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Contention 1: The Southwest Border

Non-state actors are attempting to exploit weaknesses at the border to conductoperations in the USMcCaul 12 (MICHAEL T. McCAUL CHAIRMAN UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON

HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, ANDMANAGEMENT http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdfNovember 2012 A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE

AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER)Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional

Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially amore violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terroristorganizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere,to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This secondedition emphasizes Americas ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, theirincreasing presence in Latin America, and thegrowing relationship with MexicanDTOs to exploit paths into the United States. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Timesreported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osamabin Ladens compoundindicated the worlds most wanted terroristsought to useoperatives with valid Mexicanpassports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations.3The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blendingin with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the UnitedStates would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibilityto smugglematerials, including uranium,which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a

weapon ofmass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and theuncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation,only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest

border for retaliation.

Weaknesses at the US-Mexican border are a unique threatGray 12 (Dawn L. Bartell Norwich University Masters of Diplomacy David H. Gray CampbellUniversityhttp://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bartell%20Hezbollah%20and%20Al%20Shabaab%20in%20Mexico.pdfFall 2012 Hezbollah and Al Shabaab in Mexico and the Terrorist Threat to theUnited States)Theinabilityof Mexico to secure its sovereign territories andborder areas has contributedto the ability ofHezbollah and Al Shabaab to develop a footprint within Mexico, reside inMexico, and use Mexico as a safe haven and as a transit area to smuggle weapons andterroristoperatives into the United States. The ability of Hezbollah and Al Shabaab to resideand operate within Mexico and to successfully smuggle weapons and terrorist operatives intothe United States has created a growing terrorist threat to the United States by providing

Hezbollah and Al Shabaab the ability to access and strike targets on American soil. Hezbollahand Al Shabaab pose a threat to the United States by residing in Mexico, therefore it is vital forthe international community, the United States, and Mexico to work together in order to helpcreate a strong Mexico. This would reduce or eliminate the ability of Hezbollah or Al Shabaab touse Mexico as a safe haven and as a platform to plan and conduct terrorist operations againstMexico, the United States, or any other state in the international community.
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdfhttp://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdfhttp://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bartell%20Hezbollah%20and%20Al%20Shabaab%20in%20Mexico.pdfhttp://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bartell%20Hezbollah%20and%20Al%20Shabaab%20in%20Mexico.pdfhttp://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bartell%20Hezbollah%20and%20Al%20Shabaab%20in%20Mexico.pdfhttp://globalsecuritystudies.com/Bartell%20Hezbollah%20and%20Al%20Shabaab%20in%20Mexico.pdfhttp://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdfhttp://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf


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Attack is impending---neg evidence underestimates their capabilityKanani 11 (Rahim Kanani, founder and editor-in-chief of World Affairs Commentary, CitingRolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F.Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, former Director of the Office ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weaponsof Mass Destruction Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency,

recipient of the CIA Directors Award, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, June 29th, Newal-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent, Forbes,http://blogs.forbes.com/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahiri-has-strong-nuclear-intent/)

We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahirisleadership. In a recent report titled Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and

Against Nuclear Weapons, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S. Department ofEnergy, argues that al-Qaedas WMD ambitions are stronger than ever. And that this intent nolonger feels theoretical, but operational. I believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork for

a large scale attackon the United States, possibly in the next year or two , continues

Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the Belfer Center for

Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. The attack may or may notinvolve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event on a largerscale than the 9/11 attack. Most will readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely,and we hope they are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served asthe former head of the Central Intelligence Agencys WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizingand cross-referencing Zawahiris 268-page treatise published in 2008 titledExoneration, the analytics steered us towards something far more remarkable than expected.As I read the text closely, in the broader context of al-Qaedas past, my concerns grew thatZawahiri has written this treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process ofpreparing foran impending attack, states Mowatt-Larssen. As Osama bin Ladens fatwa in 1998foreshadowed the 9/11 attack, Ayman Zawahiris fatwa in 2008 may have started the clockticking for al-Qaedas next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaedas modus

operandi holds true,we are in the middle of an attack cycle.Among several importantfindings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly weaves identical passages, sources and religious justificationsfor a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously penned by radical Saudi clericNasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothingshort of detailed and deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to kill millions of Americansand a lengthy suicide note together, this piece of literature is something we must take seriously

with Zawahiri now at the helm of al-Qaeda. The time may have come for al-Qaedas new CEO toleave a legacy ofhis own. Concluding the authors note, Mowatt-Larssen states, Even if thistheory proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to underestimate him.Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spentthat they are incapable of carrying outanother 9/11. Leaving aside whether this view is correct, for which I harbor grave doubts, we willsurely miss the signs of the next attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and

dismiss what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they put their minds to it.

Insurgent attacks causes miscalc great power warsAyson 10 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for StrategicStudies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack:Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July,

Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attackon its own soil might also raise thepossibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For


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example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclearattack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, includingits nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage ofalert. In such a tense environment, when carefulplanning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or Chinamight mistakenlyread this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possiblynuclearforce) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might

grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with adevastating response.

Attack destroys the world economy and causes retaliation leading to global warDiamond 8(John Diamond fellow of the Saga Foundation,, ,http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/10/a-financial-apo.html 10/9/08 A financialapocalypse isn't nearly as scary as a nuclear one,)The aftershocksAs the SagaFoundation a non-profit organization focused on the threat ofterrorism involving weapons of mass destruction argued in a recent white paper, the

vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero would be dwarfed in scope bythe national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem not only

from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almostcertainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack. Assuming, as theexperts believe likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, thepresident could be expected to close the nation's borders, halt all freightcommerce and direct a search of virtually any moving conveyance that couldtransport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In a nation thatlives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days.The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligencedetermined that one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack,we

would face the prospect of full-scale war. Even short of that, the nation woulddemand, and the president would almost certainly order, a level of retaliation at thesuspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 militaryresponse. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties andfreedom forever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, anuclear terrorist attack would prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability toprotect the American people. Think your 401(k) hurts now? The presidential nominees, and the

American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these two issues economic crisis andthe threat ofcatastrophicterrorism as separate problems. A nuclear attack on a U.S.city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it

would also create instantaneous national and global economic ripple effects withincalculable consequences. To put it in personal terms, if you think things are tough in thenation's financial sector now, imagine what your 401(k) or your paycheck might look likesix months after a nuclear detonation in Lower Manhattan or downtown Washington. Saga'sstudy merely began what must become a much larger-scale effort to understand in the fullestdetail possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, not only the attack itself but also

the decisions that would almost certainly follow. The idea is not to depress people but tomotivate them. While some of the consequences are obvious, others are not, and it is the lessunderstood aftershocks that could damage our world as well as transform it and not for the

better.

