(1943) intelligence bulletin, vol. ii, no. 3

8/17/2019 (1943) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3

1/194

OL.II NO 3 NOVEMBER

943

NTELLIGENCE

ULLETIN

FOR USE

OF MILITARY

OjJi^LY i NOT

TO t l fc^


2/194

VOL. I I , NO. 3

MID 461

Intelligence Bulletin

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

War Department

Washington 25, D. C.

November 1943

NOTICE

The Intelligence Bulletin is designed prim arily for the use of

junior officers and enlisted men. I t is a vehicle for disseminating

to them the latest information received from Military Intelligence

sources. In order to insure the widest possible use of this bulletin,

its contents are not highly classified; however, it is for the ex

clusive use of military personnel. Reproduction within the mili

tary service is permitted provided that (1) the source is stated,

(2) the classification is maintained, and (3) one copy of the pub

lication in which the material is reproduced is sent to the Dis

semination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War Depart

ment, Washington 25, D. C.

•

It is recommended that the contents of this bulletin be utilized

whenever practicable as a basis for informal talks and discussions

with troops.

•

Eeaders are invited to comment on the use that they are making

of the Intelligence Bulletin and to forward suggestions for future

issues. Such correspondence may be addressed directly to the

Dissemination Unit, Military Intelligence Division, War De

partment, Washington 25, D. C. Requests for additional copies

should be forwarded through channels for approval.

554765°— 43— vol. 2, No. 3


3/194

T BLE OF CONTENTS

P A R T

O N E :

GERMANY

Page

SECTION

I .

GER M A N S OLDI ER DES C R I B ES TER R OR

O F

S IC I LY R ET R EA T,

I

1. Introduct ion

\

2. R e t r e a t in Sicily 2

3 . A General W as Bi t ter 8

I I .

S I X - B A R R E L R O C K E T W E A P O N

( T H E

" N E B E L W E R F E R

41") 9

1. Introduction 9

2.

Description : 10

3 .

Note on Operation 13

4.

How the

Ger ma n Army Uses

I t 14

I I I .

P R I N C I P L E S

OF

D E F E NS E AGAI NS T AI R B OR N E TR OOP S

16

1. In t roduc t ion

16

2. German Est imate of Our Tactics 17

3 .

German Principles of Defense 18

a.

Obstacles

18

b . Protection of Defenses 19

c.

Observation Posts

19

d . Communicating an Alarm

__'

20

e .

Preparation of Mobile Reserves 20

f. Defense Tactics : 20

g. Opening

of

Fire

21

h.

Conclusions

21

IV .

W E A K N E S S E S

O F

AR TI LLER Y DEF E NS I VE P OS I TI ONS

22

1. Introduction 22

2. H o w Fault s Were To Be Corrected 22

a.

Precautions Against Damage

by

Fire

22

b . Further Construction of Firing Positions 23

c. Track Discipline

24

d.

Alternate Positions

: 24

e. Last Covering Height

—

_____

— 25

f.

Conclusion

25

V.

TACTICAL EMPLOYME NT

O F

F L A K

IN TH E

F I E L D

26

1. Introduction 26

2.

Heavy Flak 27

a. General 27

b . Employment in Rear Areas

30

c.

Employment

in

Forward Areas

30

3 .

Light Flak

___ 33

a.

General

33

b . Employment in Rear Areas

34

c.

Employment

in

Forward Areas

35

V I.

M I S C ELLANEOUS

37

1. Improvised Bangalore Torpedoes 37

2.

N ew

Army

C ap 38


4/194

TABLE OF CONTENTS IH

PART TWO: JAPAN

Page

SECTION I. N E W JAP AN ESE WE APO NS 39

1. Int rod uct ion 39

2. Pull-ty pe Ha nd Grenade 39

a.

Description

39

b.

Table of Characteristics

40

c. Operation 40

d. Booby-trapping Possibilities 42

3.

Offensive Han d Grenade 42

a.

Description

42

b.

Operation

43

4. Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun 43

5. Booby Tr ap s 45

a. Device Using a Parasol 46

b. Device Using a Flashlight -46

c. Device Using a Pipe 47

d. Device Using a Bottle 48

II. NO TE S ON JAP AN ESE LANDING OPERATIONS 49

1. Intr odu ction 49

2. Action Before Landing 49

a. Selection of Landing Points 49

b. Reconnaissance of Landing Points 50

c.

Selection of Time for Landings

50

3. Action Dur ing Landing 51

a. Water and Terrain Difficulties 51

b. Overcoming Resistance 51

c. Communication and Liaison 56

d.

Duties of Debarkation Work Units

56

4. Action After Landing 57

III . ANTIAIRCRAFT ME ASU RES 59

1. General 59

2. At Sea 60

a. Weapons 60

b. Tactics - - - 60

3. While Landing - 62

4. On Land 62

IV. SOME D E FE N SE TECH NIQU ES USE D BY JAPANESE 64

1. As Seen by Observers 64

2. According to Documents 65

V. MO RA LE , CHARACTERISTICS OF JAP AN ESE SOLDIER 66

1. Int roduct ion i 66

2. General

6 6

3. Enem y Instructi ons 67

4. Arm y-Na vy Relations 69


5/194

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART THREE: UNITED NATIONS

Page

SECTION I. SOME HE AL TH RU LE S FOR FA R EA ST AREA S 70

1.

Introduction 70

2.

Insect Carriers of Diseases 70

a.

Mosquitoes

71

b.

Lice 75

c.

Fleas

76

d. Ticks 77

e.

Mites

78

f.

Flies

78

3. Animals; Diseases Acquired from Them 80

a. Rabies mad-dog bite, hydrophobia) 80

b. Snake Bite 80

c.

Leeches

82

4.

Venereal Diseases 83

5.

Sunburn, Sunstroke, and Heat Exhaustion 84

6. Minor Wounds 85

II . How T o PROT ECT YO UR F E E T 86

1.

Introduction 86

2.

Regarding Care of Feet 86

3.

Regarding Footwear 87

a. Fitting Shoes 87

b. Care of Shoes

87

c. Care of Socks - 87

4.

Regarding Foot Troubles 88

a.

Sweaty Feet

88

b. Blisters 88

NNEX

How TO IDE NTIF Y WA R GAS ES 89

LIST OF ILLUSTR TIONS

FIGURE 1. German Rocket Six-barrel Projector (side view) 10

FIGURE 2. German Rocket Six-barrel Projector (front view) 12

FIGURE

3. New German Army Cap 38

FIGURE 4. Japanese Pull-type Hand Grenade 41

FIGURE

5. Japanese Grenade Booby Trap_ 42

FIGURE 6. Japanese Offensive Ha nd Grenade 43

FIGURE

7. Model 1 (1941) 47-mm AT Gun 1 45

FIGURES

8-11 . Japanese Booby Traps 46-48


6/194

P A R T O N E : G E R M A N Y

1

Section I. G E R M A N SOLDIER DESCRIBES

TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

1.

INTRODUCTION

A letter found in an abandoned German gun posi

tion near Troina, Sicily, gives a fairly comprehensive

picture of what went on in the mind of at least one

enemy soldier during the retreat.

Possibly because their training has stressed offensive

problems at the expense of defensive problems—the

customary proportion has been 10 to

1—many

German

soldiers seem to lack enthusiasm for the defense.

Readers of the Intelligence Bulletin will recall a num

ber of articles in which high-ranking German officers

have been quoted as expressing dissatisfaction, not

only with the preparation of defensive positions, but

with the defensive tactics of small un its. This let ter

indicates that, although a number of factors can con

tribute to the lowering of the German soldier's morale

while he is on the defensive, XL S. artillery barrages

play a substantial part in crippling the enemy's will to

fight.

1

On page 8 of Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 2, the caption under figure

3

should read "Pulk Used for Winter Transport of German Light Machine

Gun." In line 12 of the same page, the word "panoramic" should be inserted

immediately before the word "sights."


7/194

2 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

IT. S. soldiers have been conducting a type of "psy

chological warfa re"— perhaps without realizing it. It

must be remembered that a G erm an's mind is as vul

nerable as his body. This part icula r lette r reveals a

state of uncertain ty and depression which might be

called the symptom of a contagious mental illness. It

is to be hoped that, under the pressure of our attacks

and counterattacks, this illness will spread throughout

the German Army.

An order issued by the commanding general of the

Hermann Goering Division is added, to illustrate how

pessimism and fear can be communicated from one

German soldier to another.

2.

RETREAT IN SICILY

23 July 1943.

DEAR FAMILY:

I want to send you a report about these past few days, so that

in case I never come home, you will know what we are putting

up with down here in Sicily.

