Introduction 2.1

Protection equipment 2.2

Zones of protection 2.3

Reliability 2.4

Selectivity 2.5

Stability 2.6

Speed 2.7

Sensitivity 2.8

Primary and back-up protection 2.9

Relay output devices 2.10

Relay tripping circuits 2.11

Trip circuit supervision 2.12

• 2 • F u n d a m e n t a l so f P r o t e c t i o n P r a c t i c e

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2.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of an electrical power system is to generateand supply electrical energy to consumers. The systemshould be designed and managed to deliver this energyto the utilisation points with both reliability andeconomy. Severe disruption to the normal routine ofmodern society is likely if power outages are frequent orprolonged, placing an increasing emphasis on reliabilityand security of supply. As the requirements of reliabilityand economy are largely opposed, power system designis inevitably a compromise.

A power system comprises many diverse items ofequipment. Figure 2.2 shows a hypothetical powersystem; this and Figure 2.1 illustrates the diversity ofequipment that is found.

• 2 • Fundamentalso f P ro te c t i o n P ra c t i c e

Figure 2.1: Modern power station

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Figur

e 2.Figure 2.2: Example power system

R1 R2

G1 G2

T1 T2T

R3 R4

G3 G4

T10 T11

T14

T16 T17

T15

T12 T13

R5 R6

G5 G6

T7 T8T

R7

G7

T9T

T5T T6T T3T T4T

L2

L3 L4

L1A

L7A

L5

L6

L8

L7B

L1B

A380kV

380kV380kV

110kV

Hydro power station

BC

B'33kVC'

380kV

CCGT power station

ED220kV

Steam power station

Gridsubstation

F

33kV D' 110kV

380kV

G'

G

Grid380kV F'

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Many items of equipment are very expensive, and so thecomplete power system represents a very large capitalinvestment. To maximise the return on this outlay, thesystem must be utilised as much as possible within theapplicable constraints of security and reliability ofsupply. More fundamental, however, is that the powersystem should operate in a safe manner at all times. Nomatter how well designed, faults will always occur on apower system, and these faults may represent a risk tolife and/or property. Figure 2.3 shows the onset of a faulton an overhead line. The destructive power of a fault arccarrying a high current is very great; it can burn throughcopper conductors or weld together core laminations ina transformer or machine in a very short time – sometens or hundreds of milliseconds. Even away from thefault arc itself, heavy fault currents can cause damage toplant if they continue for more than a few seconds. Theprovision of adequate protection to detect anddisconnect elements of the power system in the event offault is therefore an integral part of power systemdesign. Only by so doing can the objectives of the powersystem be met and the investment protected. Figure 2.4provides an illustration of the consequences of failure toprovide appropriate protection.

This is the measure of the importance of protectionsystems as applied in power system practice and of theresponsibility vested in the Protection Engineer.

2.2 PROTECTION EQUIPMENT

The definitions that follow are generally used in relationto power system protection:

a. Protection System: a complete arrangement ofprotection equipment and other devices required toachieve a specified function based on a protectionprincipal (IEC 60255-20)

b. Protection Equipment: a collection of protectiondevices (relays, fuses, etc.). Excluded are devicessuch as CT’s, CB’s, Contactors, etc.

c. Protection Scheme: a collection of protectionequipment providing a defined function andincluding all equipment required to make thescheme work (i.e. relays, CT’s, CB’s, batteries, etc.)

In order to fulfil the requirements of protection with theoptimum speed for the many different configurations,operating conditions and construction features of powersystems, it has been necessary to develop many types ofrelay that respond to various functions of the powersystem quantities. For example, observation simply ofthe magnitude of the fault current suffices in some casesbut measurement of power or impedance may benecessary in others. Relays frequently measure complexfunctions of the system quantities, which are only readilyexpressible by mathematical or graphical means.

Relays may be classified according to the technologyused:

a. electromechanical

b. static

c. digital

d. numerical

The different types have somewhat different capabilities,due to the limitations of the technology used. They aredescribed in more detail in Chapter 7.

Figure 2.3: Onset of an overhead line fault

Figure 2.4: Possible consequence of inadequate protection

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In many cases, it is not feasible to protect against allhazards with a relay that responds to a single powersystem quantity. An arrangement using severalquantities may be required. In this case, either severalrelays, each responding to a single quantity, or, morecommonly, a single relay containing several elements,each responding independently to a different quantitymay be used.