Efficient trade key to agriculture and food securityCoC 12 (United States Chamber of Commerce, ENHANCING THE U.S.MEXICO
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/10/a-financial-apo.html%2010/9/08http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/10/a-financial-apo.html%2010/9/08


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ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP 4-24-12)In both markets, consumers and producers alike benefit from access to the othersagricultural output. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S.-Mexicoagricultural trade is largelycomplementary, meaning that the United States tends to

export different commodities to Mexico than Mexico exports to the United States. Grains,oilseeds, meat, and related products make up about three-quarters of U.S. agricultural exportsto Mexico, where domestic production is insufficient to meet demand. Meanwhile, roughly two-thirds of U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico consist of beer, along with vegetables and fruit

whose growing season largely complements that of the United States. As a result of this closerelationship,each country plays an important role in the food securityof the other. Ifthat relationship can be made more efficient through regulatory cooperation, alignment ofsafety and testing practices, transparency, and science-based regulation, citizens of bothcountries will have more reliable access to safe food at better prices, quality, andreliability.

Reduces the likelihood of GMO useDaily Yonder 8 [The Daily Yonder, The Daily Yonder's special reports also bring youoverviews of the big issues now facing small communities -- health, employment, broadbandaccess, education, and economic development. We're tracking how national policies are reaching(or ignoring) rural communities. The Daily Yonder has been published on the web since 2007 bythe Center for Rural Strategies, a non-profit media organization based in Whitesburg, Kentucky,and Knoxville, Tennessee. The site was developed with the support of the Annie E. CaseyFoundation, the Nathan Cummings Foundation, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and the MediaDemocracy Fund (a project of the Proteus Fund)., "Will Genetically Modified Crops End FoodCrisis?," Daily Yonder, 4/25, http://www.dailyyonder.com/will-genetically-modified-crops-end-food-crisis]The worldwidefood shortage and the rising cost of food are leading those who were

reluctant to use or plant g enetically m odified crops to change their minds, according toa front page story in The New York Times. "Soaring food prices and global grain shortages arebringing pressures on governments, food companies and consumers to relax their longstandingresistance to genetically engineered crops," reports Times reporter Andrew Pollack.

GMOs cause superweeds that wipe out plant species ag collapseLean 2 [Geoffrey Lean. Environment Editor, Independent, The (London), GM crops bound to`escape', says EU, Mar 24, 2002,http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4158/is_20020324/ai_n12597023]Geneswill inevitablyescape from genetically modified crops, contaminating organic farms,creating superweeds, and drivingwild plants to extinction, an official EU studyconcludes. It adds that the three GM crops at present being trialled in Britain - maize, sugar

beet and oilseed rape - pose the greatest risks of all the varieties it examined. The study, justpublished by the European Environment Agency, confirms environmentalists' worst fearsand will make it very difficult for the Government to approve the commercial planting of GMcrops in Britain. Ministers, who have consistently promised not to permit the crops if they arefound to endanger the environment, will have to make a decision next year after thecompletion of three years of trials. But the trials are primarily designed to examine the use ofpesticides on GM crops, not to look for escaping genes. The study concludes that "gene flowcan occur over long distances", and that some varieties of GM crops interbreed with others


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fragmented and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these studies havefocused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather than taking acomprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the studies (see table on p. 108)are quite varied. Nonetheless, one message comes through quite clearlylong and

unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the U nited S tates and Mexican

economies many billions of dollars each year. Moderate investments to updateinfrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long linesand overworked staffpromote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight

federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic

efforts that do more with less , improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are

also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, whichincludes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals andshipments expedited passage across the border. Common Voice Improving these programs

and significantlyexpanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal

investments in infrastructure and staffing all while strengthening security by

giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous

individuals and shipments. The development ofthe 21st Century Border initiative bythe Obama and Caldern administrations hasyielded some advances in this direction, but

the efforts need to be redoubled. The 1990s were the decade of NAFTA and skyrocketing

trade. The 2000s saw security concerns grow and recession struck. The new decade has only justbegun, but the potential is there for a resurgence of competitiveness and regional integration.There are strong ideas including trusted traveler and shipper programs,preclearance, customs harmonization, and public-private partnerships thathave enormous potential. The challenge is nowfor heterogeneous and geographicallydispersed border communities to find a way to speak with a common voice, for policymakersin Washington and Mexico City to guide strategic planning for regionalcompetitiveness, and for all stakeholders to engage vigorouslyin binational

dialogue and cooperation.

b. Time tradeoffBurnson 12 (Patrick Burnson, Executive Editor of Logistics Managementhttp://www.logisticsmgmt.com/view/ace_enhances_security_speeds_up_the_flow_of_goods

_into_u.s/airfreight 4/25/2012 ACE enhances security, speeds up the flow of goods into U.S.)ACE is the commercial trade processing systembeing phased in by CBP to facilitatelegitimate trade and strengthen border security. ACE will completely replace the

Automated Commercial System (ACS) in September and it will be the only CBP-approved EDIportal for transmitting required advance information for ocean and rail cargo to CBP.Streamlined trade and security filings underACE will enable goods to pass morequickly through border crossings, give users better control and visibility of their assets,

and allow CBP to spend less time on paperwork and more time on securityinitiatives. He noted thatACE was created to provide a higher visibility betweenparticipating government agencies as to what cargo was coming into the U.S. and from

whom. Thisallows the different agenciesto further collaborate with one another tomakebetter, moreefficientdecisionsaboutsecurity, targeting cargo for exams etc. andfor the release of containers to expedite the flow of cargo, added Heimbeck.[ Bryn Heimbeck,Trade Techs CEO.]
http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/view/ace_enhances_security_speeds_up_the_flow_of_goods_into_u.s/airfreight%204/25/2012http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/view/ace_enhances_security_speeds_up_the_flow_of_goods_into_u.s/airfreight%204/25/2012http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/view/ace_enhances_security_speeds_up_the_flow_of_goods_into_u.s/airfreight%204/25/2012http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/view/ace_enhances_security_speeds_up_the_flow_of_goods_into_u.s/airfreight%204/25/2012


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c. PrescreeningByrd 7 (Erlinda P. Byrd Department of Homeland Securityhttp://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commercial_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and

_New_Mexico/ 1/23/2007 Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) Mandate Expanded toPorts of Entry in California, Texas, and New Mexico)

