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Signicant Victories: An Analysis of Union FirstContracts

Tom JuravichUniversity of Massachuses, Amherst

Kate BronfenbrennerCornell University, [email protected]

Robert HickeyQueen's University

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Signicant Victories: An Analysis of Union First Contracts

Abstract

[Excerpt] Aer two decades of massive employment losses in heavily unionized sectors of the economy and

exponential growth of the largely unorganized service sector, the U.S. labor movement is struggling to remainrelevant. Despite new organizing initiatives and practices, union organizing today remains a tremendouslyarduous endeavor, particularly in the private sector, as workers and their unions are routinely confronted withan arsenal of aggressive legal and illegal antiunion employer tactics. is vigorous opposition to unions in theprivate sector does not stop once an election is won, but continues throughout bargaining for an initial unionagreement, all too oen turning organizing victories into devastating rst-contract defeats.

Despite these overwhelming obstacles, workers still organize and winthrough certication elections andvoluntary recognition campaigns in both the private and public sectors. And each year unions successfullynegotiate thousands of rst contracts in the United States, providing union representation for the rst time tohundreds of thousands of new workers. is research takes an in-depth look at what unions achieve in theseinitial union contracts. Why, when confronted with such powerful opposition, do unorganized workers

continue to want to belong to unions and newly organized workers want to stay union? What do these rstcontracts provide that makes the struggle worthwhile?

To explore these questions, we analyze and evaluate union rst contracts along four primary dimensions. First,we inventory the basic workers rights provided by these contracts, which go beyond the very limited rightsprovided by federal and state labor law under the employment at will system. Second, we evaluate how rstcontracts provide workers and their unions with the institutional power to shape work and the labor processon a day-to-day basis. ird, we explore how rst contracts codify the presence and power of unions in daily

work life, and we evaluate which institutional arrangements provide a meaningful role for workers and theirunions in their workplaces. Fourth, we examine the kinds of workplace benets that are codied andsupplemented in rst contracts, gaining important insights into the types of human resource practices thatexist in newly unionized workplaces. Finally, by examining the interactions among these four dimensions, we

explore the limitations of what rst contracts have been able to achieve in the current organizing environment,and what it would take for unions to improve the quality of rst contracts.

Keywords

unions, organizing, labor movement, labor rights, contract, negotiation

Comments

Suggested Citation

Juravich, T., Bronfenbrenner, K. & Hickey, R. (2006). Signicant victories: An analysis of union rst contracts[Electronic version]. In R. N. Block, S. Friedman, M. Kaminski & A. Levin (Eds.),Justice on the job:

Perspectives on the erosion of collective bargaining in the United States (pp. 87-114). Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. UpjohnInstitute for Employment Research.hp://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/248/

Required Publisher Statement

2006 by theW.E. Upjohn Institute. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

is article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: hp://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/248
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5Significant Victories

A n An alysis of Union First C ontractsTom JuravichUniversity of M assachusetts, Am herst

Kate BronfenbrennerCornell UniversityRobert HickeyQueens University

After two decades of massive employment losses in heavily unionized sectors of the econom y and exponential growth of the largely unorganized se rvice sector, the U.S . labor movem ent is struggling to remainrelevant. Despite new organizing initiatives and practices, union organizing today remains a tremendously arduous endeavor, particularly inthe private sector, as workers and their unions are routinely confrontedwith an arsenal of aggressive legal and illegal antiunion employer tactics. This vigorous opposition to unions in the private sector does notstop once an election is won, but continues throughout bargaining foran initial union agreement, all too often turning organizing victoriesinto devastating first-contract defeats (Bronfenbrenner 199 7b, 20 01 ).Despite these overwhelming obstacles, workers still organize andwinthrough certification elections and voluntary recognition campaigns in both the private and pub lic sectors. And each year unions successfully negotiate thousands of first contracts in the United States, p roviding union representation for the first time to hundreds of thousandsof new workers. This research takes an in-depth look at what unionsachieve in these initial union contracts. Why, when confronted with suchpowerful opposition, do unorganized workers continue to want to belong to unions and newly organized workers want to stay union? Whatdo these first contracts provide that makes the struggle w orthwhile?

87


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88 Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and HickeyTo explore these questions, we analyze and evaluate union firstcontracts along four primary dimensions. First, we inventory the basic

work ers rights provided by these contracts, which go beyond the verylimited rights provided by federal and state labor law under the employment at w ill system. Sec ond, we evaluate how first contracts provide workers and their unions with the institutional pow er to shape workand the labor process on a day-to-day basis. Third, we explore how firstcontracts codify the presence and power of unions in daily work life,and we evaluate which institutional arrangem ents provide a meaningfulrole for workers and their unions in their workp laces. Fourth, we exam ine the kinds of w orkplace benefits that are codified and supplementedin first contracts, gaining important insights into the types of humanresource prac tices that exist in newly unionized w orkp laces. Finally, byexamining the interactions among these four dimensions, we explorethe limitations of what first contracts have been able to achieve in thecurrent organizing environment, and what it would take for unions toimprove the quality of first contrac ts.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH O N FIRST CONTRA CTS