The terminology used in describing protection systemsand relays is given in Appendix 1. Different symbols fordescribing relay functions in diagrams of protectionschemes are used, the two most common methods (IECand IEEE/ANSI) are provided in Appendix 2.

2.3 ZONES OF PROTECTION

To limit the extent of the power system that isdisconnected when a fault occurs, protection is arrangedin zones. The principle is shown in Figure 2.5. Ideally, thezones of protection should overlap, so that no part of thepower system is left unprotected. This is shown in Figure2.6(a), the circuit breaker being included in both zones.

Figure 2.52.6

For practical physical and economic reasons, this ideal isnot always achieved, accommodation for currenttransformers being in some cases available only on oneside of the circuit breakers, as in Figure 2.6(b). Thisleaves a section between the current transformers and

the circuit breaker A that is not completely protectedagainst faults. In Figure 2.6(b) a fault at F would causethe busbar protection to operate and open the circuitbreaker but the fault may continue to be fed through thefeeder. The feeder protection, if of the unit type (seesection 2.5.2), would not operate, since the fault isoutside its zone. This problem is dealt with byintertripping or some form of zone extension, to ensurethat the remote end of the feeder is tripped also.

The point of connection of the protection with the powersystem usually defines the zone and corresponds to thelocation of the current transformers. Unit typeprotection will result in the boundary being a clearlydefined closed loop. Figure 2.7 illustrates a typicalarrangement of overlapping zones.

Figure 2.7

Alternatively, the zone may be unrestricted; the start willbe defined but the extent (or ‘reach’) will depend onmeasurement of the system quantities and will thereforebe subject to variation, owing to changes in systemconditions and measurement errors.

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Figure 2.7: Overlapping zonesof protection systems

~

~Figure 2.5: Division of power system

into protection zones

Feeder 2Feeder 1 Feeder 3Zone 6

Zone 5 Zone 7

Zone 4

Zone 3

Zone 2

Zone 1

AA

FF

Feederedprotection

Feederedprotection

Busbarprotectionec

Busbarprotectione

(a) CT's on both sides of circuit breaker

(b) CT's on circuit side of circuit breaker

Figure 2.6: CT Locations

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2.4 RELIABIL ITY

The need for a high degree of reliability is discussed inSection 2.1. Incorrect operation can be attributed to oneof the following classifications:

a. incorrect design/settings

b. incorrect installation/testing

c. deterioration in service

2.4.1 Design

The design of a protection scheme is of paramountimportance. This is to ensure that the system willoperate under all required conditions, and (equallyimportant) refrain from operating when so required(including, where appropriate, being restrained fromoperating for faults external to the zone beingprotected). Due consideration must be given to thenature, frequency and duration of faults likely to beexperienced, all relevant parameters of the power system(including the characteristics of the supply source, andmethods of operation) and the type of protectionequipment used. Of course, no amount of effort at thisstage can make up for the use of protection equipmentthat has not itself been subject to proper design.

2.4.2 Settings

It is essential to ensure that settings are chosen forprotection relays and systems which take into accountthe parameters of the primary system, including faultand load levels, and dynamic performance requirementsetc. The characteristics of power systems change withtime, due to changes in loads, location, type and amountof generation, etc. Therefore, setting values of relaysmay need to be checked at suitable intervals to ensurethat they are still appropriate. Otherwise, unwantedoperation or failure to operate when required may occur.

2.4.3 Installation

The need for correct installation of protection systems isobvious, but the complexity of the interconnections ofmany systems and their relationship to the remainder ofthe installation may make checking difficult. Site testingis therefore necessary; since it will be difficult toreproduce all fault conditions correctly, these tests mustbe directed to proving the installation. The tests shouldbe limited to such simple and direct tests as will provethe correctness of the connections, relay settings, andfreedom from damage of the equipment. No attemptshould be made to 'type test' the equipment or toestablish complex aspects of its technical performance.

