The Opening Campaigns and the Battle of the Aoi Stena in the Second MacedonianWar

N. G. L. Hammond

The Journal of Roman Studies, Vol. 56, Parts 1 and 2. (1966), pp. 39-54.

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T H E OPENING CAMPAIGKS ,4ND T H E BATTLE O F T H E A 0 1 STENA I N T H E SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

By N. G. L. HXMMOND (Plates 11-IV)

In writing a book on Epirus which is in the press1 I omitted a full description of the battle of the Aoi Stena and of the campaigns in which it is set partly because it involves areas outside Epirus and partly because I had not space for such a description. My travels in Albania included the traversing of the higher ground just east of the Myzeqija plain (see Map 11) and the crossing by ferry of the three great rivers, the Genusus (Shkumbi), the Apsus (Semeni) and the Aous (Vijose), in late March and early April 1931. At that time these rivers were in spate, and the upper parts of the plain were full of sheep, enjoying the spring pastures before moving up to the summer pastures of the mountains. I went from Durazzo (Dyrrachium) up the Shkumbi valley to Elbasan, inspected some sites on the south side of the valley, walked through the low sink which separates the Shkumbi from the Devoli SSW. of Elbasan, and then visited Berat (Antipatrea). On other occasions I wallted through the hill country southwards of Berat to Byllis and to Han Qesarat (Map I) in the middle Vijose valley. In other years I explored the lower Vijose valley as far as Apollonia, wallted through the Roi Stena and traversed the Vijose valley from Kelcpre to Konitsa and the whole length of the Drin valley. The course of these and other travels I have made is shown on Map I. Acquaintance with this terrain has enabled me, I think, to present a new interpretation of parts of Philip's campaigns and of the battle of the Aoi Stena ; new in the sense that it is different from those of Kromayer and De Sanctis, who did not visit this area. The paper falls into the following parts : A, a geographical description ; B, the campaigns of zoo and 199 B.C. in as far as they concern this area ; C, the campaign of 198 B.G. An appendix, dealing with some topographical points, is added.

A I walked through the gorge known as the Aoi Stena from Kelcyre (in Greek Kleisura)

to Tepelene on 12th July, 1931. My speed was then not more than three miles an hour, as 1 had a stiff leg after being bitten by a sheep-dog. The following description is taken from my diary. Leaving Icelcyre at 7.55 a.m. I reached the fort of iZli Pasha (shown as F on Map I) on the north side of the gorge at 8.12 a.m., examined it carefully and failed to find the wail of ancient Greek masonry which was mentioned by W. IT. Leake2 and by T. S. Hughes" I expect the stones had been moved between 1805 and 1930. I dropped down the steep descent from the fort to the motor-road in 12 minutes. The entrance from Kelcyre into the gorge is narrow between steep hillsides, and the valley-bed continues to be narrow for a short time. Then it widens on the north side of the river and has a flat bottom which is up to 400 yards wide ; this wider part continues with varying degrees of width. At 10.5 a.m. I passed the place where two side-valleys come in, one from either side (see &lap I ) . During the stretch from Icelcyre to this point there are many springs and some large sources of m-ater flowing either out of the river bank or from points above the bank, mainly on the south side of the river, and one decrepit bridge over the Aous. After the entry of the two side-valleys the gorge narrows sharply and is pinched between a pair of sheer rock faces. The sides continue to be steep but less sheer and the bottom continues to be narrow. At I 1.00 a.m. I reached a ruined bridge and houses at the mouth of the gorge (the place is called Dragot). From that point the valley is wider. I walked from it to the river bank i~.~.:hichI reached at I 1.50 a.m. A roaring wind was coming up the Aous valley and deposited

' It is being published by the Oxford University (Oxford, 19 jg). References to Plutarch, Flamkzintis Press. The follou~ing abbreviations are used in this are to the Teubner edition (ed. 1,indskog-Ziegler). article. Hughes = Hughes, T. S., Traaels in Sicily, Place-names are spelt as on the maps cited in n. 4 Greece and Albania (London, 1820) ; Kromayer = and n. 6 ; the heights are also from these maps. J. Kromayer, Alztike Sclzlachtjelder in Griechenland T r a v e l s in ~ l ~ o r t h e r nGreece I, 32 and 38j f. rr (Berlin, 1907) ; De Sanctis = G. De Sanctis, (I,:ndon, 183 5). Storia dei Romani IV (Torino, 1923) ; Walbank, 11, 273. Both say the wall was near the founda- Pliilip = F. \V. Waibank, Philip V of Macedon tions of the principal entrance to the Turkish fort (qambridge, 1940) ;, Walbank, Polybizts = F. W . (this was itself a ruin in 1931). \batbank, A Hzstorzcal Conlnzentary on Polybizcs I

4 O N. G . L. HAMMOND

THE AOUS GORGE (a) I.OOKING WEST FROM THE FORT AT A1.I PASHA, (b ) LOOKING WEST FROM A LITTLE ABOVE DRAGOT.

Plrotogrnpks by N . G . L . Hnnrmotrd. Copyriglrt reserved

JRS vol. LVI (1966) PLATE I11

THE AOUS (a) IN THE NARROWS OF THE GORGE, (b) AT TEPELENE, LOOKING SE. UP THE DRIN VALLEY.

Photographs by N . G . L. Hammond. Copyright reserved

JRS vol. LVI (1966) PLATE IV

THE AOUS (a ) UNDER MT. NEMERCKE, (b) AT PERMET, LOOKING SOUTH.

Photographs by N . G. L. Hammond. Copyright reserved

41 THE BATTLE OF THE A01 STENA

dust clouds as I waited. The river was low in July (there was only a little snow still on Mt. Nemerqke) and in its wide bed of boulders the fast-running water did not look too deep. When some Albanians came up who knew the place of the ford, I joined them and we went over to enter TepelenE.

The gorge cuts through a wide limestone range of which the northern part is called Mt. Trebeshin (over 6,000 feet high) and the southern part Mt. Dhembel (over 4,000 feet high).4 I t resembles the gorge of the Kalamas near Filiates (the subject of a magnificent painting by Edward Lear) in that it was originally cut by a much greater river ; it differs in that its flanking mountains are much loftier. The Aous, falling steeply to the sea, runs fast until it enters the coastal plain near Apollonia, and its water is cold even in summer, because it comes from melting snows and from mountain springs. Inside the gorge the river runs mainly on the southern side in a bed of conglomerate. This bed is not very wide, the surface of the river in summer is some 15 or 20 feet below the top of the banks, and the water flows deep and fast. Once the bed had been cut, it is unlikely that the river left it, except where strong side-rivers enter the bed ; and I take it that the bed was cut in the conglomerate rock aeons before the Battle of the Aoi Stena. The river is bridged relatively easily inside the gorge. But on issuing from the gorge it enters a belt of shale and other flysch formations, and its waters run in a wide and shifting bed strewn with boulders. Here fording is sometimes possible because the bed is so wide, but bridging is extremely difficult. Some idea of the terrain may be gained from Map IV and from my photographs which are shown here. Plate IIa is taken from the fort of Ali Pasha (see Map I) near Kelcyre, looking westwards down the gorge. Plate I Ib shows the view westwards as one approaches the west end of the gorge, that is shortly before Dragot (see Map IV). Plate IIIa shows a narrow part of the gorge to the west of the point where the side-valleys enter. The modern motor road can be seen in some of these photographs, running north of the river. The route through the gorge must always have taken this general course ; but the detritus deposited by the side-rivers may have choked the bed of the river and affected its course half-way through the gorge. There are two good photographs in Walbank, Philip,facing p. 148 ; these show the view looking north towards Tepelene and the view looking towards Dragot from the north-west.