There is a growing body of literature on organizing in both the private and public sectors (Bronfenbrenner et al. 19 98 ; M ilkman and Voss2004). However, only a small portion of this research extends to first-contract cam paigns (Bronfenbrenner 199 6, 20 01 ; Hickey 20 02; Hurd1996). Collective bargaining agreements are regularly evaluated forpatterns, outcomes, and emerging basic language, yet this work rarely distinguishes between first and subsequent agreements (Bureau ofNational Affairs 1995; Kumar 1989). A series of studies evaluates thefinancial impact of unionization and first contracts on employers (Di-Nardo and Lee 2004; Freeman 198 1).The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) regularly gathers dataon the wage differential between the union and nonunion sectors ofthe economy (BL S 200 3a,b). Bu t, here too, little effort has been mad eto look specifically at the impact of union first con tracts. Furtherm ore,it is inadequate to focus only on the financial rewards of unionization.Nonfinancial issues such a s dignity, fairness, and workplace control are


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Significant Victories 89often the key issues in organizing campaigns and remain central in thedevelopm ent of initial union contracts (Bronfenbrenner 1996 ; Bronfen-brenner and Hickey 2004). Comparing firms where organizing did ordid not take place, Freeman and Kleiner (1990, S8) found only m oderate wage gains through unionization but suggest that new ly organizedworkers made significant gains in the areas of grievance procedu res, jobposting and bidd ing, and seniority protection. To date, however, thereis no detailed quantitative assessment of these nonfinancial yet cruciallyimportant aspects of first agreem ents.

RESEARCH M ETHODS

This research is based on a con tent analysis of 1 75 union first con tracts in both the public and private sectors. The contracts were assembled as part of Bronfenbrenners previous research on private sector first-contract campaigns (1997a) and on research on public sectorfirst-contract campaigns by Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (1995) andJuravich and Bronfenbrenner (1998).1 We recognize that these contractsfrom 1987 through 1996 are less than current, but they draw from theonly existing national random samples of first contract campaigns inboth the public and p rivate sectors . A review of first contracts collectedas part of B ronfenbrenners m ost recent first-contract study (200 1) suggests no major changes in the nature and extent of first contracts in thelast deca de.Because of the lack of prior research on first-contract content, we

were forced to develop an entirely new research typology to evaluatethe multiple dimensions of first-contract gains.2 For all 175 first contracts, we evaluated each contract along 296 param eters, measuring theextent and nature of various contract provisions.3 Unfortunately, dueto the absence of previous research in this area, there are no analogousearlier data to which our findings can be compared. Thus, our hope isthat this research typology will provide a baseline upon which futureunion contracts can be compared and will encourage further researchin this area.Table 5.1 provides baseline information on our sample. The firstcontracts are almost equally divided between the private and public


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Table 5.1 Characteristics of the Sample

Number of con tractsAverage contract duration (in months)Signatories

LocalRegion/districtInternational

Unit scopeAll employeesRegular full-time employees onlyRegular full-time and all part-time

employeesRegular full-time plus somePart-time, per-diem, and/or

part-timetemporary

Number of w orkers covered under contractsUnit type

Blue collarWhite collar

Professional/technicalProfessional/technicalService and maintenance

All contractsNumber

175

14443

25196335

527,651

4510212154

Mean orproportion1.00

28.50

0.820.020.020.140.110.360.200.03159

0.260.060.120.120.31

Private sectorNumber

94

8222

11153722

111,453

37477

19


30.30

0.870.020.020.120.160.390.230.01123

0.390.040.070.070.20

Public sectorNumber

81

6221

144

26134

16,19886

141435


26.30

0.780.030.010.170.050.320.160.05200

0.100.070.170.170.43


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Wall-to-wallOther

IndustryManufacturingComm unications and utilitiesConstructionRetailTransportationHealth care (both public and private)Social, business and other servicesCity/county governm entPublic education (including higher

education)Bargaining unit demographics

At least 50% workers of colorNo w orkers of color in the unitProportion of workers of color in the unit

At least 50% wom en workersNo female workersProportion female workers in unit

At least 25 % part-time w orkersNo part-time workers

261832

5256

31133643

5737

104104291

0.150.100.190.030.010.030.040.180.080.210.25

0.330.210.310.590.060.520.240.52

151132

5256

291300

441238101849

0.160.120.340.050.020.050.060.310.14

0.470.130.430.400.110.380.190.52

1170000020

3643

1325660

2435

0.140.09

0.03

0.440.53

0.160.310.180.82

0.670.300.43


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92 Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and Hickeysectors. The vast majority (82 percent) of the contracts were negotiated on a local level, with an average duration of slightly more thantwo years. In the private sector the major industries represented includemanufacturing (34 percent) and health care (31 percent). Blue-collarunits represent the largest proportion (39 percent) of the private sector contracts, followed by service and maintenance units, wall-to-wallunits, and professional/technical and white-collar units. In the publicsector the contracts are concentrated in service and maintenance units(4 3 percent) and professional/technical units (17 percent), primarily ineducation (53 percent) and m unicipalities (44 pe rcent).

A majority of the workers covered under these agreements arewom en. This is especially true in the public sector, where w omen average 67 percent of the unit compared to 38 percent in the private sector.Workers of color are more concentrated in private sector units, wherethey represent the majority in almost half the un its.

BEYOND EMPLOYMENT ATWILL

Table 5.2 summ arizes the basic workplace rights provided for in firstcon tracts. Most of these protections are already guaranteed by federaland state legislation. Yet, contractual antidiscrimination language is im portant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates to the employer, unionme m bers, and the broader comm unity that the union is concerned aboutthese issues . But equally impo rtant, it provides an enforcement mecha nism that involves significantly less effort, cost, and time than claimsfiled under state or federal law.As we can see from Table 5.2, nearly three-quarters of the con tractsin our sample contained a discrimination clause, with about two-thirdscovering a range of types of discrimination including race , gender, national origin, religion, age , and disability. Of the un its with at least 2 5percent wom en, 63 percent had gender discrimination language, w hile73 percent of the units with at least 25 percent workers of color hadlanguage covering race discrimination. Fewer than 25 percent of thecontracts cover other types of discrimination, such as sexual orientation, political affiliation, and veteran status. Only 6 percent had sepa-


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Significant Victories 93rate sexual harassment lang uage , and 1 percent had separate pay equitylanguage.

