174403877 civil procedures case digest

Copyright 2012 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia 2012 1

I. Civil Procedure

Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 139611, October 4, 2002

Mariano L. Gumabon, et al. vs. Aquilino T. Larin, G.R. No. 142523, November 27, 2001

Tung Chin Hui vs. Rufus B. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 137571, September 21, 2000

William P. Chan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 138758, July 6, 2000

Perla S. Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001

General Provisions Jurisdiction of Courts

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over acontroversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by newlegislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the ruleis where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate asto actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has noretroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of thestatute.

Lourdes E. Bengzon vs. Amado G. Inciong, G.R. No. L-48706, June 29, 1979

Latchme Motoomull, et al. vs. Joffre dela Paz, et al., G.R. No. L-45302, July 24, 1990

PNB vs. Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., G.R. No. 173615, October 16, 2009

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue ofsupervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courtsdecline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

Renald F. Vilando vs. HRET, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade thecourts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there isa grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and theparamount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation ofcontrolling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable ofrepetition yet evading review.

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011


Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yetevading review." The question on Limkaichong's citizenship is likely to recur if she would runagain, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

Renald F. Vilando vs. HRET, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011

It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise ofjurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decisionrendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants andthe subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefromis but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of itsjurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case,much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

Bernabe L. Navida, et al. vs. Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr., et al., G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654,127856 &128398, May 30, 2011

The rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupledwith his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or administrative body where the action ispending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by theresolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body'sjurisdiction.

Megan Sugar Corp. vs. RTC of Iloilo, Branch 68, et al., G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011, citing Marquezv. Secretary of Labor, 253 Phil. 329, 336 (1989)

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended byRepublic Act No. 7691 . . . Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance orto remove a cloud on one's title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interesttherein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessedvalue of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorialjurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court hadjurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and theprincipal relief thereby sought.

Heirs of Sps. Teofilo and Elisa Reterta vs. Sps. Lorenzo and Virginia Mores, G.R. No. 159941, August17, 2011

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversyinvolving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to itsresolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretionrequiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determinetechnical and intricate matters of fact.

Rosito Bagunu vs. Sps. Francisco & Rosenda Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies


where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement ofthe claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed withinthe special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim issought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to theadministrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss thecase without prejudice.

Samar II Electric Coop., Inc., et al. vs. Ananias D. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012

Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrativeremedies. The Court, in a long line of cases, has held that before a party is allowed to seek theintervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processesafforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by givingthe administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought.The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding ofwaiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.


The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedierdisposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity andconvenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has beencompleted and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunityto correct its error and dispose of the case.


True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subjectto certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking thedoctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack ofjurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievablyprejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the ruleimpractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately haveto be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where theapplication of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted actsviolate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has beenrendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strongpublic interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.


The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts'area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courtswould have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of


the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition andmanagement of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subjectto review by the DENR Secretary.

While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose ofpublic land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted byoccupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations), the respondents'complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure or defacto but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession.

Rosito Bagunu vs. Sps. Francisco & Rosenda Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

Rule 1, Sec. 2 - In what courts applicable

The Rules of Court apply to all courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.Regional Trial Courts are not precluded from conducting hearings on matters on which the partiesneed to be heard, even in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. c d a s i a

Lamberto Casalla vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 138855, October 29, 2002

Rule 1, Sec. 3 - Cases governed

Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to allactions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedurehave suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminalproceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering thatRule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reasonto apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.

Concepcion Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra, et al. vs. Raul Risos, et al., G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008

An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by thecourt or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite establishedrules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish thestatus or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadingsare required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is grantedgenerally upon an application or motion.

Patricia Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001


The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such adeclaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 RevisedRules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcementor protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "aremedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisivelyclear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as thepetitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Roy S. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999

It is axiomatic that the Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effectof law. More importantly, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, orcertain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and theorderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatoryand imperative. Only strong considerations of equity will lead us to allow an exception to theprocedural rule in the interest of substantial justice.