2.4.4 Testing

Comprehensive testing is just as important, and thistesting should cover all aspects of the protectionscheme, as well as reproducing operational andenvironmental conditions as closely as possible. Typetesting of protection equipment to recognised standardsfulfils many of these requirements, but it may still benecessary to test the complete protection scheme (relays,current transformers and other ancillary items) and thetests must simulate fault conditions realistically.

2.4.5 Deterioration in Service

Subsequent to installation in perfect condition,deterioration of equipment will take place and mayeventually interfere with correct functioning. Forexample, contacts may become rough or burnt owing tofrequent operation, or tarnished owing to atmosphericcontamination; coils and other circuits may becomeopen-circuited, electronic components and auxiliarydevices may fail, and mechanical parts may seize up.

The time between operations of protection relays may beyears rather than days. During this period defects mayhave developed unnoticed until revealed by the failure ofthe protection to respond to a power system fault. Forthis reason, relays should be regularly tested in order tocheck for correct functioning.

Testing should preferably be carried out withoutdisturbing permanent connections. This can be achievedby the provision of test blocks or switches.

The quality of testing personnel is an essential featurewhen assessing reliability and considering means forimprovement. Staff must be technically competent andadequately trained, as well as self-disciplined to proceedin a systematic manner to achieve final acceptance.

Important circuits that are especially vulnerable can beprovided with continuous electrical supervision; sucharrangements are commonly applied to circuit breakertrip circuits and to pilot circuits. Modern digital andnumerical relays usually incorporate self-testing/diagnostic facilities to assist in the detection offailures. With these types of relay, it may be possible toarrange for such failures to be automatically reported bycommunications link to a remote operations centre, sothat appropriate action may be taken to ensurecontinued safe operation of that part of the powersystem and arrangements put in hand for investigationand correction of the fault.

2.4.6 Protection Performance

Protection system performance is frequently assessedstatistically. For this purpose each system fault is classed

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as an incident and only those that are cleared by thetripping of the correct circuit breakers are classed as'correct'. The percentage of correct clearances can thenbe determined.

This principle of assessment gives an accurate evaluationof the protection of the system as a whole, but it issevere in its judgement of relay performance. Manyrelays are called into operation for each system fault,and all must behave correctly for a correct clearance tobe recorded.

Complete reliability is unlikely ever to be achieved byfurther improvements in construction. If the level ofreliability achieved by a single device is not acceptable,improvement can be achieved through redundancy, e.g.duplication of equipment. Two complete, independent,main protection systems are provided, and arranged sothat either by itself can carry out the required function.If the probability of each equipment failing is x/unit, theresultant probability of both equipments failingsimultaneously, allowing for redundancy, is x2. Where xis small the resultant risk (x2) may be negligible.

Where multiple protection systems are used, the trippingsignal can be provided in a number of different ways.The two most common methods are:

a. all protection systems must operate for a trippingoperation to occur (e.g. ‘two-out-of-two’arrangement)

b. only one protection system need operate to causea trip (e.g. ‘one-out-of two’ arrangement)

The former method guards against maloperation whilethe latter guards against failure to operate due to anunrevealed fault in a protection system. Rarely, threemain protection systems are provided, configured in a‘two-out-of three’ tripping arrangement, to provide bothreliability of tripping, and security against unwantedtripping.

It has long been the practice to apply duplicateprotection systems to busbars, both being required tooperate to complete a tripping operation. Loss of abusbar may cause widespread loss of supply, which isclearly undesirable. In other cases, important circuits areprovided with duplicate main protection systems, eitherbeing able to trip independently. On critical circuits, usemay also be made of a digital fault simulator to modelthe relevant section of the power system and check theperformance of the relays used.

2.5 SELECTIVITY

When a fault occurs, the protection scheme is requiredto trip only those circuit breakers whose operation isrequired to isolate the fault. This property of selectivetripping is also called 'discrimination' and is achieved bytwo general methods.

2.5.1 Time Grading

Protection systems in successive zones are arranged tooperate in times that are graded through the sequence ofequipments so that upon the occurrence of a fault,although a number of protection equipments respond,only those relevant to the faulty zone complete thetripping function. The others make incompleteoperations and then reset. The speed of response willoften depend on the severity of the fault, and willgenerally be slower than for a unit system.

