1988-89 cabinet paper 6826
TRANSCRIPT
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0
~ N T I O N L
w ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
ustralian Government
STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 5) OF THE ARCHIVES
CT
1983-INCLUDING DECISION ON ACCESS
Record Series:
A14039
Control symbol:
6826
Title: Soviet Technical Security Activity Australian Total number of folios i.e. equivalent separate
Embassy, Moscow pages) on the record: 12
1. Decision
After examining this record I have decided to open it for public access except for certain
material which is identified below.
2.
Basis for
decision
I have taken into account:
the content of the record requested;
the relevant provisions of the Archives Act 1983 the Act ;
policy
and
guidelines of National Archives of Australia
that
relate to the access
examination of
ommonwealth
records; and
information
provided by
the
Department
of Foreign Affairs
and
the
Department
of
Defence
on
which I have relied in formulating my decision.
3. Material withheld
Category of material withheld Total number of folios per
List each folio separately
category
by
category of
material
withheld
Partially exempted folios 11
1, 2, 3,
4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
certain parts of the text
have
been
expunged)
Wholly exemp
ted
folios 0
Folios
not
within
the open 0
access period as defined in s3
7) of the Act
Folios
withheld pending 0
agency examination and advice
Statement
o
Reasons page no. 1
o
3
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Annexure
Table A Material exempted by folio number and grouped by the application of exemption provisions
Relevant legislative
Folio Findings of fact
Reasons for Decision
provision invoked
under
number
33 of the Act
S
33 1)
a) - information
1 2 3
These records are partially exempt as they contain: The disclosure of this information could lead to
or matter the disclosure
4 5 6
compromise of past and current procedures and
of which unde r this Act
7 8 9
Intelligence information of continuing sensitivity which
could reasonably be expected to cause damage
could reasonably be
10,11
remains properly security classified .
to the security defence and international
expected to cause
relations of the Commonwealth.
damage to the security
defence or int ernational
relations of the
Commonwealth.
Statement of reasons page no 3 o 3
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Title
Minister
Purpose/Issues
1
ation to
st ing policy
Sensitivity Criticism
leg islation
involved
Urgency:
itical/significant
..
tes
1sultation:
Min
isters/Depts
consulted
Is there
agreement?
Timing/handling
of
announcement
Cost
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No. -
.
SOVIET TECHNICAL SECURITY ACTIVITY
AUSTRALIAN
EMBASSY, MOS OW
Senator the
Hon Gareth Evans
QC,
Minister
for
Foreign
Affairs
and
Trade
t tention to the
possibil i ty
that a
was
plac
of the
in
Moscow
agencies.
To
recommend
that
the Australian Federal
Police
investigate the possibi l i ty that
an
Australia-based
off icer
or former officer of
the
Embassy was suborned.
The
Prime
Minister s Directive
on
Guidelines
for
the
Management of
the
Australian Government
Presence Overseas
states that the Department of
Foreign
Affairs and
Trade
DFAT)
is
responsible
for a l l
aspects
of physical,
technical
and
personnel
security
at
missions
overseas and
for securi ty
policy affecting
Australian missions.
Yes Were
information
about
the possible
compromise
of
Embassy security and/or the
Federal
Police investigation
to leak, i t would doubtless at t rac t
keen
domestic
interest . As is
customary
the Government and
DFAT
would
refuse to
comment on
matters of
security.
t
is
possible
that
an
offence
may
have
been
committed
under
the
Crimes
Act
1914
AFP investigation should commence as soon as possible.
Senator
Evans proposed
to the Prime Minister that the
matter be
treated
as
a
closed agenda item
of
the Security
Committee and no consultat ion with departments on this
Submission
has taken place.
N/A
N/A
Fin
Yr
Fin Yr
Fin Yr
I
I
I
I
)
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CABIN E r r::
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2. TOP SE RET
USTEO
In April 1989
in
the course
of
work being undertaken in
t
enclosure
of
the
Moscow
Chancery
an unexplained
wire
la te r identified as
a
l ikely
, was found by Australian
technical
officers
working
in
the
area
concerned. Preliminary
forensic
analysis by the
Defence Materials
Research
Laboratory has failed to clar i fy
with any certainty the origin
or
age
of
the But
technical
tes ts
of
the have
shown that
i t is very
capable of acting as an
effective
conduit into and out of
the
2. Completion of forensic examination of a l l related
communications equipment may s t i l l be some months off . I f that
examination proves
f rui t less the exact
nature
and purpose
of
the may
always remain
a
matter
for
conjecture.
