1848: coincidence or contagion? why did so many...reac1onary conserva1ve elites frustrated any...

1848: coincidence or contagion? Why did so many European states experience revolution in the spring of 1848?

Jamie Jackson Jessel

1 8 4 8: COINCIDENCE OR CONTAGION?

WHY DID SO MANY EUROPEAN STATES EXPERIENCE REVOLUTION IN THE SPRING OF 1848?

The 1848 European revolu1ons almost universally failed in their revolu1onary inten1ons. The ini1al revolu1onary advances were soon reversed by rulers and governments regaining the ini1a1ve. What is most interes1ng, however, is the spread of revolu1on to all four corners of the con1nent within a ma@er of weeks. Few countries escaped the flames of revolu1on – with the notable excep1ons of Britain and Russia. To inves1gate quite what set the European heather alight, one must first ask why the European states were suscep1ble to revolu1on in the first place: The long-term intransigence of Europe’s conserva1ve elites was in stark contrast to the changing Europe over which they presided. This led to increased opposi1on – exacerbated by economic factors and the changing shape of European socie1es. Most intriguingly of all, one must ask who the revolu1onaries were, and what brought them together. It is important to acknowledge the massive differences between different European states – and the diversity of dis1nct individual factors. This begs the ques1on – ‘Why 1848?’ What caused revolu1on to spread with such rapidity from one part of Europe to the next? An obvious answer is the economic slump of the 1840s but the influence of Paris as an inspira1on cannot be overlooked. Revolu1on in Paris and the collapse of the ‘Me@ernich’ system was as significant in weakening conserva1ve resolve as inspiring revolu1onaries to seize the ini1a1ve. Europe was built on unstable pillars. The collapse of one meant the collapse of the en1re system.

REACTIONARY EUROPE

Reac1onary conserva1ve elites frustrated any liberal reforms and it was this frustra1on that led inevitably to revolu1on. The period aVer the 1815 Vienna conference was defined by reac1onary and illiberal conserva1sm both on a domes1c and interna1onal scale. It was thought that war could be averted by preven1ng revolu1on. Me@ernich, oVen described as the architect of a counter revolu1onary Europe, made it his aim to ‘fight revolu1on on the field of interna1onal poli1cs’ . In 1

reality, however, he was simply ‘propping up ro@en buildings’ by blocking any form of reform which 2

Taylor A J P (1952) Europe: Grandeur and Decline. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books.p.251

Hahn H J (2001) The 1848 Revolu1ons in German Speaking-Europe. Longman, Pearson Educa1on. P.192


might have appeased liberals and prevented revolu1on. As well as meaning the occupa1on of na1ons like Italy and Hungary (where a diet could be dismissed at will by the Emperor), Me@ernich’s system was based on offering military aid to states at risk of revolu1on. This occurred in 1821 when military aid was promised to Ferdinand I of Naples . Other 1mes it was even more interven1onist: 3

Leopold of Tuscany hesitated to implement reforms and grant concessions for fear of Austrian invasion. This stability and peace was imposed by what Kolowrat described as a ‘forest of bayonets’ . 4

So paranoid was Me@ernich’s approach to revolu1on, that Taylor even likened his brand of conserva1sm to that of senator MaCarthy . (When revolu1on did break out, the domino effect was 5

probably much the same as was feared during the cold war.) For Austria to maintain its empire and s1ll remain a counter revolu1onary force beyond its borders some 40% of the budget was spent on the army . 6

On a domes1c scale, European rulers made very li@le a@empt to reform. This was despite the revolu1onary wave of 1830 which had inspired revolu1ons in a number of countries but most importantly in France. This brought about a change in dynasty and a new ‘ci1zen king’. Louis Phillipe symbolically embraced Lafaye@e and restored the tricolour . He also widened the franchise slightly. 7

