster (yoklama)of Timar holders in theeyalet(province) of Erzurumwas only forty percent of the numberavailable in x616 9).The opening of the Persianwars in 1723 was followed by anincreasein taxes, risingfood prices, and scarcityof food supplies, all of whichwere accompaniedby a continueddebasementof coinage. On top ofall this, extraordinary campaign axeswere levied to meet the needsof the Persian war. The campaign taxes of imad-i seferriye,avartz-idivaniyeand takilif-i drfiyeincreased the agitation among the popu-lation 10)The highertaxes,the shrinkingfrontiers,and the agriculturaldeclineresulted in the early eighteenth century in an unprecedented emigrationfrom the provinces to the citiesxx).The emigrantsand refugees were

    8) Ibid.9) A. Dimitrov and V. P. Mutafgieva,Surl'itat dusystimedes timarsdesXVII*& XVIIIe SS (Sofia, 1968), pp. 33-56: 194-251. In 1715 yoklama ists accountedfor 2,119 Timars comparedto 5,279 in i606, a sixty percent drop. For a critiqueof Demitrov and Mutafqieva'sbook see Omer Lutfi Barkan, Biblioyografya ,ZFM, 27, (November, 1967- March, 1968),pp. xx -124.io) Islam Ansikliopedesi, ol. 2, Aviriz , pp. I3-14. The effects of the extra-ordinarytaxeswere also felt heavily in the Balkans.See Avdo Su&eska, Bedeutungund Entwicklung des BegriffesA'yin in OsmanischenReich , Siidost-ForschungenXXV (1966), pp. 3-2I and the same author's Die Entwicklung der Besteuerungdurchdie 'Aviriz-i diviniye und die teklif-i drfiyeim OsmanischenReichwaihrenddes x6. und i8. Jahrhunderts ,Siidost-Forschungen,XVII (1968), pp. 89-I3o.II) The flight from the land to the cities was not peculiarto the early eighteenthcentury but an accelerationof a patternbegun during the Celali rebellions in the

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    188 R. W. OLSON

    not only composed of Turks or Muslims,but also were from variousmillets and nationalities,the most troublesome of whom were theAlbanians. The influx of refugees to Istanbul added greatly to theproblems of the already seething capital beset by unemployment.The hungryand worklesscrowdswereproneto riot and rebellion.One of the majorwaysin whichtheyexpressedheirangerandcon-temptfor the Porteandthe luxury loving Ottoman courtwas arson12).In thedecade1720-30 arsonwasa dangero thecapitaltself.Unable o meet the domesticneed for government pending, hePorte was forcedto enactnew revenueproducingmeasures ndtaxesin I726-27 in order to meet the needs of the war againstEsref Shah,the Afghan nvader.No soonerhad a treatybeensignedwith EsrefShah in 1727 than the Porte was confronted with renewed threatsfromNadirShah, hePersianonqueror,who wasrapidly ggrandizingpowerandpropertyn Persia.The economicmeasures f the GrandVizier not only alienated he Janissaries, rovincial oldieryand putincreased burdens on the reaya,but it also put new demands on theesnaf artisans nd skilledcraftmen),he petite[in some cases not sopetite]bourgeoisieof Istanbul.The esnaf'scomplaints enteredonwhattheyconsideredhreemajorproblems:i) thecontinueddebase-mentof the currency nd theproblemswhichaccompaniedt; (2) thechangesresultingn the guildsystemof the esnaf ecauseof the influxof emigrantsromAnatolia ndRumeli; 3)thearmy ax(orduakgesi)extracted rom the esnafn time of mobilizationfor war13a)middle sixteenth century. See Mustafa Akdag, Celdli Isyanlar: (1550-I603), (Ankara,1963), and also the same author's Celili IsyanlanriBiiyiik Kaggunluk (1603-1606),Tarih Arasthrmalart Dergisi, II, no. 2-3 (1966), pp. I149.

    I2) The frequency of fires and attempts to organize fire brigades is given inIslam Ansikliopedesi, vol. 5 Istanbul , pp. 1214-21. The immense destructioncaused by fires and arson can be found in Mustafa Cezar, OsmanhlDevr'indiIstanbulYapllarindaTahribatYapanYangminlare Tabi Afetler , TuirkSanatTarihiArastzrma ve Incelemeleri,I (1963), PP. 327-414; Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall,Geschichtedes OsmanischenReiches translated to French by J. J. Hellert (Paris, 1839),XIV, pp. i79-80 who follows Ismail Aslm Kiigiikgelebizade, Tarih (Istanbul, 1282A.H. - i865 A.D.) who records fires for 1722-1728 on pages I1, 69, 77, 90, 118,178, 224, 242, 467, 270, 409, 416, 419 and 493.

    13) Aktepe, Patrona Isyamn,-I I; and see also Olson, The Esnaf , p. 335.

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 189

    While social, economic and ethnic elements were the main forcesthat culminated in the rebellion of 1730 the cultural factors werenbnetheless important,becausethe Patronarebellionended a culturalas well as an socio-economicepoch of Ottomanhistory.The cultural significanceof the Tulip Period has been noted bymany Ottoman scholars whom I have mentioned in an earlier article 14).However, the fact that the topics which contributedto the Patronarebellion are the same as those which precipitated he revolt of 1740necessitatesa recapitulation f the significanceof the 1730 rebellion.

    In the words of ProfessorEnver Karal,this firstperiodof seculariza-tion (garpllasmak)epresentedby the TulipPeriod -which appearedso promisingly to introduce needed reorganizationand reform intothe Empire - was ended with the outbreak of the Patrona Halilrebellion. The 1730orebellion createda situationin which those whowished reform were opposedby the ulema,Janissariesand the peopleof Istanbul 15). Professor Karal concludes that antagonismbetweenthe two groupsresulted n a culturalstateof instability; n the rebellionssubsequent to I730 victories belonged to the second group. ThoseSultans who desired reform too ardently were deposed and theirGrand Viziers killed, usually in a cruel manner.A rebellion servednotice to a reforming Sultan and his ministersthat more imitationof Europe, whether in terms of culture or capitalism,would not betolerated e16).