But
the likelihood that i t
was
implanted ei ther by
or at their direction is real
especial ly
since there has been a history
of
on
our
Moscow Embassy most
recently in
November
1988
when
the
positioning
of
a
l l
outside
the
Chancery
probably
containing VHF intercept equipment
could have no other innocent
explanation. Further detai ls are in Attachment
A
3. The area in the Chancery where the was
discovered
was las t inspected thoroughly
by
Australian
technical
officers in September
1983. Those
involved
are
adamant
that the
was
not in posit ion a t that
time.
This
suggests
that placement took
place
subsequently to
September 1983. Alternatively of course despite
their
disclaimers the
wire
may have
been
inadvertently
l e f t in the
enclosure by the
technical
off icers in
1983 -
in
which case a l l
speculation around
i t
could be dismissed.
4. But
the
point is that we have
to go
with what we have and
on the evidence
available
two disturbing
possibi l i t ies
emerge.
Firs t
that
the
sometime af t e r 1983.
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3.
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or that the
was implanted by an A-based member of the Embassy s taff or
an off icial Australian visi tor at
the
behest of
5. Physical inspection of the
Embassy
in July
1989
indicates
that unassisted
covert penetration
is only
a
remote
possibi l i ty. The only feasible route would involve high r isk
of detection
given
the physical
security
measures including
permanent A-based
guard
presence
in
place
in
the
Moscow
Embassy.
This leads inevitably to
the
possibi l i ty of covert
entry assisted by an
A-based
member of staff or of an
A-based
s taff
member or vis i tor
himself/herself placing
the
t
is estimated that
i t would
take less than
two minutes to
secrete
the wire in the vent. Thus a l l A-based
officers who
have or have had
access to
the
during working hours or who have
had
the
combinations
to the
locks
permitting such access af ter
hours
are to
be
seen as
potent ia l ly
capable
of
having
implanted the
Furthermore this would
apply
to
vi tual ly
al l
serving and
former
A-based
s taff
of
the Embassy since
September
1983 and many
of
the off icial vis i tors since
that time as well. Interviewing
a l l
these persons
would clearly
be
a daunting task.
6. One
option therefore would
be to take
no
further
investigative action but to ensure the t ightening of any
remaining
gaps
in the
physical
and
technical
security
of
the
Embassy Attachment B refers . But
this
is
not
a
happy
option. f there is some circumstantial information
indicating
the
possibi l i ty
of
be investigated.
The
alternat ive
and
favoured option therefore
is
to
have
the Australian Federal Police conduct such
investigation.
This will entai l
interviewing
a l l DF T
technical s ta f f who have worked
in
Moscow and a l l serving and
former
A-based s ta f f
of
the
Embassy
since
September 1983.
t
3
1
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4. TOP
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A USTEO
visi tors
who
would
theoretically
have had
access
to
the area
as
well.
7.
There
is an indication that the ABC correspondent in Moscow
has already deduced
that
a
111111 of
some
sort has
been
located
in the
Embassy.
Also once any Federal
Police investigation is
under way there
would
be r isk of leak
by some
of those
interviewed. f the investigation becomes public knowledge
there
will be
some
fal lout , though
perhaps
not
much
affecting
USSR/Australia relations. Pending the
conclusions
and results
of
any
investigation
the
Government
should adopt
i t s
customary
/
practice of declining to
comment on
security issues.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8. I recommend
that
Cabinet
a)
note the possib i l i ty that
there has been compromise
of
Australian classif ied information at the Australian Embassy
in Moscow
b) invite the
Minister
for Just ice
to
have the
Australian
Federal Police investigate the possibi l i ty that 11111111
was placed in the Australian Embassy premises in Moscow
by
with from a member
30
October
GARETH EVANS
CAB 1NET
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ATTACHMENT A
SOVIET TECHNICAL ATTACKS :
CHRONOLOGY
The Australian Embassy to the USSR has occupied
since
1959
a two-storey
mansion with outbuildings.
