(1945) intelligence bulletin, vol. iii, no. 6

8/12/2019 (1945) Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. III, No. 6

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Have You Learned A LessonAbout The Enemy?

The Intelligence Bulletin is anxiou s to o bta in contributions fromunits and individuals, especially intelligence agencies, for publication.Articles tha t p resent lessons abo ut enemy tactics, techniques, and materiel are particularly desired, and when it is consistent with security,credit will be given to the co nt rib ut ing agency or unit. Contributionsmay be sent directly to the Supervisor of Reports, Military IntelligenceService, W ar Dep artment, W ashington 25, D. C.

Re aders are urged to com ment on th e use they a re making of thispublication and to forward suggestions for future issues. Reproductionof m ater ial pu blished her ein is encou raged, prov ided that (1) thesource is stated, (2) the classification is no t low ered, and (3) one copyof the public ation in which the m ate ria l is rep rod uced is forwarded tothe Military Intelligence Service.

By arrangement with the Adjutant General, the Intelligence ulletinis distributed in the same manner as is prescribed for field manuals(see paragraph 6-9, 23a, FM 21-6, List of Publications for Training).Requests for additional copies should be made through channels.


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FOR USE OF MILITARY PERSON NEL ONLY NOT TO BE PUB LISHE D

VOL. I ll NO . 6 FE BR U AR Y 1945

INTELLIGENCEBULLETIN

M I L I T R Y I N T E L L I G E N C E D I V I S I O NW DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON D . C .


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T BLEO CONTENTSG E R M A N

PageFORTRESS BATTALIPNS AND HOW T H E Y ARE USED 1

Their Purpose and Missions 1The Three Basic Types 3Notes on Tactics 7

MORE NOTES ON AN TIT AN K TACTIC S 10The Antitank Company 12Bazooka and Grenade-discharger Squads 13A "Fire Team" in the Withdrawal 14Failure of a Tactic 15A Delaying Position 16

DISC OVE RED I N COMBA T 19Reaction to Artillery Fire Against Towns 19Combat in Towns 20T a n k - I n f a n t r y N i g h t A t t a c k 21E n e m y P igeon Serv ice 21" T h e A m e r i c a n sAreC o m i n g " 22C a p t u r e d A r t i l l e r y A m m u n i t i o n 22Vulne rab i l i t y of P i l l b o x e s to "Sea l ing" ' 22

R O U N D I N G U P T H E B O O B Y T R A P S 24Devices Actuated by Pul l - igni ters 25Devices Actuated by P res su re 28Antil if t ing Devices on Mines 28Miscel laneous 29

T H E G E R M A N V O L K S S T U R M 31I N B R I E F , 37

A Raid on a U.S. Outpost 37Minefield Marking 39Tactic Against Infantry-with-Tanks < 41New German lakpanzer 42

JAPANJ AP AN E SE DIVE R SIONAR Y T AC T IC S f 44

Organization and Doctrine *)Burma ' 2Philippines 4Southwest Pacific 50

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T BLE OF CONTENTS III

PageT 150 -M M MORTAR 57ENEMY MINE S ON LEYTE 60

Bomb Mines 60Coconut Mines 62Box Mines 63Antiboat Mines 64

REMOTE-CONTROL MIN ES IN ANTIT ANK WARFARE 65PORTABLE FLAME THROWER 68

Fuel Unit 68Fuel Hose 70Flame Gun 70Characteristics and Operation 70Japanese Flame-thrower Troops 71

N W JAPAN ESE ARMY INSIGNIA 72Don't Remove Insignia 73

UNITED NATIONSBRITISH RAID IN BUR MA . 74ORDNANCE INTELLIGENC E TEAMS UNCOVER TECH NICA L SEC RE TS. . 81

Index to Volume III, Nos. 1-6 8 8over Illustration German bazooka teams in action against U.S. tanks

(story on page 10) .


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German Fortress Battalions now take part in thedefense of fortified linesV


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These newly created German units arecharged with the defense of such stronglyfortified lines as the West Wall.

r rtress b tt lions. . . and how they are usedA large number of German Fortress Battalions , intended

to man the West Wall, were formed during the crucial periodfollowing the enemy's collapse in France, and may be expectedto take an important part in the defense of that fortified line.A Fortress Battalion may be one of three basic types: the Fortress Infantry Battalion, the Fortress Machine-gun Battalion,and the Super-heavy (Independent) Machine-gun Battalion. Inthe late summer of 1944, General Heins Guderian issued an order giving details regarding the various types and discussingtheir tactical use. The following notes are based on the mostimportant parts of his order.THEIR PURPOSE ND MISSIONS

German Fortress Battalions are Army GHQ troops, and arecontrolled by the Army High Command. As a rule, they aremeant to be used only in the defense of fortified lines and otherfortified positions. By assignment these Battalions operate under local commanders.

If the field troops retire to new positions, the Fortress Battalions are withdrawn to the nearest permanent fortifications.In contrast with the standard 1944 battalion organization inthe German infantry division, Fortress Battalions have less per


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sonnel butas the enemy sees itgreater combat effectivenessbeca use of a m ore lib er al allotm ent of autom atic weapons andmortars, and especially because antitank rocket-projector platoons are attached.

A thor ou gh kno wled ge of the te rr ai n, (especially a knowledg e of the possib le aven ues of ap pro ac h and the areas in whichhostile forces a re co nc en trated ) an d a carefully prepared defense p la n ar e re gar ded as pre requ isit es for the correct emplace m ent of the au tom atic w eapo ns and m ortar s, and as anind ispen sab le basis for the ta ctic al employ m ent of the Battalions.

If time permits, defensive measures are tested, and defensiveaction is rehearsed, on the basis of theoretical Allied attacks.This , of course, is a customary practic efor all units throughoutthe German Armed Forces.

Th e Ge rm ans m ay em plo y these b attalio ns not only in a fortified line and in the outer defenses of forts, but in preparedrear defensive positions, entirely independent of the fortifiedl ine. The B attalio ns als o may b e com m itted as a screening forcein thr ea ten ed sectors or in secto rs which m ay be tactically important for other reasons.

The enemy believes that Fortress Battalions preferably shouldbe given missions such as these:

1. To defend ag ainst wea ke r hostile forces which havebroken through unexpectedly.2 . To delay the op po sitio n's ad va nc e by forcing its advance

guar ds to fight befo re the y reach the actu al fortified line orposition, and by blocking defiles and other tactically useful corr idors .

3 . To allow fighting tr oo ps f allin g back toward the mamdefensive position to be absorbed into that position.

4 . To occupy q ui ck ly an d to defe nd po ints or sectors ofspecial importance.


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5. To counterattack with the limited objective of cleaningup hostile penetrations into a prepared line or position.The purpose of such missions is to prevent an Allied forcefrom capturing key defensive points without a battle, and to

gain time and space for subsequent operations by Germanforces.The tactical principles that Fortress Battalions will observeare the same as the standard German principles of defense, andare not affected by the location and specific combat mission ofany individual Battalion.Normally, the Battalions will be assigned to existing fortified

lines or positions, or to those under construction. To increasethe effectiveness of their assigned sectors of defense, Battalionswill make use of natural obstacles and will construct additionalblocks. The units are told that they can greatly increase thedefense potential of their positions by the skillful employmentof all available automatic weapons and mortars; interlockingbands of fire, organization in depth, and flanking fire arestressed. However, only the local commander is allowed to alter the defense lines or to authorize changes in a fortificationplan.THE THREE B SIC TYPESDifferences in armament, strength, and mobility determinedifferent special uses for the three basic types of Fortress Battalions. Here are General Guderian 's comments about the various types and the ways in which they should be committed.

Fortress Infantry Battalions1 Bicycle Company

Infantry companies equipped with bicycles are especially suitablefor reconnaissance and mob ile warfa re. The following m issions arerecommended:

a. Long-range reconna issance. Fo r combat reconnaissance, all companies must furnish patrols because of the small number of mobileforces.


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\A well concealed Gerntan pillbox showingcenter embrasure withvision slit at right. Thispillbox for light machine guns was capturedduring the assault onthe Siegfried Line. Othervision slits are on othersides of the pillbox, afforaing a wide field ofobservation.

of an em brasure in >the rear of a Germanpillbox used to protectthe^ rear entrance fromassault. The steel platewith slot is embeddedin the center of theconcrete wall.

Closeup of center ma-thine gun embrasure,measuring 8by 12inches,showing closure platepartly closed The visionslit at the right is probably for observation ofgunfire and hostiletroopswfahout interfering withthe machine gunner.Interior of German pill- >box showing details ofembrasure closure plate.The plate is locked bythe eccentric wedges.Pinion for mounting the-machinegun,apparentlyadded after the pillboxiifas completed, is belowthe embrasure. The lettering means "No lightswhen slit is open."


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b. The swift occupation of important terrain features.c. The prote ctio n of fron t, flank, o r rea r when no other German unit

is available for this.d. Employment as a mobile reserve, at the disposal of the Fortress

Ba ttalion com mand er. W eap ons, am m un ition , and necessary pieces ofequipment are to be fastened onto the bicycles.2. Rifle Company

The heavy machine gun squad in each rifle company is particularlywell adapte d for defensive fighting in de pth from concealed, flankingfiring pos itions. Covered positions may be employed.