    According to Professor Niyazi Berkes, the Tulip Period, insofaras it originated in the rationalist spirit of the pre-revolutionary France,gavea religiouscolouringto the anti-reformmovement.The religiousreaction held the reformationistsresponsible for the destruction ofboth din (religion) and devlet state), not only because of their alieninnovations which underminedthe ancienttradition,but also because14) Olson, Ibid., pp. 329-331. For one of the best accounts of cultural life duringthe TulipPeriod see WilhelmHeinz, Die Kultur derTulpenzeitdes OsmanischenReiches , Wiener eitschriftur die Kunde esMorgenlandes,1 (1967),pp. 62-I6.15) Enver Ziya Karal, TanzimattanEvvel GarphlasmaHareketleri1718-i839in the volume Tantimat I (Istanbul, 1940), p. 19.I6) Ibid.,p. Is8.

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    190 R. W. OLSON

    of their complicity with those infidels [French and Russian] whowere now threateningMuslim rule from two sides and from within.Thus a religiouslyorientedanti-westernmovementbecamethe secondstrandrunningacross the whole historyof the Turkishtransformation,in contrast to the Westerniststrand 17)which had begun during thereign of Ahmet III.Although not a specialist in eighteenth century Ottoman historyand relyingupon secondarysources, I think it is noteworthy, that thewell known Turkishpoliticalscientist,ProfessorSerifMardin,suggeststhatthe PatronaHalilRebellion s animportantexampleof the cleavagein the center-peripheryrelations of Ottoman and modern Turkishpolitics1s). The center in the OttomanEmpireconsisted of the Sultan,the ulema or learned religious class and the elite members of theasakiror militaryclass. Mardinstressesthat several factorscontributedto the strainedrelationsbetween the center and the periphery,amongwhich were the incompatibilityof urban dwellers with the nomadsociety of Anatolia, the estrangementof the center from the pre-Ottoman nobility during the early history of the empire, and thereligious orthodoxy (Sunni) of the center and the heterodoxy (Shi'isects) of the provinces. This incompatibilityoften ended in rebellionor war. The fact that many members of the center, i.e. the militaryelite, Janissariesand the Sultan'sministers were converted Christians,coupled with the organizationof the non-Muslim communities intoself-governing millets, provided them with a great deal of autonomywhich furtheralienatedthe massesfrom governmentalpower centeredin Istanbul. To be sure, there were administrativeand politicallyintegrative nstitutions and elementswhich madethe Ottomangovern-mentalapparatus lexibleenough to ameliorate rom time to time theaccumulated tension among conflicting groups, but the Patronarebellionintroducednew disruptiveurbanelementson a scalehitherto

    17) Berkes, TheDevelopmentof Secularism,p. 52.18) Serif Mardin S., Center-PeripheryRelations: A Key to Turkish Politics ,Daedalus, I02oz,no. I (Winter, 1973), pp. 169-190.

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 19gI

    unprecedented in the capital which culminated in the first anti-modernTurkishoutbreak. ProfessorMardinconcludes,There had been many rebellions in Istanbul before, but this was the firstto show a syndromethat was thereafteroften repeated:an effort to Westernizemilitaryand administrativeorganization propounded by a section of the of-ficial elite, accompanied by some aping of Western manners, and used byanother interest group [ulema]to mobilize the masses against Westernization.Turkish modernists have concentrated exclusively upon the background ofpolitical intriguesby statesmenwhich, indeed, was an aspectof this and similarrevolts. However, for a completepicturewe should also dwell on the culturalalienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery from the center.During laterphasesof modernization, hisalienationwas to be compounded19).During the course of the Patrona rebellion the rebels and someof their supporterssucceededfor a short time in acquiringsome ofthe highestoffices n the Empirewith the supportof elements,especiallythe ulema, that had formerly supported the Sultan. The rebellionof 1730 caused a realignmentof those groups which supported oropposed the policy of increasedcontact with Europe advocated by

    the Sultan and his GrandVizier. The majorsupport of the Sultanateprior to I730 had come from the militaryelite and ulema. After 1730oelements of the militaryelite, especiallythose opposed to the intro-duction of westernmilitarymethods,andthe ulema who were opposedto the subversionof Ottomansociety by Europe began to collaboratewith the anti-Sultanforces whenever they felt it in their intereststo do so. The post 1730o-3 alignment was much more volatile thanthe pre-I730 one, because elements of the Janissaries and/or theulema could alternate heir supportfor the Sultanor for his opponentsdepending upon the circumstancesand strength of the Sultan 0).This new instabilitywas one of the reasons for the centralizationofpower in the hands of the Sultan-a policy which began to bearfruitduring the reigns of Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmut II (I808-I839).The fluidityof the new alignment s also demonstratedby the actionsof the esnafor petitebourgeoisieof artisansandmerchantswho in 1730were one of the most vocal opponentsof the Sultanand GrandVizier.

    I9) Ibid., p. I75.zo) Olson, The Esnaf , pp. 332-333.

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    192 R. W. OLSON

    In the springof 173 theesnafn faceof a threat o theirbusinessesby thecontinuingdisorders n the city, threw theirsupportto the new SultanMahmut I (1730-1754) and the last supporters of Patrona Halil wereexecuted or imprisoned.Even though MahmutI promisedto rescindthe extraordinaryampaign axesimposedby his predecessor he newlywon allegianceof the esnaf,manyof whom werenon-Muslim,was to bea mainstayof his reign. The switch of allegianceof the esnafto theSultanwas one of the most sudden and significantchanges resultingfrom the rebellions of I730-3I, and, indeed, of eighteenth centuryOttoman history. One of the few people to observe this historicswitch was Lord Kinnoull, the British ambassador o the Porte, whostatedthatthe rebels havemadethe GrandSignorstrongerby showingthe Janissarieshatthe merchantsand tradesmenof the city will alwaysbe readyto join his favorunlesshe should makehimselfhatedby somenew impression 21).During the next decadethe new allegianceof the esnafwas not aneasy one for MahmutI to nurture.The ten yearsfollowing the Patronarebellionwere among the most trying of the new Sultan'sreign. Notonly the territorial ntegrity of the empire but also the very under-pinnings of the Caliphateand the sovereignty of the Sultan werethreatenedby the militarysuccesses and the religious propagandaofNadirShahof Persia.Peaceon the eastern rontwas stillbeingnegotiatedwhen war with Russia and Austria began in 1736. It seemed to thepeople of the Ottoman Empire, especially of Istanbul, that peacewas as chimericalas contented Janissaries.The treaty of Belgrade(I739) despite its advantageous articles for the Porte did not quellthe disquiet of the people of Istanbul or the war party at the Porte.The Russo-Austro-Ottomanwar of 1736-39 was not without victories

