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click here for freelancing tutoring sitesArticle 8 – The Judicial DepartmentCases on Sections 1-3

SEC.11. JUDICIAL POWER2. CASES

Santiago v. Bautista

Firstly, how the fuck does this deserve an En Banc ruling? This is not even sensational. It’s just a whim of a father (apparently a lawyer) who wanted to make good on his threat that he will file charges if his son doesn’t get highest honors. Why can’t he accept the fact that, maybe, some students are fucking better than his son? What a faggot.

Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. He is herein represented by his mother, Angelita Santiago, with his father acting as legal counsel. Juanita Bautista was a teacher at the same school, acting as a member of the Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor of the same.

Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:Petition for certiorari — When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.

Facts:As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. After deliberations, the committee finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The graduation exercises would be on May 21. However, Santiago’s parents wasn’t contended with the 3rd honors that their son would receive, and so 3 days before the graduation exercises, the parents filed a complaint seeking the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made. This complaint was dismissed and the graduation exercises pushed through as planned. On May 24, the defendants motioned to dismiss the case, alleging that the action for certiorari was improper and the issue is already academic. Reconsideration was filed but this was again dismissed on the following grounds:

That the petition does not comply with the 2nd

paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto;

That administrative remedies were not first exhausted; and

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That there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the committee referred to.

Of course, on the other hand, defendants argue that, in addition to the abovementioned grounds, the "committee on the ratings of students for honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

Issue:Whether or not the committee of teachers whose decision is herein assailed falls within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65.

Held:In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:

That there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and the said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.

That the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.

That the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.

The so-called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. Before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions.

Therefore, since the committee did not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the petition for certiorari cannot prosper and is improper. Consequently, the petitioner is hereby held to have no cause of action.

Marcos v. Manglapus

Ferdinand Marcos was the dictator who fled after the original People Power Revolution of 1986. Raul Manglapus was then the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Facts:Ferdinand Marcos was kicked out of the presidency via the EDSA Revolution and was forced into exile. Subsequently, Cory Aquino was declared President under a revolutionary government. However, the country was far from being stabilized as continued threats emerged from various sectors ranging from the rebels to the Marcos loyalists. The economy had its own challenges as it fights to relieve itself of the devastating effect of the accumulated foreign debt as a result of the ill-mannered accumulation of wealth.

When Marcos was dying, he wished to return to the country along with his family but then President Aquino stood in his way and contended that Marcos cannot return to the country considering that his return would be a threat to the stability of the government and the country’s economy.

Issue:Whether or not the President, in the exercise of powers granted by the Constitution, can prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines posed a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Held:The President has residual and discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest as provided in Sections 4 and 5 of Article 2 of the Constitution. Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution. Therefore, as part of her residual power, the President can ban the return of Marcos and his family to the country considering the consequences which could pose a serious threat to national interest and welfare of the country.

The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in barring Marcoses from returning to the country. Their return, considering present time & circumstances, would pose a serious threat to national interest and welfare.

Fernan, concurring:

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The President’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President. The state cannot sacrifice public peace, order, safety and our political and economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.

Cruz, dissenting:As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to all individuals. Further, the military has failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere conjectures.

Paras, dissenting:The Armed Forces has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. Therefore, there is no substantial proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative and, more importantly, the military admits that it’s under control.

But where is the judicial part of this?In the process of the litigation for this case, the Court was tasked to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the President when she made that decision to bar the Marcoses. Prior to this case and perhaps in less sensational cases, the Court could have decided to forego looking into the President’s prerogative precisely because of the separation of powers doctrine. However, in this case, the Court made it a priority and a critical point that they establish the extents of the exercise of judicial review. In this case, the Court carefully examined the concept of judicial review and, subsequently, applied it. In the end, the Court found that judicial review extends, as applied in this case, to the factual basis of then President Aquino’s decision.

This is because of the fact that if indeed Aquino had no factual or substantive basis for such decision, she has therefore committed grave abuse of discretion with respect to her powers and jurisdiction, which in turn can be looked at and checked by the powers granted to the Supreme Court.

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

Leo Echegaray was a sick man who raped his own daughter Rodessa Echegaray. The Secretary of Justice at the time of this case was Serafin Cuevas.

Facts:On 4 January 1999, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the Supreme Court not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue:Whether or not the Supreme Court lost its jurisdiction over the case when the decision became final and executory.

Whether or not the Supreme Court, by granting the TRO, has in effect granted reprieve, thereby encroaching upon the functions of the executive.

Held:First of all, the Supreme Court is not modifying or amending anything in the original decision. The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers over the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even

after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

United States v. Nixon

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The United States of America is a powerful country north of Mexico, east of the Pacific, west of the Atlantic and south of Canada. Nixon was a former president of the United States. This case is about the sensational Watergate scandal.

Facts:In June 1972, five men armed with cameras and bugging equipment were arrested inside the Democratic National Committee's offices in the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. Police soon discovered that the burglars worked, directly or indirectly, for the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Then President Nixon and leaders of his campaign denied any connection with the incident.

