2 the road to the budokantheoplothe.com/stevens-ch2.pdf · 2 the road to the budokan setting the...

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2 The road to the Budokan Setting the stage

Despite the escalation of conflict in South East Asia and the deepening of the Cold War around the world, Japan experienced steady economic growth in the 1960s. It was in this time of mixed messages of both hope and fear that the Beatles planned their visit to Tokyo. Omura Toru refers to 1966 as the 'peak of [Beatle] fever' in Japan, a period characterized not necessarily by the intensity of the feelings of fans, but by the breadth of public awareness about the Beatles. That year, people who had originally had no interest in the Beatles or their music were 'drawn into the maelstrom of Beatlemania' (nihonju ga bftoruc:u ni hikkakimawasareta) (Omura 2016: 182). The Beatles' visit in 1966 not 011ly inAuenced Japanese views about music, but also their ideas about 'fashion, culture and ideology'. Omura notes the increase of amateur musicians (leading, presumably, to the singer-songwriter boom in Japanese pop music in the 1970s and 80s). In terms of fashion and culture, Omura suggests that the Beatles' somewhat feminine look (or so it was deemed at the time) inspired aesthetics in Japanese shojo manga (girls' comics) and later Takarazuka stage productions; lastly, he argues that Japanese views about 'love' and 'dreams' (personal ambition) were transfonned by a generation listening to Beatles music (Omura 2016: 183). If we accept Omura\ hypothesis, many of the popular cultural forms that Japan is famous for exporting today, such as kawaii (cute) fashion, and dreamy and romantic shojo manga and anime, owe a cultural debt to the Fab Four. This chapter sets the stage for the days of' peak Beatlemania' in June and July !966. In delving into the details of the planning for the Beatles ' tour of Japan, we see in bold relief how different social groups -stratified by age and gender, as well as class and region - came to tenns with this 'fever', and each other, as well as what this fever said about Japan in the world.

Planning the Japanese tour

From a planning perspective, the Asian leg of the 1966 tour was the most ambitious aspect of the Beatles' world tour, given that Brian Epstein had no experience working with promoters on the ground in either Japan or the Philippines. Epstein and his company's managerial ambitions were matched in scale but were also in conflict with the musicians' own professional aspirations at the time. Japanese journalist and Beatles aficionado Fujimoto Kunihiko places the year 1966 as the group's 'middle period', coming after their hectic early years of fame but

26 The road to the Budukan

prec eding the mature phase of their reco rding careers (Fujimoto 20 16: 2 1 ). After extraordinary internationa l success and recog nit ion fo llowin g their wo rld tour in 1965, reco rd-break ing sa les fig ures and recognition from the Britisb Crown , the Beat les themse lves were growi ng uncom fortable wit h the labe l 'po p st ar ' . They wished to align themse lves with the more sophisticated role of ' recordin g artist', which required m,ore investmen t in composition and record ing, while touring and other public appearances detract ed from their ability to crea te fhe compl ex sounds they desi red in t he st udio. The y had tired of their routine as a ' I ive band ' - that is, one that recorded songs much in the same way as they performed them in concert - and their experi ence recording the more complex and aJbwn -oriented work Rubber Soul hinted at the work yet to be don e, if t hey cou Id be freed from the phys ica l and emotional toll of touring. Philip No rtnan writ es oft his t ime that

[as] amazing as it may seem , mone y was never the Beatles ' prim e object ive. They saw themselves always as artists on a continuou s upward curve of experimentation and innovation. After creating an albu m 'like Rubber Soul, it was ga lling to have to run back on stage with their same old matchin g su its and .hair, and blast the same old 30-minute repertoire hlto the same vortex of mindless screams ... their standards had gone to hell, simply because no one was listenin g.

(Norman 2009: 43 I)

At that time , the Beatle s were just beg inning to I.earn how to say no. For examp le, they first refused to do the annual holida y show s in the UK that they had performed each year s ince 1963 (Noonan 2009: 432). Fmthem10re , in early 1966 the Beat les postponed produ ction on the ir third mo vie (part of their three-film co'!1-tract) w ith United Artists. 1 Recording fo r the album Revolver began in Apri l 1966 and wrapped up just before they departed for Germany in Jun e. Featurin g musi C' inspired by the band's recent expe rienc es with drug s, [nd.ian music and c lassica l musi c, Rt-'110/ver was the first Beatles album that utiliz ed new recordin o tech-

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niques such as ove rdubbin g, varispeed ing, tape loops and reverse recordin g to ' capture sounds previous ly unheai-d and in their beads , consc ious of their place ·in rock 's hierarc hy and driven by U1e need to stay ahead of the comp et ition ' (Rodriguez 20 12: xii) . Presumabl y, these competitors were the Beach Boy s and Rolling Stones, \¥ho were also releasin g musi c of increa s ing ly high standards, and the Beatles were keen ly aware of these deve lopments. To wit , the Beatles ' public relations man Tony Barrow to ld an Amer ican teen magazin e at the time tha t their new album would contai n 'all so rts of weird and wonderful innovations ... [and] specia l new sound s' (KRLA Beat, 4 Jun e l 966, p. I).

In this period of creati vity and profess iona l assertion, why did the Beatles choose to come to Japan ? Tbe 'uno fficial' Beat les fan club states that the tour was a result of 'the Beatles' desire [to visit Japan]' and 'conditions in Japan ' (BCC Shuppan 2016: 26). The Beat les themselves were said to be tired after their lengthy 1965 tour. and requested that their next tour con sist of shorte r spans of fewer dates , presumably so that they could rest between shows, and interruptions to their recordin g schedule wou ld be minimjz ed (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 3 1-2) . To

The road to the Budokan 27

keep their interest in touring, Epstein asked the members to nominate places they wanted to go, despite their wishes to spend more time in London recording. Harrison nominated India, but Lennon is said to have indicated Japan as his preference. Fifty years later, however, individual memories can differ: Paul McCartney's recollection of the decision was 'the promoter said go to Japan, so we just went' (BCC Shuppan 2016: 32).