Kelcyre lies at the lowest point of a long depression which forms a natural route (see Map I). S. S. Clarke, whose diaries I used,5 travelled along both parts of this depression. He left Berat on I ~ t hJuly, 1922 at 9.5 a.m. and rode cross-country (not via Glava, = Gllave on the British version of the Greek Staff Map) until he entered the valley of the river Deshnice. His diary reads as follows, with my additions in brackets. ' Dep. Berat 9. 5. w. 2 horses for Greka (Kleisoura), taking track across country and not route through Glava (= Gllave, Ez, 3548).6 9.35 cross river of Berat. 10.35-10.50 halt. 11.50 halt at the ruined Han Gema, dep. 12.00. Saddle falls off, later horse falls but does not drag me far. Passing ruins of Bubes (Ez, 4642) 2.00 p.m. 2.20-2.30 halt. 5.5 alleged tombs at Magasi Barlaban (E2, 5039). 6.15 descend into plain but from w. side, reach metalled road ; 6.30 halt at Han Subazi, dep. 6.50 and drop along the 3rd class metalled road to Kelcyre 9.5.' Thus the time spent in actual riding was 19% hours from Berat to Kelcyre. On the following day he walked from Kelcyre up the valley of the Aous. He took 3 i hours to Permet in ' almost unbearable heat ', and 7+hours from Permet to Mertzani bridge, which is on the Sarandaporos river just above its junction with the Aous river.s The countryside is very desolate between Permet and Mertzani. I travelled along this route in the other direction. Plate IVa shows the Aous in July, flowing along the steep flanks of Mt. Nemer~ke, which is the continuation southwards of Mt. Dhembel. Plate IVb shows the Aous at Permet ; one is looking south. The country eastwards is poor scrubby land, very thinly populated and difficult to traverse. I t was the chief hide-out of the Albanian resistance movement in the war.

Tepelene lies in the long valley which is parallel to the valley of Kelcyre. This valley

The best geological map is that of E. Nowack T h e reference is to the War Office Map (I : zoo,ooo), based on observations in 1922-1924. (I : ~oo,ooo), 1944, based on the Greek Staff Map.

Lent to me by the British School of Archaeology Hughes 11, 272 took some 14 hours by a devious at Athens. Clarke travelled in Epirus in 1922 and route from Berat to Kelcyre and 14 hours from 1923 and was drowned in an accident in the Gulf of Kelcyre to Mertzani. Corinth.

42 N. G. L. HAMMOND

also carries a natural route. The main route northwards from Tepelene follows the Aous valley towards Apollonia ; in antiquity it probably kept close to the river bank, and at the outset the right bank as far as opposite Memaliaj. Another route leads from Memaliaj to Berat. I traversed this route on 9th August, 1933. Leaving Berat by car on the evening of the Sth, I stayed the night at a Han near Lamanj ; the road followed a ridge separating two deep valleys. Leaving the Han on foot at 3.50 a.m. I reached at 5.20 a.m. the highest point of the limestone ridge which, being a continuation of Mt. Trebeshin, forms the water- shed. I dropped then to Gllave, near the sources of the river Luftinje, crossed to Rabije and walked west of the river valley through Izvor, Kamcisht and TOGto Han Qesarat (see Map 111). The walking time from the Han near Lamanj to Qesarat was just over eight hours. Next morning I walked in two hours and forty minutes to Memaliaj, and from there in one and a half hours to the river by Tepelene. My route was not the direct one, as I was visiting sites of archaeological interest, but it shows that the journey on foot direct from Rerat to Tepelene takes about fifteen hours,8 probably rather more than from Berat to Kelcyre. From Tepelene I walked on up the Drin valley. The view is shown in Plate I I Ib ; it was taken from just north of Tepelene. One is looking over the wider bed of the Aous, which then turns off to the left into the Aoi Stena, and straight ahead one sees the entry info the Drin valley with the mountains of the Kurvelesh on one's right, i.e. to the west. Leaving Tepelene on August 10th at 1.45 p.m., I walked in two hours to Lekel village square. A fortified site just south of the village is situated on a ridge sloping down to the river, which runs here in a deep bed, within a narrow valley of its own creation. The site blocks the entry. The circumference of the walls and cliffs is some 1,700 paces, and it is the site of a substantial town.g From the upper part of it one sees up the Drin valley, which carries the best route from central Albania into Greek Epirus.

B The Roman campaign against Philip V was mounted in autumn zoo B.c., when the

consul Sulpicius encamped with two legions by the river Apsus (now Semeni). As the low- lying plain of Myzeqija is often flooded by this great river and is marshy even in the summer, the Roman camp must have been on the foothills near KUG (see Map I).1° From here he sent forward Apustius to ravage the frontier areas of Macedonia (Livy 31, 27). After capturing three forts he came to Antipatrea, ' in faucibus angustis sitam urbem '. This description is particularly appropriate to Rerat, which is built on the steep hills on both sides of the narrow gorge of the river Osum, a southern tributary of the Semeni, and the identification of Antipatrea with Berat is generally accepted.ll Apustius tried to win the city over by negotiation, but on the refusal of the leading men he took it by storm. ,411 adults were massacred, the city was sacked and burnt, and the walls were dismantled. There are today the remains of two Turkish forts, one on each side of the river, and 1 visited the northern one, where a few pieces of the Macedonian foundation courses and of the lower courses above it are in their original position, for instance by the so-called gate of Comnenos and on the East side. The masonry is limestone, rough-faced, in ashlar style, and of large and medium-sized blocks. Thc fact that so little of the masonry is in situ shows that the wall had been dismantled. An Albanian archaeologist has recently reported traces of fire in the remains.12 The forts which Apustius captured first were probably to the west of Berat on the limestone range Maja e Shpiragrit, which reaches a high point of 1,197 m.13 The boundary of the Roman protectorate, therefore, lay in the western foothills of this range ;

H u g h e s 11, 254. reckoned it at 12 hours r iding, *S t r ld ia Albanica I (1964) , 184, T i rana : t h e b u t i t is n o t clear tha t h e is giving his o w n t i m e . masonry is illustrated there i n Plates 11, 2 and 3 I walked f r o m Byllis t o Berat i n 6 : hours ; i t is and 111, 2 o n pp. 191 ff. A c o p y o f t h i s n e w easier going ; see n. 13 below. Albanian periodical was k i n d l y sent t o l n e b y t h e

It is described i n detail i n l n y book o n Epirus. Albanian scholar, Professor Frano Prendi. L i v y loC. Praschniker i n Jahrb. d. :st. arch. Inst. 3 1 , 27 men t ions t h e s trength o f t h e walls. T h e

Wien XXI-XXII (1922-z4), Beiblatt, I 8.held tha t strong site o f t h e for t i s s h o w n b y t h e sketch i n t h e plain was e v e n m o r e s w a m p y i n ancient tirnes Hughes 11, 255. t h a n today ; because o f t h i s t h e V i a Egnatia followed l3T h e best crossing o f t h i s range is just sou th o f t h e foothills at t h e inland side o f t h e plain. t h e h igh point. I wallred i n 1931 f r o m Byllis i n t h e

l1 S o Leake, Trazels in Northern Greece I , 360 f. ; A o u s valley via H a n Ballsh and M e t o h t o Berat i n III, 325 f. and 485 f. ; Hughes 11, 383 ; C. Patsch, 6 8 hours (walking t i m e ) t h r o u g h wooded challry foot- Snndchak von Berat (V ienna , 1904) ; Kromayer hills ; t h i s area contained Chris t ian villages, whereas p. 10, n. 4. those t o wes t and n o r t h were all M o h a m m e d a n .

