1960 "rev0luti0n" in turkey and the british policy towards turkey ci̇hat göktepe

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1960 "RE V0U JTI0N " IN TURKEY ANDTHE BRITISH POLİCY TOWARDS TURKEY

C İ H A T G Ö K T E P E

ABSTRACT

There vvas a military coup in Turkey on May 27, 1960. This paper

examines the main causes of the coup and the effect of A nglo-TurkishRelations. The subject is analysed vvithin seven headings: 1) The PoliticalParties and The Army; 2) Inter-party relations; 3) The incidents that led tothe coup; 4) The coup and its aftermath; 5) Britain's relations vvith Turkeybefore the m ilitary coup; 6) The British attitude tovvards the coup: 7) TheBritish attitude tovvards the trial and the execution of the members of thefallen regime.

KEY WORDS:

Turkish Politics; Turkish British Relations; Military in Turkey 1960Coup in Turkey; İnönü; Menderes.



14 0 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

1. Political Parties and the Army in Turkey

The Turkish Republic vvas founded on O ctober 29, 1923 afterthree-year struggle against the occupier countries. In that year thePeople's Party vvas renamed as the Republican People's Party (RPP),vvhich continued to rule Turkey until 1950 in a single party politicalsystem. After the Second W orld W ar, the Turkish political systemevolued tovvards a multiparty system , affected by a number of internaland external factors. Four RPP m embers of parliament, C. Bayar, F.

Köprülü, R. Koraltan and A. Menderes, either resigned or vvereexpelled from their party in 1946. They formed a nevv political partycalled the "Democrat Party" (DP), on January 7, 1946.1 It vvassurprisingly successful vvithin a short period and vvon a large m ajorityin the general elections of May 14 1950, obtaining 4 16 out ofavailable 487 seats in the National Assembly. They managed to defeatthe RPP despite the continued respect for Atatürk, its founder, and thecharisma of İnönü, Atatürk's successor. At the end of the elections theRPP transferred povver to DP in an orderly m ann er. 2 The DP's firstchairman Celal Bayar vvas elected as the third President of Turkey bythe Grand National Assembly of Turkey on May 22, 1950. One of thefounders of the DP, Adnan Menderes, replaced Bayar as the chairmanof the party simultaneously. His first government obtained the vote ofconfidence from the Assembly on June 2, 1950. The transfer of thegovernm ental povver from the RPP to the D P became knovvn as the"White Revolution" (Ak Devrim) for the DP sup porters.3

DP's ideology and programme advocated more freedom for thepeop le, a liberal econo mic p olicy vvith more support for priv ateindustry and less for the state sector, togethe r vvith less restriction onthe practice of the Müslim religion .4 These liberal policies vveregenerally vvelcomed by the people at large. The Democrats vvere seenas the popülist, rural party and the Republicans as elitist and urban,

'Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Çaplı, Demirkırat; BirDemokrasinin Doğuşu, İstanbul, Milliyet, 1995, p. 26.

2Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961: Aspects of MilitaryPolitics, Washigton D.C., The Brookings Inslituüon, 1963, p. 7.

3Feroz, Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, London,C. Hurst, 1977, p. 38.

4Weiker , The Turkish Revolution, p. 8.



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTION" ıN TURKE Y 141

which was supported generally by the intelligentsia.5 Most o f theintelleetu als, hovvever, supported D P when it was founded in 1946,because of its commitm ent to greater freedom.

The military was another signifıcant factor in Turkish politics,which enjoyed close working relations with the government duringthe period of single party rule (1923-1950). The officers respectedAtatürk and his comrade İnönü, the president and prime ministerrespectively. The chan ge of the government to the DP did not

immediately lead to tension with the military, largely because the RPPvvas vvilling to respect the result of the elee tions and to hand överpovver. M endere s then vvent on to vvin tvvo further general eleetionsagainst the opposition party, the RPP, in 1954 and 1957, thus theperiod betvveen 1950 and 1960 came to knovvn as the DP or M enderesera in Turkey.

In the meantime, the Marshall Plan vvas proelaimed in June1947 and the US and later Turkey signed a protoeol for latter'sparticipation in the Plan. Turkey received a substantial amount offoreign econom ic and military assistance from the US according tothe 1948 agreement.6 This amount vvas extended, particularly duringthe Me nderes administration. Of this aid, almost 70 percent vverespent on the agrarian modernisation through mechanisation vvithinvestments in tractors and harv esters.7 These imports vvere to lead tofurther heavy e xpenditure on spare parts in later years. Thegovernment also used Marshall aid to build roads, bridges and vvaterprojects for both the urban and the rural areas.8

These developments led to a considerable social and economictransformation of the country. Migration increased from rural to urbanareas. Peasants progressively received more money, as Turkey

5A h m a d , The Turkish Experiment, p. 44.6Du ring the period of 1948-1952, Turkey received $351.7 millionAmerican aid. Duygu Sezer, "Türkiye'nin Ekonomik ilişkileri", in MehmetGönlübol et. al, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1990, Ankara, SiyasalKitabevi, 1993, p. 448.

7 G eorge H ar r i s , Troubled Al liance, Turkish-American Problems inHistorical Perspective, 1945-1970, Washington D.C., American EnterpriseInstitute for Public Policy Research, 1972, p. 71.

8A h m a d , The Turkish Experiment, p. 134.



142 THE TURKISH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXX

became an exporter of grain. This situation, described as the "goldenyears" of the Menderes era, lasted until 1955.

During the first period of DP gov ernment, it vvas sensitive tothe religious feeling of the public. In 1950 the DP abolished the 1928lavv prohibiting the use of the Arabic form of cali to prayer. The entirecountry immediately dropped the Turkish translation that the earlierlaw had required. The building of mosques vvas increased. The RPPhad agreed in 1949 to allovv religious instruction in schools should

parents requested it for their children in vvriting. The Dem ocratsaltered this to provide religious instruction for ali Müslim childrenunless their parents requested in vvriting that the children vvere not toreceive it. The RPP had authorised the creation of a faculty of divinityvvithin Ankara University, and the training of imams by privateindividu als in order to m cet the vvell-taken objec tion that if no nevvreligious leadcrs vvere trained, either islam vvould die out altogether orfail into the hands of the uncducatcd and the covert. The Dem ocratsfollovved this, vastly expand ing the numb er of institutions for trainingimam s. This silent struggle for scarce resources seem s highlysymbolic of the greater struggle betvveen the forces of secularism andislam in Turkey.

9The DP Government seemed pro-religious, but at

the same time they announced vvhat vvas popularly knovvn as the

"Atatürk Lavv", on July 25, 1951. The nevv lavv vvas designed both toprotect Atatürk reforms, statues and monum ents and at the same timeto prevent the defamation of the DP governm ent. The fact that thePresident and ex-chairman of the DP, Celal Bayar, vvas a elose friendof Atatürk , also played a part in this dccision. In short the DP vvasnom inally pro-Islamist, but in reality a secular pro-reformist party.

The DP government also attempted som e reforms in theadministration and the military that tended to support the RPP. Therevvas rivalry betvveen the social groups, consisting of rural people andtraders on the one side that supportcd the DP, and intellectuals,military and bureaucrats on the other, vvho voted m ainly for the R PP.

This situation becam e especially true after 1955.

Onc e in office, hovvever, the DP's eleetion prom ise to reducethe numb er of military officers did not last long. Prime MinisterAdnan Menderes and the other Democrat leaders, hovvever, soon

9Weike r , The Turkish Revolution, p. 9.



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTON " ıN TURKEY 143

developed a thinly veiled contem pt for the offıcer eorps, possiblybecause their vote did not bulk large in the party's politicalcalculations. Under the DP, the military usually played little part inthe ruling councils. A lthough at this time the armed forces were beingrevitalised as a result of the American aid programme that providedmo dem weapons and training for the officers, vvho thus gained morerespect inte matio nally, they vvere frustrated because of their inabilityto influence their generals, or through them the government at home.The Dem ocrats also allovved their salaries to lag far behind the rapidly

rising cost of living. From the emotionally charged recitals ofcomplaints by officers in their strained circumstances, it vvas clear thatthe DP permitted the status and prestige of the military profession tosink lovver at home than it had at any time since the founding of theRepub lic. These developm ents only reinforced the offıcer eorps intheir ide ntifıcation vvith the oppo sition party and vvith the civ ilianeducated elite vvho also opposed the government for different reasons.Certainly there vvas a grovving disenchantment of the m ilitary vvith theDP.

The officers, having been brought up to vievv themselves as thenaturally appointed g uardians of Atatürk reforms vvere especiallysensilive to the claims of o pposition p arties that the DP vvas notsuffıciently fırm in defending Kemalist principles. Some vvere upsetvvith the Democrats' concession in the matter of religion. Th e officersvvere even more disturbed at vvhat they perceived as the lack ofTurkey's development as a modern nation-state under the DP regime.In its quest for votes, the Party had concentrated on measu res top lease the common man. 1 0 Particularly after foreign exchangereserves inherited from the RPP governm ent vvere exhausted and thevveather cycle turned unfavo urable, these crovvd-pleasing m easu resled to a runavvay inflation, an acute balance of paymen ts crisis andgreat shortages of importcd consumer goods.

The broadly felt impact of this economic dislocation generated

further sympathy among the officers for the RPP and gave more creditto the allegations that the DP had no consistent development plan andthat the government vvas vvasting Turkey's resources in politicallymotivated endeavours that had little, if any, economic justification. In

10George Harris, "The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey", MiddleEast Journal (MEJ), Vol 24, Autumn 1970.




this situation the offıcer corps felt particularly outraged by vvidelybelieved rum ours of rampant corruption among civilian politicians.This led first to salon plotting among some of the younger and middleranking officers, who as early as 1954 began to talk of "righting thewrongs" of the system. From grievances against the top armycomm and this dissatisfaction gradually broadened to include theworkings of the political order, to o . 1 1

The British Ambassador to Ankara, Sir Bernard Burrovvs sent aconfıdential despatch to Londo n, dated on July 3, 1960, whichaccurately analysed the situation. He pointed out that the middle-andiunior-ranking officers had long disliked the DP governm ent andmany of them identified with the educated classes and sym pathisedvvith the oppos ition. In addition, their own conditions of pay andservice vvere very p oo r. 1 2 The senior officers vvere no doubt avvare ofthese feelings among their juniors. They had themselves great respectfor İnönü, p ersonally, rathcr than for his party. They stronglydisapproved of the government's use of the army to repress studentdemonstrations. They vvished "to keep the army free of politics and toretain its close bonds vvith the people" 1 3 .

It vvould, hovvever, be a mistake to generalise too much. Therevvere mixed attitudes from the military. Many officers vvere devo ted toİnönü as the comrade of Atatürk, though not alvvays to the R epublicanParty as such; others resentcd the use of the Army for politicalpurposes; yet others, had dceper and more radical vievvs on Turkey'spolitical future. Th ey believed that ali politicians vvere bad and that asvveeping change in the system of government vvas necessary, at leastfor some time to come, not merely to get Turkey out of its politicalcrises. In order to com plete the vvork Atatürk had began, they believedthat a nevv, and in som e cases u npop ular, lon g term reforms vverenee ded , vvhich only a nevvly elected gove rnm ent vvould feel to bestrong enough to undertake. These diverse elements came together

n Ibid.,pp. 438-45412Foreign Office Papers, London, Public Record Office (henceforth referred

to as "FO"), 371/153 034, RK 1015/33, Bernard Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 3June 1960.

13FO -371 /153Q3 4, RK 1015/33, Burrovvs to Ankara, 3 June 1960.



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTON" ıN TURKEY 145

within political conspiracy and carried out the coup in a remarkablyeffıcient and successful m an ne r. 1 4

The DP's government gradual ly lost the support of theintellectuals, whose desertion became virtually complete betvveen1955 and 1960. The intellectuals criticised the government's directinvolvement in the universities, sanctions against the press, and theDP's use of radio for its propaganda rather than for the public interest.intellectuals started a passive resistance together vvith the students

demonstrations against the government. Thus the RPP, intellectualsand the press formed a group against the governm ent. To meet thisthreat, the DP members voted in the Assembly on April 18, 1960 toset up a "Parliamentary Com mission", staffed entirely by DPmem bers, to investigate the political activities of the op pos ition .1 5

The point of no return vvas probably rcached vvith the granting to theCom mission of practically unlimited povvers to forbid ali politicalactivity, even right to surpress the reporting in the press ofparliamentary debates vvith regard to the Commission's activities. 1 6

The Commission vvas immediately condemned as unconstitutionaland anti-democratic by the opposition groups. They protested on thestreets of A nkara,İstanbul and İzmir, and significantİy the army d id

not put them dovvn. The intervention came about because the militaryfinally realised that "passive resistance" to the governm ent's order torepress demonstrations vvas not enough to solve the crisis in vvhichTurkey found itself and that they m ust instead take "positive action"to change the situation .1 7

The formation of the group, vvhich planned and carried out the1960 coup, seems to have started in 1955 vvhen tvvo young offıcers,Dündar Seyhan and Faruk G üventürk, began to form a celi ofradically-minded offıcers. They called themselves the RevolutionaryCommittee, or just the Committee and expanded their activitiesthroughout 1957 and 1958. The A nkara group formed at the end of

14FO-371/l60212, RK 1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (The Earl of Home), Ankara,6January 1960.