Ul1mately, however, 1830 was a disappointment. (The proclama1on made on the 24th described how the people had been deceived ) The franchise was s1ll only a 6th of that in Britain aVer 1832 8 9

which was much more significant (although Joanna Innes disagrees). A dis1lla1on of the government’s altude to broadening the franchise in France and the rest of Europe can be found in Guizot’s response: ‘enrichez vous’ . Like Guizot many rulers saw universal suffrage as ‘the ruin of 10

democracy and liberty’ – or just saw it as inconvenient. This quote from Guizot shows the 11

interes1ng change in in the way we understand words like ‘democracy’ – something that inhibits historians in trying to understand the ideologies of 1848. But as well as the franchise being narrow or non-existent, so too was European society, with many social and religious groups neglected or even persecuted. This refusal to liberalise runs counter to the Whig view that countries should strive towards cons1tu1onalism and may have frustrated many at the 1me who felt unfranchised, their civil liber1es restricted. This opinion is best represented by Massimo d’Azeglio who stated that ‘if the [Italian] Sovereigns do not wish their subjects to become violent liberals, they must themselves become moderate liberals’. When it came to reac1on, the European governments were incredibly repressive. Civil liber1es did not exist in the sense that they do now and the introduc1on of the September Laws in France or the Karlsbad decrees in the German Confedera1on was a sign of even greater intolerance. As such, censorship was prevalent and in France protests had to take the form of banquets. When insurrec1on did occur it was brutally repressed. In 1834, for example, 12 Parisian revolu1onaries were slaughtered (a tale made famous by Victor Hugo), and Poland was the selng for even more brutal repression aVer 1830. Such repression was enough to create many revolu1onaries and would

Rapport. M (2008) 1848: Year of Revolu1on. (2nd edi1on) Victoria Embankment, London, Abacus. P.63





h@p://history.hanover.edu/texts/fr1848.html 8

Keates J (2005) The Siege of Venice. London, Cha@o and Winds.9


h@p://soucebooks.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1848guizot.asp 11

http://soucebooks.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1848guizot.asp

http://history.hanover.edu/texts/fr1848.html


make governments increasingly unpopular in the years before 1848. The prevalent repression and illiberalism was enough to frustrate many Europeans – it was only a ma@er of 1me un1l that frustra1on overflowed into full out revolu1on. Another factor, key to explaining why so much passion flowed in 1848, is that of popular hatred of reac1onary regimes and the instruments by which they governed. Tax collectors, soldiers, and ministers were oVen the focus of public anger. Some1mes it would be hated ministers like Guizot or the repressive Me@ernich. Lamar1ne described the Na1onal Guard as being ‘far from disapproving’ 12

of the protests in Paris because of their an1-ministerial hue. Other 1mes it might have been public figures that a@racted distrust and focused the popular resentment. Lola Montez , for example, was 13

the lover of Ludwig of Bavaria – the only German monarch forced to abdicate. Lola Montez was not that significant, but she focused the public resentment which was combined with liberal demands which they were denied. More oVen, however, it was the military or tax collectors that a@racted hatred and distrust. In Prague, the civil and military authori1es evoked anger for enforcing customs du1es at 1mes of famine and for repressing worker protests . Most significant in 14

1848, however was the underlying hatred towards the military. This oVen explains how conflicts escalated and goes some way in explaining the bi@erness with which revolu1onaries fought. Nowhere was this more true than in Berlin where ci1zens scuffled with troops in a series of violent incidents between the 13th and 18th . Conflicts were escalated in Berlin and Paris when ci1zens 15

jeered and threw stones at soldiers. This was especially true with more rural regiments of the Prussian Military and the hated Municipal guard in Paris. In Milan, where the rela1onship was one of occupa1on, the Austrians claimed that the Milanese had blinded their soldiers in vengeance - such 16

was the anger on both sides. This hatred would allow many conflicts to snowball into greater violence. Misjudgements by rulers and by soldiers would lead to escala1on in many of the European revolu1ons. In Paris, for example, the crowd are described as ‘excessively good humoured’ un1l 17

news of the Rue des Capucines slaughter spread about the city. As well as being largely unpopular, European governments were generally rather weak. The centre of government in the Hapsburg monarchy was ‘weak and vacilla1ng, unable to reach decisions in a crisis.’ This was 18

because of the Emperor’s mental state and was dependent upon advisors. In Italy and Hungary, Austrians were as unpopular with nobility (the bedrock of most governments) as with the peasants or workers. Poli1cally, governments were also weakened by geographical factors. Economic centres, and areas of great poverty were oVen no more than a stone’s throw away from the seat of government. Economically the governments were also weakened. AVer Bankruptcy in 1811, mobilising the Austrian army in 1830 had almost precipitated a financial crisis. They were also unable to cope with the economic downturn and provide much needed relief for the unemployed. Militarily, governments were far from secure. In Paris, Louis Phillipe was essen1ally dependent upon a force of merely 3,900 municipal guards who were despised by the local populace. Of the c80,000 Na1onal 19