Minda Villamor vs. People of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 172110 & 181804, August 1, 2011

Rule 1, Sec. 4 - In what cases not applicable; suppletory character

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a"suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." It means that theprovisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in theapplicable rule.

GSIS, et al. vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al., G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010

It should be underscored that the nature of an election protest case differs from an ordinary civilaction. Because of this difference, the Rules of Civil Procedure on demurrer to evidence cannotapply to election cases even "by analogy or in a suppletory character," especially because theapplication of said Rules would not be "practicable and convenient."

Gelacio P. Gementiza vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 140884, March 6, 2001

The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. Inelection contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of generaljurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which are cognizable by courts oflimited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rulesof Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.


Roberto D. Ramas, et al. vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 130831, February 10, 1998

Rule 1, Sec. 6 - Construction

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of thelitigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, ourjudicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementaryperiods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and arenecessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing apleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. Viewed in this light,procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may haveprejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.

Francisco A. Labao vs. Lolito N. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010

However, there are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of procedural rules, such as:(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice notcommensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of thedefaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) theexistence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirelyattributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lackof any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will notbe unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence withoutappellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in thename of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exerciseof sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be aneffort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanationfor his/her failure to comply with the rules.

Francisco A. Labao vs. Lolito N. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010

Saint Louis University, Inc. vs. Evangeline C. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010

The strict enforcement of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in exceptionally meritoriouscases. Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious circumstance can be tested under thefollowing guidelines: Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant thesuspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by theappellate court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered arethe following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case,(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspensionof the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and


(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Arsenio Z. Locsin vs. Nissan Lease Phils. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 185567, October 20, 2010, citingSanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152766, June 20, 2003

Susan Fronda-Baggao vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 151785, December 10, 2007

Francisco Dee vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133542, January 29, 2004

Systems Factors Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 143789, November 27, 2000

Public Estates Authority vs. Jose F. Caoibes, et al., G.R. No. 132426, August 19, 1999

Marcelino Tan, et al. vs. Jose Renato Lim, et al., G.R. No. 128004, September 29, 1998

Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al., G.R. No. 132007, August 5, 1998

While Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides for a liberal construction of the rules inorder to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of everyaction and proceeding, the same can not be used as a vehicle to ignore the Rules at will and atrandom to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their justresolution.

Aneco Realty and Development Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp., G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008

Dee Hwa Liong Electronics Corp., et al. vs. Emelinda Papiona, G.R. No. 173127, October 17, 2007

Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146559, August 13, 2004

Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that rules shall be liberally construed inorder to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of everyaction and proceeding. Indeed, rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice.

Roberto Lastimoso, et al. vs. Jose J. Asayo, G.R. No. 154243, December 4, 2007

Virginia Real vs. Sisenando H. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, January 26, 2007

Teresita B. Mendoza vs. Beth David, G.R. No. 147575, October 22, 2004

Ma. Teresa Vidal vs. Ma. Teresa O. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense and are used only tohelp secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aimwould be defeated. They should be liberally construed so that litigants can have ample opportunityto prove their claims and thus prevent a denial of justice due to technicalities.

Marcelo R. Soriano vs. Sps. Ricardo and Rosalina Galit, G.R. No. 156295, September 23, 2003

As expressed in Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, "(w)hat should guide judicial action is the principlethat a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint ordefense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. . . . (T)he rules ofprocedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict


and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promotesubstantial justice, must always be eschewed."

Rosa Yap Paras, et al. vs. Ismael O. Baldado, G.R. No. 140713, March 8, 2001

Medina Investigation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144074, March 20, 2001

Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, theyshould not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that, while the Rules areliberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfectingappeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes beenrelaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course toan appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, butonly when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equityjurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Teodora Buenaflor, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000

Unity Fishing Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145415, February 2, 2001

It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time oftheir promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights doesnot preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactiveapplication of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he isadversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a generalrule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

Anita Cheng vs. Sps. William and Tessie Sy, G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical andprocedural objections is the nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues aresolely confined to the parties' private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affectingthe public, but have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised whengrave public interests are involved. Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical andprocedural where Court intervention has become imperative. Thus, we have recognized exceptionsto the threshold issues of ripeness and mootness of the petitions before us, as well as questions onlocus standi. We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the issues raised, becauseof the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or weight as precedents deservethe Court's attention and active intervention.