    21) For this highly significantdevelopment see the dispatch of Lord Kinnoull,the British Resident in Istanbul, dated 4/15 April, 1731 in State papers, Series 97,volume 26. Series97 of the StatePapersrecordscorrespondencebetween the BritishResidentsof Istanbulwith the Foreign Office in London. The StatePapersaredepos-ited in the Public Record Office in London. Henceforth the StatePaperswill bereferredto by the abbreviationSP.

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    JEWS,JANISSARIES, SNAF 193for the Ottomans, but the treaty of Belgrade did not satisfy thoseat the Porte who wished to pursue a more aggressive policy2).Throughoutthe war with Russia and Austria the differences mongtheulema, Sultan, Grand Vizier, Kizlar Agasi, Janissaries, and esnafcontinued. The tension among differentgroups in Istanbul was exacer-batedby the scarcityof provisions. The winter of 1739was extremelysevere and the mood of the people became more rebellious as thewinter progressed.The tension in the city mounted as the desperateplight of the people began to find expressionin arson. In April, 1740the lack of provisions in Istanbul caused a clamor for bread. ThePorte even engaged Everard Fawkener, the British ambassador,tointercede on its behalf to engage the English merchantsto bring allkinds of provisions to Istanbul,even wood and candles,to which theambassador commented, It is not only that things are very dear,but they are not to be had for money 23). Therewas a severeshortageof barley,wheat, fat, and honey. During the early summer the dis-gruntlement expressedin acts of arson were fanned into the flamesof rebellion. The rebellionbeganon Sunday,June 6, 1740, (Rebiytilev-vel, 1153) in the szpahibazar when shops were attacked and thegoods were plundered 24). The shopkeepers were forced to close theirshops. The rebels then proceeded to an area above the flea bazar

    22) For an accountof the.Treatyof Belgradesee KarlA. Roider,Jr., TheReluctantAlly: Austria'sPolicy n the Austro-TurkishWar,1737-1739(BatonRouge, LouisianaState University Press, 1972); Theodor Tupetz, Der Tiirkenfeldzug von 1739und der Fride zu Belgrad , HistorischeZeitschrift, XV (1878), pp. 1-5 ; I. H. Uzun-garslh, Osmanli Tarihi, IV, Part I (Ankara, i95 6), pp. 251-297.

    23) Fawkener, April 22, 1740, SP 97, vol. 31.24) Mehmed Subhi Efendi, Tarih (Istanbul, I198 A. H./1783-1784 A.D. fol. 177.Subhi's history is also referred to as Sami-Sakir-Subbi.his is the main Ottomansource that I have followed for the June 6, 1740 rebellion. Subhi's account of the

    rebellion is limited to folios 177-178.Everard Fawkener'saccountconsists of folios61-66 in SP Series 97 mentioned above. In Fawkener's dispatch of June 17, 1740he states that the rebellion broke out on June 3, but Subhi states that it occurredon Sunday, June 6, 1740 (Rebiytilevvel i1i, i 153); cf. Faik Resit Unat, Hicri TaribleriMilddiTarihe 'evirmeKdlavua(Ankara,1959),p. 58, which seems to put Fawkener'sdate in error.

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    194 R. W. OLSONwhere the coppersmithsmade pots, pans, kettles, and cauldrons 5).The British ambassadorstates that the rebellion broke out in thequarterof Istanbul where the old clothes were sold, which wouldhave been the flea bazar ). According to Everard Fawkener, therebellion started when seventeen or eighteen people who seemed tobe quarreling among themselves suddenly broke apart with drawnswords. One of the men then pulled a green flag27) out of his bosomwhich he attachedto a staffthat he evidently had brought along forthat purpose. The rebels cried in unison that all of the shops shouldbe shut and invited all good Mussulmansto follow them 28). Theuproar spread quickly all over the city and the rumors of rebellioncausedmass confusion as shopkeepershurriedto close theirshops andto seek shelter. After surging through the coppersmiths'market,thecrowd moved, lik a packof dogs ,29) towardthe fleabazar,pillagingastheywent andforcing shops to close. The shopkeeperswho hesitatedto do so were killed. The crowdthen headedfor the areaof the BayezitMosque, gathering supporters on the way. The cries of rebelliongrew louder as the rebelsbarricadedand closed the largestand richestof the shops30). The rebellionspreadto all partsof the city.Sultan Mahmut was not in Istanbul when the rebellion brokeout. He was taking the air at a new watering spot on the BosphorusnearHunkarIskelesi n Beykaz31). The GrandVizier, YeigenMehmetPasa, was likewise not in the city. He was relaxing at Sa'dabadonthe Golden Horn and did not return to Istanbul until the rebellionhad been crushed. The absence from the capital of both the Sultan

    25) Subhi, Tarih,fol. 177, Sipah Bazarnda olan dukkanin eshabimniizerlerinehucuma miibaderetve mevcut olan emval ve esyalarinyagmave garet ile .26) The place where the rebellionbegan is importantbecauseselling secondhandclothes was a work in which Patrona Halil had engaged. The flea bazar had shopsselling an assortment of used goods.27) The significanceof the green flag was that it representsIslam.28) Fawkener, June 17, 1974, SP, vol. 31.29) Subhi, Tarib, fol. I77, reme-i kilap asa .

    30) Ibid.31) The Sultan was visiting Mehmed Emin Aga's new Kiosk on the Bosphorus.