h@p://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1848lamar1ne.asp 12


h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/prague.htm 14

Rapport. M (2008) 1848: Year of Revolu1on. (2nd edi1on) Victoria Embankment, London, Abacus.p.7315


h@p://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1848johnson.asp 17

Sperber J (1994) The European Revolu1ons, 1848-1851. The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press.p.10718


http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1848lamartine.asp

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/prague.htm

http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1848johnson.asp


guard , only those from the wealthiest arrondissements were prepared to fight and most either 20

joined the revolu1onaries or acted as nego1ators. Georges Deveau believed the revolu1on could have been controlled if it weren’t for this ‘crucial betrayal of the regime’ . The situa1on was as bad 21

for the Austrians who lost 15,000 Italian troops through deser1on . This is a key reason for the fall 22

of the Venice Arsenal.

Regimes were poli1cally immobile, brutally repressive, and restric1ve of the press and of poli1cal expression. They balanced precariously on a mass of resentment and their powers were fundamentally undermined. They were unable to ini1ally crush the revolu1ons because they did not have the full support of their popula1on or even their militaries. Sperber even argues that there was a larger, more structural change in rela1ons between state and ci1zen. In a period where people were gelng poorer, the state was demanding more in taxa1on, implemen1ng more regula1on (especially regarding forests and common land), and expec1ng more recruits. This, combined with a dislocated rela1onship between ruler and subject and lack of na1onal iden1ty and popular support, made monarchs’ posi1ons untenable . Yet whilst states were demanding more of their ci1zens, few 23

concessions were granted in return. Revolu1onaries were not appeased – making violent revolu1on the only response. But whilst Europe’s rulers stood s1ll, Europe did not.

CHANGING EUROPE AND REVOLUTIONARY PRESSURES

There was a great deal of economic and social change between 1815 and 1848. For many na1ons this period was regarded as their industrial take-off. This capitalist transi1on brought about significant social change and may have created revolu1onary classes over the longue durée. Most of Europe was seeing a transi1on from ar1sanal and rural to industrial and urban. Ci1es grew phenomenally: Berlin from 172,000 to 410,000 . In 50 years the French popula1on increased by 24

10million and in 35 years Germany’s popula1on increased from 22million to 33million . Industrial 25

centres like berlin soon developed. These were homes to small workshops as well as large, more modern, works. This was doubly significant – not only did it mean that goods were produced cheaply (ac1ng as a downward force on ar1sans’ wages) but it also meant large social groups like the Borsig workers of Berlin who played a significant part in the revolu1on. Taylor describes labour arriving ‘before capital was ready’, that the popula1on had increased without any industry to employ people. He saw the demand for work as a sign of ‘economic immaturity’ – in Britain aVer all, people were demanding to work less. Thus, perhaps Europe was at a par1cularly difficult stage of economic development. It is important to stress, however, that Europe was far from uniform. Each economy was experiencing change – and Europe’s poor were under a lot of strain - but each state was at a different stage in economic development.

REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGIES

The growth of, what Habermas would have called, the ‘public sphere’ was a key reason for the growth in opposi1on ideology – especially the demands for liberal representa1ve government. The popula1ons of places like Paris were becoming increasingly poli1cally involved but there was li@le liberalisa1on during the period. For every Parisian who could vote, there were 10 who read a

Grenville J A S (1976) Europe Reshaped 1848-1878. 2 Stanford Terrace, Hassocks, Brighton. William Collins Sons and Co Ltd. P.3020

h@p://history.hanover.edu/texts/fr1848.html 21

h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/natguard.htm22

Sperber J (1994) The European Revolu1ons, 1848-1851. The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press. P.25923

Hahn H J (2001) The 1848 Revolu1ons in German Speaking-Europe. Longman, Pearson Educa1on. P.9024

Sperber J (1994) The European Revolu1ons, 1848-1851. The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press.p.10925

http://history.hanover.edu/texts/fr1848.html

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/natguard.htm


poli1cal newspaper. There was growing literacy during this period across Europe – this was especially true in Prussia but even in France the number of school children tripled . Newspaper circula1on 26

reached 25% of the popula1on in Germany France and Britain – in some areas reaching as much as 50% . There was also a growth in mass poli1cal awareness: German liberal clubs boasted 185,000 27

members , the Banquet campaign gained popular support in France, and mass rallies and mee1ngs 28