Two days after the British and the Americans had landed,

they had gained so much ground, and had succeeded in bring

ing so many troops, that it was impossible to anticipate a battle

with equal forces. On 14 July we missed being captured by just

1 hour. We took up a new position, which the Americans

promptly covered with artillery fire, costing us our first victims.

From this position we retreated again—toward the flank—and

took up still another position. This move nearly sealed our

fate.

I am supposed to keep my vehicle near the commander,

and serve as a communication trouble-shooter. Whenever the

telephone line is damaged by artillery fire, the order is "Get out

and repair." (We are fighting in the central sector, and are

opposing crack U. S. and Canadian troops.) Such an order


8/194

3ERMANY SOLDIER DESCR IBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREA T

came at 2100 on 20 Ju ly , three nigh ts ago. Righ t after we had

left our position, such a terrific barrage started that an infantry

sergeant swore he had never experienced anything like it, even

in Russia. Many were killed. Several of my comrades and I

were right in the thick of it. I t is impossible to describe the

terror of that experience. We pressed our faces to the ground

and waited for a direct hit, or flying fragments, to take our

lives.

Meanwhile, people back home in Germany were vacationing,

going to cafes and movies, and enjoying themselves. I asked

myself "Where is the justice which is supposed to exist?"

At 0400 we got back to our position. A t least, we were still

alive. We could hear machine-gun and rifle fire. We went to

sleep,

anyway, although our commander had already departed.

Half an hour later, I was awakened suddenly. There were orders

for me. The Am ericans were in the immediate vicinity, and all

lines had to be disconnected. We were 10 men altogether. We

had a large personnel carrier and a small one. I t was necessary

to go slowly on the dirt roads, but on the highway we traveled as

fast as the vehicles would go. A t a junction a car was lying on

its side, constituting a road block. I t seemed impossible to take

the vehicles any distance across country, because of the nature of

the ground, but we made it. Then it happened. We rounded a

curve and ran into concentrated rifle and machine-gun fire. I felt

as if God had suddenly put a wall of flying steel in front of me

At this moment I thought of all of you.

I had to get the car through, and somehow or other I succeeded

in doing it. Afterward, the man in the seat beside me looked at

me and I looked at him. We were white as chalk. But we had

survived. (May God always be with me I am asking this, and

I know you are asking it, too.) A short distance away friends

were waiting for

us.

They had observed everything through field

glasses. When we reported that the other car could hard ly be

expected to come through, our 22-year-old lieutenant, who was

already there, gave us a tongue-lashing. He said that he had

expected more of us to get through, and that we should be ashamed


9/194


to say such th in gs. I ha d to hold myself b ack in order not to

leap a t his th ro at . H e di d n 't know th e whole story , of course,

inasm uch as he ha d left th e po sition an hour earlier. However

some of the missing men eventually got through by foot.

A little town, which by now had been occupied by the Ameri

cans,

was shelled by our art ille ry . I n re tu rn , the American ar

tillery fired on our positions, costing us a number of wounded

and forcing us to cha nge our position once aga in. W e had re

treated 30 kilometers

2

and had had only a single day of rest.

B u t here "re st" mean s— air atta ck s ( I am obliged to admit that

while I have been fighting in Sicily, I have seen only two German

airp lane s.) H os tile enem y air reconnaissance discovered us, and

the next day th e Am ericans placed a rtille ry b arrag es on our new

est po sition. I t became a miserable he ll, and we had to abandon

it that evening.

A s a rule, we trav el only at nig ht— in pitc h da rk , without lights,

and seldom on a m ain ro ad . You can imag ine wha t thi s means—

especially wh en we are forever u nd er fire. A t noon of this day,

I was ordered to take out a detail and look for our motorcycle

ru nn er, who was m issing up front. W e searched for him until it

was ne arly da rk , b ut with ou t success. W e retu rne d, hoping to get

some sleep after the misery of the past two days, but found that

everyone ha d moved aga in to a new p osition, tak in g advantage of

the darkness.

We had a corporal with us who said he knew the route of march,.

bu t he gave us fau lty direction s. A hu nd red times we had to

dr op to the gro un d because of hostile plan es. Pl an es are always

around—nothing but American and British ones, unfortunately.

We rode through a town, but had to stop 500 yards beyond it,

inasmuch as we didn't know whether this road was still in Ger

m an ha nd s. H er e we experienced a bom bing attac k. The town

was very b ad ly h it. M oreover, ou r vehicles were bein g shot at by

m orta rs. W e were terribly frighten ed, bu t we had to get through.

Luckily, every bullet does not kill, and our venture succeeded.

2

1 kilometer equals approximately % mile.


10/194

5ERMANY SOLDIER DESC RIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETR EAT

We had already been posted as missing and our lieutenant him

self had gone out to look for us. Not only were we safe, but our

motorcycle runner had returned safely, too

Our infantry had repulsed two heavy attacks. As a result, our

light truck, which was all shot up, could be towed. While we

were taking care of this, British planes appeared overhead. A

moment later a nearby explosion threw my assistant driver and

myself out of the car. I happened to land in the fairly soft

earth of a bomb crater, and wasn't badly hu rt. But my assistant

driver was thrown onto the hard surface of the road and was still

lying there when I found him. I took him to a field hospital.

He had suffered head and face injuries. I feel very close to this

fellow, since he and I have been through so many sad hours to

gether. He will soon be with us again.

We are always being pursued. Half the time we don't know

what day or date it is. As you can probably guess, I have been

writing this letter piecemeal from time to time. I started it a

week

ago.

How many new positions

we

have retired to since then

This past Sunday we were in still another one, and again the

American arti llery covered us. You have no idea what it is like

to hear shells whizz over your head—all night long—everlast

ingly. It 's so hard to sleep At 0500 on Monday I had to go out

trouble-shooting. The line was down in seven places. My car

passed a field aid station, where there were men who had literally

been torn to pieces. A ghastly sight I couldn't eat anything

that noon. All that day our position was shelled. We kept run

ning and flopping down under the car—up and down, up and

down. Suddenly, at 1900 a terriffic barrage came at us, and again

my detail and I had to take down the communication lines while

the others departed. Several times we had to stop, jump out,

and take cover. The shells seemed to whistle past, a yard ahead

of us or a yard behind us. At 0200 the next morning we were

safe again. Unfortunately, I had developed a bad boil on my

right knee. This morning they lanced it. I t was very painful.

Again we have taken up new positions. For the moment it is

554705°— 43— vol. 2, No. 3 2


11/194


still quiet here—but for how long? The whole thing will start

all over again.

Today we learned that M ussolini had been kicked out. This

means the end of Fascism, too. Will Ita ly turn against us now?

Whatever will become of us is debatable. I t can hardly be sup

posed that this event will turn out for the good.

Incidentally, Hans M aier and most of my other friends are all

with the Services of Supply, 30 to 40 kilometers to the rear. I

don't suppose anyth ing much will happen to them. My comrade

Huebner is in Germany by now, and has probably visited you and

told you a small pa rt of what is going on. He has had damn

good luck. Do you know that recently w

T

e were awakened at

0300 because mail had arrived? At th at time I received your

letters of the 7th and 11th of July, as well as a newspaper and

two picture post cards from Schala, who was vacationing in

Allgaou. He said, "From a wonderful rest and furlough days,

the heartiest greetings." You can't imagine what I felt like

when I read that. Hourly I fight for my life, and then suddenly

I get Schala's post card. I just haven 't the heart to answer it.

28 July 1943.

Yesterday things were fairly quiet in our new position, although

occasionally we could hear artillery in the distance. A tremen

dous number of planes passed overhead. Flak is constantly being

fired, yet I have never seen a plane shot down. Our

Luftwaffe

must be employed elsewhere, because I still haven't seen any Ger

man planes to speak of. Tonight there is a terrific thunderstorm

going on, and our comrades who are further up front must be

wretchedly uncomfortable. I can hardly stand listening to the

noise any longer. The lightning—coupled with everything that

has happened— shatters my nerves. I find it impossible to sleep

after a storm like this. All I can manage are little naps, in which

I have bad nightmares. Oh, if I could only have a roof over my

head again We're always sleeping on the ground, and in a

different place every night.


12/194

7ERMANY SOLDIER DESCRIBES TERROR OF SICILY RETREAT

29 July 1943.

Last night we moved out without having been fired on. Even

in transit, we did not encounter what we call "magic fire"

Feuerzauher).

This is the name that we give to the insane ar

tillery barrages tha t the enemy places on us. Around midnight

we arrived at our new position. While sleeping on the ground,

we heard reverberations, as if we were sleeping in a basement

while somebody upstairs was moving furniture. So even

though we weren't directly under the "magic fire," we weren't

allowed to forget it. . .