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF I95and Grand Vizier paralleled the circumstances of 1730, but theresults werenot to be the same.In the absenceof the SultanandGrandVikier, Nisancl SehlaAhmet, HasanPasa,Aga of the Janissaries,andanother Janissaryofficer, Kulluk ?orbactsl Hasan, took quick actionto prevent the disturbance from mushrooming into full-fledgedrebellion. It was ?orbaciHasan'sbraverywhich nipped the outbreakin the bud. ?orbaci Hasan was the leader of a group of Janissariesnear the At Meydamn,he areawhere the rebelswere headed. He con-fronted themutineersdirectlyandspokewith theirleader.The exchangedid not quiet the rebels,andHasan's comradeswere reluctant o attackthem. Hasan, however, chargedinto the mass of mutineersshoutingthat he preferred death to the bowstring. Without further ado hemade straight for the rebel bearing the green flag whom he struckdown in one blow. The quick death of the banner-bearer eartenedthe hesitating Janissaries,and they fell in behind (orbaci Hasan andattackedthe rebels. Despite the quick and unexpecteddeath of theirstandard bearer the mutineers still offered resistance,but they weresoon dispersed, carrying with them two dead comrades 32). TheJanissary Aga, Hasan Pasa, arrived shortly thereafter with a forceof a few hundred (bir kag ytiz nefer). The Janissary Aga split hisforces with those of ?orbaci Hasan and formed a pincer which cutthe rebels' road to the At Meydamn,The rebels were trappedin thepincers and most of them were killed33. At this point the GrandVizier, Mehmet Pasa, arrived from Sa'dabadand issued orders tocrushall those suspectedof participatingn the outbreak.The immediate pecterof a rebellionon the scaleof 1730 wasdispelledbut the Sultanwas takingno chances. He issuedafermanwhich statedthat any shopownerwho closed his shop during a rebellionwould beconsidered a rebel and punished as such. Shopkeeperswho did notheed the ferman were arrested and some of them were killed 34). TheJanissary Aga and Grand Vizier patrolled the streets of Istanbul the

    32) Subhi, Tarih, fol. 177-178; Fawkener, June 17, 1740 SP, 97, vol. 31.33) Subhi, Tarib, fol. 178.34) Ibid.

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    196 R. W. OLSONentire night and raided numerous hamamswhere the suspected in-stigatorsof the rebellion, the perfidiousand hypocritical Albaniansusuallygathered.As in 1730o, he main suspectswere againAlbanians.The Grand Vizier and JanissaryAga showed no mercy to those theycaught; all were killed35). The estimated death toll for the June 6rebellion and subsequent suppressions was as high as three thousand 36).Boatsful of rebels' bodies, manyof whom had been strangled,pliedup and down the Bosphorus dumping their cargo in the Black Sea.The openness of this action, often undertaken in broad daylight,was surprisingto residents of the city as such actions had formerlybeen carriedout at night in a more discreetmanner and in secludedplaces. Everard Fawkener was convinced this was proof that theJanissariesand other parts of the army were not involved in therebellion37). The Janissariesdisclaimed their involvement and rei-teratedpromises f allegianceo the Sultanwhichallowed hePorte ocrush heuprisingwithout ear romthatsector.The Portetook moreprecautionsto assurelaw and order in the city. Fermanswere issuedto returnanyonewho had not residedn Istanbulor at leasttenyearsto his formerplace of residence 8). For days Hasan Pasa filled boatswithpeopleandsentthemto Uskiidar nd Izmitwith the cooperationof the quarter mahalle)mam. All of the hans,hamamsand shopswere checkedfor suspects; hose apprehendedwere exiledto Ana-tolia39). A ferman was sent to the Molla (chief religious dignity) ofEdirne to take the strictest measures to prevent peasantsfrom aban-doning their plots of ground and immigratingto Istanbul. Especiallystrong measureswere taken to keep Albanians from coming to Istan-bu1 40). Villages in Anatolia and Rumeli were to delegate one or two

    35) Ibid.,fol. 177.36) Fawkener, June 17, 1740, SP 97, vol. 31.37) Ibid.38) Subbi,Tarih, ol. I78.39) Ibid.40) MiihimmeDefterleri, no. 147, p. 152, Arnavud taifesini bila terreddudgeriye izlere iizere kalayetlerine iade ve irac . MiihimmeDefterleri, henceforthabbreviatedas MD, are registers located in BasbakanhkArgivi (Prime MinisterArchives) in Istanbul in which arerecorded the correspondence,e.g. hatt-thiimayuns,

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 197

    people to go to Istanbul to transactthe necessarybusiness and tobuy provisions for the entire village. All merchantstraveling in andout of Istanbul had to show a special permit to guards at the gateof the city. The merchantswereallowedto passonly after diligentinspection1).EverardFawkenerhought hatthehatt-thiimayunhichordered llshopkeeperso keeptheirshopsopenduringa rebellionwas a remark-ableproclamationn that the shopkeeperswere also commanded nthreatof beinghanged romtheirown shopdoorso takeuparmsandto attackthe insurgents2). Threedayslater(June9) there was an-otherflare-up, utbefore t couldgathermomentumt wassuppressedby the peoplein the neighborhoodmahalle)where t occurred.Thepeoplefell uponthe rebelsand knocked n the Headthe Mutineersas theyweredirected y the hatt-thimayun hichhad called or theretaliationn thepartof theesnafwho hadbeenarmed orthispurpose.Therewerethose in Istanbulwho were of theopinion hattheJune 9outbreakwas not a generaluprising of the people, but ratheronly aquarrel among Janissaries.But the suppression of it by the esnafand peopleof the neighborhood ould have given greatoffensetothe Janissaries.Accordingto Fawkener he retaliation n the partof the esnafwas detestedby the Janissaries nd it made the hatt-ihiimayuneem ill judged,for now the esnaf-many of whom wereChristiansand Jews-were calledupon to take arms againstthebatt-tferifs, ermansand other dispatchesfrom the Sultan, Grand Vizier and Sey-hiilislam to provincial, militaryand religious officialslocated outside of Istanbul.41) MD, 147, p. 152; Subhi, Tarib,fol. 178; also see Miinir Aktepe, XVIIIl.Asrin Ilk Yarislnda Istanbul'un Niifus Mes'elesine Dair Bazl Vesikalar , TaribDergisi (TD), IX, no. 13 (September, 1958), pp. 19-20 Ancak bir veya iki neferademtevkil ve arzve mahzar le o makulelerinkezilik tiiccarmakulesindenasitaneyeecnis-i zehgir ve esya getiirenlerin miiriirlarinaruhsat verilup ve zeh~ir ve egyanakleden tiiccara hilde muavenet olunarak bu vechile sahih erbib-i mesalih ilezehtir ve esya makleden tiiccardanmaadaefrid-i $feride dahi vir ferdinbild-emr-1serif miirurlarinacevaz g6stermeytip ve eger bir takrib ile gelecek olurlarise bucinibde daimatecessiis olmaglala-mehaleahiz olunurlar .