1 5Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve ideolojisi, Ankara, İmge, 1990, p.155.

1 6 F O 371/160212 , RK 1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (The Earl of Home), Ankara,6 January 1960.

1 7Ibid.




1956 by Talat Aydemir, Osman Koksal, Sezai Okan and AdnanÇelikoğlu, and İstanbul committee decided to merge their networks in1 9 5 8 .1 8 Two things were crucial to the success of their planned take-over. O ne vvas the posting of their mem bers to comm and positions,which were essential for the take-over of povver, and the other w as tofind a senior officer to head their moveme nt in order to gain thesupport of the rest of the armed forces. Eventually, they vveresuccessful on both co un ts. 1 9 1959 and the spring of 1960 vvas busytimes for the Committee and by May 1960 they vvere in a position to

* strike. After a fevv failed attempts, they found the senior officer theyneeded as a figüre head; General Cemal Gürsel, a former commander-in-chief of the land forces, vvho had been placed on a permanent leaveon May 3, 1960 because of his vvritten a mem orandum to the M inisterof Defence that expressed the discontent of the military tovvardsgovernment pol ic ies .2 0 He vvas acting as the representative of thediscontented military in demanding the resignation of the government.

The Defence Minister, Ethem Menderes, brought the letter toPrime Minister. When he savv the memorandum, he decided to resign.Hovvever, the President Celal Bayar refused his resignation and sent amessage of support. Then, Menderes changed his mind vvhen he vvas

informed of the President's attitude.

2 1

It seemed that he hoped that heand his government stili had the capacity to repress thedemonstrations and to solve the internal problems of the country. Hethought general public support vvas behind him. One crucial pointthoug h, the President vvas not informed about the m emo randumneither Ethem nor by Adnan M enderes.

The memorandum vvas very clear and the last vvarning to thegovernm ent before the military coup. The governmen t did not seem tograsp its significance. The Chicf of General Staff, General R üştüErdelhun, vvas loyal to the government and vvas knovvn to oppose any

18 WiIliam Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, London and Nevv York,Routledge, 1994, p. 100.

1 9 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey, A Modern llistory, London, Tauris, 1994, pp.253-254.

20 Sta nfo rd J. Shavv & Ezel Kural Shavv, llistory of the Ottoman Empire andModern Turkey, Vol. II, London, Cambridgc University Pres, 1977, p.414.

21Birand/Dündar/Çaplı, Demirkırai, p. 168.




intervention against Menderes. Moreover, twenty generals visited thePrime Min ister and confirmed that they vvould obey the gov ernm ent,thus the government decided to rely on the hierarchical discipline ofthe Turkish Army. They did not expect any conspiracy from themiddle-ranking and junior officers against the government.

Ge neral Gü rsel, an easy -going and fatherly figüre, vvas vvell-knovvn and vvell-liked through out the arm ed forces. He agreed tobecome head of the Committee but he vvas not involved in the details

of its organisation. Essentially, the cou p originated vvith a group ofmiddle-ranking and junior officers, vvho brought their com mand ersinto their preparations only at a relatively late stage. As mentioned byGeorge Harris: "It had been [in] essence [a] colonels' coup, vvithmerely a facade of senior officers recruited by their juniors, to takeadvantage of the strong hierarchical sense of the Turkish militaryprofess ion" .2 2 When the coup took place on May 27, 1960, GeneralGürse l vvas brought from İzmir to Ankara by an airforce plane as thehead of the Revolutionary Committee.

2. Inter-P arty Relat ions

During the DP decade (1950-1960), there vvere tvvo mainpolitical pa rties in Turkish politics. The D P vvas in gov ernment vvhilethe RPP vvas in opposition. In the general eleetions on May 14, 1950,the DP received 53.3 percent of the general vote and 420 seats in theGrand N ational Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) vvhile the RPP received39.9 percent of the vote and 63 seats.2 3 Just after the 1950 eleetionsand the transfer of povver from the R PP to the D P, there vvas a short-lived political honcymoon.24 For a fevv years the regime vvas as liberalas any Turkey had knovvn. The DP's first lead er Celal B ayar agreedthat there vvere no ideolog ical differences and both parties vverecommitted to the programme of developing a modern and prosperousTurkey. The Democrats pledged to make Turkey "little America"

22Harris, The Causes of ihe 1960 Revolulion, pp. 438^54.2 3Kemal Karpat, "Political Developmcnts in Turkey, 1950-1970", Middle

Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, 1972, pp. 348 -375; and Shavv/Shavv, History of th eOttoman, pp. 406-407.

24 Ro der ic H. Davison, Turkey, A Short History, Huntigton, Eothen, 1988, p.153.




vvithin a generation, vvith a millionaire in every province. The

Rep ublica ns had follovved a similar program me. T he differencebetvveen the parties vvas not about the goals, but över the m et ho ds .

2 5

Hovvever, the DP vvas not as homogenous as it appeared to be.Tho ugh its central leadership cam e directly from the RPP, itsgrassroot support cam e from people vvho first en gaged in politics onlyafter the opposition vvas set up in 1 94 6.

2 6The se people had suffered

severely under Republican one-party rule and hated the RPP blindly.

They shaped provincial DP branches independ ently of the party'scentral organization and vvished to achieve povver in order to exactrevenge on their former opp ressors. They criticised Men deres forbeing a continuation of the RPP and for not offering the country adifferent policy and programm e. Men deres heard such com plaintsrepeatedly in local party congrcsses and vvas more annoyed by thisconflict vvithin his ovvn party than by the official oppos ition. His vvayof appe asing dissidents vvas to take severe me asures ag ainst the RP Psuch as censorship of the press and radio for the RPP, despite theirearlier promise that they vvould not "question the past".

2 7

The DP soon launched an open attack on the opposition.

Considerable amount of property of the RPP vvas confiscated on thegrounds that it had been illegally acquired through the misuse ofpub lic funds during the single party era. Their local partyheadquarters vvere closed. A nevv press lavv imposed heavy penaltiesfor pu blishing inaccurate informalion that might endanger Turkey'sstabi l i ty.

2 8

Th e 1954 election vvas stili free and fair. T he D P's major ity ofthe popular vote increased to 58 percent and it received 503 seats inthe Assembly vvhile the RPP garnered only 35 percent and 31 seats.The electoral system used in Turkey in the 1950s, vvas inherited fromthe first Ottoman electoral regulations of 1876. Each of the 64(subsequently 67) provinces servcd as a constituency electing one

member if its population vvas under 55.000, and an additional member

2 5Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, London, Routledge, 1993,p. 109.

2 6Ibid.,p. 111.

2 7 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiement, p. 67.28

Davison, Turkey, p. 153.



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTO N" ıN TURKEY 149

for every 40 .000 inhabitants. The number of parliamentary seats thushad to be adjusted upwards in every eleetion to cope with the rise inthe popu lation. As a result the assembly seats inereased from 487 in1950 to 602 in 1957. With a few exceptions, ali citizens öv er tvventy-one were g iven the franehise.

M oreov er, the sim ple m ajority system vvas used, vvhich allovvedthe front-runner in each constituency to obtain ali the seats regardlessof the percentage of votes it rece ived. This procedure can be

illustrated using , for exam ple, the Konya province during the 1957elections. Kony a returned 21 deputies for the Assembly. The share ofthe votes of the four p arties com peting in Kony a vvas as follovvs; RP P40.9 %, DP 44.3 %, NP (Nation Party) 10.5 %, and FP (FreedomParty) 4.4 %. Notvvithstanding the narrovvness of its lead, the DP ali21 seats because of the simple m ajority system. It is hard to believeany other electoral system vvould have produccd the same result,unless the elections vvere carefully rigged. The fact that this effect vvasrepeated in the majority of constituencies in ali three elections duringthe 1950s gave the Democrats massive parliamentary majorit iesdespite its slendcr advantage of the popular vote. For example, in the1950 eleetion the DP received 53.3 % of the votes, but gained 83.7 %seats in the Asse mb ly. In the 1954 elee tion, the fıgures vvere 56.6 %

and 91 .6 % . On the other h and, num bers for the RP P's vvere 34.2 %and 5.6 % in 1950 and 39.9 % and 14.2 % in 1954, respeetively.29

Therefore, the parliamentary representation vvas not an acc uratereflection of pub lic tendencics. Th e eleetion system vvas designedduring the single party period by the RPP, but created significantadvantages for the DP during the 1950s.

The inereased majority, couplcd vvith the vvorsening economicsituation, seemed to drivc the Democrats tovvards a more authoritarianrule even though there vvere criticisms from vvithin the party. T he"liberal gro up", vvhich favoured free e nterprise and po litical freedom,opposed the pressure of state authority öve r the econom y, as vvell as

their aim to control political aelivity. Nineteen DP members eitherresigned or vvere expelled from the party because of their opp osition.

2 9W ill ia m Hale, "The Role of the Elcctoral System in Turkish P olitics",International Journal ofMiddle East Studies,Yol. 11, 1980, pp. 401-417.




They formed a new political party in Decem ber 1955, called theFreedom Party (Hürrriyet Partisi).

30

The increasingly heavy-handed methods of the DP also led theopposi t ion par t ies tovvards col laborat ion. In August 1957,representatives from the opposition parties started to hold m eetings.At the same time, in Septem bcr 1957, Fuat K öprülü (one of thefounders of the DP) resigned from the party and joined theo p p o s i t i o n . 3 1 These initial stcps towards co-operation alarmed the

Democrats and they decided to hold the 1958 elections a year earlierthan planned . To prevent the opposition from joining forces, theyenacted a new electoral law forbidding electoral a lliances betvveenparties.

Thus, the general election of Septc mb er 27, 1957 vvas held in atense climate and num ber of incidcnts occurred during the electioncampaign. Despite ali the cfforts of the opposition, the DP lost only9.3 percent, once again emerging as the strongest party vvith close to48 percent of the vote, vvhile the RPP rcceived about 41 percent. Theremainder vvent to the Republican Nation Party (7 %) and to theFreedom Party (4 % ). The DP's scats in the parliament d ecreased from505 to 424 and the RPP increased its seats from 31 to 1 7 8 .3 2

After theelection, the opposition parties argucd that the nevv government vvasnot legitimate. They urged the government to resign because its totalvote vvas under 50 pcrccnt. The result of the election only increasedthe political chaos. The R PP, thirsty for triumph and an increasedrepresentation in the Assembly, stepped up the İlerce criticism andfrequency of its assault on Menderes and his associates. Th egovernment responded by continucd acts of repression, and theviolence mounted in and out of the parliament.

The foreign policy of the DP vvas also heavily criticised by theoppo sition. A lthough the RPP had mainly follovved a similar policyduring the post-vvar period tovvards the W est, they condem ned the D P

government as "more Westernised than the West". It meant that

3 0 C e m Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule:1945-71" in I. C.Schik and E. A. Tonak (eds.), Turkey In Transition, New Perspectives,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 101-143.

3 1Ibid.,p. 115.3 2 K a r p a t , Political Developments In Turkey, pp. 349-375.




Turkish foreign policy became depended on West, particularly uponUS interest in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, the Turkish policy-makers increasingly saw themselves during the 1950s as therepresentative of the West vvithin Turkey's immediate neighbourhood.This vvas exaggerated by the op position.

In the Cold W ar atmosp here, Turkey vvas looking for analliance against her expansionist neighbour the Soviet Union. Thus,on Au gust 1, 1950, Turkey formally applied for admission to the

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). At the NATO councilmeeting in September, Norway and Dcnmark strongly opposed theentry of both Turkey and Greece. The Europeans were not keen toextend their commitment beyond the North Atlantic region. Britainwished Tu rkey to stay out of NA TO, because she wanted to seeTurkey bccoming the cornerstone of an alliance in the Middle East.As a result Turkish application vvas rej ee ted .3 3 Hovvever, the KoreanWar vvas an opportunity for Turkey to gain access to NATO. The DPgovernment decided to send a brigade of 4500 troops under the UNframevvork to Korea on July 25, 1950. The oppos ition vvas notinformed about this significant decision by the government. By theend of the vvar, there vvere 1200 casualties among the Tu rkishforces . 34

This heavy price acceleratcd Western acceptance of Turkey'smilitary co-operation. The Pentagon had begun to appreciate thestrategic importance of Turkey as vvell as the military augmentationshe could make to the alliance. Finally, Britain, too, announced itssupport for Turkey's admission to NATO, and in September 1951 theScandinavian countries also vvilhdrevv their objeetions. FinallyTurkey, together vvith Greece, became a full mem ber of N ATOFebruary 28, 1952. After that, Turkey's foreign and defence policiesvvere planned according to mutual defence principles of the AtlanticAlliance.

Meanvvhile, Turkey also signcd bilateral agreements vvith theUS. Most of these agreem ents vvere not ratified by the parliame nt, andvvere only approved by the foreign ministry or military institutions.

3 3 A h m a d , The Turkish Experiment, p. 391.3 4Selim Dcringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk" in Clement H.