Our food is good. Every day we also receive a bit of hard

candy, half a cake of chocolate, and a box of "Attikah" cigar

ettes. The cigarettes don't last long, however. You have no

idea how much one smokes, just to distract one's thoughts. As

to

myself,

I must report that I am having a great deal of trouble

with my ears. The artillery fire, together with the clouds of

dust that we endure while we are traveling, deprives me more

and more of my hearing. I really hear very badly now, and can

notice it myself. This gives me a very insecure feeling. Since

I was last in the hospital, I haven't had any pus in my knee—

so that seems to be coming along all righ t. But my sense of

hearing is something I'll never be able to regain entirely. If I

live,

I'll always have a certain degree of deafness.

Two of our men remained too long under cover during an

artillery barrage, and while they were there, the unit moved out.

They didn't rejoin us until the following day. They were

threatened with a court-m artial. These fellows may have been

a little bit to blame, but such a threat is too severe and very de

pressing. One can very easily fall into a "bad light" here.

Everything is construed as "dereliction of duty," and the sever

est punishments are decreed.

1 August 1943.

Sunday again. Will I ever be able to mail this letter ? Oh, I

wish I could tell you, my beloved ones, what we are going

through in this cam paign Our infantry suffers even more.


13/194


Yesterday I lost a very good comrade. Everyth ing is against

us.

The hostile artillery fires w ith its heaviest-caliber guns on

our road of retreat. Right now the "Tommy" is attacking. It

won't last long. Our only possible line of retreat is through

burning fields and woods and towns subjected to artillery fire.

The future looks terribly dark. . . .

3. A GENERAL WAS BITTER

There were many other German soldiers in Sicily who

felt as did the write r of this lette r. An order of General

Conrath, commanding general of the Hermann Goering

Division, testifies eloquently to the fact that the British-

American onslaught dealt a sledgehammer blow to the

morale of a unit which formerly had been the pride of

the German Army.

During the past few days, I have had the b itter experience of

watching scenes which are not worthy of a German soldier, par

ticularly not of a soldier of the Hermann Goering Division.

Men came running to the rear, hysterically crying because they

had heard the detonation of a single shot fired somewhere in the

distance. Others, deceived by false rum ors, moved whole columns

to the rear. In one instance, supplies were senselessly distributed

to soldiers and civilians by a supply unit which had fallen victim

to a rumor. I wish to state that not only the younger soldiers,

but also noncoms and warrant officers, were guilty of panic-

stricken behavior.

Panic, "Panzer fear," and the spreading of rumors are to be

eliminated by the strongest possible measures. Cowardice and

withdrawal without orders are to be punished on the spot, and,

if necessary, by the use of weapons.

I shall apply the severest measures of court-martial against

such saboteurs of the fight to free our nation, and I shall not hesi

tate to pronounce death sentences in serious cases.

I expect all officers to use their influence in suppressing this

undignified attitude throughout the Hermann Goering Division.


14/194

Section II. SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

(TH E NEBELWERFER 41 )

I. INTRODUCTION

Whenever the fortunes of the German Army take a

new turn for the worse, Nazi propagandists attempt to

encourage the people of the Reich—and influence pub

lic opinion in neutral countries—by spreading rumors

of new and formidable developments in German ord

nance. Recently the Nazis have been releasing propa

ganda declaring that spectacular results are being

achieved with the German six-barrel rocket projector

known as the

Nebelwerfer

(smoke m orta r)

41.

Actu

ally, this is not a particu larly new weapon. It s name,

moreover, is extremely misleading. In the first place,

the

Nebelwerfer 41

is not a mortar at all, and, in the

second place, it can accommodate both gas-charged and

high-explosive projectiles, as well as smoke projectiles.

It would be just as foolish to discount the German

claims 100 percent as it would be to accept them unre

servedly. Although fire from the

Nebelwerfer 41

is

relatively inaccurate, one of the weapon's chief assets

appears to be the concussion effect of its high-explosive

projectiles, which is considerable when the weapon's six

barrels are fired successively, 1 second apart . The high-

explosive round contains 5 pounds of explosive; this is

9


15/194

10

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

comparable—in weight, at least—to the high-explosive

round used in the U. S. 105-mm howitzer.

In view of the mass of misleading information which

has been circulated regarding the

Nebelwerfer

4 —or

as the Germans sometimes call it, the

Do Gerdt

a

—it is

hoped that junior officers and enlisted men willfind he

following discussion both timely and profitable.

2

DESCRIPTION

The

Nebelwerfer 41

(see figs. 1 and 2) is a six-bar

reled (nonro tating ) tubular projector, with barrels to

3% feet long and 160 mm in diam eter. The projector

Figure

1.—German

Six-barrel Rocket Projector (side view).

X

U. S. soldiers in Sicily promptly nicknamed the

Nebelwerfer U

the

'Screaminsr Mimi.


16/194

GERMANY SIX-BARR EL ROCKET WEA PON H

is mounted on a rubber-tired artillery chassis with a

split trail.

There is no rifling; the projectiles are guided by three

rails, each about %-inch high, which run down the

inside of the barrels. This reduces the caliber to

approximately 150 mm.

The barrels are open-breeched, and the propellant is

slow-burning black powder (14 pounds set behind the

nose cap). Th is propellant generates gas through 26

jets set at an angle. As a result, the projectiles ro tate

and travel at an ever-increasing speed, sta rting with the

rocket blast. The burs ter, which is in the rear two-

sevenths of the projectile , has its own time fuze. The

range is said to be about 7,760 yards.

The barrels are fired electrically, from a distance.

They are never fired simultaneously, since the blast

from six rockets at once undoubtedly would capsize the

weapon. The order of fire is fixed at 1-4-6-2-3-5 .

The sighting and elevating mechanisms are located

on the left-hand side of the barrels , imm ediately over

the wheel, and are protected by a light-metal hinged

box cover, which is raised when the weapon is to be

used.

Each barre l has a metal hook at the breech to hold the

projectile in place, and a sparking device to ignite the

rocket charge. This sparker can be turned to one side

to permit loading and then turned back so that the

spark ju m p is directed to an electrical igniter placed

in one of 24 rocket blast openings located on the pro

jectile, about one-third of the way up from the base.


17/194

12


Figu re 2,—German Six-b arrel Rocket Pro jector front view).

About one-third of the length of the projectile extends

below the breech of the weapon.

The projectile itself resembles a small torpedo—with

out propeller or tail fins. The base is flat, with slightly

rounded edges. The rocket je ts are located about one-

th ird of the way up the projectile from the base, and

encircle the casing. The jets are at an angle with the


18/194

1 3EEMAKY-—SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON

axisof theprojectile soasto impart rotation inflight,

in"t u rb in e" fashion.

Thepropelling charge ishoused in the forward pa rt

oftherocket. Adetonating fuze islocatedinthebase

of the projectile to detonate the high-explosive or

smoke charge. In th is way, on impact, the smoke or

high explosive is set off above ground when the nose

ofthe projectile penetrates the soil.

3. NOTE ON OPERATION

The following note on the operation of the

Nebel

werfer 41is reproduced from the GermanArmy peri

odical

Die WeJirmacht.

I t is believed to be substan

tiallycorrect.

The Nebelwerfer4-7,or Do-Gerat,is unlimbered and placed in

positionbyitscrewoffourmen. Assoonastheprotectivecover

ings havebeen removed, the projector isready to be aimed and

loaded. The ammunition isattached to the right and to the left

of theprojector, within easy reach,and the shells are introduced

two at a time, beginning with the lower barrels and continuing

upward. Meanwhile, foxholes deep enough to conceal amanin

standing position has been dug about 10to 15yards to the side

and rear of the projector. The gunners remain in these foxholes

while the weapon is being fired by electrical ignition. Within

10secondsaba ttery canfire36projectiles. Thesemakeadroning

pipe-organ sound as they leave the barrels, and,while in flight,

leaveatrailof smoke (seecoverillustration). After asalvohas

beenfired,the crew quickly returns to its projectors and reloads

them.

• JO470O°— 43— vol . 2 , No. ?,


19/194

1 4 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4. HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES IT

The following statements havebeenmadeby ahigh-

ranking German Army officer, and may beacceptedas

an authoritative expressionofGermanideasconcerning

theemploymentofthisweapon.