THE BATTLE OF TIlE A 0 1 STENA 43

for the Romans needed this higher ground to maintain communications between Apollonia and Dyrrachium, since the low-lying plain of Myzeqija is subject to floods. The capture of Antipatrea resulted in the capitulation of Codrion, ' satis validum et munitum oppidum '. Codrion is probably at Rrmait.14 Here Apustius placed a Roman garrison. He then captured Cnidus (an unidentified place) and returned to the consul's camp.

This o~erat ion bv A~ust ius showed the intention of the consul. If he had wished to i I

hold Antipatrea as a strong place against the Macedonians, he could well have done so ; but its total destruction meant that he planned to clear a bridgehead for operations inland of Antipatrea. The garrison at Codrion was his advanced point of contact with the NIacedonian forces. His choice of a camp on the Apsus (Semeni) instead of on the Genusus (Shkumbi) or the Aous (Vijose) shows that he wished to clear this bridgehead.15

In the campaign of 199 B.C. (see Map 11) Philip was concerned to prevent the Romans from joining forces with the Dardanians, and he therefore occupied the passes from Pelagonia to Lyncus (Livy 31, 28, j and 31, 33, 3), that is in the upper valley of the r i ~ e r Erigon.16 Philip's main army was evidently in Lyncus ; for he had to hold a position between Pelagonia and anv Roman advance. His aim was ~robablv to block the Romans' easiest entrv into ~ a c e d i n i a , namely that from the head o'f the inu us us valley to the northern end of" Lake Lychnitis (now Ochrid) and so into Lyncus ; this route is that used later by the famous Via E~natia . The consul had several choices if he started from Berat. He could take the " very easy route due north from Berat through the low sink which leads into the Shkumbi (Genusus) valley (see p. 39) and he would then follow that valley, taking the Via Egnatia route which runs north of Lake Lychnitis. There were, however, two difficulties on this route. He had to cross two great rivers which are in spate in the spring and early summer, the Apsus and the Genusus, and he had also to ensure his lines of supply over these two rivers.I7 He could take a less easy and more hilly route through the district called Gramsh to the southern end of Lake Lychnitis ; this route had the great advantage that it did not involve the crossing of any large river.lS He could go across country to Koritsa and enter Orestis through the Tsangon Pass (see Map I ) ; here too he avoided large rivers. In fact he chose the middle course. Marching through Dassaretis via Codrion which his garrison was holding, he pitched camp 'near Lyncus by the river Bevus' (' ad Lyncum stativa posuit prope flumen Bevum ', Livy 31, 33, 6). Up to this point he had not made contact with the forces of Philip. I t was only a few days later that some of their cavalry forces when roaming through the hilly country of Dassaretis met and engaged one another.lg The operations

l3 T h e only fortified site so far known i n the area Lake Ochrid t o Grabove-e-Krishteree ; the sector inland o f Berat is at Kalaja Rrmait t o the north o f f rom this Grabove t o Sqimar o n the river Tomorrice M t . T o m o r (Riz'. d. AID. 3, 157) i n Gramsh just cuts the tracks eastwards f rom Berat t o Strelcg and N E . o f Mirake (Bz~letini Universitetit Shtetbvol. tb t o Voskopoj. From Sqimar the line ran south Tiuanbs, seria Shkencat Shoqe~ore, 1963, 4, 3 ff., between M t . T o m o r and M t . Zaloshnye t o Fratar, where the name is given as Kalaja e Irmajt). T h e just east o f Kelcyre. See A. Papagos, The Battle of strong walls o f ashlar masonry (Btcletin, figs. 3-7) Greece, 1940-1941, 290 (Athens , 1949). T h e pro- are i n the same style as the foundations at Berat. posed Greek of fensive ( p p . 339 ff.) shows the As the Illyrians did not build walled sites, these importance o f Berat. walls are due t o Epirus or Macedonia. It is probably l 9 I f the Romans advanced u p the Genusus valley t o b e identified wi th Codrion. It lies north-east o f t o the northern end o f Lake Lychnitis as Icromayer Berat in the direction o f Lake Ochrid. and Walbank suppose, one cannot see h o w Philip

l 3 Kromayer 10 considers the campaign b y failed t o make contact ; for this entry mus t have Apustius t o have been a ' Streifzug '. H e does not been an expected one, and it is also a narrow one. appreciate the significance o f his actions at Antipatrea Nor is Dassaretis likely t o have extended north o f and Codrion. the Lake. Polybius described the route o f the V i a

l w r o m a y e r 1 1 and Walbank, Philip 142, put Egnatia with some detail. T h e description survives these passes i n the valley o f the Vardar (Ax ius) ; i n Strabo ( C 323, c f . C 327), b u t n o mention is b u t I doubt i f Lpncus extended so far east. made o f Dassaretis or o f the river Bevus or o f the

l7 1 walked f rom Elbasan o n the Genusus t o town i n Macedonia called Beve (S teph . Byz., B~irq, Shtermen (see Map 11) i n the sink north o f the n6A15 Ma~ESovia5 ~ a l ~b ~ O V I K ~ Vnpo5 ah0 BE SO^ n o ~ a p 6 ~ . bend i n the Apsus river, and o n the way I saw B~uaios). T h e river and the t o w n are likely t o have the piers o f the ancient bridge whicb has been lain south o f Lake Lychnitis. Lyncus is o f course described b y Praschnicker and Schober, {rchiiolog. t h e name o f the canton occupied b y the Lyncestae ; Forschungen i n Albanien u . Montenegro , Schvift. Sulpicius camped near t h e frontier o f Lyncus and d. Balkankommission VIII (1919) , 59 f . Its position foraged i n Dassaretis. Kromayer, 16 f., seeing the shows that the route through this sink was a main difficulty o f Philip failing t o find Sulpicius, argued route, probably i n the t ime o f Pyrrhus rather than that Philip was still at Pella w h e n Sulpicius was i n that o f the Roman occupation. already i n Lyncus i n the plain o f Monastir ; b u t ,

l 8 T h e Greek position i n the winter o f 1940-1941 i f so, it is even more odd that his cavalry could not defended this route against the Italians. T h e Greek find Sulpicius in that plain. line ran f rom Pogradec o n the southern shore o f

44 N. G. L. HAMMOND

D A R D A N I A

FIG 3 . MAP I1 : ILLYRIS, EPIRUS AND WESTERN MACEDONIA

Drazvn by Helen Wazrgh from sketch-map by the author

45 THE BATTLE OF THE A01 STENA

which followed were abortive. Sulpicius tried to bring Philip to a pitched battle or to join hands with the Dardanians. He ran short of supplies and so he marched, ravaging through Eordaea, Elimiotis and Orestis, where despite its strong position Celetrum (Kastoria) surrendered. From there he returned into Dassaretis. He captured Pelium by storm (probably near Koritsa), but he treated the people with unusual generosity, and placed a strong garrison in the town as a convenient base for making attacks into Macedonia (Livy 31, 40, 5 , ' nam et sita opportune urbs erat ad impetus in i\/lacedoniam faciendos '). H e then brought his army ' in loca pacata ad Apolloniam, unde orsus bellum erat '. The march from Celetrum was probably on the third of the alternative routes which I mentioned above, so that he emerged at Berat ' in loca pacata ' and went on to A p ~ l l o n i a . ~ ~