If th e assault pla toon is equipped with the submachine gun 44(Machinenpistole 44), the fire power of the com pany is greatly increased. Th is plato on shou ld be emp loyed for counterthrusts, in caseof hostile pene tra tions , and a t local defense po ints where the terraindoes not pe rm it effective use of of such long-range weapons as theheavy machine gun and the 81-mm mortar.

Up to a range of 450 yards, the M.P. 44 is as accurate as the rifle.The principal value of the M.P. 44 lies in its accuracy and high rateof fire (22 to 28 roun ds per m inute ) as a semiau tomatic weapon, andin its alternate use as an automatic weapon, when it is fired in shortbu rsts of 2 to 3 round s (40 to 50 round s per m in u te ). Generally, theweapo n is set for sing le fire. Bu rsts will b e fired only when beatingoff an enemy assault, making a counterthrust (against a penetration,in close co m bat ), o r at very sho rt ran ges d urin g combat in trenches,tow ns, or wood s. Stric t fire disc ipl ine m ust be observed. Conserveam m un itio n! Rem ember t ha t this weapon fires a short cartridge, notinterchangeable with ordinary rifle or machine-gun ammunition.

In add ition to be ing equipped with antitan k hollow charges, thean titan k rocke t-projector pla toon ena bles the rifle company to buildup a powerful and deeply echeloned an titan k defense in, or immediately behind, the main line of resistance.3. Heavy Company

By means of fire from its heavy machine-gun platoon (4 or 6 guns),the heavy com pany supplem ents the heavy machine-gun fire of therifle com pan y. W henever possible , the p lato on fires from coveredpositions.

The m or ta r pla too ns supp or t the ac tion of the rifle companies bycommitment as a unit and with concentrated fire. The mortar-platoon


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observation posts are to be situated so that they can maintain communication with the company commander in whose sector they arecommitted. The firing positions should be close enough to permitcontinued observed fire, even if technical means of communication aredestroyed. This can be achieved by situating observation posts closeto the firing positions.

Fortress Machine-gun BattalionThe usual German tactical rules for the defense apply , with certain

natural modifications, to the Fortress Machine-gun Battalion. The latter is committed in the first line of defense and in terrain where thebest use can be made of the shock power of the heavy machine gun.

The machine-gun company is committed by squads or platoons. Theheavy machine guns usually will take advantage of every opportunityto fire from the flanks. Concentrated fire is placed on terra in featureswhich are especially threatened.

Antitank rocket-projector platoons are committed by squads orteams, for the protection of firing positions.

The heavy company receives a liberal allotment of 81-mmmortarsand 75-mm infantry howitzers, to permit heavy concentrations of fire.

The engineer platoon is committed in the usual ma nner.Super-heavy Independent) Fortress Machine-gun Battalion

The companies equipped with single-barrel, 20-mm machine gunsare primarily intended to combat ground targets from concealed orcovered firing positions. These positions are selected withan eyetowardthe possibleuse of theguns against air targets,aswell.

The antiaircraft company, equipped with four-barrel, 20-mm guns, iscommitted principally against air targets, and from concealed p ositionsat important terrain features. How ever, when the firing positions areselected, the possibility that the guns may also be used against groundtargets is taken into account.NOTESO T CTICS

The Germans recognize that Fortress Battalions often will beon their own especially in the early stages of an operation.This is why the enemy believes in conducting tactical and terrain reconnaissance frequently for a considerable distance andin ample time to permit planning. Moreover early liaison is


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established with approaching reinforcements and with Germantroops falling back to the fortified positions. Ruses and decep.tions are used.Great care is taken to prevent a hostile force from penetrat

ing a fortified line or position unexpectedly or occupying rearpositions before German troops can reach them. Therefore, inaddition to performing reconnaissance, Fortress Battalions takethe necessary measures to guard the fortified positions and tokeep them in readiness for defense on very short notice. In thisconnection, no time is lost in constructing additional positions,with emphasis on sectors considered suitable for a hostile approach ; frequent alerts and drills are ordered, to reduce thetime needed to man the installations; and mobile elements aredispatched forward.

The Germans believe that counterthrusts and other fightingoutside the fortifications can be conducted successfully only bymobile elements. Such elements are selected at the earliest possible time (they may be drawn from the mobile forces of theBattalion), and are equipped with the necessary weapons andsupplies.

Because of the independent nature of a Fortress Battalion,the headquarters company takes care of the supply of all companies in the Battalion. Thus the company commanders becomefree to devote their entire.time to leading their units in trainingand in combat, and are not obliged to concern themselves withsupply problems beyond maintaining a general supervision.(This type of organization is called freie Gliederung, or"freeing organization," since it frees the company commanderfor combat duties only. It represents a trend which is becomingnoticeable in the organization of all German armored units andsome Volksgrenadier units.) According to General Guderian,the principal job of Fortress Battalion company commandersshould be to weld the whole organizaJian into a perfectly coor


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dinated fighting unit. However, as with all German units, it isrequired that an "adequate" amount of time be set aside forNational Socialist education and indoctrination. Even FortressBattalions, charged with conducting a desperate defense withinthe borders of Germany itself are not permitted to forget thatNazi domination of the world still is the ultimate goal.


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MOR E NOTES O N NTIT NK T CTICSWith German antitank activity coming increasingly into the spotlight, these new noteson enemy antitank tactics have a special significance. Moreove r, it must be expected thatsuch measures will become even more vigorous as the threat to the German homelandgrows.

A German two man bozooka team firing on U. S. tanks.U. S. combat experiences in Italy and the interrogation of

German officers have yielded fresh information about G ermanantitank tactics, which today are playing a more important partthan ever in the enemy s stubborn defensive fighting. The following tactical notes deal with the antitank compan y, -thebazooka and grenade-discharger squads, and ground-mount antitank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery in the withdrawal.In addition, a new German technique of preparing delaying positions is discussed and illustrated . The latter information comesfrom a U. S. armored division now fighting in Germany.

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THE ANTITANK COMPANYCo m pan ies of the G erm an division antita nk battalion, as well

as the regim en tal 14th C om pan y, ar e emp loyed in support ofth e infan try reg im en ts, but their o rd ers for deployment normally come from the antitank battalion headquarters, ratherth an from the regim en t. Th e G erm ans believe that this procedu re ensu res a high er d eg ree of coo rdin ation in the antitank defense thro ug ho ut the divisio n secto r. Ho wever, the followingtactical principles are followed by companies of both types.

The gun s are br ou gh t into an asse mbly ar ea , and the company and platoon commanders go forward to make a detailedrec on na issa nc e of firing po sitio ns . If the com pany commanderhas had enough time, he will have made a preliminary surveyof the entire sector, and will have prepared a map designatingareas as Panzersicher ( t ank-proof ) , Panzer gefahrdet ^difficultfor tanks) , or Panzermoglich (goo d tan k te rr a in ). The over-allallo tm en t of an titank gu ns will have been m ad e on the basis ofthis map, with the object of covering those areas designated asPanzermoglich Great care is taken with the siting of each gun;whenever possible, this is done by the platoon commander.

The caliber of the guns determines the nature of the positionswh ich a re chosen. Th e G erm ans s tipu late that the 50-mm antitank gun must be sited in defilade and must fire to the flanks.This is why the Germans choose such positions as the reverseslopes of hills and the reverse edges of small woods. Housesare avoided, on the principle that they attract too much artilleryfire. The G erm ans also p re fe r flanking fire for their 75-mmantjtank guns, but the U. S. and British practice of advancingwith infantry in the lead and tanks following in support makesth is difficult to achie ve . A nd since the G erm ans believe thatthese 7 5 s can p ierc e the fron t ar m or of A llied tanks at rangesup to 2,000 yards, the guns usually are sited to fire forward,an d ar e well camouflaged in stead of be ing defiladed. Guns of

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all calibers are sited in depth, at varying distances behind themain line of resistance, depending on the situation and the terrain. Invariably, the guns have infantry in front of them forlocal protection. The positions are arranged so that the gunscan support each other, each gun covering positions from whichother guns might be attacked by Allied tanks in hull-down positions.

The enemy s normal practice has been to withdraw the company s prime movers to lines about half a mile to a mile behindthe gun positions, but, because of Allied heavy artillery superiority, this is no longer possible. The more usua l procedure nowis to send back all but one prime mover out of range of artilleryfire. The remainding prime mover serves for any local changesof position which prove necessary. Since such changes of position are likely to be fairly frequent, it is standard enemy practice to prepare alternate positions for the guns as soon as theoriginal positions have been prepared. Of course, a companywith only one prime mover forward is not able to undertake asudden withdrawal. (If the probable necessity for a withdrawal is foreseen, the prime movers are kept near the guns,and are disposed in whatever cover can be found.)

