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64 East Asia / Winter 2004

Regional Security ComplexTheory and Chinese Policy

towards North Korea

Tuva Kahrs

With the end of the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War, emphasis on the systemlevel power structure (dominant in international relations theory since the riseof neorealism in the late 1970s) has declined. One of the most interestingtheoretical developments to have emerged in this context is Regional SecurityComplex Theory (RSCT). Like neorealism, RSCT focuses on security. How-ever, the rationale behind early Security Complex Theory was that for themajority of states, the most relevant scale for conceptualising military andpolitical security functioned at the regional rather than the system level.1RSCT

has now opened the analysis to a wider range of sectorsincluding economic,societal and environmental securityand the tendency to refer to units ratherthan states acknowledges the importance of agencies other than the state interms of security. Nevertheless, the central idea remains that because mostthreats travel most easily over short distances, security interdependence isnormally patterned into regionally based clusters, called security complexes.

This essay seeks to examine RSCT with reference to the region, or subre-gion, of Northeast Asia, focusing on Chinese policy towards the DemocraticPeoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) after the Cold War. Northeast Asia is nota straightforward area to look at, because of the difficulty in distinguishing

between the regional and the global levels. There is a heavy American mili-tary presence, and three of the main actors with security interests in the re-gionthe United States, China and the Russian Federationare nuclearweapons states with permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council.Nevertheless, Northeast Asia is an important area in terms of securitybe-cause of the heavy concentration of military capability, high levels of tension,the economic and technological capacity to support a hi-tech arms race andthe absence of a multilateral security frameworkand provides a worthwhilecontext in which to assess the analytical applicability of RSCT.

The Korean peninsula features prominently in Northeast Asian security

concerns. China, Japan, Russia and the US all consider Korea to fall, to someextent, within their own geo-strategic sphere, and all recognise that change on

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the Korean peninsula could significantly alter the balance of power in theregion. With international concern about the DPRKs nuclear and missileprogrammes, as well as the growing economic strength of the Republic of

Korea (ROK), the potential for Koreans to drive international events has in-creased. Chinas role remains central, however, and the development of Chi-nese security practice and foreign policy is itself an issue of regional andglobal interest.

Beginning with a closer look at RSCT and its relevance as a tool for study-ing security practice in Northeast Asia, this essay will consider Koreas piv-otal position in regional security dynamics and the concerns of each of thesurrounding powers in relation to the peninsula. Chinas relationship with theDPRK will be examined in greater depth, focusing on contemporary policyissues and Chinese policy concerns. In conclusion, the possibility will be raised

that the current nuclear crisis is leading to change in Chinese policy, and thatthis may have implications for the gradual emergence of a multilateral secu-rity regime in Northeast Asia.

The Theoretical Framework

It is tempting to assume that because of the lack of significant multilateralorganisations for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, and because statesin the region themselves largely favour a realist outlook,2 neorealism is thetheory most relevant to understanding and explaining international relations

in Northeast Asia. RSCT does not contradict the salience of certain features ofrealism, but offers a more nuanced approach that also accommodatesconstructivist concerns.

Unlike neorealism and other systemic theories, RSCT does not seek to im-pose one dominant theory on the international system as a whole. To pictureglobal security accurately, it is argued, the regional and global levels must beunderstood independently, as must the interaction between them. The re-gional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, andwhere most of the action occurs.3 In prioritising a lower level of analysis thanmore abstract systemic theories, RSCT offers a practical framework for securityanalysis and a better chance of reflecting the real concerns of policy-makers.

In addition to emphasising the regional level, RSCT stands apart fromneorealism by incorporating social construction in its approach, thereby mak-ing greater allowance for the potential for change in security dynamics andstructures. From the neorealist perspective, states operate in an anarchical sys-tem where each must concentrate on strengthening its power and securitycapabilities even if this induces insecurity in others. RSCT does not disputethe anarchical structure, but assumes that within this structure the essentialcharacter of a Regional Security Complex (RSC) is defined by a couple ofindependent variables: the distribution of power and patterns of amity andenmity in the form of geographically coherent patterns of security interdepen-dence.4 Security in Northeast Asia, for example, is affected by history both interms of durable enmities and a degree of shared culture, and cannotthere-

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The internal dynamics of a security complex are located across a spectrumaccording to whether the defining security interdependence is driven by am-ity or enmity.5 At the negative end lies conflict formation, in which interde-

pendence arises from fear, rivalry and mutual perceptions of threat. In themiddle lie security regimes, in which states still treat each other as potentialthreats but have made reassurance arrangements to reduce the security di-lemma among them. At the positive end of the spectrum lies a security com-munity, in which states no longer expect or prepare to use force in their relationswith each other. Arguably, the discussion of regional security in terms ofcomplexes is a first necessary step in clearing the ground for a potential de-velopment of security regimes or communities.6As Buzan and Waever note,7

Northeast Asia remains a conflict formation even as Southeast Asia has evolvedto a security regime.

It should be mentioned that Buzan and Waever, in their pioneering work onRSCT, do not consider Northeast Asia as an RSC. They do not deny that North-east Asia conforms to their basic definition, as a set of units whose majorprocesses of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked thattheir security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart fromone another.8They argue, however, that in the mid-1990s Northeast Asiaand Southeast Asia began to merge into a single RSC, within which NortheastAsia forms a subregional complex. According to them, with the establishmentof the ASEAN Regional Forum and Vietnams membership of ASEAN in themid-1990s, the point was reached at which the interregional dynamics of East

Asia overrode the regional ones.

9

This is debatable. The case for an emergent East Asian security complexrests on three parallel developments: a shared concern throughout East Asiaabout the implications of growing Chinese power, the creation of institutionalsecurity connections, and the build-up of an East Asian regional economy.While these claims are all correct, they arguably do not constitute somethinggreater than the sum of their parts. Concern about the implications of growingChinese power has long been shared by India, but according to Buzan andWaever that does not mean that South Asia forms an RSC with Southeast andNortheast Asia. Rather, Asia as a whole constitutes a supercomplex that alsoencompasses Australia.10As for the institutional security connections betweenNortheast and Southeast Asia, they are partial and fragile, as Buzan and Waeveradmit.11With regard to the build-up of an East Asian regional economy, it issignificant for Northeast Asia but overshadowed by the economic interdepen-dence within Northeast Asia and between Northeast Asia and the US.