The
f i r s t
storey
houses the
Ambassador s
office, the
poli t ical
off icers and the
secure area incorporating the classif ied regis t ry and a
been guarded
24
hours per
day
since 1960 by
Australia-based
personnel. The
ground
floor
serves
as
the Ambassador s
Official
Residence.
What
is
cal led
the
Chancery
annex
occupies
the
outbuildings
and
here are
located
the Embassy s
administrative,
consular and
t rade s taff
2.
In 1976
f i re
broke out in the Residence underneath the
communications area,
spread throughout
the secure area
and was
put out by Soviet
firemen.
During the subsequent refurbishment
was
discovered
in 1978
where workmen from the
were
repairing plaster work
in
the Chancery.
Further
invest igat ions revealed
similar
3.
In
1979 a new
provide
information
within
information in the
was
a means of containing
a controlled and
secure volume.
of
This
provide a habitable environment for the users of such
provision
must
be made
for
ingress/egreses,
air
and
power supplies.
The most
practicable
means of providing
the
required
a i r
supply is via
an
attenuating window/vent coupled
with
an
acoustic
f i l t e r
i e an
attenuvent
CABIN :
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C A D l N E T - I N a C O N F I D : ~ : : : U TEO
6.TOP SECRET 0
TT CHMENT
A
4.
In August 1986 the combination
lock
which had been f i t ted
to the
secure area
entrance class B door was replaced and
returned to Canberra for inspection.
concluded that an
attack
had taken
place
on
the lock
whilst
the
Melbourne Defence Material Research Laboratory
was
of
the
opinion that an attack could
not be ruled
out.
6. This and incidents at five other Australian
missions
indicating
physical penetration of
sensitive
Chancery areas led
Cabinet
to approve in 1987
{Minute
9778 {SEC)) a
project
-
known
now as
the
time delay access
control
system
TD CS -
to
upgrade the locking and
intrusion
alarm
systems a t the 30 posts
with the highest technical
security threat
from HIAs.
7. - In 1987 the
instal lat ion
of
a new P BX encountered
technical
diff icult ies
caused
by
A technical
Security
Officer was
sent
from
Canberra
to investigate and was
harassed
to a
greater
)]I extent than has previously
been
experienced.
A team was
sent
in and instal led a
secure
earth
rod
for the communications and
P BX
instal lat ions.
8.
A
resident
technical
security officer position
has been on
our Moscow establishment since 1984. June 1988
by
that officer revealed
evidence
of a marked deterioration in
the performance of the and i t was
decided
to
remove
communications to
a
small
new
temporary
unt i l the could be completely
refurbished. The communications equipment was moved to the Ill
on
October
1988
and
five days l ter a
caravan
commonly
used
by
Russian
work
personnel
on
construction
projects)
was
parked
5-6
metres
from the Embassy
boundary
C BSNET
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CABUNi:T aN
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srEo
1
TOP SE RET
r
ATTACHMENT A
wall. Subsequent
analysis
of the
at our
Embassy
emanating
from the
These
stopped
on 2 November and were
replaced
by
an
from the Novosti
press agency
building a t
the rear
of
the Chancery annex.
The high levels of
measured precluded
any
innocent origin. t
seemed that
the Soviets
were ei ther trying to verify the
new
location
for
our
Soon after the l l
appeared representations were made to
the
Foreign
Ministry
about the reasons
for
i t and
i t
was removed on 3 November.
we know l i t t l e about Soviet
crypto
intercept
DSD advised
DFAT on 29 March 1989
various
recommendations
on
search
and
securi ty
procedures.
In
the l ight of this
information i t
was decided to
replace
completely
the large
t J
A
common parti t ion wall
of similar
the enclosure creating two rooms
of
a
siamese
configuration.
10. On 8 April 1989 during the
dismantling
of the enclosure a
piece of wire
was found folded through
copper core black
insulated electr ical
wire formed
an
approximate 2 mm diameter loop on the inside of the
The two ends protruded
airconditioning ducting.
into
the
external
11.