Dodd (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy, London, Eothen, 1992, pp. 1-8.




There vvere 54 bilateral agreements ali together; three of them vveresigned before 1950, 31 vvere signed during the DP period (1950-1960), and the rest (20) after 1960. Acco rding to these agre eme nts,the US Government obtained the right to establish American militarybases in Turkey. Accordingly, the opposition condemned thegovernm ent's action as a violation of Turkey's sovereignty andnational security.3 5

In the meantime, the Turkish, Greek and Yugoslav foreign

ministers on the instigation of the US governm ent, signed aFriendship and Co-operation Treaty in Ankara in February 1953. 3 6

On A ugust 9 , 1954 it vvas transformed into an alliance and a militarypact, namely, the Balkan Defence P ac t. 3 7 Although the Pact openedup the possibility of support from the US against the USSR and itssatellites, it vvas short-lived, especially after Stalin's death in 1953 asWestern-oriented Turkey, Greece and socialist Yugoslavia could notalvvays agree on the direction from vvhich the m utual threat vvassupposed to come. Finally Khruschcv's visit to Belgrade in May 1955determined the fate of the Pact. Tito changed his policy tovvardsmilitary alliances and became a leader of the non-aligned movem entvvith Nehru and Nasser. Same year also savv the Turkish foreignminister, F. R. Zorlu, supporting the idea of a defensive pact and thecontinu ation of alliance system s vvith the West at the B andun gConference of non-aligned countries on 18-24 April.

Greco-Tu rkish relations also deteriorated after 1955 because ofthe C yprus dispute. As a result, the Balkan Pact effectively died in1955, though it survived officially until 1960 vvhen it vvas dissolvedby its mem bers because of increasingly divergent aims of itsmembers.

Turkey also became a formative mem ber of the Baghdad Pacttoge ther vvith Iraq on Febru ary 24, 1955, vvhich vvas a heav y blovv forArab unily and to Turkey's relations vvith the Arab countries. Britain

officially joined the Baghdad Pact on April 4, 1955, follovved byPakistan on Septembcr 23. Iran joined on Novem ber 3, 1955, giving

3 5G önlübo l , Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, pp. 235-236.3 6 Ib id „ p. 238.3 7Hüseyin Bağcı, Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası, Ankara, İmge,

1990, p. 57.




the Pact its final form. Finally it vvas renamed CEN TO o n Aug ust 21,1959 after Iraq withdrew from the Pact as a result of a coup on July14, 1958. Th e nevv Pact left out Iraq but brou ght in the U S as anobserver. Both CENTO and its precursor established defensivearrangement against the USSR, forming "the Northern Ti er ." 3 8 ThusTurkey played the leading role in the realisation of Western policy inthe M iddle E ast, directed tovvard "containing" the USSR vvith militaryal l iances. 3 9

Crit ic ism of Turkish foreign pol icy from the internalopposition, vvhen it came, vvas centred largely on matters of detail andon vvays the government carried out its policy, not on the underlyingstrategy. For example, F. R. Atay, a vvell-knovvn RPP joumalist,expressed his anxiety that Turkey appeared to be taking a"provocative" stance in championing opposition to the USSR in theM iddle E ast. İnönü also recog nised that there vvere difficulties inreconciling Turkey's regional policies in the Balkans and the MiddleEast tovvards the Soviet Union and Greece. Speaking in the name ofhis party, he vvarned the DP leadership to pay close attention toreconciling the obligations of Turkey's different security groupings,including the Baghdad Pact. Hovvever at the outset ,the DP's domestic

critics did not yet seem prepared, as they vvould become by the end ofthe follovving year, to blame the government for alienating some A rabstates especially Egypt and Syria by seeking other Arab members forthe Baghdad Pact; Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. 4 0

On March 5, 1959, the DP government approved a bilateraltreaty vvith the US, vvhich vvas strongly criticised by the opposition forits vague vvording. It stated that the US government vvould supportTurkey against any direct or indirect involvement from outside. Theopposition argued that the limits of the indirect involvement should beclarified by the governmen t as they fcared that the US forces migh t beemployed to keep the DP in the government even if it loses povverthrough eleetions. Despite the opposition's objeetions, the treaty vvas

approved by the Assembly by the DP's majority on May 9, 1960.

3 8 N urhan İnce , Problems and Polit ics in Turkish Policy, 1960-1966,Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1974, p. 30.

3 9E r o ğ u l , Demokrat Parti, p. 101.4 0 H ar r i s , Troubled Alliance, p. 63.




During the 1950, Turkey not only became the fonvard shield ofthe West, but also a champ ion of the Cold War. The DP leaderscontinually expressed deep suspicion of the Soviets. They were notreceptive to the new policy of the post-Stalinist Soviet leaders w hohad denounced Stalin's expansionist policies and urged betterrelationship vvith Turkey. Tha t the Soviets had been shifting to aposition of a peaceful proces s in East-We st relations vvas ignored bythe DP leadership vvho continued to rely on US and NATO support

vis-â-vis the USSR , despite the fact that these cou ntries vvere by novvengaged in ddtente vvith the Soviets.4 1

The British Ambassador Sir Bernard Burrovvs in analysingTurkey's situation in 1960 comm cntcd; "It is one of the manyparadoxes of this eventful year hovv the Dcmo crat Party G overnm entcould internally embark on so dangerous and ili judged a course,vvhile in its foreign policy it shovved such steadfastness as a m em berof the Western alliance".4 2 The Ambassador also explained the nevvtrend in the Turkish-Soviet's relations;

There vvere signs tovvards the end that even in foreign policy the strainvvas beginning to teli. M. Menderes vvas heard to mention ratherenviously on m ore than one occasion hovv much easier it vvas for atotalitarian system like Russia to carry out m easures of economicdevelopment in a short time. His agreement to exchange visits vvithM. Khrushchev may be regarded not only as a prudent vvithdravvalfrom Turkey's previously extreme anti-Russian position, but also as ahope of distraction from the intcrnal c ris is. 43

His an alysis vvas mainly co rrcct, but it should be mentioned thatthe negativ e attitude of the US tovvards Turkey's ec onom ic aiddem ands and the general policy of d£tente betvveen the blocks alsoaffected the Turkish-Sovict relations. Another factor vvas that theTu rkish politic ians novv realised their error of blindly follovvingNATO and Western policy. They thought they needed to improveTurkey's relations vvith her norlhern neighbour too. The Soviets alsooffered a significant amount of aid and credit to Turkey. According tothe exchange visit agreement betvveen the tvvo governments,

4 1Gönli ibol , Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, p. 312.4 2 F O 371/160212, RK 1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (The Earl of Home), Ankara,

6 January 1961.4 3 Ib id .



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTON" N TURKEY 155

Menderes vvas scheduled to visit Moscovv in July 1960, but vvas notable do so in the event because of the coup on May 27, 1960.

3. The Incidents That Led to the Coup

There vvere various events accelerating the tension vvithin thecountry, vvhich led to the coup. Although some had began earlier, theyconverged mainly in the spring of 1960.

The po litical tension steadily inereased after the 1957 eleetion,as the inter-party relations d eteriorated follovving the eleetion. Th en,Menderes' aeroplane crashed near Gatvvick Airport on the journey tothe London Conference on February 17, 1959. Me nderes escapedfrom the crash bu t tvvelve passeng ers d ied. The Gatvvick air crashmight have an opportunity for both sides to improve their relations.Menderes vvas vvelcomed back home by huge crovvds, and theopposition leadcr İnönü, too, met him at Ankara station. They shookhands and İnönü asked Menderes to accept his good vvishes. It vvas thelast time the tvvo leaders shook ha nd s. 4 4 They vvould never m eet ag ainin friendly circumstances before the coup.

The road leading to the extinction of the DP began on A pril 19,1959, vvhen İnönü, the 75-year-old RPP leader, as vvell as other partymembers and journalists, started vvhat vvas called the "GrandOffensive", a tour of country vvith a party train. 4 5 The train's first stopvvas Uşak in vvestern Turkey, and the group vvas met by ademonstration organised by the government supporters, one of vvhomvvas a 16-year-old youth vvho threvv a stone that injured İnönü in theh e a d . 4 6 This aroused anger throughout the country and vvas exploitedby the RPP . It also affected the military circles due to their respect forİnönü, a former general and veteran of the independence War. And,on May 3, 1959, Turkish nevvspapers vvere issued vvith blank columnsfor the first time. In return, the governm ent issued a press d ecree

aiming to control and censor any statements by the opposition.

^ E r o ğ u l , Demokrat Parti, p. 146.4 5 E r o ğ u l , The Establishment of Mulliparty Rule, p. 117.46 FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10, Burrovvs to FO (Sclvveyn Lloyd), Ankara,

22 April 1960.




At the end of the A egean tour, İnönü went from İzmir toİstanbul by air. His car was attacked by a crowd at Topkapı on theway from the airport to the city. Fortunately, İnönü w as saved by theprompt interference of an army unit, which had previously beenordered no t to intervene. The RPP supporters publicised the event ofthe Topkapı incidents and they alleged that it vvas a planned attackvvith the aim of killing İnönü but m aking it appear as if this vvasaccidental .4 7

In the spring of 1960, these kinds of incident increasedvvhenever the opposition leader and other RPP members vvhorepresented him launched tours throughout Anatolia. For example,İnönü visited Konya in February 1960 and the poliçe used tear-gasand truncheons to disperse the Republicans vvho turned out to meeth i m . 4 8 On A pril 3, 1960, he vvas to visit the tovvn of Kayseri in centralAnatolia. The governm ent decided to prevent this visit. Accordingly,the gov ernor of Kayseri stopped İnönü's train and ordered him toabandon his plan, but İnönü took no notice and eventually the traintook him on his vvay. Hovvever, the next day the govemor called onarmed forces to obstruct him from going on to Y eşilhisar, vvhich vvassituated half vvay to N iğde. The soldiers did not obey the govem or'sorder b ecause of their respect for İnönü. The n, a colonel and tvvo

majors resigned in protest against being ordered to deprive him of hisconstitutional right to take a trip vvhere he pleased. They vverepromptly arrested.

The Kayseri incident had tvvin importance: it both confirmedthe ex tent to vvhich, as Hale pointed out, M enderes vvas prepared to g oto chain dovvn the opposition, and also indicated that he might not beable to count on the support of the army, if he needed i t . 4 9 TheAm bass ado r Burrovvs vvas of the same opinion in his despatch: "itsimm ediate effect vvas a serious blovv to the Govern me nt's cred it. Invievv of M. İnönü's great p restige among the bulk of the Tu rkisharmed forces, it is stili diffıcult to understand vvhat vvas in th e

Government's mind in attempting to use units of the army against his

4 7 H a l e , Turkish Politics, p. 105.4 8 L e w i s , Modern Turkey, p. 152.4 9 H a l e , Turkish Politics, p. 105.



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTION" ıN TURKEY 157

p e r s o n " .5 0 This w as, infact, a turning point. The relations betw een thearmy and the opposition against the government was closer than everbefore.

Following the Kayseri incident, İnönü met with a group offormer g enerals and adm irals in his house on April 17, 1960 and toldthem it was up to them to protect the ideals of Turkish pro gre ss. 5 1

This led the D P to announce that it vvould investigate wh ether the RP Pwas secretly inc iting the armed forces to disobey the law and order.

The Investigation Commission vvas established on April 18. Ali of the15 members of the Com mission vvere chosen from DP rank. It vvas toinvestigate political activities, the press, and meetings, vvhich vverebanned immediately by the Commission.5 2 Nine days later, a furtherlavv gave the Investigation Comm ittee d raconian right of inspectionand arrest. İnönü protested; "If you continue on this road, even I vvillnot be able to save you". 5 3 Earlier on, he vvas reported to say that"When the conditions compel it, revolution is the legitimate right ofn a t i o n s " .5 4 Aftervvards İnönü vvas punished for his speeches by beingexpelled from the Assem bly for the next tvvelve sessions. Thu s theAssem bly lost its function to solve problems vvithin the parliam ent.

As the political tension increased, university studentsthroughout the country began to protest the government policies.During demonstrations by the İstanbul University students on 28April 1960, the army and poliçe suppressed the students. Tvvostudents vvere killed, and many vvere injured. D ue to c ensorship of thepress, d etails of the eve nts vvere not made public. Hovvever, rum oursspread quickly to the affect that sixty or more students had beenkilled. As the protest increased, the government declared martial lavvvvith a curfevv in İstanbul and A nkara on April 28 , 1 96 0 .5 5 On April29, there vvere crovvds demonstrating in Ankara in a meeting

50FO -371/1530 32, RK1015/10, Burrovvs to FO (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara, 22April 1960.