The placing of a strong garrison at Pelium suggests that Sulpicius intended to attack Macedonia from that advanced base in 198 B.C. -4pro-Roman party in Orestis, which brought its people over to Rome before the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 B.c., may have approached Sulpicius in 199 B.C. and the operations in Orestis and in Elimiotis in 199 B.C. may have led Sulpicius to suppose that, if he invaded from Pelium and reached Elimiotis, he could make contact through the pass by Dheskati with his allies the Athamanians and the -4etolians who had overrun Perrhaebia in northern Thessaly for a time in 199 B.C. (Livy 31, 41, One threat to such a line of advance might be offered by the Epirote League which lay to his south and was an ally of Philip ; but in 199 B.C. the Roman army had not entered Epirote territory, and the Epirotes had not taken any action. The Roman fleet returned from the Aegean late in 199 B.C. and spent the winter at Corcyra (Livy 31, 47, 2) ; its presence was a threat to the coast of Epirus, and it would be able to help in supplying the Roman army, if an offensive was to be launched in the spring from the area of Apollonia against Macedonia. During the winter Sulpicius was relieved by the new consul Villius, whose first task was to deal with a mutiny in the Roman army. 'CTillius inherited a disposition of the Roman forces which was adapted to an advance along the line of Antipatrea and Pelium and to an invasion of Orestis in Southwestern Macedonia. Whatever his own intentions may have been, he was forestalled by Philip who seized the initiative.

C Philip was aware of disaffection in Macedonia (Livy 32, 5, 3). If Villius invaded Orestis

with a well supplied army, if the Iilyrians and the Dardanians attacked from the north, and if the Aetoiians and the Athamanians attacked from the south, his chances of survival were small. He therefore took the bold step of placing himself on the flank of the probable Roman line of advance (see Map I). At the beginning of spring 198 B.C. he sent his general Athenagoras ahead with a force of mercenaries and light-armed Macedonians ' into Chaonia through Epirus to occupy the narrows at Antigonea ' (Livy 32, 5 , 9, ' in Chaoniam per Epirum ad occupandas quae ad Antigoneam fauces sunt '). These narrows (' Stena vocant Graeci ', as Livy remarks) are those of the Drin valley at Lekel. If he held these narrows, he would block the entry of the Roman army from the north into Epirus. But, at the same time, the Aoi Stena would be available for a Roman force to occupy ; and if the Romans occupied the Aoi Stena, he would no longer threaten the probable line of advance of the main Roman army through Pelium into Macedonia. Therefore, when he arrived with his main army a few days after Athenagoras, he abandoned the narrows of the Drin at Lekel and took up a new position inside the Aoi Stena. This position had much superior advantages. From it he was able to threaten any Iioman advance from Antipatrea (Berat) to Pelium (near Koritsa) ; for he could reach Berat either from Kelcyre in one day along the route followed by Clarke or in a day and a bit from Tepelene along the route of the Luftinje valley and at Berat he would cut the Roman lines of supply completely. R4oreover his army at the Aoi Stena was immediately on the flank of the Roman army if it tried to go through the narrows of the Drin by Antigonea ; and he could again cut its lines of supply from Apollonia if it did succeed in entering the Drin valley. Finally the position in the Aoi Stena was much

2 0 Thus he did not enter Epirus, as he would The famous march of Alexander from PeIium have done if he had gone via Leskoviq. Leake to Pelinna (near Tricca) in Thessaly (Arrian, Anab. followed this route in September 1805 ; see n. 24 I , 7, 5) followed such a route. below.

stronger in itself and in depth, and his own lines of supply through Parauaea were clear. Philip must have seen all these advantages before he left Macedonia. The first position may have been adopted to encourage his supporters and discourage his opponents in Epirus ; for there was a pro-Roman party in the Epirote League as well as in Orestis.

As a strong Roman garrison held Pelium, it is unlikely that Philip came over the Tsangon Pass which descends into the plain of Koritsa. Moreover his appearance at the Aoi Stena seems to have surmised the Roman command. The onlv other route oDen to him. especially at this time of the year when snow is deep on high ground, was that which crosses the watershed between Grammos and Pindus. When I walked over this route in July I93j, I was told there that the villages along it are occupied throughout the year and that the route is usually open all winter. It took me 204 hours of walking time from Konitsa to Kastoria. The pass over the watershed has been called ' the Fourlza pass ', but the better pass is in fact to the north of Fourlza above Kotili. In talzing this route Philip no doubt resumed control of Celetrum (Kastoria). He descended into Eoirus when he came down the Sarandaporos valley to ~ e i t z a n i , a i d he then entered the & b u s valley. He was now in Parauaea, a canton of Epirus, and he followed the valley until he entered Chaonia. Thus his armv came ' in Chaoniam Der Eoirum '.

Th; action of Philip has deen iAterpreted in various ways. Kromayer assumes that the Roman losses in 199 B.C. had been so heavy that the Romans were convinced of the im~ossibilitv of launching an attack on Macedonia from the w e ~ t . ~ T h i s is not consistent

'3

with Liuy's account, which records the death of a mere thirty-five Roman troopers in one skirmish, the killing of some foreigners in another, and the easy winning of the pass into Eordaea (Livy 31, 33, 10 ; 31, 36, 9 ; 31, 40, I).

What brought the Romans back from Macedonia was not loss of men but lack of supplies, as is clear not only from Livy who insists on the matter of supplies (31, 33, 4 and 6 ; 31, 36, 5-7 ; 31, 38, I ; 31, 39, 3-4) but also from Plut., Flafn. 4, TOG 0ihi.rr.rrou c p u y o ~ a ~ o i i v ~ o ~dt-rropfioq oi-riwv. Moreover Kromayer entirely disregards the Roman action in placing a strong garrison in Pelium, which he identifies with Koritsa ; for if the Romans had decided against advancing from Apollonia in that direction, this garrison would have been isolated and in jeopardy. Kromayer also believes that, if the Romans had dis- regarded Philip and proceeded at once to invade Macedonia, Philip would have been able to get ahead of them and bar their march on Pella.23 This is not so. The distances are relatively short. If the Roman army left Berat when Philip was at Tepelene (where Kromayer puts him), the news would not reach Philip for some 15 hours. Even if he started at once, he would find the Roman army either in possession of the Tsangon Pass, leading from Pelium (near Koritsa) to Florina2" or in control of the area north or south of Lake Lvchnitis

\ I

(Ochrid), if one or other of these routes was chosen. De Sanctis follows Kromayer's views in general, but he adds that, if the Roman army entered Macedonia some days before Philip's army got back, the loss would not be great (' il danno non era grave '). This is most doubtful ; for the Roman armv was likelv to ioin forces either with their Illvrian and Dardanian allies

J d

if they turned north-achieving the object which had eluded them in 199 B.c.-or with their Athamanian and Aetolian allies if they turned south. De Sanctis suggests too that if the Romans invaded Macedonia, the Macedonian army could capture the Roman bases in Illyria ; but the winning of the Roman bases ~vould not compensate Philip for the loss of

mTalbank takes a different view." He supposes that Philip expected the Roman army to march through Epirus into Thessaly and that he therefore occupied the Aoi Stena in order to block the route. He bases his theory partly on the erroneous belief, shared by Icromayer

2 2 Kromayer 35, ' die Verluste der Rorner in 24 Leake travelled in the reverse direction, from Obermakedonien waren so bedeutend gewesen, die Koritsa to Berat, in 288 hours in wet weather in uberzeugung, hier nicht zum Ziele ltornmen zu September (I, 343 f.) ; Philip therefore would not konnen, muss bei den Romern so allgemein gewesen have been able to overhaul a Roman army which sein, etc.' had at least 15 hours start.