For nearly all the most com mon antidiscrimination protections, thepercentage of public sector contracts including these protections was1020 percent lower than the private sector contracts. This may resultfrom the fact that many public sector workers may be covered by stateand local discrimination laws that provide them a more streamlinedprocess for filing antidiscrimination su its than federal protections .Seventeen percent of the first contracts go beyond basic w orkplacerights to include specific contract language that requires managementto treat employees with respect and dignity. Respect and dignity issues are often core elements of successful organizing campaigns, andthese clauses provide an opportunity for the union to file grievances andpublicly question managements reputation, even when other contractclauses have not been violated.As is clear in Table 5.2, in a significant departure from the nonunionemployment-at-will environment, nearly three-quarters of the con tractswe examined require discipline and discharge to be based on just cause,thus constraining managem ents ability to play favorites or to intimidateand threaten workers who challenge them. Nearly 40 percent of firstcontracts also codify Weingarten rights for union members to obtainunion representation when they believe that they will be disciplined,and 13 percent expand o n those rights by requiring the employer to no tify the emp loyee of h is or her right to union representation before thedisciplinary meeting begins.Virtually all the contracts in our samp le (96 percent) create a grievance procedure with third-party arbitration. Emp loyers, wh o before thefirst contract was settled retained sole authority to make decisions inthe workplace, become bound by a system that allows for independentthird-party review of disputes between management and employees.This due process language is the most widespread provision in thisstudy, and provides the enforcement mechanism that guaran tees all theother clauses in the first agreement. A quarter of the contracts permitclass-action grievances where the remedies apply to all those affectedby the violation.


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Table 5.2 Workplace Rights Provided by First Contracts

Antidiscrimination protectionsUnion activityRaceaGenderbAgeDisabilityNational originFamily statusMarital statusSexual orientationPolitical affiliationReligionVeteran statusSeparate sexual harassment clausePay equityCompliance with all state, local, and federal

lawsRespect and dignity clauseDiscipline and discharge

All contractsNumber

12810112312211292

1188

483138

115261029

29

Mean orproportion0.7300.58

0.70 (0.73)0.70 (0.63)

0.640.530.670.050.270.180.220.660.150.060.010.050.17


80517574665272

21719146820

519

25


0.80 (0.78)0.79 (0.74)

0.700.550.770.020.180.200.150.720.210.050.010.100.27

Public sectorNumber

48504848464046

631122447

65104


0.59 (0.62)0.59 (0.54)

0.570.490.570.070.380.150.300.580.070.060.01

0.05Just cause 122 0.70 67 0.71 55 0.68


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Specified progressive discipline procedureGrievable Weingarten rights (notification)Grievable Weingarten rights (no

notification)Grievance procedure

Grievance procedure with 3rd partyarbitration

Expedited grievance proceduresClass-action grievances permitted

482242

1685047

0.270.130.24

0.960.290.27

191416

932511

0.200.150.17

0.990.270.12

298

26

752536

0.360.100.32

0.930.310.44

aNumbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with 2 5 % or more w orkers of color that have no race discrimination language.bNumbers in parentheses report the proportions of units w ith 25 % or more female workers that have gender discrimination langu age.


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96 Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and HickeyUNION RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEM ENT RIGHT S

In addition to these basic rights, first contracts contain languageoutlining a system of rational and equitable rules and procedures forworkplace practices, restraining unilateral decisions by management.As w e can see in Table 5.3, seniority plays a key role in developing co nsistent, nonarbitrary procedures for promotions, layoffs, recall, transfers, and vacation and overtime scheduling. However, seniority is lessof a feature in public than in private sector agreem ents because in m anycases it is already codified in civil service law.It is important to note that none of the sen iority clause s in the firstcontracts in our sample include affirmative action language to protectwom en and w orkers of color from being last hired, first fired. Th is isa relevant issue for the labor movement, particularly since women andworkers of color continue to make up the majority of new workers organized. Th is lack of language on affirmative action may not just be theresult of bargaining. Over the past decade we have seen an increasingnum ber of legal challenges to affirmative action, which has made m anypublic entities hesitant to sign on to these types of p rovisions.The first contracts we examined also contain language laying outthe process for promotions and the filling of vacancies beyond basicseniority rights. More than three-quarters of agreements in both sectors provide for the posting of vacanc ies. In 40 percent of the contractsinternal candidates are given priority in hiring. More than one-third ofthe contracts provide for p rovisional transfer to newly posted pos itions.However, very few contracts provide opportunities for part-time employees to bid on full-time wo rk.Thirty-eight percent of the contracts go beyond state and federalwage and hour law s to require overtime pay after 8 hours and 6 percentprovide overtime for work beyond an employees regularly scheduledhours. This is particularly important for part-time workers, who otherwise are frequently asked to work additional hours but not enough toreach the legislated threshold of 40 hours a w eek .While expanded hours and mandatory overtime are an increasingproblem in todays wo rkplaces, virtually none of the con tracts set limitson mandatory overtime. These provisions mirror contract negotiationsin general, where even after long strikes few unions have succeeded


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Significant Victories 97in eliminating 12-hour days or cutting back on mandatory overtime(Franklin 2001 ).