The five men were convicted of burglary, along with Howard Hunt, Jr., a former Nixon aide, and Gordon Liddy, a lawyer for the Committee to Re-elect the President. Shortly afterward, the presiding judge received a letter from one of the convicted men. It spoke of payoffs to the burglars in return for their silence—the men had perjured themselves to protect others involved in the break-in.

In 1973, a Senate select committee began an investigation, and it became clear that top members of the Nixon administration were involved in a cover-up of the break-in and several other illegal actions. It was also discovered that Nixon had installed a taping system that automatically recorded all of his conversations with his advisors. A special prosecutor appointed to probe the Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tapes. Nixon refused to release them, claiming they were protected under executive privilege. Nixon eventually released some of the tapes, but portions of them had been erased. Finally, another special prosecutor asked the United States Supreme Court to compel Nixon to release all of the tapes in their entirety.

Issue:

Whether or not the separation of powers doctrine created by the Constitution provide the President with an absolute power to withhold information from other branches of government.

If the power is not absolute, whether or not President Nixon is able to claim executive privilege under the aforementioned circumstances.

Whether or not the separation of powers allow for the settlement of this dispute to reside in the executive branch or it should be settled in the judiciary.

Held:Nixon must surrender the tapes. The impediment that an absolute, unqualified executive privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under Article III (Bill of Rights).The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced. The Court made it clear that the President could not withhold evidence from an ongoing criminal prosecution of another person simply because he was the President.

Note:On 9 August 1974, Nixon became the first President in United States history to resign from the presidency. He did so in order to avoid going through the likely prospect of being impeached by the full House of Representatives and convicted by the Senate.

Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC

Infotech is an organization. COMELEC is the constitutional commission which is, quite fairly, in need of an overhaul at least with respect to its members. Seriously, look at all the cases and pertinent jurisprudence in political law. COMELEC is the favorite defendant. It’s either our election laws are inherently flawed or the minds of the commissioners (almost all of which incidentally became wealthier after their terms) are so spent.

Facts:On 22 December 1997, Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the 1998 national and local elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. This failed in the 1998 elections but was revived in the preparations for the 2004 elections. On 24 January 2003, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 172, which allocated P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the 2004 elections. Subsequently, the COMELEC issued an invitation to apply for eligibility and to bid. Out of the 57 bidders, the Bids and Awards Committee found Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BAC’s Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). After evaluation, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had failed in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, COMELEC awarded the project to MPC. On 29 May 2003, five individuals and entities (including Infotech Foundation, represented by its president, Alfredo Torres) wrote a letter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos. They protested the award of the Contract to MPC due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted. Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements, they sought a re-bidding.

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Issue:Whether or not the COMELEC, the agency vested with the exclusive constitutional mandate to oversee elections, gravely abused its discretion when, in the exercise of its administrative functions, it awarded to MPC the contract.

Whether or not the petitioners’ legal standing should be recognized and upheld despite the fact that they don’t meet the rule on legal standing.

Held:COMELEC’s awarding of the subject contract is not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure. For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections, COMELEC awarded the contract to “Mega Pacific Consortium” an entity that had not participated in the bidding.

On the other hand, petitioners -- suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens -- respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, COMELEC’s flawed bidding and questionable award of the contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government.

SEC.21. CONGRESS AND JUDICIAL POWER2. CASES

Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.

I wasn’t able to find the original text of the case.

Facts:

In 1981, during Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 1818 which provided that no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation. Apparently because Malaga was somehow affected by this, it was assailed in this petition.

As held in Datiles v. Sucaldito:The injunctions seek to restrain the administrative agencies and its officials would in effect amount to interference by the court or the substitution of its judgment for that of the said administrative agency in the discharge of its functions in pursuing infrastructure projects in question. The issuance of an injunction is clearly covered by the peremptory language of PD 1818. While the prohibition is by no means absolute, as the courts are not prevented from exercising jurisdiction where questions of law are involved.

As held in the case of Zamora v. Caballero:In Malaga, the Court declared that although PD 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented

from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

SEC.31. FISCAL AUTONOMY2. CASES

Radiowealth, Inc. v. Agregado

Radiowealth was the vendor of the equipment and accessories which the government bought for the offices of the Supreme Court. Manuel Agregado was then the Auditor General of the Philippines.

Facts:The government bought equipment (1 Webster Teletalk Model 206 MA and 6 Webster Telephone Speakers) and other supplies from Radiowealth. However the Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President disapproved the purchase and installation as contrary to the provisions of E0 32, and the policy adopted by the Cabinet last year, discontinuing open market purchases, and also a violation of the requirements of EO 298. Notwithstanding this, Radiowealth wanted to be paid their due, but the Auditor General did not budge and refused to pay them.

Issue:Whether or not the Auditor General, as part of the Executive Department, was correct in his decision to withhold payment of the equipment that the Supreme Court bought from Radiowealth.

Held:No one denies the power of the Auditor General to audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, expenditures of funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. This flows from Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution. Neither does the court claim exemption from the authority vested in the Auditor General to examine, audit and settle all accounts of the government or to bring to the

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attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant (Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution).

