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2 American Post-war Global Strategic Planning

The quest for a world-wide chain of bases, which gave rise to the initial proposals for a security agreement for the Pacific, was only the first of the American post-war planning issues. Before the Second World War had ended, Pentagon planners began to raise matters which would have to be faced by a nation which had previously held aloof from 'entangling alliances', had basked securely in hemispheric isolation bolstered by the Monroe Doctrine and the Royal Navy, and had maintained a comparatively small peacetime military establishment. Now, the Americans contemplated an entirely new environment. It included atomic bombs, a rapidly declining British Empire, devastated exenemies in Germany, Italy and Japan, newly achieved dominance for the United States and the Soviet Union and an untried United Nations organization. How could a coherent approach be found to face this unfamiliar new world? Military policy, overall strategy, national objectives and the bases network were the four basic ingredients of the strategic debate of the second half of the 1940s as it began to focus on the production of coherent plans to prevent, or wage, a future war. The process was, however, complex and long drawnout, immensely complicated by the Cold War, and was still in a state of flux on the eve of the Korean War, which induced a rapid acceleration.

A POST-WAR STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Once the study of requirements for post-war bases was under way, the Joint Post-War Committee (created in April 1945 to study national security problems) and the Joint Staff Planners proposed to the Chiefs of Staff on 12 May 1945 that they should prepare proposals for post-war military policy and an overall strategic plan for the Pacific.1 By the time they reported, on 18 July 1945, they were taking a global, rather than a solely Pacific perspective. They envisaged an era of world-wide adjustment in the post-hostilities period, when the United States would have to maintain forces larger than before to take a share in the supervision of defeated enemies. They would also have to pursue

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88 Background to the Anzus Pact

national policies until such time as the United Nations had either 'conclusively proved' or 'disappointed' the intentions of its founders.

As a basis for the formulation of military policy the planners outlined six objectives: the defence of the Western Hemisphere; the maintenance of American dominance in the Pacific Ocean; the defence of the Philippines; regional collaboration with other American republics; the enforcement (along with allies) of the peace terms imposed on wartime enemies, and participation in the maintenance of international peace as a member of the United Nations. A third world war would, at worst, destroy the United States, at best, be won only at terrible cost. Such a war was to be avoided if at all possible and it was expected that the US would contribute to any security arrangements made by the UN. A first consideration would be reducing Germany and Japan to a 'militarily impotent state', which would depend on cooperation between the US, Britain and the Soviet Union. The planners concluded this part of their report with an ominous paradox. They asserted that 'the possibility of a breakdown in the relations between the major powers and the necessity to exercise individual or collective self-defense, requires. for our own national interests, that we be prepared to take unilateral action to protect the United States, its territories, possessions, bases and trust territories'. Yet they recognized that to maintain overwhelmingly strong forces in time of peace was politically and economically unacceptable to the American people. They must, however, be willing to accept sufficient forces to guarantee security during a period of mobilization and readiness to take prompt action the moment a threat appeared. This would require moderately strong forces, a global system of bases and machinery for rapid mobilization.

The second part of the Planners' report concerned an 'Overall PostWar Strategic Plan'. Seven tasks were listed: the defence of the United States and its territories; the defence of the Western Hemisphere; the maintenance of lines of communication in the Atlantic and Pacific; reconnaissance in the Atlantic and Pacific; the chain of bases; full cooperation with allies, and full collaboration with the UN. The overall concept would have to provide for simultaneous action in the Atlantic and Pacific. In the Atlantic, the seaward approaches to Canada, the USA, the Caribbean and South America had to be guarded. The Arctic approaches to North America were also a concern. ln the Pacific, they should maintain an 'island barrier' from the Aleutians, through the Kuriles, Japan. the Rykyus to the Philippines and the East Indies (Indonesia). To meet these needs there should be a chain of bases

American Post-war Global Strategic Planning 89

well removed from the Americas; maintenance in the Atlantic and Pacific of balanced, trained forces in a state of readiness; a global intelligence system; a trained reserve, and liaison with the American republics, Canada, the Philippines and other nations essential to US interests.2

Before any planning along those lines developed, it was necessary to consider the impact of 'new developments' - meaning weapons of mass destruction. Thus, on 22 August 1945, three weeks after Nagasaki, Dr. Vanevar Bush, chairman of the Joint Committee on New Weapons, and General Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project, met with the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint War Plans Committee to discuss some of the implications of guided missiles and atomic weapons. Dr. Bush suggested that the atomic bomb had no counter -it created a 'new situation in warfare'. He also felt it would have been difficult to persuade the American people of its power if it had not been used against Japan. The limitation was that its power was such as to rule out use except as a last resort in a major war. It also needed a new blend of scientific and technical ability, industrial capacity and military thinking. He said there had been no co-operation with the Russians on the bomb. The British had all the scientific and technical information, but not the manufacturing know-how. When asked how long before the Soviet Union would possess the bomb, he said the consensus was about five years (1950), but personally he thought it would be longer. General Groves, looking at more practical implications, said the bomb was at present delivered from aircraft, would, in the future, be delivered by guided missiles, but could, also, be smuggled into a city in parts and assembled there. He thought that in ten to twenty years other countries would have the bomb. While they were safe from surprise attack for a while, he suggested that the United States should 'get our bases now' and plan for fifty or a hundred years. The only defence against the bomb was stopping the plane which carried it.' Shortly after this meeting, the Joint Planning Staff produced their first outline plan, which not only incorporated the use of atomic bombs but also named the likely enemy.

On 27 August 1945 they produced a 'Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of US Armed Forces'. In their estimate of the situation the planners recognised that during the war the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire [old usage] had emerged as the dominant world powers. The US and the British Commonwealth of Nations [new usage] were genuinely interested in the maintenance of world peace, but Soviet intentions were 'enigmatic' as the USSR set out to surround itself with states friendly to Communist ideology.


It was felt that the United Nations would be able to prevent acts of aggression by small states, but that aggression or economic and ideological penetration outside the strategic frontiers of the United States might involve issues not reconcilable by the great powers. Within the Western Hemisphere and its own strategic frontiers in the Atlantic and Pacific the United States should be able to take actions which would not provoke a third world war. But such action outside the US sphere might well provoke such a war.

The United States must be prepared to take action in five contingencies. These were: the enforcement of the German and Japanese surrender terms; a threat to the Western Hemisphere; a threat to the Philippines; a general threat to peace and security alongside the members of the UN; and a threat to US interests from a major power in a matter not solvable by the UN. To be prepared for these contingencies the United States needed an integrated global bases network; moderate but adequate mobile forces, and a global intelligence service. There had to be full consideration of the tactical and strategic use of the atomic bomb and other new weapons. In planning to meet these contingencies, it was accepted that the only major power likely to present a threat was the Soviet Union. Thus, at the close of the Second World War, even before Japan's formal surrender, the outline future strategic concept and plan simply became one for the defeat of an ally, the Soviet Union.