A number of contracts in our sample, particularly those in the private sector, where w eekend and evening shifts are more com m on, haveclauses that codify and/or expand upon shift differentials (supplementalpay) for those employees who work outside of the regular workday orworkweek. Nearly one-half of private sector first contracts guarantee ashift differential for evening work, while a smaller percentage establishdifferentials for weekend work.One-third of private sector contracts and 51 percent of public sector contracts have language outlining work schedules and hours. M anycontracts also require the posting of schedules and notice of, o r protec tion from, changes outside w orkers regularly scheduled h ours. Theseclauses are important because they provide workers predictability andcontrol over their work schedules. Workload and minimum staffing,serious issues in almost every workplace, are addressed in only 7 percent of first agreem ents. Th is reflects the fact that most em ployers aggressively oppose any inclusion of staff and workload protections inthe contract and frequently argue that these are absolute managementrights.Health and safety is another area that dramatically distinguishesunion from nonunion workplaces. Forty-two percent of all contractsand 55 percent of private sector contracts have grievable health andsafety clauses. Thirty-one percent include language requiring employers to provide protective equipment, and 30 percent establish a jointhealth and safety committee. Only a small number (6 percent) giveworkers the right to refuse unsafe work, and only 5 percent guaranteeworkers and unions the right to health and safety information.Unions have not been very successful in gaining significant jo b security protections in first contracts, despite the increasing importanceof such language in a climate of corporate restructuring, technologicalchange, privatization, and capital mobility. As described in Table 5.3,approximately one-third of private sector first agreem ents include som elanguage governing restrictions on successo rship, restricting the u se oftemporary workers, subcontracting, and supervisors doing bargaining-unit work. Much less common are provisions relating to new ownershonoring the agreement, union notification of closure, and technological change.


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Table 5.3 Union Restrictions on Mana gement Rights

SeniorityOvertimeLayoffRecallTransferPromotions where m inimum qualifications are metPromotions where equally qualifiedShift assignmentsHolidaysVacationProrated for part-time employees aFull seniority for part-time employeesa

Layoffs or reduction of hoursLong-term layoff noticeAverage minimum number of days noticeShort-term layoff without seniority considerationBumping rightsSeverance payRetrainingRecall rights

All contractsNumber

3613211648

1672103

63187

74

981

74

142

Mean orproportion0.210.750.660.270.090.410.060.020.36

0.10 (0.07)0.04 (0.05)

0.4217

0.050.460.040.020.81


277970351051

63

4674

41

846

64

82

Mean orproportion0.290.840.750.370.110.540.060.030.49

0.07 (0.11)0.04 (0.06)

0.449.9

0.090.490.060.040.87

Public sectorNumber

9534613

621

40

17113

33

135

10

60

Mean orproportion0.110.650.370.160.070.260.05

0.210.14 (0.04)0.04 (0.04)

0.4123.70.010.430.01

0.74


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Promotions and filling of vacanciesPosting of vacanciesInternal candidates first priorityOpportunity of temporary trial/returnPart-timers can bid for full-time a

OvertimeOvertime for over regularly scheduled hoursOvertime pay for over 40 hours per weekOvertime pay for over 8 hoursOvertime equalizationNo mandatory overtimeLimits on mandatory overtimePremium pay for over 12 hours workPremium pay for over 6 days a week

Shift and other pay differentialsEvening differentialSaturday differentialSunday differentialRelief in higher classification

Schedules, hours of work, and minimumstaffing/workload

Hours and scheduling specified in the contractPosting of schedules requiredMinimum staffing/workload

1407065

710246732

3964

60243563

723913

0.800.400.37

0.04 (0.10)0.060.190.380.180.020.050.030.020.340.140.200.36

0.410.220.07

754042

56

224321

0863

46152533

31298

0.800.430.45

0.05 (0.11)0.060.230.460.22

0.090.060.030.490.160.270.35

0.330.310.09

653023

242

24113101

149

1030

41105

0.800.370.28

0.03 (0.08)0.050.030.300.140.040.01

0.010.170.110.120.37

0.510.120.06


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Table 5.3 (continued)

Health and safetyRight to refuse unsafe workEmployer provided protective

equipmentHealth and safety committeeRight to informationGrievable health and safety languageEmployees w ill alert employer of

safety concernsJob security and protecting bargaining

unit workSubcontracting rulesRestrictions on the use of temporary

workersRestrictions on supervisors doing

bargaining unit workSuccessorship language

Purchaser must honor contractUnion notified, request purchaser tohonor agreement

New technology language

All contractsNumber

105452

873

7

402841351168

Mean orproportion

0.060.310.300.050.420.04

0.230.160.230.200.060.030.05

All contractsNumber

73336

752

5

21253330

768

Mean orproportion

0.070.350.380.070.550.05

0.220.270.350.320.070.060.09

All contractsNumber

32116

121

2

19385400

Mean orproportion

0.040.260.200.010.260.03

0.240.040.100.060.05

aNumbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with at least 25% part-time workers.