ACE is the next generation of CBP technologydesigned to protect the United Statesfrom terrorismwhile ensuring the countrys economic vitalityby expediting lawfultrade. The electronic submission, called an e-manifest, is an electronically filed versionof the paper manifest carriers are already required to submit before crossing the U.S.

border. E-manifest allows CBP to begin processing the truck before it arrives at theport, said Louis Samenfink, executive director for CBPs Cargo Systems ProgramOffice. With advance access to truck cargo information, CBP officers are able to pre-screen trucks and shipments, and dedicate more time to inspecting suspiciouscargo without delaying the border crossings of legitimate carriers.

d. Data efficiency and elimination of corruptionIDB 10 (Inter-American Development Bank, Risk Management for Cargo and Passengers: A

Knowledge and Capacity Product,http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08876.pdf) Automated commercial cargo risk assessment capabilities provide administrationswith new means to identify high-risk shipments earlier in the trade chain. Newtechnologies that support this approach will also reduce corruption by eliminatingopportunities for tampering that exist in paper processing environments. Theyensure that modernizing administrations begin to focus their efforts on security-

based threats and assist in establishing a common and strategic risk managementregime among security partners.87 Depending on the threat involved, pre-arrival datacan be reviewed and scrutinized in advance of loading and before departure inorder to identify high-risk shipments and potentially interdict threats at theappropriate stage of the supply chain. The more security and safety-oriented thethreat, the more important it is to interdict the threat as early as possible in thesupply chain. This prompts efforts to obtain data as early as possible within the supply chaintimeline. While responses to interdict a security threat (e.g., bomb) must start as soon aspossible (i.e., before loading/departure), other less physical threats (e.g., smuggledtobacco/evasion of duties and taxes) are normally interdicted after arrival, as a formaldeclaration is required which will prove actus rea (the act) and mens rea (intent). This point offinality is legally required by most regulatory agencies with a border or supply chain mandateoutside of the security realm.

e. Inter-agency coordination, scanning, and information accessCBP 13 (Customs and Border Protection, Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)/International Trade Data System (ITDS) 7-15-13)

ACE is an enterprise-wide initiative that includes sweeping process and technologyimprovements across CBP. It touches nearly every CBP employee, as well as the tradecommunity, PGAs, and the traveling public. TheACE Program also brings this enterprise-

wide approach to planning, defining, developing, and implementing new business processes,designed to increase national security through accurate, available data andpromote seamless trade processing and collection of duties, taxes, and fees. It isdramaticallystreamlining CBP processing of imports with automated administrative andformerly paper-based functions. Significant screening, targeting, and border securitycapabilities have been implemented through the ACE Program. Leveraging the Automated
http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commercial_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and_New_Mexico/http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commercial_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and_New_Mexico/http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commercial_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and_New_Mexico/http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08876.pdfhttp://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08876.pdfhttp://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/08876.pdfhttp://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commercial_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and_New_Mexico/http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commercial_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and_New_Mexico/http://www.domesticpreparedness.com/Updates/Government_Update/Automated_Commercial_Environment_(ACE)_Mandate_Expanded_to_Ports_of_Entry_in_California,_Texas,_and_New_Mexico/


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Targeting System, the Intranet-based enforcement and decision support tool that isthe cornerstone for all of CBPs targeting efforts,ACE delivers innovative and emergentscreening and targeting capabilityto identify high-risk cargo and crew based onadvance information and strategic intelligence, allowing CBP, DHS, and other lawenforcement officials to prescreen and evaluate entities early on, generally at the port ofdeparture.With theACE platform, CBP has the ability to initiate activities, foster

collaboration among security analysts, and access past activity logs for additionalintelligence. ACE has the potential to be integrated with DHS information systems and bordersecurity technology,bringing together critical security, public health, public safety,and environmental protection information through a common platform, enablingagencies to efficiently obtain trade and enforcement data across the Government.


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1AC - Plan

Thus the plan, the United States Federal Government should fully fund andimplement the Automated Commercial Environment land port modernizationprogram along the United States-Mxico border.

'Economic engagement towards Mexico includes infrastructure investments.U.S. Chamber of Commerce, no date, The U.S.-Mexico Leadership Initiative Vision 2020:Enhancing the U.S.-Mexico Economic Partnership,http://www.uschamber.com/international/americas/us-mexico-leadership-initiative-vision-2020-enhancing-us-mexico-economic-parIn this moment, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is launching a CEO-level Leadership

Initiative to execute a strategy for enhanced economic engagement between the

U nited S tates and Mexico. The Leadership Initiative will provide the strategic energy behind

Vision 2020, a five-point plan for enhancing the U.S.-Mexico economic partnership,with a view toward making the relationship a global model for bilateral best practices by the year2020. Key Elements: Annual high-level trade and investment mission to Mexico City and

reciprocal visit to Washington, DC Annual high-level U.S.-Mexico commercial dialogue to behosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in conjunction with the Mexican private sector

Working-level policy group structure in support of Vision 2020 Annual report to U.S. andMexican governments on the state of the bilateral economic relationship Policy Program of

Work The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is building a program of work thatwill move true

economic partnership between the U nited S tates and Mexico from policy

aspiration to reality. Our goal is to make our border work; make both countries morecompetitive in global markets; promote the continent's energy independence while respectingour shared environment; raise living standards for our citizens; and enhance inter-governmental cooperation; all within a framework that fully respects and supports nationalsovereignty and interests. Leadership Initiative members will:Advance a Partnership forCompetitiveness Our bilateral economic framework must build on the foundation of

NAFTA to advance 21st Century standards for our increasingly integrated markets.Through the work of its Global Regulatory Cooperation Project and Coalition for the Rule of Lawin Global Markets, the U.S. Chamber has positioned itself as a thought leader and prime moverin this area. This working group will advance best practices that will grant citizens on both sidesof the border the benefits of markets where openness, competition, and transparency prevail.Build A Partnership of Mutual Respect With the end of the Security and ProsperityPartnership, the United States and Mexico lack a robust institutional framework for cooperationfor one of the most complex bilateral relationships in the world. This working group will pressfor pragmatic ways for the private sector to support regular government-to-government cooperation. Our objective is to foster closer bilateral working ties at all levelsof government, especially in those areas that most closely affect the flow of trade andinvestment. Create a World Class Border U.S. and Mexican officials must pursue a

common, consistent, and comprehensive approach to border management to address our sharedsecurity and competitiveness challenges. This working group will engage the U.S. Chamber and

AmCham Mexico as they produce a report on the Mexico-U.S. border to underscore that the

use of proven risk-management techniques, investments in infrastructure , and a

renewed focus on trade and travel facilitation can advance both countries' securityand economic interests. Lead Collaboration on Energy and the EnvironmentMexico is second only to Canada as a source of U.S. petroleum imports, and we must recognizethat our economic competitiveness depends on our ability to secure sustainable and reliablesources of energy while acting as wise environmental stewards. This working group will work to


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leverage the advantages inherent in each country to boost our mutual competitiveness throughoptimal and sustainable use of resources. Raise Living Standards by EnhancingCompetitiveness Recognizing the challenges facing workers in the United States andMexico, this working group will promote common approaches to workforce issues

wherever possible. We must build on the competitive advantages inherent to workers in eachmarket if we are to raise living standards for all our workers.