like that in Manheim expressed liberal demands like trial by jury, free speech, representa1ve government, and an all-German parliament. Liberal demands to emancipate serfs, cries for cons1tu1ons, and a general acceptance of post enlightenment thought are described by Hahn (in Germany at least) as ‘the single most important issue’. Europeans were becoming more involved in society and liberal ideals were becoming increasingly the norm. 1848 can be described today as a liberal ‘revolu1on of intellectuals’ because liberalism, at the 1me, was such a broad and vague concept. There were radical demands for universal male suffrage and more socialist demands for ‘the right to work’. At the same 1me there were more moderate liberals, like Marco Minghel of Bologna, who saw Britain’s 1832 Reform Act and the campaign to remove the Corn Laws as a cons1tu1onal apex towards which European states should strive. Revolu1onary demands were almost universally liberal – whether the Mannheim pe11on in Germany, the na1onalist demands of the Czech ‘repeal’ organisa1on, or Kossuth’s speech which succeeded in capturing, not just the Magyar zeitgeist, but that of almost all Habsburg subjects . Liberal demands were generally what 29

started each revolu1on and it was generally liberal concessions (however temporary) that ended them. The gran1ng of cons1tu1ons were enough to sa1sfy most revolu1onaries. Even in Berlin, aVer the deaths of over 900 people in bi@er street figh1ng, the gran1ng of a cons1tu1on and a vague commitment to unifica1on were enough to quell the agita1on. Thus it can be reasoned that the revolu1ons were overwhelmingly preoccupied with achieving representa1ve government, free speech, and civil rights. Carl Schurz describes how ‘the word democracy was on all tongues’. Na1onalism was also a driving force which, as well as liberalism, was sufficient to unite many revolu1onaries in insurrec1on. Na1onal iden1ty was undoubtedly a growing force in 1840s Europe. Ideas of unifica1on within Italy were given extra momentum by works such as Vincenzo Giober1’s Of the Moral and Civil Primacy of Italians and there was a growing celebra1on of na1onal German Heroes in the run-up to 1848. There were also growing numbers of publica1ons such as Risorgimento which advocated Italian independence and unifica1on. In Hungary a Na1onal Song was wri@en, calling: ‘’Rise Magyars! Is your country’s call’’ . 30

Joanna Innes of Oxford University argues that apart from in Italy which resembled a war of libera1on, Na1onalism was more a product than a cause for the other revolu1ons in Germany, for example . This is supported by the fact that liberal demands were usually most prominent. From my 31

reading, however, I have concluded that although na1onalism took different forms in different countries, rather than merely being a product of revolu1on, in Germany, Italy, and much of the Habsburg Empire, it was also a cause. Na1onalism was vague, and rarely the most important cause. It did succeed in bringing revolu1onaries together as it was never a completely separate force: In Italy liberals, neo-Catholics, and early socialists all met together on the common ground of the

Sperber J (1994) The European Revolu1ons, 1848-1851. The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge University Press. P.3326

h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/popcultr.htm 27

Gildea R (1987) Barricades and Borders, Europe 1800 – 1914, The short Oxford History of the Modern World. Walton Street, Oxford 28

University Press. P.85

h@p://ww1.habsburger.net/en/chapters/hungarian-war-independence-184849 29

h@p://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1848hungary-natsong.asp 30

Innes J, Somerville College, University of Oxford, Professor of Government, Society, and Ideas in Britain and Europe Between the 31

Seventeenth and Mid-Nineteenth Centuries.

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/popcultr.htm

http://ww1.habsburger.net/en/chapters/hungarian-war-independence-184849

http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1848hungary-natsong.asp


‘’redemp1on of Italy’’ . There were different approaches – liberals, for example wanted a more 32

gradual process of unifica1on in both Germany and Italy. Generally, however, na1onalism was significant in that it brought many revolu1onaries together in the name of ‘’a causa vinta’’ . 33

In Lombardy, Vene1a, and other parts of the Hapsburg Empire like Hungary the revolu1on was more a war of libera1on and na1onalism was more important than anywhere else. In Milan, for example, a republic was not declared for fear of losing support from other Italian states – thus, in places like Lombardy and Vene1a, na1onalism could be considered the foremost ideological objec1ve. In these areas na1onalist sen1ment was fomented by the hated authori1es – Italians felt exploited (for good reason as the Austrians extracted 45 million lire more than they spent . in Vene1a alone) and rela1ons were not aided by the provoca1ve 34