2.5.2 Unit Systems

It is possible to design protection systems that respondonly to fault conditions occurring within a clearlydefined zone. This type of protection system is known as'unit protection'. Certain types of unit protection areknown by specific names, e.g. restricted earth fault anddifferential protection. Unit protection can be appliedthroughout a power system and, since it does not involvetime grading, is relatively fast in operation. The speed ofresponse is substantially independent of fault severity.

Unit protection usually involves comparison of quantitiesat the boundaries of the protected zone as defined by thelocations of the current transformers. This comparisonmay be achieved by direct hard-wired connections ormay be achieved via a communications link. Howevercertain protection systems derive their 'restricted'property from the configuration of the power system andmay be classed as unit protection, e.g. earth faultprotection applied to the high voltage delta winding of apower transformer. Whichever method is used, it mustbe kept in mind that selectivity is not merely a matter ofrelay design. It also depends on the correct co-ordination of current transformers and relays with asuitable choice of relay settings, taking into account thepossible range of such variables as fault currents,maximum load current, system impedances and otherrelated factors, where appropriate.

2.6 STABIL ITY

The term ‘stability’ is usually associated with unitprotection schemes and refers to the ability of theprotection system to remain unaffected by conditionsexternal to the protected zone, for example through loadcurrent and external fault conditions.

2.7 SPEED

The function of protection systems is to isolate faults onthe power system as rapidly as possible. The mainobjective is to safeguard continuity of supply byremoving each disturbance before it leads to widespreadloss of synchronism and consequent collapse of thepower system.

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As the loading on a power system increases, the phaseshift between voltages at different busbars on thesystem also increases, and therefore so does theprobability that synchronism will be lost when thesystem is disturbed by a fault. The shorter the time afault is allowed to remain in the system, the greater canbe the loading of the system. Figure 2.8 shows typicalrelations between system loading and fault clearancetimes for various types of fault. It will be noted thatphase faults have a more marked effect on the stabilityof the system than a simple earth fault and thereforerequire faster clearance.

Figure 2.8

System stability is not, however, the only consideration.Rapid operation of protection ensures that fault damageis minimised, as energy liberated during a fault isproportional to the square of the fault current times theduration of the fault. Protection must thus operate asquickly as possible but speed of operation must beweighed against economy. Distribution circuits, whichdo not normally require a fast fault clearance, are usuallyprotected by time-graded systems. Generating plant andEHV systems require protection gear of the highestattainable speed; the only limiting factor will be thenecessity for correct operation, and therefore unitsystems are normal practice.

2.8 SENSIT IV ITY

Sensitivity is a term frequently used when referring tothe minimum operating level (current, voltage, poweretc.) of relays or complete protection schemes. The relayor scheme is said to be sensitive if the primary operatingparameter(s) is low.

With older electromechanical relays, sensitivity wasconsidered in terms of the sensitivity of the measuringmovement and was measured in terms of its volt-ampereconsumption to cause operation. With modern digitaland numerical relays the achievable sensitivity is seldomlimited by the device design but by its application andCT/VT parameters.

2.9 PRIMARY AND BACK-UP PROTECTION

The reliability of a power system has been discussedearlier, including the use of more than one primary (or‘main’) protection system operating in parallel. In theevent of failure or non-availability of the primaryprotection some other means of ensuring that the faultis isolated must be provided. These secondary systemsare referred to as ‘back-up protection’.

Back-up protection may be considered as either being‘local’ or ‘remote’. Local back-up protection is achievedby protection which detects an un-cleared primarysystem fault at its own location and which then trips itsown circuit breakers, e.g. time graded overcurrent relays.Remote back-up protection is provided by protectionthat detects an un-cleared primary system fault at aremote location and then issues a local trip command,e.g. the second or third zones of a distance relay. In bothcases the main and back-up protection systems detect afault simultaneously, operation of the back-upprotection being delayed to ensure that the primaryprotection clears the fault if possible. Normally beingunit protection, operation of the primary protection willbe fast and will result in the minimum amount of thepower system being disconnected. Operation of theback-up protection will be, of necessity, slower and willresult in a greater proportion of the primary systembeing lost.