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Contention 2: Supply Chains

Aerospace growth and competitiveness declining now stronger supply chains keyBernardini and Fitzpatrick 13 (Eric Bernardini and David Fitzpatrick, managing directorsfor AlixPartners, Pockets of Turbulence

June 2013)The airline sector reflects the current good-news/bad-news state of the A&D industry. Steadytraffic growth5.3% in 2012is leading to improved revenue, and the airlines have

become much more disciplined on capacity than they were in the past. (Capacity grew 3.9% lastyear.) Still,airlines have struggled to translate these improvements to the bottomline, and strong profits remain elusive. Current projections call for operating margins of just3.3% in 2013. [] As the profit pool gets larger, commercial aircraft OEMs will fight to increasetheir share, by developing new aircraft designs and ramping up production for both narrow-

body and wide-body aircraft. Supply chain: Challenges on the horizon The coming increase

in sales volume is a positive sign, but itwill create significant challenge s for A&D supply

chains . As noted earlier, we project a 45% ramp-up in workload by 2017, with new programs

like the A320neo, Boeing 737 MAX, and Bombardier C series that will tax engineering andindustrial service functions. These new programs also involve more-technologicallycomplexdesigns aimed at increasing aircraft operating efficiency by 15 to 20%. such advances includecomposite materials, fuel-efficient engines, and new systems, including avionics, fuel, braking,and electric systems. The current industry supplychain is not entirely ready for this dualchallenge of delivering a greater volume of more-sophisticated aircraft. in fact, there is a realand growing riskof 1supply chain disruptions. Certain suppliers have only limited expertiseand modest engineering capabilities for implementing and sustaining several programs,especially in the detailed-parts and aerostructures segments. some suppliers and OEMs havetaken early steps to handle those limitationsfor example, by more directly involving andclosely monitoring tier 1 aerostructure suppliers in new programsbut those measuresrepresent a new risk-sharing model for which neither side is yet mature enough to implement

and monitor.

US aerospace competitiveness key to air powerWatkins 6 (Todd, PhD-Harvard and director-Lehigh Universitys Institute forEntrepreneurship, Creativity and Innovation, with ALAN SCHRIESHEIM and STEPHENMERRILL, Glide Path to Irrelevance: Federal Funding for Aeronautics,http://www.issues.org/23.1/watkins.html)

World leadership in air transportation and aircraft manufacturing iswidely viewed as acornerstone ofU.S.economic welfare and national security. Department of Transportationstatistics are revealing. U.S. residents already have the highest per capita level of air travel in the

world, and use is rising steadily. Domestic commercial flights, the backbone of the U.S. travelindustry, carried 660 million passengers in 2005. The Federal Aviation Administration predictsone billion passengers by 2015. General aviation already flies 150 million more passengers thando commercial flights. Air cargo has grown 7% annually since 1980, by far the fastest-growingmode of freight transportation during the past two decades. It now accounts for more than one-quarter of the overall value of U.S. international merchandise trade, steadily gaining ground onthe maritime sector, which has a two-fifths share. JFK International Airport alone handled $125

billion worth of international air cargo in 2004; this total ranks ahead of the value of cargothrough the Port of Los Angeles, the nations leading maritime port. Aviations nationaleconomic impact does not stop with the air transport system. Aerospace exports in 2005 made


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up nearly 30% of all U.S. exports in the category that the Department of Commerce labelsadvanced technology products. Census Bureau trade figures indicate that aerospace, mainlyairplanes and parts, delivered a surplus to the United States of nearly $37 billion in 2005, whichsignificantly defrayed an $82 billion deficit in all other advanced technology categories. Indeed,for years aerospace has regularly logged the widest positive trade margin among U.S.manufacturing industries. As for aeronautics military significance, the Departmentof Defenses

(DODs) guiding doctrine relies significantlyon air superiorityand aircraft rapid strike andforce-deployment capabilities. Moreover, a variety ofaeronautics technologies, such asstealth and unpiloted remote-sensing aircraft and airborne command and control systems, havetransformed militaryoperations not only in the air but on the ground and at sea. Thecentrality is reflected in procurement strategy: A 2005 RAND analysis found that the DODspends on the order of a third of its procurement budget on aerospace, including about $40

billion every year to buy aircraft and other air systems. Nonetheless, recent signs that thenations preeminence in aviation may be imperiled have occasioned deep concern. At least 12studies of U.S. activity in aeronautics published during the past half decade by the National

Academies and various industry and government bodies have called attention to thevulnerability of the United States traditional leading position. In its final report, theCommission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, widely known as the Walker

Commission, stated that the critical underpinnings of this nations aerospace industry areshowing signs of faltering and warned bluntly, We stand dangerously close to squandering theadvantage bequeathed to us by prior generations of aerospace leaders. In 2005, the National

Aerospace Institute, in a report commissioned by Congress, declared the center of technical andmarket leadership to be shifting outside the United States to Europe, with a loss of high-paying jobs and intellectual capital to the detriment of the United States economic well-being.The clear message is that the United States must overcome a series of major challengesto thecapacity, safety, and security of the nations air transportation system, to the nations ability tocompete in international markets, and to the need to reduce noise and emissionsif the nations

viability in this sector, let alone international leadership, is to be ensured.