A
preliminary
report
on
forensic analysis
of that
device
by
the Defence Materials
Research
Laboaratory
cannot clarify
with
CAD IN
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any certainty i t s
country of
origin or age of
Technical tes t s of have shown that i t is very
capable of
acting as
an effective conduit
into
and
out
of the
I t s
exact
purpose
s t i l l remains unknown.
I t
may be connected
with some
other
device
in returned
communications
equipment from
Moscow but completion of forensic
examination of
that
equipment
is
s t i l l
some months
off.
I f
that
examination proves
frui t less and unless our opposite
numbers
in
technical security services overseas
in response
to
our recent enquiry}
confirm
that
they have encountered a
i t s
intent may
always
remain
a
matter
for
conjecture.
C B
J
NET
-IN
ONFIDEM J
T P
S R TAUSTEO
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I N E T
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T
EO
9 TOP SE RET
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ATTACHMENT
B
MOS OW ACTION PLAN FOR REMEDYING SECURITY
SHORTCOMINGS AS AT
18
OCTOBER
1989
Recommendation
Comment
Rl Replace
type
with
improved Completed
May 1989
R2
Carry
out forensic
examination
of old
R3
t s t new
communications
ins ta l la t ion to
be
instal led in Moscow
R4 Replace
communications
system Moscow
RS
t s t
of typewriters and
FACIT
tape
punch
returned
from Moscow
Carry
out
forensic
examination
R6 t s t of communications equipment
returned from
Moscow
and carry
out
forensic
examination
R7
Upgrade CCTV
coverage
both internally
and externally
to
ensure
no
gaps in
coverage
R8 Upgrade alarm system by provision
of
video motion detection
and
the improve-
ment
of
mimic panels
Completed
June
1989
Completed
September 1989
Completed
October
1989
Commenced
ugust
1989
Commenced
October
1989
Completed
October 1989
Equipment
forwarded to
Moscow
October
1989
R9 Replace uninterruptible power supply for
Equipment ordered
alarm
system
awaiting
delivery
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It:E i IN -
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lo TOP SEC
\o
Recommendation
RIO
Instal
f i re alarms
in secure area
Rll
Instal door in
basement to res t r ic t
access during functions
Rl2 Instal
secure
telephone system STUll)
R13 Replace padlocks and combination
locks
on gr i l les vault
doors,
secure doors
and
containers
Rl4
Instal
time delay access
control system
on
vault door
and
secure entry
doors
Rl5
Replace
enclosure a i r
conditioning
system
Rl6 Carry
out forensic
inspection of motor
alternators
sent from
Moscow to U
Rl7 Test and
recal ibrate
Rl8
Rl9
used
to
protect
equipment
and
to photograph
a l l
parts
TT CHMENT B
Comment
Proposed
January 1989
Completed
To be installed
in January 1990
Completed
August 1989
To be installed
in January 1990
Under
design
consideration
Awaiting advice
from FCO
Completed
September
1989
Commenced
September
1989
Awaiting
availabi l i ty
of
equipment
from
U Government
C
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Recommendation
R20 Implement a
ctivi ty
R21
Provide
new
X-ray equipment
to
post
R22 Carry
out
non-destructive
NOT) test ing
of outer Chancery walls
R23 Inspect anomalies in outer Chancery
walls
R24
Carry out
NOT
of
selected
load bearing
inner walls
R25 Carry
out inspection of
wooden flooring
on ground
and
f i rs t floors
R26
Inspect
ut i l i t i e s
for
anomalies
R27
Inspect basement
for surrepti t ious
entry points
R28
Trench
dir t
floor
beside
main
load
bearing
walls
R29
Inspect
roof and
t t ic for egress of
any wired system
CAB N
s r
N
c o t ~ F i r t : N
~
Comment
Quotes being
obtained
Completed
Completed
October 1989
Currently in
p r o r ~ s s
Proposed
1990
Proposed
1990
Completed in
previous
inspections
Proposed
1990
Proposed
1990
Has
been done
progressively;
will continue
1990
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