Units of Nebeltruppen ( smoke-lay ing t roops ) a re organized as

rocket-projector regiments (Werferregimenter), which are fully

moto rized and therefore extr eme ly mobile. A rocket-projector

regiment isdivided into batta lion s and batteries, l ikethoseof the

a r ti ll e ry . S ince rocket -pro jector regiments a re capable of play

ing a decisive pa r t in ba t tl e , they may be concentrated at stra

tegically im portan t points along a front. . . . The organi

zation of a ro cket-p ro jec to r re giment is much like th at of a

[German ] mo to rized a rt ille ry r eg imen t; o rgan iza tionally , the

motor vehic les and s ignal equipment of bo th a re also much the

same. Since the projector uni ts usual ly are kept closebehind the

forward infant ry l ine , the i r bat ter ies may a lso be equipped with

an titank guns. Becauseof thel ig htconstruction of theprojectors,

a 3-ton pr ime mover is sufficient for t rac tion purposes, andcan

also ca r ry thegun c rewand someof the ammuni tion . . . .

The Nebelwerfer 41can fire three different type s of projectiles:

high-explosiveshells,incendiaryprojectiles,andsmokeprojectiles.

Th e high-explosive shellsincludethosew ith supersensitive fuzes

and those w i th delayed-a ction fuzes. The la tte r can penetrate

reinforced cover. Because of their fragmen tat ion and concussion

effect, high-explosive shells are used pr im arily against personnel.

I t ha s been found tha t the concussion has not only been great

enough to kil l personnel, but occasionally hascaused field fortifi

cations and bunkers to collapse.

The incendia ry pro jectiles a re psychologically effective, and

under favorable condit ions can s tart field and forest fires .

The smoke projectiles are used toform smoke screens or smoke

zones.


20/194

GE'RMANJY—SIX-BARREL ROCKET WEAPON" 1 5

[This

Die Wehrmacht

article naturally does not discuss the

possibleuse of gas-charged projectiles.]

Kocket-projector troops are employed as battalion and regi

mental units, in keeping with their task of destroying hostile

forcesbyconcentrated fire. Oneof theadvantagesof the Nebel

werfer Jfl

isthatitcanmassitsprojectilesonaverysmalltarget

area. Bymeans of ashrewd disposition of the batteries, acare

fully planned communication system, and a large number of

observation posts with advanced observers, the infantry can

assure for itself maneuverability and a concentration of itsfire

power upon the most important points . Projectors are placed

well toward the front—almost without exception, at points for

ward of the artillery—so that they will be able to eliminate

hostilecommandposts,destroyhostilepositions,andevenrepulse

sudden attackseffectively. Thefiring positionsof the projectors

arealwayscarefully built up sothat theweaponscangive strong

support to the infantry.

In Russia, during the winter of 1942-43,many breakthrough

attemptsbyhostileforceswererepulsedbydirectfirefromrocket-

projector batteries.


21/194

Section I I I . PRINCIPLES O F DEFENSE

AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS

1. INTRODUCTION

The German Army is not relaxing its long-standing

vigilance in the matter of taking precautions against

possible attacks by United Nations airborne troops.

A German Army document of 8April 1943discusses

methods that the enemy believes we are likely toem

ploy, and summarizes the German principles of de

fense against such attacks. The Germans admit that

wecan choose from avariety of tactics inplanningan

airborne offensive, and that our chances of achieving

surprise are very great. Acknowledging that wemay

t ry to deceive them with ruses and stratagems, the

Germans warn their soldiers to be prepared for all

kinds of unexpected and unpleasant surprises. They

point out tha t our parachute troops and air-landing

troopsare likely tobeemployedin " th e most fantastic

ways," and explain that for this reason eachGerman

soldier must be trained to meet any crisis decisively

andwithspeed.

The following statements are paraphrased from the

Germandocument.

16


22/194

GERMANY DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS 1 7

2. GERMAN ESTIMATE OF OUR TACTICS

The United Nations have an excellent understanding of the

twomainmethodsof airborne attack:

(a) A raid in which landings are made in the immediate

vicinityof the objective, sothat a surprise attack maybe under

taken.

(b) An attack in which landings are made at some distance

from the objective, and at a place where no effective immediate

defense is antic ipated . The United Nations units then group

themselves,and prepareto advance and launch aplanned attack.

In the firsttype of attack, the opposition will attempt anum

ber of separate small raids by parachutists, in an effort to gain

possession of important objectives as quickly as possible. (The

British, especially,will try to destroy theseobjectives at once in

order to cause confusion.) These small detachments of para

chutists with special tasks to perform may be dropped at night,

some hours before the main a ttack . After landing, they will

make the most of natural concealment, so as to approach their

objectives unobserved.

In the second type of attack, the landings are very often pre

ceded by air bombardment, followed immediately by the first

wave of parachutis ts . However, i t is always possible that, in

order to gain complete surprise, a landing will not be preceded

bybombing—oreventhattheoppositionwilltrytocreateadiver

sion and deceive us by bombing an entirely different objective.

Britishparachutetroopshavebeenpracticingnightoperations

for a long time. Hence i t is necessary to be constantly alert.

It must be expected tha t well-trained parachutists will be ready

tofightafew secondsafter landing.

TheUnited Nations can drop parachutists on terrain of vir

tually any type. I t is quite feasible to drop parachutists on

stony,irregular ground (as at Narvik);onground covered with

thick, low growth and even with orchards (as on Crete) ; and

on ground crisscrossed by canals and ditches (as in Holland).

The dropping of parachutists is out of the question only on


23/194


ground where there are many high-tension cables, in deeply

ravined or thickly populated areas, or in woods where thetrees

are tall. I t is self-evident, however, that the employmentof

parachute troops ona fairly large scalew illcallfor openground.

Since such a tremendous amount of ground is suitable forthe

landing of parachutists and evenof transpo rt gliders—thelatter

canland in remarkably confined spaces—onemustselectandindi

cate onmaps only those areaswhich are especially advantageous

for the landing of large numbers of parachutists and gliders,or

which are conceivably suitable for landing transport planes.

Abattalion of parachutists needsa jumping area of 800by 300

yards. The landingand debarkation of an air-landingbattalion

on an airfield of medium size takes 45m inutes,providedhostile

forces do not interfere. I t takes longer if art il lery is carried.

Sinceit isbynomeansnecessary for transport gliderstoland

on airfields proper, these aircraft must be regarded asespecially

dangerous. Smallgliderscandiveandgetbeneath thefireofthe

defense. Also,since gliders are armed with machineguns,they

can return fire effectively. Although gliders can often beused

at night, theyrequire acertain amount of light intheskytoland

satisfactorily.

It must be expected that gliders will be used in carryingout

isolated raids. Fo r example,two 30-seater "Horsa" gliderswere

used in a British ra id near Trondheim. I t is known that the

opposition is building a large number of these and of 60-seat

"Hamilcar'' gliders,aswell.

3. G E R M A N PRINCIPLES O F DEFENSE

a. Obstacles

We [the Germans] must erect obstacles on landing grounds

and in areas likely toproveinv iting to parachutists and gliders.

Obstacles will be erected in front of, or all around, localities

strategically important to the defense—for example, entrances

toareascontaining important establishments.


24/194

1 9ERMANY—DEFENSE AGAINST A IRBORNE TROOPS

Minesand wire can beespecially effective against parachutists

andair-landing troops. (The "S "mine isexcellent for this pur

j)ose.) In fact,theoppositionissoawareof thedangerofmine-

fields toairbornetroopstha t theywillrespect and avoid anyarea

thattheyhavereasontobelieveismined. However,tohelp deter

theopposition from attempting toland,dummyminefields,aswell

as true mines spaced far apart , must bemaintained as though

theyweredangerous,thicklylaid fields.

AH types of dummy defense works should be employed. The

defenders, as well as the attackers, must use imagination and

cunning.

Poles,

ditches,pilesofwoodandbrokenfurniture , farmwagons

piledwithjunk andwiththeir wheelsremoved,andlargemounds

of earth, stones,or manure can also prove effective obstacles.

1

b. Protection of Defenses

Defenses must have all-around protection. For this reason

important defense works must bebarricaded all-around against

raids by airborne troops. Also, all the inhabited area within a

defended work must be covered by automatic weapons. Since

batteriesareveryinvitingtargets,itwillbenecessarytoprovide

a sufficient numberof sentries and machine guns toprotect them.

Vehiclesmust never be concentrated in areas not adequately de

fended.

c. Observation Posts

Observation posts must bemaintained on all high landmarks

(such as church steeples); this must be done everywhere, even

in rearareas. Suchobservationpostsareindispensable,especially

in occupied territory, for spotting parachutists in time to give

warning.

1

See Intelligence Bulletin Vol.I,No.11,pp.48-51for otherAxismethods

of obstructing airfields.