For such a war four principles were proposed. Firstly, the main effort should be in the west, with a secondary effort in the Pacific. Secondly, the commitment of US troops in a land campaign should be avoided, because of Soviet manpower superiority. Thirdly, emphasis should be given to a quick, decisive, strategic air offensive against Soviet war-making capacity exploiting, if need be, the atomic bomb. Fourthly, it would be necessary to occupy advanced bases needed for the continuing campaign. For the main effort, these bases would be in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. For the secondary campaign, the bases would be in China, Japan, Korea or Siberia. 4

Although it represented only the barest summary of an approach to planning, this paper incorporated some basic concepts, which were to govern American strategic planning for the rest of the 1940s. The Soviet Union was identified as the enemy. The 'west' was to be given priority over the 'east'. A land campaign was to be avoided initially. The Soviet will and capacity to fight would be broken by a massive air offensive mounted from the global chain of bases and using atomic weapons. As more detailed appreciations and plans emerged over the next four years, they adhered broadly to these concepts.


THE 'PINCHER' SERIES

On the question of why a war might be fought with the Soviet Union there was disagreement. When the Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, gave his approval to the Concept and Plan he discounted the likelihood of using US forces in UN operations and suggested the most likely cause of war would be a Soviet attempt to overrun Western Europe or China.5 The Joint War Plans Committee, however, thought a Soviet incursion into the Middle East to get ice-free ports in the Mediterranean and control of the oil-fields of Iran and the Arabian/ Persian Gulf more likely. Such thrusts would be accompanied by a simultaneous attempt to overrun Western Europe.6 The first concept of operations for a war with the Soviet Union, then, was based upon countering a Soviet offensive in the Middle East, mounted concurrently with a drive into Western Europe.

The Joint War Plans Committee, acting on its own initiative, on 2 March 1946, drew up a concept of operations code-named 'Pincher'. It was based on the assumption of a war, which the United States would not enter until I January 1948, and in which it would not attempt complete military defeat of the Soviet Union. The objective would be to overcome the Soviet will to fight. It was also assumed that Soviet actions against the Suez Canal and the Gulf oil-fields would threaten Britain's position as a world power. Thus the British would resist. They would fight if the USSR began to penetrate Turkey. And, if the Soviets penetrated south of Turkey, Britain would have to fight or 'accept ultimate disintegration' of its empire. The Soviet Union would probably defeat the British Empire if the United States did not give full support. Since such a defeat of the British would eliminate from Eurasia the last bulwark to Soviet aggression, it was vital to US security that the British be supported. The USSR was expected to drive simultaneously towards the Gulf, the Suez Canal and into Western Europe. It was anticipated that they would succeed in taking the oilfields, but that the British could halt a thrust towards the Suez Canal. In Europe, there would be an attempt to hold the Rhine, but it might be necessary to withdraw to the Scandinavian, Danish, Iberian or Italian peninsulas.

For such contingencies, the US Planners recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should authorize planning for operations with five objectives. First came protection of US territory and bases. Secondly, it was important to secure advance bases from which the Soviet Union could be bombed. These would be in Britain, Egypt, northwest


India and possibly Italy and China. Thirdly, a strategic air offensive would be mounted from these bases against the war-making capacity of the Soviet Union. Fourthly, there should be a blockade and a campaign to destroy Soviet shipping. Finally, operations in preparation for an offensive into the Soviet Union would be conducted, such as seizure of the Caucasus and the opening of the Dardanelles. Any other operations which might divert resources were to be avoided. High priority was accorded to holding Britain as a base for operations and for its industrial potential. It was conceded that initially Western Europe might be lost and forces withdrawn to the Iberian Peninsula or to North Africa. Of four possible subsequent lines of approach to the Soviet Union - through Scandinavia, Western Europe, the Mediterranean or the Gulf- the latter two were deemed the most promising.7

Over the next three years, further papers in the 'Pincher' series refined and re-refined possible American actions in a war with the Soviet Union. While it was always regarded as essential to hold Britain and maintain an arc of bases for striking at Russia (in Britain, the Middle East, India and the Far East), it was acknowledged that withdrawal of forces in Europe to Spain might lead to what General Lincoln termed a 'European Bataan' .R There was also concern that the mistakes of Napoleon and Hitler should be avoided and Russia's ability to wage war be dealt with before any ground offensive into the USSR was launched.~

With such a marked and exclusive focus on war with the Soviet Union as the guiding concept for military planning, there was a realization that the matter had to be viewed in perspective. This was achieved in three ways. First, for the benefit of all recipients of the 'Pincher' documents, it was decided that a standard cover-sheet would be provided indicating the hypothetical nature of the exercise. This noted that hostilities were not expected at any particular date and that there was no intelligence support for an assumption that would suggest even a possibility of war in the three-year period under review. 10 Secondly, at the political level, President Truman sought an appreciation of those Soviet activities which affected American security and an estimate of future Soviet military policies. 11 In response, the Joint Intelligence Staff suggested that the Soviet Union would use every means short of war to expand its influence in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. But, until it could build its war potential to a point where it could defeat the US, Britain and their allies, the Russians would avoid the risk of a major war. Their lack of the atomic bomb, limitations in petrol and steel production and their weakness in strategic air capacity and naval forces all placed them at a disadvantage. 12 When the Joint


Chiefs of Staff drafted a report to the President on 25 July 1946, they detailed recent Soviet actions in Europe, the Middle East and Far East and concluded that Soviet policy had world domination as its objective and that fundamental to its approach was the view that 'the peaceful coexistence of communist and capitalist states is, in the long run, impossible.' 13

Thirdly, a series of much more detailed, regional, studies of Soviet capabilities were begun in November 1946, which proceeded until the middle of 1947. Since the prime strategic objective of the Soviet Union was thought to be the oil-fields of the Middle East, these studies began with a paper, code-named 'Cauldron', on the entire area between the Alps and the Himalayas. It was assumed that at the outbreak of hostilities simultaneous Soviet attacks would be mounted on Turkey, Greece, probably Italy, Iran and Iraq, with highest priority being given to the occupation of Turkey, the seizing of the oil-fields and the gaining of the Cairo-Suez area. Turkey represented the 'only gap' in the Soviet Union's defensive barrier. The oil-fields contained one-third of the world's known reserves and had to be denied to the West, as well as being required by the Soviet Union in a prolonged war. Gaining the Suez Canal would cut the so-called 'lifeline' of the British Empire and disastrously damage British prestige in the Moslem world. After analyzing the forces available to both sides, the planners calculated that Turkish resistance could be crushed in 120 days and the Suez Canal reached in 175 days. Success in Turkey, Greece and Italy would open the possibility of control of the eastern Mediterranean. Allied priorities would be to hold Cairo-Suez and as much as Palestine as possible; to hold, if feasible, Cyprus, Crete and Sicily, and to assist in the defence of Turkey. At the same time, naval and air operations from the eastern Mediterranean should be mounted to force Soviet offensives off balance. 14 A specific study of the Gulf area, dated 13 January 1947, suggested four targets for Soviet action - Bushire, Bandar Abbas, Bahrein and Oman. Of these, Bahrein and Bandar Abbas would be prime strategic targets and the oil refineries of Abadan and Basra would receive high priority; Basra could be reached after only 17 days. At D + 20 days Bahrein might be seized by an airborne assault of four battalions launched from Iran and Iraq .15

A second pair of regional studies looked at the Soviet threats to Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. The Italian study, code-named 'Cockspur', concluded that by D + 20 days five Soviet divisions would be available from southern Germany and by D + 30 there could be ten additional divisions which could join Yugoslav forces to overrun Italy. A

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prior attack on Spain would delay the Italian campaign until D + 145. 1r'