This brings us to the definition of the Northeast Asian RSC itself. In Buzanand Waevers scheme, China and Japan are members of the East Asian com-plex, but Russia and the USA are not.12 Instead, they are treated in terms ofpenetration or overlay. Without suggesting that the US is a Northeast Asianstate, it would be possible to make the case that it is part of the NortheastAsian security complex. This argument would be based on 1) the emphasis inNortheast Asia on economic security and the economic interdependence be-tween China, Japan and the US, and 2) Buzan and Waevers own definition of

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may not coincide with more general understandings of what constitutes a re-gion. With regard to the US, however, their explanation in terms of penetra-tion is convincing. This mechanism occurs when outside powers make

security alignments with states within an RSC.13

For Russia, on the other hand, the security interdependence of its easternprovinces with the rest of Northeast Asia is self-evident, and likely to increasewith growing energy interdependence. For a start, Russia shares a border withChina of approximately 4,000 kilometres, not to mention boundaries with theDPRK and Japan. As Buzan and Waever themselves argue with reference tothe concept of region: if it does not mean geographical proximity [it] doesnot mean anything.14 Naturally, if one treats East Asia as a whole as an RSC,Russia appears peripheral. But, as Buzan and Waever write,15 the USA orRussia can decide whether or not to be in Southeast Asia in a way China

cannot. To paraphrase, the US can decide whether or not to be in NortheastAsia in a way Russia cannot.Until the East Asian complex is more strongly integrated, it would seem

more fruitful to treat Northeast Asia as a regional rather than a subregionalcomplex. It would no doubt become more manageable for East Asia to de-velop into a coherent security complex if Northeast Asia converges with South-east Asia on the conflict formation / security regime spectrum. In this essay, atleast, Northeast Asia and its particular security dynamics will be treated as aRegional Security Complex.

In addition to the difficulty of defining the geographical boundaries of re-

gional security complexes, disagreement may arise over the basic definitionof an RSC, for example what actually constitutes a major process ofsecuritisation or desecuritisation, and how to determine whether the securityproblems of a set of units can or cannot reasonably be analysed or resolvedapart from one another. Nevertheless, this essay argues that RSCT provides auseful framework for the analysis of security issues in Northeast Asia.

A key reason for the applicability of RSCT in a study of Chinese policytowards the DPRK is that it accepts the durability of power politics withoutrejecting the possibility of international society. The view that both the distri-bution of power and patterns of amity and enmity determine the character ofan RSC is highly relevant to a discussion of security in Northeast Asia. Thereis not the scope in this essay to discuss the role of RSCs as a response toglobalisation. However, it is clear that RSCTs focus on the regional levelworks very well in capturing the interplay between domestic and global secu-rity dynamics, a key feature of Chinas policy towards the DPRK.

Korea in the Regional Security Complex

Situated where the interests of greater powers converge, the Korean penin-sula plays a pivotal role in the politics of Northeast Asia. Historically per-ceived by its neighbours as both opportunity and threat, Korea is strategicallyimportant, positioned where shifts in the regional balance of power are playedout. The peninsula is also volatile; on several occasions conflict of interest

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change in Korea has the potential to alter the structure of the Northeast AsianRSC. Against this background, a brief look at the concerns of Koreasneighbours will help to understand the dynamics of the RSC and provide

context for the case study to follow.In the longer term, the surrounding countries wish to prevent a reunifiedKorea from tilting towards one of the other powers in the region. The degreeof external support for reunification would largely depend on the circum-stances leading to unification and the nature of the process itself. Althoughthe situation for the last five decades has been very tense, there is awarenessthat any attempt to force change could cause greater instability and wouldentail the risk of war.

From the Chinese perspective, diversions from the drive for domestic eco-nomic development are unwelcome. The preferable scenario in the DPRK is

gradual reform; not so major as to destabilise the ruling regime, but enough toimprove the DPRK economy and bring the country in line with internationalnorms. In brief, China is reluctant to see American control over the process ofchange on the peninsula, seeks to maximise its influence in Northeast Asiathrough its relationship with the DPRK, prefers a nuclear weapons-free Koreaand is concerned about the security of its northeastern border.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USSR was transformed fromdiplomatic guarantor and economic supporter of the DPRK to recipient ofeconomic support from the ROK. The Russian relationship with the DPRKhas improved under Putin, providing the DPRK with a way to reduce its de-

pendence on China. Russian involvement in Korea can be seen as motivatedby relations with the US, development of the Russian Far East and a desire toreassert Russian interests in Asia. However, compared with China, Russia atpresent has limited influence and weak interests in Korea.

Through security alignments, the US continues to play a major role in thesecurity relationships of East Asian countries after the Cold War. At present,the ROK hosts 37,000 or so American troops, and Japan an even greater num-ber. This military presence enables the US to assert itself in the region, as inthe Taiwan straits in 1996, but upheaval or reconciliation on the Korean pen-insula would necessarily lead to reconsideration of the basis for maintainingthe American security presence in Northeast Asia. It has been argued that theoutcome most threatening to American interests is a unified Korea alignedwith a hostile China.16

The Japanese occupation of Korea and attempt to create the Greater EastAsia Co-Prosperity Sphere left enduring patterns of enmity that continue toinfluence Northeast Asian security dynamics. Notably, suspicion among Japansneighbours about its militarist past is one reason why Japan is unable to assertitself in East Asia today, for example by taking the lead in the development ofa regional security regime. The poor relationship with the DPRK remains anobstacle for Japan in overcoming its colonial and wartime legacy. However,the Japanese are wary of the bill they will be expected to foot for reconstruc-tion in the North, and there is concern about the prospect of a reunified Koreaaligned with China. It has been suggested that even a reunified Korea that

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ture strategic position.17 Certainly, reconciliation on the peninsula would callinto question the long-term viability of the American security presence andJapanese subordination. It might also complicate relations with China, since

the DPRK currently provides formal justification for a number of securityinitiatives involving Japan.Considering Northeast Asias turbulent history, it is hardly surprising that

patterns of amity and enmity play a significant role in the regions securitydynamics. RSCTs recognition of these patterns is an important reason for itsutility in the Northeast Asian context. Nowhere is the effect of patterns ofenmity more obvious than between the two Koreas, which for over half acentury have interpreted their common history differently and refused for-mally to recognise the legitimacy of the other state. Confucianism and othercultural and historical links also ensure some amity-driven features in the re-

gion. On the other hand, as RSCT clearly recognises, material issues are alsofundamental. More tangible concerns that affect security in Northeast Asiainclude several unsettled territorial issues and conflicting maritime claims.These unresolved problems clearly have an impact on the dynamics of theRSC.