If the company makes a planned withdrawal, assembly areasas well as new lines of resistance are reconnoitered to the rearof the initial positions. The guns then withdraw singly, undercover of the remaining weapons.BAZOOKA AND GRENADE DISCHARGER SQUADS

Bazooka and grenade-discharger squads are allotted to thoseinfantry companies whose sectors are considered most likely tobe attacked by tanks. The bazooka is regarded as a relativelystatic weapon, to be fired from a prepared position, whereas thegrenade discharger is regarded as a mobile reserve weapon, andusually is held back at the Antitank Company command post.

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Wherever possible, bazookas are used in groups of three, andare sited in a V with its prongs toward the opposition.

This permits at least two weapons to engage a tank approaching from any direction. The individual rocket launcher is em-placed in a V-shaped pit, with the prongs pointing toward theopposition. The weapon is carried to either end of the V, according to the direction from which the tank to be engaged isapproach ing. Having loaded the weapon, the loader takes shelter in the opposite arm of the V, to avoid the back-flash of therocket. He usually is armed w ith a submachine gun, and isresponsible for the ground protection of the position. In thegeneral defense plan of the company, bazooka sections have themission of defending narrow tank lanes and defiladed approaches. The antitank guns cover the open areas of attack.A FIRE TEAM IN THE WITHDRAWAL

Ground-mount antitank guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery frequently constitute a fire team in German withdrawalactions. The ground-mount antitank guns are sited singly, ingroups of two or th ree, in positions permitting all-around defense. W ire entanglements and minefields surround these positions, and infantry in company or platoon strength is maintainedin the immediate vicinity. The in fantry stays close to the road,

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and their positions are planned for ready withdrawal. For thisreason the infantry engage mostly with frontal fire, and fireonly a few rounds before pulling back. Small groups of tanksdeploy on the flanks of their position, serving both as protection for the antitank guns and as an incentive to hostile armorto deploy similarly. In retreat, these tanks engage the hostilearmor and afford time for the ground-mount weapons to retireto their next position.The mission of the self-propelled guns in an action of thiskind is to remain in the rear, between the antitank guns in thecenter and the armor on the flanks. The self-propelled guns

provide fire support, changing position continually and avoiding a direct engagement with the hostile arm or. The Germansconsider them especially valuable in helping antitank guns todefend a road block. By changing their positions so often, theself-propelled guns place interdictory fire of heavy caliber onthe obstacle area without endangering themselves to any appreciable extent.FAILURE OF A TACTICA prisoner declared that the antitank company never wasused in support of advancing tanks; its chief mission was toattack Allied tanks and cover the German retreat.The three guns of a platoon were staggered in the followingmanner:

ill:

JOOy |

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In theory, the No. 1 gun was to start firing so as to attractre tu rn fire from the hostile tank s. As soon as it was feasible to

so, the N o. 1 gun was to cha ng e position to the rear. In them ea nt im e, the N o. 2 gun was to fire in or de r to attract the oppositio n s a ttentio n. As soon as the Allied tanks fire was directedtoward the N o. 2 g un , tha t gun was supposed to cease firing andmove to the re ar , leav ing the N o. 3 gun to take over until theN o. 1 gun was in position and ready to start firing again.

In actual practice, however, this system seldom worked. Fireon ad van cing tank s was op ened at 40 0 y a rd s; the prisoner considered this range much too short to permit a successful changeof position as outlin ed in the theor y. Since the prisoner wascap ture d by ad van cing A llied infa ntry because he had beenunable to move his gun to the rear quickly enough, his contention seems pretty reasonable.

No s pa re b ar re ls w ere c arr ied by the enem y, and only thegun sight was used . Th e pr iso ner s plato on once had a rangefinder ca lib ra ted u p to 10,00 0 m ete rs, but the prisoner hadne ve r seen it in ac tion. F ir e contro l was independ ent for eachgu n, and was h an dle d by the noncom in cha rge , who relied onfield glasses.

In the p ris one r s op inio n, the following ranges for the 75-mraantitank guns were the most effective:

Against tanks or other moving targetsAgainst attacking infantryAgainst strongpointsAgainst houses

400 yards1,000 yards1,200 yards1,500 yards

A DELAYING POSITIONIn recent weeks a U. S. armored division has been encounter

ing German delaying positions designed to destroy the leadingtanks of an armored column and to cause confusion and delay.O ne type of set-up in p ar tic u la r ha s been encountered re

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peatedly and evidence shows that the Germans have been practicing and perfecting the technique very studiously indeed.As shown in the illustration a covered and perfectly camouflaged foxhole for a two-man bazooka team normally is dug in

a semicircular pattern around the corner of a house or otherbuilding anywhere from 5 to 50 yards off a road. A camouflaged escape trench leads from the rear of the bazooka emplacement to any nearby place of concealment such as gardenshrubbery outbuildings or woods. Machine guns are placed ina V with the prongs of the V about 300 to 400 yards awayfrom the road and facing the direction from which an Alliedapproach is expected.

When an advancing Allied column is preceded by a dismounted point fire is withheld un til the bazooka team can becertain of knocking out the leading vehicles.

4representative German delaying position

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W hen the bazook a fires, all the m achin e guns open up on there m ain de r of the c olu m n, not so m uch to cause casualties as tocreate confusion and to make it difficult for the Allied forceto tell the spot from which the bazooka fire has come. In fact,the Germans rely on a combination of factorsthe excellentcamouflage of the p ositio ns a nd the escap e trench , besides theconfu sion cre ate d by the cross-firing m ach ine guns to make itdifficult for Allied soldiers to determine the points from whichthe resistance originates.

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LJiscoveredm Combat

Military gains may be measured, not only in terms of areasliberated or conquered, but also in terms of the knowledge weacquire about our opponent. From U. S. unit commanders andstaff officers who have been engaged in recent fighting in Western Europe comes currently valuable information regarding theGerman enemy. Further intelligence notes of this type will appear in subsequent issues of the Intelligence Bulletin.REACTION TO ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST TOWNS

When U. S. heavy artillery destroyed buildingseven fortified buildingsin Brest, without making sure that the direct-support artillery could maintain neutralization until the infantry assaulted the area, the Germans made the most of their op


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portun ity when our fire was lifted. They pro m ptly moved backin, and constructed fortifications from the rubble. When theGermans did this, their new positions often were harder to reduce than the original buildings would have been.

German troops in Brest who were provided with adequatecover seem to have been affected only slightly by intermittenthara ssing fire, even when the fire was from heavy a rtille ry . Assoon as the men became convinced that their cover affordedreasonable protection, occasional rounds failed to disturb theirnormal rout ine.COMBAT IN TOWNS

At no time while our outfit was engaged in mopping-up operations in Aachen did the enemy fire a shot from behind ourlines. As we went along , we searched every room and closet inevery building, and blew every sewer which might have affordedthe enemy a hiding plac e. Not only were our fighting men relieved of the fear of being sniped at from the rear, but command and supply personnel functioned more efficiently.

In Aachen the enemy covered all avenues of approach withantitank guns and used his tanks and self-propelled guns asroving weapons in a series of positions which changed continually . The Germ ans tried to use their 120-mm m orta rs at arange of 400 yards, because they felt that in this way theygained effectiveness and made it harder for us to locate theweapons.

As the fighting in Brest progressed, small groups of German soldiers often were led to surrender because the call forthem to lay down their arms came to them in their native language . One sergeant's ability to speak Germ an resulted inma ny p risoners being taken. In two days 120 enemy soldiers

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came out in answer to his call for surrender, and many similarexperiences occurred elsewhere.TANK-INFANTRY NIGHT ATTACK

On one occasion the Germans launched a tank-infantry attack at night against our positionsand over muddy ground.After taking the objective, the tanks withdrew before daylight,,leaving their infantry to hold the ground. A counterattack restored our position.

In the attack the Germans sprayed the area with fire, andused star shells and flares, in an attempt to frighten our troops.The enemy tanks didn't stick to the roads, but maneuveredacross country, racing their engines and milling around to causeconfusion among our infantry . Our infantry fired machineguns in the direction from which the sounds of the tanks came,and the sparks from ricochets located the vehicles sufficientlyto permit the tank destroyers to fire. Incidentally, a Germanself-propelled gun was knocked out as a result of this activity.ENEMY PIGEON SERVICE

It has been found that German agents have been using carrier pigeons to transmit information to Germany from localities

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behin d A llied lines . Fr om sm all lofts the pigeons fly to largerand more centrally situated lofts; the latter transmit the inform ation to Germ any by ra d io . Most of these German pigeonscarry on their leg rings the lettering Wehrmacht or Wehr-macht Brieftaube, as w ell as sev eral nu m be rs. Birds that theenemy has commandeered from France, Belgium, and Hollandhav e other m ar k in g s. (P ers on ne l of at least one U. S. divisionhave been ordered to capture or kill pigeons suspected of beingenemy message carriers . )THE AMERICANS ARE COMING

On previous occasions it has been reported that certain German units have a poor opinion of the 'noise discipline' maintaine d by U . S. sold iers. Pr iso ne rs ca ptu red recently have beensay ing m uch th e sam e th ing in effect, that U . S. troops advan cing to attack G erm an po sitions have app roach ed the latterso noisily that the important element of surprise has been sacrificed.CAPTURED ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

The projectiles of captured German 105-mm ammunitionw ill fit U . S. shell cases and gun s, bu t the case will not. To usethe ca ptu red am m un ition , we hav e modified some of our shellcases so that they can b e used over an d over . The case is cutdown to the size of the German case, and the primer from theG erm an cas e is remo ved and is screwed into the U. S. shell case.It requires about 3 hours to complete this modification.VULNER ABILITY OF PILLBOXES TO SEALING

T he am ou nt of T N T need ed to blow G erm an pillboxes canbe reduced considerably if the escape hatches can be found andplug ged be fore han d. The se hatch es, which are encountered m

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nearly all pillboxes, are about 2 feet square. They are likelyto be plastered over and hard to detect.Pillboxes have been vulnerable to effective demolition when

charges have been placed in the ventilation pipes, which runvertically through the side walls near the pillbox entrance. Firstthe bottoms of the pipes are plugged, then 30 to 50 pounds ofTNT are dropped in, primed, and tamped . In one instance,firing the charge breached the wall completely, and the surviving occupants were either wounded or stunned by the flyingconcrete.