    42) Fawkener, June I7, 1740, SP 97, vol. 31; Subhi, Tarih, fol. I78, says nothingregardingthe esnaf'scall to arms.

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    198 R. W. OLSON

    Janissaries.Fawkenerconcludedthat an interferenceof this type couldlead to a general Massacre of those people [which] may one dayvery easilybe the effectof it, as well as what furtherMischiefmay beapprehended rom the Militia'sbeing got together in arms, & fearingin punishment of it 4S). This, indeed, is a striking and highly sig-nificantpassage.The outbreaks of June 6 and June 9 resulted once again in a re-shufflingof the government. On Tuesday, June 22 (rebiytilevvel27)the Grand Vizier, Ivaz MehmetPasa, was replaced by Ahmet Pasawho heldthe office of Nisanciandhadbeen instrumental n suppressingthe outbreakof June 6. A host of lesser officialswere eitherdismissedor assumed other posts. The purges and dismissalof officials deemednecessary o quell the disgruntledpopulaceof the capitalagain parallelthat of 1730. The scarcity of provisions increased the potentialof rebellion and added to the alreadystrained relationsbetween theMuslim and non-Muslim population. Regarding the scarcity of pro-visions, Fawkener stated in his report of January to, 1742, Thereis shewn a great attention to the price of provisions, & some exe-cutions have been madefor disobedienceto the orderspublisht (theseorders stated that hoarding and greatly raised prices of food wasforbidden): heVizer & his emissariesarecontinuallyrunningabout thestreets n disguise,andit is saidthe GrandSignordoes this sometimes.The Vizer hoping to make himself well thought of by the people;& by his vigilance in pursuing all suspicious or disorderly people,who might endanger the government, he courts the favour of hisMaster. These reports of the discovery of assembly'sof ill disposedPersons,the executionswhich are saidto be made, & the orderswhichare given as well that strangerswho are unknown & without avowedbusiness, especiallyAsiaticks and Albanese shall not stay here, or tobe allowed to come hither and that nobody shall be abroadafter sucha time of night ... 44).Less than two weeks later more disturbances,

    43) Ibid.44) Fawkener, January ro, 1742, SP, vol. 31. The shortage of good grains waslargely caused by the shipment of grain from the Danube basin to Trabzon rather

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 199

    some which resulted from the shortage of food stuffs, the supply anddistribution of which were in the hands of the esnaf, had deterioratedto the point that the GrandVizier thought it wise to issue new sump-tuary proclamations regarding the dress of Christians and Jews for-bidding them to wear certain colors and furs. The new sumptuaryproclamations caused great consternation, especially in the some of theforeign embassies, for as Fawkener states, the protection which theembassies gave to certain groups of Christians and Jews,

    extended as so far to become equivocal, there now and then falls a victimto it. When the Druggomans of several of the foreign Ministers were the otherday with the Chiaux [?avus] Boshi to get some particularexplanationof theVizer's intentions, he told them the order was not meant to extend to themor anybody belonging to any foreign Minister, but as to Persons protectedby them, he would advise them to be cautious, for where the groups of thatprotection might be liable to discussion, the blows might be in the meantimegiven. [Fawkener then goes on to relate a very peculiar incident]. But themistakes don't all happen on one side, for the other day the Servants of theVizir who walk about the city to observe how these regulationsare observedtook up a Servantor dependentof a Jew, who is Agent or as they call it hereBazargan Bezirgan]Boshi, of the Agau and body of the Janissaries,on accountof some part of his dress, in the way to the Vizir's Palace they passt by theStationof one of the bodys of the ordinaryGuardof the city, who areJanissaries,and the commandingOfficerin each of those bodys of Guard is a Colonel orChiorbagee [Corbaci].The Servant as he passt told the Guard to whom hebelonged, and they immediately took him from the Vizir's People and senthim to some of their own Chambers;the Vizir displeas'dat this insult offerdto his Servantsand authority, sent immediatelyto require this Person of theJanissaryAgau; but he was told that the Body claimedhim as one belonging,to them, and would be offended if he was taken out of their hands, and so thematter dropt. It is not easyto imaginehe credit hisJew, Agent of theJanissarieshas in that body.He disposesof all Offices,and applicationsare madeby thepretendersto them to Him, in thefirst instancesof this I have seenseveralproofs, for as he is anHonoraryBritish Druggoman, and in vertueof his Baratq [Berat] or Commisisonromthe Sultan in that quality, is undermyprotection,I havehad applications rom Officersof rank, even as high as Colonel,for recommendationso him; there is a jumble hereofpowerand dependenceot easilyto beaccountedor or explained 45). (My italics.)

    than Istanbul in order to stockpile provisions for the war against Nadir Shah. Thefull dispatchis appendedto this article,pp. 203-207.45) Fawkener,January23, 1742, SP 97, vol. 3I. See the dispatchdated June 17at the conclusion of the article.