23 Kromayer 37 ' Wenn alle Berechnungen trogen 2 5 De Sanctis 59. und die Romer sich doch direkt gegen Makedonien 26 Philip 148 f. ; Holleaux, CAH VIII, 168, has in Marsch setzen, . . . sich ihnen vorzuschieben much the same view. und . . . dem Gegner den Marsch auf Pella zu verlegen.'

THE BATTLE OF THE A 0 1 STENA 47

and by De Sanctis, that ' there is a way (from Illyria into Macedonia) along the valley of the Viossa (Aous), which runs from Apollonia south-east to Metsovo (see Map 11), and forms the main route from Albania into Thessaly '. This is not so ; for the Aous enters an impassable gorge at Konitsa, and its tributary, the Voidhomati, enters another in~passable gorge at Artsista (see Alap I) ; these gorges are turned by a long detour through wooded mountainous country to the north-east of K o n i t ~ a . ~ ~ ' The main route from Albania into Thessaly ' is along the Drin valley to the plain of 1VIolossis near Dodona and thence over the Zygos pass into Thessaly (see Map 11). In order to block that route Philip would have occupied the narrows of the Drin valley by Antigonea and not the Aoi Stena. The other part of Walbanli's theory is that Philip anticipated Villius' intention to march through Epirus. There are two assumptions in this view. The first is that Philip's anticipation was based on the idea that Villius would make no use of the open line of advance from Berat and of the strong Roman garrison at Pelium ; but it is difficult to see what justified such an idea. The second is that Villius did intend to march into Epirus ; but there is no evidence that Villius had made any diplomatic approach to the Epirote League.

As I see it, Philip moved first and occupied the Aoi Stena in order to deflect Villius from the invasion of Macedonia via Pelium. He calculated that in the light of Sulpicius' sufferings from shortage of supplies Villius would not venture to expose his own lines of supply to the Alacedonian army on his flank. This calculation proved to be correct. I t had the advantages that it drew Villius into an area where he could not obtain the help of his allies, and that it gave Philip a chance of protracting the war without the hazard of a pitched battle. His strategy throughout these years was designed to wear down Rome's will and obtain a reasonable peace.

The topography of the area round Tepelene has been much mistlnderstood. This misunderstanding has been due in part to the fact that Kromayer and De Sanctis, who \\-rote most about the battle, never visited the place. One mistaken idea has been that illntigonea was at Tepelene itself (see Map I). There are, however, no remains of ancient malls at Tepelene, and the site is too weak for the emplacement of a fortified Greek city (see Plate 1IIb). IIralbank, who visited Tepelene but did not go through the gorge to KelcyrE, realized that the slight narrowing of the valley 28 beneath the hill of Tepelene 'cannot be -rh Trap' 'Av-r ly6v~lavB T E V ~'. I-Ie therefore put these Stena in the entrance of the gorge ' a mile and a half higher up ', i.e. near Dragot (see Map 111). But Scerdilai'd;~~ whose march I shall mention in a moment is not likely to have gone through the pass of ICelcyrE. More-over, if Walbank's view is taken, no distinction can be drawn between the mission of Athenagoras ' ad occupandas quae ad Antigoneam fauces sunt-Stena vocant Graeci ', and the actioil of Philip in occupying the narrow valley of the Aous (as Walbank's map on his p. 149 shows) ; yet Livy makes it clear that Philip took up a different position from that occupied by Athenagoras (Livy 32, 5 , 9). The truth is rather that the ' narrows by Antigonea ' are at Lekel some five miles south of Tepelene. This walled site by Lekel, about a mile in circuit, is the only large site in this area ; it was not known to Kromayer, De Sanctis and U7albank. The ' narrows by Antigonea ' are the narrows of the Drin. These narrows are those called T& Trap' 'Av-rty6v~1av o- r~va by Polybius at 2, 5 , 6, when he wrote of Scerdilaidas conling from Illyria to Phoenice in Epirus (cf. Polyb. 2, 6, 6), and they give access only to the Drin valley.29

The position adopted by Philip (see hIap 111) was in the narrows not of the Drin but of the Aous, a name which has been corrupted or mistakenly transmitted as 'Apsus ' in the text of Plutarch (E'lam. 3, 4 and 6). The gorge of the Aous is described by Plutarch in exact terms. ' I t is deficient '-to quote Leake's colourful translation-' in the beautiful groves,

27 One Italian column in 1940 took this route 2 s Walbank, Polybius I, I 56, realizes this : ' the and got into serious difficulties. Kromayer described O T E V ~must be the short gorge on that river (the the upper Aous valley as ' das sich iiber xoo Kilo- Drin) immediately south of its confluence with meter siidostlich ins Gebirge hineinziehende, the Viossa, despite the more common application of verhaltnismassig weite und bequeme 'ral der the term to the gorge of the IClisoura on the Viossa Wiossa ' ! He certainly had no idea of its nature itself '. But the gorges are five miles or so apart, above IConitsa. on different rivers and giving access to different

2 8 This is where De Sanctis 60, n. 117, put areas ; they were hardly likely to have shared a Philip's position : he was not aware that ~t does common name. not fit Plutarch's description at all.

48 N. G . L. HAMMOND

the verdant forests, the pleasant retreats, and the meadows which border the Peneus ; but in the lofty and precipitous mountains, in the profundity of the narrow fissure between them, in the rapidity and magnitude of the river, in the single narrow path along the bank, the two places exactly resemble. Hence it is difficult for an army to pass under any circum- stances, and impossible when the place is defended by an enemy.' On the other hand the gorge of the Drin is quite different ; for it is wooded and the mountains stand some way back from the narrows, as Plate I I Ib shows. The gorge of the Aous, which is treeless and

FIG. 4. M A P 111: THE APPROACHES TO T H E A 0 1 STENA

Heights in metres. Drawn by Helelz Waugh from sketch-map by the author

tightly pressed between towering mountains and cliffs, fits the description of Plutarch . A

precisely. The rivers Aous, Drin and Bence are very powerful, especially in the spring and early

summer when the snows are melting fast. Leake I , 57 remarked that the bridge over the Drin below Hormove (to the south of Lekel-see Map 111) had recently been swept away, and he described the Aous after a night of violent rain. ' The Viosa, which is nearly half a mile broad below the junction, pours even above it such a flood of water against the bridge of Tepelene, that it has almost overtopped the old piers ' (these carried planking in 1805, as the original arches had been carried away on a previous occasion). Walbank's photograph30 shows the piers of another ruined bridge, which I too had seen some years earlier. Leake described the Bence as being three or four hundred yards wide at its mouth where it joins

30 Philip, facing p . 148, no. I.

THE BATTLE OF THE A01 STENA 4 9

the Aous just below Tepelene. The bridging of these rivers presents very great difficulties. The Turkish road which Leake followed ran down the right bank of the Drin past Lekel and then crossed the Aous at Dragot, where I saw a ruined bridge in 1931. The river is much more easily bridged at Dragot than at Tepelene. Moreover one can then follow the right bank of the Aous all the way downstream, whereas any road following the left bank needs a bridge over the Bence. The ancient bridge then was probably at Dragot. The position of Antigonea on the right bank of the Drin at Lekel was therefore designed to control the ancient road from the north via Dragot and Lekel.

The position occupied by Philip in the Aoi Stena must have been on the north side of the Aous, because only on that side is there room for the road or path which Plutarch describes. Livy 32, 5 , 10-13 gives a full description of the position which Philip adopted. ' Ipse . . . maxime idoneum ad muniendum locum credidit esse praeter amnem Aoum. 1s inter montes, quorum alterum Meropum, alterum Asnaum incolae vocant, angusta valle fluit, iter exiguum super ripam praebens. Asnaum Athenagoram cum levi armatura tenere et communire iubet ; ipse in Meropo posuit castra. Qua abscisae rupes erant, statio paucorum armatorum tenebat ; qua minus tuta erant alia fossis, alia vallo, alia turribus muniehat. Manna tormentorum etiam vis. ut missilibus vrocul arcerent hostem, idoneis

u

locis disposita est. Tabernaculum regium pro vallo in conspecto maxime tumulo, ut terrorem hostibus suisque spem ex fiducia faceret, positurn.'