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Significant Victories 101UNION RIGHTS AND PRACTICES UNDERFIRST CONTRACTS

Table 5.4 presents data on how union rights and practices becomecodified and institutionalized after the signing of an initial union agreement. First contracts lay out the parameters by which unions operateon a day -to-day b asis. Nearly two-thirds of a ll the first contracts in oursample have an agency or union shop, thereby laying a foundation uponwhich the union can more easily establish and maintain its presencein the workplace. For those with open shops, 91 percent of the privatesector contracts and 69 percent of the public sector contracts were inright-to-work states, where open shops are required. Union security isfurther strengthened in the three quarters of the first con tracts that allowfor dues check-offwhere union dues and/or agency fees are automa tically deducted from workers paychecks.Another essential element of union representation is language guaranteeing staff and officers access to the workplace and to bargaining-unit me m bers . Forty-five percent of private sector first contracts and 25

percent of public sector first contracts have liberal union access po liciesallowing union representatives to meet with employees in the workplace without having prior authorization from the employer or beingrestricted to certain times and certain areas. This is less of an issue inthe public sector, however, because a combination of open meeting andpublic access laws provides union representatives, as members of thepublic, equal access to any public areas or public m eetings.Nearly one-half of first contracts provide stewards release time to

investigate grievances, although this is more prevalent in the privatesector than in the public sector. Approximately one-third grant stewards paid release time to investigate grievances on company tim e. F ifty-eight percent of first contracts grant stewards release tim e for grievanceprocessing, and almost half allow this to take place on paid companytime. Less than 10 percent of the contracts in both sectors have con tractlanguage allowing for new member orientation, despite the importanceof such language in recently organized un its, where everyone is new tothe union.M ore than one-third of the contracts provide union leave for officers and 25 percent provide union leave for members to attend union


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Table 5.4 Union Practice after First Contracts

Type of shopUnionAgencyOpenProportion of open shops in right-to-work states

Dues check-offUnion staff access to workplace

LiberalRestrictedNo access specified in contract

Union accessUnion bulletin board for union postingsUnion right to information

Officer/steward rightsStewards time to investigate grievances

Paid release time to investigate grievancesStewards time to process grievances

Paid release time to process grievancesPaid release time for other meetings with m anagementUnion orientationUnion leave for officers to conduct union business

All contractsNumber

61513428128625063142177856

10 2834 41415

Mean orproportion0.350.290.190.820.730.350.290.360.810.100.450.320.580.470.250.080.09


571221196742331982125332624 41376


Public sectorNumber

43913

96120174460

52524403931

79



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Union leave for officers to attend meetings conventionsPaid union leave to attend meetings/conventions

Unpa id leave for officers to take higher union officePaid leave for memb ers to process grievances

Union leave for mem bers to attend meetings/conventionsPaid leave to attend meetings/conventions

642933114318

0.370.170.190.060.250.10

285

221021

3

0.300.050.230.110.220.03

362411

12215

0.420.300.140.010.270.19


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104 Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and Hickeymeetings and conv entions. Only a few of the contracts in our sam ple (9percent) provide union leave for officers to conduct union business outside the workplace, while 19 percent provide for union leaders to takeunion-funded positions, protecting their right to return to the bargainingunit.

BENEFITS IN NEWLY ORGA NIZED W ORKPLACES

Table 5.5 summarizes the workplace benefits provided by the firstcontracts in our sample. Health insurance, pension plans, leaves of absence, pay systems, training, and continuing education are fundamental concerns for unorganized workers, and are areas that have showna substantial differential between union and nonunion workplaces.For example, according to BLS data, 72 percent of unionized workers are covered by defined benefit pension funds compared to only 15percent of nonunion workers, while 60 percent of unionized workershave medical care benefits compared to 44 percent of nonun ion workers(BLS 2003a,b). Beyond ensuring basic rights, fair and equitable standards, and an institutional presence already discussed, these workplacebenefits help to create and protect a certain quality of life for workersand their families. The extent and na ture of these contract clauses alsoinform us about the kinds of human resources practices in operationin newly organized workplaces, some of which existed before the organizing campaign but then were codified and guaranteed in the firstagreement.Overall, 89 percent of the first contracts provide contractual guarantees for some form of health insurance. Yet, reflecting the spiralingcosts of health care that had begun to escalate during the period thesecontracts were negotiated, only 10 percent provide fully paid healthinsurance for workers and dependents. This is a significant departurefrom union contracts a generation ago, when many newly organizedworkers were brought into master agreements, which provided fullypaid family health insurance and un ion health and welfare p lans .Pension plans are provided for in only 39 percent of first agreements, with employer-sponsored saving plans offered in an additional12 percent and retiree health benefits offered in only 8 percent. Here,


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Significant Victories 105too, we see a significant departure from the kinds of retirement benefitsthat once were a common element of large industrial and public sectoragreem ents reflecting, in part, the grow ing efforts by U.S. employers tocut costs and long-term liabilities by shifting to a more contingent andless costly workforce.Nearly three-quarters of the first contracts provide for some sickleave benefits. Sick leave benefits a re much m ore prevalent in the pub lic sector than in the private sector, but are more likely to be proratedfor part-time workers in private sector units with significant numbersof part-time workers. In approximately one-third of the contracts, sickleave may be taken for sick children and other sick dependents.Unlike sick leave, vacation and holiday benefits are slightly lesscommon in the public sector, partly because most pub lic sector holidaysare set by law and, for public school employees, vacations are oftentaken outside of the nine-month employment period. Seventy-two percent of private sector contracts provide at least five paid holidays and 83percent provide at least one week of vacation, wh ile only 42 percent ofpublic sector contracts provide a minimum of five paid holidays and 6 2percent provide at least one weeks vacation. A variety of other leavesare provided for in first contracts as w ell, with the m ajority of contractsincluding leaves for jury duty, bereavement, military service, and personal days.Table 5.5 also presents data on the kinds of pay sy stems establishedby first contrac ts. Alm ost two-thirds of ag reem ents provide for step systems. Given the arbitrariness of most nonunion pay systems that frequently involve wages being negotiated on a person-by-person basis,step systems are a significant accom plishment. In contrast, only 2 percent of the contracts had merit pay system s, which are the systems thatdominate the nonunion environment. At the same time, cost-of-livingadjustments are provided in only 2 percent of first contrac ts.