Air power key to US-Asia alliances and effective Asia pivotLowther 11 Dr. Adam B. Lowther is a member of the faculty at the U.S Air Force's AirUniversity. November 22nd, 2011, "Why U.S. Needs Airpower Diplomacy,"thediplomat.com/2011/11/22/why-u-s-needs-airpower-diplomacy/?all=true

What makes affording a shift to the region particularly difficult is the fact that the Asia-Pacificsdistances make operating in the region much more expensive than operating in the West. Bycontrast, Europe is a rather compact continent where the distance between Washington, DC,and Berlin is closer to half that of Los Angeles to Beijing. To make matters more challenging,existing U.S. bases in Japan and Korea, for example, are among the United States mostexpensiveeven with significant financial support from the host nation. And to make matterseven more difficult, in some cases,local populations no longer support a permanent

American presence. These challenges impose a difficult set of requirements on a new U.S.strategy for the Asia-Pacific. Such a strategy should demonstrate that it relies on U.S. assets bestable to overcome the challenges of distance; it must prove cost effective; and it is sensitive to the

domestic and strategic position of partner nations. One approach is particularly well suited toovercoming these challenges. Airpower diplomacy, also known as building partnerships by theU.S. Air Force, offers some distinct advantages over any alternatives. Best thought of as the non-kinetic application of air, space, and cyber power, airpower diplomacy is a form ofsoftpower thats useful in strengthening existing relationships and developing new oneswhileprotecting American interests. The U.S. Air Force has successfullyemployed airpowerdiplomacy in one iteration or another for more than six decades. Its strengths are in threedistinct areas. First, airpower,broadly speaking, is able to overcome the distances thatmake the Asia-Pacific such a challenging region. As the single largest feature on the earths


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surface, the Pacific Ocean makes it difficult for the United States to respond quickly with menand material to unexpected events in the region. With airpower,theres no place on earth thatthe United Statescant reach in less than 24 hours. However, aircraft must land, which is

why building partnershipsof mutual interestswith countries in the region is a criticalcomponent of airpower diplomacy. For many nations in the Asia-Pacific, walking a careful line

between China and the United States is the unenviable position in which they find themselves.

As the most advanced air, space, and cyber force in the world, the U.S. Air Force is a desirablepartner for many countries. This provides a natural advantage for the United States. However,ensuring that the U.S. doesnt overplay its hand is important if airpower diplomacy is to succeed.Second, airpower diplomacyis a cost-effective alternative to the use of force. Since its aconcept that focuses on the application of soft power, airpower diplomacy is far more than just

American aircraft sitting on the ramps of foreign airfields. Itbuilds partnerships througheconomic ties, training and support of local forces, humanitarian relief, jointoperations, and much more. For example,Fifth Air Force, based at Yokota Air Force Base inJapan, has provided assistance to victims of floods, typhoons, volcanoes, and earthquakes onnumerous occasions in recent years. The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004), Burmacyclone (2008), Indonesian earthquake (2009), and the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (2011)are some examples of where airpower diplomacy played a leading role in the United States

response to natural disasters. In the case of the Indian Ocean and Tohoku earthquakes andtsunamis, a strong American response led to improved relations between the United States andIndonesia in the first case and the United States and Japan in the second. This was airpowerdiplomacy at work.An often overlooked example of airpower diplomacy is the U.S. Air ForcesInter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas.There, students from across Latin America attend courses ranging from aircraft maintenance toprofessional leadership. The schools broader objective is to build a community of airmen withthe skills to lead capable air forces in their home countriesmaking cooperation with the UnitedStates more likely. In these and many other instances, airpower diplomacy acts as a cost-effective way for the United States to build partnerships with nations that share commoninterests. And,bystrengthening relationships, the United States is less likely to find itself ina costly conflictwith what could have been a partner. Third, airpower and airpower

diplomacydont require permanent large footprint bases that are both expensive for theUnited States and a political irritant for many governments in the region. With the U.S. pivotingtoward the Asia-Pacific, a growth in the number of American main-operating bases in the region

would be expected. Airpower diplomacy, however, focuses on the use of joint operations, short-term deployments, and other temporary measures, enabling the United States to maintain aregional presencedemonstrating commitmentwhile eliminating concerns ofan

Americanoccupation. Flexible operations and arrangements also have the added benefit ofproving to be less of a stressor in the host nations relationship with China, which is becomingincreasingly important for every nation in the region. The United States attempt to conduct

what Secretary of State Clinton calls forward deployed diplomacy, a strategy in whichAmerican airmen operate with their host nation counterparts at bases owned and operated bythe host nation, may prove a far superior option to one resembling Cold War NATO where up toseveral hundred thousand Americans were stationed in Western Europe. With its focus on a

wide range of soft power tools, airpower diplomacy is well suited to serve a central role inAmerican foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. Simply put, no other U.S. military capabilityprovides the speed and flexibilityof airpower. As defense and foreign policy officials in theObama administration refine the presidents regional strategy, they may want to give airpowerdiplomacy and its mix of diplomatic tools significant consideration. After all, no other approachis as cost effective, culturally sensitive, and responsive to the requirements of a complex andchanging region.


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Effective Asia pivot solves multiple scenarios for nuclear warColby 11 Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policyadvisor to the Secretary of Defenses Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor tothe Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, Why the U.S. Needs itsLiberal Empire, The Diplomat, online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes

But the pendulum shouldnt be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment.For our problem hasnt been overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kindsof interventions. The US alliance and partnership structure, what the late William Odomcalled the United States liberal empire that includes a substantial military presence and a

willingness to use it in the defence of US and allied interests, remains a vital component ofUS security and global stability and prosperity. This system of voluntary and consensualcooperation under US leadership, particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable

bloc defending the liberal international order. But, in part due to poor decision-making inWashington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the securitysituation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the globaleconomy. A nuclear North Koreas violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as

well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyangs development of a road mobile

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover, brings into sight the day when North Koreacould threaten the United States itselfwith nuclear attack, a prospect that will further imperilstability in the region. More broadly, the rise of China and especially its rapid and opaquemilitary build-up combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes istroubling to the United States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularlyrelevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijingsanti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile,more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines,torpedoes, and other assets. While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range ofmatters, these capabilities will give China the growing power to deny the United States theability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to undermine theUS-guaranteed security substructure that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II.

Even if China says today it wont exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrowor the next day will bring? Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific inresponse to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engageBeijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrainedmilitary posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. In short, the UnitedStates must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintainingthe military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments toimprove US capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence

by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US security umbrella. Thiswont be cheap, for these requirements cant be met simply by incremental additions to theexisting posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and otherexpensive high-tech capabilities. Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents theeconomic future, and its strategic developments will determine which country or countries setthe international rules that shape that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in theMiddle East and, to a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe have been driven by far moreambitious and aspirational conceptions of the national interest, encompassing theproposition that failing or illiberally governed peripheral states can contribute to aninstability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether thisproposition is true, the effort is rightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the

benefits gained. Moreover, the United States can scale (and has scaled) back nation-buildingplans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in