Liberal Party vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC inorder to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. . .

It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the


attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tendto frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. In deciding a case, theappellate court has the discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must beexercised soundly and in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account thecircumstances of the case. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excusea technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather thandispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impressionof speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

Mid-Islands Power Generation Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 189191, February 29, 2012 citing Tan v.Ballena, G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008

We cannot allow a patently wrong judgment to be implemented because of technical lapses. Thisratiocination is in keeping with the policy to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition ofevery action or proceeding.

Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010

But while we have so ruled, we recognize nonetheless that the right to appeal is an essential partof our system of judicial processes, and courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive aparty of the right to appeal. We invariably made this recognition due to our overriding concern thatevery party-litigant be given the amplest opportunity to ventilate and secure the resolution of hiscause, free from the constraints of technicalities. This line of rulings is based, no less, on the Rulesof Court which itself calls for a liberal construction of its provisions, with the objective of securingfor the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In this lineof rulings, we have repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. The lawand jurisprudence grant to courts in the exercise of their discretion along the lines laid down bythis Court the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatorycharacter, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and theparties' right to an opportunity to be heard.

Sps. Heber and Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto and Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21,2010

Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months topass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not ajustification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case.

Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 166236, July 29, 2010

While the court has the power to relax procedural rules "for persuasive and weighty reasons," thisdoes not mean that "[they] are to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance mayhave prejudiced a party's substantive rights." Just like any other rule, "[procedural rules] arerequired to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed."

Jovina Dabon Vda. de Mendez vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012


Rule 2 - Cause of Action

Conrado Pineda, et al. vs. Pedro T. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 143482, April 13, 2007

Rule 2, Sec. 1 - Ordinary civil actions, basis of

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of acause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and

(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaintbecomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of thecomplaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of actionmay be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause ofaction may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of thestipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.

Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other.On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is aground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause actionrefers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011

Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedyin the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur tothe evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. Theprocedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timelyobjection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion iswarranted.


Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011, citingRegalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, Ninth Revised Ed. (2005), p. 182

Rule 2, Sec. 2 - Cause of action, defined

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essentialelements of a cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) acorrelative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission by suchdefendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintifffor which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant. Althoughthe first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the lastelement, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or otherappropriate relief.

Philip Turner, et al. vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010

DBP vs. Silverio Q. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. 163827, August 17, 2011

With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of theRules of Court as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. This Court haslaid down the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and second casesare identical, to wit: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and formercause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of theformer action.

Goodland Co., Inc. vs. Asia United Bank, et al., G.R. Nos. 195546 & 195561, March 14, 2012

Subject to certain qualification, and except as otherwise provided by law, an action commencedbefore the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed. The fact thatthe cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while the case is pending is of nomoment. It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps no exception, either in law or in equity, that torecover at all there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit. There arereasons of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and whypeople who are in no default and against whom there is as yet no cause of action should not besummoned before the public tribunals to answer complaints which are groundless. An actionprematurely brought is a groundless suit. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause ofaction at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by theacquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or anamendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.

Philip Turner, et al. vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010, citing SurigaoMine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris, 68 Phil 113 (1939)


Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the act oromission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the followingelements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever lawit arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not toviolate such right; and, (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right ofthe plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which thelatter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

Pioneer Concrete Phil., Inc., et al. vs. Antonio D. Todaro, G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007

Kenneth O. Nadela vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 149627, September 18, 2003

Progressive Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999

Rule 2, Sec. 4 - Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

(Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court) proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisiblecause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it.

Ernesto C. Del Rosario, et al. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 150134, October31, 2007

Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action intoseveral parts or claims and instituting two or more actions therein. A single cause of action or entireclaim or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be made the subject of two or more differentactions.