The extent and type of back-up protection applied willnaturally be related to the failure risks and relativeeconomic importance of the system. For distributionsystems where fault clearance times are not critical, timedelayed remote back-up protection may be adequate.For EHV systems, where system stability is at risk unlessa fault is cleared quickly, multiple primary protectionsystems, operating in parallel and possibly of differenttypes (e.g. distance and unit protection), will be used toensure fast and reliable tripping. Back-up overcurrentprotection may then optionally be applied to ensure thattwo separate protection systems are available duringmaintenance of one of the primary protection systems.

Back-up protection systems should, ideally, becompletely separate from the primary systems. Forexample a circuit protected by a current differential relaymay also have time graded overcurrent and earth faultrelays added to provide circuit breaker tripping in theevent of failure of the main primary unit protection. Tomaintain complete separation and thus integrity, currenttransformers, voltage transformers, relays, circuit breakertrip coils and d.c. supplies would be duplicated. Thisideal is rarely attained in practice. The followingcompromises are typical:

a. separate current transformers (cores and secondarywindings only) are provided. This involves little extracost or accommodation compared with the use of

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Figure 2.8: Typical power/time relationshipfor various fault types

Time

Load

pow

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Phase-earth

Phase-phase

Three-phase

Phase-phase-earth

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common current transformers that would have to belarger because of the combined burden. This practiceis becoming less common when digital or numericalrelays are used, because of the extremely low inputburden of these relay types

b. voltage transformers are not duplicated because ofcost and space considerations. Each protection relaysupply is separately protected (fuse or MCB) andcontinuously supervised to ensure security of the VToutput. An alarm is given on failure of the supply and,where appropriate, prevent an unwanted operation ofthe protection

c. trip supplies to the two protections should beseparately protected (fuse or MCB). Duplication oftripping batteries and of circuit breaker tripping coilsmay be provided. Trip circuits should be continuouslysupervised

d. it is desirable that the main and back-up protections (orduplicate main protections) should operate on differentprinciples, so that unusual events that may causefailure of the one will be less likely to affect the other

Digital and numerical relays may incorporate suitableback-up protection functions (e.g. a distance relay mayalso incorporate time-delayed overcurrent protectionelements as well). A reduction in the hardware required toprovide back-up protection is obtained, but at the risk thata common relay element failure (e.g. the power supply)will result in simultaneous loss of both main and back-upprotection. The acceptability of this situation must beevaluated on a case-by-case basis.

2.10 RELAY OUTPUT DEVICES

In order to perform their intended function, relays must befitted with some means of providing the various outputsignals required. Contacts of various types usually fulfilthis function.

2.10.1 Contact Systems

Relays may be fitted with a variety of contact systemsfor providing electrical outputs for tripping and remoteindication purposes. The most common typesencountered are as follows:

a. Self-resetThe contacts remain in the operated condition onlywhile the controlling quantity is applied, returningto their original condition when it is removed

b. Hand or electrical resetThese contacts remain in the operated conditionafter the controlling quantity is removed. They canbe reset either by hand or by an auxiliaryelectromagnetic element

The majority of protection relay elements have self-resetcontact systems, which, if so desired, can be modified toprovide hand reset output contacts by the use ofauxiliary elements. Hand or electrically reset relays areused when it is necessary to maintain a signal or lockoutcondition. Contacts are shown on diagrams in theposition corresponding to the un-operated or de-energised condition, regardless of the continuous servicecondition of the equipment. For example, anundervoltage relay, which is continually energised innormal circumstances, would still be shown in the de-energised condition.

A 'make' contact is one that closes when the relay picksup, whereas a 'break' contact is one that is closed whenthe relay is de-energised and opens when the relay picksup. Examples of these conventions and variations areshown in Figure 2.9.

A protection relay is usually required to trip a circuitbreaker, the tripping mechanism of which may be asolenoid with a plunger acting directly on themechanism latch or an electrically operated valve. Thepower required by the trip coil of the circuit breaker mayrange from up to 50 watts for a small 'distribution'circuit breaker, to 3000 watts for a large, extra-high-voltage circuit breaker.

The relay may therefore energise the tripping coildirectly, or, according to the coil rating and the numberof circuits to be energised, may do so through theagency of another multi-contact auxiliary relay.