From the mai1agerial side, Japan was a reasonable nomination in terms of fan interest and profitability. The Japanese 'Beatles Boom' had gained momentum in mid-1964, and the band's first film, A Hard Day's Night (Japanese title B'itoru:ou ga yattekuru ya! ya/ ya.', or The Beatles Are Coming, Yeah! Yeah! Yeah1), premiered on I August that year at the Sh ochiku Central Theatre in the Tsuk ij i district of Tokyo (Omura 2016: 89). Many of the film's scenes featured the 'screaming voices of the fans' (BCC Shuppan 2016: 32) that characterized British Beatlemania, setting an example ot: and also justifying, similar fan reactions in Japan. On 16 February 1965, the Beatles were photographed with the director of EMI Records, Sir Joseph Lockwood, when they received the Carl Allen Award for the best group of 1964. In it, they held carved wooden kokeshi dolls, which had been sent to Lockwood From EMl's Toshiba Ongaku Kogyo colleagues (Omura 20 I 6: 107), who sought to raise the Beatles' awareness of their Japanese fans. Clearly, there was interest, and a conce11 in Tokyo would sell well. As early as February 1965, rumours began to fly; on 16 February the Nikkan Sports paper published an article headlined 'Will the Beatles visit Japan this autumn?' (Omura 2016: 124).

On the Beatles' side, there were practical as well as individual reasons for choosing to stop in Japan, for the first half of the l 966 tour was moving in an eastward direction. The first tour dates to be scheduled were for Germany, which was a 'nostalgic' option, given that the band had not visited there since 1963 and they were all eager to see old friends from their pre-Beatlemania residency in Hamburg (Nonnan 2009: 440-1; BCC Shuppan 2016: 26). The Manila concerts were decided next. Nonnan writes that the Philippines, which had long been under the United States' imperial hand, was not 'a usual destination for travelling pop groups', hut this was a 'brilliant territorial move on Brian's part' (2009: 442). Given that English was widely spoken and Manila was a highly populated city - in 1960, it had 2.5 mil lion residents, and grew at an average rate of 4.9 per cent between 1960 and 1970 (United Nations 1986: 6)- promoters guessed that a large-scale Beatles concert could sell well there (BCC Shuppan 2016: 27). They also saw the Philippines from a stereotypically outsider perspective, as 'the most willingly Americanised nation in Southeast Asia' (Nonnan 2009: 442), eagerly adopting many aspects of Western popular culture, including pop music and fashion (which was to be amply illustrated by Imelda Marcos's closet contents in the years 10 come). As we will see later in Chapter 4, however , this was a much more complex situation, and the tour's conclusion spoke volumes about the Beatles' and their promoters' mistaken views about this emerging Southeast Asian nation.

With offers in West Germany and the Philippines already set, Japan seemed well placed for a mid-tour stopover. The promoter involved with setting up the Gennan and Manila concerts was a British man named Victor Lewis. Formerly

28 The road to the Budokan

an accomplished jazz guitarist, Lewis was an 'o ld school London theatrical agent' (Norman 2009: 44 1) who had moved into booking management after his jazz band's fortunes waned in the face of competition from rock and roll (Voce 2009). In 1963, Lewis, who had been doing some recording in Los Angeles, returned to London to manage the General Artists Corporation office there (.Jc,pcm Times, 16 July 1966, p. 5). His success at GAC caught Epstein's eye; he had also"Worked with Epstein on the 1964 US tour. and in 1965, his agency was acquired by Epstein's company NEMS, and he became a member of its board (Japan Times, 16 July 1966, p. 5; No.nnan 2009: 44 J: Voce 2009). Lewis became responsible for the Beatles' bookings outside the UK and was considered the • ·'advance" man' in the company (Japan Times, 16 July 1966, p. 5). Therefore, Lewis was considered a trusted insider in the generally closed Beatles business community (BCC Shuppan 2016: 27), and Japanese negotiators felt that infonnation from him was legitimate and his promises binding.

As noted in the introduction of this book, first news of the Beatles' tour of Japan was published as early as 16 Pebrua1y 1965. when the Nikkan Spol'fs newspaper reported that Toshjba Ongaku Kogyo had sent an invitation to the Beatles to come to Japan (Yunioshi.com n.d.; Omura 20 16: 124). It seems that most of the negotiations regarding the tour occurred after the tour was aru10unced, The first 'official' annouhcement was the 3 Mai:ch issue of the British magazine New Music Express. In this article, Epstein released preliminary information about the Beatles' tour plans with reference to Gennany, Japan. the Phi.lippines and North America. This was their third large-scaJe, international tour. but the ir 'first tour that included dates outside the European and Anglophone markets.: The tour announcement did not include exact dates (Japan was thought to be 'so metime in June') but the geographic span of the 1966 tour was specified (BCC Shuppan 2016: 28, 125) and released .in Japan's three national presses: Asahi Shimb11i1, Yomiz1ri Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun on 4 March (BCC Shappan 2016: 125) as well as the entertainment dailies, known as 'sports papers' in Japan (Omura 20 16: J 87). This announcement came just about two weeks before the Japanese release of Rubb er Soul via Toshiba Ongaku Kogyo (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 125) on 15 March, with the single 'Nowhere Man'fo llowing on 15 April (Omura 20 16: 202). Even before exact dates were announced, however, Mainichi Shim/nm opened its article on the proposed tour riffing on an o.ld Japanese proverb, 'out ofgmffd will come a pony' (hyolan kara koma deso) (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 28), referring to the unexpectedness of good news.

Some report that Lewis contacted Epstein first over the idea (McClure 2016: 14), while others say that after the Philippines concert dates were set, Lewis contacted Nagashima Tatsuji, the president ofU1e Kyodo Kikaku Bjenshf [agency]3 to book dates in the gap between the German and Philippine dates (BCC Shuppan 2016: 27). Nagashima wo11ld be forever known as the man who brought the Beatles to Japan. He is not only a key person in the Beatles in Japan story, but history has shown him to be one of the top promoters of Japanese popular music in the postwar period. along with major figures in the entertainment lndustry, including Watanabe Production founders Watanabe Shin and Misa, and Hori Takeo ofl-lori Productions (Toya 1016: 54). Yamamoto Shin' iclri, a professional drummer who later sta1ted


his own production company, rcfeJTed to the Beatles' concert as an event that really demonstrated the 'power' (chikara) ofNagashima's business acumen.