ac1ons of the Hapsburg soldiers. In other areas na1onalism was more a cloak for the familiar demands of 1848. Liberalism and na1onalism were expressed in the selng up of the German Pre-parliament, and in many instances revolu1onaries and rulers, whose priori1es were not na1onalist, were keen to wrap themselves both figura1vely and literally in na1onalist colours. The barricades of 1848 were efflorescent with tricolours and na1onal colours. In aligning himself with the revolu1on, Friedrick Wilhelm even wore German na1onal colours and stated ‘henceforth Prussia merges into Germany’ . Such na1onalist statements were deliberately vague whilst demands for rights and 35

cons1tu1ons or for the organisa1on of labour were always very specific. This suggests that na1onalism was an ideological glue binding the more important and specifically liberal demands of most revolu1onaries – an important factor but not in itself.

WHO WERE THE REVOLUTIONARIES OF 1848?

The importance of revolu1onary leaders and ideology and the extent to which all revolu1onaries were ideologically mo1vated is ques1onable, however. Rapport is quick to emphasise that 1848 was a popular movement that had its roots in the ‘social ques1on’ and discontent with living and working condi1ons as much as it had an ideological focus. It is too far to say, as Taylor does, that the ‘intellectuals’ were ‘passengers’ on a ‘train driven by the masses’ and that there ‘would have been no revolu1on if leV to the revolu1onary leaders’ . Langewiesche believes, however, that middle-36

class ac1vists oVen with an academic background ar1culated the essen1al revolu1onary concepts . 37

On the one hand, 1848 is well known for producing famous revolu1onary leaders like Mazzini, Hecker, Blum, Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin, and Kossuth. In Paris and Vienna students were par1cularly important in rousing workers and formula1ng revolu1onary pe11ons. It is important to remember that the Paris revolu1on began with the cancella1on of a poli1cal banquet – that the first people to protest were poli1cally mo1vated intellectuals, whether from workers organisa1ons like the society of the rights of man or from journalism and the ‘rich and elegant classes of the bourgeoisie . 38

The macro socio-economic trends of the period were significant in crea1ng social groups that were more likely to harbour revolu1onary sen1ments. These groups included peasants who went on strike in 1847, demanding an end to servile du1es. Ar1sans also saw their wages squeezed by industrial compe11on. Before and during the revolu1ons, there was a significant degree of ‘luddism’,

Catalono F. Socialismo e Comunismo in Italia dal 1846 – 1849. (Roma 1951)32


h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/rz/venrev.htm 34

h@ps://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-William-IV 35


Langewiesche D./ Liberalism in Germany. (London 2000)37

h@p://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1848schurz.asp 38

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/rz/venrev.htm

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-William-IV

http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1848schurz.asp


what is ques1onable is whether this was part of a generally an1-industrial, an1-capitalist protest or simply a product of anger and frustra1on. Nevertheless, it was a manifesta1on of working class resentment of the status quo. The 1844 Silesian weavers’ strike was, according to Marx, the first emergence of a ‘class conscious proletariat’ . Such groups were increasingly militant and vulnerable 39

to trade cycle slumps. Another significant, and poten1ally revolu1onary group was that of the ‘intellectual proletariat’ . This was an ‘excess of educated men’ and students in a society that did 40

not require their services, where there were ‘more lawyers than suits to lose… and more doctors than pa1ents to kill’ . Student popula1ons increased drama1cally – doubling in Germany during 41

1817-31 . These men were drawn to poli1cs and journalism. The Marxist historian E.J Hobsbawm 42

emphasised the ‘dual [industrial and poli1cal] revolu1on’ which took place during the ‘long 43

nineteenth century’. His analysis emphasises a repeated ‘dialec1cal dance’ which he says defined European revolu1ons during the period: First the bourgeois moderates would incite revolu1on from below (exacerbated by a dispropor1onate conserva1ve recalcitrance) – then seeing the revolu1onary masses demand more radical change – the moderates would split into those siding with the conserva1ve order and those siding with the revolu1onary masses. According to Hahn, however, ‘current thinking rejects’ both a middle class interpreta1on of the revolu1ons and an ‘an1-capitalist’ interpreta1on, and that, like Rudiger Hachtman, it is thought that the revolu1ons were a reac1on from ‘many strata to socio-economic change’ . On 44

the other hand, it could be argued that the vast majority of Europeans involved in revolu1on had li@le interest in ideology and were ac1ng spontaneously – without the encouragement or direc1on of middle class revolu1onary leaders. In Sicily the revolu1onaries wanted to restore their 1812 cons1tu1on. The peasants and urban poor who brought about the ini1al victory had only a confused idea of cons1tu1onalism . Many of those on the barricades were educated men like Carlo Osio (a 45