Training benefits are limited, with only one-quarter of agreementsspecifying job training or in-service training provided for by the employer. Finally, em ployee involvem ent clauses w ere included in 28 percent of the first contracts we examined. How ever, most of these clauseslack union protections. Particularly with the growing management interest in joint programs, unions clearly need bargaining language thatensures that these programs are indeed joint and do not undermine theunion or the contract.


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Table 5.5 Benefits in Newly Organ ized Workplaces

Health and other insuranceHealth insurance

Full individual onlyFull individual plus full familyFull individual and part family

Dental insuranceShort-term disabilityLong-term disabilityEmployer contribute to union health andwelfare planLife insuranceVision insuranceDrug insuranceWorkers compensation provision

Retirement benefitsPension planEmployer-sponsored savings planRetirement health planLeaves of absenceSick leave

At least 10 sick days a year

All contractsNumber

15612172490383111

106182255682114

12272

Mean orproportion

0.890.070.100.140.510.220.180.060.610.100.130.310.390.120.080.700.41


8584

14452714

859

68

243620

55014

Mean orproportion

0.900.090.040.150.480.290.150.090.630.060.090.260.380.210.050.530.15

Public sectorNumber

714

1310451117

34712143132

19

7258

Mean orproportion

0.880.050.160.120.560.140.210.040.580.150.170.380.400.010.110.890.72


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Average number of days veteranProrated for part-time workersaApply to sick childrenApply to other sick dependentsSick bank

Vacation

employees

At least one week vacation shutdown a yearAverage number of days new employeesAverage number of days veteranProrated for part-time workersa employeesMandatory vacation for plant shutdown

HolidaysAt least five holidays a yearAverage number of days new employeesAverage number of days veteranProrated for part-time workersaPremium pay

Parental leaveBereavement leaveEducation leaveMedical/disability leavePersonal leave of absenceMilitary leaveJury leave

employees

43635784

13212847

915210233

10650

1372776

114106142

11.610.25 (0.29)

0.360.330.480.750.736.60

19.840.27 (0.26)

0.050.870.587.83

10.520.19 (0.17)

0.610.290.780.150.430.650.610.81

2113

927827831

992681671

9801148655476

9.710.22 (0.44)

0.140.100.290.870.836.60

18.530.33 (0.44)

0.100.980.727.899.44

0.17 (0.28)0.760.100.850.120.510.690.570.81

225048575050160

6034173541571628495266

12.440.27 (0.17)

0.610.590.700.620.626.59

22.020.20 (0.13)

00.740.427.77

11.330.21(0.08)

0.430.510.700.200.350.610.640.82


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Table 5.5 (continued)

Pay systemStepMeritCombination of step and meritCOLA stepRate set in contract, not necessarily stepRegular bonuses grantedProfit or gain-sharing

TrainingJob training/in-service training paid by

employerContinuing educationTuition paidTuition for children/spouse

Employee involvementLabor/management committee

Equal number of union and managementNo discussion of contractual issuesService/product qu ality comm ittee

Drug insuranceWorkers compensation provision

All contractsNumber

106353

4815

5403045

54927

952255

Mean orproportion

0.610.020.030.020.270.090.030.230.170.260.030.280.150.050.030.130.31


57140

30115

199

150

2513848

24

Mean orproportion

0.610.010.04

0.320.120.050.200.100.16

0.270.140.090.040.090.26

Public sectorNumber

48213

1840

212130

52414

111431

Mean orproportion

0.610.030.010.040.220.05

0.260.260.370.060.30

0.17 (0.58)0.01 (0.04)0.01

0.170.38

aNumbers in parentheses represent proportion of units with at least 2 5% part-time worke rs.


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Significant Victories 109HOW CO MPREHEN SIVE ARE FIRST CONTRACTS?

In order to assess just how comprehensive these first contracts are,we also examined whether and how these individual provisions clustertogether. While there are a number of methods that could be used toevaluate the comprehensiveness of initial union agreements, we evaluated the contracts in our sample based on whether they contained whatwe would consider a core set of provisions. This core includes antidiscrimination clauses, grievance and arbitration, steward rights in investigating and processing grievances, union access, and seniority forlayoff.4 While many contracts include important individual contractclause s, only 14 percent of the con tracts in our samp le contain allfiveofthese core provisions. These data suggest that, while unions hav e m adeimportant strides in first contracts, considerably m ore work is necessaryto achieve strong basic agreem ents.

We need to recognize that good contracts, like organizing victories,dont just happen . Given the increasing level of emp loyer opposition tounions, extending all the way through the first-contract process, winning first contract requires much more than simply good bargainingskills. As previous research has shown, unions can win first contractsonly when they utilize a comprehensive, multifaceted, union-buildingstrategy throughout both the organizing and the first-contract campaign(Bronfenbrenner 199 6; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 20 04).