Lewis is said to have reached out to Nagashima (.Japan Times, 16 July 1966, p. 5) on 14 March 1966 (Yunioshi.com n.d.); from that date, Nagashima's career would be changed forever. Born in 1926 in Yokohama, Nagashima was the son of a banker and, like Yoko Ono, he was an early example of a kikokushijo (returnee child), a double-edged social status in Japan at that time. Kikokushijo experienced both privilege and obstacles in Japanese society thanks to their families' high-paying international careers. Nagashima moved with his family to New York when he was two; his family went to London when he was four; and after returning to Japan briefly at age eight, he was again living in New York at age 12. This international experience at such a young age meant that his English was excellent and would be an advantage for him later in his profession; yet Nagashima recounted experiences of discrimination as a Japanese national living in Westchester County, New York, in the interwar period. He apparently acclimatized, however, developing a taste for junk food, and the music of US bands such as the Glenn Miller Orchestra, Benny Goodman, Artie Shaw and Tommy Dorsey (Yoshiteru 2012).

Teenaged Nagashima returned to Japan in 1941 just months before the outbreak or war between Japan and the US, but he was too young to serve in the Imperial A1my. Like other kikokushijo, he was likely to have experienced discrimination in Japan, having been 'tainted' by overseas experience, likely finding it difficult to adjust after spending his formative childhood years living and studying in the countries with which Japan wa~ at war. After the war, however, his excellent English and familiarity with American music brought him work at US military base clubs as a floor manager. He then began managing Japanese jazz singers, establishing his first entertainment management agency (then known as Kyodo Kikaku) in 1957. He also focused on bringing foreign acts to Japan, for at this time, there would have been a good audience for this as there were a large number of foreigners present in Japan as part of the Occupation, and the domestic Japanese recording industry was still nascent.

It turned out Nagashima had, by coincidence, attended the Woodstock School in Golder's Green, London, as did Victor Lewis, so there was common ground between the two promoters. A newspaper at the time introducing Lewis to the public noted that 'Vic remembered Tals and his brother Hideo because ... they were the only two Japanese kids in the whole school' (Japan Times, 16 July 1966, p. 5). In 2006, Vic Lewis was interviewed by the Japanese Beatles Fan Club, and confinned Nagashima's key role and their relationship: 'My window into Asia was Tats Nagashima. We've been friends for a long time' (BCC Shuppan 2016: 28). It seems that this initial contact between Lewis and Nagashima was made on 18 March 1966, after the general announcement in both the UK and Japan (BCC Shuppan 2016; I 25), and just after Sir Joseph Lockwood of EMI had visited Japan on the 15th for meetings with his Toshiba counterparts (Omura 2016: I 92). Nagashima's recollection of the start of negotiations was as follows:

I got a phone call from Brian Epstein's partner Vic Lewis, who said: 'The Beatles want to come to Japan. You guys do it! [omae yatlekure!]' So it wasn't

30 The road w the Budokan

us who called them, the phone call came from their side. Japan at the time couldn't just use foreign currency as we pleased, and we thought because it's the Beatles for sure they would require a large sum, but I was told 'we won't let you lose fmoney] on this [son wa sasenm]'.

(BCC Shuppan 20 16: 28)

This story also appears in the recollections of music journalist Yukawa Reiko, who worked with Nagashima on the tour. Yukawa retells the stoty of securing the Beatles' concert dates from Nagashima's point of view:

(Helj ust got a phone call from Vic Lewis who told me chc Beatles were wanting to come to Japan, and he said, 'Won't you invite them? fyondekurenai ka?]' But surely their fees were high and this was a time when we did not have good access to foreign currency, so he said, 'No way we can host them! [totemo yobenai yo.T fLewis] said that no matter how low the fee was, the Beatles wanted to come to Japan ... At that time, we knew that they only wanted to record and were tired of touring. Beatlemania was still incredible, and wherever we went and however we thought about it, we couldn 't help but think il was something we couldn't do. The Beatles themselves had come to a standstill, having become too big, and too much for Brian Epstein to handle [te ni oenakunalleita]. That was about the time they were beginning to be interested in the 'Orient' [toyo] and it was also a time they were beginning to be attracted to places like India ... John, from that time on, was especially interested in Japan, and we thoughL 'If! got the contract for the Far East tour, wouldn' t the Beatles be really happy?' It would also be a vacation for them. To do it, there'd have to be mutual understanding between us on a lot of different things, and it seemed they thought about it. Then, all of a sudden, they decided to come and it was really hectic.

(J-Wave 2006)

Of interest in these remembrances of the initial stages of p lanning is the sense that Japanese promoters would be unable to secure the toUT, yet the Beatles themselves desired this visit as a kind of holiday, a unique experience to be wedged in between gigs in Europe and North America, the two largest markets for their music. Japan was seen as something they would choose to do, rather than what their manager would recommend for business reasons.

In another account, Lewis remembers the initial phone call coming from Nagashima, rather than the other way around, saying that he wanted to ask the Beatles to come to Japan, and Lewis replied ' leave it with me', and then approached Epstein with the offer, which he presented as a very good one, coming from honest, 'sn·aight up' people (massugu na ningen) (BCC Shuppan 201 6: 32). At the time, however, the press reported that the Beatles had initiated contact, choosing Japan because it was their seventh largest market in terms of record sales (BCC Shuppan 2016: 32; Japan Times , 16 July 1966, p. 5). Nagashima contacted lshizaka from Toshiba Ongaku Kogyo with the news on 19 March, and he departed Japan on 22 March for London and New York with Brian Epstein to