As Philip had to hold the north side of the river, he placed his main force on that bank. hit. nleropus then is the ridge west of Mt. Trebeshin, that is Mt. ShendEl ; and Mt. Asnaus is the the ridge west of 1Mt. DhEmbel, that is Mt. Golik (see Map 111). Athenagoras held the slopes of the latter with light-armed troops. The main camp was on the side of Mt. Meropus. The strongest point in the defensive position, at which the consul was stopped by the firm stand of the phalanx (Livy 33, 4, 3), was ~ $ 5( ~ b )(TTEV&T~TOV . . . r r ~ p i T&S Fuoxwpicc~(Plut., Plum. 4, 10). This very narrowT place is that which I have described as ' pinched between a pair of sheet rock faces ' (p. 39 above). I t is marked P on Map IV. These roclr faces are five English miles as the crow flies from Tepelene. When Villius came up, Livy describes his first action. ' Quinque milia ferme ab regiis castris cum abesset, loco munito relictis legionibus ipse cum expeditis progressus ad speculanda loca postero die consilium habuit '. Villius is likely to have placed his legions either south of the Bence river at Tepelene itself, or opposite Tepelene if he came up the right bank of the Aous. Therefore the five miles of Livy's text is compatible with my placing of Philip's main holding position inside the gorge. The main army of Philip held not only the wider space to the east of the holding force but also the side-valleys of the hlfexhgoran stream and the Zagori stream which offered obvious routes for turning forces. His advanced forces with their artillerv. which

0

commanded the approach from the west towards the holding force, were placed on the escarpment on the north side of the valley (shown by A's on Map IV). Philip strengthened all his positions with field defences such as he had used in the previous year (Livy 31, 34, 7 ; 31, 39, 8). Some of these were no doubt on the valley bed to the west of the narrow point (see F's on Map IV),31 and others such as ' turres ' were on the escarpment. I le may also have built a rampart on the right bank of the Aous, such as he had built on the bank of the Erigon (Livy 31, 39, 6). The river itself, flowing fast and deep, could not be crossed by armed men unless they could throw a bridge over it ; and even then the detachment under Athenagoras held the escarpment south of the river (its positions being marked by A's and 1,'s on Map IV).

Kromayer, followed by Walbank, put the position of Philip on either side of Dragot, at the entrance to the gorge (as shown by K's on Map IV). Here Philip's artillery could not have fired onto the flank of an attacking force, but \.vould have had to hurl its missiles over the heads of its own men. His armv would have offered a front four kilometres long to the Romans, and on each flank his fro& would have been turned by a ~treambed.~"t some eight kilometres to the rear of Kromayer's position there were two side-valleys, which gave easy access to any enemy turning force. Finally Livy's statement that Villius' fortified position for the legions was almost five miles, i.e. some eight kilometres, away from the

"l See Livy 32, 12, 1-3. Similarly Leonidas 3 S e e his Map 3 based on the Austrian Staff fought in advance of his strongest point at Thermo- Map, which is inaccurate. I have put his positions pylae ; see my History of Greece 234. Defence in for the Macedonian forces on my Tilap IV. depth has obvious advantages.

so N. G. L. HAMMOND

5 1 THE BATTLE OF THE A 0 1 STENA

king's camp is likely to refer to the distance between fixed camps, not between a provisional Roman camp and Philip's camp. Villius needed a strong position tenable against a night attack and at the same time he wished to block the exit from the Aoi Stena. Therefore the positions which I have suggested are suitable, that is, either at Tepelene on the bluff where the town now stands, if he had bridged the Aous, or opposite Tepelene if he had not bridged the river. These positions for the Roman camp are five miles distant not from Dragot but from the place where I put Philip's camp. If Kromayer's position at Dragot is adopted, Villius' camp has to be moved downstream to a position between Dames and Memaliaj, in order to put five Roman miles between them (see Map III).33 This would have left Philip free to move, if he had so wished, into the Drin valley ; but the Roman desire was always to bring Philip to battle and not to give him room to slip away.

The news that Philip had occupied the Aoi Stena was brought to Villius at Corcyra, where he was with the fleet. The information was sent by an Epirote statesman of Roman sympathies, Charops (Livy 32, 6, I). Villius crossed over to the mainland and joined his army either at Apollonia or on the river Apsus. The alternatives open to him were several. He could advance in strength into Macedonia, making use of the conquered area and the strong garrison at Pelium. There was no doubt that this would draw Philip out of the Aoi Stena. But Villius' own lines of supply were likely to be cut if Philip then moved from Kelcyre into the country between Berat and Koritsa. Alternatively Villius could advance towards Macedonia, taking the route to the southern end of Lake Ochrid, or if he preferred to the northern end ; but here too Philip was likely to pursue him and in the process to cut his lines of supply. He could use his cavalry to reconnoitre the position at the Aoi Stena, which Charops must have told him was exceptionally strong, and then decide whether to attack Philip there or to draw him out by some real or feigned move in a different direction. Instead of these he chose foolishly to bring the legions up to the Aoi Stena and then reconnoitre. Once there he could not withdraw the army without a loss of face, which would injure Rome's influence with her allies and strengthen the loyalty of the Epirote League to Philip.34 At this point Flamininus arrived at Corcyra, crossed to the coast of Epirus, reached the camp of Villius and relieved him of the command. He now faced the same dilemma as Villius : to attack or to set off for Macedonia through Dassaretis. Livy (32, 9, 8) and Plutarch (Flam. 4, I ) express the dilemma in their own terms, Livy emphasizing Philip's evasive tactics and Plutarch the lack of supplies, if Flamininus were to advance through Dassaretis into L v ~ c u s . ~ ~

Flamininus decided to attack. His army was much superior in numbers to that of Philip ; for the two legions were now reinforced by 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry which followed Flamininus from Cor~yra.~-ut numbers alone were of little avail. Planning went slowly. The legions had spent forty days in camp before they moved to the assault. During the delay Philip used the good services of his allies, the Epirotes, to arrange a meeting with Flamininus at which peace-terms were discussed ;but Philip found the Roman general's demands excessive and broke off the negotiations. Philip and Flamininus met, one on either side of the Aous, at the point where its banks are closest ('ubi in artissimas ripas Aous cogitur amnis ', Livy 32, 10, 2). Viewed from the Roman side this point is just east of Dragot where the wide bed by Tepelene contracts (the ruined Turkish bridge stood here in 1931). It was customary for such a meeting to be between the enemy lines ; and if the Roman camp was at Tepelene this is about half way between the camps. The interposition of the river gave some guarantee against treachery ; Philip was on the right bank, as his main force was north of the river ; the Roman general was on the left bank, which indicates that his army was at Tepelene and he had crossed the Drin but not the Aous. When the meeting failed, the Romans attacked in strength. Livy cuts the assault down to one day, no doubt for

33 Five miles i n t h e other direction would p u t 36 T h e reinforcements came either via Phoenice t h e R o m a n c a m p sou th o f Lekel ( i ln t igonea) and and t h e Dr in valley or via t h e Skarfice pass t h r o u g h wou ld have l e f t Philip cut t ing Villius' l ines o f t h e Kurvelesh, t h e latter perhaps being m o r e likely. supp ly f r o m Apollonia. Leake I , 388 put t h e Philip evident ly had n o cavalry w i t h h i m , his a r m y R o m a n c a m p near Lekel . o f phalangites, mercenaries and light-armed troops

3 % i ~ y 32, 6, 3 presents such a withdrawal as a n was very mob i l e , and h e m u s t have l e f t large forces alternative t o attack. i n Macedonia t o hold back his n u m e r o u s enemies .