Embrasure openings have been obstructed by means of thermite grenades. If the sliding door of the embrasure is closed,a grenade is placed on the slideway, is activated, and becomesa molten mass. Although the door itself is not welded, it isjammed by the mass, which hardens and thus obstructs the slide-way. A single grenade is sufficient to jam a small door, but twogrenades are used against large doors with armor plate morethan 2 inches thick. If the grenade cannot be placed on theslideway, a trough of ^4-inch metal may be used, to cause themolten mass to run into the slideway. The surface on whichthe weld is to be made should be clean and dry. If the door ofa German pillbox works on hinges, jamming cannot be accomplished by means of thermite grenades, since the molten masscannot be controlled sufficiently to create a strong band betweenthe door and the frame.

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\\x)unding upthe >by \_rapsWe haven t seen any booby traps for thepast two weeks. That's the kind of statementthat can spell trouble if it leads to any slack-ening of precautionary measures. As soon asAllied vigilance relaxes, the stage is set forthe Germans to use one of the most vicioustechniques of modern warfare. A technique,incidentally, at which the enemy is highly

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A well-prepared booby trap looks like a perfectly harmlessobject, of course. A bicycle resting against a farm house, awheelbarrow standing outside the barn, a bucket waiting to bedipped into the cool wellthese are everyday sights in the country, and yet nothing is simpler than for a German soldier toconnect each of these to a pull-igniter before his unit withdraws.Clearly, certain elementary precautions are necessary when itis known that the enemy has occupied, or even merely passedthrough, a certain area. Trip and tension wires may be presentin what seem to be the least likely places. After all, traps maybe detonated by any normal activity such as opening a door orwindow, treading on loose floor boards, or disturbing any inanimate object indoors or out.Nothing should be interfered with simply out of curiosity.In this business, continuous vigilance is the price of safety.

What sort of booby traps has the enemy been using lately?Here is a roundup, from the Western and Southern fronts, oftypical instances of recent German booby-trapping activity. Thetraps may be divided into four categories: those actuated bypull-igniters, those actuated by pressure, mines with antiliftingdevices, and miscellaneous contrivances.DEVICES ACTUATED BY PULL IGNITERS

1. Helmet.A steel helmet lying on the ground covered a Sprenghorper 28 charge containing a Z.Z. 35 pull-igniter, which was connectedby wire to the inside of the helmet. A second w ire connected thecharge to a fixed po int. Lifting or kicking the helm et would have setoff the trap.

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2. Mine in Oven. A Tellennine 42,was found secured to the rear of anoven do or in the kitchen of a privatehouse. A Z.Z. 35 ign iter had been inserted in the m ine, w ith a wire connectin g the ign iter to the back of theoven. The doo r was slightly ajar; if ithad been opened further, the minewould have exploded.

3. Corpses. Egg grenades have beenplaced in the pockets of enemy dead.The actuating cords of the grenades

are tied to strings, and the strings, in turn are tied to inconspicuouspick ets driven in to the groun d ne arby . W hen the corpse is moved, thegrenade explodes.

4. Fruit Trees. Fruit trees havebeen fitted with wires leading to pull-igni ter s and charges of high explosive. W hen Allied soldiers reach forthe lower branch es or try to climbthe tree, the charges are detonated.5. Hedges.The following instanceof boo by-trapp ing a hedge at a pointwhere Allied soldiers would be likelyto work their way through is typicalof many othe rs. Th ree picric blockswith Z.Z. 35 pull-igniters inserted inthem were covered with stones, and

were connected with wires to a nearby hedge.6. Fence Posts. Trip wires leading from the base of fence posts,and connected to pull-igniters andlarge bu ried charges of TNT, havebeen repo rte d. Also , taut wires haveled from fence posts to tension-release igniters (Zu.Z.Z. 35). The latter set off small charges, which firedetonating fuzes and large buriedcharges.

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7. River Banks. -The banks on either side of a river ford, usableonly at certain times of the year, were booby-trapped in the followingmanner. Three 3-kilogram charges (Geballte Ladung) were laid sideby side in each bank, with two Z.Z. 42 pull-igniters screwed verticallyinto the outer charges. Ten-foot length of trip wire led from the ignitersand were secured to wooden stakes. Anyone attempting to use thebanks would have been likely to trip the wires.

8. Roads.The Germans have tied grenades to trees on each side ofnarrow roads, and have strung trip wires across the roads so that thefish-pole aerials or other parts of vehicles-will trip the wires.

9. Telephone Lines.An enemy patrol came across an artilleryobservation-post line and cut it. In the imm edia te vicinity, they b uriedtwo S-mines, about 10 yards apart, so that the prongs of the igniterswere about 1 inch above the g rou nd level. Each loose end of the telephone wire was attached to a piece of fine cord about 12 inches long,and each cord led to a m ine. Th e resu lt Avas that, in the dark , a linesman picked up what he thought was merely a loose end of wire, and anS mine exploded. (As the Intelligence Bulletin has previously reported,this ruse has also been employed by the Japane se.) The pote ntial danger of such booby traps is of course considerably less in the daytime.

10. Rubbish Heaps.The usual booby trap in a rubbish heap consists of an attention-catching object of some value as a souvenir, whichis connected to a pull-igniter and a charge or antipersonnel mine bymeans of a wire or cord.

11. Molotov Cocktails as Traps.Molotov cocktails may be used asbooby traps when the Germans believe that particularly successful damage can be caused by fire. Just sucha trap was found in a lumber yard.A small explosive charge of corditewith a detonator and primer hadbeen attached to a large bottle ofgasoline, which, in turn, had beenlashed to a bo ard . The device was

to have been deton ated by a pull-igniter, actua ted by a trip w ire. Ifthe trap had worked, it would have spread flaming gasoline over afairly large area, probably inflicting severe burns on personnel and certainly making fire fighting extremely difficult.

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DEVICES ACTUATED BY PRESSURE1. Inverted Tellermines. The Germ ans often inverted a Tellermine

and inserted a D.Z. 35 pu sh- ign iter in th e bo ttom hole to make thedevice antipersonnel in effect.

2. Mines under Planks.A combination of S-mines and Tellerminesmay be bu ried in a road t ra il, an d covered w ith a plank. Thus pressurecaused either by a vehicle or by personnel would lead to detonation.ANTILIFTING DEVICES ON MINES

1. Delay Igniters. Thirty-second delay ignite rs have been reportedfixed to mines, presumably directed against personnel who may attemptto lift such mines by using a cable.

2. Dum my Trip Wires. Recently a new type of antilifting devicehas app eare d one which could be used w ith almost any type of mine,and p ar tic ul ar ly w ith wooden m ines. Such a device, used in conjunction w ith an Ita lian fo ur-ig niter m ine , employed a stake driven into theground about 3 feet from the mine, which had been buried aboutVfafeet below grou nd level. A dum m y t ri p w ire connec ted the top of themine w ith the stake, while ano the r wire led from a pull-igniter in thebo ttom of the min e to the botto m of the stake . If the latter wire hadbeen disturbed, it of course would have produced detonation.3. Devices on S-mines.A wire may connect an S mine with as tandard 1 kilogram ch arge . One end of the wire is wound around thebase of the m ine s S. Mi.Z. 35 igniter, while the other end is attachedto a Z.Z. 35 pull-igniter screwed into the 1 kilogram charge.

Also worth mentioning is an instance in which a wooden stake about12 inches long w as driv en into the grou nd , with its top about 2 inchesbelow the surface. A stan dard 2 00-gram charge (Sprengkorper 28)was wired to the stake, and a Z.Z. 35 pu ll-ignite r screwed into thecharge. An S mine with a w ire strin g attached , then was placed in apr ep are d hole, a nd the other end of the wire was connected to theZ.Z. 35 ign iter. The igniter safety pin w as withd rawn, and the S mineitself was arm ed . As a resu lt, deto na tion would be caused by anyonelifting the mine carelessly and rap idly , w itho ut having disconnected thewire sl-inp;. In addition, the S mine itself remained a threat to unwaryfoot-sloggers.