China-US relations are critical, partly because they influence the nature ofthe relationship between China and Japan. This triangle is the key to the char-acter of the Northeast Asian security complex. However, the dynamics of thistriangle and each of its components, including the future role of the US in EastAsia, remain a source of uncertainty.

As Northeast Asias main crisis point, the DPRK intersects with China-USrelations and the regional security structure. Because of the dire state of theDPRKs economy and infrastructure, reunification with the ROK under cur-rent circumstances would probably mean absorption of the North by the South.Not only is this an undesirable outcome for the DPRK regime, but it wouldcreate an immense social and economic burden for the ROK. In other words,the outcome of the Korean conflict depends not only on the political relation-ship between the two Koreas, but also on reform in the DPRK. The recentnuclear crisis has brought this question, along with the issue of nuclear prolif-eration, firmly to the forefront of Northeast Asian security issues. In the ab-sence of a multilateral security framework, the most important outside factorfor a viable resolution is arguably Chinese policy towards the DPRK. Accord-ingly, this key relationship forms the basis of the following case study.

Characterising Chinese Security and Foreign Policy

Since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asias security landscape has beendramatically altered by the collapse of the USSR, the elevation of the US tothe position of sole superpower, and the growing weight of China. The localand regional dimensions of security have become increasingly salient, but thedevelopment of a more independent regional system is likely to be gradual and its configuration may not become firm for some time to come.18

With the regional security configuration in a state of flux, Chinas rising

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nificance remain unclear, because of uncertainty both as to how Chinas enor-mous domestic problems are to be addressed, and as to the extent to whichthe Chinese will cooperate with their neighbours in approaches to regional

problems.19

The inter-relatedness of these uncertainties reflects the interac-tion of the domestic and international aspects of Chinas security concerns.This is one of the reasons why RSCT, which emphasises the regional level asthe point of interaction between local and external influences, is a suitabletheoretical framework for the case study. It is also a reason why Chinas policytowards the DPRK, which reflects both domestic and international Chinesepolicy concerns, is an appropriate case study with which to test the practicalviability of RSCT.

Chinese security and foreign policy have been transformed from the ideal-ism (lixiang zhuyi) or revolutionary internationalism of the first two decades

of the Peoples Republic to one of pragmatism (shiyong zhuyi). Gradually,China has come to be seen as a system maintainer or system exploiterrather than a system challenger.20 Domestically, this change is illustrated bythe way in which the Chinese Communist Party has effectively tied its legiti-macy to economic growth. Failure to improve peoples living standards wouldalmost certainly cause widespread social unrest, challenging the control ofthe Party and the government. In other words, the legitimacy of the Party andthe regime no longer depends on its revolutionary credentials, but on its abil-ity to deliver what it promises.21

It is clear that Chinas overriding priority is economic development, for

which a peaceful and stable international environment is required. Despitethis, there is constant international speculation about whether China has reallybecome a socialised member of international society. It is widely suspectedthat China follows a neorealist logic clothed in the rhetoric of global interde-pendence.22 In other words, China engages in international cooperation inform but not in essence, in order to enhance its material strength. This relatesto the concept of comprehensive security, which emphasises the link betweennational security and economic prosperity (security seen in terms ofquanfangwei, duocengci:all aspects, many levels), which RSCT is sufficientlyflexible to accommodate. From a constructivist point of view, on the otherhand, Chinas cooperation with international regimes will gradually becomeinternalised and substantial. Participation in multilateral organisations is a pro-cess of acquiring new role identities, not just of creating external constraintson the behaviour of exogenously constituted actors.23 RSCT also allows forthis possibility.

While it is too early to say how China will come to use its growing materialstrength, it is clear that the policy of comprehensive security introduced in theearly-mid 1990s invested China-US relations with greater significance. As aresult, China will not willingly put its trading relationship with the US in jeop-ardy, and the Chinese government certainly has no intention of challengingthe US over the DPRK. Despite official rhetoric criticising the unipolarity ofthe international order and American hegemony, China does not believe itcan change the present system, and perceives that any attempt to do so

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Chinas concept of comprehensive security also embodies the political.Zhang argues that Chinas social experiences of revolution, war and reformhave accentuated the insecurity and vulnerability of the Chinese state and

regime.25

In other words, Chinas concept of security is shaped by an insecu-rity complex with an emphasis on internal security challenges. This is re-flected in the focus on state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interferencearticulated by the Chinese government26 and accentuated by Chinas currentdevelopment problems. These include rising expectations and inequality, highunemployment, the lack of a welfare state, widespread corruption, issues ofadministrative reform and mechanisms for dealing with local interests, andfinancial sector reform.

Chinas concern with domestic stability is unsurprising, therefore, and islinked with issues of territorial integrity. As an empire, China had ill-defined

borders, largely consisting of buffer territories with populations ethnically dis-tinct from the Han Chinese. The Peoples Republic has gradually been con-solidating its borders, but as a multinational state it is highly concerned aboutseparatism. China has 56 officially recognised nationalities, some of whommay have a degree of attachment to a neighbouring country. That includes theKorean minority, which exceeds two million. While Chinas focus on nationalsovereignty may seem anachronistic, it is also part of what Buzan and Waeverdescribe as the new security agenda, which often focuses on concerns aboutidentity and migration,27 again illustrating the relevance of RSCTs approachcombining traditional and more recent concepts of security.