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ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism. The lesson to be drawn from recentyears is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments assuch, but rather that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. Atotal US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure,leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos ordominance by others who could not be counted on to look out for US interests. We need to

focus on making the right interventions, not forswearing them completely. In practice, thismeans a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious security challenges there, andless emphasis on the Middle East. This isnt to say that the United States should be unwillingto intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should bemore tightly connected to concrete objectives such as protecting the free flow of oil from theregion, preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, and forestalling or,

if necessary, containing nuclear proliferation as opposed to the more idealistic aspirations

to transform the regions societies. These more concrete objectives can be better met by themore judicious and economical use of our military power. More broadly, however, it meansashift in US emphasis away from the greater Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific region, whichdwarfs the former in economic and military potential and in the dynamism of its societies.The Asia-Pacific region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the

global stage, is where the future of the international security and economic system will be set,and it is there that Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of risingregional security challenges. In light of US budgetary pressures, including the hundreds of

billions in security related money to be cut as part of the debt ceiling deal, its doublyimportant that US security dollars be allocated to the most pressing tasks shoring up theUS position in the most important region of the world, the Asia-Pacific. It will also requirerestraint in expenditure on those challenges and regions that dont touch so directly on thefuture of US security and prosperity. As Americans debate the proper US global role in the

wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct theirire not at overseas commitments and intervention as such, but rather at those not tied to coreUS interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the liberal empire that we haveconstructed and maintained since World War II. Defenders of our important overseas links

and activities should clearly distinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barelyrestrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing the United States tieddown in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed,those who refuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle East or call for still more aredirectly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia, given strategicdevelopments in the region and a sharply constrained budgetary environment in

Washington. We can no longer afford, either strategically or financially, to squander ourpower in unnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The abilityand will to intervene is too important to be so wasted.

The Asia pivot protects straits of Malacca---key to Asian trade

Kaplan 11 Robert D. Kaplan 11 is senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security,national correspondent for the Atlantic, and a member of the U.S. Defense Department'sDefense Policy Board, September/October 2011, The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict,online:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_south_china_sea_is_the_future_of_conflict?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=fullThe South China Seajoins the Southeast Asian states with the Western Pacific, functioning asthe throat of global sea routes. Here is thecenter ofmaritime Eurasia, punctuated by thestraits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar. More than halfthe world's annual


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merchant fleet tonnage passes through these choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic.The oil transported through the Strait ofMalacca from the Indian Ocean, en route to East

Asia through the South China Sea, is morethan six timesthe amount that passes through theSuez Canal and 17 times the amount that transits the Panama Canal. Roughly two-thirds ofSouth Korea's energy supplies, nearly 60 percent of Japan's and Taiwan's energy supplies,and about 80 percent of China's crude-oil imports come through the South China Sea. What's

more, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and an estimated 900trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge bounty. It is not onlylocation and energy

reserves that promise to give the South China Sea critical geostrategic importance , but

also the coldblooded territorial disputes that have long surrounded these waters. Severaldisputes concern the Spratly Islands, a mini-archipelago in the South China Sea'ssoutheastern part. Vietnam, Taiwan, and China each claim all or most of the South ChinaSea, as well as all of the Spratly and Paracel island groups. In particular, Beijing asserts ahistorical line: It lays claim to the heart of the South China Sea in a grand loop (widely knownas the "cow's tongue") from China's Hainan Island at the South China Sea's northern end allthe way south 1,200 miles to near Singapore and Malaysia. The result is that all nine statesthat touch the South China Sea are more or less arrayed against China and therefore

dependent on the U nited S tates for diplomatic and military support . These conflicting

claims are likely to become even more acute as Asia's spiraling energy demands -- energyconsumption is expected to double by 2030, with China accounting for half that growth --make the South China Sea the ever more central guarantor of the region's economic strength.

Already, the South China Sea has increasingly become an armed camp, as the claimants buildup and modernize their navies, even as the scramble for islands and reefs in recent decades ismostly over. China has so far confiscated 12 geographical features, Taiwan one, Vietnam 25,the Philippines eight, and Malaysia five.

Collapse of Asian trade causes US draw-in and nuclear warAuslin 9 Michael Auslin 9, resident scholar at AEI, Averting Disaster, The Daily Standard,2/6, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29339/pub_detail.asp

As they deal with a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the

globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truerthan in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds andterritorial rivalries.Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalistoutbursts, growing distrust, andultimately, military miscalculation. The result would bedisaster on top of an already dire situation. Asia's political infrastructure may not be strongenough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. No one should think that Asia is onthe verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in thisregion for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore,China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, todevelopment and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomaticinitiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America hasdirectly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the

general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during thesedecades of growth, moments ofeconomic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led toinstabilityand bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in Chinahas led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imaginesuch instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China'spotential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian CurrencyCrisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources,further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmareof governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand


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and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened politicalleaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia areattacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia'spolitical infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation andconflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in

Asia. It would almost certainlydrag America in at some point, as well. First of all,we have

alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any ofthem come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities couldmean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in goodmeasure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terriblelocalized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s.Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear iftheAmerican military,already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is itclear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing toshed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historicchanging of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China wouldemerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea wouldlink up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is

guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason tobelieve we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyedinternational systems in the past.

Plan key to aerospace sectorCoC 11 (United States Chamber of Commerce, Steps to a 21st Century: U.S.-Mexico Border 11-30-11)Much discussion takes place today about the ability of U.S. companies to increase their exports.President Obama made this a national goal in the United States, calling for doubling the nationsexports over the next five years. The Chamber supports this goal, and through its advocacy foropen markets is working to ensure that it is achieved. However, policymakers should recognize,too, that exports sometimes rely on imports. For example, year after year, the BoeingCorporation isthe largest U.S. exporter by value. The company designs, manufactures,and sells commercial jetliners, satellites, militaryaircraft, and other products in a worldwidemarketplace. The completion of its newest commercial aircraft, the 787 Dreamliner, is truly amarvel to behold and a point of pride for the company and the entire country. While theDreamliner is constructed in the United States, many of its parts come from all over the world.Consequently,while Boeing is the countrys leading exporter, it is also a top importer.Companies invest billions annually to ensure the security, safety, and speed of the productscoming into the United States. The faster those products are brought to theirmanufacturing facilities, the faster Boeing exports its planes. In a just-in-time deliveryenvironment, Boeing relies on anefficient supply chainfrom countries around the globe,including Mexico. In this high-value, mass-scale production environment, inventory is not an

option. Trade facilitation is the only solution .