4. Pressure-release Antilifting Device. A mine may be laid on thepressure-lifting device E.Z. 44 (Entlastungzunder 44), which is subsequently arm ed and packed a rou nd with e arth . Lifting the mine allows

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a rod, which has been kept down by the weight of the mine, to riteand release a striker in the E.Z. 44. Th is sets off the cha rge in theigniter and detonates the mine.MISCELLANEOUS 1. Abandoned Vehicles.Aban

doned vehicles, either wrecked orstill intact, often are booby-trappedso that any movement of thewheels will result in an explosion.In the case of a motor vehicle,the booby-trap may be intendedto function when the engine isstarted. The Germans sometimesuse farm wagons in road blocks,

and the possibility that such vehicles may have been booby-trappedshould not be ignore d. On a roa d in Holland, three ab andone d farmwagons had been loaded with 15 cases of grenades and miscellaneousshells, and left blocking the road in such a manner as to give theimpression that they had been abando ned in haste. Fo rtun ately , a corporal inspected them carefully before ordering his detail to move themoff the road . He found ten 200-g ram charg es on the bottom of one ofthe wagons, with a friction igniter (Zdschn. Anz. 29) attached by meansof wire to a spoke of one of the wheels. Any m ovement of this w agonwould have resulted in detonation.

2. Tellermine Crates. Tellermines in their original packing caseshave been found fitted with igniters to prevent the mines from beingwithdrawn and used.

3. Charges Concealed in Weapons.The Germans sometimes conceal a smallcharge in the mechanism of a rifle orLuger pistol that they plan to leave behind in a farly obvious place, to attractthe attention of Allied sold iers. Thecharge, which is sufficiently powerful to

injure a man severely, is detonated if the trigger of the weapon ispressed.4. False Signs.The Germans have been known to post signs inEnglish indicating that road shoulders have been cleared of mines,when mines actually are present in these areas.

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Whether dressed in civilian clothes or varied uniforms olkssturmmembers near the organization s arm band

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THE GERMAN

VolksshmuOf the measures taken to mobilize speedily the last man

power resources of the German nation, the most extreme is thecreation of the Volkssturm a national militia designed to supplement the defense of the hom eland. The call to arms, whichwas issued on 18 October 1944, was literally a dragnet, sweeping into a single organization virtually all German males between the ages of 16 and 60 who were not already members ofthe German Armed Forces. The creation of the Volkssturmserves a double purpose, as far as the Nazi Party is concerned:first, to strengthen the defense of the Reich, and, second, to keepa large part of the population so thoroughly under military control that any incipient revolt against the Party will have a hardtime thriving. It is the enemy s intention to have a strong h ardcore of Nazi fanatics dominating the Volkssturm at all levels.

In announcing the formation of the new militia, Hitler designated the Chief of the Storm Troopers, Schepmann, as Inspectorof Weapons Training, and the Chief of the Nazi Motor Corps,Kraus, as Inspector of Technical Training . Himm ler is chargedwith ordering the actual employment of theVolkssturm for localdefense. However, it must be remembered that the militia iscurrently in the training stage, with its mem bers continuing theirordinary jobs. When the Volkssturm is operating on a full-timebasis, its employment may be directed by the Army.The Volkssturm is definitely a bottom-of-the-barrel organiza

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German males between the age of 16 and 60 are liable for servi ein the nciv national militia.

lion. A lthoug li it m ay succeed in m us teri ng m ore than ten million m en for loca l de fense ins ide th e Reich, a conservative estimate indicates that less than half of these will be physically fit.

In one capacity or another, many of the J olkssturm personnelal re ad y w ere c on tributin g th eir services to the German wareffort when the call to arms was issued. t will be recalled thatdozens of Nazi semi-military, service, and political organizations, regimenting practically every walk of German hie, at l


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been in existence for some time. Because of these organizations,and because Nazi Party officialdom itself is so extensive that iteven includes city block lea ders , the Nazi au thorities longhad had a very fair knowledge of the military and service possibilities of every male in Germany. Much had been done toexploit German manpower on a part-time basis wherever full-time service could not be performed. Thus service in the Volks-sturm becomes merely an added duty for men who already havepart-time jobs in other defense organizations or who work inwar industries. As the Germans envisage it, a man who performs ARP tasks during an air raid, who has a route to patrolas a member of theStadtwacht (City Guard), or who is a skilledlaborer in a Messerschmidt plant will take his post in a Volks-sturm squad and fight as an infantryman when his home area isattacked by Allied ground forces.

It is logical to infer that, as Volkssturm units are beingformed, the abilities, physical fitness, and war work of the recruits will be taken into account. Limited-service personnel willbe given local or static defense m issions. Invalids and cripples,it is reported, will be reserved for headquarters w ork. Althoughyouths of 16 are to be included in the Volkssturm the lower agebrackets in general are likely not to be represented very generously, in view of the fact that the German Armed Forces increasingly are drafting men younger than 18. Also, if a Volks-sturmmannis drafted into the Armed Forces, his m embershipin the militia automatically terminates.

Despite the fact that the Volkssturm is inducting by ageclasses, an appeal for vo lun teers is being conducted in theusual Nazi manner. Working through the factory cells of theGerman Labor Front organization and other groups directlysupervised by the Party, Nazi leaders have induced the entirepersonnel of certain factories and businesses to vo lunteer ina body, with the result that recruits pour in as fast as the train


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ing facilities can handle them , and faster than if they all hadbeen drafted formally.With the Nazi Party in charge of organizing the Volkssturm

the early stages in the development of this national militia havebeen expedited. Although each Gauleiter or Nazi DistrictLeader, is charged with the leadership, enrollment, and organization of the Volkssturm in his district, the largest olkssturmunit seems to correspond to the next smaller territorial subdivision of the Nazi Party organizationthe Kreis. In a city,Volkssturm organization might run something like this:

Territorial Political Unit Military UnitKreis (roughly equivalent to a U. S. Bataillon (battalion)

county; there are 920 kreisein Greater Germany)

Ortsgruppe (roughly equivalent to a Kompanie (company)U. S. Congressional district)

Zelle (literally a ce ll ; roughly equi Zug (platoon)valent to a U. S. precinct)Block (a city block) Gruppe (squad)

Not only each Gauleiter but each Kreisleiter has a Volks-sturm Chief of Staff to assist in handling militia problems.

Although differentials may be introduced in the selection andassignment of personnel, Nazi leaders assert that all olkssturmmembers will be given the same instruction . This is to consistof infantry training, with special emphasis on close combat. Therifle is the basic weapon. It is to be supplemented by submachine guns and light machine guns. Since there is almost nolimit to the number of models of such weapons taken over bythe Germans from conquered nations, it would be difficult tostate exactly which small-arms models the Volkssturmwill use.German, Czech, and Polish Mauser rifles already are in service,

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The rifle is the basic weapon of the Volkssturm, which receivesinfantrytraining with special emph sis onclose combat.and use will be made of the many thousands of captured Russian rifles and machine guns. Other equipment includes egghand grenades and potato-masher hand g renades. For antitankdefense, the Panzerfaust hollow-charge launchers have beenpromised to the Volkssturm. The latest of these recoilless weapons has a range of 88 yards; earlier models have a range ofonly 33 yards.) German bazookas also may be furnished. Instruction in the handling of antitank and antipersonnel minesalready is being given.

At present any turnout of the Volkssturm is likely to presenta rag-tag-and-bobtail appearance, in dress as well as armament.The only item of clothing or insignia currently issued is ablack arm band with the lettering Deutscher Volkssturm ina light color and with the word Wehrmacht directlyunderneath this. The Nazis have asserted that this arm bandofficially makes the Volkssturm members a part of the Wehr-macht Armed Forces). It is left to the individual to providethe rest of the clothing. Uniforms of the Storm Troopers,

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Hitler Youth, and Party territorial leaders will be encountered.M any m en will sim ply we ar civ ilian clothes. Already the lackof complete official uniform has caused a great deal of disgruntleme nt throu gh ou t the new m ilitia . M any m emb ers feel thatthey ar e ass um ing th e du ties of so ldie rs, with none of the privileges. (In cid en tally , the re is no rem un era tion for service inVolkssturm except when a member is taking part in actualcombat . )

The effectiveness of the Volkssturm rem ains to be tested. Inthe past, org anized defense of u rb an and ru ra l areas by theloc al po pu lac e fighting in su pp or t of re gu lar troops has indicate d tha t a pe op le defe nd ing their hom es under such conditions are capable of putting up a most determined defense.Volkssturm elem ents w ere used in com bat near Metz, but thepo or showing th at they m ad e m ust be attributed primarily tothe fact tha t they h ad on ly rec en tly b een m us tered and that mostof their brief time in the militia had been spent in digging fortification s. In fu tu re m on ths the Naz is will discover and try tocorrect the outstanding defects of the Volkssturm and their unqu estion ed talent for org aniz ation and m ilitary training mustbe expected to show at leas t a few ta ng ib le results. Just howmuch success the Nazis will have in using Volkssturm membersas gu er ri lla fighters af ter loca l ar ea s have been overrun by theA llies can no t be predi cte d. M uch wo uld seem to depend on howhard a core of Nazi fanatics each element contains.