Consideration of identity, national sovereignty and non-interference is con-nected with the question of Chinas relationship to international society. Themembership criteria for international society have been changing, and to agreater extent than before they have come to include solidarist rather thanpluralist conceptions of international society.28 This makes it difficult forChina to conform to the expectations of international society: greater toler-ance of, and sympathy for, the claims of ethno-nationalism manifested in theinternational community constitutes a new challenge to Chinas managementof ethnic conflicts, which threaten the integrity of China.29On the other hand,if China does not adapt to the new membership criteria for international soci-ety, it will no doubt face negative consequences for failing to be a responsibleparticipant.

This may be one reason why China has been taking a more active role inthe Korean nuclear crisis since 2003, although clearly stability and domesticsecurity are Chinas primary concerns. Some would argue that Chinas rela-tionship with the DPRK is driven, to a large extent, by a desire to enhanceChinas regional and international standing. As You notes, the role of bridgehas serviced Sino-US relations well when they encounter difficulties in otherareas.30Certainly there is an element of maximising Chinas leverage as abalancer and link between the DPRK and the US. In several respects, ChinasNorth Korea policy is made to order for exploring the interplay between Chinaand the outside world.31 It has even been suggested that Chinas support forPyongyang has to do with acquiring influence as the starting point for a

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The argument that China has developed the strategic understanding thatany weakening of influence over the DPRK would degrade its strategic statusand interests in Northeast Asia in general33 does make sense, because the

Korean peninsula is the key arena where China can play a global role. On theother hand, the North Koreans rightly perceive that Chinese aid and diplo-matic support are given in Chinese self-interest. Wielding the power of a weakstate, the DPRK has the potential to entrap China and its other neighbours ina spiral of conflict escalation that these governments would rather avoid.34

Therefore, Chinas security policy has to be carefully balanced. Before study-ing Chinas current policy dilemma in greater detail, however, it is necessaryto consider Koreas significance in Chinese security policy.

China and North Korea

There is no doubt about the strategic importance to China of the Koreanpeninsula, which is geographically close to the Chinese capital and the heavyindustries of the Northeast, as well as to major ports. When Korea is underexternal control, Chinas heartland is threatenedas illustrated by events fol-lowing Japans colonisation of Korea in 1910. Determining precisely how toprotect Chinas interests and ensure stability on the northeastern border is notso straightforward, however. It is particularly difficult to achieve consensuson how best to persuade the DPRK regime to give up its nuclear programme,and to gauge how far China can or should pressure the DPRK regime to re-

form in order to make the situation more sustainable and any change lessthreatening to stability.Since the 1950s, the assumption among Chinese policy-makers has clearly

been that the survival of the DPRK regime is indispensable to Chinas nationalsecurity. Interviews with Chinese analysts indicate that this is still the domi-nant view among the leadership, but it has been suggested that this assump-tion should be reviewed in light of the DPRKs nuclear developmentprogrammes. A leading Chinese academic published an article in early 2003arguing that Chinas interests are best served by prioritising a nuclear weap-ons-free Korea, and that if this goal cannot be achieved through diplomacyalone, economic means of pressure should be considered in addition. 35

It is worth noting that while there are still a number of high level personalconnections linking the two Parties, militaries and governments, the genera-tion of Chinese leaders that experienced the War to Resist America and AidKorea is passing. There is a lack of consensus on the best way to pursueChinese interests on the peninsula. Interviews suggest that among the youngergeneration there is a tendency to view the DPRK as a liability that escalatestension and that has failed to develop along with the rest of the region. TheChinese leadership faces the question of whether it is possible to alter theChina-DPRK relationship from the current special relationship to a normalrelationship without losing the benefits that China derives from the leverageassociated with its relationship with the DPRK.

Despite the strategic realignments in Northeast Asia following the end of

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periphery has remained Chinas major concern. When it took the step ofrecognising the ROK in 1992, China also increased military cooperation andeconomic aid to the DPRK. Upon the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, China

immediately recognised his son Kim Jong Il as the new leader of the DPRK,presumably in the hope of helping to ensure a smooth transition of power inthe DPRK. By providing more aid in a wider variety of forms Beijing be-came more deeply involved, playing a more active role (indeed every year acrucial role) in the politics of regime survival.36

It is widely assumed that without Chinese economic support, the DPRKregimes control mechanisms would break down. (Some observers disputethis, arguing that a loss of Chinese assistance would be offset by increasedreliance on the ROK.)37 The exact terms and amount of Chinese aid to theDPRK are not clear, especially with regard to military assistance, but esti-

mates generally range from half a million tons of grain and half a million tonsof fuel per year in recent years to over twice that amount, 38orin monetarytermsfood and energy assistance worth approximately US$500 million an-nually.39In addition, there is a substantial trade deficit, by one estimate amount-ing to US$4.4 billion cumulatively since 1990.40

One reason why the Chinese leadership is so reluctant to take action thatmight lead to uncontrolled change in the DPRK, is concern that instabilitycould spill across the border to China and complicate the Chinese governmentsrelations with its ethnic Korean population. Chinese sources, in interviews,suggest that the government is very sensitive about the potential for economic

problems to intersect with ethnic tensions, and such disturbances could have aknock-on effect in other parts of China.Despite the mutual strategic dependence between China and the DPRK, it

is not a smooth relationship. While the Chinese may be growing weary ofsupporting the DPRK regime year after year without succeeding in arriving ata more sustainable situation, the DPRK regime resents having to depend onChina for its economic and political survival. Tension is illustrated by actionssuch as DPRK endorsement of Kaohsiung (in Taiwan) as a venue for the 2002Asian Games after the establishment of China-ROK relations. More recently,the DPRK attempted to establish a visa-free capitalist zone on the Chineseborder at Sinuiji without, apparently, securing Chinese blessing (the Chinesepromptly arrested Yang Bin, appointed by the DPRK to manage the zone).The DPRK also announced its agreement to participate in multilateral talks inAugust 2003 through Russian, rather than Chinese, diplomatic channels.