5 ' H a l e , Turkish Politics, p. 106.52 FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10, Burrovvs to FO (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara,

22 April 1960.5 3 W e i k e r , The Turkish Revolution, p. 15.^ H a l e , Turkish Poliıic, p. 106.55FO -371/1530 32 , RK 1015/11, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 29 April 1960.




organised by the students of the Political Science Faculty. Th edemonstrators called for Menderes' resignation.56

A NATO Ministers' council vvas scheduled to meet in İstanbulon May 2-4, 1960. Hovvever, Menderes cancelled his address to themeeting in order to stay in Ankara and remain in touch vvithdeve lopments .57 This clearly shovved the seriousness of the situationto the foreign ministers of the N ATO countries. Another importantevent occurred on 5 t h of May in Ank ara. M enderes vvas passing

through Kızılay Square vvhere a demonstration vvas being held. Whenhe stopped his car and stepped out, he vvas manhandled by thesti'dents, and managed to get into a journalist's car vvith diffıculty,vvhich had also, been accidentally trapped in the crovvd.58 After hisreturn to his office and mee ting vvith the Presiden t, President Bay argave an order to the Interior Minister Namık G edik to open fire on thedemo nstrators. The security officers hovvever did no t fire. But thisord er vvas signifıcant as it shovved hovv Bay ar had in erease d hisinfluence över Menderes.

The last signifıcant event before the coup occurred during thevisit of the indi an Prime M inister Nehru to Ankara on 20-22 May. On

May 21, about 1000 officers and cadets from the Army War Co llegestaged an orderly march to the presidential mansion in the suburb ofÇankay a in protest for the arbitrary arrest of several officers. Theevent vvas regarded as an attempt to intimidate of the government.

Although there vvas substantial pressure on Me nderes from aliquarters to resign, he did not yield. Until about the beginning of April,political speculation centred on the question of vvhether thegovernment intended to hold prematüre eleetions in the spring or theautumn. Legally, they did not need to be held until the middle of th efollovving year. M embers of the governmen t and their supporters vventa long vvay, hovvever, short of actually announcing a date, to suggestthat eleetions vvould be held before the summ er. Tours by m inisters to

ali parts of the country vvere characterised by blatant e leetion eeringspeeches that ineluded the promised economic development and thepreparation of nevv electoral registers.

5 6 E r o ğ u l , Demokrat Parti, p. 157.5 7 W e i k e r , The Turkish Revolulion, p. 18.58Birand/Dündar/Çaplı, Demirkırat, p. 172.




The Prime M inister vvas himself favourable to ho lding-earlyelections . U nfortunately, hovvever, he vvas unable to carry vvith him asufficient majority of his party follovvers, includ ing the P resid ent, vvhoexercised a good deal of independent influence in party matters. Theopponents of the early eleetion might have been motivated by generaluncertain ty as to the result, but more likely it vvas for m ore pe rsonalconsideration s. At the time, m emb ers of parliament vvere dravvingtheir salaries in advance for the vvhole four-year term for vvhich they

vvere elected. A ccordingly if the Assembly vvas dissolved before theend of its term, they vvere, thcoretica lly, ob liged to repay theappropriate proportion of vvhat they had d rav vn. 59

Moreover, in some cases, vvhile members might have beenfairly sure of the eleetion of their party, they might have had personaldoub ts ovving to local rivalries, in terms of their seleetion as D Pcandidates. The Kayseri incident, too, had caused the government torevise sharply its estimate of casy electoral success. Finally, a nevvlyobtained grant of $50 m illion from Germany may have made theGov ernm ent feel that they could m ore comfortably serape through therest of the year vvithout a nevv economic crisis.

British ambassador Burrovvs analysed the political situation inTurkey vvith considerable insight. Consequently, the British ForeignOffice vvas vvell informed and kept abreast of the rapidly changingand complex situation. He pointed out that, many outside observersthoug ht that an eleetion vvas likely to result in further victory of thedemocrats. Hovvever, the Government could not take the risk of goingto the country either because they might loose or because an eleetionvvould give rise to disorder vvhich the army vvould be unvvilling tosuppress for the benefit of the Dcmocrat P art y. 6 0

An other factor vvas that vvhile he vvas touring on the Aeg eanregion, a huge enthusiastic crovvd of almost 200 thousands met him in

İzmir and shovved their sympathy and support, vvhich inlluenced the

59 FO-371/153032, RK.1015/10, Burrovvs to FO (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara,22 April 1960.

60FO -371/1602 12, RK.1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (The Earl of Home), Ankara,6 January 1961.




Prime Minister's decision to stay on. 6 1 Then he went to Eskişehir on25 May and made a speech during a public meeting. He emphasisedthat they vvould abolish the investigation commission and declare anearly election date. The crowd did not hear his vvords because the w ireof the loudspeakers had been cut off. While he was stili in Eskişehir,his secretary vvoke him up at 4 am on May 27, 1960 with the news ofthe military coup.6 2

4. The Coup and its Aftermath

The coup took place during the night of M ay 27, 1960 vvithmore or less simultaneous action in İstanbul and Ankara. In İstanbul,the operation vvent smoothly and quickly meeting vvith no resistance.The martial lavv com man der, also first army com man der, vvas said tohave given a dinner party attended by military and civil supporters ofthe D P. These vvere prompü y arrested at the end of the party.

The Third Armourcd Brigade seems to have been the maincomponent of the striking force vvith individual officers from the staffcollege in İstanbul also playing an important part. Tanks and troopsvvere first observed moving into the city at about 2.30 a.m . Half anhou r later they vvere in position and in control of the Vilayet(Governor's Place). Seizure of the central post office, the poliçeheadquarters, the railvvay stations, airport and radio station quicklyfollovved. T he leading mem bers of the former regime vvere taken intocustody. After some confusion, due to an inability to contact A nkara,İstanbul R adio broadcast the first announ ceme nts that the armedforces had taken control at 4.15 a. m . 6 3

The operation in Ankara, on the other hand, began later thanİstanbul and met vvith surprises. It has since been revealed that thema rgin betvveen su ccess and failure vvas narrovver than it had firstappeared. The garrison commanders of the Armoured Training Centre

and the horsed cavalry (43rd Regiment) similarly refused to join thecoup. The support of the troops under their command had, hovvever,already been assured. The main striking force vvas the cadets of the

61Birand/Dündar/Çaph, Demirkırat, p. 135.6 2Ibid.,p. 180.63FO -371/15 303 4, RK 1015/33(A), Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 3 June 1960.



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTION" ıN TURKE Y 161

War College, w ho, together vvith a large num ber of individualofficers, formed the spearhead of the operation. Further supportingelements vvere reserve officers (i.e. conscript officers) and a numb erof infantry, largely trainees.6 4

The three most important individuals in the planning andexecution of the operation in Ankara vvere the Logistic Commander ofthe Land Forces, the Chief of Training Staff on the General Staff andthe Commandant of the War College. The cadets of the War College

vvere instructed during the evening and issued vvith arms andamm unition. At about 3.30 a.m., a sm all num ber of senior officers,including the Chief of the General Staff, the acting Land ForcesCommander and Martial Lavv Commander vvere arrested. Adetachm ent con sisting of tanks and trainee soldiers led by officers andcade ts left im me diately aftervvards for the Presidential Palace to arrestCelal Bayar. A lthough the sympathies of the Presidential GuardRegiment, vvere uncertain this potentially delicate operation vvascarried out vvithout bloodshed, largely by means of bluff. From thenon m atters proceeded smoothly. One detachment of cadets left at 3.45a.m. to protect İnönü's house and others encountered little more thantoken resistance from gendarm e and poliçe in securing strategicpoints, such as the Prime Ministry, the Post Office and Radio Station.

VVhen the suc cess of the o peration vvas assured, the nevvs of th eoverthrovv of the governm ent vvas broadcast by colonel AlparslanTürk eş över Ankara Radio in the follovving statement;

Honourable Fellovv Countrymen: Ovving to the crisis into vvhich ourdemocracy has fallcn, and ovving to sad incidents and in order toprevent frauicide, the Turkish armed forces have taken över theadministration of the country.

Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose ofextricating the parties from irreconcilable situation vvhich they havefallen and for the purpose of having just and free elections, to be heldas soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above

party and impartial administralion.Our initiative is not direeted against any person or elass. Ouradministration vvill not resort any aggressive act against personalities,nor vvill it allovv others to do so. Ali fellovv countrymen, irrespeetive

^Ibid.




of the parties to vvhich they may belong, vvill be treated in accordancevvith the principles of lavv.

For the elimination of ali our hardships and for the safety of ournational existence, it is imperative that it should be remembered thatali our fellovv countrymen belong to the same nation and race, aboveali party considerations, and that therefore they should threat oneanother vvith respect and understanding vvithout bearing any grudge.

Ali personalities of the Cabinet are requested to take vvith the Turkish

armed forces. Their personal safety is guaranteed by lavv.We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbours and theentire vvorld: Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the UnitedNations Charter and to the principle of "peace at home peace in thevvorld" set by the great Atatürk. We are loyal to ali our alliances andundertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and vve are faithfulto them. We repeat: Our ideal is "peace at home, peace in thevvorld".65

When Menderes and his companions heard the nevvs inEskişehir, they decided to go tovvards Kütahya. Hovvever, one of th eair colonels, Muhsin Batur, vvas ordered to intercept Menderes andtake him to Ankara. When the group arrived in Kütahya, Colonel

Batur follovved their convoy, arrested M enderes, and brough t him toAnka ra by air. The president, prime minister, and four gen erals vverearrested together vvith 400 Dcmocrat deputies and other supporters.They vvere then confıned to Yassıada a barren islet near İstanbul.

The Commanders in İzmir and Erzurum had previouslysignifıed support for the movemen t. The remaining elements of thearmed forces imm ediately d eclarcd their support. M artial lavv and acurfevv vvere immed iately imp osed throughout the co untry. The coupvvas accepted throughout the country vvith only one or tvvo very minörincidents of opposition being reported.

A notable feature had been the determination of the army toassociate civilian and predominantly intellectual elements vvith thecoup from the start. One consequcnce of this vvas that after the coup,vvhen there vvas a move to draft a nevv con stitutio n, seve ralcons titutiona l lavvyers from İstanbul and Ankara Univ ersities vveresumm oned. T his drafting of an entirely nevv constitution meant the

65Weiker , The Turkish Revoludon, pp. 20-21.




legi t imisat ion of the movem ent . What had begun as a couptransformed into a "revolution" through the participation of theintellectuals in the drafting of the nevv constitution.

On May 27, the Constitutional Commission vvas instructed tostart vvork imme diately to reform the Constitution, and thusimm ediately form a civilian government. The Com mission vvasheaded by Professor Sıddık Sam i Onar vvho vvas the R ector of theUniv ersity of İstanbul. Parallel vvith this, hovvever, the m ilitary

Committee of National Union continucd to exist and vvas stated to besuperior to the government, vvith General Gürsel providing the linkbetvveen the tvv o. 66

Then, G eneral Gürsel and 37 offıcers representing ali branehesof the armed forces (although p redominantly from the army, vvith onlythree from the airforce, and tvvo from the navy), organised themse lvesinto the Milli Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Committee - NUC). Itvvas largely composed of middle ranking offıcers. Their ranks vvere asfollovvs: five g enerals, seven c oloncls, five lieute nant colon els,thirteen majors and eight captains. The overvvhelming majority ofNU C mem bers vvere betvveen 35 and 46 years of a g e . 6 7

The NU C vvas a coalition of d issimilar factions in the armedforces, ali hungry for povver. The junta vvas large and unvvieldy,because so many different secret groups claimed representation. TheNUC assumed legal povver to govern the country under a provisionallavv, enacted on June 12, 1960. This document enabled the NUC toexercise sovereignty on behalf of the Turkish nation until an assemblyhad been elected under a nevv constitution. The legislative povver ofthe junta vvas through the Cabinet commissioned by the Head of Statevvho vvas also chairman of the NUC. The Committee could dismiss theministers but only the Head of State could app oint them. Only thejudiciary funetioned indepcndently of the junta and executive povverremained in the hands of the civilian C ouncil of Ministers, albeit

66FO -371/15 303 4. RK. 1015/33, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 3 June 1960.67K em al H. Karpat, "The Military and Politics in Turkey 1960-64; A Socio-

Cultural Analysis of a Revolution", American Ilistorical Review, Vol. 75,1970, pp. 1654-1683; F0-371/153035,RK 1015/39, Burrovvs to SouthernDepartment, 17 June 1960.




under the scruting of the jun ta . 6 8 The "Cabinet of Technocrats", as itcame to be know n, consisted of 18 mem bers (three offıcers and 15civilians) was a purely executive organ, appointed and controlled bythe NU C. Thus, ali important policy decisions were made by the N UCitself.6 9

There vvere tvvo majör groups in the NUC. One group, vvhichincluded G eneral Gürsel and the other generals, referred as

moderates, vvished to restore povver to the civilians vvithin a shorttime. They supported the Onar Comm ission's proposals for a liberaland democratic Turkey. The second group vvas described as theradicals, and consistcd predominantly of junior offıcers, vvith Co lone lTürkeş emerg ing as a prominent figüre. They vvanted the junta toretain a povverful position so as to carry ou t a more thoroug hrestructuring than that envisaged by the professors. T hey even talkedof creating a "nevv culture" and a popülist p olitical system vvithoutparties. They vvere especially against the NUC's close relationshipvvith or suppo rt of the İnönü's party, the RPP.