The Iberian paper, code-named 'Drumbeat', noted the great strategic significance of the Straits of Gibraltar for the control of the Mediterranean and North Africa. Once France was overrun, Soviet forces could reach the line of the Pyrenees by D + 45. Three months from the start of hostilities they could invade Spain with 50 Divisions supported by I ,000 aircraft. They might overrun the Iberian Peninsula by D + 150. Gibraltar could not hold out for more than two or three weeks against a co-ordinated attack. For the allies, the Pyrenees represented the best line of defence, but a seventy-mile perimeter round Gibraltar represented an alternative line, which would require 16 di visions. 17

The third pair of studies covered the Pacific and Far East. A tentative study of deployments in the Pacific was based on the principle that the United States would, for the proximate future, adopt an offensive-defence posture in a theatre which had to be recognized as secondary to the European-Mediterranean theatre. The main role in a Pacific war would be the denial of island bases to an enemy (especially those north of the equator) and the defence of sea communications.1x The paper on the Soviet threat to the Far East, code-named 'Moonrise', admitted that Soviet objectives in the region would have a lower priority to those in Europe and the Middle East. It was vital, however, for the United States to hold the line Bering Sea-Japan SeaYellow Sea. Soviet forces had the capacity to overrun Korea in 20 days, Manchuria in 40 days and China, down to the Yellow River, in 150 days. Soviet submarines would pose a threat to Western Pacific lines of communication. The allies, however, would be capable of holding Japan, the Ryukyus and Taiwan. 1

Y

THE FIRST WAR PLANS

After sixteen months of such area studies, the Joint War Plans Committee moved on to the idea of outline war plans. Although studies had yet to be made of the defences of Egypt, Britain, sea communications and the north-eastern approaches of the USA, the planners proposed that the 'Pincher' series had progressed to the point when a joint services war plan for the initial stages of a war before 1950 should be prepared. As an introduction, they produced their 'Global Planning Estimate' on 16 July 1947.

This suggested that the Soviet Union would try to avoid war until its military potential was re-vitalized and it had developed the 'new


weapons'. However, its relative power had increased since the war at a time when the US and Britain had demobilized. Soviet actions in the UN, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the occupied areas and all parts of the world, indicated a policy of expansion. To match them in a war before 1950, the overall strategic concept would be to destroy the Soviet capacity to continue fighting by a main offensive in Western Eurasia and an active defence in East Asia. Four basic undertakings were to be fulfilled. As always, the security of the Western Hemisphere came first. The security of Britain had to be assured, secondly, as the one major industrial source available to augment US war production. Coupled with Britain went the security of the Middle East. Retention of as much of the Aleppo-Mosul-Basra-Cairo quadrilateral was desirable, but, as a minimum, the Cairo-Suez area was needed as a base for offensive action in Western Eurasia. Thirdly, essential bases and lines of communication had to be secured, especially Greenland, Iceland and the Azores in the Atlantic; Gibraltar, Sicily, Crete, Cyprus and North Africa in the Mediterranean; Japan and the Ryukyus in the Pacific. Fourthly, the maximum strategic air bombardment should be mounted against the Soviet Union, from Britain, the Cairo-Suez area and other suitable bases. This estimate took a pessimistic view of the prospects for Western Europe. British and American occupation forces from Germany, Austria, Italy and Trieste would have to be withdrawn to Britain or Egypt. American occupation forces in Korea would be withdrawn to Japan and the Ryukyus. The retention or recovery of the Middle East oil resources would be an essential pre-condition of an eventual offensive in Western Eurasia. On this basis, the Joint Planners recommended that a war plan, giving specific detail for the first year, should now be made.20 The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized such planning on 29 August 1947.

As planning began in the northern hemisphere fall of 194 7, the American planners had discussions with their British counterparts in the Pentagon talks of October 1947, which had the effect of confirming the importance of the Middle East. It became clear that American and British appreciations of where the Soviet Union might strike coincided. The Americans also became more aware of Britain's weakness and they appear to have indicated, at this point, that some American military support would be forthcoming in a Middle East emergency.

Following Anglo-American staff talks, three different exercises were presented to the American military establishment. The initial joint out-line war plan for a war forced on the United States in the near future ( 1948, later 1949) was code-named 'Broiler'. Next there was an


intermediate-range plan, for a war in 1952, code-named 'Bushwhacker'. An outline long-range plan for a war in 1955-56 was also started, code-named 'Charioteer'. Priority was given to 'Broiler' - the plan for a war in the next eighteen months.

In the first version of 'Broiler', in November 1947, some questions were raised about the Middle East. Could control of the Mediterranean be maintained? Were allied oil resources sufficient to permit a temporary loss of the Middle East oil-fields? Would the British have their expected forces available to defend the region?21 In the first version of 'Charioteer', on 20 November 1947, which concentrated on the requirements for the strategic air offensive, bases in Saudi Arabia, northwest India and Pakistan, were cited rather than CairoSuez. A base in Lahore, Pakistan, was shown as closest to the Soviet Union. 22

As revised early in 1948, 'Broiler' re-iterated the overall concept of a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East. These were to fulfil four national war objectives, which were: to destroy the war-making capacity of the Soviet Union; to compel Soviet military and political forces to withdraw to the 1939 boundaries of the USSR; to create conditions which would ensure that the Soviet Union abandoned military aggression, and to establish conditions conducive to international stability. The initial allied action would be to launch a massive strategic air offensive against Soviet war-making capacity and to secure the Americas, Britain, Japan and either the Cairo-Suez area and Jines of communication through the Mediterranean or bases in India and Pakistan and in North Africa.

'Broiler' outlined, for the first time in detail, possible Soviet aims. The maximum probable political aim was seen as Soviet supremacy of a Communist-dominated world. The intermediate aim appeared to be control over the Eurasian continent and its strategic approaches while the immediate aim was the establishment of a barrier of Sovietdominated countries on the borders of the USSR, an aim which had been largely accomplished except in the Middle East. It was not expected that the Soviet Government wanted war in the next three years, but it was possible that some incident could spark a war. The prime Soviet military objectives would be the seizure of Middle East oil resources, destruction or neutralization of all western forces in the Eurasian land mass, seizure or neutralization of areas from which the Soviet Union could be bombed, especially the Cairo-Suez area and Britain, and the consolidation of their position in China, Manchuria and Korea.


The war was expected to have three phases. In Phase I, up to D plus nine months, the Soviet Union had the capacity to overrun the Middle East, Western Europe, Manchuria, Korea and northern China. 'Broiler' provided time-tables of possible offensives into Turkey, Palestine, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf, which will be discussed in chapter 4.

In Western Europe the Soviet Union would aim to destroy opposing forces, seize industrial resources, gain Atlantic ports and acquire the springboard for an attack on Britain. Five lines of attack might be expected: (i) to the Channel Ports and then the Pyrenees; (ii) through the Lorraine Gap, to Marseilles and the Pyrenees; (iii) to gain the ports and airfields of Denmark and Norway; (iv) through Austria and southern Germany to Italy; and (v) a subsidiary move by way of the White Sea to Narvik. Airborne forces might be dropped to hold the Rhine and Meuse bridges. Bruges and Amsterdam would be reached in eight days, the Seine River and the Le Havre peninsular in 25 days. The Russians would consolidate in the Nancy-Strasbourg area in one month, in Denmark in ten days, in Norway in two months. The Pyrenees would be reached at D + 70 days. They then might attack Spain or Italy. An assault over the Pyrenees at D + 100 with 50 divisions and I ,000 aircraft could reach Gibraltar at D + 180. A concerted Soviet and Yugoslav assault on Italy could overrun the country in 75 days. Greece might be overrun by 25 divisions from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania in two months, with the Aegean Islands brought under control by D + 135. After such advances and with the Middle East and Western Europe in their hands, the Soviet Union could neutralize the Mediterranean Islands. If Gibraltar fell, the way would be open to North Africa. In the Far East, Manchuria and Korea would be overrun and Communist forces would be at the Yellow River by D + 150. In six months, according Plan 'Broiler', the Soviet Union could be in a position to threaten both Britain and Japan. It might even make one-way air raids and submarine-launched missile attacks on the United States.