The 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is stillofficially recognised, legitimising Chinas stake in North Korean security.However, the Chinese have let it be known that China would not automati-cally intervene in case of conflict and that assistance would not necessarilymean deployment of Chinese troops.41Taking an ambiguous posture, Chi-nese leaders are making it clear that the treaty commitment will be interpreted asChinese leaders see fit. Arguably, China has distanced itself from the DPRK stra-tegically, while in some ways becoming more involved in its internal affairs.

The issue of how Korea features in regional security calculations has al-

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construed as a threat to Chinas territorial integrity, and could facilitate theemergence of an anti-China coalition in the region. The DPRKs nuclear ac-tivities may lead to a strengthened US presence in the western Pacific. This is

a sensitive issue at a time when the US has improved relations with Russia andVietnam, strengthened cooperation with India and Pakistan (as has Japan),established a new government in Afghanistan, altered the geopolitics of Cen-tral Asia with its presence there, and is continuing with arms sales to Taiwan.We have also seen how Chinas Korea policy is firmly tied to the key issue ofeconomic growth. This brings us to the dilemma China faces with regard to itscontemporary Korea policy.

Chinas Dilemma

Chinas Korea policy can be said to face two ways. On the one hand, it isdirected towards the DPRK: China wants a nuclear-free Korea. On the other, itis directed towards the US: China wants to avoid military conflict. The nuclearcrisis that surfaced in 2002 brought urgency to Chinas dilemma: the nuclearissue, if delayed for too long, could undermine regional stability.42China hasto avoid collapse of the DPRK regime, keep the peninsula nuclear-free andprevent armed conflict.

While the DPRK needs to shift resources from the military sector in order toimprove its economy and attract international economic assistance, the re-gime faces the dilemma of the security risks inherent in change and the dan-

ger of failing to improve the economy. Without serious reform and willingnessto open up, the DPRK can neither access nor absorb substantial financial re-source flows, and lacks other resources required for economic restructuringsuch as a functioning power grid and regulatory and management capacity.Meanwhile, the DPRK is reluctant to give up its military assets, which are thefoundation of the regime, an important source of hard currency and a lever ininternational negotiations. Since the DPRK was included in the Axis of Evilin the 2002 State of the Union address by President George Bush, they havealso become crucial as a deterrent against American hostility.

Were the DPRK system to collapse, China would face chaos on its borderand an influx of refugees. Aside from the problem of managing such a situa-tion (or sealing its border), an increased proportion of Koreans in NortheastChina could potentially lead to territorial claims by a future, reunified Korea.It is no surprise, therefore, that China does not favour UN sanctions againstthe DPRK. Furthermore, reunification through conflict or implosion of theNorth under current conditions, would likely increase US influence over thepeninsula as a whole. In addition, there is concern about the destabilisingeffects of the corruption and chaos that might result should the transition froma totalitarian to a more accountable political system in the DPRK take placetoo suddenly.

Interviews indicate consensus among analysts in Beijing that Chinas policyis to avoid a dramatic collapse by continuing to supply the DPRK with aidwhile giving the North Koreans time to stabilise their economy and develop

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routinely inviting DPRK government officials to China for training in marketeconomics. Kim Jong Ils itinerary when he visited China in 2001 focused onplaces, such as the Shanghai stock exchange, that illustrate the scope of Chinas

economic opening and development.Although the Chinese have been careful to stress that the North Koreansmust do things in their own way and in their own time, there has also beendiplomatic pressure to reform. In 1997, the government-linked Beijing Re-view published a rebuke concerning the DPRK food crisis:

A heavy military burden is using up much needed resources Ultimately its up to the[North] Korean people themselves to resolve the grain crisis. It requires spirit and willpower to meet the challenge of such reforms as introducing foreign investment andopening up, while maintaining a stable political situation. And Korea needs to be flex-

ible while carrying out diplomatic policies.43

A more recent article in the same weekly urges the DPRK not to lose an-other opportunity to strengthen itself by committing to reform and openingup: after failing to follow the trend of regional economic growth in East Asiaafter the Cold War ended, the DPRK may lose another historical developmentopportunity of economic integration in East Asia.44

While China does not favour any action that may lead to instability in theDPRK, the Chinese also do not enjoy the prospect of nuclear weapons on thepeninsula. The current nuclear crisis has its roots in the 1994 Agreed Frame-

work. Under this agreement, the DPRK would freeze and then dismantle itsexisting nuclear facilities in exchange for the construction of two prolifera-tion-resistant nuclear reactors, better relations with the US, and a formal Ameri-can assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. While the UStreated the Agreed Framework as a non-proliferation initiative, the DPRK sawit as a way to transform the US role from adversary to patron. It may be thatthe North Koreans never intended to give up their quest for nuclear weapons,or that they began to think the Agreed Framework would not deliver. In eithercase, according to the CIA, the DPRK in the late 1990s began a covertprogramme of highly enriched uranium (HEU), expected to be able to pro-

duce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for at least two bombs annually, pos-sibly by mid-decade.45 In late 2002 the DPRK also resumed its plutoniumprogramme, which is believed to have produced enough material in the early1990s for one or two weapons (which may already have been completed). In2003, the North Koreans claimed to have reprocessed the spent fuel extractedfrom the reactor at Yongbyon,46 which would be enough for up to six bombs.In addition, they could extract enough plutonium from the reactivated reactorto make one additional weapon per year.47 Construction of two larger reactorshas also been resumed.48

China remained critical of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after signing,

because of the advantages the established powers derive from it.49

In 1999,then Premier Zhu Rongji reportedly declared that because the DPRK is a sov-ereign state it is none of our business whether North Korea develops a mis-

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sile or whether it researches and develops nuclear weapons.50With the DPRKswithdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003, and its public drive to becomea nuclear power, however, Chinas situation changed.