doctor) or Enrico Cernuschi (a former lawyer) but the casual1es are overwhelmingly made up of tailors, cobblers, cabinet-makers, and journeymen . The prevalence of middle-class or student 46

accounts of the revolu1ons is a problem facing historians. It suggests that they were more involved than perhaps they were. Casual1es in almost all of the barricade figh1ng suggest that there was much greater involvement from the lower classes - ar1sans, the urban poor, the des1tute and the unemployed. Though, as these people will have leV a smaller body of wri@en sources behind, it is harder to assess what mo1vated them to join the revolu1on. 1848 was a series of popular movements that had an ideological focus. Generally the insurrec1on of discontented and oVen unemployed ar1sanal workers or journeymen and that of the predominately middle-class revolu1onary leaders happened simultaneously. Those from the lower social strata may have provided the muscle but it was ideologically driven intellectuals who gave the revolu1ons focus and legi1macy. For example, Louis Phillipe was deposed because he lost his legi1macy and the support of the middle classes who did not defend the monarchy in its hour of need but joined the








Hobsbawm E J (1962) The Age of Revolu1on, 1789-1848. Clays Ltd, St Ives plc. Abacus.43

Hachtman R./ Eine Poli1k – und Gesellschafsgeschichte der Revolu1on. (Bonn 1997)44

h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/ityconst.htm 45

h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/journeym.htm 46

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/journeym.htm

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ip/ityconst.htm


revolu1onaries instead. It was this coming together of different groups, ideologies, and social classes – driven by economic and ideological factors that allowed a cri1cal mass to develop which 1pped the balance of history.

This conclusion may be supported by the fact that Britain and Russia were two prominent countries which did not experience revolu1on. In both countries there was some limited insurrec1on but in neither country did different ideological fac1ons or social groups come together in revolu1on. In Russia the intellectual opposi1on was small because there was no intellectual class. There was no middle-class, few large ci1es, and the country was largely isolated from the rest of Europe. In Britain Char1sm was a dying force with ‘monster’ pe11ons having proved ineffec1ve in shaping government policy. Two liberal victories also appeased many poten1al revolu1onaries from more affluent classes – the first was the repeal of the Corn Laws, the second was the 1832 Reform Act This is why – unlike in France – the bourgeoisie and moderate liberals were prepared to defend the government and did not side with the revolu1onaries. This meant that the only real revolu1onary threat came from Char1sm which could be isolated and undermined. The mass mee1ng of Kennington Common was a massive disappointment with only 25,000 a@ending compared to the 200,000 expected. The authori1es also responded skilfully – with troops on standby but deployed tacwully out of sight and over 85,000 ‘special constables’ who volunteered to defend the peace. This poor turnout was the nail in the coffin for Char1sm, the Government counted on popular support, and the authori1es learnt from the mistakes made by other European states. Char1sm failed in 1848 because it did not have the mass appeal that other European movements had. The government succeeded because it had made necessary concessions, because of skilful use of force and unwillingness to provoke popular anger, and because of popular support from the middle classes. This is exactly the opposite of what generally occurred in the rest of Europe.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF GENERALISING FOR A WHOLE CONTINENT

There are clearly generalisa1ons to be made: Most of Europe was experiencing a massive economic and societal transforma1on which had many vic1ms and affected most European states. The revolu1ons also succeeded generally when revolu1onaries from different socio-economic groups came together at the same 1me. The coming together of ideologies into a general expression of discontent was also significant. The excep1ons of Russia and Britain can be used to ‘prove’ these general rules. It could be said that Britain had already experienced a revolu1onary period and was ‘out of the woods’, whilst Russia was poli1cally, socially, and economically immature. This teleological approach assumes that all Europe was at the same stage in societal development. This was simply not the case. The serfdom of the eastern Hapsburg Empire could not have differed more from the urban socie1es of Paris or Berlin. European socie1es differed incredibly from state to state and the poli1cal liberalism of different states varied. Economically there was even less con1nuity between different states. What makes 1848 so interes1ng, therefore, is how revolu1on spread despite the diversity of European socie1es, and the different economic and ideological factors affec1ng different states.

WHY 1848?