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    ZOO R. W. OLSON

    It would be well perhapsto leave the Britishambassador'sstatementas put, but it is at once too highly provocative and of potential sig-nificancenot to attemptto unravelthe jumbleof power and depen-dence to which he alludes. We have evidence from Kinnoull's state-ment of April 4/15, 1731, that the merchants and tradesmen of thecitywill alwaysbe ready o joinin his [theSultan's] avor .It wasindeeda drasticswitch of allegiancewhen we recallthatthe esnafwere amongthe major opponents of Ahmet III who were instrumental n precip-itating the Patrona Halil rebellion. It does, however, partiallyexplainthe greater degree of stabilitythat MahmutI was able to obtain onhis accession, despite recurring outbreaks, in contrast to his pre-decessor. The decisionof the esnaf o supportrather hanto oppose theSultanwas due, in part,to the promiseof Sultan MahmutI to rescindthe extraordinary ampaign axes which hadbeen the maingrievanceof the esnafprior to the rebellion in September of 1730. But the supportwhich the esnaf gave the Sultan after 1730 was also doubtlessly en-couraged by the continual upheavels and disturbances which greatlycurtailed their business activities.

    It is also significantthat EverardFawkener,the successor of LordKinnoull to the Istanbul Residency46), writing almost nine yearslater in his dispatch of June 17, 1740, was cognizant of the esnaf'ssupportof the Sultan,at least, in regardto the Janissaryand popularinsurrections.Are we to assumethen that it was the acceptedpolicyof the Britishresidentsto recognizethat the esnaf upportedthe Sultanto the extent that they were armed, even if unwillingly, in order tohelp suppresspopularand Janissarynsurrections?The activities of the esnafbetween the years 1730oand 1740 impliesthat they must have been aware of the dangers and the risks their newpositions of importance gave them and the opposition this generatedon the part of the Janissaries and the Muslim population. Increasedtension between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities was indi-cated by the reimposition of the sumptuarylaws in January, 1742.

    46) Lord Kinnoull was replaced as British Resident in Istanbul by EverardFawkenerin December, 1735and he served to September,1742.

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    JEWS,JANISSARIES, SNAF 201The Porte no doubt imposed them to quell increasinglystrong op-position to the ostentatiousdisplayof wealth by Christiansand Jews.The display of such wealth in a city in the throes of a severe foodshortage, high unemployment,and sufferingfrom an inundation ofrefugeesfrom the provincesmust have addedto the animosityexistingbetween the two communities.The esnaf's support of the Sultanwasin turn reciprocatedby favors from the Sultan evidencedin the 1740French capitulationswhich broadened the immunitiesand protectionof the Jews andChristians romprosecutionandtaxesunderaegisof theEuropean embassies47). As Professor Berkes stated The religiousreaction held the reformationistsresponsible for the destruction ofboth din (religion) and devlet (state) not only because of their alieninnovations which underminedthe ancienttradition,but also becauseof their complicity with those infidels [French and Russian] whowere now threateningMuslim rule from two sides and from within.Thus a religiously oriented anti-Western movement became thesecond strandrunningacross the whole history of the Turkish trans-formation 8). What Professor Berkes does not mention in his wellarticulated statement is that the religiously oriented anti-Westernmovement -also gained support from the ulema-led Muslimmasses who sawwealthyChristians ndJews with the apparent upportof the Sultangain in power to the extent that they were able to armthemselves to help put down rebellionsin opposition to the govern-ment. To be sure, as Professor Mardinhas stated, the rebellion of1730 and subsequentrebellions were filled with political intrigue andestablished a syndromethat was thereafteroften repeated:an effortto Westernize militaryand administrativeorganizations propoundedby a section of the officialelite, accompaniedby some apingof Westernmanners,and used by anotherinterestgroup [ulema]to mobilize the

    47) Regat Ekrem, OsmanlhMuahedeleri e Kapitiildsiyonlar300oo-z920oe LoganMuahedesi4 Temmuz 923 (Istanbul, 1934), PP. 430-437, especiallyarticles45,46,47, 48 and 60.48) Berkes,TheDevelopmentf Secularism,. 5 . See above pp. 189-190o.

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    202 R. W. OLSON

    masses against Westernization 49). But in view of the statementsby Kinnoull and Fawkener s it not possible to deduce that the ulemaand the masses' [Muslim]alienation from Westernization ,was due,in part, to the fact that they benefitedlittle, if at all, from Westerni-zation but that the esnaf,many of whom were Christiansand Jews,benefited a great deal? Second that this policy was apparentlysup-portedby theirSultan-the leaderandprotectorof all Muslims?The jumbleof power and dependence existing between the non-Muslim millets, the Janissariesand the Porte is well illustratedbyFawkener'srelationof the episode regarding the servant, either aChristianor Jew, of the BezirganBasi, the Jewish agent of the Janis-saries, in their relationswith the esnaf.This episode is importantforseveral reasons. It is the first evidence I have seen indicatinga closerelationship, or, for that matter, any kind of relationshipbetweenthe Janissariesand the Jews at such an earlydate. Second, it indicatesthat the position of his masterwas such that he felt that he did nothave to comply with the newly reimposed sumptuary aws-a reali-zation which was justifiedby the subsequentaction of the JanissaryAga. Third, if we accept Fawkener's statement that a Jewish agentcontrolled all applicationsto the Janissarycorps. This is certainlyanovel, highly significant, if not astounding statement, in itself. Finally itappears that the Grand Vizier was not aware of the extent of the re-lationship between the Janissaries and the Bezirgan Basi, but wheninformed of it in this particularnstance he acquiesced o the JanissaryAga's request that he drop charges against the servant of the BezirganBast. This indicates some knowledge on the part of the Grand Vizierof the relations between the Janissaries, Jews and esnaf.It is impossible to untangle the jumble of power implied inFawkener's statement on the basis of the available data but I hopethis article is suggestive enough to encourage more research on aprovocative topic.

    49) Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations , p. I75. See above, p. 190.