Arguably, Chinas main concern is that an expanding North Korean nucleararsenal would increase the pressures on Japan and the ROK to develop theirown nuclear deterrents, possibly leading to a region-wide arms race. There isdeep psychological and political antipathy to nuclear weapons in Japan, but anuclear-armed and hostile DPRK might change that. Already, the unannouncedlaunch of a rocket over Japan in 1998 led Japan to cooperate more closelywith the US on missile defence. Samuel Kim wrote in 2002 that no singleevent is said to have impacted and reshaped Japanese public opinion as muchas the North Korean Taepodong-I missile launch.51

Even if the Japanese refrain from developing nuclear weapons, a nuclear

DPRK would complicate Chinas position in the triangle with Japan and theUS, because it would decrease Japans feeling of security. In other words, theUS would have to work harder to maintain Japanese confidence in the Ameri-can security commitment, including great sensitivity in balancing US-Chinarelations with US-Japan relations. It could also lead the Japanese to expandthe role of their Self Defence Forces and introduce equipment, such as thesatellites launched in 2003, that might be used to assist Taiwan in the event ofconflict with China.

Foremost among Chinese concerns is the possibility that an arms race wouldencourage Taiwan to reconsider the nuclear option. Both Taiwan and the ROK

have in the past begun nuclear programmes and abandoned them only underAmerican pressure, and the ROK revealed in 2004 that it has experimentedwith uranium enrichment. Merely raising the possibility of nuclear weaponsdevelopment in Taiwan would complicate Chinas relations with the US. Evenexcluding this possibility, the DPRK remains the formal justification for mis-sile defence and other American security initiatives in East Asia that manyChinese suspect are really aimed against China.

Furthermore, an arms race would be costly, and the Chinese clearly haveno intention of being led into Soviet style bankruptcy. The leader of JapansLiberal Party is reported to have said in April 2002 that its possible for us toproduce 3,000 to 4,000 nuclear warheads. If were serious, well never getbeaten in terms of military power.52 Should Japan and China enter into thislevel of arms race, there would be global implications, not to mention a sig-nificant economic impact on Northeast Asia.

A senior Chinese researcher has pointed out, in an interview, that change inChinese official wording urging the non-nuclearisation of Korea from wuhehuato the stronger feihehua is reminiscent of Chinas moderation at the UN in1994 from opposing economic sanctions to not favouring economic sanc-tions, a signal that China might abstain rather than veto a sanctions resolu-tion against the DPRK. There were also unconfirmed reports that Chinainterrupted oil supplies to the DPRK for three days in March 2003 (on a tech-nical pretext) after the DPRK conducted short range missile tests. It seemslikely that China will gradually increase the pressure on the DPRK to end its

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form of security assurance, either from the US or through a multilateral ar-rangement.

The scenario that China needs to avoid above all is military conflict in

Korea. The Axis of Evil speech, the threat of pre-emptive attack outlined inthe US 2002 National Security Strategy and the war against Iraq without UNapproval probably led the DPRK to conclude that nuclear weapons are notonly valuable as an asset to be traded but also essential as a deterrent.

In reality the US is unlikely to accept the costhuman, financial and interms of its security relationships in Northeast Asiaof war with the DPRK.Over 1.5 million well-armed military personnel confront each other at the38th parallel. While the North Koreans would be unable to defeat the US inthe event of war, they could inflict tremendous damage. US General GaryLuck in the mid-1990s estimated that as many as one million people would be

killed in resumption of war in Korea, including up to 100,000 American sol-diers. He also reckoned that war would cost over US$1 trillion for NortheastAsia in terms of destruction of property and interruption of business activity.53

On the other hand, while the US can contain a nuclear DPRK, it cannotreliably prevent the sale of nuclear material. Already, the DPRKs sale of bal-listic missiles and technology to Pakistan, Iran and others is said to have al-tered military calculations in the Middle East and South Asia.54 Chinesepolicy-makers have no difficulty recognising the legitimacy of US fearas aprime target of terrorismabout illicit trade in nuclear material, and are wor-ried about the possibility of an American military reaction against this risk.

The Americans do not want to be seen to reward the DPRK for resumingnuclear weapons development and are concerned about the potential for cheat-ing on any new version of the Agreed Framework. A freeze on the HEUprogramme would be particularly difficult to verify because it could be hid-den in any of the DPRKs thousands of caves. For the North Koreans, mean-while, one of the lessons from Iraq is that accepting weapons inspectionswould not mean safety for the regime.

In this context, the utility of RSCT as a theoretical framework is demon-strated by its capacity to reflect the real concerns of policy-makers at the inter-section of power politics and constructivist aspects of security, both of whichare relevant in Chinese policy towards the DPRK. With the ongoing nuclearcrisis, China has become increasingly concerned about American and NorthKorean perceptions of each other, and with the need to build mutual trust. Amajor reason why there is anxiety in Northeast Asia about the possibility ofconflict between the US and the DPRK is the perception that the US leader-ship assumes that the DPRK has an unchanging persona in world and do-mestic affairs that cannot be altered unless the regime is eradicated.55 Suchconcerns are intensified by remarks such as those of John Bolton as USUndersecretary of State, stating that the 38th parallel serves as a dividing linebetween freedom and oppression, between right and wrong Change in theNorths diplomatic, economic, and security posture is necessary, but not suffi-cient.56

Military escalation or war would negatively affect both the strategic and

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lem for China. Chinese analysts, in interviews, have predicted that it would beimpossible for China to remain neutral in a conflict between the DPRK andthe USa diplomatic and strategic decision the Chinese want to avoid. Al-

though a nuclear-armed DPRK is against Chinese interests, China would beextremely reluctant to support an American attack on the DPRK to rid it ofweapons of mass destruction. The Chinese have not discounted the possibilitythat American intelligence is overestimating the DPRKs level of nuclear weap-ons development. In particular, Chinese officials have expressed doubt aboutthe existence of a dedicated HEU programme.57

Against this background, the Chinese became concerned about escalatingmilitary tension. A think-tank linked to the Foreign Ministry published an ar-ticle warning that the possibility of conflict as a result of loss of control can-not be ruled out if confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang escalates

further and any clash could lead to large-scale military conflict.58

The Chi-nese realised that they must act in order to try to ensure a peaceful outcome,and in July 2003 they began intense diplomatic activity to try to resolve thecrisis.