25/194


d. Communicating an Alarm

Telephone l ines are extremely vulnerable to destruction by air

borne troop s. The re fo re, th ere must alway s be an alternative

method of c ommunica ting an a la rm . Chu rch bells, bugles, or

drums may be employed.

e. Preparation of Mobile Reserves

As a genera l ru le , even in prepara t ion for minor a ttacks, it is

best t o have mobile re se rves available t o serve as "commando

hunte rs . " Machine guns , an t i t ank guns , or 20-mm dual-purpose

guns should be mounted on the t rucks tha t the reserves willuse,

so tha t i t wil l bepossible to open fire from thevehicles. Machine

pis tols and hand grenades should be provided, and—if possible—

l ight por table searchl ights .

F la k personnel can beemployed locally ascombat squads.

Tan ks and armored cars,if available,will offer the bestpossible

means of combatt ing a irborne t roops .

f. Defense Tactics

The defense must be conducted offensively. Therefore, donot

sp li t up your fo rces, bu t make a rr angements fo r a s trong shock

reserve . I f observation posts and reconna is sance uni ts have not

supplied precise information, at tack decis ively whichever hostile

g roup seems to be tacti ca lly t he most dangerous. An extended

period of inactioncanhaveunfo rtuna te consequences.

Use your reserves economically . Al l objectives of in te rest to

the enemy mus t be adequate ly manned, even if your own attack

is in p rogre ss . The ma in t h ing is t o have an i n tu it ive g ra spof

wh at the a irborne a t tackers ' rea l in tent ions are, and not to allow

yourself tobedeceivedby diversionary at tacks,dummy parachut

ists,

and soon.


26/194

GERMANY—DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE TROOPS 2 1

g Opening of Fire

Thechancesof your being abletohit parachutists during their

descent are very slight. It will be advisable to openfireonly at

closerange. Experience has shown that fireis likely to bemost

effective just after the parachutists have touched the ground,

while they are detaching themselves from their parachutes, and

whiletheyaretryingtoregroupthemselves.

If i t is not possible to cover with fire the locality in which

parachutists are landing, there may be some advantage in plac

ing sweeping machine-gun fire on the attackers while they are

still in the air—even if they are not within close range.

Transport planes flying overhead should be subjected to fire

aslong as they are within range. Just before parachutists are

to be dropped, transports slow down and become extremely

vulnerabletargets.

h Conclusions

I t must be recognized that the British and Americans have

made great progress in developing their methods of airborne

attack, and that they are capable of undertaking airborne oper

ations on a large scale. Whenever they believe that circum

stances are favorable, they will attempt to achieve decisive suc

cesses by using large numbers of airborne troops behind our

coastal defenses. For this reason wemust continually examine

our defensive measures and keep them up to date.

When an airborne attack occurs,wemust be able to estimate

the situation with lightning-like speed, dispatch accurate infor

mation to the proper quarters, and launch a determined attack

without regard to losses,even if weare outnumbered.

554705°—43—vol. 2, No.3 4


27/194

Section IV . WEAKNESSES OF ARTILLERY

DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

In Sicily the positions of the Armored Artillery

Regiment of the Hermann Goering Division wereso

unsatisfactory that on 23 July the regimental com

mander felt it necessary to issue a sharply worded

order requiring that certain outstanding weaknesses

be corrected at once. The commander had just re

turned from avisit to the batteries. Hismost signifi

cant s tatements are either quoted or paraphrased in

thissection.

2.

HOW FAULTS WERE TO BE CORRECTED

a. Precautions Against Damage by Fire

The regimental commander said, at the beginningof

hisorder:

We are in danger of suffering grea t damage by fire, not only

as a resul t of incendiary bombs, but because of the carelessness

of our own soldiers. I notice th at , in spite of my repeated

wri t ten and ora l warnings , the requis ite measures for protection

a ga in st d amage by fire h ave not been put in to effect. I shall

hold t he commanding officers of un it s re sponsib le if adequate

measure s a re no t a t once o rdered and car ried out.

The expression "repea ted warn ing s" is interesting.

Any weakness continually displayed by this regiment,

once regarded asa superior outfit, may sooner orlater

become apparen t elsewhere in the German Army,


28/194

23ERMANY ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE POS IT IONS

granting the existence of such pressure as the United

Nations were able to bring to bear in Sicily. Even if

the weaknesses noted by th is particula r reg imental

commander are not at present widespread, they are at

least symptomatic—an indication that the harder we

hit, the more rapidly German efficiency is likely to

decline.

Theorderstipulatedthatfiretrenchesbeconstructed

around guns and ammunition supplies in such a way

as not to interfere with the quick removal of camou

flage, when necessary.

In every position sufficiently large detachments of

fire sentries were to be ready day and night with the

necessary equipment such as

Feuerpatschen

(fire

brooms),filledwater containers, and soon.

P rime movers and emergency tra ile rs were to be

kept nearby, sothat guns could be removed quickly in

case of danger or damage by fire or enemy shelling.

Commanding officers were to check regularly tomake

sure tha t thesemeasureswere being followed.

b. Fu rthe r Construction of Firing Positions

It was pointed out that the necessary attention still

was not being paid to the construction of firing posi

tions:

the digging-in of the guns, the preparation of

enough foxholes for proper cover,and the construction

of ditches for ammunition, with shells and cartridges

kept separate. The detachments in gun positions and

observation-postpersonnelwerenottorestuntilevery

thing was under cover. This workwas to be done at

night. In ordertopreserve,asfar aspossible,thefight


29/194


ingfitnessof over-tired elements in actionin the firing

positions and observation posts, the rear serviceswere

tobeutilizedforsuchadditionaldigging.

c. Track Discipline

In some instances deep, conspicuous tracks ledinto

thefiringpositions. Noattention hadbeenpaidtothe

planning of routes which would afford at least some

semblance of camouflage against air observation. Dis

organized driving in and out-—that is,themovement

of

guns without an intelligently devised track plan—had

beenthecauseof this. Theregimental commanderre

minded his battery commanders that one of their pri

mary duties was to take care of th is aspect of the

camouflaging of firing positions. He ordered battery

commanderstoinspectallpositionsfromsuitablyhigh

terra in points, for the purpose of taking advantageof

all natural camouflage for tracks, and of visualizing

howthepositionswould appear tohostile aircraft.

d.

A ltern ate Positions

Alternate positions were not being occupied with

the requisite speed,when suchmoveswere dictatedby

thesituation. Theregimentalcommanderorderedthat

batteries be made more mobile so that new positions

could be occupied without difficulty. He pointed out

that the shelling of German positions over opensights

(withtimeandpercussionfuzesandsmokeshells)could

be expected to force the abandonment of these posi

tions.

Too often, he said, batteries supplied with a

large amount of ammunition, but insufficiently mobile.


30/194

25ERMANY ARTILLERY DEFENSIVE PO SIT IONS

hadbeenutterly destroyed inamatte r ofhoursbycon

centrationsofhostilefire.

e. "L as t Covering He ight* '

Theimportanceofa"la s tcoveringhe ight"wassome

thing that allmembers of the regiment seemed to have

forgotten completely, the regimental commander said.

He ordered that, inasmuch asmost of the observation

postswereon forward slopes or ongentle inclines,no

tices be put up in places most exposed to the hostile

forces, and that these signsread"W ar n in g ! Lastcov

ering height! Now you are observed by the enemy!"

He required tha t the routes from observedpositions to

headquarters and observation posts be clearly marked

withsignpostsandthat,ifnecessary,approachtrenches

be constructed to these positions after dark.

f. Conclusion

The final words of the order are perhaps the most

revealing.

To sumup,units containing elementswhich still are inexperi

enced or stupid or apathetic must be taken in hand, and ener

getically taught and controlled by the officers in command of

these units. If this is done, the heavy casualties that we have

been incurr ing up to the present time may be avoided in the

future. In particular, themostcareful measuresaretobeunder

taken everywhere for the organization of an air-raid warning

system. Each unit commander will see to i t tha t the system

operates smoothly and that any man who fails to perform his

duty is punished ruthlessly. I have repeatedly stressed the

principles contained in this order. Onlywhen they are adhered

to by everyone will the artillery avoid heavy casualties and, by

maintaining its"strength, be able to carry out its task.


31/194

Section V . TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

OF FLAK IN THE FIELD

1.

INTRODUCTION

The original German doctrineregarding theemploy

mentofGermanA ir Forceflakartillery inthe

field

has

steadily been undergoing modification. Germanman

ualsformerly described the responsibility offlakinthe

fieldas primarily, and almost exclusively, antiaircraft

defense; the engagement of ground ta rgets was re

garded as secondary, and onlyto be undertaken inan

emergency. Although the oldermanuals admitted the

possibility of using light flak to reinforce thefireof

heavyinfantry weapons,andofusingheavyflaktosup

plement antitank and other artillery, suchemployment

was described as exceptional. There was nothing to

suggest, for example, the now extensive useof the88

mmantiaircraft gunin an antitank role.