3%yncus is ment ioned i n order t o bring o u t t h e precedent af forded b y Sulpicius.

52 N. G. L. HAMMOND

nationalistic reasons. Plutarch may be more accurate in saying that there were repeated assaults with losses on both sides.37 The fighting began with skirmishes at the western exit of the gorge, where the valley is wider (Livy 32, 10, 9 ' in planitie satis ad id patenti '). The Macedonians were no doubt trailing their coats. They drew the Romans on into the narrow steep-sided gorge. There the artillery, the archers and the javelin-men, positioned along- side and above ' as if on a wall ', fired their missiles at short range into the flanks of the attacking force (Livy 32, 10, 11, ' pro hoste loca et catapultae ballistaeque in omnibus prope rupibus quasi in muro dispositae ', and Plut., Flam. 4, 3 i~ TQV ~ l h a y i o v T T C ( V T C ( X ~ ~ & V

$'mi T O ~ S'Pmpaiou~&KOVT~WV ~ a i~ o ~ ~ u p a - r o v noq~popivov). Other assaults were more successful.

The deadlock was broken when Flamininus accepted the proposal of some shepherds, which was supported by Charops, to lead a force by a circuitous route to a position above the Macedonian lines (' super caput hostium ', Livy 32, I I, 3 and 8), on the heights behind the Macedonians ( h i -rGv 6 ~ p o v . . .~ a - r aV ~ T O V. . .46q TQV k p o v 6xopivov. . .oi 8' BTILCTEV & ~ l bTQV ~ K ~ W V , Plut., Flam. 4, 4, 11 and 12). As the turning troops needed two days and two nights to reach their destination while moving mainly at night, and as they were accompanied at first by cavalry, they probably went up the Luftinje valley, left their mounts there, climbed to the ridge of Mt. Shendel, the ancient Mt. Meropus (the highest point being 1,802 m.), and came down the spur southwest of Mexhgoran into a position above and behind the Macedonian right wing at the narrows. At the pre-arranged time on the third day, in the light just before dawn, Flamininus attacked in full strength. He led the central column alongside the river (-rrapa ~b @~iOpov), that is along the northern bank where the road now runs, and passing under the Macedonian fire, engaged the enemy at the narrowest point on the difficult ground (&is ( ~ b ) o - r ~ v h ~ m o v . . . mpi -ra< 6uqopias) . Here the attack came to a halt, as the phalangites stood firm (Livy 33, 4, 3 ' Macedonum vero phalangem et tunc stetisse . . . invictam '). Meanwhile the two other columns advanced, one on each side of him. They tried to grapple with the enemy but became stuck on the difficult terrain. When the whole force was thus engaged the sun rose in the east, lighting up a thin wisp of smoke which came from the expected quarter on the heights behind the Macedonians. As the wisp changed into a cloud of smoke, the Roman forces charged with shouts, and the turning force on the heights shouted in reply. Then the Macedonians, on the north side of the gorge, who had not seen the smoke signal behind them, realized there were enemy forces behind them as well as in front of them. Our sources say that they broke in flight. Flamininus did not pursue with any success. I t is likely that Philip's withdrawal was much less disorderly than our sources suggest, and that the Romans did not renew the attack against the phalanx in the narrow pass. The Macedonian losses were put at 2,000 men ; the Roman losses are not given by our sources.38

Philip re-formed his troops five Roman miles, i.e. some eight kilometres, away from the scene of the battle. This distance brings them just to the eastern end of the Aoi Stena.

37 Plutarch uses imperfect tenses, which implies Flatn 4,8). O n the morning o f the third day L ivy several attacks. walbank takes Livy's forty days says that the Romans saw the smoke-signal before ' sine ullo conatu ' (32,10,I) t o b e forty days o f they attacked ; Plutarch says that they saw ~t after attacks, bu t this is not justified b y the Latin text . the attack ( L i v y 32, 12,I ; Plut., Flam 4, 12). I n T h e first attack is described at 32, 10, 9. H e also L ivy 32, 12,3-4 when the impetuous Romans ran reverses the order o f events in putting the parley into danger the shouts o f the turning party threw after his supposed forty days o f attacks ; this is an the Macedonians into a panic ; i n Plutarch, Flam. arbitrary rearrangement o f Livy. 4, 10 all three Roman columns were held u p before

3 8 T h e question whether L ivy and Plutarch drew the smoke-signal was seen. T h u s Livy's account is only o n Polybius or o n other authors cannot b e not only m u c h more laudatory o f Rome than properly treated within the limits o f this paper. Plutarch's account, bu t it also has substantial Rut it is worth noting that there are considerable differences o f detail and o f timing. I f L ivy and differences between the account i n L ivy and the Plutarch used only one source, namely Polybius, as account i n Plutarch. I list some o f them. L i v y Kromayer 11, 41, w i t h n . 2, following Nissen, and has one shepherd ; Plutarch has several shepherds. others believe, then w e mus t recognize that either I n Livy the shepherd was sent b y Charops; i n one (and, i f one, L ivy) or bo th treated the account Plutarch the shepherds came o f their own initiative o f Polybius with considerable freedom. T h e and referred Flamininus t o Charops ( L i v y 32,11, I ; possibility that a Roman source w h o was acquainted Plut., Flam 4,4).W h e n the turning party started o f f , with Ennius' Annales was also used, at least b y L ivy reports that for t w o days attacks were delivered Livy, whose mention o f Valerius Antias at 32, 6, f rom every side ; Plutarch says that the Roman 5-8 only t o refute h i m is peculiar, should not b e army rested for two days ( L i v y 32, 11, 6 ; Plut., excluded f rom consideration.

THE BATTLE OF THE AOI STENA 5 3

He took up position ' in tumulo quodam ', probably at the site of the Turkish fort ( F on Map I),39 and brought in the stragglers. He could now move either towards Berat and Lyncus, or towards Orestis through Danglli (Parauaea) or towards Central Epirus ; and he knew that Flamininus was likely to follow his general direction. His plans had presumably been laid in advance. He marched in one day to ' castra Pyrrhi ' in Triphylia, a district of Molossis. As I have argued elsewhere,40 Castra Pyrrhi was probably near Konitsa. This is at a suitable distance, since the walk from Kelcyre via Permet to Mertzani bridge took Clarke 102 hours. T h e next day Philip reached the high country of central Pindus. He waited there for several days, probably until he had information of the advance of Flamininus into Central Epirus, and he then descended to Tricca in Thessaly.

O n the day that Philip marched from Kelcyre to Castra Pyrrhi, Flamininus came through the Aous gorge to Kelcyre, following Philip (' per ipsas angustias, quas inter valle se flumen insinuat, hostem sequitur ', Livy 32, 13, I). This statement is resumed by Livy in the phrase ' faucibus quas fuga hostium aperuerat ' (32, 14, 5 ) . Meanwhile his baggage train will have followed the easier route up the Drin valley. Flamininus did not pursue Philip beyond Mertzani. Instead he probably crossed the southward continuation of Nit. N e m e r ~ k e to join the baggage train in the upper Kalamas valley. H e handled the Epirotes diplomatically. T h e Epirote League was an ally of Philip, but it had not engaged in armed conflict with the Romans and one of its leading statesmen, Charops, had secretly helped the Roman commanders. T h e aim of Flamininus was now to win over the Epirote League. H e pardoned its previous attitude (Livy 32, 14, 5-7). T h e good discipline of his troops and his personal diplomacy enabled him to advance without opposition, and many Epirotes enlisted as individuals in the auxilia (Livy 32, 14, 8). H e needed Epirus as a base of supply for his next move. For the merchant fleet moved to Ambracia and supplies were taken from there to Gomphi in Thessaly. Flamininus and his army crossed (probably by the Zygos pass) into Thessaly. There he joined forces with the Aetolians and the -4thamanians. T h e wolves were closing in for the kill.