Although Chinese security policy is generally considered well-grounded inrealism, the process of trying to resolve the current crisis contains a constructivistelement, reconfirming the relevance of RSCT as an analytical tool in the con-text of Chinese policy towards the DPRK. RSCT is compatible both with real-ist thinking about the international system and with approaches that considerregional systems to be dependent on the actions and interpretations of ac-

tors, not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power

59

, as illus-trated by Northeast Asias patterns of amity and enmity. In order to preventthe nuclearisation of Korea, without resort to conflict, China is attempting toget the DPRK to see that the outside world need not be threatening, that theirsecurity issues can be resolved in cooperation with China and the US.

Competitive security systems are sustained by practices that create insecurity and dis-trust. In this case, transformative practices should attempt to teach other states that onesown state can be trusted and should not be viewed as a threat to their security.60

This is what China is trying to get the US to do with the DPRK, apparentlyhoping that a superficial security assurance may gradually, through mutualconfidence-building measures, lead to more substantial change. The Chinesealso seem to regard a lasting, peaceful outcome as more likely if rooted in amultilateral framework. To ensure lasting stability and peace in the region,an effective multilateral mechanism for security cooperation is needed.61

Chinas conversion to multilateralism to try to stabilise the DPRK situationmay reflect the idea that a multilateral security institution would reduce theChina threat conceptions of others. If successful, this strategy may reassureJapan about Chinas international behaviour without driving it deeper into the

alliance with the US. It may also reduce the perception in the ROK that Chinais a rising power with ambitions and grievances that may conflict with vitalKorean interests 62 Growing commercial and educational ties as well as a

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degree of anti-Americanism in the ROK, are helping China to balance USinfluence in Korea. If China plays its hand well, it may succeed in translatingits role in the DPRK nuclear crisis into a regional security framework that is

not built on US-Japan relations, and ultimately to place itself in a positionwhere it can exert indirect political influence over the Korean peninsula. Gen-erally, however, China remains preoccupied with domestic issues and is un-likely, therefore, systematically to take a proactive regional or global role.

Conclusion

In employing a bottom-up approach using regional components to create aglobal picture, RSCT is able to reflect real conditions in individual regions.RSCTs receptivity to different sectors of security also means that it can easily

accommodate a policy of comprehensive security, making it an appropriateframework for looking at the different aspects involved in Chinese policytowards North Koreaincluding national identity and ideological security, aswell as more traditional concerns such as military and economic security.

This essay has attempted to get beyond the division between the traditionalsecurity emphasis on material issues and what can broadly be grouped asconstructivist concerns with institutional norms and issues of identity and re-gime survival. RSCT rightly emphasises the relational and interdependent as-pects of security, and takes into account historical and cultural contexts. Aswe have seen, Chinas concern with territorial integrity and national sover-

eignty are historically and culturally charged. Its former imperial status withKorea as a tributary kingdom, the impact of Marxism, the emotional questionof PRC-Taiwan relations, and Chinas interdependent but enmity-influencedrelationships with Japan and the US are among the ideational factors that havean impact on Chinas security policy. This, however, does not mean that wecan favour constructivism over realism in explaining Chinese security policy.

Realist elements are still very important and many analysts remain con-vinced that Chinas greater participation in international institutions has to dowith maximising Chinese influence and avoiding being penalised for remain-ing outside those institutions, rather than with genuine support for their val-ues. Such views are reinforced by, for example, American criticism of laxenforcement of missile proliferation controls by Chinese authorities, and vari-ous cases of arms sales by Chinese companies to Iran and others in recentyears.

Not only does RSCT avoid a narrow theoretical focus. Concerned with theinteraction between the domestic, the regional and the global, it also encom-passes multiple levels of analysis. Chinese policy towards the DPRK is drivenby security concerns at all of these levels, and to focus on any single levelwould inadequately explain Chinas policy concerns and behaviour. Internalvulnerabilities and international security concerns are deeply inter-related.While Chinas domestic problems drive its regional and international securitypolicy, regional and global issuesincluding energy geopolitics and US se-curity concernsin turn impact on Chinas security concerns and Chinese

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The significance of China in Northeast Asia means that Chinese securitypolicy will play an important role in determining where the region is placedon the conflict formation / security community spectrum. In turn, a move

away from conflict formation in Northeast Asia would help China in its bid forgreat power status at the global level.Until very recently, the Chinese had not articulated a vision for the region

and showed no enthusiasm for development of a regional security commu-nity. China has largely reacted to American ideas and developments at theglobal and regional level that it perceives as having the potential to endangerChinese national interests.63It is too early to say whether Chinas recent changein styletaking the initiative in the Korean nuclear crisis and promoting amultilateral resolutionreflects a change in substance. A think-tank associ-ated with the Foreign Ministry published an article in 2003 suggesting that the

countries concerned should cooperate to seek an effective security frame-work in the region and that resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue with thehelp of international mediation could set a precedent for establishment of asecurity consultation mechanism.64Alagappa has also suggested that multi-lateral talks on Korea reflect the sort of precedent on which it may be pos-sible to build other concert-like structures tailored to particular subregions.65

This is not to imply that change in Chinas style would be sufficient tomove Northeast Asia towards a security community. There is, so far,

no social and psychological foundation for establishing a more comprehensive and

stable security architecture in the Northeast Asian region, owing to the absence of com-mon or shared identities, rules, norms, and governing procedures around which stateactors expectations could converge.66

There is still a hostile regional environment, and military distrust over Tai-wan makes it especially difficult to build viable institutions. Shi Yinhong ar-gues:

Northeast Asian international relations are tragically not far from the classical type ofthe 18th century, while Europe has entered the 21st. However, a peaceful resolution of

the DPRK crisis could provide a chance to move beyond pure power politics towards amultilateral security regime somewhat resembling the 19th century Concert of Europe.67

While it would be premature to be optimistic about the evolution of a North-east Asian security regime on the basis of this particular stage in Chinas policytowards the DPRK, it is not inconceivable that a cooperative mechanism todeal with the conflicts that exist within the RSC may gradually emerge. Withan institutional framework for multilateral security cooperation, Northeast Asiawould be much better placed to move, in time, closer to the security commu-nity end of the spectrum. For some time to come, power balancing and eco-nomic growth will probably remain the main features of the Northeast AsianRSC, but Alagappa may be right in suggesting68 that a combination of mutual

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increasing economic and social interaction will gradually give rise to a func-tionally rooted international society.