In the final analysis, the quality of the first contract that a unionachieves is a direct product of their powerthe power to stop or slowproduction, to interfere with companies profit centers, growth strategies, or key relationships, or to bring influence to bear on the key de cision makers of a larger employer. In the context of growing employeropposition, it is not enough to infer this power at the bargaining tab les.Instead, unions that have successfully achieved stronger first agreements have continued to use the same kind of comprehensive gra ssrootstactics inside and outside the workplace and in the broader com munitythat helped them first achieve a union victory in the certification elec tion or card check recognition process and then throughout the first-contract bargaining cam paign that follows. These direct expressions ofmem bers support and activism whether it be wearing union buttons ort-shirts, or holding solidarity days, community events, or mini-job ac-


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110 Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and Hickeytionscombined with more indirect but still member-intensive leverage strategies involving customers, suppliers, regulators, or investors,are clear reminde rs to managem ent of union power and are fundamentalin achieving positive results.Indeed, a cursory analysis of the data here suggest that, in thoseunits where the union runs a moderately aggressive organizing campaign, the likelihood that any of the five core elements w ill be includedin a first contract rises between 5 and 20 percentage points. More aggressive and strategic organizing and first-contract campaigns not on lyincrease the probability of winning the organizing campaign and settling the first contract, but also improves the quality and strength of thefirst contracts them selves.Clearly, more energy and attention need to be devoted to developing and implementing more comprehensive and strategic first-contractcampaigns. In addition to running more aggressive first-contract campaigns, unions need to work together to share hallmark first-contractlanguage and to explore creative contract language. One of the discouraging findings of this research is that few contracts contained language addressing job loss, staffing, m andatory ov ertime, technologicalchan ge, privatization, and plant closingcrucial issues facing w orkerstoday. W hile these are difficult issues to take on even in ma ture bargaining relationships, unions need to begin addressing these issues in firstagreements.It is also important to recognize that first-contract language is sim ply thatlanguageuntil and unless the union does what it takes toimplement and enforce what it has negotiated in the agreement. Antidiscrimination language is worthless if m em bers of a local union are toointimidated to file and follow through on grievances, or the local leadership fails to take discrimination violations seriously. Seniority and bidding language are meaningless if the union turns a blind eye when lesssenior w orkers are moved into higher-paying job s.

W hile w e have not gathered data on the operation and effectivenessof the local unions where these first contracts were negotiated, we su ggest that the shape and scope of the organizing and first-contract campaign is a m ajor predictor of a locals ability to use and enforce a firstcontract to its fullest. Campaigns that develop and utilize representativerank-and-file leadership, and that start acting like a union long beforethe first contract is reached, are much more likely to already have in


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Significant Victories 111place the leadership structure and membership involvement necessaryto make the most of the first-contract language they negotiate. Whenboth organizing and first-contract campaigns are w eak, it not only lead sto weaker first-contract languag e, but also to less capacity to utilize andenforce that language once the first contract is won .

CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, first contracts constitute significant victoriesfor workers and their unions. These contracts provide important basicrights that go far beyond employment-at-will and institute a grievanceprocedure that allows for the enforcement of these rights. They alsocontain important restrictions on management rights, substituting seniority and equitable systems for the assignment of work, promotions,and layoffs, for arbitrary employer control. In addition, they establishan institutional presence for the un ion and the rank-and-file leadershipin the workplace. Finally, first contracts establish, codify, and expandhealth insurance, pens ions, and substantial paid leave benefits.While some unions are more successful in some areas than others, clearly these contracts provide the foundation for a fundamentallydifferent employment relationship than that which existed prior to theunion organizing camp aign. We must remem ber that these agreementsare only the first in what typically become stronger agreements overtime. The establishment of a grievance sy stem, just cau se, union access ,and stewa rds rights is an enorm ous accomplishment for workers andunions confronting employers who for decades clung to their absoluteright to manage and wh o fought the union organizing effort with ev erything they co uld. Even if less than comprehensive, these agreem entsmake significant inroads into management prerogatives and, in futurenegotiations, leave room to strengthen and expand these inroads intomanagement control.

Our findings also suggest that union first contracts could be morecomprehensive. While this does not diminish the significant victoriesthat the first contracts w e studied represent, it rem inds us of the promiseand potential for strong first contracts and the strong unions that go withthem . W orkers risk so much to bring a un ion into their w orkplace; it is


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112 Juravich, Bronfenbrenner, and Hickey

imperative that the labor m ovem ent do everything in its power to ensurethat the contracts they achieve, and the unions they build, make thoserisks worthwhile.

N o t e sFunding for this project was provided by the AFL -CIO . The authors would like to thankIan Campbell, Chad Apaliski, David Turner, and Robert Glase for research assistance.We would a lso like to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Beth B erry.

1. The 5 5 contracts in the first private sector study were based on the 119 electionswon in a random sample of 261 organizing campaigns that took place betweenJuly 1986 and June 1987. Copies of the first contracts were collected from 55(69 percent) of the 80 negotiators who returned surveys in units where the firstcontract was reached (Bronfenbrenner 1996). The 39 contracts collected in thesecond private sector study w ere based on 155 elections and 18 voluntary recog nitions won from a random sam ple of 525NLR B organizing cam paigns that tookplace from 199 3 to 1995 (Bronfenbrenner 1997 b). First contracts were collectedfor 39 (59 percent) of the 69 returned surveys from campaigns where a firstcontract was won. The 81 contracts collected in the third study were based onthe 149 elections won from a random samp le of 2 50 state and local certificationelections in 1991 and 1992. First contracts were collected in 81 (63 percent) ofthe 129 cases in our sample w here the election or voluntary recognition wa s won(Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1998).