The road to the Budokan 3 1

finn up discussions on the Beatles' appearance fees. the venue, and ticket pricing (Yoshiteru 20 12; BCC Shuppan 2016: 28, 125; Yuni.oshi.com n.d.). Lewis noted that the price of the Beatles conceit was considered ' astronomical . . . at the time. [Now equivalent lo] millions ... I proposed [the deal] to Brian, "there' s no fairer man [than Nagashima] here·· ' (BCC Shuppan 10 16: 28). It is interesting that in many of these accounts, both Japanese and British insiders valorise Nagashima as a ·hero' . both unusually capable and moral in accomplishing the impossible. While negotiating the details of the contact with Lewis and Epstein, Nagashima was also hustling Japanese sponsors to help fund the venture; the first to be confinned was Lion TootJ,paste (Omura 20 16: 203), with the others soon Lo follow. Yomiuri Shirnbunsha, the publishing company for major national newspapers, was the next named sponsor. On the one hand, Yomiuri had several business interests in ente11ainment, with its professional baseball team and television broadcasting station, and it certainly would have seen financial potential in sponsoring this event. On the other hand, Yomiuri tended to be more conservative politically and socially than its competitors, Asahi and Mainichi, which meant its editorial stance was sometimes at odds with the liberal va.lues that were embedded in Western rock and roll, making for 'strange bedfellows' at various stages of the planning process, as we will see.

In the end, Vic Lewis said that Brian Epstein didn't really have other options and would have accepted any reasonable figure from Nagashima, for the band members did not concern themselves with these details (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 28) and already had their minds set on going to Japan. Other accounts say lhnt Brian Epstein agreed to a relatively low fee, because he didn't want an overly highpriced ticket lo negatively impact the Beatles' reputation overseas. Epstein had been concerned when they had failed to fill an auditorium the previous year in Milan after overestimating foreign fans' willingness to pay high prices for concert tickets (Yunioshi.com n.d.) .

Nagashima travelled to London to finalize and sign the contract with Epstein on his birthday. 26 April 1966 (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 128: Omura 2016: 206). The Beatles' specific dates were 1hen fonnally announced in Japan by Yomiuri Shimhun the next day (BCC Shuppan 2016: 34). although aspects of their schedule had been leaked by other papers such as Mainichi Shimbun, Sports Nippon and Shiikon Myojo earlier in April (Yunioshi.com n.d.; BCC Shuppan 2016: 12T-8) . Yomiuri called the tour 'a golden opportunity for music lovers' (Yomiuri Shimbun, 27 April 1966, p. 14). On that same day, officials from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department visited the Yomiuri offices co begin scheduling the many meetings for concert security (Omura 2016: 206-7). On 4 May. the Japanese Ministry of Finance announced its approval of the Beatles' visit. with the provision that the tour did not result in profits of more than £10,000 per member (BCC Shuppan 2016: 129).

Choosing the venue, the Budokan

One ofthe first of Epsrein 's contractual conditions concerned site selection: he had insisted that any venue must have at least 10,000 seats, having been successful


with such large-scale stadium tours in the US such as Shea Stadium in the previous year (BCC Shuppan 2016: 30). There were baseball stadiums in Tokyo, such as the outdoor Meiji Jingu Stadium (opened 1923) and Korakuen Hall (built in 1962 for the Olympics), which had that kind of seating capacity. Another option was Kokuritsu Kyogijo (the National Olympic Stadium). However, given the concerts were scheduled during Japan's annual rainy season spanning June and July, an outdoor venue such as a baseball field was out of the question. The high probability of rain during the tour meant an indoor venue was crucial to the smooth operation of the Tokyo conceits. At that time, none of the existing baseball stadiums had roofs, and the only domed structure, built for the 1964 Olympics, was the Budokan. As noted in Chapter I, the Nippon Budokan, as it is fonnally known, was constructed as one of the centrepieces or Tokyo's Olympic architecture, along with Yoyogi National Gymnasium, built in 1963-1964 in Shibuya district of Tokyo. While the Yoyogi site was used for swimming and basketball competitions, the Budokan was built specifically for judo competitions, and judo was at the time the only Japanese sport included in the Olympic summer events (as karate would be added many decades later). Japanese martial arts, with their accompanying cultural and intellectual values, were to he performed on a world stage in this new venue. While there were many constructioTI projects for the 1964 Olympics, this was the only one with the formal name of the nation in its title-the Nippon Budokan. Located as it was so close to the Imperial Palace and dedicated to the sole Japanese Olympic sport, the building particularly came to represent national pride in an international arena.

Nagashima soon learned that this would be a pricey venture. He had to work in the ¥54 million fee charged by the Epstein (¥ 10,800,000 per show x S shows), airfare for I J individuals (¥5.5 million), and hotel fees (¥3 .6 million) among other costs. The Budokan would charge ¥102,700,000 yen for the cost of using the venue for the five shows (Bitoruzu Repoto Fukkoku linkai 1996: 46). Not long after Nagashima's return from his meeting with Epstein iTI England, landing in Japan on 9 April (BCC Shuppan 2016: 127), however, he received news that the chosen venue - the Budokan -was not going over well with the sponsors. Resistance went as far as the top of the sponsor chain: Shorik i Matsu taro, the head and owner of Yomiuri Shim bun, is quoted as saying that the planned concerts were 'against the spirit of the Budokan LBudukan no seishin ni han suru]' (Yoshiteru 2012). Shoriki is an interesting figure in the Beatles in Japan story; at the same time as holding the top position at Yomiuri, he had also been the chair of the committee, formed in 1961, to construct the I3udokan, and held the chair of the structure's governing institution, called the Zaidanhojin Budokan, from 1962 to 1969. Shoriki's backgrouTid made him an interesting character in the Beatles in Japan story. A fo1mer police bureaucrat and a judoist, he developed a career as a 'media mogul' and helped found professional baseball in Japan. He also served as the president of Japan's new Atomic Energy Commission and is still known as the Japanese 'Father of Atomic Energy' because of his role in establishing Japan's first nuclear reactors (Economist 20 J 2).