Notes

1. Barry Buzan, Ole Wver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis(Boulderand London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1998), 11.

2. See, for example, Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, IISSAdelphi Paper 295(1995), 7.

3. Barry Buzan and Ole Wver,Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security(Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43.

4. Buzan and Wver (2003), 49.5. Buzan et al. (1998), 12.6. Said Haddadi, The Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex, November 1999, [http://

www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp24.htm].

7. Buzan and Wver (2003), 173.8. Buzan et al. (1998), 201.9. Buzan and Wver (2003), 144.10. Buzan and Wver (2003), 164.11. Ibid.12. Buzan and Wver (2003), 80.13. Buzan and Wver (2003), 46.14. Buzan and Wver (2003), 80.15. Buzan and Wver (2003), 60.16. Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard Ellings, eds., Koreas Future and the Great Powers (Seattle and

London: University of Washington Press, 2001), 323.17. Michael Armacost and Kenneth Pyle in ibid., 127.

18. Muthiah Alagappa,Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 1998), 4-5.19. Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London and New

York: RoutledgeCurzon, 1996), 285.20. Rosemary Foot in Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, eds., Power and Responsibility in Chinese

Foreign Policy (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2001), 28.21. Zhang in ibid., 262.22. Samuel Kim in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth, eds., China as a Great Power (Melbourne:

Longman, New York: St. Martins, 1995), 49.23. Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics,

International Organization (Spring 1992), 417.24. Kim in Harris and Klintworth (1995), 64.

25. Zhang and Austin (2001), 251-252.26. See, for example, Muthiah Alagappa,Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 76.

27. Buzan and Wver (2003), 23.28. Foot in Zhang and Austin (2001), 22.29. Zhang in ibid., 265.30. You Ji, China and North Korea: a fragile relationship of strategic convenience, Journal of

Contemporary China10:28 (2001), 392.31. Samuel Kim in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., The Future of North Korea (London: Routledge,2002), 105.32. Hazel Smith, Chris Rhodes, Diana Pritchard and Kevin Magill, eds.,North Korea in the New

World Order (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 56.33. Kim and Lee in Samuel Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, eds.,North Korea and Northeast Asia (Lanham

and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 132.34. Ibid., 111.35. Shi Yinhong, Lun ruhe renshi he duidai Chaoxian heweiji (How to understand and treat the

DPRK l i i ) T K P 15 J 2003

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36. Samuel Kim in David Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Eraof Reform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 387.

37. See, for example, Alexandre Mansurov, Giving Lip Service with an Attitude: North Koreas ChinaDebate, December 2003, [http://nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/multilateralTalks/

mansurov_DPRKChinaDebate.html].38. See, for example, Liu Ming, Chinas Role in the Course of North Korea Transition, 13 July 2004,

[http://www.nautilus.org/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/Liu.pdf] and Kim in Akaha(2002), 120.

39. Shi Yongming, interview, 29 July 2003.40. Aidan Foster-Carter, Seouls Secret Successes, 21 November 2003, [http://nautilus.org/archives/

fora/security/0345_FosterCarter.html].41. See, for example, Kim in Akaha (2002), 123 or Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Time to Act, China Tells N

Korea, 25 August 2003, [http://taiwansecurity.org/CNN/2003/CNN-082503.htm].42. Sun Cheng, The Second DPRK Nuclear Crisis,International Studies (2003), 15.43. Quoted in Akaha (2002), 121.44. Shi Yongming, Chance Behind Crisis,Beijing Review,7 August 2003, 44.

45. Quoted by Gary Samore, The Korean Nuclear Crisis, Survival(Spring 2003), 12.46. DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman in DPRK to Continue Increasing Its Nuclear Deterrent

Force, 3 October 2003, [http://www.kcna.co.jp].47. Steve LaMontagne, Dj Vu All Over Again: How Reliable is U.S. Intelligence on North Koreas

Nuclear Program?, February 2004, [http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/DPRKNukeProgram.html].

48. Jon Wolfsthal, Getting Back to Go: Re-establishing a Freeze on North Koreas Plutonium FuelCycle, 31 January 2003, [http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0236A_Wolfsthal.html].

49. James Cotton in Harris and Klintworth (1995), 210.50. Charles Hutzler and Gordon Fairclough, The Koreas: China Breaks With Its Wartime Past, 7

August 2003, [http://taiwansecurity.org/News/2003/FEER-080703.htm].51. In Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, eds., Korea Briefing 2000-2001(New York: M. E. Sharpe:

2002), 132.52. Ozawa Ichiro quoted by Selig Harrison in Beyond the Axis of Evil: What Price for a Nuclear-FreeKorea?, 10 May 2002, [http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/HarrisonRemarks.pdf].

53. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1997), 324.54. John McLaughlin, North Korea: Engagement or Confrontation, 17 April 2001, [http://

69.44.62.160/archives/pub/ftp/napsnet/special_reports/McLaughlin_on_North_Korea.txt].55. Hazel Smith, Bad, mad, sad or rational actor? Why the securitisation paradigm makes for poor

analysis of North Korea,International Affairs 76:3 (2000), 612.56. Quoted by John Feffer, Responding to North Koreas Surprises, 1 November 2002, [http://

nautilus.org/archives/fora/security/0219A_Feffer.html].57. See, for example, Ding Zhitao, Kim Drops In,Beijing Review,29 April 2004, 12.58. Sun (2003), 15.

59. Buzan and Wver (2003), 40.60. Wendt (1992), 421.61. Shi Yongming (2003), 44.62. Eberstadt and Ellings (2001), 325.63. Alagappa (2003), 75.64. Sun (2003), 17.65. Alagappa (2003), 203.66. Kim in Kim and Lee (2002), 23.67. Interview, 20 April 2003.68. Alagappa (1998), 6.

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