The transi tion from the defensive doctrine of the

earliermanualstothemoreaggressivemodernconcep

tion seems to date from the introduction of the Flak

Corps—units ofwhich first appeared during theBattle

ofFrance . TheFlakCorpswascreatedtoperformthe

tasks described in the following enemynotes.

The Flak Corps is awartime organization, and constitutesan

operational reserve of the commander in chief of the German

Air Force. I t combines great mobility with heavy fire power.

I t can beemployed in conjunction with spearheads composedof

armored and motorized forces, and with nonmotorized troopsin

26


32/194

GERMANY TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IN THE FIELD 2 7

forcing river crossings and attacking fortified positions. I t can

also be deployed as highly mobile artillery to support tank

attacks.

The Flak Corps can take part in antitank defense on a broad

front, and can be employed in ground engagements at strongly

contested points. Its capabilities are tremendous in antiaircraft

defense, because its great mobility enables it to rush flak concen

trations to strategically important points, and to transfer flak

strength from one area to another, as required.

It isalsoresponsible for protecting forward ground organiza

tionsoftheGermanAirForce.

Asthesenotesshow,flakinthefieldisnowintended

toserveas apowerful and highlymobilestrik ing force.

The emphasis laid on its employment in the ground

role,

and in an offensive capacity in conjunction with

spearhead formations, is most important. Experience

hasverified tha t these principles are actively practiced

inthefield.

2. HE AV Y FLAK

a. General

Inoperationswiththefieldarmy,the88-mmgun,as

a result of i ts great mobility , has become almost the

universal weapon of heavy flak. Larger calibers are

usually encountered only in areaswhere the defense is

static.

The heavyflakbattery consists either of four or six

guns (usually 88's) , with two light guns (20-mm) for

close protection. Six-gun batteries are becoming in

creasingly common. In theory theheavy battery con

sistsoftwoplatoons,butinpracticeitisrarelydivided

in thismanner. All the guns are generally fittedwith


33/194


shields, to protect the detachments against small-arms

fire , and with two sights—a telescopic sight for the

direct engagement of ground targets, and apanoramic

sight for indirect laying. In the interests ofmobility,

thefire-controlequipmentisoftenleftbehind. Inaddi

tion to time-fuze high-explosive ammunition, armor-

piercing and percussion-fuze high-explosive ammuni

tion is normally carried. To avoid the muzzle flashes

which, at night, readily give away the gun positions,

the Germans now make widespread use of a flashless

propellant.

The 88-mm gun can be put in to action in about2

minutes. If necessary, it can befiredfrom itsmount,

but against g round ta rge ts only.

1

Since the normal

mountisconspicuousbecauseofitsheight,thegun

is

ex

tremelyvulnerabletoart ille ry fire. Wheneverpossible,

therefore, the gun is dug in so that only the barrel

appears over the top of the emplacement. (Actually,

the time factor and the frequent moves donot always

permit the Germans to devise effective concealment.)

Realizing tha t destruction of hostile observation posts

constitutes an indirect method of protecting their

heavy flak guns, the Germans try to accomplish this

at every opportunity.

The 88-mm guns can open fire on armored vehicles

at2,500yardswithfairprospectofsuccess,butaremost

effective at rangesof about 1,000 to1,500 yards. They

mayfireatrangesofasmuchas4,000yards,ifotherand

1

Against ground targets on the Eastern Front, the Germans haveused

a self-propelled 88-mm gun, called the "Ferdinand." See Intelligence Bul

letin,

Vol.II ,No.1,a 1.


34/194

GERMANY TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IK TH E FIELD 2 9

moreinviting targets are not available. W ith the aid

of a forward observation post, 88's sometimes engage

such targets as troop concentrations a t ranges of as

much as6,000 yards.

2

The following are examples of

the penetration performance with the 88-mm Flak 36,

themostcommonmodelofthisgun:

Thicknessofarmor

Range(yards)

Perpendicular (noangleof

30°angleofimpact

impact)

500

110mm (4.33in) _. _ _

129mm (5.07in).

1,000

101mm (3.97 in) __ _ _ _

119mm (4.68in).

1,500

92mm (3.62 in) __

110mm (4.33in).

2,000

84mm (3.30 in) __

100mm (3.93in).

I t is estimated that the following figures are correct

for the 88-mm Flak 41 :

Thicknessofarmor

Range(yards)

Perpendicu lar (noangleof

30°angleefimpact

impact)

500

150mm (5.91 in) _ __ 175mm (6.89in).

1,000

140mm (5.51in) . _ 164mm (6.46in).

1,500

130mm (5.12 in) ___ 153mm (6.02in).

2,000

121mm (4.76'in) 142mm (5.59in).

2

The telescopic sight is.graduated up to 10.340yards, and theoretically it

would be possible to engagetargets upto this range. In indirect fire,when

the panoramic s ight is used, the maximum range of the 88-mm Flak 36 is

11,445 yards with time-fuze high-explosive ammunition, and 16,132 yards

withpercussion-fuze high-explosive ammunition.

Correspondingmaximum ranges with the88-mmFlak 41a re :

Yards

Direct fire (with telescopic sight) 11,770

Indirectfire(withpanoramicsight):

Using time-fuze HE 13, 561

Using percussion-fuze HE

22,

091

5547 05°—43—vol. 2,N o.3 5


35/194


b. Employment in Rear Areas

In rear areas heavyflakhas the normaltask ofpro

viding antia irc ra ft protection for ports, airfields,

dumps,headquarters,andpointsofimportance

on

lines

of communication. Predictors and/or auxiliarypre

dictors are employed, andmobile radio-locationequip

mentmayalsobeallotted. Althoughflakunitsinrear

areasprimarily havethetask of providing antiaircraft

protection,eventheseunitsarenormallyprovidedwith

armor-piercing and percussion-fuze high-explosiveam

munition, and therefore canoperateagainst anyhostile

troops or armored vehicles which may break through.

The heavy flak's degree of preparedness tomeetsuch

attacks naturally depends on the distance betweenthe

gunsandthefront.

c. Employment in Forward Areas

I t is in the employment of heavy flak batteries at

tached to the Army, for operations in forward areas,

that current German methods depart most noticeably

from the doctrine expressed in earlier manuals.

Formerly, German doctrine outlined a primary anti

aircraft role,a secondary an titank role, and,underex

ceptional circumstances,employmentin a field-artillery

role. I t may be said tha t the antitank role nowhas

assumedvirtualpr iority , for experiencehasshownthat

the88-mmgunhasbecomeanindispensablecomplement

to the German Army 's antitank a rtille ry . A certain

proportion of heavy batteries in forward areas isstill

deployed in an antia ircraft role,chiefly to protect for

wardairfields,andduringperiodsofinactivityorprep


36/194

GERMAXY TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK INITHE FIELD 3 1

aration the antia ircraft role still predominates. For

example, an assembly prior to an attack will usually

beprotectedbyheavyguns,and under these conditions

the ground role is assumed only in the event that the

Germansare subjected to asurprise attack. However,

oncebattleisjoined,whether inattack ordefense (and

especiallywhenarmoredforcesareinvolved),theheavy

flakguns are usually employed against ground targets

only, and the antiaircraft role becomes the exception.

If necessary,evengunsoriginally deployedtogiveanti

aircraft protection to forward airfields are sometimes

pressedintoserviceasan titankweapons.

The employment of heavy flak batteries natura lly

varies considerably, depending on the terrain and the

natu re of the fighting. In open country the 88-mm

gun 's long range gives it a d istinct advantage as an

an titank weapon. I n North Africa, where so often

there was no well-defined " li n e ," heavy flak batteries

often served as the nucleus of defensive

hedgehogs."

In an advance the pr imary function of the batteries

usually has beentoprovide antitank protection during

themovement of German armored vehicles. The 88's

have also been known to accompany tanks in an as

sault-gunrole. Although theba tteryisthenormalfire

unit, large numbers of 88-mm guns have occasionally

beenemployedunder onecommandwhen the situation

has required that maximum antitank strength becon

centratedatasinglepoint.

A strik ing example of the value of heavy flak in

defense is afforded bythefinalphases of the Tunisian


37/194


campaign, in which heavy flak units frequently pro

vided thebackbone ofGerman resistance to theAllied

advance.

For

this purpose several units were formed

intomobilebattle groups, aprocedurewhich hadbeen

resorted to on previous occasions, and which pre

sumably

is

dictated

by the

s tress

of

circumstances.