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 203

    Dispatchdatedune i7, 74t from EverardFawkener,TheBritishResidentin Istanbul o the Duke of Newcastle,The BritishForeignSecretary,Con-cerningheRebellionf une6-9 inIstanbul.Constantinoplethe i7th June 1740

    MyLord(fol. 6i) The last letter I had the honour of writing to Your Grace was dated the29.th past.We have since had great alarmshere, which however have had no other Effectthan the changeof the Vizir & a few subordinateOfficers.The first tumult hapned the third Jvs. [June] in the afternoon, in the quarterof the Town where old Cloths are sold, there did not appearabove seventeen oreighteen People, who at first seemed to have some quarrelamongst themselves,but one of them, when the rest drew their Swords,pulled out of his Bosom a greenFlag which he fixed to a Staff, & they then cried out that the Shops should be shut,& invited all good Mussulmansto follow them.A great uproarimmediatelyensued & it was soon spreadall over the City thatthere was a rebellion, which occasioned a general Confusion, the Shops were shut& all people were intent upon providing for their own safety.The Sultan was at one of his Houses upon the canal, & the Vizir was out ofTown upon an airing, & this small beginning either neglected or attendedby anyunluckyevent, might very easilyhave proceededto a like fatal Catastrophewith therising ten years since, which at first was not so considerableas this; for matterswere very well disposed, & if the flame had got ever so little head, it would noteasilyhave been extinguished.But the JaniserAga, the Vizir Kayhauh [Kahya] o50), the Nisangee [Nisanci]51)Pashau,late Camicam Kaymakam] 2)& now Vizir got immediatelyon horseback;it was also a fortunate Circumstancethat a Guard of Janisarieswhich was nearat hand was commanded by a Man of bravery. It is said, one Guard which wasthereabouts withdrew upon the first Noise, but this officer made towards it, &had something of a Parley with the Mutineers; who seemed disposed to defendthemselves. His people did not express any great forwardness to venture theirLives, but he reproaching (fol. 62) them with exposing their Commanderto theString, told them he would at least avoid that ignominy, and made at the Ensign

    50) The Vizier Kahya was the Grand Vizier's deputy responsible for domesticand militaryas well as ceremonialaffairs. See Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen,IslamicSocietynd heWest,vol. i, parti, (OxfordUniversityPress, 1963),pp. I21-I 22.5I) The Nisanci Pasa was the official who traced the royal cipher (Tugra) onimperial documents. He had the authority to examine, correct and the re-

    sponsibilityto harmonizenew laws with previous laws. By the eighteenth centuryhowever the office of Nisancl was largely a sinecure. Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety,pp. I24-126.52) The Kaymakamwas an official with the rank of Vizier appointed to replacethe Grand Vizier when the latter was on a campaign. Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety,pp. I14-115.

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    204 R. W. OLSONBearer with his sword, whom he had the good luck to lay dead at his feet; his fol-lowers encouragedby this fell upon the rest, & tho' they made some resistance,they were soon dispersed,one or two were killedupon the Spot & the rest taken.

    The Grand Signor tho' he had this good news almost as soon as he heard of therising, came directlyto his Palacein town. Strong Guards were placed every where& the Vizir himself was upon the Patrol all night. Great Numbers of People wereseized, & many put to death, & these executions continued with violence for agood while, & are not yet quite ceased. The number is made to amount high, Ihave heard as far as three thousandPeople but I dont see which way it is possibleto come at any certainty n this point, since it is very doubtful whetherany accountis kept at all who or how manyaretakenoff in such a Massacre.The Mischief is fallen chiefly upon the Albanese & other Strangersabout theCity, & it has been remarkedthat large boats have gone out publickly, filled withthe Carkassesof those StrangledWretches, to be thrown into the Sea, which is awork which alwaysused to done privately.This is saidto be proof thatthe Janissaries& other Bodies of Militia were not concernedin this Business, & which they havedisowned any partin & madefresh promisesof allegiance& fidelity.Such of those People who have upon this occasion fall'en into the hands of theGovernment, as have escaped the String have been sent away & no Person oflow Rank is allowed to continue here, who is not established,or cannot find some-body to answer for him: and it has been said an account has been taken of thelabouring people who are Turks, which has been reduced to such a Number asis thought equal to the work, & the rest are sent away.But what is most remarkables a Proclamationwhich was made all over the Cityby the Publick Cryers, by which the Shopkeepers of what Religion soever areforbid to shut up their Shops upon all (fol. 63) people who shall raiseany uproarin the Streets, & to endeavour to seize or kill them, & all this under penalty ofbeing hanged at their Shopdoors.To shew an appearanceof securitythe Grand Signor returned the day followingto his palaceupon the Canal,& it was hopedunder the greatattention of the Govern-ment the publick quiet was quite restored. Yet on the 9.th there was another ap-pearanceof a tumult & which was suppressedby the People of the Neighbourhood,who fell upon & knocked on the Head the Mutineers as they were directedby theProclamation.There are those who say that this last affairwas not an attempt tocreate a rising of the People, but realya quarrelbetween a few Janissaries,& thatthis way of putting an End to it has given great offence to that Body. Howeverthis particularCase may be, that Proclamationseems ill judged for quarrelswillunavoidably happen amongest the Soldiery & if at any time Christiansor Jewsshould interposein them in the mannerprecribeda generalMassacreof those peoplemay one day very easily be the effect of it, as well as what further Mischief maybe apprehended rom the Militia'sbeing got together in arms,& fearingthe Punish-ment of it.

    Upon this second Ruffle it was thought proper to change the Vizir which wasdone the I2.th & he is succeededby Achmet Pashaw,Camaican Kaymakam]duringthe two last Campaigns& lately Nisangee [Nisancl].I have for a good while thought him a very likely Person to ascend one day tothat greatDignity, & he seems to have been kept here on purpose for an Occasion,

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    JEWS, JANISSARIES, ESNAF 20Jyet if things had been quiet it is probableBekeer[Bekir]Pashaw who is just arrivedfrom Guidda [Jidda], might have preceeded him, but he was preferredfor thepresent Conjuncture& the other succeedshim as Nisangee (Niganci).