On the other hand, this authority is absolute. The Constitution defines the limits of the Auditor General's powers, and it provides a remedy against his actions when he transcends those bounds. The Auditor General's decisions in cases affecting an executive department, bureau, office or officer are appealable to the President, and in those affecting the rights of private citizens to the Supreme Court. The Auditor General's authority to audit disapprove this court's expenditures has to limited to the conditions prescribed by the Constitution, or statute, if there be one, which did not invade the court's independence. Executive and administrative orders and regulations promulgated by officers who have no jurisdiction under the law or the Constitution over the court, can give no justification or validity to the Auditor General's decision. In the absence of express and valid legislation, the Auditor General may not question the court's expenditures except when they are irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant. Outside of these exceptions his duty to approve the payments is mandatory; and even when the objection is that the expenditures are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant, his decisions are not final.

The Auditor General's ruling under review does not criticize the expenditure in question on any of the above purchase and installation of a teletalk and telehome speakers in the offices of the Chief Justice and of the clerk of court has been explained in the clerk's statement; the cost of the equipment and labor has been certified to be the lowest obtainable on the market, and there is appropriation from which the items may lawfully be paid for.

Bengzon v. Drilon

Cesar Bengzon was the Chief Justice of the Philippines from 1961 until 1966. In November 1966,

a few months after his retirement, he became the first Filipino to be appointed to the International Court of Justice. The petitioners herein are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. Franklin Drilon, at the time of this case, was acting as the Executive Secretary.

Facts:On 20 June 1953, RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least 20 years service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of 70 years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation. This RA was amended by RA 1797 which provided that in case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is increased or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension which a Justice who as of 12 June 1954 had ceased to be such to accept another position in the Government or who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in office. Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby.

Two months later, however, then President Marcos issued PD 644 repealing Section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided that the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through House Bill

16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 General Appropriations Act were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.

It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was useless because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.

Issue:Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

Held:The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting. The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary of its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.

Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or “preferential treatment” to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.

Note from the book:The provisions which were vetoed by then President were in effect for so long. She vetoed those items, apparently, because she was misinformed.

SEC.4

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1. CASES

Fortich v. Corona

Carlos Fortich was then provincial governor or Bukidnon and Renato Corona was the Executive Secretary of then President Macapagal-Arroyo. Garilao was then Agrarian Reform Secretary.

Facts:On November 1994, then Agrarian Reform Secretary Garilao denied the application for conversation of hectares of land from agricultural to agro-industrial use and ordered its distribution to qualified landless farmers. BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association) and NQSR Management and Development Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. Thereafter, then Bukidnon Governor Carlos Fortich sent a letter to then President Ramos requesting him to suspend the Garilao Order and to confirm the ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao converting the subject land from agricultural to industrial/institutional land. Acting on the letter, then Executive Secretary Torres reversed the Garilao Order and upheld the power of local government units to convert portions of their agricultural lands into industrial areas.Subsequently, Garilao filed a motion for reconsideration. Admittedly tardy, which was denied by then Executive Secretary Torres on the ground that the decision had already become final and executory (in view of the lapse of the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration)? A second motion for reconsideration was filed during the pendency of which President Ramos constituted the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. On November 1997, then Deputy Executive Secretary Corona issued the herein-assailed "win-win" resolution which, pursuant to the recommendations of the task force, substantially modified the Torres decision by awarding one hundred (100) hectares of the Sumilao property to the qualified farmer beneficiaries and allocating only forty four (44)

hectares for the establishment of an industrial and commercial zone.

Motions for reconsideration were filed and a resolution was promulgated regarding this case on April 1998 affirming the assailed Corona decision. In a November 1998 resolution, the Supreme Court voted two-two which affirmed the April 1998 resolution, again on separate motions for reconsideration filed by the respondents. Now, respondents argue that the November 1998 resolution did not effectively resolve the matter inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Supreme Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Section 4(3), Article 8 of the Constitution.

Issue:Whether or not the matter should have been brought to the Supreme Court, sitting en banc.

Held:A careful reading of Section 4(3), Article 8 of the Constitution reveals the intention to draw a distinction between cases and matters such that cases are “decided” while matters, which include motions, are “resolved”. Otherwise put, the word “decided” must refer to “cases”; while the word “resolved” must refer to “matters”, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the concerned provision but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.

With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the provision speaks only of “case” and not “matter”. The reason is simple. The above-quoted Section 4(3), Article 8 pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no

decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.

People v. Dy

Bryan Ferdinand Dy was a convicted rapist.

Facts:Antecedent facts are as follows:On or about 12 January 1994, in Baguio, and within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the above-named accused, conspiring and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully and taking advantage of the unconscious state of the complainant who was then under the influence of drugs, have carnal knowledge of Gina Marie Mobley against her will and consent.

Accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Bernardino filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision which affirmed the judgment of Baguio RTC, Branch 5, finding them guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

In his motion, Dy argues that the Supreme Court’s decision should have been merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of Section 5(2) (d), Article 8 of the Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. He contends that Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89 which provides that death penalty

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cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible with the aforementioned constitutional provision.

Issue:Whether or not the Supreme Court’s decision was only recommendatory.