From May 27, for the ne xt six month s, the tvvo groups in theNUC engaged in a povver struggle. Finally, on November 13, themoderates carried out a coup and purged 14 NUC members vvithradical inclinations. They vvere ali expelled under the canopy of"advisers" to Turkish em bassies around the vvorld. The first round ofconflict vvas thus res olv ed. 7 0

The nevv constitution vvas approved by the public through thereferendum of July 9, 1961. After the referendum approved theConstitution, affairs moved steadily tovvard the election of October15, and the end of the formal existence of the NU C. The NationalAssembly of Turkey re-convened in Ankara in October 1961. GeneralGürsel vvas elected Turkey's fourth President by the Assem bly onOctobe r 27, and the nevv civilian coalition governm ent vvas formed by

İnönü, the leader of the RPP, in October 1961.7 1

6 8 A h m a d , The Making of Modern Turkey, pp. 126-127.69Zürcher, Turkey, p. 254.7 0Semih Vaner, "The Army" in Schick/Tonak, Turkey in Transition, pp.

236-265.71Weiker , The Turkish Revolulion, pp. 23-24.




5. Ang lo-Turkish Relations Before the Co up

The Anglo-Turkish relations since the establishment of theTurkish R epublic had undergone signifıcant chan ges. There were anum ber of issues in Anglo-Turkish relations before 1959, whichcontinued to affect their relations in the period 1959-1965.

Stra teg ic and Defence issues

During the 1920s, Britain strongly opposed to the new TurkishNational G overnment in Ankara during the period of the LiberationWar (1919-1922) and did not recognise the new Turkishadministration until the Lausanne Peace Treaty that was signed afterintensive negotiations on July 24, 1923. After Lausanne, Turkey waspreoc cupied vvith domestic affairs and vvas determined to cure he rbackvvardness by means of rapid orientation tovvards Western values.There vvere hovvever number of unsettled points leftover from theLausanne Treaty. The Mosul dispute vvhich concerned the Britishma ndate adm inistration in Iraq vvas one of the more imp ortant

problems that occupied the energy of the nevv Republic.

The agreement about Mosul vvas finally signed at the end oflong negotiations in Ankara on June 5,1926 by the British, Turkishand Iraqi Governments. Turkey accepted the League of N ations'decision on Mosul, namely it ceded Mosul to Iraq, vvhich vvas thenunder Br i t i sh manda te . 7 2 The follovving visit of the BritishMe diterranean fleet to Turkey in October 1929 reflected the end ofthe Anglo-Turkish conflict of the 1920s.

During the 1930s, British policy became less strained. On July6, 1934, Ali Fethi Okyar, close friend of M. Kem al, vvas appointed as

the Turkish Ambassador to London, and in the same year Sir PercyLoraine vvas appointed as a nevv British A mbassad or to A nkara. Th ese

7 2 ö m e r Kürkçüoğlu, "Turco-Brilish Relations since 1920s" in William Haleand Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), Four Cenluries of Turco-British Relations,Humberside, Eothen, 1984, pp. 80-102.




were signifıcant points attesling to the shift in Ang lo-Turkish relationsfrom hostility to alliance.

A new step was taken with the signing of the Balkan Entente onFebruary 9, 1934 under the leadership of Turkey and Gree ce, vvith theparticipation of Romania and Yugoslavia. The Entente vvas supportedby both Britain and France. It vvas obvious that the expansionistpolicies of Italy and Germany vvere affecting the British and Turkishinterests in the region. Turkey also took the lead in the conclusion ofthe Sad abad Pact in July 1937 vvith Iran, Iraq and Afgha nistan, vvhichcreated a nevv chain of indirect co -ope ration betvveen Britain andTurkey since Britain vvas involved as the mandatory povver in Iraq.The Italian attack on Eıhiopia in 1935 causcd similar concern in bothcountries.

German occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939 ledBritain to take counter-measures. As a result Britain and Franceoffered to protect Greece, Romania and Turkey against G ermanattack. Hovvever, Turkey proposcd that this collaboration should takethe form of an alliance. The meeting betvveen Britain, France andTurkey ended vvith the Turco-Briıish and Turco-French declarations

of May 12, 1939 and June 23, 1939 respectively. Finally the Turco-British-French Pact vvas signed on October 19, 1939.

During the vvar, Britain and Russia pressured Turkey toparticipate in the vvar on the Allicd side. Turkey's involvement in theFirst World War, hovvever, had produccd tragic consequences andthere vvas an understandable rcluctance to enter the second conflict.Th us Tu rkey 's official reply vvas that its army and air force lackedequ ipm ent to perform the tasks, vvhich vvere dem anded of them. Thus,after resisting to the end of the War, Turkey finally declared vvar onGermany on February 23, 1945. Turkey's decision vvas essentiallyaimed fulfilling the pledge taken at the Y alta conference that is toqualify for the founding membership of the United Nations. Theconfron tation vvith Britain during the vvar öve r Tur kish neu trality,hovvever, led to a coo l atm osphe re aftervvards.

Later on, Britain encouraged Turkey to lead the establishmentof the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Pact vvas reorganised in 1959, afterthe rev olution in Iraq and h er vviıhdravval from the pact, as the C entralTreaty Organisation (CENTO). Both Britain and Turkey agreed forthe continuation of the Pact u nde r the nevv framevvork.




Cyprus became the main issue between Britain and Turkey inthe second half of the 1950s. Finally, Britain, Greece and Turkey aswell as the Turkish and Greek Cypriots themselves reached aconsensus in 1959/60 on the basis of the Treaty of Guarantee and theCyprus Constitution of 1960.

The Straits

The British Government supported the Turkish proposition forthe revision of the regime of the Straits through the M ontreuxConvention in 1936. After Stalin's claims över the Turkish territoryand requests for the revision of the status of the Straits in 1945,Britain supported Turkey vvith the US against Russian advances. 7 3

The Nature of the Regime and Economic Issues

Kin g Edvvard's visit to İstanbu l in 1936 , had facilitated arapprochcm ent betvveen the tvvo sides. A nother factor, vvhich broughtabout a eloser relations betvveen Britain and Turkey vvas the creditarrangements signed in London in 1938. In the post-vvar vvorld, theRussian demands pushed Turkey into the Western camp in theeme rging Cold W ar conflict. This alignm cnt vvas sealed by heradmission to NATO togclhcr vvith Greece in 1952. Britain's relationsvvith Turkey thus became part of ihe multilateral strueture of thevvestern al lian ce .7 4

The British Ambassador Sir B. Burrovvs presented an accurateand full account of ali the important and dramatic dev elopments inTurkey during 1958, vvhich inllucnced Anglo-Turkish relations. In hisannual report to the Foreign Secretary he described the year asstart ing badly for Cy pr us . 7 5 Basically, the sides had different

proposals to solve the Cyprus problem. Britain's main aim vvas to

7 3 0 s m a n Okyar, "Turco-British Relations in The Inter-War Period: FethiOkyar's Mission to London" in Hale/Bağış, ibid., pp. 62-79.

74 W ill iam Hale, "Introduction: The Historical Background" in ibid., pp. 1-9.75FO -371/144739 , RK 1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara, 17

February 1959.




preserve the British bases and keep her influence över the CyprusGovernment. Turkey's proposal vvas partition (Taksim) o f the I slandbetvveen Turkish and Greek sides. There vvere many anti-Britishdemonstrations held in Turkey because of the Cyprus question.

In 1959, especially after the Londo n agreemen t con cem ingCyprus on February 19, Anglo-Turkish relations moved to a nevvphase. This good relationship reflected in the economic and culturalareas as vvell as in politics. The British Ambassador encouraged the

Foreign Office (FO) to inerease the scale of British institutions inTurkey, such as opening nevv British Council branehes, supportingTurkish universities and colleges vvith equipment and staff fromBritain. Moreover, he pointed out that, British credit and economicand military aid should be increased and British investment should beencouraged by the government . 7 6 Furthermore he argued, thatbecau se con ditions for trade and bu siness in Turkey vvere favourable,these activities vvould improve British influence in Turk ey, thusenabling Britain to deal vvith Turkey on diffıcult issues such asCyprus and the Middle East from a position of some strength.imp ortant too, he pointed out, vvere strategic facilities as the rights ofoverflying, vvhich the British enjoyed in 1959.

The Ambassador pointed out that even though Britishassistance to Turkey had been received vvith appreciation, it vvas smallvvhen com pared vvith that of the US and Germany. He emphasised thatBritain could, or should, compete vvith these countries in providingfınancial and econom ic assistance. But the assistance to the Turkisharmed forces vvas probably the most spec tacular evidence of vvhat theAm bassado r called British friendship. According to his vievv, theTurks evidently attached particular importance to the relationship innaval matters. For ali these reasons, he rccommended that Britainshould transfer a mine-layer ship to Turkey on the basis of a loanfrom NA TO , but he also raised the problem of hovv the Turk ishGov ernm ent vvould be able to meet the cost of £500.000 for the

necessary refıt.7 7

The attitude of the FO vvas different from that of theAm bassa dor's recom me ndation , as the follovving reply shovvs: "Wehave already do ne a good deal for Turkey in the past year, in

76FO -371/1530 30, RK 1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara, 26January 1960.

77FO -371/1447 80, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 11 April 1959.




particular by our contribution of £3.5 million to the O.E.E.C creditand since last August at any rate our relation with the Turks have beenclose and cordial and not in need of any artificial stim ulu s". 78

Th e po int of seeking to develop go od re lations, hovvever vvasaccepted. The Turkish Minister of Construction vvas invited to Britainby the British G overnment for a fevv days' visit. That invitation hadbeen strongly recommended by the Ambassador in Ankara, becauseof the Minister's close relations vvith Prime Minister M enderes and

because there had been no official visit from Turkey at ministeriallevel since 1956. The Ambassador mentioned that it vvould be a goodopp ortun ity to reaffırm good po litical relations betvveen the alliedcountries after the Cyprus confrontation. The minute vvritten by theassistant under-secretary Ross expressed agreement, "I entirely agreevvith Sir. B. Burrovvs' suggestion. It may annoy the Greeks but thatneed not deter us from inviting M. B er k" . 7 9 The British FO hadtraditionally tried to balance their relations vvith both Turkey andGreece espccially över Cyprus. Hovvever, on this occasion, it decidedin favour of Turkey, and the Minister of Construction paid his visit tothe UK betvveen March 30-April 4, 1959.

The relationship vvas emp hasised further by the visit of theBritish Defence Minister Duncan Sandys to Turkey from 19 to 25M a y 1 9 5 9 .8 0 He attended a military exercise in the east and south ofTurke y. T he v isit vvas successful for it shovved An glo-Turkish co-operation against the Soviets and against Iraq's nevv revolutionarygovernment.

Then, the Commander-in-Chief of the M iddle East A ir Force(located in Cyprus) of the UK paid a courtesy visit at'the beginning ofApril. Both the Ambassador in Ankara and the FO agreed that thevisit vvas valuable for strengthening British relations vvith the Tu rkishA i r F o r c e . 8 1 The British Foreign Secretary Selvvyn Lloyd savv theTurkish Ambassador M. N. Birgi on July 9,1959. They exchanged

vievvs on recent p olitical developm ents över the vvorld and the A nglo-

78FO-371 174778, FO to Ankara, 25 March 1959.79FO -371/14 475 3, The note vvrilten by A. D. M. Ross ,14 January 1959.80FO -371/14 4754 , Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 4 January 1959.81 FO-371/144785, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 10 February 1959 and FO to

Ankara, 24 February 1959.




Turkish relations especially concerning the Cyprus issue. TheSecretary told the Ambassador that they vvere worried about thediffıculties, vvhich the G reeks vvere making över the detailed workingout of the London agreements. At the London Conference, Averoffhad taken the line that the British must have what they needed. Birgireplied that it vvas in the nature of Greeks to haggle and that he did notthink that their recent manoeuvres should be taken too ser iou sly .8 2

Sir Winston Churchill visited Turkey on 5 August 1959; Prime

Minister Menderes and Foreign M inister Zorlu met him. According tothe British Ambassador, the visit vvas counted as a considerablesuccess from every point of vievv .8 3 There vvere a vvhole series ofBritish goodvvill missions sent to Turkey after the Lon don agreem entin 1959.

A crucial question for the British g overnment in 1959 vvasvvhether the Menderes administration vvould continue to providepolitical stability in Turkey. The reports from the Embassy, thoughproviding evidcnce of some intcrnal problems in Turkey in 1958 and1959, advised that the situation vvas unde r the control of thegovernment. Conscquenlly, the possibility of military action against

the government seemed to be very unlikely.

8 4

Their vievv changeddrama tically in April 1960. Burrovvs pointed out in his despateh datedApril 22, 1960 that there vvas a potcntially revolutionary situation. 8 5

He emphasised that the circumslances in vvhich he could foreseemilitary intervention designed to protect the Constitution in the eventthat Menderes decided to suspend the Constitution and carry ongoverning by decree. 8 6

The British FO vvas novv concerned about the internal securityof Turkey as the Foreign Secretary vvould be participating in the

82

FO-371/144752, RK 1051/5, FO (Selvveyn Lloyd) to Burrovvs, 13 June1959 (Record of Conversation).83FO-371/144793, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 8 August 1959.^FO -371 /144739 , RK 1010/1, Burrovvs to FO (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara, 17

February 1959.85 FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10, Burrovvs to (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara, 22

April 1960.86 FO-371/153032, RK 1015/8, The Note vvritten by G. M. Galbraith

(Southern Department), 20.4.1960.