These flak battle groups

are

purely temporary units,

formed

for a

specific purpose. They consist

of a

number

of

platoons,usuallywith

two

heavy

and

three

light guns each,

and may be

employed either alone

or

in combination with other arms. They areusedboth

indefense and in attack . Since they aremobilestrik

ing forces, there isalways a possibility that theywill

beused by theGermans inattempts to repel landings

on the European continent. They would afford a

means

of

rapid countera ttack

in

threatened sectors.

The employment of these temporary units, which has

become increasingly common, demonstrates the flexi

bility offlakorganization in thefield and theextent to

which theGermans useheavyflak tocomplementanti

tank artillery.

Theemployment

of a

heavyflakbattery

is

naturally

governed by thetype ofoperationthat isbeingunder

taken by theArmy unit towhich it isattached. Al

though thelessonslearned from desertwarfare arenot

necessarily applicable to o ther theaters , the activity

of aheavy flak battery during theearly stages of the

German counteroffensive in Cyrenaica in May 1942

affords some very good tactical illustrations. During

this action thebattery accompanied theArmyunit to


38/194

GERMANY TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF F LAK INITHE FIELD 3 3

which it was attached, and provided protection both

against air attacks and tank attacks. Theground role

predominated. Not only were tank engagements

fought by day, but at night the battery was deployed

inanantitank roletoprotect i ts " p a re n t" Army unit.

The battery was continually on the move during the

day. More than once i t detached some of its guns to

strengthen another Army unit, and at other times it,

in turn, was given added s trength. When opposition

was expected, the battery took up an antitank siting,

generally onhigh ground and facing the piobable line

of attack. The choice of th is position was not hard

and-fast. The batte ry moved to a different position

when reconnaissance had established the location and

course of the hostile tanks. When in position, the

battery often had to site its guns so that they faced

in two directions, because of uncertain ty as to the

exact line of attack.

3. LIGH T FL AK

a. General

Light flak units operating in the field are generally

equipped with 20-mm guns (single- or four-barreled),

sometimes with 37-mm (1.45in.) guns, and once in a

greatwhile with 50-mm (1.97 in.) guns. A light bat

terynormally consistsof four platoons of 20-mmguns,

orthree platoons of the larger caliber light guns, with

threegunstoeachplatoon.

Light flak guns are especially useful in combatting

surprise attacks, because of the.rapidity with which


39/194


these pieces

can be put

intoaction.

The

20-mmFlak

30,

for

example,

can be put

intoaction

in

abouthalf

a

minute,

and in

extremeemergencies

all

lightflakguns

can be fired (although with a limited traverse) from

their mounts. In addition, it is known tha t self-pro

pelled models

of the

20-mm

and

37-mm calibers exist

and

can

engageboth

air and

ground targets . Like

the

heavyguns,

the

lightguns

in the

field

are

usually fitted

with shields

for

protection against small-armsfire.

They

are

also fitted with flak sights and/o r telescopic

or linear sights,

and

carry armor-piercing ammunition

in addition

to

percussion-fuze high-explosive ammuni

tion. Light flak guns mayengage ground targets, es

pecially "soft-skinned" vehicles, atranges of asmuch

as800yards,butaremosteffective at

rangesuptoabout

300yards. Thefollowing are examples

of

thepenetra

tionperformance

of the

20-mmFlak

30

firingarmor-

piercingprojectiles:

Thickness ofarmor

Range(yards)

30°angleofimpact

Perpendicular

100 31

mm

(1.22

in)

48

mm

(1.89in).

200

29 mm (1.14 in) _

44

mm

(1.73

in).

300

27mm (1.06

in)

41

mm

(1.61

in).

400

25

mm

(0.98in)____

_

38mm (1.50in).

b. Employment in Rear Areas

In rear areaslightflakbatterieshavethenormaltask

of giving antiaircraft protection

to

suchvitalpoints

as

airfields, bridges,ra ilroad stations and junctions,head

quarters, anddepots. For this purpose batteries are


40/194

GERMANY—TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FLAK IK.THE FIELD 3 5

generally deployed as a whole, with the guns sited by

platoons. Although theantiaircraft rolepredominates,

these batteries constitute an important element in the

ground defense plan for the vital rear points they are

protecting, and are prepared to engage any armored

or other forces which may succeed in penetrating to

that depth.

c. Employment in Forward Areas

Light batteries a ttached to Army units in forward

areasmayalsooperate asawhole,butplatoons areusu

allydetached

to

performspecialtasks.

On the march, platoons are generally spaced at in

tervals along the column, or are sited at part icularly

vulnerable points along the route—such asbridges,de

files,or crossroads—and subsequently "le ap frog" for

ward. The ir p rincipal task is to pro tect the column

against attack by low-flying aircraft; their secondary

taskistoengagegroundforces.

In battle light flak units afford protection for head

quarters,fieldart ille ry concentrations,infantry concen

trations, engineerunits,motor parks,andsoon. Also,

it is sometimes considered necessary to assign a light

platoon (threeguns) toaheavyflakbattery engaged in

antitankwork—presumably because,under certain cir

cumstances,thetwolightgunsbelongingtothetwobat

teries do not afford enough pro tection. In all these

tasks the antiaircraf t role predominates, but engage

mentofpersonnelandarmoredvehiclesisalsoregarded

ashighlyimportant andoften takesplace. Experience


41/194


has shown tha t during tank attacks, light guns,aswell

as heavy guns, have ignored air targets and havecon

centrated onhostile armored vehicles, leavingGerman

groundunitstodefendthemselvesagainstairattack

by

meansofrifleandlightmachine-gunfire. (Asprevious

issuesof the

Intelligence Bulletin

haveexplained,Ger

man Army training stresses the importance of small-

arms fire in defense against low-flying aircraft.)

Itwillbeseenthatwhereasheavy

flak—which

swell

suited to combat ground targets, pa rtly because ofits

penetration performance—is nowbeinggivenwidetac

tical employment in a ground role, light flakwiththe

Armystillclingspret tymuchto theprinciplesoutlined

in German pre-war manuals. Althoughthe capability

oflightflakinagroundroleisalwayssomethingtotake

into account, this type of employment seems to bethe

exception,ratherthantherule.

NOTE.—This

section has dealt solelywith GermanAir Force flak.

There a re also (1) Army flak (Heeresflak) units, which include

"mixed" battalions (containing both heavy and light batteries) as

par t of the arti llery , and (2) light companies (Flu), which have

light guns only, as part of the in fantry. These o ther types are

not numerous, however. As arule, they are GHQ troops, and are

a ttached to a rmy un its in much the same way tha t German Air

Forceflakunits are attached. Recentenemy documents show that

an Army flak battalion, consisting of two heavy batteries and one

light batte ry , is now included in the tab les of organization of

armored andmotorized divisions.


42/194


43/194


and a length of safety fuze that would give adelay of

30seconds.

2. NEW ARMY CAP

The adoption of a standard field cap (Ewheits

miltze) for the German Army has been ordered (see

fig. 3) . The cap, which resembles that worn by

XL

S.

railroadmen,willreplacethe former German garrison

("overseas" ) cap. If the visor interferes with the

handling of weapons or equipment, the cap willbe

worn back to front. Un its wearing a blackfielduni

form will wear a black cap. Generals caps willhave

gold cord around the to p ; all other officers' capswill

havesilvercordaroundthetop.


44/194

PAKT

TWO:

JAPAN

Section

I. NEW

JAPANESE W EAPONS

1.

INTRODUCTION

Severalnewtypes ofJapaneseweapons aredescribed

inrecentreports from observers

in

combatareas

of the

Pacific. Theseweaponsinclude:

a. A

hand grenade which

is

actuated

by a

pull-type

igniter;

b.

A small, smooth-surfaced hand grenade which is

actuated bystriking the fuze against a hard surface—

as in thecase of theModel 91 and theModel 97 gre

nades;

*

c. A47-mm antitank gunwhich iscompletely mod

ern indesign; and

d.Fourtypes

of

boobytraps.

2. PULL-TYPE HA ND GRENADE

a. Description

This grenade, which

has an

over-all length

of 3%

inchesand

a

diameter

of

2inches,iseasilydistinguished

from Models

91 and 97

because

it has no

lengthwise

grooves.

The

weapon

has

fivetraverse grooves,

how

ever,

and it

also

has a

lead cover which

is

grooved

to

1

Intelligence Bulletin,

Vol. II, No. 1,included a section devoted tothese

and

othergrenades

and

mineswhichhavebooby-trappingpossibilities.

39


45/194


provide a grip for the fingers in removing thecover.

Ononesideofthisgrenade,fittedtothetopandbottom,

are two rings. These could be used for carryingthe

weapon, or for anchoring in case it is used asabooby

trap.

b. Table of Characteristics

Over-all length 3%inches.