Shoriki's singular role in these powerful government, media and sport institutions also show how, despite the supposed completion of the SC AP-imposed


'democratization' project, early postwar Japanese society was controlled by a small pool of elite iTidividuals with important positions across a number of interests. Shoriki's experience with the police meant he understood the underworld's potential for violeTice. He also understood the right wing in Japan; he had nearly been killed after organizing an exhibition game between an all-star team of Japanese baseball players and US major leaguers. Shoriki had been stabbed by a right winger who objected to what he perceived as Shoriki's 'pro-AmericaTI stance' (Economist 2012) and the presence of Americans in the Meiji Jingu Stadium (Nabhan 2006). Apparently, he was amenable to the proposal at first, but after learning of the behaviour of the Beatles' fans, changed his mind (Nabhan 2006). Given Shoriki's position as the owner of the tour's major sponsor and as a member of the governing board of the Budokan, Nagashima made special overtur es to him, but the story goes - as reported by employees at the newspaper-that Shoriki received Nagashima politely, but soon walked him to the elevator saying simply, 'I'm very sorry' (mako10 ni moshiwake nai). it was highly unusual that the head of such a large company wou Id escort a guest to thee levator in the office building, so this event did not go unnoticed; the head of the planning division at Yomiuri mistakenly thought Nagashima must have been a high-ranking V[P, rather than a spumed business suitor (Nabhan 2006).

An employee at Yomiuri at the time, Suzuki Hiromasa, said that Shoriki was just one of many executives who were against the decision; many considered the hall a sacrosanct space which represented a link from Japan's traditional cultural and political past to its tenuous identity as a postwar liberal democracy. The chainnan of the newspaper's board was incensed, purpo1tedly saying 'They're gonna use the Budokan to beat those drums?' (taiko tataki ni Budokan o tsukawasern ka!) (BCC Shuppan 2016: 31) Despite these ideological objections, there were practical considerations that pushed the decision through. The Japanese martial arts schedule was not a year-round event, and the Budokan was left vacant for many weeks in bet ween competitioTis. Suzuki says that the Budokan administrators, in need of further income, thus welcomed the proposal (BCC Shuppan 2016: 31). They reassured SMriki that the Beatles were worthy performers of the site located so close to the Imperial Palace because the group themselves had been honoured by Queen Elizabeth on the occasion of their MBE awards. Another factor involved contractual issues. Shoriki had initially committed to the concert. Despite his lengthy experience in government and business, some say he had signed the contract without fully considering the consequences, aTid then learned that the contract he had signed was legally binding (Nabhan 1006) . It is possible that as a longtime member of Japan's professional elite, he thought he could act first based on his financial instincts, and address with the details later, which in the end caused him more trouble than expected.

As early as 3 May, Yomiuri Shimbun announced the pricing of the tickets, the venue and the sponsorship of the concerts (Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 May 1966, p. 14), despite the ongoiTig controversy roiling behind the Budokan management office walls. On 26 May 1966, however, Yomiuri Shimbun published a short article with the headline 'Nippon Budtikan - Bttoruzu koen ninka' (Permission [granted] for the Beatles to perform at the Budokan), which appeared in a tiny square in the bottom left comer buried deep inside the newspaper. It read simply:


At the N ippon Budo kan on th e 25t h of May, the chairmen of the same organization , Kimura Tokut a:ro an.d Mats umae Shigeyos hi,4 disc ussed the cond it ions of usage of the ha ll, but have accepted che use of the h al I by the Beat les for pub lic perform ance(s) from the 30 th of June.

At the time of the propose d Beat les ' pe rfonn an ces , it is expecte d that there w ill be a flood of tour ists , but current ly tbere is no ot her ha ll in Tokyo that can acco,mmodate the nwnber of personn el [requir ed] for ma nag ing [the eve nt], and fo r th is reaso n they acce pted tJ1 is proposa l.

(Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 May 1966, p. 14)

Desp ite this officia l perm iss ion , it is sa id that Shoriki continued to disse nt personally, thoug h this was on ly pub lished in a 'scoo p' inte rview in the Sunday Main/chi (Om ura 2016: 224) , a competing publi catio n to Shoriki's stab le of pap ers and wee kly magaz ines . He wo u Id continue to ask N agash ima to cons ide r other venues in tl1e followi ng days (Om ura 2016: 226). However, wi th the com mittee's pennission for the Beat les to play at tl1e Budoka n now pub lished in p1i n t, Nagas h ima had licence to res ist this press ure and l1"avelled to New York to let Epstein know , on 1 Jun~, that there were no furt her prob lems w ith the venue (BCC Shu ppan 20 16: l32 : Omura 20 16: 226 ).

Finances and ticketing

After the fact, Nagashima spoke about how he and Epstein worked out ticket pricing. It seems that Nagashima told Epstein it was such an 'honour to deal with the Beatles' that he thought fans would pay as much as¥ I 0,000 per ticket, but given that most of their fans were minors, he was concerned about keeping the prices affordable (Yunioshi.com n.d.). At that time, a record album cost about ¥2,100; according to an annual average calculation of conversion rates in 1966, this was approximately US $6 (Yunioshi.com n.d.), or about US $40 today considering inflation (this is in contrast to the US cost of a mono album, which was about $3.99 at that time). The average monthly salary of the whitecollar male office worker in Japan in 1966 was ¥33, I 00 (Nenjitokei 2013), but the starting salary of a recent university gradl!ate was much less -- this was closer to ¥6,000. Considering the cost of an album and averao-e salaries Nagashima suggested to Epstein that they put the upper price of th~ tickets a; ¥2,200, but interestingly, Epstein settled on ¥2, I 00, which, Nagashima felt, was evidence that the Beatles really wanted to come to Japan and didn't have an interest in financially gouging their fans. Epstein had also wanted to ensure, in agreement with Nagashima, that young people could afford to attend the concert, so the cost of the ticket was to be in line with the cost of a Beatles album (BCC Shuppan 2016: 34). Given that the Candlestick Park concert tickets ranged in price between US $4.50 and US $6.50, there was some parity in terms of blunt exchange rates, but given the differences in the cost of living and average salary rates between the two countries, this pricing was a bargain for Japanese fans.