In face of such overwhelming force and possible retreats, the American concept of the first year of the war was based on the two-fold aim of ensuring the security of the war-making capacity of the United States and the immediate launching of a massive strategic air offensive on the Soviet Union using atomic bombs. Thus the initial response to war would be to withdraw occupation forces from Europe and Korea; ensure the defence of the Western Hemisphere (especially American atomic bomb and industrial facilities), and provide for the defence of sea and air lines of communication and for the defence of


Britain. A detailed plan had been made by the commanders of the American and British occupation forces in Germany for a withdrawal to the Channel Coast and a combined evacuation from a beachhead in the Dunkirk-Breskens area. 23 Other initial deployments would include a carrier force to be maintained in the Mediterranean. Minimum forces would be deployed to hold Japan, the Ryukyus and the line of the Bering Sea-Japan Sea-Yellow Sea. Forces would also be needed for the two alternate base areas in the Middle East. These were either the Cairo-Suez area and the Eastern Mediterranean or bases in the KarachiLahore area and a base in Casablanca in Morocco. If the Cairo-Suez option were selected, a 'first charge' on the air offensive would be attempts to halt the Soviet advance through Turkey and give sufficient support to the British and the Turks to hold the Iskenderan Pocket -Jordan Rift line until US forces had secured Mediterranean lines of communication and could reinforce the Cairo-Suez area. If this proved impracticable, the alternative choice was to seize and secure bases in the Karachi and Lahore area.

In Phase II of the war, from D + 9 months until the end of Soviet organized resistance, the aim would be the regaining of the Middle East oil resources and closing-in on the Soviet Union. If the CairoSuez option had been held, land operations could begin through the Aleppo-Mosul-Qatar-Cairo quadrilateral to regain the oil-fields. If the Pakistan option was followed, an amphibious operation through the Gulf would be mounted to recover the oil-fields. If, at this stage, Soviet resistance continued, campaigns against the USSR might be mounted through the Balkans and Black Sea into the Ukraine or through Western and Central Europe. The planners did not attempt to predict events beyond the first year of the war. Phase III would involve such additional measures as might be necessary to remove Soviet forces from liberated territories and establish allied controls to impose their war objectives. Additional plans were needed in case of an immediate Soviet collapse after atomic bomb attacks. 24

While concurrent work continued on the intermediate-range and longrange plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the planners to develop 'Broiler' into a short-term emergency plan code-named 'Frolic', to meet a possible war with little warning 'at any time' as a result of a Soviet miscalculation or a western stand over Soviet expansionist policies. The main shortcoming of 'Broiler' was the failure to assist Western Europe or retain the Middle East oil-fields in the first year of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the importance of Middle East oil and sought to generate additional forces to provide

American Post-war Global Strategic Planning I 0 I

for its retention. 'Frolic' accepted that, with available forces, the United States could secure the Western Hemisphere and that the British Empire could ensure Britain's availability as a base. But British and American troops would have to be evacuated from Germany, Austria, Trieste, Greece and Turkey. American forces would have to be withdrawn from China and Korea to defend Japan and the Ryukyus. Marines would be sent to secure bases in the Azores and Iceland and to evacuate US nationals and demolish oil installations in Bahrein. US forces would also have to establish the base in the Casablanca-Port Lyautey area of Morocco as a 'collecting point' for exiled European Governments and military organizations and as a main base for the re-occupation of Europe.

As for offensive actions against the USSR, Phase I (the strategic air offensive, using atomic bombs) would be mounted from Britain at D + 15 days, from Okinawa at D-Day (with atomic bombs at D + 15), and from Karachi at D + 30. To secure the latter base, one-third of an airborne division would be sent at D + 20. A carrier task force in the Arabian Sea would lend support to the operation. If Britain became untenable for the Strategic Air Command, Iceland would be used. By D + I 0 months additional US forces, for the start of Phase II of the war, would include five infantry, two marine, one armoured and one airborne division. These would be available either to drive up the Gulf to re-occupy the oil-fields or for operations in the Mediterranean to secure bases for intensifying the air offensive. 25

This emergency plan, however, did not meet with the full approval of the Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy put on record that his endorsement of the outline plan did not mean he approved use of atomic weaponsY' Admiral Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, suggested the plan was quite unacceptable as a basis for further planning, except on a very short-term basis, since it did not take into account recent American moves to improve preparedness. He also castigated 'Frolic' for being 'completely at variance' with US foreign policy and national war objectives. He gave four reasons. To start with, the plan abandoned Western Europe to the Soviet Union without a struggle, thus giving up any stabilization which might be wrought by the Marshall Plan. He felt this was unacceptable and that assistance should be given, through Western European Union, to establish a defensive line at, what he called, the 'easternmost practicable limits of an enclave which would constitute a further bridgehead for an ultimate offensive operations'. He also felt the plan nullified the strong psychological position which should be exploited by the United States to encourage resistance to


the Soviet Union. If the strategy became known, it would induce 'despair and defeatism' among overrun or threatened peoples. It accepted the almost certain loss of the Mediterranean, the most direct avenue of approach to the Euro-African land mass, leaving the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar all vulnerable and it offered little incentive to the Turks to resist the Soviet Union. Finally, it left the oil sources of the Middle East inadequately protected.

Denfeld challenged the strategic concept on two main grounds. He felt it placed too much emphasis on the strategic air offensive. He said long-range operations against the interior of the USSR would present great difficulties. And what if they did not succeed? - 'we shall have lost so much territory, so many allies, strategic positions and vital resources, and so much time as seriously to jeopardize the possibilities for ultimate victory'. At the same time, he deprecated the Karachi option. He felt it was an operation which would require logistic support over extended lines of communication and would not support any other part of the plan. He preferred the main air bases to be in the Tripolitania-Cairo-Suez area or Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. Above all, Denfeld felt that 'Frolic' was based on an overestimation of Soviet capabilities and excessive pessimism about the US capacity for mobilization. The plan incorporated 'all our present shortcomings, our worst fears, and our most glaring weaknesses'. It was based on a poor state of readiness, which was already being rectified.