A single act or omission may be violative of various rights at the same time, such as when the actconstitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. The violation of each of these rightsis a cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may be violated by several acts oromissions, there would only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two separate and distinctprimary rights are violated by one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right should beviolated by two distinct and separate legal wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each brokenby a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two causes of action would result. Causes of actionwhich are distinct and independent, although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state offact may be sued separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on the others.

Isidro Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005

A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recoveredin one case and the rest, in another. The rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations betweenthe same parties in regard to the same subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from


unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.

Progressive Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999

Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999

If a party-litigant splits his single cause of action, the other action or actions filed may bedismissed by invoking litis pendentia, pursuant to Sec. 1(e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure. This is in relation to Section 4, Rule 2 which provides for the cause and effect of thispractice.

As a general rule, therefore, the second case filed should be abated under the priority and timerule, for this is a declaration of public policy against multiplicity of suits.

Dasmarias Village Assn. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127276, December 3, 1998

Rule 2, Sec. 5 - Joinder of causes of action

United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Sps. Samuel and Odette Beluso, G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007

Well-settled is the rule that since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legalright of the plaintiff and a correlative duty of the defendant but also "an act or omission of thedefendant in violation of said legal right," the cause of action does not accrue until the partyobligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.

It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises.Accordingly, a cause of action on a written contract accrues only when an actual breach or violationthereof occurs.

China Banking Corp vs. CA, G.R. No. 153267, June 23, 2005

The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue infavor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties isinvolved. The issue of whether respondents' claims shall be lumped together is determined byparagraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified bySection 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that "where there are several claims orcauses of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amountof the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whetherthe causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions."

Pantranco vs. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005

Multiplicity of suits should be avoided if the filing of a separate and independent action torecover a claim would entail proving exactly the same claim in an existing action. It can not


however, be avoided when the cause of action in the two complaints are distinct and separate fromeach other.

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81024, February 3, 2000

Manuel Silvestre Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111715 & 112876, June 8, 2000

Rule 3, Sec. 1 - Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant

Gloria Santos Dueas vs. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Asso., G.R. No. 149417, June 4, 2004

Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 134049, June 17, 2004

Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the party complaining,and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court. In order to maintain anaction in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or itmust be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, andno suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person. 05plpe

The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when heinstitutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of action. In a suitor proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for thepurpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legallycapable of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the legalpersonality of a party defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court andnot one of procedure.

Sulpicia Ventura vs. Francis J. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 63145, October 5, 1999

There can be no legal duel in court when the one who demands satisfaction from the allegedoffender is not even the offended party.

Stefan Tito Mioza vs. Cesar Tomas Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011

Rule 3, Sec. 2 - Parties in interest

Speed Distributing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351, March 17, 2004

The afore-quoted rule (Section 2, Rule 3) has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, theplaintiff must be the real party in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of thereal party in interest. Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution of


actions by persons without any right or title to or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actualparty entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.

Jose Max S. Ortiz vs. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 151983-84, July 31, 2008

Sps. Anthony and Percita Oco vs. Victor Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006

The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by thejudgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest", as contemplated by the Rules,means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguishedfrom mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rulerefers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interestto protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.

Jose Max Ortiz vs. San Miguel Corp., G.R. Nos. 151983-84, July 31, 2008

The rules of court define a real party-in-interest as "the party who stands to be benefited orinjured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Every action,therefore, can only be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corp. vs. Macroasia Corp., G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, 176226 &176319, December 19, 2007

Rule 3, Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides explicitly that every action must be prosecutedand defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Eduardo L. Rayo vs. Metropolitan Bank, et al., G.R. No. 165142, December 10, 2007

In Re: Reversion / Recall of Reconstituted Titles in Tarlac Registry of Deeds, G.R. No. 171304, October10, 2007

This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real partyin interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by personswithout any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal reliefbe the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigationand keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an interest in issue to beaffected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about thequestion involved. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of thecourt as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case isdismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Rural Bankers Association of the Phil. vs. Ma. Rosario Tanghal-Salvana, G.R. No. 175020, October 4,2007


Sps. Anthony and Percita Oco vs. Victor Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006

Real party-in-interest is a concept in civil procedure and is expressly defined in the Rules ofCourt.

Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 168484, July 12, 2007

Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio C. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003

According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party whostands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of thesuit.

Samahang Magsasasaka ng 53 Hektarya vs. Wilfredo G. Mosquera, et al., G.R. No. 152430, March 22,2007

The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by thejudgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules,means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguishedfrom mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rulerefers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interestto protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.

Mayor Dagadag vs. Tongnawa, G.R. No. 161166-67, February 3, 2005

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by thedecree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a realparty-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present realowner of the right sought to be enforced."

Stefan Tito Mioza vs. Cesar Tomas Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011

The party-in-interest applies not only to the plaintiff but also to the defendant. "Interest" withinthe meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decreeas distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A realparty in interest is one who has a legal right. Since a contract may be violated only by the partiesthereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either asplaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract. The action must be brought by theperson who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.

Ma. Teresa Vidal, et al. vs. Ma. Teresa O. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003

"Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to beaffected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mereincidental interest. This means that the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive


law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.

Alvin Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003

Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of thesuit." Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts doneby the government. It bears stressing that "a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the actcomplained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds from taxation."

Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio C. Carreon, et al., G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003

To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a"direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affectedby the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locusstandi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or withmaterial interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue ofcritical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality inrelation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, haswaived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injuredby the operation of a law or any other government act.

Dennis A. B. Funa vs. Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

The Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may beextended standing to sue, thusly:

1) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds orthat the tax measure is unconstitutional;

2) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of theelection law in question;

3) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are oftranscendental importance which must be settled early; and

4) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained ofinfringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Dennis A. B. Funa vs. Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012 citing David v.Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3,2006

Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real party in interest is defined as "theparty who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to theavails of the suit." "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest inissue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a


desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on theother hand, means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

VSC Commercial Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121159, December 16, 2002

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in thesuit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantialinterest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate orconsequential interest.

Shipside Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action "must beprosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest." This means that the action mustbe brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced and notnecessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the recovery.

Gilda C. Lim vs. Patricia Lim-Yu, G.R. No. 138343, February 19, 2001

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Universal International Group of Taiwan, G.R. No. 131680,September 14, 2000

Eliseo Fajardo, Jr. vs. Freedom to Build, G.R. No. 134692, August 1, 2000

Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000

Philippine Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124658, December 15, 1999

Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real party in interest in the case cannot beexecuted. Hence, a complaint filed against such a person should be dismissed for failure to state acause of action.

Alfredo N. Aguila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127347, November 25, 1999

If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismissmay be filed on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action (Sec. 1(g), Rule 16).

Eduardo Balagtas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109073, October 20, 1999

By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy ora future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

Emiliano R. "Boy" Caruncho III vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 135996, September 30, 1999

Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed.

Angela C. Tankiko, et al. vs. Justiniano Cezar, et. al., G.R. No. 131277, February 2, 1999

The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without


any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be theone to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation andkeep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy

Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the realparty-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.

Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, orthat the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of publicfunds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer,however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of publicfunds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing theillegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of theenforcement of the questioned statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer's suit to prosper,two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a politicalsubdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committedand (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. In light of the foregoing, it is apparentthat contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge itsvalidity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by thegovernment.

Manuel N. Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009

[L]egal standing in suits is governed by the "real parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3of the Rules of Court. This states that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name ofthe real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is one who stands to be benefited or injuredby the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff'sstanding is based on his own right to the relief sought.

Jose L. Atienza, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010 citing David v.Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have apersonal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, directinjury as a result of its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illuminationof difficult constitutional questions." In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a personwho is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a "stranger," or as a"citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that publicfunds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that


public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greaterimport than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal woundinflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management, et al., G.R. No.164987, April 24, 2012

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack theconstitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but alsotaxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised bytaxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure ofpublic moneys.

Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management, et al., G.R. No.164987, April 24, 2012 citing Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331, 342-343 (1960)

Rule 3, Sec. 3 - Representatives as parties

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring thesuit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lackof advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan vs. Young, this Court recognized thelegal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administrationpending the appointment of an administrator.