Meanwhile, payment in advance was one of Brian Epstein's contractual conditions with Nagashima (13CC Shuppan 2016: 29), and it is worth mentioning that at the time, Epstein himself was pocketing about 25 per cent of the Beatles' earnings as their manager (Norman 2009: 502). At the time, the going rate for a major foreign artist's appearance in Japan was about ¥2 million (BCC Shuppan 2016: 29), then equivalent to US $5,500,' but Epstein asked for twenty times that rate as a 'guarantee'. US $100,000 was an extremely high rate, and would be in equivalent to US $750,000 today (McClure 2016: 14). As Yukawa recalls, the promoters ' access to American dollars was limited and to pay these fees in advance was a significant task. The fixed exchange rates were put in place some 20 years earlier as per the Bretton Woods agreement, which 'pegged' the currency of member counti·ies in North America and Europe (as well as Australia and Japan) against a reserve currency (the US dollar), which was in tum 'pegged' to a gold standard. This made the American dollar the most stable and thus valuable currency in international terms, and being in paid in this currency meant that the Beatles' overseas tours were particularly profitable to their business in the UK, because of their ability to request payment in American dollars wherever they went. In the 1960s, British individuals had to have government permission to convert their domestic money to foreign currency and could do so only within legal limits:

A long came The Beatles - mere minstrels to many, but to the UK government a magical machine for printing US dollars. Major live popular musical acts in the mid-1960s typically earned only domestic cun-ency ... The Beatles by contrast posted world-record dollar-denominated concert receipts from appearances during US tours in 1964, 1965, and 1966. Media reports said they earned a net $650 a second in today's dollars performing live in 1965. Furthermore, in 1966 the band also em barked on concert tours of Germany and Japan that raked in massive performance fees denominated in deutsche marks and yen ... By cashing in their hard-currency appearance fees, The Beatles joined an elite category of British 'invisible' exporters: commercial enterprises thal earned foreign currency not from the manufacture and transshipment of visible, physical goods, but from invisible credits and receipts.

(Wilson 2014)

Discussions about these transfers made international news; in late May 1966, Billboard published a short blurb on these rumours in their miscellaneous international news section:

Reliable reports here indicate that each Beatie will be able to take $28,000 out of Japan afier the group's concerts at the Marshall Arts Hall [sic] in Tokyo (July 1-3).

(Billboard, 21 May 1966: 40, emphasis in the original)

The sum of$28 ,000 multiplied by four, plus Epstein's 25 per cent cut and costs incurred, would have been a significant figure at the time. In order to amass the


large amount that Epstein required in cash, Nagashima enlisted the assistance of the broadcasting company, Chubu Nippon Hoso (also known as CBC, an acronym for its English translation Chubu Broadcasting Corporation), to guarantee the sum in exchange for sponsor status. The broadcasting company was an interesting choice, given all coverage of Lhe Beatles' visit was shown on Nihon Terebi (NTV), the television affiliate of the other major sponsor, Yomiurt, and CBC was an affiliate ofNTV's competitor, Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS). TBS and NTV had competed for the exclusive rights to broadcast the concerts (BCC Shuppan 2016: 129), with NTV taking the spoils. I3ut Nagashima and the chief of CBC's operations division, Sakuma Kazuya, had been friends for some time, and Sakuma was interested in expanding CBC's musical interests, which were previously limited to opera or foreign 'big orchestras' (BCC Shuppan 2016: 129). In exchange for their cooperation, CBC was given permission to broadcast the concerts in Nago ya in ret urn for pu.tting up initi a l cap ital for the eve nts, which was at the time an 'u nprecede nted' arrange ment betwee n the big broadcasting companies. NTV would broadcast the I July concert on that evening, in colour (BCC Shuppan 2016: 133).

Sakuma was responsible for raising money for the Beatles' contract, construction of the venue and security, all within a three- to four-month window (BCC Shuppan 2016: 133). Lewis had an associate named Ralph Yempuku, a JapaneseAme rican from Hawai'i , who became a promoter afte r serv ing in the Seco nd World War for the US, and YempuJrn ap proac h ed C BC as he had so me previous experience with t hem wo rking on spo rts even ts (Yun ioshi.com n.d .). A cco rdi ng to

1 Sakuma, Yempuku serve d as the person a l link between Epste in and the Japa nese promoters regarding the cash advance for the concerts (BCC Shuppan 2016: 29). The contract to perform in Japan was signed by the Beatles themselves, as well as Nagashima, Sakuma and Epstein, with Sakuma noting it was unusual for the band members to sign these kinds of documents individually. Sakuma notes that nom1al\y the manager's signature was enough (BCC Shuppan 2016: 31); perhaps this was an indication of Epstein's waning influence over the band, as the business grew and the members matured.

Meanwhile, things were healing up in Japan. The police were not the only ones concerned about security; the fire department and venue staff as well were worried about their ability to respond to potential crises (Yoshiteru 2012). To pay for this extra security, a ticket tax was implemented, and each ticket had to be individually numbered by hand to confirm that the tax had been paid on each ticket; this painstaking work began on 30 May (Omura 2016: 228).

While concern about fundraising and access to American dollars would have been limited to Nagashima's inner circle, Yazaki writes that there was also diffuse anxiety ia wider society ove r the visit. Whil e fans rejoiced, 0th.er Japan ese viewed the Beatles ' proposed tour as ' sometl1ing 'like a bad om en tha t was brought up by tbe tide' because the internat ionaJ sphere, as seen from Japan, was un easy: inte rnationally, the Co ld War had reac hed a ce rta in leve l of nuclea r read iness and Japan was concerned about anothe r war betwee n th e ' West ' and the Sov iet Un ion (Yazak i 1996: 16). It would have been unsett ling to read about the exc itement of Beat lemania alongside reports on militmy crackdowns and unrest in Vietnam (fig. 2.1).

The road to the Rudokan 37

Figure 2.1 'Camera News': a visual section of the evening edition of the 16 May 1966 lomiuri Slzimbun, juxtaposing images from the military crackdown in Da Nang, Vietnam with the swell of Beatlemania in Tokyo.

Both topics•- war in Indochina and Beatlemania - could be categorized as 'international news', lending validation to Yazaki's comment about negative associations in Japanese readers' minds.