Denfeld wanted a medium-range emergency plan, for a war in 1949, in which bases, with modest US forces, would be established in the Middle East and Mediterranean prior to a Soviet attack. In Europe the US should help equip a French army of forty divisions and in Japan it should stockpile equipment for a Japanese army of five divisions. The plan ought to aim at holding Western Europe at the Rhine; North Africa as far east as Suez; and the Middle East oil-fields as far north as Basra.27 The Chief of Staff US Army Air Force, General Carl Spaatz, countered Denfeld to the extent that he could accept 'Frolic' as a plan based on current capabilities. But he agreed that revisions should be made to take account of recent political improvements, especially endeavours to strength Western Europe's ability to resist communist aggression. 2x In the end 'Frolic' was not adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The basic picture drawn in the 'Broiler'/'Frolic' plan was. however, used for American-British-Canadian staff talks (called the ABC meetings) which were held between 12 and 21 April 1948. Here a brief outline emergency war plan, code-named 'Halfmoon' was dis-

American Post-war Global Strategic Planning !03

cussed and agreed by the three planners' groups, as a basis for 'unilateral but accordant national emergency plans' by the respective staff organizations. 29

No overall combined plan was made. With regard to the Middle East, the original American plan was for a base in the Karachi area. The British agreed that this might be the best area strategically, but they put in a firm plea for developing the Cairo-Suez-Khartoum area because of their own treaty relations with the Middle East states.30

This plan was adopted. However, the US planners said they would retain the idea of an India-Pakistan base as an alternative. It was agreed that the British service commanders-in-chief in the Middle East would work out detailed operational and logistic plans for further consideration by the ABC planners. The respective commanders-in-chief in Europe would make evacuation plans for the occupation forces in Germany, Austria and Trieste. The US Navy would provide information on worldwide base requirements, including Australia and New Zealand. There would also be sharing of material on naval communications, convoy cycles, shipping resources, anti-submarine and mine sweeping capabilities. For the air war, the USAF would state its requirements for bases in Britain and also survey air base needs in the Middle East and North Africa. 31

At the conclusion of the ABC meetings the British planners called for the preparation of long-range plans based on a complete appreciation of Soviet long-term capabilities and intentions. Although it had not been possible so far, the British felt than an agreed overall allied strategic plan should be a target to aim for. It was agreed, therefore, that a recommendation should be made to the respective chiefs of staff organizations that the British and American intelligence staff should exchange their estimates of Soviet aims.32 Meanwhile, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted 'Halfmoon' for planning purposes on 19 May 1948. 33

'Halfmoon' included the same overall concept of an offensive in Western Eurasia and a defensive strategy for the Far East, the same national war objectives and basic undertakings as the 'Broiler' /'Frolic' plan, but Phase I included a defence line in Western Europe at the Rhine and the retention of the Cairo-Suez base area with US support. However, it accepted the initial loss of the Middle East oil fields, and the possible loss by D + 6 months of the Mediterranean line of communication. Not until the end of the first year of war would two or three US divisions be available to re-open the Mediterranean or regain the Middle East oil-fields. 34 By June 1948, however, the Army


Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley, suggested that 'Halfmoon' (later named 'Fleetwood' then 'Doublestar'), although recently approved as the basis of planning, had been overtaken by events. He argued that a medium-range plan based on the maximum allied potential in Western Europe should be devised and should provide, if possible, for the retention of the Middle East oil-fields. 35 Bradley also wished to retain flexibility in face of British attempts at an overall plan. When he considered the report of the April ABC meetings he said his approval of the agreed planning procedures was conditional on the understanding that the United States was not committed to the execution of any British plans which emerged from the planners' Conference, or any combined common plan, or the evacuation of Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this caveat when they approved the report of the Planners Conference on 23 July 1948.36

By the middle of 1948, the existing medium and long-range plans which had been prepared were also beginning to seem over-pessimistic. The first attempt at a long-range plan for a war in 1955-56 (codenamed 'Charioteer') in November 1947 had assumed the evacuation of forces from Western Europe, but the establishment of US bases in the Arabian Peninsular and India to give some protection to the Middle East oil-fields. 37 The medium-term plan, for a war in 1952, which was produced in March 1948, looked to the recovery of the Middle East oilfields in the first months of the second year of the war and also listed the forces needed if control of the oilfields was to be retained. 3x

The whole basis of Middle East planning, where the British had prime responsibility, was rehearsed once more, by further AmericanBritish-Canadian staff planners meetings between 18 and 26 October 1948, with 'Fleetwood' (the latest version of 'Halfmoon') as basis for discussion alongside the British version, code-named 'Sandown'. The British were anxious for American fighter protection for their Egyptian bases and for part of the strategic air force operating from Egyptian bases to be available for tactical use in an emergency. They went to Washington in October 1948 anxious to hear details of the American war-time build-up of forces about which there had been some earlier tentative agreement. They came away, however, with major doubts about the possibility of American help, even though it was all still included in 'Fleetwood' . 3 ~ The ABC planners made revisions to 'Fleetwood' and tasks were allocated for rectifying deficiencies, particularly in the Middle East. However, when the Joint Strategic Plans Committee reported on the results of the ABC meetings for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they recommended that an alternative emergency war

American Post-war Global Strategic Planning I 05

plan should be developed, which did not require emphasis on the retention of the Cairo-Suez area.40

It had become evident by 1949, as negotiations were progressing for the North Atlantic Treaty, that none of the medium or long-range American war plans was satisfactory and that there were serious USBritish divergences. The most significant development was that, with the advent of Nato, American attention focussed on Western Europe and away from the Middle East. Thus an ad hoc committee was appointed to draft a long-range plan for a war with the Soviet Union in 1957. The Committee consisted of Major General Richard C. Lindsay (USAF) as the steering member, Rear-Admiral Matthias B. Gardner and Brigadier-General Robert M. Bathurst from the army. Their initial report, for plan 'Dropshot', was produced on 31 January 1949.

'Dropshot' incorporated three new features into American planning. First, it related military planning in a fixed ratio to national expenditure. Secondly, it incorporated a new formulation of war aims approved by the National Security Council. Thirdly, it drew a global 'containment' line at which Soviet forces were to be held. Thus, although it painted a scenario at the end of Phase I involving the loss of parts of Europe, the Middle East, China and Japan, it did look to the retention of Europe west of the Rhine, south-eastern Turkey, CairoSuez, the Gulf and most of Japan.

The ad hoc committee worked within the financial limit of 10 per cent of the US national income, meaning an annual total of not more than $20 billion per year. In their first report they projected total national security expenditures (including the Marshall Plan and Military assistance payments to allies) over the period 1950-57.41

Table I US national security expendtiure ($ biiiions), 1950-57

National Military Military Establishment ERP Assistance Total

1950 17 3.5 2 22.5 1951 17 2.5 2 21.5 1952 18 1.5 2.5 22 1953 18 .5 3 21.5 1954 18 2.5 20.5 1955 18 2.5 20.5 1956 I 8.5 2 20.5 1957 18.5 1.5 20

143 8.0 18 169 (since 1949 12.5)


Such expenditures were presented as a modest insurance premium for success in war. World War I had cost the USA $25 billion and World War II $340 billion, with continuing payments in pensions and interest of $7.8 billion. The probable cost of World War III was put at three times that of World War II or four times American annual industrial production, amounting to $1 trillion. The premium amounted to 2 per cent.

The new formulation of national objectives stemmed largely from a forcefully argued analysis of Soviet aims and capabilities conducted by George Kennan, one of the chief authors of the doctrine of containment, and now head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. This paper, in August 1948, recognized that the Soviet Union had, for the time being, become 'the outstanding problem' of American foreign policy and that a clear formulation of objectives was needed to avoid the dissipation of national efforts. It noted that two rival views were held as to the relationship between national objectives and the factors of war and peace. One argued that objectives should be constant and not affected by war and peace. The other saw war and peace objectives as unrelated, in that war produced its own particular objectives which focused on achieving victory. This was the usual American approach. But in relation to the Soviet Union neither approach was adequate. The United States had already considered more militant objectives towards the USSR than it ever had in peace before. Yet it could hardly expect to conclude a war with the Soviet Union with such finality as had been achieved in the Second World War. On the other hand, Soviet objectives were almost constant and expansive moves in Eastern Europe bore a strong resemblance to policies on the eve of war in 1939-40 and Tzarist policies before 1914. A democratic country could not be expected to be so consistent, but the smaller the gap between peace and war aims the better. Objectives formulated in the heat of war might not reflect a balanced concept of the long term national interest.