[N ote : As the Intelligence Bulletin goes to pres s, it is reportedthat rank insignia worn by the Volkssturm consist of silver starsw orn on the lap el or on the coll ar . One star will indicate asq ua d lea de r, two a plato on lea de r, th ree a company comm and er, and four a bat tal ion com m and er. ]

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A RAID ON A U S OUT POS TEarly one morning the Germans staged a raid on a U. S. out

post, and -captured or killed an officer and 10 men. Althoughthere are certain discrepancies between the stories of the few-available witnesses, the following is believed to be. a reasonablyaccurate account of what happened.

The battalion was holding a small town with a platoon. Anoutpost at A was manned by the Platoon 's headquarters, withoutguards to the right and left. Another Platoon, 2 miles to theeast, had an outpost manned at B with outguards to the front.A daylight observation post was situated in a church steeple at

D, 11/2 miles to the south, and a mortar squad was situatedin the town at C across the road from the Platoon's commandpost.

In the afternoon the Germans shelled the town and the steepleobservation post with remarkable accuracy. Early the nextmorning, when it was very dark and stormy, a barrage ofNebel-werfer (rocket projector) and mortar fire f ll in th vicinity

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while standing near a window. The strength of the raidingparty was not determined.

At about the same time the raid on the outpost-headquarterswas being conducted, trouble was getting under way at themortar squad's position. A voice behind the protecting wallwas heard asking, What have you got on the other side of thiswall? The mortarmen replied, Two mortars , whereupon ahand grenade was thrown over the wall. Another grenade wasdropped into a mortar barrel, and the barrel was blown open.

Obviously the enemy raid had been well planned and coordinated. The party had worked its way directly to the outpost they intended to raid. Following closely behind theGerman barrage, the enemy soldiers had passed the U. S. out-guards unobserved. It is clear that the Germans were inpossession of detailed and accurate information regarding theU. S. dispositions, presumably having obtained it from civiliansin that area. The coordination of the artillery barrage with theactivity of the raiding party was excellent, indicating that theraiders were continually in contact with their supportingartillery.

The exact time of the incident was not determined, but itoccurred in the early hours of the morning. At 0300 the platoonleader reported by radio, Nothing unusua l.The enemy unit which perpetrated this raid could not beidentified, but the manner in which it performed its mission

suggests that it must have been a special assault detachment, ofthe type organized in each regiment under a policy establishedby Kesselring during the Anzio beachhead stalemate.MINEFIELD MARKING

Although German minefield marking varies at the discretionof local commanders, a fairly recent set of instructions issued

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by an en em y division is he lpful in ad ding to our knowledge ofcurrent practices.

The division ordered that minefieldsmore than P/4 milesbehind the main lineof resistance were tobe marked off byfences 3 feet 3 incheshigh, consisting ofthree strands of wire.In te rmi t t en t s ignswere to bear the fa

mi l iar "Minen" or "Achtung MinerC bu t the sku ll and crossbones were to be omitted.

In w ooded te rr a in , minefields in front of the main line ofresis tan ce w ere to be m ar ked by a fence 3 feet 3 inches high,without any signs at all.

In open terrain, minefields were to be marked by a low fence,w ithou t signs, on the Germ an side only . Th e fences were to beas incon sp icuou s as pos sib le, so as not to give away the positions of the centers of resistance in the main line.

No special fences were to be erected around wire obstacleswith booby traps or aroun d r a m p mines (Rampernminen)on roads.Minefields at a sho rt d istan ce b eh ind the m ain line of resistance w ere to be fenced ar ou nd on a ll sides, and were to bemarked with unobtrusive signs.

All pickets used for marking minefields were to be providedwith a short verticle length of barbed wire.

Pa ths th roug h minefields were to be 1 3 feet wide, with acentral guiding wire suspended loosely between 4-inch stakesdriven into the gro und at inte rvals of 10 feet, to serve as a

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guide for reconnaissance parties. Each path was to be coveredby observed or fixed machine-gun fire.The engineer company in each sector of the line was toinform all troops in its own sector regarding the position of all

minefields. Local battalion commanders were held responsiblefor keeping an up-to-date plan of these minefields, and forensuring that all members of their commands were fully informed about the locations and boundaries of the fields.Incidentally, it is reported that in some instances dummy-minefield signs in any three colors excludingblue , whereas true mine-fields are identified by any three colors includingblue.

TACTIC AGAINST INFANTRY WITH TANKSThe commander of a U. S. tank company describes a tactic

that the Germans like to employ against Allied infantry supported by tanks:

It was late in the afternoon, and one of my tank platoonswas aiding a company of French infantry in capturing a ridgeoccupied by the Germans. The French company commanderasked my platoon leader to fire on a house on the slope of aridge about five hundred yards to our front, because it contained enemy machine gunners. The tank-platoon leader complied with his request, and with a few well-placed rounds of 75,soon chased the Germans from the house. The French infantrythen continued to move on up the ridge . They soon ran intoanother house which presented the same obstacle as the previousone. This house was located about 1,000 yards away and alittle to our right. As the tanks started to fire on the secondtarget, the French captain noticed shells hitting the first house,around which some of his infantry had already establishedthemselves. He hurriedly asked my platoon leader to ceasefiring on this place and to fire only at the new target. Theplatoon leader informed him that the shells were not coming

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from our guns, and they must have been fired by the enemy.It took some time to convince him of this fact, for the burstslooked much like those of our 75 's and had occurred at thesame time our tanks had fired on the second target.This same thing has happened several timesvaryingslightly, of course, depending on the situation. We have foundit to be a favorite trick of the Germans. It not only gives thema sure target and inflicts heavy casualties on us, but also tendsto cause dissension between the tanks and infantry.We have learned to expect this return fire immediately aftertaking a certain position, and have made sure that the infantry

unit we are working with understands what may happen. Incertain cases we have attempted to keep the enemy confused bycontinuing light firing on an objective after having taken it(where the situation permits), and by keeping the infantryaway from the definite points that we have just captured, suchas buildings and well-defined terrain features.NEW GERMAN FLAKPANZERA new German Flakpanzer, the third and latest type of antiaircraft tank the Germans have put into action on the westernfront, has been captured by U. S. troops during recent combatin France.

This self-propelled weapon consists of a 4-barrelled 20-mmantiaircraft gun, the Flakvierling 38, mounted on the standardPz.Kpfw. IV chassis. The open-top tu rret is octagonal in shape,with each of the eight sides made of two plates or 1.6 incharm or. The top and bottom plates of each side are slantedinward at approximately 30 degrees from the vertical, and theturret has a 360-degree traverse.It is a further development of the Flakpanzerwhich mountsthe single-barrelled 37-mm Flak 43 on the same model chassis.The Flakvierling 38 is a quadrupled version of the single-barrelled 20-mm Flak 38, a gun that the Germans have

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mounted on a modified ex-Czech tank chassis the Pz.Kpfw.38 (t), for use as another type of Flak panzer.

The Flakvierling 38, a four-barrelled 20-mm antiaircraft gunmounted on the Pz.Kpfw. IV chassis, is he newest version ofthe Flak panzer to make its appearance with the GermanArmy in combat.Correction

An incorrect and dangerous method of throwing the Panzerwurf mine is illustrated in the photograph on page 79 of Intelligence Bulletin, Vol . I l l No. 3 .

The soldier in this photograph is holding the anzerwurf-mine in the arm ed co ndition with the cloth vanes open . Thisis the proper way to han dle the w eap on : Grasp the gren adeholding the vanes in the closed position and remo ve the cap .Maintain this grip as the weapon is thrown.

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Diversionary tacticsthe Japanese versionof commando raidshave become a standardform of warfare in the Japanese Army. U. S.troops in action in the Pacific must be pre-pared for harassing raids designed to disruptsupply lines to create confusion in rearareas and to divert attention from other op-erations.

JAPANESE DIVERSIONARY TACTICS

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ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINETo compensate for lack of air power and effective long-rangeartillery, the Japanese Army has adopted the practice of organizing special troops equipped to penetrate enemy lines to raid

airdromes, supply areas, and headquarters, and to disrupt communications in the combat zone by harassing or destroyingsupply trains and other motor convoys.Organized into groups known officially as DiversionaryUnits, these soldiers are trained to strike with surprise, tocreate a maximum of confusion and devastation, and to with

draw as suddenly as they had appeared. They may be especially equipped for their work, and may move to their operations area by submarine, by air, or by infiltrating in smallgroups through the forward positions of the opposing force.Although not activated on the same large scale as BritishCommandos and U. S. Rangers, the Japanese have been known

to organize diversionary troops for specific missions. Theseunits may vary in size from well-equipped companies of selected men to hastily organized raiding parties of a squad ormore. There appears to be no provision in the Japanese Armytables of organization for a permanently established and standardized Diversionary Unit. The more complex of'these unitsapparently are composed mostly of volunteers organized intotemporary companies. These companies are attached to alarger field force for the duration of a specific campaign. Ifthe mission should require it, several of these companies maybe banded together to form an even larger organization underthe command of a colonel.