NATO ministerial meeting in İstanbul in early May. They realisedthat certain senior offıcers were already showing discontent at thegovernment's measures against the opposition. In his telegram,Burrovvs considered, but appeared to discount the likelihood of earlyviolence. E. J. Barnes, the Assistant head of the Southern Department,minuted: "I am sure we can rcly on Burrows to warn us in time of anylikely threat to security".87

As can be seen, the B ritish diplomats vvere follovving Turk ish

internal and the foreign policy closcly. They had close relations vviththe government, but they vvere also trying to establish contact vvith theopposition party and its lcadcr İnönü.

6. The British Attitud e tovvards the C oup

The Am erican State Department told reporters on May 2 7,1 96 0that the overthrovv of the Men deres regime came as a com pletesurpr i se to Washing ton . 8 8 The US State Department vvas notsuffıciently informed by the American Am bassador in Ankara.Fletchcr Warren mentioned in his reports that Menderes vvas verystrong, the arm y sup ported him and the Chief of Gen eral Staff,General Erdelhun, obeyed the Prime Minister. According to MetinToker, a distinguished journalist and son-in-lavv to İnönü, the USAmbassador vvas nicknamcd "the tali idiot" among the intellectualcommunity in Ankara. He vvas almost tvvo metres tali and theydescribed him as an "idiot" because of his misleading information tohis government about Tur ke y. 8 9

On the other hand, the British FO vvas not as surprised by thecoup in Turkey as the US, since the British Embassy in Ankara vvassending information regularly concerning the internal situation inTurkey. In a long despateh in vvhich he detailed hovv the internalscene in Turkey had been characterised by periodic outbursts of

violence and bitterness vvith a quicter period in betvveen 1955 and

87 FO-371/153032, RK 1015/8, Note by E. J. Barnes (Southern Dept.),20.4.1960.

8 8 W e i k e r , The Turkish Revolution, p. 160.8 9 M et in Toker , Demokrasinin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları , inönü'nün Son

Başbakanlığı, 1961-1965, Ankara, Bilgi, 1992, p. 48.




1960, the British Am bassador also pointed out the mistakes made bythe Menderes administration in dealing with the opposition and inparticular the trend tovvards repressive action against the oppositionand the press. This trend of DP thinking has sometimes beenrationalised into the belief that Turkey is not suited to the forms ofdemocracy practised in the West and would loose its ownindividuality if it tried to adopt them. There is some reason to believethat the Prime Minister has been attracted by this philosophy, thoughhe had in the past been shy of taking the m easures needed to put it

into effec t.90

Although only in Ankara for six months, the Ambassador hadgained an accurate understanding of Turkish politics, vvhich vvasevidence of the good support he received from the Embassy Staff. Hepointed out the possibility of a potentially "revolutionary situation" amo nth earlier in one of his despatches . This vvas particularly evidentin his desp atch dated April 22, 1960, vvhich vvas prepared after theestablishment of the "Investigation Commission".

The Commission has already banned ali party political activities andmeetings in the country. Future developmcnts are uncertain. There is apotentially revolutionary situation. But İnönü and his party do not at

present seem to vvant to push matters to extremity. Indeed in hissecond speech in the M ejlis debate on A pril 18, he specifically arguedagainst any such tendency. The Government on their side may also beinhibited from going to extremes by a lack of internal unity, uncertainabout the army, and, for the immediate future, the prospect of a NatoMinislerial MeeLing in İstanbul at the beginning of the next mon th.91

The British FO spokesman in London had no comm ent to makeon aspects of the coup, vvhich vvas described as an internal affair forT u r k e y . 9 2 He said that no reports of any damage suffered by Britishsubjects or property during the coup. He added that there vvere about3500 people in Turkey vvho vvere either British subjects or British-protected persons.

90 FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10, Burrovvs to FO (Selvveyn Lloyd), Ankara,22 April 1960.

9 1Ib id .92The Times, 28 May 1960.




Burrovvs had close relations vvith the American Ambassador inAnkara. Fletcher savv General G ürsel just a day after the coup at aninformal level. The nevv Foreign Minister of Turkey, Selim Sarper,told Burrovvs that General Gürsel vvould also be glad to see otherAmbassadors if the B ritish side vvished, but he had not felt it right toinvite the British Am bassador formally. In the circum stances theAm bassador sought urgent instructions from the FO as to vvhether heshould see G eneral Gürsel in advance of the completion of therecognition the nevv government. The FO authorised this and agreed

vvith the vievv of the A mbassado r, concerning the impo rtance ofestablishing early contact vvith the nevv Turkish regime and the factthat the American Ambassador had already called on the General. Sothe British ambassador should seek a private intervievv vvith the latteras soon as practica ble.93

According to FO information about the US attitude tovvards thenevv Turkish administration, the US State Department regarded acommunication made to them on the previous day by the TurkishAm bassador in W ashington as sufficient evidence to justify them therecogn ition qf the nevv Turkish governm ent vvithout more ado.Accordingly, the US Ambassador in Ankara had received instructionsfrom Wa shington to resume the ordinary conduct of business vvith thenevv Turkish government on May 3 0 . 9 4

By this time, the British vvas very anxious to recognise the nevvTurkish government simultaneously vvith the US, and did not vvish toappear to be lagging behind. 9 5 The Canadian, Pakistani and IndianAmbassadors in Ankara vvere also keeping in close touch vvith theBritish Ambassador and did not anticipate any long delay on the partof their governments. Thus, the British governm ent recognised thenevv Turkish government on May 30:

Her M ajesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully share andreciprocate the vvish of the Turkish Government for the maintenance

of the relations of friendship and alliance vvhich so happily existbetvveen the tvvo countries.

93FO -371/1530 46, RK 1051/3, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 29 May 1960.94 FO -371 /153 046 ; RK 1051/2, FO to Washington, 29 May 1960 and FO-

371/153046, RK 1051/3(B), Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 29 May 1960.95FO -371/1 5304 6, RK 1051/3, FO to Ankara, 29 May 1960.




Her Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to theMinistry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its highestconsideraüon

96.

The C omm onw ealth countries vvere informed about thissituation through the Commonvvcalth Relations Office vvith a telegramdated May 30. As the British recognised the nevv government vvithoutprior consultation vvith their NATO and CENTO allies, the FO sentinstruetions to Burrovvs to po int out on a personal basis that they vvere

in a special position because of the Cyprus n egotiations. It vvasessential that they should be able to transact business on this subjectvvith minimum delay.

9 7

The FO then sent comprehensive instruet ions to theAm bassador in Ankara, conccming his meeting vvith General G ürsel.It vvas men tioned that Britain, of course , had no intention ofinterfering in Turk ish internal affairs and realised that it vvould bequite improper for her to do so. Ncvertheless, throughout the anxietiesof the Suez affair, the early days of the Baghdad Pact, the revolutionin Iraq and the Cyprus crises, Menderes, later supported by Zorlu,acted as a true friend, an ally and a vvorthy spokesm an of the Turkishnation in support of their alliance vvith B ritain. The British therefore

thou ght that at this time of political a dversity, th is vvould beremem bered in their favour and infiuence the nevv government in theirtreatment of Turkey's former leaders. They also mentioned that theydid not vvant this to be a formal demarehe but the indication of aproper interest in the fate of old fricnds and co lleagues, vvithout in theleast condoning their handling of Turkish internal affairs.

98

According to his despateh, the Ambassador expressed hisgovemment's attitude tovvards the nevv Turkish government, duringhis conversation vvith General Gürsel on May 31. He said that itvvould be quite vvrong for them to commcnt on the internal situation ofano ther co untry , but Turkey vvas a friend and ally, and they vvere

naturally sad vvhen she vvas in trouble. They liked to see Turkeyhealthy and strong. He then oullined the points of contact vvhich they

96FO-371/15 3046 , RK 1051/3, FO to Ankara, 30 May 1960.

97FO -371 /153 046 , RK 1051/2, C. R. O. to Commonvvealth Countries, 30May 1960.

98FO-371/15304 6, RK 1015/29, FO to Ankara, 29 May 1960.




had vvith Turkey: NATO, CENTO, Cyprus, cultural activities,contributions to Turkish economic development and their help överthe provision of equipment of the armed forces. These w ere ali areflection of the com mon oullook on vvorld prob lems, vvhich theyshared vvith Turkey." In another despatch, Burrovvs also pointed outthat he had, of cou rse, m ade the usual rem arks that it vvasinappropriate for him to comm ent on the internal situation ete. vvhenhe met vvith Foreign Minister Sarper on June 2 1 ,1 9 6 0 . 1 0 0

The Am bassador cmphasised that he had been particularly gladto knovv from the statem ents of the nevv government that her foreignpolicy vvas basically unehanged. General Gürsel mentioned, in hisappreciation, the many points of contact and common interests thatthey had and expressed the vvish that their relationship vvould grovvever more elose and that there should never be a cloud över it. At thesame time they spoke about the former politicians. The A mbassadorsaid that he necdcd assurance about their health and security. TheAmbassador had knovvn his Foreign Minister had personal interest inthe fate of the former ministers. General Gürsel said that it vvas verynatural that the British authorities should have these feelings ofhumanity tovvards people vvith vvhom they had had such elose

collaboration and that he fully appreciated their feelings on thesubject. He vvished to emphasise that he himself had no feelings ofpersonal hostility tovvards them. He said he had acted because of vvhathe savv as his duty, not because he vvanted to act against particularindividuals . 1 0 1 Later the British plea concerning the memb ers of theprevious government vvas rcpcaled to the Turkish side again throughthe Ambassador in a non-aggressive m an ne r. 1 0 2

Sarper vvas under-secretary of the Turkish Ministry of ForeignAffairs before he vvas appointed Foreign M inister by the military juntaon May 28, 1960. The British under-secretary of state, Sir F. H . Millersent a friendly me ssage to Sarper in vvhich he mentioned that it vvasnot for him to comment on the internal affairs of Turkey. He vvas,

hovvever, delighted that an old friend and trusted collea gue sh ould

"FO-371/153046, RK 1051/5(A), Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 30 May 1960.10 0FO-371/153035, RK 1015/40, Burrovvs to FO (A. D. M. Ross), Ankara,

21 June 1960.IOIfo-371/153046, RK 1051/5(A), Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 30 May 1960.102 FO _37i/ i53 03 5, FO (Ross) to Burrovvs, 29 June 1960.




occupy the post of Foreign Ministry in the nevv government. He alsomentioned that ever since they first met at the UN in 1951, he had hada high respect and feeling of vvarm friendship for him. He sent Sarperhis very sincere good vvishes looking forvvard to the same close co-operation vvith him as he had had vvith Sarper's predecessors. He lcftthe initiative to the Ambassador vvhen and on vvhat terms to deliverthat message. M iller also informed the Ambassador that if he felt thatthe nevv gove rnm ent vvas firmly in the sadd le, he vvould like his

mes sage to Sarper to be one of the earliest me ssages h e vvas tor e c e i v e .

1 0 3

The Am bassador m et Sarper for the first time as the TurkishForeign Minister on May 31. Sarper explained to Burrovvs that theprogram me and the orientation of the foreign policy of the nevvgovern men t and the general intentions of the military a uthorities,including General G ürsel. Finally, Sarper remarked that part of vvhathe said to the Amb assado r represented "the secrets of the nevvgovernment". The Ambassador then recommended to the FO not tohint at any proposal until it vvas made public in Turkey.

1 0 4

It can be observed from this despatch that the British vvished toavoid any appearance of intervening into Turkish domestic politics,and they called the coup as an internal affair of Turkey. Hovvever,they also reminded the military governm ent of their close relationsvvith the former governm ent mem bers. This vvas explained as theformer Prime Minister Menderes and Foreign M inister Zorlu hadclose relations vvith their British counterparts.

In June 1960, the FO sent an important message to Burrovvsconc erning Turk ey's internal and foreign relations. It shovvs that hecould not avoid being dravvn into conversation vvith Sarper, vvhichvvas indeed valuable to the B ritish, since the likely develop ment of theTurkish internal situation vvas naturally a matter of interest to them.

On the other hand, the Permanent Assistant Undersecretary of theState, A. D . M. R oss, vvrote that, "they could no t really expect them toabandon everything to the vvhim of the ballot box and it may not be abad thing for them and for Turkey's other allies". He also added thatTurkey should be ruled by a firm hand, determined to stop the rake's

10 3FO -371/153054 , RK 1051/4, FO to Ankara, 28 May 1960.