In approaching the problem of Soviet power and influence, Kennan drew distinctions between the Soviet Union, the satellite states contiguous to the USSR, and those parties and groups in the wider world which looked to Moscow for inspiration. In the last case, Sovietinspired communism became a domestic problem for virtually every nation because it appealed to the 'congenital fifth columnism' which existed in all communities. Kennan suggested it would not be feasible to occupy and administer the Soviet Union and it should not be an objective to cause its disintegration. While the Baltic states might be encouraged to recover their freedom, it should not become US policy


to assist an autonomous Ukraine. The satellite states of Eastern Europe should be encouraged to regain their independence, but it should not be US policy to follow a policy of de-communization. Kennan's restrained proposal was that the general objectives, in both peace and war, should be to reduce the power and influence of the Soviet Union to such limits that it could no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society, and to bring about a change in the theory and practice of international relations as currently observed by the Soviet Government. The peacetime aim should be the promotion, by means short of war, of the gradual retraction of undue Soviet influence in the satellite states and the emergence of Eastern European states as an independent factor in international affairs. It would not be the aim to place the main emphasis on preparations for war or to bring about the overthrow of the Soviet government. The prime war aim should be to end Soviet military domination of areas outside the USSR; to destroy the influence of the leaders of the AllUnion Communist Party over individuals or groups outside the communist world; to ensure that no communist regime was left in control of the military-industrial potential to wage war with neighbouring states, and to ensure that any regime in traditional Russian territory after the war did not have strong military power and was dependent to a large extent economically on the outside world. It should not be US policy to be committed to any specific pre-conceived border arrangements, or to assure the independence of national minorities in the USSR (except in the case of the Baltic states), or to impose any particular ruling group on the Russian peoples and to carry out a de-communization programme.

Kennan's proposals were largely adopted as the US policy objective by the National Security Council in NSC 20/4 which was approved by President Truman on 24 November 1948.42 They were incorporated in long-range war plan 'Dropshot' for a war in 1957. The peacetime objective was here stated as (1) to reduce the power and influence of the Soviet Union to limits where it could no longer threaten the peace, national independence and stability of the family of nations and (2) bring about a basic change in the conduct of international affairs by Soviet governments so as to conform with the principles of the UN Charter. The war aims were (1) to eliminate Soviet dominance outside the USSR, (2) destroy the influence of the AllUnion Communist Party in non-communist countries and (3) to ensure that the post-war regime in the Soviet Union did not have power to wage aggressive war or impose an iron curtain.


A STRATEGY FOR CONTAINMENT

The third innovation in 'Dropshot' - the drawing of a global line of 'containment' - was only added after modifications were demanded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1949. These arose in response to the recommendation of the ad hoc committee that Phase I of the longrange plan should be war-gamed. But on 7 March 1949 the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, felt more detail was required on Phase I and an approximation of the forces needed for Phases II and III should be made. The Army Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, made much more serious criticisms. The basic problem, he argued, was that the overall concept did not provide for the defence of the home territories of those countries with whom the United States would be allied in Nato. In view of the US commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty, shortly to be signed, Bradley felt that Western European defence should be given equal priority with the defence of the Western Hemisphere. Thus, as well as launching a powerful air offensive at the outset of the war, the allies should initiate a 'discriminate containment' of Soviet power within the line North Pole - Greenland Sea- Western Scandinavia- River Rhine- Alps -River Piave -Adriatic - Crete - Iskenderan Pocket - Turkey/Syria border - Iran - Himalayas - South China Sea - East China Sea - Sea of Japan - Tsugaru Strait -Bering Sea - Bering Strait - North Pole. This concept did not meet the approval of Admiral Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, who believed they should prepare to respond to events set in motion by the Soviet Union, not adhere to any 'Maginot line' type of thinking. He could find no commitments to Nato which were inviolate.43 The Joint Chiefs of Staff followed Vandenberg's suggestion and called on 6 May 1949 for more details on Phase I of the war.44

Meanwhile, the proposed containment line was incorporated in a new Joint Emergency War Plan for the first two years of a war beginning I July 1949. This had been called for at a Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 26 April 1949, which authorized planning to hold a line no further west than the Rhine. The logical extension of this concept was said to involve the British Isles as the left flank and Cairo-Suez as the right flank. For the centre, the formula adopted ran: 'Realizing that the accomplishment of this purpose cannot be counted upon at this time, and pending the attainment of such objective, plans must be so drawn that, if possible, a substantial bridgehead be held in Western Europe.' If it was not feasible to hold the bridgehead, the plan must envisage a return to Western Europe at the earliest practicable time.45

SOVIET UN 10 N

Port Lyaut ~

CE TRE

(

..

Map 3 Containment and the , Centre strategy', 1949


The result of this was Plan 'Offtackle', a new outline emergency plan. It incorporated the Britain left flank - Cairo-Suez right flank - Rhine River centre strategy, with the caveat that, although the plan was 'infeasible' with forces available in 1950, it envisaged holding a 'substantial bridgehead' in Western Europe or at the earliest opportunity a return to the Continent.

ANGLO-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES

The basic concepts of 'Offtackle' and 'Dropshot' were the subject of three separate US-British discussions between August and October 1949. Here certain major differences of approach surfaced, which were to be of great significance for the new North Atlantic alliance. First, there was a meeting in the Cabinet Offices in London, on 3 August 1949, between the American and British Chiefs of Staff. The two matters discussed were the future organization of Nato (with the consequent ending of the US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff structure) and the Strategic Concept and Emergency War Plan in 'Offtackle'. The concept for the latter was outlined for the British, who were shaken by it.

The British did not like the American 'centre strategy', based on a build-up in North Africa, or their apparent neglect of Western Europe and the Middle East. The Americans for their part, were fearful that the Soviet Union might be able to seal the Mediterranean at the Straits of Gibraltar and were concerned to create a major base in Northwest Africa. They wanted to maintain a bridgehead in Western Europe, preferably at the Rhine, or alternatively at the Pyrenees, but failing both, they would have Morocco to fall back on. The British insisted that the Middle East was vital for launching a strategic air offensive, protecting oil-fields in the Middle East and securing the Mediterranean and Africa. They also admitted that Britain could not both reinforce Western Europe and hold the Middle East. But the Americans felt that the Middle East was of little use if Western Europe was lost. They wished to obtain the flexibility which a North African base would afford - from it they could move to reinforce Spain, France or the Middle East.4

c,

This major difference was discussed with great frankness, but was not resolved.