A typical diversionary company of this type is composed ofapproximately 200 officers and men organized as three platoonsof three squads each. Unusual is the fact that a large percentage of the personnel may be commissioned, an average

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platoon consisting of a first lieutenant serving as platoon leader,12 second lieutenants serving as squad leaders and assistantsquad leaders, and 18 men. There m ay be practically no noncoms, since their duties are performed by junior officers. Abouthalf the unit strength may consist of men who have volunteeredfor this type of combat.

Although a Diversionary Unit may be employed regularlyin raiding missions against ground positions, headquarters, airfields, and similar installations, some of their primary missionsare to attack convoys of supply trucks, artillery, or headquarters units in transit. Such raids are conducted on the theorythat, during a movement, security is less stringent and the combat capabilities of a unit are diminished.One well-organized Diversionary Unit advocated two methods

of operating against a so-called "moving objective"the "attack in force" and the "concealed attack." Such tactics aretypical of the methods by which a Diversionary- Unit will tryto operate , although in actual combat thev seldom achieve suchsmooth operation.Attack in Force

The attack in force, as the name, implies, is a swift, all-outattack delivered either from ambush against a moving convoy,or, by surprise, against a unit in transit which has halted orbivouacked for the night. In either case, the primary missionis the destruction of the vehicles and the weapons or suppliesthey carry . The common procedure is to deal a hard blow topersonnel, and, in the resulting confusion, to destroy, burn, orcapture equipment.

The preparations for an attack on a motor convoy are essentially the same as those involved in an o rdinary Japanese assault operation. Before a definite plan is made, a detailed

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reconnaissance is made. Painstak ing care is taken to collectterrain information and to find the most traveled supply routes,the customary rest or bivouac areas, the extent of routinemarch-security measures, and the type of motor transport operating in the sector.Along the supply route, an area is selected to offer a minimum of cover and protection to a convoy, but to permit the disposition of ambushing troops so they may fire upon and chargethe convoy effectively. Road blocks or land mines are preparedto block the front and rear of the column at the moment theattack begins. If necessary, the flanks of the road may bemined to prevent the escape of vehicles across country.

The disposition of the Japanese unit will vary according tothe terrain. Usually, it will be concealed along one flank ofthe convoy route, either massed or disposed in groups at severalpoints. The distance between the ambushing troops and theroad will depend upon the terrain and the degree of securitymethods expected from the convoy. Fire power is concentratedin the foremost ranks of the ambush; on occasions when equipment is the main objective of the attack, the attackers may bedivided into a covering unit and a demolition unit.

Once the unit has taken its ambush position, every man remains on the alert to strike at any moment. Because a largenumber of observers might disclose the existence of the ambush,the unit commander himself watches for a hostile column.

When the convoy enters the ambush, the advance guard isallowed to pass unmolested, and the Diversionary Unit waitsfor the main body. At the most opportune moment, the roadis blocked according to plan, the ambush opens fire, and anattack is launched at the height of the ensuing confusion. Ifthe convoy is traveling with a large interval between vehicles,the ambush may not open fire and attack until the lead vehicle

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has been halted and un til the follow ing vehicles have beenallowed to close up and shorten the column.

In conducting such an attack, the Diversionary Unit dependsfor success upon the total surprise and disorganization of theconvoy. In trai ni ng instru ctio ns , ov eren thusiastic officers areadmonished "not to foolishly expend your energy to accomplishthe mission if it is perceived that the enemy has prepared forres ista nc e." Si m ilar ly, once the shock of surp rise and disorderhas passed, and the immediate mission has been completed aswell as circum stance s p erm itted , the Jap an es e raid ers do nothang around to mop up isolated elements that have succeededin defen ding them selves. Ins tead , the attackers withdraw andproceed to a predetermined assembly point.Concealed Attack

The so-called "concealed attack" advocated for use by Diversionary Units is a Japanese expression for the normal undercover sabotage of supply lines that might be expected of guerri ll a units oper atin g in enemy o ccupied terr itor y. In this typeof operation, the Diversionary Unit will try to avoid contactwith opposing troops, and will attempt to operate with secrecyfrom a base established behind their opponent's lines.

Grea t stress is pla ced on the use of explosives and mines todestroy vehicles, to block supply routes, and to demoralizerear -are a troo ps. One Jap an ese hea dq ua rters encouraged thefollowing methods of concealed attack:

1. A tree on the side of a mountain road is cut almost through. Asteel w ire, tied to this tr ee , is stretched across the road so that a passing vehicle that strikes the wire will fell the tree thus causing damageI the vehicle.

2 . Vehicles crossing a bridge are destroyed by pressure mines placedthe planking.

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A tree on the side of a mountain road is cut almost through. Asteel wire tied to this tree is stretched across the road so that apassing vehicle that strikes the wire ivill fell the tree thus causingdamage to the vehicle.3.One section of a bridge is damaged so that the weight of a passingvehicle will cause it to collapse.4. Obstacles are laid on steep, winding roads.5. Land mines or time bombs are laid at intervals along extendedroutes in forests, swamp areas, and cliff areas. They are adjusted sothat the explosion of the farthest mine would cause the explosion ofother mines.Presumably, this arrangement is designed to damage severalvehicles when the lead vehicle of a convoy detonates the keymine.Whenever possible, a Diversionary Unit engaged in anti-

vehicle operations of this type will establish a hidden commandpost, from which rear-area traffic can be observed. Demolitiondetails will be dispatched from this command post to execute


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specific m issio ns. C om m an de rs a re instruc ted to ensure that,when eve r an ex plos ive is use d, a few m en a re left behind toobserve its effectiveness.

Although, under many circumstances, Diversionary Unitsmay be employed on suicide missions, they are not organizedto be ex pend ed reckle ssly in com bat. W hen the mission hasbeen completed, or when the unit is not able to sustain itselflonger in the hostile territory, it will return to the Japaneseline s eith er by in filtration , or by- a p re ar ra ng ed evacuation bywater.

SOUTHWEST PACIFICIt is known that the Japanese have had various diversionary

com pan ies th rou gh ou t the Sou thwest Pacific a typical compa ny streng th be ing from 10 0 to 14 0 m en . Organ ization withinthese com pan ies is ap pa re nt ly ex trem ely flexible, with the useof various attack "units" advocated for tactical purposes.

A lthou gh no definitely identified com m and o raids are onrecord in this theater, early in 1944 a Japanese headquartersissued its interpretation of rules for commando warfare basedupon the experiences of a First Lieutenant who had commandeda so-called "commando unit" in the Southwest Pacific. Theselessons were r ep or ted as being p ar tic ul ar ly applicable to comm and o w ar far e in the "u nc iv iliz ed " ju ng le country of NewGuinea.

Like all diversionary companies and other Japanese raidingtroo ps, the co m m and o unit dep end s upo n surp rise to enable itsco m pa rat ive ly few men to attack l ar ger bod ies of hostile troops.Its missions p ar al le l those of other ra id in g p arties in that thecommando unit also is designed to strike at hostile higher headquarters, air fields, advance bases, and supply lines.

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The commando unit recommended by the enemy headquarters is distinguished by its unusual organization. The militarypersonnel of the unit are specially selected mennot morethan 30 in number. If possible, however, the unit will have asmany natives as soldiers at its command. When traveling inthe jungle, each man will carry complete equipment, but inaction a commando soldier will carry no more than approximately 40 pounds of equipment, including arms and ammunition.

Apparently this recommended Japanese commando unit isintended to work in close cooperation with friendly natives.Prior to an operation, the unit will endeavor to set up a spy netof natives in the operation area.Its intelligence complete, this commando-native force generally will have some distance to travel before it reaches theobjective to be attacked. Usually this distance will not be morethan 40 miles from the unit's base, but, if necessary, the com

mandos will extend the range of their activity by setting up twoor three advance bases between their main base and the pointof attack. When the unit travels on foot, it will move from8 to 15 miles a day. By native canoe, the commandos generallywill try to make approximately 20 miles a day when travelingup a river, or 40 to 50 miles when traveling downstream. Whensupply is by manpower, the load should not exceed approximately 40 pounds per man.

Before an attack is launched, an assembly point somewherebetween the advance base and the point of attack is decidedupon. The Japanese describe the ideal assembly point as onewhich has natural defensive features, is some distance fromrivers and roads, and consequently is not easily approached byhostile troops.

Preparations for the attack will be made during the day, and

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the attack will be launched at dusk, during the night, or atdawn. Before attacking, the commandos will attempt to infiltrate to within 100 yards of the objective, provided the situation perm its. An attack during a torrential rain or gale isrecommended, but it is pointed out that escape afterward issometimes "difficult." The commandos are instructed that whenthey attack a headquarters, an effort should be made to capturecodes, new weapons, and documents. However, they are cautioned not to lose the opportunity to escape so they may participate in future action.