Held:Under Section 4(1), Article 8 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same court.

People v. Ebio

Gerry Ebio was a convicted rapist who abused his own daughter, Dory Ebio.

Facts:Antecedent facts are as follows:On April 2000, Dory was preparing to sleep in the sala. Then, Gerry, apparently drunk, approached the her and told her to transfer to the bedroom because they were already crowded in the sala. Armed with a six-inch long bladed instrument, Gerry ordered her to undress and threatened to kill her if she would not comply. Afraid of the threat, she took off her shorts and panty. Gerry also took off his shorts, mounted her and had carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and cried. The private complainant was silent during the sexual assault because he threatened to kill her if she would talk or shout. After the assault, she put on her shorts and panty and again lay down. She remained inside the room, crying.

On 14 October 2002, Gerry Ebio was convicted by the Supreme Court of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The Public Attorney’s Office moved for reconsideration on the ground that the Court lacked a quorum when the case was deliberated as it appears that the decision was signed only by seven justices. In a Resolution dated 7 September 2004, the Supreme Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration, ruling that there is no question that the Court’s decision in the case was concurred in by majority of the members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberations. It was in fact unanimously signed by the seven justices who were present during the deliberations.

Issue:Whether or not the 7 concurring justices constituted a quorum of the 14-member court.

Held:The term "quorum" has been defined as "that number of members of the body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business, or, in other words, that number that makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass a law or ordinance or do any other valid corporate act.” The question of the number of judges necessary to authorize the transaction of business by a court is as a general rule to be determined from the Constitution or statutory provisions creating and regulating the courts, and as a general rule a majority of the members of a court is a "quorum" for the transaction of business and the decision of cases.The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court meets by Division. There should be at least three members present for the Division to conduct its business. This may be deduced from paragraph 3 of Section 4 Article 8. There is no similar pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc. The 2nd paragraph of Section 4, Article 8 of the Constitution does not expressly state the number of justices required to be present to constitute a quorum of the Court en banc. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a

quorum when the Court is composed of only fourteen members. In case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where the death penalty is imposed, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.

The case should be readmitted for deliberation of the Court, en banc.

SEC.51. POWERS OF THE S.C. CLASSIFIED2. JUDICIAL REVIEW3. JUDICIAL REVIEW: CASE/CONTROVERSY

Marbury v. Madison

Marbury was then the appointed Columbia Justice. Madison was then Secretary of the State.

Section 2(2), Article 3 of the ConstitutionIn all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

Judiciary Act of 1789The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts and writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.Facts:The case began on March 2, 1801, when an obscure Federalist, William Marbury, was designated as a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury and several others were appointed to government posts created by Congress in the last days of John Adams's presidency, but these last-minute appointments were never fully finalized. The

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disgruntled appointees invoked an act of Congress and sued for their jobs in the Supreme Court.

Essentially, then outgoing President John Adams had appointed William Marbury as justice of the peace in Columbia, but the new Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver it. Marbury then sued to obtain it.

Issue:Whether or not the Supreme Court was the correct place for Marbury to seek his desired relief.

Held:The justices held, through forceful arguments, that the Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void." In other words, when the Constitution--the nation's highest law--conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.

Note:This conflict raised the important question of what happens when an act of Congress conflicts with the Constitution. Marshall answered that acts of Congress that conflict with the Constitution are not law and the Courts are bound instead to follow the Constitution, affirming the principle of judicial review. In support of this position Marshall looked to the nature of the written Constitution—there would be no point of having a written Constitution if the courts could just ignore it. "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?" Marshall also argued that the very nature of the judicial function requires courts to make this determination. Since it is a court's duty to decide cases, courts have to be able to decide what law applies to each case. Therefore, if two laws conflict with each other, a court must decide which law applies. Finally, Marshall pointed to the judge's oath

requiring them to uphold the Constitution, and to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which lists the "Constitution" before the "laws of the United States."

Further note:The landmark decision inspired the current engraving on the Supreme Court’s wall, which reads as follows:It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

In the elections of 1935, Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

Facts:On October 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on November 1935, he took his oath of office.

On December 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On 8 December 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a protest against Angara and praying that Ynsua be declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. This motion was dismissed. On 9 December 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Issue:Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy.

Held:The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the Ynsua against the election of Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on 3 December 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

Note:In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Arturo Tolentino was the creator of the Family Code, and was the 9th Vice-President of the Philippines. The Secretary of Finance at the time of this case was Roberto De Ocampo.

Facts:The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 was issued, seeking to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by

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amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Unsurprisingly, a barrage of suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds was filed.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, House 11197 and Senate 1630. There is also a contention that Senate 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Held:Whether or not RA 7716 violates Sections 24 and 26(2) or Article 6 of the Constitution.

Held:The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution is wrong. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The fact that Senate 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution was

because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified such as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

But where is the judicial part in this?Some petitioners were complaining that their constitutionally protected rights under the Bill of Rights are being impaired. The Court said that when cases present these controversies, the Court must exercise its Constitutional duty. However, the Court cannot invoke this duty to justify this Court's intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Section 5(2), Article 8 clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of "cases," and nothing but "cases." That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining the Supreme Court’s authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what the Supreme Court is called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.