1040- 37 1/15 30 46 , RK 1051/8, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 31May 1960.




progress of recent expenditure, to check corruption in high places andgenerally to return to the spirit of A t a t ü r k .1 0 5

One can easily see that British policy makers were notparticularly interested in the Turkish democratic process. They reallyconcentrated on British interests in the political, economic andmilitary spheres. The impact of the coup on Turkey's foreign relationswas remarkably s m al l . 1 0 6 When the coup occurred, British politicianswere pleased about the lack of majö r change in Turkish foreign

policy. When they saw the first public annou ncemen t of the nevvgovernment reiterating Turkey's alliance vvith NATO and CENTO,and its allegiance to other existing international settlements, includingCyp rus, they realised that there vvere advantages for Britain especiallyin the case of C y p r u s . 1 0 7

During his meeting vvith Sarper on June 21, the BritishAmbassador especially vvanted to knovv the election date and vvhetherthe Democrats vvould participatc in the next election. He also vvishedto learn about the future of the members of the previous government.Sarper mentioned that the trial of the members of the previousgove rnm ent vvould be entirely im partial and free from political

pressure. The Ambassador did not believe his explanation andreported that "Sarper's remarks about the trials are even less probablycorrect than I thought at the time." He argucd that the provision aboutdeath sentences being carricd out by the NUC, for instance, seemed tomake it clear that the vvhole process vvould be completed vvhile theyvvere stili there. They had also heard from a source close to the N UCthat they intended to complete the trials before handing överpovver .1 0 8

1 0 5 F O (A.D.M Ross) to Burrovvs, 29 June 1960, FO-371/153035.10 6FO -37 1/1 60 21 2, RK 1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (The Earl of H ome),

Ankara, 6 January 1961.1 0 1 The Manchester Guardian, 28 May 1960.10 8FO-371/153035, RK 1015/40, Burrovvs to FO (Ross), Ankara, 21 June

1960.




7. The British Attitude tovvards the Trial and the Treatmentof the Fallen Regime

The trial of the former members of the DP government andMP s opened on October 14, 1960, four and half months after thecoup, on the island of Y assıada on the Sea of Marmara. The triallasted almost eleven months until September 15, 1961. Thedefendants included former President Celal Bayar, former PrimeMinister Adnan Menderes and former speaker of the Pa rliament Refik

Koraltan, the entire cabinet, ali DP dcputies, several former provincialgovem ors, the former Chief of General Staff, local officials and poliçeofficers involved in cascs of reslricling freedom of movement and theshooting at the universitics, and a number of businessmen involved incorruption cases. Most had been confincd to the Island from earlyJune 1960.

The pre-trial invesligations vvere carried out by a special HighInvestigation Comm ission of thirty-one members seleeted by themilitary regime. The trial vvas delayed for more than four monthsvvhile the Commission carried out its vvork. 1 0 9 There vvas a team ofprosecutors headed by Ö mer Altay Egesel and the tribunal of ninejudg es, seleeted by the NU C. There vvere 202 sessions of the trial,almost 150.000 speetators and 592 defendants during the eleven-month period. At the end of the sessions the verdicts vvere annou ncedby the judges on September 15, 1961. There vvere 15 death sentences,four of them acceptcd by unanimous vole and eleven by majority. 418defendan ts vvere jailed betvveen 6 months and 20 years, 123defendants vvere acquitted, and 5 defendants had their charge sd i s m i s s e d .1 1 0

According to the Constitution, the death penallies had to beconfirmcd by the NU C. It cannot be said that the trials vvere free frominterference by the aulhorities. The judg es and the prose cutors vveredirectly appointed by the governm ent that vvas formed by the m ilitary

Committee. The British Ambassador to Ankara pointed out that thereaso ns for ins tituting the trials vvere varied . M ost impo rtant vvas

1 0 9 Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, p. 27.1 1 0 Hikmet Özdcmir, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, İstanbul, İz, 1995, p. 228.




probably the wish to justify the coup. The am bassador com mented,"the Turks are legalistıc people". 1 1 1

This analysis vvas accurate because the lavv lecturers fromİstanbul U niversity, including the Rector, Profcssor Onar, advised theNUC to legalise the coup. When the coup occurred, the offıcersintended to hold nevv elections and then transfer the authority to thecivilian government in not more than three months. The academicsencouraged the coup leaders to try the former government ministers

and members of the DP before the nevv elections vvere held, pointingout that if they vvere not conviclcd and found guilty they vvould beentitled for re-eleetion and could then form the government again.The advice of the intellectuals to follovv a proper legal p rocessdelayed the outeome for almost eleven months. The offıcers seem tohave thought that the previous government members could be morespeedily disposed of as a result of a short trial. The length of the trialsvvithout verdict led to the postponem ent of the elections and thepostponement of the retum to civilian regime.

It can be argued that some of the intellectuals supported thecoup in Turkey dircctly and that their advice led to a simple couptuming in to a " revo lu t ion" . 1 1 2 The NUC abolished the existingconstitution and ordered the preparation of a nevv constitution b y acommission. As they realiscd that they vvere guilty according to theprevious constitution, they ehanged it and claimed that the army haddon e nothing other than fulfıl its patriotic duty acco rding to both theprevious and present Constitutions.1 1 3 Thus, they tried to legalised thecoup.

There vvas a contrast betvveen the military government's firstpublic announcement that "their movement vvas not for or against anyperson or elass" and the holding of the Yassıada Trials. The onlyaccused vvere from the former government party m embers and theirsupporters. This meant the coup vvas certainly against the DP. The

head of the military gov ernm ent, General G ürsel, hovvever,emph asised that there vvould not be any execution of former ministers.

11 1FO -37 1/1 60 21 2, RK 1011/1, Burrovvs to FO (The Earl of Home),Ankara, 6 January 1961.

112Birand/Dündar/Çaplı, Demirkıral, p. 215.1 1 3 Hikmet Özdeınir, Rejim ve Asker, İstanbul, Afa, 1989, pp. 217-219.




The British government, too, was concerned about the situationin Turkey. Soon after the beginning of the trial sessions, theAmbassador sent regular despatches about the trials and the possibleverdicts, especially those affecting the previous Prime M inister andthe other ministers. The Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper met theforeign representatives in Ankara on November 25 ,19 60 and advisedthem how best to handle the situation, taking Turkish susceptibilitiesinto account. R . F. G. Sarell, who vvas then the Head of Southern

Department in the British FO, summarised Sarper's advises to hisgovernment in a note; "To make no representations about deathsentences since these vvould only annoy and embarrass GeneralGürsel vvho had himself expressed strong oppo sition to anyexecutions". Reportedly, he had told Sarper that he had alreadydecided to resign if any death se ntences vvere carried out, adding thathe could go no furlher than this.

Sarper estimated that there vvas one in tvvo chance no deathsentences vvould be promulgated, and a 80/20 chance againstexecution in the event of promulga l ion .1 1 4

Burrovvs also reported on these developments, and on the samedocu me nt there vvas a minute vvritten by an offıcer in the FO : "Veryinteresting . I am sure vve should follovv Sarper's a dvice. Th e P rimeM inister might be interested to see this".

The FO then sent a despatch to the Prime Minister andemphasised that; "It seems as though things are going the vvay vvevvant at the mom ent. The fceling in the Dep artment is that vve mustcertainly follovv S arper 's a dv ic e" . 1 1 5 In November 1960, PrimeMinister Macmillan agreed to send a personal message to GeneralGürsel concerning the Yassıada Trial to be delivered by theAmbassador in Ankara.

The Ambassador vvas given the diseretion to make any changesand the initia tivc to decid e vvhen and hovv to deliver it to Gürs el. Inthe even t, Burrovvs vvaited for nine m onths before hand ing öv er the

11 4FO-371/153038, RK 1018/1/83, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 26 November1960.

11 5PR EM -11 /45 52, FO to Prime Minister, 30 November 1960.



2000] 1960 "REVOLUTıON" ıN TURKEY 181

message on August 4, 1961 as the trial was near to its end vvithunfavourable verdicts likely. The follovving were the m ain points inthe message:

This is a m atter of Turkish internal lavv and it is not for us to commenton the course of the trials or the verdicts. The Prime Minister vvouldonly like to dravv General Gürsel's attention to the effect vvhichexecutions are likely to have in the United Kingdom. We attach greatimportance to our friendship and alliance vvith Turkey. Menderes andhis colleagues vvere knovvn as suıunch upholders of Turkey's Westernconnection and NATO and CENTO. They played a large part in theCyprus settlement. The executions of these men vvould be regarded inthe United Kingdom as inconsistent vvith the high ideals of theWestern community to vvhich Turkey and the United K in gd om .116

He reported that the message had received vvide circulationamong the key military personncl. The FO commented optimisticallythat the message had crcated a considerablc im pr es sio n. 1 1 7

Burrovvs had been advised by the FO not to intervene earlierand vvait to the last possible mom ent to avoid the dan ger of doingmore harm than good by accu sations in Turkey of foreign

interference.

1 18

He vvas advised, according to the despateh, in anyevent to guard against this danger, and emphasise the vvould be effectof possible sentences of undue severity on Turkey's friends in theWestern vvorld. This position seemed to be in line vvith the generalopinion of foreign representatives at Ankara and vvith that of othergovernments, including the US vvith vvhom the British had been intouch. Burrovvs had been asked to keep in touch vvith his principalallied colleagues, and FO had suggested that the Iranian Ambassadorto Ankara should also keep in close touch vvith Burrovvs.119

Even before the aetual transm ission of the m essage fromMacm illan, the British governm ent expressed its feeling to theTurkish authoritics at every possible opportunity. In December 1960,Selvvyn Lloyd, previously the Foreign Secretary and novv the British

11 6FO-371/160214, RT 1016/49, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 3 March 1961.11 7FO -37 1/1 60 79 1, Minute by E. E. Tomkins from Central Department, 8

September 1961.118 FO -3 7i /i5 30 38 , RK 1016/18, FO to Tehran, 25 Novemberl960.11 9FO -37 1/1 530 38 , RK 1016/18, FO to Tehran, 15 November 1960.




Chancellor of the Excheq uer, met the Turkish Foreign MinisterSarper, during OECD meeting. Lloyd asked Sarper about the trial.Sarper said that the defendants vvere being given full facilities and afair trial. Lloyd also asked abo ut the result of the trials. Sarp erme ntioned that a povverful section vvithin the jun ta vvhich inelud edGeneral Gürsel, vvas against prom ulgation of any death penalty. Th eChancellor of Excheq uer said that he vvas rclieved to hear that, and hethought it vvould be a tragedy for Turkey if there vvere any executions.He also emphasised that those on trial had been good friends to theWest. Sarper said that he complclcly agrecd and thought that he couldreassure the British Minister that there vvould not be any deathsentences actually carried out.

1 2 0

While, the British Ambassador kept elose relations vvith themission of the allied countries in Ankara concerning possible deathsentenc es at the end of the trials, the FO also kept c ontact vvith theallied missions in London. The German Ambassador met thepermanent Under Secretary of State, Hoyar Miller, on Novem ber 7,1960. They agrecd that any prematüre intervention vvould be amistake and that any representations should be held up until the

mo men t vvhen they vvere likely to prove most effective. M iller tookthe opportunity of adding that the B ritish believed at one time that theGerman government had thought of linking this question vvith that oftheir economic relations vvith Turkey. He also thought that it vvould bea mistak e to link the tvvo matters, and that pressure of this kind on theTurks m ight be sclf-defealing. The G erman A mbassador said that heunderstood this and gave the impression that the German authoritieshad novv dropped the id c a .

1 2 1

Fletcher Warren, then American Ambassador to Ankara, toldBurrovvs that in the very early day s of the coup, he had told G ürselthat executions vvould have a bad effect on A merican o pinion andvvould thus make it more difficult for the US governm ent to obtainCongressional approval for aid to Turkey. Burrovvs mentioned that theGerm ans and the French m ight also try to influence the Turks in thismatter through the Common Market discussion. He pointed out thathe thought it vvas a great mistake to try to introduce this economicleverage on Ankara. In fact, he doubtcd if the American Ambassador

12 0FO -371/1530 36, RK 1015/71, FO to Ankara, 16 Decembcr 1960.

12 1FO-371/153037, RK. 1016/11, FO (Sarcll) to Burrovvs, 7 November 1960.




was wise to do so, adding, "The Turks are oriental enough to enjoystanding on their honour against sordid economic considerations. Anappeal to their prestige as a civilised nation is more likely tos u c c e e d " .1 2 2

The Turkish Government had earlier issued invitations to thehead of Foreign Missions to attend the trials. The FO sent a despatehto Ankara concerning this situation, which emphasised that theAm bassad or should co-ordinate friendly allied missions, in particular

with his US colleague;

Subject to such co-ordination, I should not consider it appropriate forYour Excellency to attend in person but I should see no objection,and, indced, some advantage if you vvere to be represented by amember of his siaff as an obscrvcr. Such altcndance vvould avoid anydiscourtesy to the present Turkish authoritics and vvould enable him toform an accurate assessment of the proceedings vvithout implying anyapproval of the trials or of their o uteo me .123

This message shovvs the dilemma of the British g overnm entvvho vvished to continue good relations vvith the existing Turkishgove rnm ent vvhilst avoiding app roval of the military coup and

approval of the kind of special tıial inslituted to arraign members of aprevious government. They calculatcd that the militarily controlledgov ernm ent vvould be likely to stay in povver for so me tim e. Fo rstrategic and economic rcasons, membership of CENTO and NATO,and in considcration of the Cyprus qu estion, they vvould continue todeal vvith the existing Turkish rulers. The policy is understandable ifBritish interests are considcred, but from the hum anitarian or moralpoint of vievv, the British government comprom ised. It neverthelessshould be noted that they tricd to stop the executions. In the samedesp ateh , the FO instructcd Burrovvs on hovv to react if deathscntences vvere passed.