Despite this generalized malaise among some, the Beatles ' Japan tour was also embedded in values associated with Japan's expanding consumer culture. This positive association can be seen in the names on the tour sponsorship list. Japan Airlines (JAL) and Odeon Records (who , presumably, had the rights to distribute EM I recordings in Japan) had top-level sponsorship, as their logos appeared on the original fliers distributed after the concert announcements (fig. 2.2). Major hosting sponsors (shusm) arc listed in the following order: Yomiuri Shimhunsha, then Chubu Nippon Hoso. 'Cooperating sponsorship' (kyosan) was offered by Lion Toothpaste, a phannaceutical company which manufactured toothpaste, deodorant and other health and beauty products, and 'backing sponsorship' (koen) was provided by JAL and Toshiba Ongaku Kogyo. This choice of sponsors demonstrated that the concert organizers' intended audience was a wide one, elicited through the 'mainstream' media outlets (Yomiuri and CBC) and the ubiquitous national air carrier, JAL.

Applications to buy concert tickets were received via the post. There seemed to be some discussion about selling them in person on a 'first come, first served' basis, but fears about security influenced the decision early on to allocate tickets

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Figure 2.2 !\n original handhi1! from the Tokyo tour. Note this early version contains three rather than /lvc concert dates. The matinees were added aller the initial response for tickets was overwhelming.

Photogrnph courtesy of the East Asian Collection, University ofMelboume, Melhourne.

remotely, as had been done for the Tokyo Olym pics ( BCC Shupp an 2016: 35). Yomjuri, as the majo r sponsor. co llected applicatio ns that we re to include se lfaddressed, stamped envelopes . As per the previou s 3 May ann ouncement , applicant s were reminded that the tickets came in three price categories (¥1500-, ¥1800 and ¥2 I 00) with a one-t icket-per-person po licy, with appli cati ons accept ed from 5-1 0 May ( Yomiuri Shimbu11, 3 May 1966, p. I 4; BCC Shupp an 20 16: 34) , As the application deadl ine drew Lo a c lose, tbe newspap er featured the ' mounta in' of applications rece ived (fig. 2. 1 ).

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Figure 2.3 A flyer from a record store parli<.:ipating in the Toshiba-affiliated ticket draw and associated giveaway campaign. It is stamped 'King Record' (the name of the record store) with the dates 14 and I 5 May 1966. This flyer states that 2,000 seats were available to those who purchased one of the listed Beatles albums before 15 June. Consolation prizes included 5,000 Beatles card sets and 30,000 Beatles photo collt:ctions, demonstrating the scale of expected audience parti~ipation. The promotional material on the right lists the group's LPs usmg their Japanese titles from Bftonc11 ! ( corresponding to the US title Meet the Beatles [1964]) to Nahii So11rz1 (Rubber Soul [1966]).

Image courtesy orthe East Asian Collection, Univcrsily of Melbourne, Melhoumc.


Toothpas'le draw ran from 11 May to 17 June: they rece ived 50-60 ,000 requests for tickets fo r the ir 5,000 sea ts (BCC Shuppan 2016: 129, 134). Japan Airlines distributed the remafoing 3.000 of the sponsors' tickets across Osaka, Fukuoka and Sapporo, making it a national campaign (BCC Shuppan 2016: 36).

In early May, Lion Toothpaste announced in Yomiuri Shi111bw1 their promotional campaign to commemorate the Beatles ' tou r of Japan (Omur a 20 16: 2 1 0).

Lion received 5,000 individual tickets to the schedul ed concerts and would award tickets through a draw to applicants who sent in either two empty boxes of Lion's 'Dia' brand toothpaste. or one empty box of Ban deodorant sent in with the applicant's persona l detai ls, a11 to be received before the draw deadline on 17 June (Omura 2016: 2 IO-I 1 ). Artist Yokokura Kinue recalls that she first heard about the Lion Toothpaste campaign through the newspaper, and she asked all her relatives to buy the product so she could send in a 'mount ain ' of empty toothpas1e boxes to qualify. She sent in so many that she was able ro attend three out of the five concerts (Yokokura 2016: 113). She noted that she had to attend with a school friend and her older sister, for it would have been inappro priate for a female high school student to· travel to Tokyo a l.one for these concerts from her home in Maebashi in Gunma Prefecture (Yokokura 2016: 113).

Meanwhile, the first Yomiuri draw was conducted on 17 May. The conditions of the draw were published the previous day: the draw would be over seen by corporate planning and editorial executives 'assisted by fomale members of local university English clubs', who drew the names 'wi,d1out prejudice' (Yomiuri Shi111b11n, 16 May 1966, p. 3). The large number of applications for the Yomiuri draw meant there were 28,850 disappointed applic ants (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 36), while successful applicants were informed via se lf-addressed stamped postcard at the end of May (BCC Shuppru, 20 16: 130). The decision to add extra matinee shows on I and 2 July was made mid-May; unsuccessful Yomiuri applicants were put into the second draw; after the second draw there were only 12,000 left without seats (BCC Shuppan 2016: 34). Given the later timing of the Lion toothpaste campaign, it is likely that some of those first round unsuccessful Yomiuri app licants were able to get tickets via other outlets. In fact, while the Yomiuri draw was well documented for its competitiveness, on-the-ground rumours were such that the sponsors had taken as part of the deal a large portion of complimentar y seats to give out to clients and to awar d as prizes to fans, so many free tickets were circulatin g publicly. This didn't match the sense of competit ion so urgen tly reported by-Yomiuri Shimb1m. Yamamoto Shin ' ichi to ld me that he was g iven a leftover ticket to the Beatles at the Budokan the night befo re the performance by a fr iend at a ja zz cafe Uazu kissa). This anecdot e suggests that the vast number s of disappointed fans were rather exaggerated by the media.