But why did the Court say that the issues raised by the petitioners are not yet ripe for adjudication (premature)?As the words of the original case states, “Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners' attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is that there have even been no notices of

assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these suits.”

Tan v. Macapagal

Eugene Tan was representing the people of the Philippines. Diosdado Macapagal was acting on behalf of the other delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Facts:Petitioners are assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution, dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and wants the Court to declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article 15 of the Constitution and RA 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." This was dismissed. The petitioners then filed another petition, this time longer, hinging on American Jurisprudence, and this is the case at bar.

October 6, 1971 – Tan, Acejas, and Fernandez (as taxpayers) assailed the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution.

Laurel-Leido Resolution deals with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. It seeks to replace the present (1935) Constitution by adopting a form of government other than the form outlined in the present Constitution.

According to the petitioners, the Constitution Convention is merely empowered to propose amendments and must not alter the general plan.

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Issues:1. Do petitioners have legal standing in

assailing the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution?

2. Is the matter ripe for adjudication?

Held/Ratio:1. Petitioners do not have legal standing.2. The matter is not ripe for adjudication.

Therefore, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration cannot be sustained.1. NO LEGAL STANDING

It does not mean that in each and every instance where such ground (locus standi as taxpayers) is invoked, the Court is left with no alternative but to hear the parties.

o “As far as taxpayer’s suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to W/N it should be entertained.”

2. NOT RIPE FOR ADJUDICATIONo In Gonzales v. COMELEC, Gonzales

waited before filing his suit until after the enactment of the statutes.

He acted in accordance with the controlling doctrine, which requires something to be accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture.

o Such doctrine also applies when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in the Constitutional Convention.

As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. The judiciary must leave it free to fulfill its

responsibility according to its lights.

Pacu v. Secretary of Education

4. JUDICIAL REVIEW; LOCUS STANDI

Joya v PCGGFacts: Petitioner, Dean Jose Joya, a National Artist, is

joined by several other prominent Filipino artists (Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, Virgilio Almario, Lucrecia Kasilag, Kerima Polotan, etc.).

Petitioners seek to prevent the auction sale by the PCGG in Christie’s of New York of 82 Old Masters paintings and silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila after the Marcoses fled.

Paintings and silverware were allegedly ill-gotten by the Marcoses.

Petitioners contend that the items for auction are “cultural treasures of the nation” which Art. XIV, Sec. 14-18 of the 1987 Constitution protects.

Issues:1. WON petitioners have legal standing to file the

case2. WON said paintings and silverware are “cultural

treasures of the nation”3. WON said paintings and silverware are

properties of public dominion4. WON PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to

enter in agreement with Christie’s of New York5. WON PCGG has complied with due process6. WON the petition has become moot and

academicHeld:1. NO, petitioners have no legal standing (locus

standi) Legal standing – personal and

substantial (material) interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

Paintings were donated by private persons to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit organization. Silverware were donated to the Marcos couple by friends on the occasion of their 25th wedding anniversary.

Therefore, paintings and silverware are NOT public property. Petitioners won’t sustain direct injury if they are sold.

Also can’t be tried as a taxpayer suit. Taxpayer suit can only prosper if the

governmental acts involve disbursement of public funds.

Auction of the items are dispositions, not disbursements.

2. NO The Director of the Museum issued a

certification that said items are not “cultural treasures of the nation”

3. (answered in #1)4. not discussed5. not discussed6. YES

Case is moot because the items were already auctioned off.

The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. No such justification in the case at bar.

PETITION DISMISSED

MACASIANO v. National Housing Authority

POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.), in his capacity as the consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Task Force on Demolition and/or in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING AND

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LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD and NATIONAL MAPPING RESOURCES INFORMATION AUTHORITY, respondents.

Definition:1. Locus Standi- legal standing before the court2. Lis Mota- The cause of the suit or action. By

this term is understood the commencement of the controversy, and the beginning of the suit.

3. In Vacuo- In isolation; without reference to related evidence

Facts: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on:

1. His being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police)

2. His being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed."On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law.

He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

Held: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a) The existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination (b) The constitutional question must be raised by a proper property(c) The constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity(d) The resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. *A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under

the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."The petition also anchored his locus standi on the fact that he is a tax payer. But in Tan vs. Macapagal, it was decided that “as far as tax payer’s suit is concerned, this Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained.”

Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

Extra Info:Republic Act No 7279 section 28

Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:

(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled

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and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;

(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition; (4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition; (5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise; (6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials; (7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and (8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.

This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.

Republic Act No 7279 section 44

Moratorium on Eviction and Demolition. — There shall be a moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall not apply to those persons who have constructed their structures after the effectivity of this Act and for cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof.

Mariano Jr. v. Commision on ElectionsFacts:I. Republic Act No. 7854 entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati” was passed. A petitioned was filed by individuals, suing as taxpayers. Only one was a resident of Makati, while the others were residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig and Metro Manila. They assailed certain sections of the act unconstitutional on the following grounds:II. Sec. 51:“Present Officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held”

1. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area of territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical description.

2. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the “three consecutive term” limit for local effective officials.

3. Section 53 a) increases the legislative district of Makati only by special law, b) increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill and c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the Constitution because the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Note: G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner John H. Osmena as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.

He assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7854 sections 2, 51, and 52 are unconstitutional

Held/Ratio1. The delineation of the land area did not

change even an inch previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. Section 2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.”

Also, the reason why the land area was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions was because there was a territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio under court litigation. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. Out of respect, legislators felt that they should leave it up to the courts to decide.

2. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events like Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

3. Same as with the Tobias vs. Abalos case, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of

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the law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative district

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article 6 of the Constitution because as of the latest survey in Makati (1990), census stood at 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have at least one representative.

In petitioner’s contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the bill, the court ruled that “it should be sufficient compliance if the title expressed the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

Oposa v. Factoran Jr.

Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. Ponente: Davide, JrPetitioner: A non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice and national renewal represented by its BOT; Sen Webb and Tanada; and Rep. J Arroyo in their capacities as taxpayers, and concerned citizens/members of congress.Respondent: Guingona Jr. Facts:This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the

“Contract of Lease” executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as “lotto.” Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42. Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of “wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews;” and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. Issues:1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. Held:As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities. When the subject in issue is transcendental interest to the public, te court entertains the suit even if those suing do not have a personal and direct interest sucha that they are stand to suffer harm. As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent

contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid. NOTE: The Green Book says that 4 months later, a second Kilosbayan case was heard and the decision to the former was reversed. Please read page 976 of green book.

Tatad v. Garcia, Jr

PetitionersFrancisco Tatad, John Osmena, Rodolfo Biazon—suing in their capacities as Senators and taxpayers

RespondentsJesus Garcia, Jr.—incumbent Secretary of the Dept. of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)EDSA LRT Corporation Ltd.—private respondent; Private Corporation organized under Hong Kong laws

Facts In 1989 DOTC planned to construct EDSA

LRT III, traversing Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluyong, and Makati City

The “Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Railway Transit System for EDSA” (April 1992) and the “Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April 1992 Revised and Restated Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Railway Transit System for EDSA” (May 1993) granted EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd., a foreign corporation, ownership of EDSA LRT III—unconstitutional!

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Issue(s) The only issue discussed as far as the case

book is concerned is WON petitioners are real parties-in-interest and have legal standing to institute this petition

Held Taxpayers may question contracts entered

into by the government or government-owned or controlled corporations when allegedly in contravention of law (Kilosayan, Inc. v. Guingona)

Taxpayers are disallowed to do this when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Dev’t. Corp. v. Laron)

LEGAL STANDING UPHELD!

Concurring (J. Mendoza) Concurs with the rest of the decision except

the legal standing issue NO Legal standing as member of Congress

o No allegation of infringement of prerogatives as legislators

NO Legal standing as taxpayerso No allegation of unconstitutional

exercise of taxing or spending powers of the Congress (Art. VI, Sec. 24,25,29) or illegal disbursement of public money

o A taxpayer must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract (Bugnay Const. and Dev. Corp. v. Laron)

NO Legal standing as citizenso The Court found standing because

the claims for unconstitutionality were of transcendental importance amounting to public interest

o BUT a party’s standing is preliminarily affected to an extent by the substantive merits of his case (Lawyer’s League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino) and the Court found the petitioners’ case to be without merit

o A citizen must show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government

This Court’s recognition of the standing in this case turns the SC into an office of the ombudsman for ventilation of generalized grievances

PETITIONERS HAVE NO STANDING!

Recit-ready versionIn this case, petitioners question the constitutionality of the decision of the DOTC to grant the ownership of EDSA LRT III to EDSA LRT Corp. Ltd., which is a foreign corporation. Given emphasis in this case is the legal standing of the petitioners, who sued in their capacities as senators and taxpayers. The Court upheld their legal standing, following the ruling in Kilosbayan and Bugnay that taxpayers may question the contracts that the government enters into when they are allegedly against the law and that taxpayers are disallowed from doing this only when municipal contracts are concerned.

(If he asks about the opinion…)J. Mendoza disagrees that petitioners have legal standing. As Senators they don’t have standing because they do not allege any infringement of their prerogatives as senators. As taxpayers, they do not allege unconstitutional taxing or spending or disbursement of public funds. They have to also show that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the contract. As citizens they don’t have it either, because they failed to show a direct injury or threat of injury as a result of the illegal conduct of the government. Also,

since the Court found their case to be bereft of merit, their legal standing is also weak as in Lawyers League.

Kilosbayan v. Morato

Facts:Jan 1995 → parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) whereby the Philippine Gaming Management Corp (PGMC) leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in consideration of a rental equivalent of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket sale derived from the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in Commercial Operation

Issue:1. W/N the petitioners have substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit?

Ruling:Petition for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction seeking to declare the ELA between the PCSO and PGMC is invalid --- DISMISSED.