2. Anyone interested in a copy of the instrument we developed to conduct thecontent analysis should contact the authors at [email protected] [email protected] .3 . We did not include wage gains in these data because we were unable to obtainreliable information on the pre-organizing cam paign base wa ge rate, since so fewunorganized workplaces had established wage scales and employers frequentlygrant illegal wages increases during the course of the union campaign (Bronfen-brenner 2001 ).4 . These five fundamentals are defined as follows: race and gender discriminationplus at least one of th e following antidiscrimination clause s: union activity, age ,sexual harassment, sexual orientation, family status, handicap, or national origin; just cause; steward release time to investigate and process g rievances (paidor unpaid); at least some union access (liberal or restricted); and seniority forlayoffs.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Significant Victories 11 3

ReferencesBronfenbrenner, Kate. 1996. Lasting Victories: Successful Union Strategiesfor W inning First Contracts. Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Annual M eet

ings. M adison, WI: IRRA , pp. 161167.. 1997a. The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB Certification Elections. Industrial and L abor Relations Review 50(2): 195221. . 1997 b. The Effects of Plant Closing or Threat of Plant Closing on theRight of Workers to Organize. Supplement to Plant Closings and WorkersRights: A Report to the Council of M inisters by the Secretariat of the C ommission for Labor Cooperation. Dallas, TX : Bernan Press, pp. 156. . 2001. Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers,W ages, and Un ion Organizing. Commissioned research paper and supplement to The U.S. Trade Deficit: Causes, Consequences and Recommendations for Action . Washington, D C : U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission.Bronfenbrenner, Kate, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald, and Ronald G . Seeber, eds. 1998 . Organizing to Win: New Researchon Union Strategies. Ithaca, NY : ILR Press.Bronfenbrenner, Kate, and Robert Hickey. 2004. Changing to Organize: ANational Assessment of Union Organizing Strategies. In Rebuilding Labor: Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement , Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss, eds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press/ILR Press,1761.Bronfenbrenner, Kate, and Tom Juravich. 1995. Union O rganizing in the PublicSector: An Analysis of State and Local E lections. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.Bureau of National Affairs. 1995. Basic Patterns in Union Contracts . Washington D C : Bureau of National Affairs Bo oks .. 2003b. Employee Benefits in Private Industry, 2003. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf (accessed April 14 , 200 5).DiNardo, John, and David S . Lee. 2004. Un ionism in California and the Un ited States: Using Representation Elections to Evaluate Its Impact on Business Establishments. In Rebuilding Labor: Organizing and Organizers inthe New Union Movement, Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss, eds. Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, pp. 25127 0.Franklin, Steve. 2001. Three Strikes: Labors Heartland Losses and What TheyMean for Working Americans. New Y ork, NY : Guildford Pres s.Freeman, Richard B . 1981. The Effect of Unionism on Fringe Benefits. In dustrial and Labor Relations Review 34(4): 489510.Freeman, Richard B., and Morris M. Kleiner. 1990. The Impact of NewUnionization on Wages and Working Conditions. Journal of Labor Economics 8(1): S8S25.
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Hickey, Rob ert. 20 02 . Strategic Contract Campaigns at M ultinational Corp orations. Labor Studies Journal 27(1): 7191.Hu rd, Richard W. 1996 . Union-Free Bargaining Strategies and First ContractFailures. Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meetings . Madison, WI:IRRA, pp. 145152.Juravich, Tom, and Kate Bronfenbrenner. 1998. Preparing for the Worst:Organizing and Staying O rganized in the Public Sector. In Organizing to

Win: New Research on Union Strategies , Kate Bronfenbrenner, SheldonFriedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald, and Ronald G. Seeber,eds. Ithaca, NY : ILR Press, pp . 2612 82.Kumar, Pradeep. 1989. Wage and Non-Wage Provisions in Labour Contracts ofDifferent Lengths. K ingston, Ontario: Industrial Relations Centre, QueensUniversity.Milkman, Ruth, and Kim Voss. 2004. Rebuilding Labor:Organizing and Organizers in the New Union Movement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Un iversity Pre ss.

U. S . Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2003a. Relative Pay Rates amongCensus Divisions and Occupational Groups. http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030814ar01p1.htm (accessed April 14 , 2005 ).. 2003b. Employee Benefits in Private Industry, 2003. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf (accessed Ap ril 14, 20 05) .
http://www.bls.gov/opub/http://www/http://www/http://www.bls.gov/opub/


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Justice on the JobPerspectives on the Erosion

of Collective Bargainingin the United States

Richard N . BlockSheldon FriedmanMichelle KaminskiAndy LevinEditors

2006

W .E. Upjohn Institute for Em ployment ResearchKalamazoo, Michigan


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Library of Con gress Cataloging-in-Publication D ata

Justice on the job : perspectives on the erosion of collective bargaining in the U nitedStates / Richard N . Block . . . [et al. ].p . cm .Includes bibliographical references and inde x.ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-278-7 (pbk. : alk. paper)ISB N-10: 0 88099-278-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-279-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)ISBN-10: 0-88099-279-4 (hardcover : alk. paper)1. Collective bargainingU nited States. 2. Labor unionsU nited States. 3. JobsecurityUnited States. 4. Employee rightsUnited States. 5. Industrial relationsUnited States. I. Block, Richard N .HD6508.J87 2006

331.890973dc222005033299

2006W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research300 S . Westnedge AvenueKalamazoo, Michigan 4 9007-4686

The facts presented in this study and the observations and view points expressed arethe sole responsibility of th e author. They do no t necessarily represent positions ofthe W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employm ent R esearch.

Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.Index prepared by Diane Worden.Printed in the United States of America.Printed on recycled paper.

1st contracts cornell

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