Trade efficiency especially key to UASAIA 13 [Aerospace Industries Association, The Aerospace Industries Association represents thenation's leading manufacturers and suppliers of civil, military, and business aircraft, helicopters,unmanned aircraft systems, space systems, aircraft engines, missiles, materiel and relatedcomponents, equipment, services and information technology., "Unmanned Aircraft Systems:


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Perceptions & Potential,"]As U. S. defense budgets decline, maintaining a strong U. S. aerospace industry willincreasinglydepend on an effective export strategy for technologies where the United States isa global leader. There isno better example than UAS. According to the Defense SecurityCooperation Agency, approximately 556 models of unmanned systems are produced

worldwide by 195 companies.21

UAVs key to ISRsolves crisis managementTrefz 3 John L, Jr., LCDR, US Navy, From Persistent ISR to Precision Strikes: The ExpandingRole of UAVs, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a420264.pdfOperational intelligence is directed at collection, analysis, and evaluation of informationdealing with all aspects of the situation in a given theater of operation plus adjacent areas of

interest.21 The ability to gather timely, relevantintelligence is critical to the success ofany

major operation or campaign. The capability to provide adequate coverage of theoperational commanders Area of Responsibility (AOR) or Area of Interest (AOI) depends onthe integration of both manned and unmanned assets. The level of effort will vary with thesize (factor space) of the AOR/AOI and the time available (factor time) for intelligencecollection. During the pre-hostility stage of a conflict, UAVs can assist manned assets in the

Intelligence Preparation of the Theater (IPT). Easily transportable and rapidlydeployable, both the Global Hawk and Predator systems can quickly respond to an

emerging crisis . Their smaller footprint in a given theater allows the operational

commander to gather intelligence withless diplomatic and political interference. Thedeployment of manned platforms such as the JSTARS or Rivet Joint aircraft to monitor a givencrisis results in a very large support package to sustain operations. Once these aircraft are intheater, Operational Security (OPSEC) becomes more challenging and Military Deception(MILDEC) may be lost. During the monitoring of adversary activity, the presence of easilyidentifiable, radar significant intelligence platforms makes easier the enemys job of hiding hisactivities. UAVs smaller size, combined with long endurance and unlimited sustainability,makes them the optimal platform during the pre-hostility phase of operations. Once hostilities

commence, the UAV remains the premier intelligence-gathering platform. The reduced risk tocoalition aircraft and personnel in high-threat environments makes UAV employment ideal.Although systems such as the Global Hawk at $10 million per unit are not consideredexpendable, the cost of losing one of these assets is insignificantwhen compared to the lossof a manned asset and its aircrew. The ability of UAVs to provide real-time BDA to theoperational commander will allow more efficient allocation of follow-on strike assets tomaximize their effects on the enemys ability to continue to resist. Command and Control

Warfare (C2W) Information Warfare (IW) is the actions aimed at achieving informationsuperiority by denying, exploiting, corrupting, or destroying the enemys information andinformation functions while protecting ones own from enemy attack.23 C2W uses OPSEC,MILDEC, PSYOPS, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Physical Destruction to defeat the enemysCommand and Control (C2) functions while protecting ones own.24 The UAV has the ability toaccomplish all of these functions effectively. As mentioned before, the employment ofUAVs formonitoring and IPT missions improves both OPSEC and MILDEC activities. Additionally, thepsychological impact to the enemyof constant monitoring and surveillance cannot be

overlooked. The ability of the UAV to maintain 24/7 coverage of selected portions of the AOR

willmake itvirtually impossible for the enemy to determine if or when he is being

watched . The CNN Factor of constant coverage will make him think that all his movements

are under scrutiny. When you add a limited strike capability to the UAV, such as armedPredators, the adversary commander would have to assume that all UAVs are armed. Another


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subset of C2W is Electronic Warfare (EW). This is an area where the UAV can tackle the dulland the dangerous missions presently performed by manned aircraft. The three parts of EWare Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Protect (EP), and Electronic Support (ES).25 EA serves todeny the enemys operational commander the use of the electromagnetic spectrum while EPserves to safeguard the use of the same spectrum for our operational commander. ES involvesthose activities which serve to identify our enemys activities and help locate the threats (SIGINT

is a by-product). ES also helps to provide Indications and Warnings (I&W) to our forces ofimmediate threats or potential future threats enhancing overall Force Protection. The GlobalHawk UAV is ideally suited for the mission of monitoring enemy electronic emissions andproviding timely threat warnings to the operational commander. As UAV technology advances,they will prepare the battlefield by leading the way into high threat envelopes and

neutraliz ing enemy air defense systems . As mentioned before, they are not expendable,

but their loss would be more acceptable than that of a manned aircraft.

That prevents nuke war over TaiwanLieber 7 - Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of NotreDame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University ofPennsylvania, Winter 2007, U.S. Nuclear Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,

China Security, Issue No. 5, online: http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_5.pdfHe notes that if Chinawere to alert its strategic nuclear forces during a warwith theUnited States over Taiwan, the United Stateswould likely act to beat China to thepunch. He continues, Given constant U.S. surveillance of Chinese nuclear launch sites,anymajor Chinese preparations tofire preemptorilywould be detected and countered

by a rapid U.S. preemptive strike against the sites by U.S. conventional or nuclear forcesThe United States could easily detect and react inside of the lengthy launch cycle time ofChinese forces.24 Blairs words mirror our argument and suggest the two ways that nuclearprimacy may benefit the United States. First, ifthe Chinesewere to threaten nuclearescalation in the context of a Taiwan war, the U.S. could strike first and likelydestroytheChinese force on the ground beat China to the punch, as Blair puts it. Second, Chinasknowledge ofits vulnerabilityto nuclear preemption might prevent China from alerting

its nuclear force or even attacking Taiwan in the first place.

Transition wars for econ reformKothari, 82[Professor of political science at University of Delhi, Towards a Just SocialOrder, p. 571]

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked byincreasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres ofpower -- and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domesticrepression producing in their wake an intensification of the old arms race andmilitarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting thestage for eventual global holocaust.