The basic trip circuit is simple, being made up of a hand-trip control switch and the contacts of the protectionrelays in parallel to energise the trip coil from a battery,through a normally open auxiliary switch operated bythe circuit breaker. This auxiliary switch is needed toopen the trip circuit when the circuit breaker openssince the protection relay contacts will usually be quiteincapable of performing the interrupting duty. Theauxiliary switch will be adjusted to close as early aspossible in the closing stroke, to make the protectioneffective in case the breaker is being closed on to a fault.

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Figure 2.9: Contact types

Self reset

Hand reset

`make' contacts(normally open)

`break' contacts(normally open)

Time delay onpick up

Time delay ondrop-off

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Where multiple output contacts, or contacts withappreciable current-carrying capacity are required,interposing, contactor type elements will normally be used.

In general, static and microprocessor relays have discretemeasuring and tripping circuits, or modules. Thefunctioning of the measuring modules is independent ofoperation of the tripping modules. Such a relay isequivalent to a sensitive electromechanical relay with atripping contactor, so that the number or rating ofoutputs has no more significance than the fact that theyhave been provided.

For larger switchgear installations the tripping powerrequirement of each circuit breaker is considerable, andfurther, two or more breakers may have to be tripped byone protection system. There may also be remotesignalling requirements, interlocking with otherfunctions (for example auto-reclosing arrangements),and other control functions to be performed. Thesevarious operations may then be carried out by multi-contact tripping relays, which are energised by theprotection relays and provide the necessary number ofadequately rated output contacts.

2.10.2 Operation Indicators

Protection systems are invariably provided withindicating devices, called 'flags', or 'targets', as a guidefor operations personnel. Not every relay will have one,as indicators are arranged to operate only if a tripoperation is initiated. Indicators, with very fewexceptions, are bi-stable devices, and may be eithermechanical or electrical. A mechanical indicator consistsof a small shutter that is released by the protection relaymovement to expose the indicator pattern.

Electrical indicators may be simple attracted armatureelements, where operation of the armature releases ashutter to expose an indicator as above, or indicatorlights (usually light emitting diodes). For the latter, somekind of memory circuit is provided to ensure that theindicator remains lit after the initiating event has passed.

With the advent of digital and numerical relays, theoperation indicator has almost become redundant.Relays will be provided with one or two simple indicatorsthat indicate that the relay is powered up and whetheran operation has occurred. The remainder of theinformation previously presented via indicators isavailable by interrogating the relay locally via a ‘man-machine interface’ (e.g. a keypad and liquid crystaldisplay screen), or remotely via a communication system.

2.11 TRIPPING CIRCUITS

There are three main circuits in use for circuit breakertripping:

a. series sealing

b. shunt reinforcing

c. shunt reinforcement with sealing

These are illustrated in Figure 2.10.

For electromechanical relays, electrically operatedindicators, actuated after the main contacts have closed,avoid imposing an additional friction load on themeasuring element, which would be a serious handicapfor certain types. Care must be taken with directlyoperated indicators to line up their operation with theclosure of the main contacts. The indicator must haveoperated by the time the contacts make, but must nothave done so more than marginally earlier. This is to stopindication occurring when the tripping operation has notbeen completed.

With modern digital and numerical relays, the use ofvarious alternative methods of providing trip circuitfunctions is largely obsolete. Auxiliary miniaturecontactors are provided within the relay to provideoutput contact functions and the operation of thesecontactors is independent of the measuring system, asmentioned previously. The making current of the relayoutput contacts and the need to avoid these contactsbreaking the trip coil current largely dictates circuitbreaker trip coil arrangements. Comments on thevarious means of providing tripping arrangements are,however, included below as a historical referenceapplicable to earlier electromechanical relay designs.

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Figure 2.10: Typical relay tripping circuits

(a) Series sealing

PR TC

PR TC

PR TC

52a

(b) Shunt reinforcing

52a

(c) Shunt reinforcing with series sealing

52a

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2.11.1 Series sealing

The coil of the series contactor carries the trip currentinitiated by the protection relay, and the contactor closesa contact in parallel with the protection relay contact.This closure relieves the protection relay contact of furtherduty and keeps the tripping circuit securely closed, even ifchatter occurs at the main contact. The total tripping timeis not affected, and the indicator does not operate untilcurrent is actually flowing through the trip coil.

The main disadvantage of this method is that such serieselements must have their coils matched with the tripcircuit with which they are associated.