    The Chiaux [(avugl]68) Pashaw is also deposed, & is sent to Baghdad to waitthereanother ambassador rom Persia,& the Officerwho killed theEnsign Bearer inthe firsttumult, has a Reward of his courage beside a sum of Money, the office ofMuzur [Muhzir]54)Agau or Commander of the Body of Janissarieswhich keepsguard at the Vizirs's Palace.Other Changes are talked of particularly(fol. 64) that of the Reis Effendi55);the Vizir Kayhauh[Kahya] s confirmedin his office, & I have been told with anexpress declaration from the Sultan to the Vizir, that He must consider him as aPerson placed in that office by him directly & therefore as Kayhauh [Kayha]ofthe Empire.He bears the Characterof Fidelity & Integrity but it is somewhat out of theway to put in a place of so much Businessa Person who can neitherwrite or read.The late Vizir is made Bashau of Guidda[Jidda].It is apprehendedthat great disorders must have ensued, if the Rebellion hadtaken place for as the Memory of the Executions after the Establishmentof thepresent Sultan [MahmudI] is so fresh, those who had brought about this, & hadgot the power in their hands, would have been desperate,& have tried all meansfor their own safety. In that case it is very probablethe pretence of dissatisfactionwould have been the accepting Belgradedemolished & consenting to such a Peace,whilst the arms of the Empirewere in a condition to procuremuch greaterAdvan-tages: This would have been imputed to the arts of the Christianministers & theignorance & corruptionof those of the Porte; and the heats this must have raisedin a Mad Multitude might have put all Strangersin danger, especially those whowould have been looked upon as more immediatelyconcerned.The Government has had a great deal of Reason for sometime past to be upon its guard, & no doubt these strong marks of an unquiet Spirit abroadwill re-double all their vigilance & attention, yet if at last the Mischief should overturnthem, these Executions will have exasperatedMatters, & it will fall the heavier.I am afraidthings would not pass as they have done heretoforeupon the like oc-casions,but that we shouldhave a long scene of Confusion& Tumult to go through.I have however greatConfidencen the ability,Vigilance& Resolutionof the presentVizir, who will not easilybe surprised.

    53) The (avus Bastwas one of the lieutenantsof Grand Vizierin chargeof judicialaffairsand of carrying out the orders of the courts of justice. Gibb and Bowen,IslamicSociety, p. 118-I20.54) The Muhzir Aga was head of the JanissaryAga's guard and controller ofthe prison located in the JanissaryAga's headquarters.He also representedtheJanissaries n dealings with the government as a member of the staffof the GrandVizier whose residence was guarded, in part, by Janissariesunder the commandof the MuhzirAga. Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety, . 325.

    55) The Reis Efendi was the principal secretaryof the Chanceryin charge ofall affairs xceptfinancialmatters,but includingforeign affairs.He also was in chargeof preparingthe Telhisor the communications rom the Grand Vizier to the Sultan.Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety, p. 122-123.

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    206 R. W. OLSON

    Seven months later the tumultuous situation was worsened by thelack of provisions. In a report dated January Io, 1742, Fawkenerstated,There is shewn a great attention to the price of provisions, & some executionshave been made for disobedience to the orders publisht (these orders stated thathoardingandgreatlyraisedpricesof food was forbidden):the Vizir & his emissariesarecontinually runningabout the streetsin disguise, and it is said the GrandSignordoes this sometimes. The Vizir hoping to make himself well thought of by thepeople; & by his vigilance in pursuing all suspicious or disorderlypeople, whomight endangerthe government, he courts the favour of his Master.These reportsof the discovery of assembley'sof ill disposed Persons, the executions which aresaid to be made, & the orders which are given as well that strangerswho are un-known & without avowed business, especiallyAsiaticks & Albanese shall not stayhere, or be allowed to come hither & that nobody shall be abroad after such atime of night...

    On January3, 1742, Fawkenereportedo theDuke of Newcastlethatthedisturbancesad reachedhe pointat whichthe GrandVizierthoughtit wise to issue new proclamationsegarding he dressofChristians nd Jews. Both groups were forbidden o wear certaincolorsandfurs.Regardinghe issuance f thisproclamation,awkenerwrote that it causedconcern in some of the foreign embassiesas theprotectionwhichtheygaveto certaingroupsof ChristiansndJews,extendedso far as to become equivocal, therenow & then falls a victim to it. Whenthe Druggomans of several of the foreign Ministers were the other day with theChiaux(Cavug)Boshi to get some particularexplanationof the Vizir's intentions,he told them the order was not meant to extend to them or anybody belongingto any foreign Minister, but as to Persons protected by then, he would advisethem to be cautious, for where the grounds of that protection might be liable todiscussion, the blows might be in the meantime given. But the mistakes dont allhappenon one side, for the other day the Servants of the Vizir who walk about thecity to observe how these regulationsareobserved, took up a Servantor dependentof a Jew, who is Agent or as they call it here BazarganBoshi [BezirganBas] 56),of the Agau & body of the Janisaries,on account of some part of his dress, in theway to the Vizir's Palace they passt by the Station of one of the bodys of theordinary Guard of the City, who are Janisaries, & the commanding Officer in

    y56)According to Redhouse's Lexiconof Turkishand English (London, 1890),p. 322, a Bezirgan Bast was a warden of the merchantsguild . It also definesbezirganas a merchant , a pedlar and vulg. a Jew .

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    JEWS,JANISSARIES, SNAF 207each of those bodys of Guardis a Colonel or Chiorbagee(?orbaci)57).The Servantas he passt told the Guard to whom he belonged, & they immediatelytook himfrom the Vizir's People & sent him to some of their own Chambers;the Vizirdispleas'd at this insult offerd to his Servants & authority, sent immediately torequire this Person of the JanisarAgau; but he was told that the Body claimedhim as one belonging to them, & woud be offendedif he was taken out of theirhands, & so the matterdropt. It is not easy to imagine the credit this Jew, Agentof the Janisarieshas in thatbody. He disposesof all Offices,& applicationsaremadeby the pretendersto them to him, in the first instances of this I have seen severalproofs, for as he is an Honorary British Druggoman, & in vertue of his Baratz[Berat]or Commissionfrom the Sultan in that quality, is under my protection, Ihave had applications rom Officersof rank,even as high as Colonel,for recommen-dations to him; there is a jumble here of power & dependencenot easily to beaccountedfor or explained68.

    57) A ?orbaci Basl was a commander of an or/a or one of the I96 companiesof variable sizes which comprised the JanissaryCorps. Gibb and Bowen, IslamicSociety,pp. 319-322.58) See above, p. '99.