Burrovvs mentioned that hc had rcccivcd a very strong hint fromthe Turkish Foreign Minister on March 3, 1961. Sarper emphasisedthat it vvould be most uscful if the Qucen said something pcrsonally to

12 2FO -37 1/1 53 03 7, RK 1018/1, Burrovvs to FO (Ross), A nkara, 21 October1960.

1 2 3 F O .3 7i /i5 30 37 , RK 1016/11, FO (For the Secretary of State) toBurrovvs, 10 October 1960.




Gürsel when they met in Ankara on March 6 about the bad impressionthat would be caused abroad if there vvere exe cutions resulting fromthe Y assıada trial of the former president, prime m inister, ete.Burrovvs said that he thought it vvould be m ost unusu al for HerMajesty to speak on a matter of this kind, but that he vvould send toMiller a personal message on this subject. Sarper underlined the vitalimportance to him that it should not be knovvn that he had made anysuch sugge s t ion . 1 2 4

Sarper vvas one of the prominent diplom ats during the DPgovernm ent. H e vvas appointed as foreign minister by the m ilitaryregime soon after the coup. He had vvide experience on intern ationalcomm unity and foreign relations. H e vvas personally against deathsentence s, and he vvas avvare of the neg ative effect on T urkey 'sreputation they vvould have in the international arena. He had alsoclose relations vvith Burrovvs and Miller. Thus Sarper might vvell havebelieved that it vvould be possible to vvork vvith the British to preventthis end.

During the stop of Her M ajesty's aireraft at Ankara airport onits vvay from Tehran to Lon don, the Q ueen had a short con versationvvith General Gürsel at the Airport lounge. His Royal Highness theDuke of Edinb urg, the Earl of Hom e and Selim S aıper vvere present.When they asked Gürsel about the political situation in Turkey, hementioned that his plans vvere moving in the right direetion. He alsosaid that:

There could be no intervention vvhile the due process of the lavv vvasbeing carried through. The lavvyers for the defence vvere good and thejudg es vvere the besi in Turkey. The matter must be left to theirconsciences. But the verdict vvas subject to revievv by himself and theNUC It vvould be then that he vvould have the opportunity to interveneon the side of clemency, should that be necessary and right. 1 2 5

He could not, of course, anticipate the result of the trial, butvvould say that his government had carried out a bloodless revolution,and bloodless they vvished to keep it. Prince Philip suggested that adecision to shovv clemency vvould certainly be vvelcomed by ali

124 FO-371/160214, CT 1016/49, Burrovvs to FO (H. Miller, personal),Ankara, 3 March 1961.

12 5FO -37 1/1 60 217 , RK 1052/2G, FO to Burrovvs, 7 M arch 1961.




Turkey 's many friends ov ers ea s. 1 2 6 This vvas the first official meetingthat had ever taken place betvveen a Turkish and British Head ofStates. King Edvvard VIII met Kemal Atatürk privately in İstanbul in1936, but certainly no British monarch had visited "Turkey's stiliaustere capital of Ankara". T he Queen vvas also the first foreign headof state to visit Turkey since the military coup d'âtat.

12 7

As mentioned earlier, the FO had sent a message to Burrovvsfrom Prime M inister Macm illan to General Gürsel in Nove mber 1960,

vvhich he vvas authorised to deliver at any time. He thought itapprop riate in support of representations abou t the undesirab ility ofe x e c u t i o n s . 1 2 8 On Au gust 4, 1961, on the last day of the trials,Burrovvs delivered the messag e of his Prime M inister to Sarper forGü rsel . The final verdicts vvere pronounc ed in the middle ofSeptember. The message vvas the second vvritten message that Sarperreceived from a head of state. The first vvas from the Ge rmanChancellor Adenauer. Sarper told the Ambassador that the Germanmes sage approached the matter from a slighüy different point of viewfrom the British, but he gave the imp ression that he regarded it aseffect ive and potent ial ly u se fu l . 1 2 9 During the meet ing Sarperexplained to Burrovvs the internal situation of the NUC and vvhat vvas

likely to happen. He pointed out that there vvas another grouporgan ised in the army vvhich describcd itself as the real repr esenta tiveof the army, knovvn as the Armed Forces Un ion (AFU ). Sa rpermention that they vvere likely to shadovv Committee and they vvantedsom e execu tions carried out. Sarper vvanted help from abroad toenc our age the me mb ers of the NU C, vvho vvere stili agains t thee x e c u t i o n s .1 3 0

On 15 September, the judges delivered their verdicts. Therevvere 15 death se ntences, four of them vvere accepted unan imou slyand the rest by m ajority vote. By a m ajority of fourteen to eight, theNU C confirmed the death sentences in those cases vvhere the Y assıadajudges had reached unanimous verdicts. The eleven, vvho vvere

12 6FO -37 1/1 60 21 7, RK 1052/2G, FO lo Burrovvs, 7 March 1961.1 2 7 The Times, 7 March 1961.12 8FO -37 1/1 60 21 4, RT 1016/49, Burrovvs to FO, Ankara, 3 March 1961.129FO -37 1/1 60 79 1, CT 1016/17, Burrovvs to FO (The Earl of Hom e),

Ankara, 5 August 1961.1 3 0 I b i d .




sentenced by m ajority vote of the judges, had a life prison sentenceconfirmed by the NU C. The four, who were sentenced to death byunan imo us vote vvere former-President Bayar, Prime M inisterMend eres, Foreign Minister Zorlu and Finance Minister Polatkan. AsBayar vvas 78 year of age at the time of his sentence, he escapedexecution because of his old age.

Death sentences vvere ali pronoun ced unde r article 146 of theTurkish penal co de, vvhich prescribed ca pital penalties for "those

attempting by force to change, replace or abrogate the Constitution ofthe Turkish Republic." The court held that this charge had beenproved in spite of conflicting cvidcncc by experts during the t ri al s. 1 3 1

The British FO sent a dcspatch vvhen they savv the reports ofdeath sentences and the statement that they vvould be carried outvvithin 24 hours. They instructed Burrovvs, if he thought it vvould haveany effect, to com mun icatc the me ssage. Burrovvs thereup onimmediately dclivercd the message to Gürsel:

Your Excellency vvill no doubt recall the vievvs about the state trials,vvhich I ventured to exprcss to you in my rccent letter. Thesearguments seem to me particularly apt at the present time having

regard to the interests of Anglo-Turkish friendship and of the vvesternAlliance as a vvholc. I trust Your Exccllcncy vvill appreciate the spiritin vvhich I send you this further message. -Harold Macmillan.13 2

The former British Prime M inister Sir Winston Churchill alsosent a similar message to G ür se l. 1 3 3

As soon as they hcard the verdicts of the trial, the US, British,German, French and Pakistani governments sent messages to Gürseladvising a postponement of the cxecution. Appeals for elemeneypoured into the NUC from İnönü, Türkcş, US President K en ne dy , 1 3 4

Queen Elizabcth, Adcnaucr, De Gaulle and Ayub Khan vvho offered

mTh e Times, 15 September 1961.132 FO -37 1/l 60 22 4, No:1921, FO to Burrovvs, 15 September 1961.1 3 3 I b i d .13 4Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Volume XVI, 1961-1963,

Washington 1994, p. 709.




asylum to Menderes and Bayar if they vvere to sent to exile. 1 3 5 Theyvvere ali ignored by the NUC. Her Majesty's Government's, and otherme ssage s vvere too late to affect the NUC.

There vvere several reasons for this. First, the foreign missio nsin Ankara delivered their messages to Sarper rather than directly toGürsel. Second, Gürsel had already lost his authority över the NUC.Third, the Chief of the General Staff Sunay already emphasised thatfailure to confırm the death sentences vvould create "discontent" in the

a r m y .1 3 6

Mo reover, the m essages, vvhich vvere from abroad, vvere notread by the NUC mem bers, but seemingly left on the table. Finally,the radical groups in the army vvere able to exert pressure över theNUC members. Although the generals in the Committee vvere againstthe executions, the junior members supported them.

Tvvo ministers, former-forcign minister Zorlu and formerfinance minister Polatkan vvere hanged on Septem ber 15, 1961 on theisland of Imralı. Menderes tried to commit suicide vvith sleeping pills.He vvas revived, but subsequently also hanged on September 17 in thesame place.

The British media condemned the executions as harsh. TheSunday Telegraph pointed out that the marathon trial, vvhichpurported to carry the same vveight as the Nuremberg tribunal, vvas apolitical slant, not an impartial legal pr oc es s. 1 3 7

It is important to ask the question vvhy there vvere not internalreactions in Turkey against the verdicts and the carrying out of theexecu tions. The re vvere tvvo important factors; first of ali, m artial lavvvvas in force and the strict security m easures vvere in place. A ban onali public discussion about the trial on pain of severe penalties hadbeen imposed by the military government. Any public demonstrationfor Me nderes, even of grief, vvas dangerous. T here vvas alsocensorsh ip of the m edia. On August 21, tvvo Turkish nevvspapers

appearcd vvith blank spaces on the front page, the result of last minutecensorship by the martial lavv authorilies. The nevvs concemed the tvvoparty leaders, O sman Bölükbaşı, the leader of the Nation Party and

13577î<? Daily Telegraph, 18 September 1961.1 3 6 H a l e , Turkish Politics, p. 144.^The Sunday Telegraph, 17 September 1961.




Ekrem Alican, the Leader of Nevv Turkey Party, statements of bothhad advocated openly that there should be no death sentences atY a s s ı a d a .1 3 8 The seco nd factor, m ore controv ersially, vvas related tothe character of the Turkish People. The British generally describedthe Turks as an "undemonstrative people". 1 3 9 This may be right, butat the time the Turkish public vvas not organised in such civilianinstitutions as labour or agricultural unions, media corporations orfully independent intellectual foundations such as universities andinstitutions of higher educ ation. Thus, the general silence in the

coun try did n ot reflect vvhat individ uals really felt.

8 . Concluding Remarks

What then can be concluded from the in-depth examination ofthe period before the coup, the coup itself and the British reaction?Th e Me nderes era vvas important and interesting for the improv emen tit introduced in multi-party dem ocracy. When the DP took över povveras a result of the eleetion in 1950, it marked a nevv phase in Turk ishdemocracy.

During the decade, more foreign econom ic and military aid andcredit from the West, particularly from the US, vvas delivered toTurk ey. They vvere used basically for the agrarian e conom y,technology and building roads. DP's economic policy vvas successftılin the first fıve years, but in the second fıve, foreign countriessuspended their credits and aid to Turkey because of the unplannedand uncoordinated economic policies of the DP government. T hedeterioration of the econom ic situation affected the political stabilityin the country. The opposition, the press, and the intellectualsinereased their criticism upon the government. The governmentresponded vvi th censorship and other measures . In thesecircumstances, a group of military officers planned a coup against thegovernment, seeing themselves as the guardians of the regime, a vievv

that emerged from the history of the Turkish m ilitary-state tradition.

During the Menderes era, both the US and the UK vveresatisfied vvith the foreign policy of the DP government generally, and

mThe Times, 22 August 1961.mTh e Times, 19 September 1961.




the policies it follovved in the Balkans and the M iddle Ea st. D uringthe establishment of the Balkan and Baghdad Pacts, Turkey played animp ortan t role. She also follovved a steady cou rse during thenegotiations över the Cyprus issue. Thus, Britain had close relationsvvith the DP governm ent since the DP's policies confirmed vvithBritish interests. The DP also practised a strong anti-Soviet policyduring the period, vvhich gained favour from Britain and the US.

After the coup, B ritish policy found itself in a dilemma. O n theone hand the democratic process had been broken by an anti-democratic intervention. Britain could not have supported the kind ofregime that emerged because of its comm itment to democracy. On theother hand, British economic, strategic and military interestspromp ted it to continue its relations vvith the nevv military re gime . Inthe event, it did not take the British government long to resolve thedilemma in consultation vvith the US. Thus, the British recognised thenevv Turkish regime just three days after the coup on May 30, 1960.

The m ilitary gov ernment established a special court for themem bers of the fallen regime. After the lengthy trials the verdictsvvere announced on September 15, 1961 and the military junta (NUC)confirmed four executions. Tvvo former ministers and Prime Ministervvere hanged on 15 and 17 September 1961 respectively on the Islandof İmralı.

The hea ds of foreign governm ents such as the US, Britain,Germany, France and Pakistan sent messages to Gürsel at the lastmoment to postpone the verdicts, but the NUC members ignored.Th eir m anoeuv res vvere too late to protect even the lives of theministers. It is also important to note that foreign gove rnm ents,especially the British, vvere extremely reluctant to appear to involvethem selves in Turkey's internal affairs. Although the BritishGovernment could have done more under the existing circumstances,

their perceived immediate national interests took precedence.

1960 "rev0luti0n" in turkey and the british policy towards turkey ci̇hat göktepe

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