War over Taiwan inevitable - U.S. superiority causing China escalation nowZhang 8 - Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Lingnan University, HongKong, March 2008, The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China's No -First-Use Nuclear Policy,Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 164-182In fact, the Chinese military was awed bytheAmerican dominance in conventional

warfare. As observed by General Wang Baocun, a prominent strategist at the PLA Academyof Military Sciences, the U.S. revolution in military affairs has resulted in a new kind of gap

with other countries. Previously, the gap was merely generational. This time, there is a time


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gap in that the U.S. military and others are fighting as if they were from different historicalperiods. According to Wang, The time gap in military technologies allows the superior sideto possess an absolute advantage while leaving the other side in a position of absolutedisadvantage. The time gap makes it impossible for developing countries to overcome theirmilitary disadvantage in confrontations with the United States. Wang thus reaches a gloomyconclusion: The military time gap results in serious threats to the national and military

security of developing countries. In fact, they are almost in a defenseless situation.17 MajorGeneral Xu Hezhen, who is the Commandant of PLA Army Command Academy inShijiazhuang, suggests that the RMA allows the U.S. to conduct no-contact combat againstother militaries through beyond visual range sensor technologies and precision-strike

weapons. This revolution in combat creates a battlefield situation where 'I can see you andhit you but you can't see me and hit back. The situation leaves the weaker side in a position ofperpetual disadvantage until it loses the will of resistance.18 The RMA thus presents aserious problem for China's military planners: how to defeat a technologically far superiorenemy such as the United States. In fact, China is no longer confident it can defeat such anenemy due to the vast gap with the United States in conventional military technologies. AsLewis and Xue observe, As senior PLA planners dissected the American strategy from theGulf War of 1991 to the lightening war against Iraq in 2003, it was to become painfully

evident that no war with the United States could be won or even brought to a reasonabledraw.19 This bleak assessment by Chinese officers of the U.S. conventional dominance in theTaiwan Strait is echoed by American analysis. In a research project for the U.S. Departmentof Defense, the Rand Corporation analyzed how China may choose to conduct a war againstthe American military. According to Rand, in the coming decades the U.S. will possess evengreater military advantages over Chinese forces than it currently enjoys.20 Therefore, if theChina intends to fight the U.S. through conventional military modernization, this option,taken alone, potentially condemns the PLA to evolving relative obsolescence.21 How toprevent a disastrous defeat in the Taiwan Strait led some in China to question theseparation ofconventional and nuclear doctrines in Chinese military thinking. Whilethe no-first-use policy can prevent a nuclear attack against China, it cannot deter a large-scale conventional war by a technologically superior enemy. Some believe that the policy can

no longer protect China's core national interests, such as preventing de jure independence ofTaiwan. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, who was the first Western analyst to notice thistrend in the 1990s, some Chinese strategists began to argue that China should develop anuclear doctrine suitable for economically and technologically weak states.22

Taiwan escalates and goes nuclear - no defenseLowther 13 [William Lowther, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, 3/16/13, Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211]Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China and theUS, a new academic report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangeroussource of tension and conflict between the US and China, says the 42-page report by the

Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prepared by the CSIS

Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes thatBeijing continues tobe set on a policy to prevent Taiwans independence, while at thesame time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. Although tensionsacross the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of

engagement in 2008, the situation remains combustible , complicated by rapidly

diverging cross-strait military capabilities and persistent political disagreements, the

report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations RichardBetts describing Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in EastAsia. The report
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211


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also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fullycontroldevelopments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise,

miscalc ulation and uncontrolled escalation , Betts wrote in a separate study of his own.

The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclearweapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwinedboth with the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and the reliability of US defensecommitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, thestudy says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict

between China and the US, but they do provide kindling for potential conflict between the twonations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including theinterests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the KoreanPeninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, thestudy says. Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis managementmechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a

direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for

miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and drawon deep historical

reservoirs of suspicion , the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side

understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by theother party. To make things worse, neither side seems tobelieve the others declaredpolicies and intentions, suggesting that escalation management, already a very uncertainendeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict, it says. Although conflict mercifullyseems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot be ruled out and may becomeincreasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky. The report says: With both sides possessing

and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals , such a conflict would be

tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.

UAS will monitor agriculture and energy infrastructure against attacks an attackwould collapse the entire industry

Darnall 11 [Bart Darnall, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: A Logical Choice for HomelandSecurity Support, Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Dec. 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-

bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA556271]Agriculture and food infrastructure comprises of production, processing, and delivery systems.A disaster caused by anattack on this infrastructure could disrupt the food supply andpose a seriousthreat to public health, safety, welfare, or to the national economy.129

According to DHS, food and agriculture infrastructure is almost entirely under privateownership and is composed of an estimated 2.1 million farms, approximately 880,500 firms andover one million facilities.130 It accounts for approximately one-fifth of the nation's economicactivity. The capabilities provided byUAS can facilitate the monitoring of farm andagriculture related features, such as the spread of crop destroying pests, status ofcrop production, identification of crop varieties, and loss of timber in areas

threatened by timber theft. Using UAS for crop spraying and dusting greatly reduces theexposure of people to hazards associated with chemical contamination.

Leads to resource wars and extinctionLugar 4 (Richard G., U.S. Senator Indiana and Former Chair Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, Plant Power, Our Planet, 14(3),http://www.unep.org/ourplanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html)


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In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclearthreats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range challenges. But we do so at ourperil. One of the most daunting of them is meeting the worlds need for food and energy in thiscentury.At stake is not onlypreventing starvation and saving the environment, but also

world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access toresources, and that poverty and famine have oftenbred fanaticism and terrorism.

Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and theproliferation of weapons of m ass d estruction. With the world population expected to grow

from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food willincrease well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developingnations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake.Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same timethat the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating asolution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developingcountries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. Asgood land disappears, people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to createmore arable land to feed themselves. The long-term environmental consequences could bedisastrous for the entire globe.


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Contention 3: Solvency

ACE underfunded - plan speeds up the project no disadsCoC 11(Steps to a 21st Century: U.S.-Mexico Border, A U.S. Chamber of Commerce BorderReport, http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2011_us_mexico_report.pdf)

Another area of concern is the lack of progress related to, and budget cuts affecting, AutomatedCommercial Environment (ACE). The FY 2011budget for ACE is $153 milliona reductionof $75 million from the FY2010 budget. This includes some $40 million to fund the

Automated Commercial System (ACS), a 26-year-old program on life support. At its budgetpeak, ACE was funded at the $300 million level. Funding has been steadilyreduced, slowingtheprogress of the project. The current budget allocation only prolongs the use of twosystems, whichis inefficient and costlyfor both industry and government. We are

encouraged by recent efforts by leadership at CBP to achieve our shared goal, but funding is

needed now to signal to the private sector that the government is serious about this

system. Our goal in the next three years should be theretirement of the U.S. AutomatedCommercial System and the full use ofACEby the entire trade community. We should alsostrive to ensure the development and implementation of the International Trade Data System

(ITDS). Unfortunately, there has been little progress made due to the lack of coordinationbetween government agencies to harmonize data submission into the system. To date,companies are required to enter repetitive data to each government agency involved. Simplifying the entryprocess for trade decreases costs for businesses and providesgovernments withmore accurate and accessible information.
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2011_us_mexico_report.pdfhttp://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2011_us_mexico_report.pdf

1ac ace.docx

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