The coil of these contacts must be of low impedance,with about 5% of the trip supply voltage being droppedacross them.

When used in association with high-speed trip relays,which usually interrupt their own coil current, theauxiliary elements must be fast enough to operate andrelease the flag before their coil current is cut off. Thismay pose a problem in design if a variable number ofauxiliary elements (for different phases and so on) maybe required to operate in parallel to energise a commontripping relay.

2.11.2 Shunt reinforcing

Here the sensitive contacts are arranged to trip thecircuit breaker and simultaneously to energise theauxiliary unit, which then reinforces the contact that isenergising the trip coil.

Two contacts are required on the protection relay, sinceit is not permissible to energise the trip coil and thereinforcing contactor in parallel. If this were done, andmore than one protection relay were connected to tripthe same circuit breaker, all the auxiliary relays would beenergised in parallel for each relay operation and theindication would be confused.

The duplicate main contacts are frequently provided as athree-point arrangement to reduce the number ofcontact fingers.

2.11.3 Shunt reinforcement with sealing

This is a development of the shunt reinforcing circuit tomake it applicable to situations where there is apossibility of contact bounce for any reason.

Using the shunt reinforcing system under thesecircumstances would result in chattering on the auxiliaryunit, and the possible burning out of the contacts, notonly of the sensitive element but also of the auxiliaryunit. The chattering would end only when the circuitbreaker had finally tripped. The effect of contact bounce

is countered by means of a further contact on theauxiliary unit connected as a retaining contact.

This means that provision must be made for releasing thesealing circuit when tripping is complete; this is adisadvantage, because it is sometimes inconvenient tofind a suitable contact to use for this purpose.

2.12 TRIP C IRCUIT SUPERVIS ION

The trip circuit includes the protection relay and othercomponents, such as fuses, links, relay contacts, auxiliaryswitch contacts, etc., and in some cases through aconsiderable amount of circuit wiring with intermediateterminal boards. These interconnections, coupled withthe importance of the circuit, result in a requirement inmany cases to monitor the integrity of the circuit. Thisis known as trip circuit supervision. The simplestarrangement contains a healthy trip lamp, as shown inFigure 2.11(a).

The resistance in series with the lamp prevents thebreaker being tripped by an internal short circuit causedby failure of the lamp. This provides supervision whilethe circuit breaker is closed; a simple extension givespre-closing supervision.

Figure 2.11(b) shows how, the addition of a normallyclosed auxiliary switch and a resistance unit can providesupervision while the breaker is both open and closed.

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Figure 2.11: Trip circuit supervision circuits.

PR TC52a

PR TC

PR TC

52a

52b

(c) Supervision with circuit breaker open or closed with remote alarm (scheme H7)

52a

A

Alarm

52a

52b

TCCircuit breaker

Trip

Trip

(d) Implementation of H5 scheme in numerical relay

(a) Supervision while circuit breaker is closed (scheme H4)

(b) Supervision while circuit breaker is open or closed (scheme H5)

C

B

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N e t w o r k P r o t e c t i o n & A u t o m a t i o n G u i d e • 1 5 •

In either case, the addition of a normally open push-button contact in series with the lamp will make thesupervision indication available only when required.

Schemes using a lamp to indicate continuity are suitablefor locally controlled installations, but when control isexercised from a distance it is necessary to use a relaysystem. Figure 2.11(c) illustrates such a scheme, which isapplicable wherever a remote signal is required.

With the circuit healthy, either or both of relays A and Bare operated and energise relay C. Both A and B mustreset to allow C to drop-off. Relays A, B and C are timedelayed to prevent spurious alarms during tripping orclosing operations. The resistors are mounted separatelyfrom the relays and their values are chosen such that ifany one component is inadvertently short-circuited,tripping will not take place.

The alarm supply should be independent of the trippingsupply so that indication will be obtained in case offailure of the tripping supply.

The above schemes are commonly known as the H4, H5and H7 schemes, arising from the diagram references ofthe Utility specification in which they originallyappeared. Figure 2.11(d) shows implementation ofscheme H5 using the facilities of a modern numericalrelay. Remote indication is achieved through use ofprogrammable logic and additional auxiliary outputsavailable in the protection relay.

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