Ratio:The traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, Sec 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.Denying them the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. Question as to the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate case before the Ombudsman or Commission on Audit.

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In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a government corporation, like the PCSO, has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.

Primer: Q: Explain further the concept of StandingA: A person has “standing” to challenge the validity of governmental act only if he has “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. People Vs. Vera; Macaisano Vs. National Housing Authority. Thus Joya Vs. PCGG art lovers seeking to enjoin the auction sale of European artworks and silverware, part of the objects recovered by the government after the ouster of president Marcos, on the ground that these formed part of the Filipino cultural heritage were deemed without standing to sue because they neither owned the properties involved nor had they been purchased with public funds.

What appears in jurisprudence on “standing” is that it is not only a rule that assures concrete adverseness which can sharpen the presentation of the issue but it also involves considerations of policy related to judicial self restraint Kilosbayan Vs. Morato 1995

TELEBAP v. COMELEC

Petitioners:(1) Telecommunications and Broadcast

Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) – org. of lawyers of radio and TV broadcast companies and (2) GMA Network, Inc.

Respondent: COMELEC

Facts:Section 92 of BP Blg. 881 requires the radio/TV companies to give radio/TV airtime for free for political ads (sale of airtime for political ads is prohibited in a previous case, but was later repealed). Petitioners

contend that the said section is invalid on the grounds (1) that it takes property without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and TV broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulation the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

Issue: W/N the petitioners have standing in the case (given that the members “have interest” as lawyers of radio/TV companies and as citizens, taxpayers and registered voters)

Held:The petitioner TELEBAP have no merit nor standing in the case. A citizen can only raise a constitutional question:

(1) when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly lllegal conduct of the government

(2) when the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and

(3) when the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioners of TELEBAP have failed to show that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of Section 92 of BP Blg. 881. However, the other petitioner, GMA Network Inc., appears to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge, which is why the court has decided to take or consider the case.Note: Standing jus tertii (third party standing) is a term of the law of civil procedure that describes when one party may file a lawsuit on behalf of another party. Basically, TELEBAP is asserting that it has third party standing, when it doesn’t. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if

(1) it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party (2) that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or

(3) that the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claim.

Gonzales v. Narvasa

Notes: in this case, hindi na nagfocus masyado sa issues brought up by the petitioner since wala syang locus standi to begin with. So the issues that he raised, though answered, are not comprehensively tackled in the decision since wala nga siyang locus standi. And since locus standi yung topic, yung doctrine on legal standing nalang yung ginawa kong issue hehe :)

Facts:-This is a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus filed on Dec 9, 1999.-The PCCR (Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform) was created by President ERAP on Nov. 26, 1998 through EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed ammendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution and the manner of implementing it. -Petitioner Gonzales, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER, assailed the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of consultants, advisers, and assistants. -The following contentions were made by petitioner:1. It is a public office, hence, only congress can create it by way of law.2. By creating such a body, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constituton - the ammendment of the fundamental charter.-He asked the court to enjoin presidential consultants, advisers, and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their recommendations. He also wanted to enjoin COA from passing in audit expenditures from PCCR and its members. He also asked to be furnished with documents containing information on this matter.

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Issue:Whether or not petitioner has sufficient legal standing to file the case as a citizen and taxpayer.

Held:First of all, the action must be considereed moot or dead. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to President ERAP on Dec 20, 1999 (11 days after the case was filed) and was dissolved on the same day. Likewise, it had already spent the funds alotted to it. Hence, PCCR has ceased to exist. Those said events have overtaken the petition and has left the court with nothing to resolve. How can the SC enjoin a body which no longer exists??

In the final analysis regarding the main issue above, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayer's suit. In this case, since Congress did not exercise taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR AS A TAXPAYER.

A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

As somewhat of a consolation prize, his request for a copy of the documents containing information was granted.

J. Del Mar, et al. v. PAGCOR

Facts:Belle Jai Alai(BELLE) agreed to provide all the required infrastructure facilities and all the needed funding, while PAGCOR, with no financial outlay, will handle the actual management and operation of jai-alai.

Issues:W/N the franchise granted to Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) includes right to manage and operate jai-alai1. (No decision regarding this issue was given in the book)

Petition was granted by the supreme court, PAGCOR not allowed to manage and operate jai-alai

MAIN ISSUE FOR CLASS: W/N Congressmen Raul B. Del Mar (1st district of Cebu), Federico S. Sandoval II (Malabon-Navotas), Michael Defensor (3rd

congressional district of QC) and Juan Miguel Zubiri (3rd congressional district of Bukidnon) has locus standi.

a) As a tax payerb) In their capacity as members of the House of

RepresentativesHeld:No, Yes

a) NO locus standi as a taxpayer since, according to the agreement no money (public funds) will be spent by PAGCOR

Taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or

that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or

where petitioner seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law

b) YES they have locus standi as members of the house of representative since they complain that there is an infringement by

1 a form of sport or game played for bets (Del Mar, et al. V PAGCOR)

PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise.