'Sanitized versions' of both 'Offtackle' (the short-range emergency plan) and 'Dropshot' (the outline long-range plan) were examined in detail during a further set of extensive American-British-Canadian staff talks (ABC meetings) in the Pentagon between 12 September and 4

American Post-war Global Strategic Planning Ill

October 1949. Twenty-one US planners and nine each from Britain and Canada split-up into political, economic, scientific, army, navy, air force and editorial working groups and a series of service-to-service discussions was also held. Thirty-five papers were prepared for the occasion, which was described as an intelligence conference followed by planners' meeting. The intelligence estimates in the American plans were updated and more detailed time-tables for the expected Soviet advances into Western Europe and the Middle East were made. Two momentous events, which occurred actually while the meetings were taking place, had also to be taken into account. These were the Communist victory in China and the detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on I October 1949. and therefore in the political alignment section it was recognized that all of mainland China would be under communist control by 1950 and, whether or not it should be counted as a belligerent ally of the Soviet Union, the expectation was that it would not withhold base facilities from the Russians. 47 Of potentially greater significance was the Soviet A-bomb. This had been tested in August, radiation was detected on 3 September and the announcement of the first Soviet atomic explosion was made by President Truman on 14 September 1949. In the draft estimate of Soviet potential drawn-up for the meetings, mid-1950 had been cited as the earliest date for a Russian test, with a more likely date of mid-1953. A test in mid-1950 was expected to give a likely thirty-bomb stockpile by 1953; a mid-1953 test would allow for fifty by I 954. No sooner had the ABC meetings begun, than these forecasts became out-dated.4x

Of the anticipated Soviet incursions, it was agreed that the campaign to secure the Middle East oil-fields would provide the greatest strategic gain in relation to effort expended.49 The British were delighted to find the Canadians agreeing with them. Indeed, the latter surprised the Americans by suggesting they might examine the possible allocation of two Canadian divisions to fight in the Middle East alongside 'the remainder of the British Commonwealth' .50 But the results of these meetings were disappointing for the British since the American approach was unshakeable. Although more up-to-date intelligence estimates were exchanged and new tables of available forces were incorporated, the Anglo-Canadian contingent was unable to alter the American 'centre strategy'. 'We shook their faith in it', reported the British planners. They could not effect any adjustment, although they felt that the Americans, who apologised for being 'under direction', seemed pleased to have the British views to pass on to the Joint


Chiefs of Staff. The British found the meetings very harmonious as an exchange of opinions: 'They heard our views on the cold war and their new European allies. We heard their views on a fighting war and the resources required.' 51

Because of the basic divergence of views no agreed emergency war plan emerged. But a short combined 'Outline Strategic Concept' (ABC 109 - based on 'Offtackle') was accepted for submission to the respective Chiefs of Staff organizations for unilateral planning. As usual, less discussion was accorded to 'Dropshot' the long-range plan, but a paper (ABC 303 Revised) was accepted for guidance in Nato planning. Although no agreement was reached on future command arrangements, the intelligence staffs produced an agreed paper (ABCI 15) paying particular attention to the announcement of the Soviet atomic test, which came during the meetings.52 Matters still unresolved included, where the first US divisions would be sent (to France or Britain or North Africa) and what help, if any, the British could now expect in the Middle East.

In an attempt to resolve some of these problems, a third exchange occurred in Washington on 5 October 1949, when Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder and the British services mission met with General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They addressed the two related problems of Western Europe and the Middle East, about which an impasse had been reached in August. The British were worried about the impact American 'centre strategy', based on the build-up in North Africa, would have on the French at a Western Union Council meeting due later in the month. Tedder insisted that it was necessary to keep a foothold in Europe and hoped a line could be held at the Rhine. He felt that the Americans had accepted a 'worst-case' scenario in their fears for Gibraltar and their plans for a base in North Africa. If they were unwilling to send their first reinforcements to France, could they not be sent to Britain, where they would be nearer than they would in North Africa? Bradley feared an early retreat - another Dunkirk - and he 'cringed' at the thought of another Overlord, this time against an atomic power. The Americans still hoped they could hold the Pyrenees. Tedder pointed out that to admit the possible loss of the Rhine would discourage the French. General Collins was inclined to agree and suggested that the French be told that if the Rhine held, American troops would be sent to Europe as soon as possible, but if the Rhine were not held, there was no alternative to a base outside French territory. Maybe, he said, they should examine the possibility of sending US forces to the Rhine through a bridgehead at Bordeaux.


General Vandenberg (Air Force Chief of Staff) preferred Brest, because it could be accorded better air cover from Britain. But Bradley did not think US forces could be at the Rhine before D plus 3 months. Eventually a five dimensional formula was reached for use in discussions with the French. As General Collins put it: 'First, if we can go to the Rhine, let's do it', second, drop back to a bridgehead at Brest, third to Bordeaux, fourth to the Pyrenees, and finally there would be North Africa.

In the second part of the meeting, Tedder bluntly suggested that the United States did not fully appreciate the importance of the Middle East, which, if overrun, would mean the Cold War was 'as good as lost'. The British, he said, could not fight in Europe and the Middle East but, if the Americans did not move into Europe, the French would want the British there. This meant that Commonwealth forces would have to be relied on in the Middle East. Could not the Americans send a brigade group to assist operations in the new State of Israel where they would be more acceptable than British units? Bradley was adamant that this would be impossible during the first six months of war. After that it would become a possibility. The Americans agreed that the French must be made to understand the significance of the Middle East for Britain. They also preferred that a division from Britain should go to France rather than the Middle East.53 The Middle East would have to be left to the existing British garrison and reinforcements from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and possibly Canada. As in two previous wars, the Middle East would loom large in all British Commonwealth plans for World War III as will become clear in chapters 3-6.

IMPACT OF THE SOVIET A-BOMB AND THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN CHINA

While the British and Americans absorbed the implications of their different views of the importance of the Middle East - with important repercussions for Australia and New Zealand as will emerge in subsequent chapters - the Truman administration had to face the impact of the Soviet atomic bomb and the 'loss' of China. On 31 January 1950, President Truman called for a thorough re-examination of American objectives in peace and war and their effect on strategic plans, in the light of likely Soviet nuclear weapon capability .54 In response, a joint

I 14 Background to the Anzus Pact

working party from the State and Defence Departments was made up of the Policy Planning Staff and the Joint Strategic Surveys Group. It was chaired by Paul Nitze, a former investment banker and later adviser on economic affairs, who had replaced Kennan as Director of the Policy Planning Staff at the end of I 949, though Kennan was consulted during its deliberations. The result was a remarkable report dated 7 April 1950, later circulated as NSC-68. It has been called 'one of the most significant policy papers in the history of American diplomacy' .55

The Nitze working party paper reiterated the objectives stated by Kennan in NSC-20/4 in 1948, but adapted and encompassed them in all-together more apocalyptic language. Acheson later said the purpose was to 'bludgeon the mass mind of "top government"' in order to facilitate decision,56 but NSC-68 reads like a caricature of Cold War paranoia and rhetoric. The paper began by outlining the 'present crisis' caused by recent changes in the balance of power - the defeat of Germany and Japan, the decline of the British and French Empires, and the emergence of the bi-polar world. It suggested that the Soviet Union, 'unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world'. With the development of nuclear weapons everyone faced the 'ever-present possibility of annihilation' in the event of total war. The matter at issue involved 'the fulfilment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself'. The paper went on to outline what it saw as the opposing objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The fundamental purpose of the United States was, as stated in the Constitution, to 'establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity'. The fundamental design of the Soviet Union was to consolidate Communist power in Russia and the satellites and 'the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of Government and structure of society in the countries of the nonSoviet world and to ensure the domination of the Eurasian land mass'. The conflict was pictured as one between freedom and slavery. Freedom welcomed diversity. The idea of freedom was 'the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority'. The Soviet assault on free institutions was world-wide and, in the current polarization, 'a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere'.