Teodora A. Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004

For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognizedthe heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administratorappointed by the court.

Virginia O. Gochan vs. Richard G. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001

Rule 3, Sec. 6 - Permissive joinder of parties

Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.148560, November 19, 2001


Rule 3, Sec. 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

Ma. Valentina Santana-Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120176, July 20, 2001

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interestwithout whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined eitheras plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civilaction requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of allindispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for theexercise of judicial power.

Victoria Regner vs. Cynthia R. Logarta, et al., G.R. No. 168747, October 19, 2007

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interestwithout whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined eitheras plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civilaction requires the joinder of all necessary parties where possible and the joinder of allindispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for theexercise of judicial power.

Simplicio Galicia, et al. vs. Lourdes Manliquez, et al., G.R. No. 155785, April 13, 2007

Marcelino Arcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997

An indispensable party has been defined as one: [who] must have a direct interest in thelitigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, ifthe court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have aninjurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence willbe inconsistent with equity and good conscience.

There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiffwithout the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits withoutprejudicing the rights of the other party? There is, however, no fixed formula for determining whois an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of theparticular suit or litigation.

Speed Distributing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351, March 17, 2004

Andrea D. Domingo vs. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004

Drianita Bagaoisan, et al. vs. National Tobacco Administration, G.R. No. 152845, August 5, 2003


A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either on the basis ofliability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.


China Banking Corporation vs. Mercedes M. Oliver, G.R. No. 135796, October 3, 2002

It is clear that the presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court withjurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Theabsence of indispensable parties renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void,because of that court's want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to thosepresent. 05plpe

Rebecca T. Cabutihan vs. Landcenter Construction & Development Corp., G.R. No. 146594, June 10,2002

Metropolitan Bank vs. Floro T. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties whopossess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights,so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. A party is indispensable if his interest inthe subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with the otherparties' interest.

Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. vs. Catalino U. Villamater, et al., G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010

Rule 3, Sec. 8 - Necessary party


Rule 3, Sec. 9 - Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissalof an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may beadded by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the actionand/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite theorder of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failureto comply therewith.

Rene B. Pascual vs. Jaime M. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010

Heirs of Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, A.M. No. CA-01-32, January 23, 2002


The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At anystage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion ofa party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead anindispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for theplaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to beindispensable.

Pamplona Plantation Co. vs. Tinghel, G.R. No. 159121, February 3, 2005

Rule 3, Sec. 10 - Unwilling co-plaintiff

Ramon Ramos vs. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., G.R. No. 140848, April 25, 2002

Rule 3, Sec. 11 - Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Union Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131729, May 19, 1998

Ma. Linda T. Almendras vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110067, August 3, 1998

Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al., G.R. No. 106615, March 20, 2002


Mabayo Farms vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058, August 1, 2002

China Banking Corporation vs. Mercedes M. Oliver, G.R. No. 135796, October 3, 2002


Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is aground for the dismissal of an action, thus:

The proper remedy is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court,either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensableparty or give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensableparties. If the plaintiff ordered to include the indispensable party refuses to comply with the order ofthe court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's ownmotion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is theaction dismissed.


Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. vs. Catalino U. Villamater, et al., G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010

Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.

Littie Sarah a. Agdeppa, et al. vs. Heirs of Ignacio Bonete, G.R. No. 164436, January 15, 2010

Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such acase, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added byorder of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/orsuch times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable partydespite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for thepetitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Mamindiara P. Mangotara, et al., G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505, 173355-56,173401, 173563-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7, 2010, citing Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No.152643, August 28, 2008

Rule 3, Sec. 12 - Class suit

In order that a class suit may prosper, Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires theconcurrence of three (3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy isone of common or general interest to many persons; (2) that the parties are so numerous that it isimpracticable to bring them all before the court; and (3) that the action be maintained by parties whowill fairly and adequately represent the class.

MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da'wah Council, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

Rule 3, Sec. 16 - Death of party; duty of counsel

Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al., G.R. No. 144891, May 27, 2004

Asuncion Macias, et al. vs. Mariano Lim, et al., G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004

City Sheriff, et al. vs. Alfaro Fortunado, et al., G.R. No. 80390, March 27, 1998

Ang Kek Chen vs. Amalia R. Andrade, AM RTJ-99-1504, November 16, 1999

Maria Mercedes Nery, et al. vs. Gabriel Leyson, et al., G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000

The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to thelitigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself


protected as he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legalrepresentative of his estate.

Antonio C. Sumaljag vs. Sps. Diosdidit and Menendez M. Literato, et al., G.R. No. 149787, June 18,2008

Failure of a counsel to comply with the Section 16 of Rule 3 is a ground for disciplinary action.

Crisologo C. Domingo vs. Severino Landicho, et al., G.R. No. 170015, August 29, 2007

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitutionby a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenorseeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestantprescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, wehave every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a propertytransmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow orthe heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.

In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee butdenied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, inthe later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the claim of thesurviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even inanalogous cases before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a deceasedprotestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by thewife or heirs.

Ronald Allan Poe vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice ofAppeal, petitioner's counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceasedclient who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court'sdecision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.

Domingo Carabeo vs. Sps. Norberto and Susan Dingco, G.R. No. 190823, April 4, 2011

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and thedamage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarilyand principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, whilein the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the propertyand rights of property affected being incidental.

Domingo Carabeo vs. Sps. Norberto and Susan Dingco, G.R. No. 190823, April 4, 2011, citing Bonilla v.Barcena, G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976


Rule 3, Sec. 19 - Transfer of interest

State Investment House vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106795, November 16, 1999

Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 134049, June 17, 2004

Section 19 of Rule 3 of Rules of Court uses the word "may" to denote that the substitution ofparties on account of transfer of interest from the original party to another is discretionary.

Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007

Rule 3, Sec. 20 - Action on contractual money claims

Vivencio M. Ruiz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 116909, February 25, 1999

Purita Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000

Natalia Realty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002

Melencio Gabriel vs. Nelson Bilon, et al., G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007

Rule 3, Sec. 21 - Indigent party

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Jorge Valdez, G.R. Nos. 150107 & 150108, January28, 2008

Teofilo Martinez vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 132852, May 31, 2000

Rule 3, Sec. 22 - Notice to the Solicitor General

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. La Suerte Cigar, G.R. No. 144942, June 28, 2001

Rule 4 - Venue of Actions


While stipulations regarding venue are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in acontract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules ofCourt in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.

Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc., et al. vs. Klaus K. Schonfeld. G.R. No. 166920, February 19,2007

Rule 4, Sec. 1 - Venue of real actions

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue ofvenue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherethe real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall becommenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffsresides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.

Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010

A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possessionof real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the propercourt which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, issituated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or anyof the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Yahya M. Tomawis vs. Rasad G. Balindong, et al. G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010 citing Orbeta v.Orbeta, G.R. No. 166837, November 27, 2006

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when thesuit relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make itnecessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the contractshould be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should bestrictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles offreedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to beallowed free access to courts of justice.

Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient forthe parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restrictionshould be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venuestipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will createunwarranted restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.


Moreover, since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules on venue, venue stipulation shouldbe deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves theparties' convenience. Contrawise, the rules mandated by the Rules of Court should govern.

SMC vs. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 30, 2005

By express provision of Section 417 of the LGC, an action for the enforcement of the settlementshould be instituted in the proper municipal or city court. This is regardless of the nature of thecomplaint before the Lupon, and the relief prayed for therein. The venue for such actions isgoverned by Rule 4, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. An action for theenforcement of a settlement is not one of those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure in civilcases; hence, the rules on regular procedure shall apply, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 5 of theRules of Civil Procedure, as amended.


Real actions, as so opposed to personal actions, are those which affect the title to or possession ofreal property. Where a contrary claim to ownership is made by an adverse party, and where therelief prayed for cannot be granted without the court deciding on the merits the issue of ownershipand title, more specifically so as to who, between the contending parties, would have a better rightto the property, the case can only be but a real action.



Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003

Rule 4, Sec. 2 - Venue of personal actions

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue ofvenue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherethe real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall becommenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffsresides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.

Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010

A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possessionof real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the propercourt which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is


situated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or anyof the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Yahya M. Tomawis vs. Rasad G. Balindong, et al. G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010 citing Orbeta v.Orbeta, G.R. No. 166837,November 27, 2006

The general rule on the venue of personal actions, as in a case for damages, is embodied inSection 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court The rule, however, finds no application where the parties,before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue.

Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs. Warren Embes Luyaben, G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007

Uniwide Holdings, Inc. vs. Alexander M. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not toplaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The rule on venue, likeother procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or theimpartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. The option of plaintiff inpersonal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found,or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.

Aniceto Saludo, Jr. vs. American Express Int'l Inc, G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006

An action for damages being a personal action, venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2of the Rules of Court.

Davao Light vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001



Anita Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125027, August 12, 2002

Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003

Rule 4, Sec. 4 - When Rule not applicable

Section 2 of Rule 4 is, however, qualified by Section 4 of the same rule which allows parties,before the filing of the action, to validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue.

Uniwide Holdings, Inc. vs. Alexander M. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007

The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on which


an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough topreclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that suchstipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties' intention to restrict the filing of asuit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictionalrequirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable,do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In theabsence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement onadditional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.

Anita Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125027, August 12, 2002

Rule 5 - Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts

Sps. Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina vs. Humberto D. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002

Rule 5, Sec. 1 - Uniform procedure


Rule 6, Sec. 5 - Defenses

Reynaldo T. Cometa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124062, January 21, 1999

Alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly exculpate a person accused of a crime.However, this is true only if the accused's alibi strictly meets the following requisites:

1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and

2. The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011

This Court has ruled consistently that alibi is an inherently weak defense and should be rejectedwhen the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution.Moreover, for alibi to overcome the prosecution's evidence, the defense must successfully prove theelement of physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime scene at the time of the


perpetration of the offense. Physical impossibility in relation to alibi takes into consideration notonly the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where accusedmaintains he was, but more importantly, the accessibility between these points. . . . By physicalimpossibility, we refer to the distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and theplace where he says he was when the crime was committed.

People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, citing People vs.Bihag, Jr. and Hilot, 396 Phil. 289 (2000)

It is well-settled that since alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevailover and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accusedperpetrated the crime.

People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, citing People vs.Bihag, Jr. and Hilot, 396 Phil. 289 (2000)

Jurisprudential rules and precepts guide this Court in assessing the proffered defense. One, alibisand denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak. Two, they cannot prevail over thepositive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for alibi to prosper, theaccused must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, butalso that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of itscommission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated bycredible and disinterested witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility ofwitnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court unless patently and clearly inconsistent must be accepted.

People of the Phil. vs. Juanito Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, citing People vs. Estoya,G.R. No. 153538, May 19, 2004

Alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself andhis or her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms and not by credible persons.

Victor Rondina vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 179059, June 13, 2012 citing People v. Alfredo, G.R.No. 188560, December 15, 2010

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no illmotive on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of theminstitute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did notcommit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that thedefense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification ofthe accused as the perpetrator of the crime.

People of the Phil. vs. Francisca Talaro, et al., G.R. No. 175781, March 20, 2012 citing People vs.Molina, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009

It is elementary that the defense of denial is outweighed by a positive identification that iscategorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying onthe matter. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and


self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

People of the Phil. vs. Antonio L. Baldomar, G.R. No. 197043, February 29, 2012

Rule 6, Sec. 6 - Counterclaim

Felipe Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131692, June 10, 1999

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. Itpartakes of the nature of a complaint or cause of action against the plaintiff. It is an independentaction, separate and distinct from the original complaint.

Johnny K. Lima, et al. vs. Transway Sales Corp., et al, G.R. No. 106770, October 22, 1999

Rule 6, Sec. 7 - Compu

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