APPENDIX (See Maps I and 11)

It remains only to define some topographical terms and explain some misunderstandings. As I have argued in my book on Epirus, the Roman protectorate in 200 B.C. did not extend to the south of the Aous river above Byllis. The disputed region Atintanis or Atintania, which passed from Rome to Philip and vice-versa, lay north of the Shkumbi valley, being visible from Dyrrachium (Polyaenus 4, 11, 4), and is not to be confused with the land of the Atintanes in Central Epirus, towards which the Epirotes fled after their defeat at Phoenice (Polyb. 2, 5 , 8). I t is commonly said that the Aous valley below Tepelene, the Aoi Stena and Antigonea were all in Atintar~ia .~~ Mommsen held that when Philip advanced to the Aoi Stena he took the offensive by entering Atintania.42 Kromayer on the other hand stated that the Aoi Stena, being in Atintania, were in Philip's territory.43 But the evidence is clear that the Aoi Stena and Antigonea were in the territory not of the Atintanes but of Chaonia. Livy brings Philip ' in Chaoniam per Epirum ad occupandas quae ad Antigoneam fauces sunt ' (32, 5, g), from which it follows that the areas northeast of Mertzani and between Mertzani and Kelcyre, that is to say Parauaea, were in Epirus at this time. Stephanus Byzantinus, ' A v r ~ y o v a ~ a , n o h i s Xaov ia s $v ' H n ~ i p q . 6 ' A v ~ l y o v a i r ~ ,places Antigonea in Chaonia,~ 0 h i ~ T l ~ and his ethnic is confirmed by an inscription which was found at Radotovi, north of D ~ d o n a . ~ ~ 'The possession of the pass by Antigonea is closely involved with the possession of the Aoi Stena, so that we may place the Aoi Stena also in Chaonia. The district called Dassaretis and the people called Dassaretii belonged to hlacedonia at the outbreak of the war. Stephanus Byzantinus A6capo1, & 0 v o ~ X a 6 v o v , ~ o i ~ h b "Apupov' E y ~ a A i a l g -rrpooaxai~, 'E~cc ra ios E i rphnq . d p o ~ o i ~ o 6 v preserves this interesting fragment from Hecataeus (= FGrH I , F 103). The Encheleae, we know, were near Lake Lychnitis (Polyb. 5, 108, 8). The Dexari were therefore in what was later called Dassaretis. We may indeed infer that the A a o o a p f i ~ ~ sname was derived from the tribe A i c a p o ~ , a variant spelling probably of A a o o a p o ~ . The mountain beneath which they lived was the most conspicuous mountain of the region, namely Mt. Tomor, rising to 2,418 m. behind Berat.45 I t

Geschichte I, 709. 4 0 B S A 32, 145 and in my forthcoming book, 43 Kromayer 11, 36.

Epirus. 44 Eph. Arch. 1914, 239. 41 E.g. by Kromayer 11, 36, Walbank Polybius I, "Hughes, op. cit. 11, 253 gives a noble description

163 and Holleaux and others in C A H ~ I I I ,map 7 , of the mountain.

3 9 SO too Leake I, 388. 4 W R n i ~ ~ h e

p. 117.

54 THE BATTLE OF THE A01 STENA

is the northernmost outlier of the great limestone range which runs through the centre of Epirus. Thus, at the end of the sixth century Chaonia included Dassaretis. At the end of the third century when Philip held Dassaretis and when the Epirote League included Chaonia, we can draw the frontier between Dassaretis and Chaonia at the watershed between the Aous tributaries and the O ~ u m . * ~The other Epirote territory which abutted onto Dassaretis and Orestis was Parauaea. Map I shows the more precise definitions of these areas.

The two passes, the narrows by Antigonea and the Aoi Stena, are both in Epirus and may both be called claustra Epiri (Livy 32, 21, 20) or -ra -r.ii~ 'Hneipou o-reva. They can be, and are, more closely defined respectively as ' quae ad Antigoneam fauces sunt-Stena vocant Graeci ' (Livy 32, 5, 9), and -ra -rijs 'Hneipou 81' &V e i ~ TT)V Mme80viav eiuiv eiuPohaiUTEV~X, (Zonaras 9, 16, I). Polybius 2, 5, 6 and 2, 6, 6 used the term T& ~ a p ' ' A V T I ~ ~ V E I W o-revtr, which is evidently the original of Livy's ' quae ad Antigoneam fauces sunt ', and he was there writing of the pass giving access from the direction of Illyria. On the other hand the Aoi Stena gave access from the direction of Macedonia and some phrase of Polybius may well underlie the words of Zonaras. T h e books of Polybius in which he described the action between Philip and Flamininus and named these passes are lost : references in his later books are naturally brief, e.g. in 18, 23, 4, npo~a-rixoll-ras T ~ Sh q h n 1 u p 2 v a ~ Ev 'Hne ipq Gvoxwpias and 27, 15, 2 -rh ~ m h "Hne~pov o-revtr. TT)V

But the description of the pass in Plutarch, Flam. 3, is almost certainly taken from the lost book of Polybius. The description at 4, 10 of the deadlock between the central column under Flamininus and the phalanx of Philip at the ' narrowest part ' has the phrase n s p i TUS Gucrxwpias, and this evidently used a Polybian expression which we see in -ras h q h n ~ o p k v a s. . . Gucrxwpias. The statement at 3, 4 that Philip was guarding - r a ~nsp i TOV "AWOV (corrupted to "Ayov) no-raybv ipPoAas ~ a i-ra o-revtx is likely to borrow a phrase from Polybius. Where Livy used Polybius, he abbreviated Polybius' account and his words ' locum . . . praeter amnem Aoum ', while reflecting those of Polybius, are less explicit. He returns to this phrase in a speech at 32, 21, 14 (' cur excessit faucibus Epiri claustrisque illis inexpugnabilibus super Aoum amnem relictoque quem insidebat saltu penitus in regnum abiit ? '), and at 33, 4, I (' acceptae ad Aoum flumen in angustiis cladi'). And again in a connecting phrase Livy 32, 16, I has the words ' consul adversus Philippum in Epiri faucibus posuit castra ', which suggests that the camp of Flamininus was close to the defended pass, that is where we have put it. These are examples of a lack of precision in Livy which may be due to him rather than to Polybius. Sometimes one can see that Livy has dropped a topographical detail which was in his source. Thus, although Livy makes it clear that the narrows by Antigonea and the Aoi Stena were both in Epirus, he writes at 32, 14, 5 ' consul faucibus, quas fuga hostium aperuerat, in regionem Epiri transgressus '. Here it is clear that he has omitted the name of a ' regio Epiri ', perhaps Parauaea.

University of Bristol.

46 This area was a most important one in the of Greece 1940-41 (Athens, 1949), 300. The division Greek position in 1941 when the Italians made their in the Greek line between the Army of Epirus and spring offensive against the sector between Mt the West Macedonian Army was made on the line Trebeshin and Bubesi. See A. Papagos, The Battle of the Osum just south of the Tomor massif (p. 304).