To the extent the powers of congress are impaired so is the power of each member thereof since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution

White Light Corporation v. City of Manila

Facts:On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City. Issue:Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid. Held:The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be

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avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

5. POLITICAL QUESTIONS6. POLITICAL QUESTIONS: CASES7. EFFECT OF DEC. OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY8. RULE-MAKING POWER

Bustos v. Lucero

Petitioner: Dominador BustosRespondent: Antonio Lucero, judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga

Facts: The petitioner was accused of a criminal

case and filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial.

The petition was a request praying that the record of the case be returned to the custody of the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.

It was contended that SEC. 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Rights of the Defendant after the Arrest) was unconstitutional because it contradicts SEC. 13 Article VII (now Section 5 Par. 5) which states that the SC in promulgating rules regarding pleadings, procedure and practice in all courts should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

The former is said to deal with substantive matters that impair substantive rights.

Held:Motion was denied.

RD: Citing a case, De Quito and Salingbuhay VS

Arellano: Preliminary investigation may be done

away with entirely without infringing the constitutional rights of the accused.

Section 11, rule 108 of Rules of Court is not a substantive law nor a substantive right but an adjective law.

o Substantive Rights – includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.

o Substantive Law – that part of the law which Creates, Defines, and Regulates rights or which gives rise to a cause of action

o Adjective Law – prescribes methods of Enforcing rights or Obtain Redress for their invasion.

Sec 11, Rule 108 is also PROCEDURAL, since Evidence is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress is obtained.

It was also said that the right of the accused to cross-examine the witnesses who have given evidence against him during a preliminary investigation is not an offense against constitutional inhibition.

Preliminary investigation is not an essential process of due process of law. It is a limited and unsubstantial matter.

Sec. 11 Rule 108 still has kept the provisions of the accused’s rights to know the charges being filed against him and at the latter part of the trial, he can still enjoy his right to cross-examine the witnesses.

Because of the degree of difficulty in demarcating the difference between

“remedy” and “substantive right”, SC should make sure that in making rules should step on substantive rights and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate such intrusion to affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense. It shall operate only to a limited and unsubstantial matter to the accused’s disadvantage.

In Re Cunanan

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANANResolution March 18, 1954Facts:Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.Issue:WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid? NOHeld:RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the

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profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside.Distinction between the two:Congress may repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by the Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court (as stated in Sec 5). Congress' power is limited to repeal, modify, or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. Exercised properly, they should not be repugnant to each other but rather complementary.On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Javellana v. DILG

Facts: Atty. Erwin Javellana was an elected City Council of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto

Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No.C-10-90 against Javellana as he continuosly engaged in the practice of law without securing the authority of the Regional Director, DLG.

Javellana filed a petition for certiorari saying that DLG memorandum circulars No.s 80-38 and 90-81 as unconstitutional and null and void because it violates Art.VIII sec.5 of the Constitution.

Held: Petition dismissed.

Ratio: The Local Government Code and DLG memorandum circular No.90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharges of their public duties and the private practice of their profession.

*Department of Local Government (DLG)

Note: Amendment of rules by statuteSection 4 of R.A. 8974

9. REVIEW OF DEALTH PENALTY

People v. Mateo

Facts:On October 30, 1996 10 counts of rape were filed against Efren Mateo. The lower court finds Mateo guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing reclusion perpetua. Solicitor General assails factual findings and recommends acquittal of defendant.

Issue:WON case should be forwarded directly to Supreme Court by virtue of Article VIII Section 5 par 2 (d), provides for review of all criminal cases in which penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

Held:While the Constitution requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court for cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere has it proscribed or forbidden an intermediate or appellate review.The Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to Supreme Court.

A prior determination of the CA would minimize the possibility of error of judgment. If the CA should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, it could refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for final disposition.

Between 1993 until June 2004, 71.77% of cases where death penalty was imposed, the penalty was modified or vacated by the Supreme Court. That is 651 out of 907 appellants saved from lethal injection.

Under Article VIII Section 5 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested the power to amend rules of procedure. The rule additionally allowing an intermediate review by the CA before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court is a procedural matter.

Only in cases where death penalty is imposed should the trial court automatically forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court (now CA) for review, and this right cannot be waived.

The right to appeal reclusion perpetua may be waived. If the petitioner does not file a notice of appeal or does not indicate a desire to appeal, the decision becomes final and unappealable. Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 106531, November 18, 1999.

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10. BAR INTEGRATION

In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera

Ponente: Justice Tinga

Petitioners: Attys. Oliver Garcia (VP of Bukidnon IBP Chapter)Emmanuel Ravanera (former President of Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter)Tony Velez (current President of Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter)

Respondent: Atty. Leonard De Vera

Facts: o The petitioners are seeking the

disqualification of the respondent from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Integrated Bar of the Philippines Regional Governors’ elections.

o De Vera filed a respectful comment on the petition. In his defense, he stated that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy. The election of the officers of IBP, including those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP.

Issue:W/O this Court has jurisdiction on the matter

Held:The contention is untenable. Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP. Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.

*In addition, IBP By-Laws even vests in the SC the power to amend, repeal or modify the IBP By-laws (Sec. 77) and to have the final decision in the removal of the members of the Board of Governors (Sec. 44)

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