In the face of this challenge, the United States had to make itself


strong, affirm its values, build a successfully functioning world political and economic system, and foster fundamental change in the Soviet Union. It had to take on the responsibility of world leadership. Reiterating the Kennan view of 1948, the paper reinforced what it called 'the strategy of the Cold War'. Only by fostering the moral and material strength of the free world would it be possible to convince the Soviet regime of the falsity of its assumptions and make it learn to coexist with the non-Soviet world. In addressing the means for achieving these objectives, the paper argued that since compulsion was the negation of freedom, force should only be used as a last resort. Military power existed to deter an attacker.

In an analysis of economic and military capacities, the Soviet Union was shown to have its strengths and weaknesses. Its rapid advance to world power status was a powerful model for under-developed countries, especially in Asia, but the Soviet Union was itself vulnerable to its own nationalities. Although its economy was on a near-maximum production basis, its capacity was only about a quarter that of the United States, which had far vaster potential. However, the Soviet Union had such current military superiority that it could overrun Western Europe and the Middle East, launch air attacks on Britain; and on communications across the Atlantic and Pacific; and even make atomic raids on the United States, Canada and Alaska. By 1954 it might have a stockpile of 200 atomic bombs.

In face of this threat, American policy should be to 'foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish'. The policy of 'containment' - now explicitly stated and pushed further than Kennan's version two years before - was one which sought, by all means short of war, to achieve four things: to block further Soviet expansion; to expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions; to induce a reduction of the area of Soviet control, and to 'foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system'. At the same time it was essential to keep open the possibility of negotiation with the Soviet Union.

The real problem was that to fulfil the policy of containment, the United States had inadequate resources. It had allowed its military strength to decline relatively. Although it had overwhelming potential, there was a wide gap of 'unactualized power'. Four possible approaches were mooted: continuation with present policies, isolation, war, or a rapid build-up of the political, economic and military strength of the free world. The Nitze committee recommended the last. The conclusion drawn in the paper was that the Soviet possession of atomic weapons had greatly intensified the threat. This was the same threat outlined in


NSC 20/4 in 1948, though now more immediate. The United States must face the possibility of an atomic attack within four or five years and must have substantially increased capability 'to deter war and provide reasonable assurances, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow'. A continuation of present trends would result in a serious relative decline in strength for the free world. 'We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination'. It was, indeed, necessary to recognize that 'the Cold War is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake' .57

After these momentous words were sent to the National Security Council by the President, the joint State-Defence committee's paper became NSC-68 and was later adopted by Truman as US policy. Meanwhile, in June 1950, the objectives stated in both NSC-20/4 and NSC-68 became a policy basis for the JCS planning staff to frame a Joint Intermediate War Plan, code-named 'Reaper', to cover the early years of a war starting on I July I954. In such a war the overall concept would remain a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East.

In the first version of 'Reaper' on 7 June I950, the Soviet Union was assumed to be allied with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Outer Mongolia, China and North Korea, and possibly with Taiwan, Burma, Indo-China and the Philippines.5x In a version, made on 20 June only Taiwan had been added to the putative enemy camp, but a category of strategically important countries whose resources would not be available to the allies now included Austria, Iraq, South Korea and Indo-China. 59 Ten basic tasks were outlined in the plan: (I) the protection of the Western Hemisphere, (2) the strategic air offensive, (3) operations against enemy naval forces and shipping, (4) the retention of Britain and as much of Western Europe as possible, (5) the retention of bases and lines of communication, (6) the expansion of the power base for later offensives, (7) initiating a strategic offensive as soon as possible, (8) aid to allies, (9) exploiting the psychological weakness of the Soviet Union, and (IO) preparations for enforcing a surrender.

The war was expected to take from four to five years and pass through five phases. Phase I (the first three months) would see an initial Soviet offensive and allied holding operations. A strategic air offensive would be launched against the Soviet Union; tactical air operations would be mounted, and there would be operations against enemy naval forces and shipping. The allied defensive line would run from Trondheim


through Oslo-Rhine-Alps-Piave-Adriatic-Crete-Southeast TurkeyIranian mountain passes to the Gulf. Thus, Europe east of a line from the Balkans and northern Turkey through Iraq and Iran would be lost. In Southeast Asia and the Far East, the allies would hold a defensive line from the Kra Isthmus, through the China Sea and Japan Sea to the Bering Strait. Phase 2 (lasting nine months) would see a stabilizing of the Soviet advance and an attempt to achieve air superiority. The position in Western Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East would be strengthened and reserve forces built up. Phase 3 (which would take a further fifteen months) would be a period of relative stability, while preparations for an offensive were completed. Phase 4 (taking two years) would be the decisive period of the war with an allied offensive launched to ensure Soviet capitulation. The main thrust would be across the North German plain, with ancillary operations from the Aegean, the Turkish Straits and the Black Sea. The campaign would culminate with drives into Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union. At the same time, captured parts of Turkey, Iraq and Iran would be recovered and limited operations would be conducted in the Far East to hold down Russian resources. Phase 5 (a further year) would involve disarming the Soviet Union, demolishing its military industrial capacity and establishing allied control arrangements.

Such plans, with the Anglo-American differences unresolved over the role of the Middle East in the strategy, left many questions about the sharing of resources unanswered. Then, only five days after the second version of 'Reaper', the outbreak of the Korean War made the time-table seem out of date. However, the Korean outbreak did not invalidate the basic strategy. Indeed, the Korean War seemed to vindicate the writers of NSC-68. The Truman administration's response to the war (to be discussed in chapter 1 0) well-accorded with the doctrine that 'a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere', although it begged the question as to how free institutions in South Korea were at the time. The Korean War led to part of the massive re-armament called for in NSC-68, formally endorsed by Truman in September 1950.

Similarly, plan 'Reaper' (for a global war in 1954) was persisted with for a time. It was the subject of further Anglo-American staff talks in October 1950 when a new British paper 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy' (completed before the Korean outbreak) became available. The Americans continued to feel that the British overemphasized the importance of the Middle East, but they recognized that even though the war might not be lost if the Middle East was lost, 'someone has to


hold there'. This was the task of the British Commonwealth. The American planners said reinforcements would have to come from East of Suez, because of logistical problems, thus the troops would come from 'Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan etc.' The United States, said the planners, could guarantee that Australia and New Zealand would not be invaded, but could not guarantee the security of Malaya or Hong Kong.lt would give assistance, though not send troops. As to air support in the Middle East, there was no American commitment, but if something could be spared from adjacent areas 'they will be used' .60

The 'Reaper' plan, like its predecessors, was soon re-written and eventually a new planning programme was created, involving short-, mediumand long-term plans reviewed annually. 61

These plans for World War III were all very remote from Australia and New Zealand. In the Anglo-American plans for the Middle East the expectation that Australia and New Zealand would assist Britain was a constant theme. Moreover, the assumption in the American plans that Australia and New Zealand would be protected by the United States while they sent their forces to assist Britain in the Middle East, gives these plans an essential role in an analysis of the background to Anzus, as will become clear from the discussion of British, Australian and New Zealand planning which follows.

2 american post-war global strategic planning - springer · 2 american post-war global strategic...

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