One factor that affected almost all European states – however they might have differed – was the agrarian and economic crisis which was the most significant short term cause. The failure of the staple potato crop in the mid-to-late 1840s, combined with a series of bad harvests had meant food prices rose drama1cally. As food and drink took up 60-70% of a poor household’s wages, this meant costs increased and workers had less disposable income . The industrial slump that this precipitated 47



led to mass unemployment and 30% wage cuts in manufacturing towns like Rouen . Although there 48

was some growth in the last quarter of 1847 and the economy was beginning to recover, by 49

mid-1848 an es1mated 56% of Parisian workers were unemployed . 75,000 emigrated from 50

Germany in 1847 alone – such was the pressure on wages and the lack of opportunity. Mass 51

emigra1on, however, was not possible. This meant that there was no ‘safety valve’ and the masses of unemployed had to turn to violent revolt. The mass unemployment, the sudden increases in costs (especially rents), and the slow economic recovery all corroborate the asser1on that 1848 was a mass response to the ‘social ques1on’. The squeeze on old-fashioned ar1sanal trades was exacerbated suddenly by the drop off in demand and excess in labour. Across Europe silk weavers, journeymen, cabinet makers, and craVsmen found themselves without work in states that could do li@le to help. This explains why so many European states were affected at once.

THE SPREAD OF REVOLUTIONARY FERVOUR AND THE CONSERVATIVES’ LOSS OF NERVE

The revolu1on in Paris was significant both in inspiring Europe’s revolu1onaries and threatening its rulers. It was Me@ernich, aVer all, that said: ‘when France sneezes Europe catches a cold’. The revolu1on in France was par1cularly significant given that only a genera1on separated 1848 from the memories of 1789. For this reason both revolu1onaries and leaders looked to France before ac1ng. This explains the almost simultaneous responses from revolu1onaries and the overreac1ons of Europe’s leaders. Revolu1onaries both ideologically and prac1cally mimicked the events of 1789 – In Budapest they set up a Commi@ee of Public Safety as well as a Na1onal Guard. More recent French revolu1onary tradi1ons were embraced such as the banquet programme which was copied in Sweden. The selng up of Na1onal workshops was also a significant inspira1on to many of the other revolu1onaries of 1848. The measured response from the Provisional Government – especially the reassuring language of Lamar1ne - was significant in that it reassured moderate liberals that 52

revolu1on needn’t be bloody and chao1c. The events in Paris were significant in reviving the memory of 1789 among revolu1onaries and the memory of 1793 among European governments. Friedrich Wilhelm IV should have had confidence that his troops could have crushed revolu1on in Berlin – but due to his reluctance to do so and the fact that news of revolu1on had weakened his resolve – he lost his nerve and granted concessions. Therefore it was news of the French revolu1on that both unse@led and inspired and this is what may explain the wave of enthused revolu1onary efforts and irra1onal and panicked response.

THE SPREAD OF NEWS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE ‘METTERNICH SYSTEM’

If it was news of revolu1on in Paris that inspired revolu1onaries, it was revolu1on in Vienna that led to the unravelling of the ‘Me@ernich system’. Much like the collapse of the Soviet Union – the revolu1ons may have had more to do with the collapse of the ‘police hand’ and the unnerving of her rulers. News of Me@ernich’s dismissal reached Venice by steamer on 17th March. The existence of new technology – steam and even telegraph communica1on – meant that the spread of news was much more sudden than it had been in the past. This may explain the rapidity with which revolu1on spread from state to state. The dismissal of Me@ernich was important, also, in undermining the Hapsburg ability to respond to revolu1onary threats and crush the emerging na1onal and liberal movements that were emerging across the polyglot empire. Me@ernich and the Hapsburg centre of

Collins. I (1974) Revolu1onaries in Europe 1815-1848. London, The Historical Associa1on p. 1448

h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/dh/franfin.htm 49

h@ps://www.ohio.edu/chastain/dh/francemp.htm 50

Siemann W (1998) The German Revolu1ons of 1848 – 1849. Basingstoke, Macmillan.51

h@ps://www.britannica.com/biography/Alphonse-de-Lamar1ne 52

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alphonse-de-Lamartine

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/dh/franfin.htm

https://www.ohio.edu/chastain/dh/francemp.htm


power were the kingpins that kept Europe stable – revolu1on in Vienna meant the destruc1on of the corner stone of the poli1cal and diploma1c system. If the Austrian government could not prevent revolu1on at home, there was no way they could maintain their fragile empire. This is why revolu1onaries in Prague, Milan, Venice, and Budapest all took advantage of this Hapsburg weakness at the same 1me.