Throughout the course of these operations, the unit will keepin touch with its higher headquarters by radio, or, if necessary,by runner. Friendly airp lanes will be signalled by smokecandles or fire smoke.BURMA

A recent analysis of the infiltration tactics of Japanese troopsin Burm a, coupled with information from enemy sources, indicates that the Japanese there established three distinct rolesfor units assigned to diversionary missions behind Allied forward defense positions.

Although the mission of some of these raiding parties closelyparalleled that of more highly trained Diversionary Units, thereis no evidence to indicate that the troops involved in Burmahave been other than the ordinary infantry and engineer soldiers of the Japanese Army organized on the spot for theirspecific m issions. Most of the raiding activity was confined towithin a few thousand yards behind the Allied line, and hasbeen of a type which always must be expected of any Japaneseground force.The Japanese have classified raiding parties into three typesaccording to their general missionsthe Teishintai or raid


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unit; the Betsudotai or flying column; and the Toppatai orpenetration unit. This seems to be the pattern of diversionarytactics in Burma.Raid Unit

The Teishintai or raid unit, is the infantry-engineer demolition team which has been encountered in nearly every large-scale jungle operation. This infiltration unit of between 20 and30 men is given the mission of demolishing guns and motorequipment in artillery positions and vehicle parks.One battery experienced five of these suicide assaults, andan officer commented that as long as artillerymen are preparedto cope with these attacks, they are of a nuisance value only.On occasion these raid units, rather than assault the artillerypositions openly, would take up a position on a nearby hillwhere, with automatic weapons fire, they would attempt to wipeout the gun crews.

Flying ColumnRaids of a harassing nature, designed to disrupt rear communications temporarily before the raiding party returns toits own lines, are the function of the Betsudotai the so-called"flying column."Such a Japanese force, of about 150 soldiers and fifth-columnists, infiltrated through the Allied lines in the Arakan,Burma, on one occasion. Moving through the hills to a point10,000 yards in the rear of the Allied forward positions, theylaunched an attack upon the line of communication, timing thisassault with a general Japanese attack on the Allied eastern

flank. This attempt to create disorder in the rear area actuallyresulted in little more than some slightly damaged bridges anda few burned trucks.

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Penetration UnitThe mission of a penetration unit, the Toppatai is very

similar to that of the flying column, except that the tacticalemployment of the unit is related to offensive operations.

In conjunction with a general offensive, units of a companyor larger will infiltrate, or seize by assault, a key terrain featureor som e other tac tically adv anta geo us position in rear of thefor w ard A llied line . Th is position , which usu ally w ill be on theline of co m m un icatio n, w ill be held at a ll costs until it isreached by the main Japanese advance.

Two instan ces of such a m an eu ve r hav e been reported. Oncea ge ne ral Ja pan es e offensive in the A ra kan opened after a penetration unit of about one company with medium machine gunsseized and occup ied a hil l ab ou t 3,500 yar ds beh ind the Alliedposition s. A sim ilar attem pt was ma de by a penetration unitwh ich estab lishe d a strong p ositio n in a grou p of small hills2 ,0 00 ya rd s beh ind the then-existing forw ard lines. The position served as a base for enemy patrols, and at times divertedsome Allied troo ps in attem pts to liq u id at e it. It was necessaryonly to dr ive the force from the o ut er edges of the position toneutralize the tactical value of this penetration.

PHILIPPINESThe curr ent Ph ilipp ine cam paig n has produced a clear

example of action by Japanese troops from a well-organizedD ive rsio na ry U nit . It took pla ce when a small-scale airborneraid was attempted behind the American lines on Leyte. Theoperation was typical of the type advocated for DiversionaryUnits , but it best illustrates how Japanese tactical doctrine,when g iven th e test of ac tu al e xecu tion , so often falls short ofthe enemy's expectations.

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An enemy source says Diversionary Units may infiltrate ,jbyairthat "parachutes, gliders and transport planes can J>e employed. As landings are to be accomplished at dawn or at dusk,the location of the landing area, its condition, and the routeof infiltration after the landing must first be investigatedsecretly and thoroughly."

Early on the morning of last 27 November, three transportplanes each loaded with from 20 to 25 commandos from aformer Southwest Pacific Diversionary Unit deliberately crash-landed in U. S. occupied terr itory. Two of the planes landedon the beaches on the east coast of Leyte. The third plane wasshot down over an airfield before it could land.The two planes which crash-landed on the beaches succeededin discharging their cargoes of raiders in an area not immediately occupied by U. S. troops. Two Japs from one planewere killed by troops approaching the landing in an amphibiousvehicle, the remainder fled into the jungle, to be tracked downby U. S. patrols.

The planes which crash-landed on the beaches succeeded indischarging their c rgoesof raiders in an area not immediately-occupied by U. S. troops.

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exact objective of these airborne raiding parties maybe determ ined, but apparently they were sent upon amission of raiding and destruction to divert attention from theoperations in western Leyte, then entering their final and decisive phase. An exam ination of the equipment of the dead commandos disclosed musette bags filled with hand grenades, antitank mines, demolition charges, and concentrated rationstheaccoutrements of the diversionary commando.


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THE 150-MM MORTAR

The Japanese Army, which has relied heavily upon thetrench mortar for fire support, has developed a 150-mm mortar.

Called a "medium" mortar by the Japanese, this Model 97(1937) 150-mm weapon is a conventional smooth-bore, muzzle-loading, bipod-mounted mortal1 of sturdy construction. Captured on Peleliu Island, this weapon is the largest Japanesemortar yet found. There it was emplaced in a concrete pit withthe muzzle level with the top of the pit.This 150-mm mortar, which resembles in design the standardU. S. 81-mm mortar, weighs 770 pounds complete with sight,and fires a conventional type of high-explosive shell weighingapproximately 57 pounds.

The weapon is sighted by means of a 3-power panoramicelbow telescope, and the Japanese claim it will throw a projectile a maximum 2,187 yards . Bursting radius of the shell isreported to be 65 feet, with some fragments thrown 100 feetfurther.

For transport, the mortarincluding the sightbreaks downinto these five component parts:

Tube 257 poundsBase Plate 337 poundsBipod and elevating gear 100 pounds

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Tra versin g gear shock-absorbers andm orta r clamp s 71.5 pounds

Sigh t 1.5 pounds

The Japanese Model 97 150-mm mortar largest enemy we pon ofthis type yet encountered by U . S. troops in the Pacific.

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The 150-mm mortar shell weighs approximately 57 pounds. Thebursting radius is reported to be 65 feet.

The tube is 75.37 inches long and has a reinforcing muzzleband while the heav y ribbed -steel base pla te m eas ure s 17.75inches by 35.5 inches.

The weapon is assem bled adjusted for fire and op eratedlike the U. S. 81-m m m or tar . Ho wev er the firing m echa nismresembles that of the Jap an ese M odel 99 81-mm m orta r usinga firing-pin cam shaft buil t into the base-cap ra th er than afixed firing pin.

The.Japa nes e a re known to have ano ther Mo;lel 97 150-mmm ortar which has not yet been encou ntered . It is repo rted toweigh 1 540 poun ds and to have a m axim um range of 3 828yards. There is a possibility that this mortar may be installedon a mobile mount.

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First reports from Leyte tell of increasede of land mines by the Japanese defenders

N MY MIN S ON L YT

As had been anticipated from the trend of previous operations U. S. troops landing on Leyte found that the Japanesehafl made practical and extensive use of minefields and boobytraps in the planned defense of the island.

Preliminary reports indicate that although a decided effortat m inin g had been attem pted im pro vised m ines were usedm ore often than stan dard enem y dem olit ion s. Chief of thesewere aircraft bombs set into the ground with an armed nosefuze expo sed as the deto na tor. A ha ph az ar d use of bombs inthis ma nn er w as enco untere d before by Sixth Army troops inseveral Southwest Pacific operations.BOMB MINES

On Ley te the p ri nci p al m inefields w ere found on the airstrips at Tacloban and Dulag. Here 63-kilogram aircraft bombsha d been pl an ted in gro up s of thre e at intervals along thelength of the runwaysan obvious attempt to destroy aircraft

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63 Kg bombI 1 Kg bom b

Tacloban air strip Dots indicate the approximate location ofJapanese bomb mines found buried on the runways and th >nearby beach61


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>vhich migh t try to lan d on the s tr ip . Bom b mines of this typewe re plan ted also on the beach which run s par allel to thenearby Tacloban airfield and which was a logical vehicle route.Near Dulag, armed bombs, which could be detonated by a truck

Japanese Coconut Minetire brushing against the fuze, were laid on the surface alongroads and camouflaged with grass.

In add ition to the bom b m ines , the Ja pa ne se on Leyte employed two types of improvised mine that Jfrave not been foundin gen era l use in pas t o pe rat ion s. These were the so-called

coconut m in e, and an impro vised box m ine.COCONUT MINES

The coconut mine was a simple but not particularly effectivedev ice. Th e Ja pan es e ha

(1945) intelligence bulletin, vol. iii, no. 6

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