Leng th of body 2% inches.

Length of cover 1inch.

D iameter of body 2 inches.

D iameter of cover i y

8

inch.

Body (m ateria l) Cast iron.

Cover (materia l) Lead.

W eight ( to ta l) 449grams.

W eight of filler 39.5grams.

W eight of body 509.5 grams.

Loading factor 8.7 percent.

F il le r G ranular TNT.

c. Operation

To remove the lead cover, depress the cover thumb

release on the side of the grenade (see fig . 4) . The

cover then screws off in

iy

2

turns . This exposesthe

firingstring . Whenthefiringstringispulled,itdraws

a friction ign iter between twopiecesofmatchcomposi

tion and fires them. Thematch composition, in turn,

firesa5%-second delayt ra in ,whichfiresthe detonator,

thus setting off the main charge.


46/194

41

APAN

1

—NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS

Cover

thumb release

Firing string

Brass plate

Match composition

Lead cover

Friction

Delay train

(5 sec)

Detonator

Figure 4.—Japanese Pull-type Hand Grenade.


47/194

42


d.

Booby trapping Possibilities

Sincethisgrenade

can be

activated

by a

pullonthe

firingstring,

it

isbetteradaptedtobooby-trappingpur

posesthan

the

Model91

and the

Model

97

grenades.

The grenade booby-trap sketch (taken from

a

Japa-

Figure 5.—Japanese Grenade Booby Trap.

nese document)

in

figure

5 is of the

pull type.

The

enemymay

rig up

suchboobytraps

on

deadsoldiers

in

battleareas

in a

manner

so

that

a

pull

of a leg or

some

other par t

of the

body will cause detonation.

3. OFFENSIVE HAND GRENADE

a. Description

Thisgrenade

is

small

in

comparison with

the

Model

91 andModel 97Japanese grenades (see fig. 6). It is


48/194

JAPAN—NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS

43

Fir ing pin-

•Sleeve

•Safety-pin hole

Firing-pin

re ta in er spr ing

B rea the r hole

Delay t ra in

•Grenade body

Booster-

Figure

6 —Japanese

Offensive Hand Grenade


49/194


3.5 incheslongand 1.75 inches in diameter, andweighs

approximately 10ounces. Because of its lightweight,

the grenade canbe thrown almost as far as abaseball.

This fact indicates that the weapon is designed pri

marily for use in offensive operations. I t is called

"offensive" hand grenade in this section because its

modelnumberisnotknown.

The body of the grenade is smooth and cylindrical,

both insideandoutside,andhasarim at eachend. Its

nonserratedbodyisanadditionalhelpindistinguishing

the weapon from the other types of Japanese hand

grenades. I t isclosed bya threaded plug,whichhasa

holeinthecenter to

receiveathreadedfuze.

The workmanship of the grenade is good, andord

nance experts consider the fuze an improvement over

thatoftheModel

91

andModel

97

grenades.

b. Operation

A sleeve that holds the firing pin and the firing-pin

retaine r spring inplace isheld tothe fuze bymeansof

a smallscrew. Thedetonatorboosteriscrimpedtothe

lowerpar tofthefuzebody. Thesafetypin,whichpre

ventsthe firing pin from strik ing theprimer,isheldin

placebyacord. Toarmthegrenade,removethesafety

pin and s tr ike the head of the weapon against some

hard object, such as a helmet. Thus the operationis

likethatoftheModel91and97grenades.

4. MODEL 1 (1941) 47-MM AT GUN

This new Japanese weapon is a split-trail pieceof

modern design (see fig. 7) . Its silhouette is low,and


50/194

JAPAN NEW JAPANESE WEAPONS 4 5

itstreadisunusuallywide. Because ofthese features,

plus thefact that thewheels are fittedwith pneumatic

tires,

it is evident that the piece is adapted for towing

byamotorvehicle.

Figu re 7.—Japanese Model 1(1941) 47-mm ATGun.

The barrel of this weapon is extremely long, and is

heavilyreinforced atthemuzzle. Thisindicatesahigh

muzzle velocity. The trails, also unusually long, are

equipped with a locking yokeand handles. Thewide

treadandsmallwheelspermitawidetraverse. Awide

shield,cutawayatthebottom,isprovided.

Acompletecheckhasnotbeenmadeontheammuni

tionused for thisweapon. However, the armor-pierc

ing round is 15.5 inches long and weighs 6 pounds

5 ounces, complete. The case, made of brass, is

unusually large and long, and is necked down to take

the47-mm projectile . The projectile has a red t ip , a

blackbody, and awhite band just in front of the cop

perrotatingband.

5. BOOBY TRAPS

Fou r types of booby traps which the Japanese may

use in fu ture operations are described below. The


51/194

46


sketchesandexplanatorywordingwerecompiledfrom

various Japanese notes. They may have beencopied

fromenemymilitaryinstructionsortheymay

have been

devised by individual Japanese soldierswith technical

experience.

a . Device Using a Parasol

Phial containing

sulphuric ocid

Detonating fluid

Mixture of detonating

and ignition fluid

Detonating fluid

Ignition fluid

Mixture of

heat producing acid.

Figure8.

This booby tr ap apparen tly is a combined explosive

and incendiary device. Opening of the parasol prob

b. Device Using a Flashlight

Explosive

Switch

Bicycle ball bearings

probably used as schrapnel)

Dry cell battery

Figure9.


52/194

47

APAN N EW JAPANESE WEAPONS

ablybreakstheacidvial,whichinturn,ignitesthedet

onatingandignitionmixtures.

In th is type

of

booby trap ,

the

flashlightswitch

is

usedtoconnect acircuit through an electric detonator.

Whentheswitch ispressed,theexplosive isignited.

c. Device Using a Pipe

Threaded joint

Explosive

Figure 10.

" A " is probably asafety pin, which,while inserted,

prevents the unscrewing

of

the pipe stem. When the

deviceisplacedasabobbytrap,thesafetypinwouldbe

removed; after this , unscrewing

of the

stem would

release the striker pin,whichwouldfirethe percussion

cap and explosive.


53/194

48

INTELL IGENCE BULLET IN

d.

Device Using a Bottle

Rubber cork

Mixture of

potassium chlorate

and T.N. unreadab le)

Air space

Benzine or kerosene

Sulphuric acid

Figure 11.

If thebottleispickedupand shaken,orif itistipped

over,sulphuricacidcomingincontactwiththemixture

inthecorkwouldcauseasmallexplosionandignitethe

benzine. Thistype of boobyt rap isprobablydesigned

primarily for itsincendiary effect.


54/194

Section II . NOTES ON JAPANESE

LANDING OPERATIONS

1.

INTRODUCTION

The information contained in this section has been

extracted from several translated Japanese documents

dealing with landing opera tions. Some of the sta te

ments comefrom enemyfieldmanuals,while othersap

pear to bebased on results of landing maneuvers. In

connection with this section, reference should bemade

toinformation previouslypublished in the Intelligence

Bulletin

and other M. I . D. publications on Japanese

landing opera tions. For example,

Intelligence Bulle

tin, Vol.I , No.8, included a lengthy articlewhichwas

paraphrased from a translated enemy document tit led

"AmphibiousTacticsBasedonExperiencesatWake."

Intheparagraphswhichfollow,thereadermustbear

inmind that he isreading Japanese doctrine, someof

which isexperimental, and hemust not confuse it with

our owndoctrine on landing operations.

2.

AC TION BEFORE LA N D ING

a. Selection of Landing Points

In selecting landing points, take into consideration the prob

abilitythathostileforceshavealotofmechanizedvehiclesandan

excellent network of roadsand othermeansof communication.

Thelandingpoints should besuitable for landing installations,

49


55/194


and especially convenient for the landin g and subsequent advance

of vehicles.

In landing on host ile coasts where breakers are antic ipated, it

is best to select one or two a l ternate landing points because the

actual condition of thesurf may be different from that whichwas

expected . Fo r example , we had expected l arge b reakers at one

of th e poin ts considered fo r l and ing in th e Ph ilippines , but a

closereconnaissancerevealed th at they were small. Thereforewe

landed ther e th e first d ay . Towa rd n igh tf al l, th e surf became

rough , sowechanged ancho rage and continued the landingopera

tions a t another poin t, where the surf was not heavy.

b. Reconnaissance of Landing Points

A thorough air reconnaissance of proposed landing points must

be made by a competent officer who is scheduled to participatein

the landings. A lso, a i r photos must be made and d istributed to

each uni t designa ted to t ake par t in the l andings . These photos

must show views of the landing points dur in g high t ide andalso

dur ing low t ide .

Keconnaissance of land ing points from the sea must becarri