THE SOLIDARITY OF THE TRICOLOUR – THE EFFECT OF NATIONALISM IN SPREADING REVOLUTION

I have discussed the importance of Na1onalism as a revolu1onary cause and effect – another aspect of it may explain the rapidity with which revolu1on and revolu1onary demands spread across old borders. Na1onalism served as a means to link and coordinate different liberal demands. News of revolu1on in one Italian state would lead to revolu1on in another. The elec1on of liberal Pio IX in 1846 inadvertently gave Italian revolu1onaries a religious and na1onalist legi1macy to their liberal demands. The disturbances, reforms, and interven1on of smaller states like Piedmont or Tuscany turned isolated disturbances into a war of libera1on. In Germany na1onal sen1ments played a similar role in uni1ng revolu1ons. Carl Schurz described a demonstra1on in response to news of revolu1on: The leader of the procession ‘depicted a resurrec1on of German unity, greatness, new liber1es and the rights of the German people, which now must be conceded by the princes or won by force by the people. And [then] at last he waved the black-red-gold banner, and predicted a free magnificent future for the free German na1on’ . This source is significant in that it shows reflects 53

the immediacy with which revolu1onaries in different parts of Europe came out to protest in solidarity with revolu1onaries across a fragmented Germany. It reflects the tendency for revolu1onaries in Germany or Italy to iden1fy first as German or Italian – thus the borders drawn up in 1815 only existed on maps. The tricolour soon became a revolu1onary flag across Europe but in Germany it had specific significance. The demands of the Manheim rally or the selng up of a German Pre-parliament meant that German states were dragged into revolu1on by an ideology that affected all German people. Therefore, the ideas of 1848 crossed European borders with such haste because most revolu1onaries and their enlightened ideologies did not care for the ar1ficial borders established by Europe’s elites - their ideologies applicable across Europe. The newly appointed French ambassador to Berlin - Adolphe De Circourt – described Prussia a being at the centre of ‘a circle of fire’. This was partly due to the general destabilising effect of revolu1ons in neighbouring states – but had even more to do with the fact that Berlin was at the centre of most na1onalist and liberal revolu1onary plans.

CONSERVATIVE COLLAPSE AND REVOLUTIONARY INITIATIVE

The spring1me of peoples is oVen described as a series of roman1c revolu1ons. They happened for different reasons and were shaped by different ideologies, individuals, and other contextual factors. But it was a general feeling of opportunity that united European revolu1onaries in 1848. At the same 1me the props that held up Me@ernich’s ‘rolng buildings’ had collapsed and during the spring of 1848 it was the radicals and reformers who took advantage. This is why conserva1ve Europe succumbed to revolu1on so suddenly and – once the crisis in confidence had ended – why Europe’s conserva1ves quickly regained the ini1a1ve.

h@p://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1848schurz.asp 53



CONCLUSION

Therefore the spread of news (aided by new technology) had a double effect and it was this that allowed revolu1on to spread at unprecedented speed. The news and destabilising effect of the revolu1ons was important, not only in inspiring revolu1onaries from below, but in weakening rulers and monarchies from above. Most of Europe was going through a difficult socio-economic transi1onary phase and the destabilising effects of the economic slowdown or the news of revolu1on can’t have helped. Ul1mately, however, whilst the spread of revolu1on can be analysed with the use of some generalisa1ons – any a@empt to reduce the 1848 revolu1ons to a set of common long-term socio-economic forces cannot. If any generalisa1ons can be made about 1848 – it can be said that the ini1al revolu1onary successes and growth of opposi1onal momentum was achieved by the coming together of different groups – whether economic, social, or ideological. Poten1ally revolu1onary unrest in Silesia in 1844 or Poland in 1846 did not snowball interna1onally and achieved absolutely nothing. This was because they were only a response from a certain class or ideological group (in Silesia these were radical weavers and in Poland they were na1onalist nobility). In 1848, however, what stood out was the spontaneous nature with which very different revolu1onaries came together in the same expression of discontent – whatever their differing inten1ons. In Paris disaffected bourgeois joined with downtrodden workers. In Milan na1onalists, liberals, and even early socialists came together under the tricolore in common hatred of an Austrian foe. Immediate causes like a grinding trading slump, the spread of news and excitement, and the unifying effect of inspira1on and ideology helped the dominoes to fall.


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1848: coincidence or contagion? why did so many...reac1onary conserva1ve elites frustrated any...

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