Still, the perception that many fans were disappointed persisted. On \ 9 June 1966, Yomiuri's competitor , Asah i Shimbun, publish ed an article rega rding the Yomiuri draw, in which the headl ine read '180,000 -people are left without [tickets]':

The popular band the Beatles are coming to Japan. [The details of the concert werej announced on 3 May, and the concert sponsor Yomiuri Shimbun


received all at once a flood of applications. In just one week [they received requests] from 230,000 [fans] who wished to gain [ticket] entry. Starting on 30 June, the Beatles will perform five concerts at the Nippon Budokan, meaning an estimated 50,000 [fans] can attend. 6 This means roughly 180,000 will be left out. 'I'll line up for tickets a month in advance' is heard from many fans, and so it has been decided the names for the tickets wi11 be drawn, but it will take two hours for ten people to do the judging/draw of reservation postcards. There will be a huge uproar.

(Asahi Shimbun, 19 June 1966, p. 23)

Another negative story came out on 21 May, when a fraudulent ticket sch em c was discovered in Osaka (BCC Shuppan 2016: 130) with a discovered ¥600,000 in damages reported (Omura 2016: 219), demonstrating the extent to which th is event presented underground financial opportunities. Another access problem was not related to ticket availability but to the social sanctioning of concert attendance for young peopl e. Tsuchiya Kiyos hi, a Japanese mus ic ian who was in high school in J 966 , expl ains that he was able to go to the concert after wi)rn ing a seat in the Lion Toothpaste draw, but noted that many of his friends' schools had strict rules about their students' extracunicular activities and forbade them to attend (BCC

Shuppan 2016: 68). Meanwhi le, Nagashima had contacted several Japanese opening acts to play

before the Beatles' Japanese sets. 'In an effort to downplay the presence of a Western band with long hair' (Nabhan 2006) in the Budokan, he chose Japanese, rather than British or American, artists. lackey Yoshikawa, drummer for the Blue Comets, remembers how he was approached by Nagashirna, who also contacted the musical comedy group the Drifters; vocalists Uchida Yuya, Bito lsao, Mochizuki Hiroshi and Sakurai Gora; and 'group sounds' stars the Blue Jeans, along with t he Blue Comets (/11/usic l ffe 2016b: 89). The Japanes e tern, for 'ope ning act' (rnn:;c,), as in English, carr ies with it a secondary status, but Yoshikawa of the Blue Cornets said they were lJ1terested in the offer, despit e the fact he wo uld have preferred to be asked to open for a band that he admired more, like the Animals, but given the Beatles' status as truly international stars (sekai no bftoruzu), he was happy to oblige (Music L!fe 2016b: 89). Later, however, we will see how on the first night, the opening acts would pay for this privilege through a series of missteps that would significantly affect the main act's performance. The opening acts were announced formally on 14 June (Omura 2016: 243).

Security issues and the protests

Yomiuri Shimbun employee Suzuki Hiromasa had been given the responsibility of working on security for the concert; this job was quite unnerving, as he had no experience in the entertainment business. The police stated that they viewed the Budokan events not as 'a concert, but [as] an incident', implying the seriousness with which all viewed their jobs. One of their concerns, which merited several planning meetings, was creating a strategy to ensure the safety of audience members in case they became so emotionally overwrought they fell out of their


balcony seats. 7

For security purposes, it was decided that the arena area right in fro nt of the stage wou Id not be Ltsed for seating, and this was a 'blow' to the promote rs (BCC Shuppan 20 I 6: 38).8 Taking out the arena seati ng not only cut into sa les, but it al.so p laced the fans at a con siderably greater distance from the staoe changing the emotional dynamics of the concert.

0 '

Meanwhile, Tokyo Metropolitan Pol ice began planning for the eve.nt in earn est. A special departrnen twas created with the title 'special security headquarters', led by the then head of the Tokyo MP, Hatanaka Tatsuo. Below Hatanaka there were t!iree sub~,r_oups: HanedaAirport, Hilton Hotel and Budokan, with the latter group fmther d1v1ded mto exterior and interior subgroups, as well as traffic and plainclothes police sections (Bltoruzu Repoto fokkoku linkai J 996: 22). Influencing these plans were 20 May reports from the Associated Press detailing some ofth; more extreme fan behaviour in Europe and North America, so the idea was floated that the Beatles would travel via hel icopter fro m Haned a Airpo1t to a more distant site - Osaka or Nagoy a - and be ho used underc over in private home s rath er than first-class hotels. These plans were soon dismissed as impractical (Omura 2016: 219). The police chief would have to make do in Tokyo, raise additional police to supplement his forces, and give all of the members trainino on how to deal with minors, including undertaking further training from school~ and educational associations (BCC Shuppan 2016: 134). The next day, the police headquarters announced that they would move 6,000 police into Tokyo for back-up, and the fire department would need an extra 500 personnel, two extra ambulances and an ann ~ured vehicle (BCC Shuppa n 20 16: 134), the latter reques t giving the security deta il a decided ly milit ary fee l. In the end, the number of police on duty for the Bea:les· pr~tec:ion betwee n 29 June and 3 July was about 8,370, which comprised a mix of district and local riot pol ice, pla inclothes police and fema le ofiic ers. They were deployed at various tim es at Ha nedaAir port, the Toky o Hilton and the Budokan (BCC Shuppan 2016: 38).

After the idea of private accommodation was shelved, the police debated the best choice for accommodation. Al first there was a concern that no hotel would :vant t? take on the security burden, leading to a joke circulating in England, ·what 1fth e Beatles have to sleep rough in Tokyo?' (BCC Shuppan 2016: 38). The Tokyo Hilton announced it would take on the task, on 13 May (BCC Shuppan 2016: 130). The Hilton used the phrase 'the hotel where the Beatles stayed' for some years afterwards, but at the time, Sakuma of CBC claims that the hotel had, up until the last minute, asked him to consider cancelling their booking (BCC Shuppan 2016: 39). Another security concern was planning the Beatles' movements between the airpo rt , the h ote l and the concert venue. Epste in reportedly suggested he.licopter transpon , as th is had already bee n tested successfully at the .1965 Shea Stadium eve nt. One plan under cons ideration saw the Beatles aiTiving at the US Yokota A ir Base (lo cated west of Tokyo ) and taken by heli copter to the lchigaya SDF (Self-Defen se Force s) Garrison, located in Chiyoda Ward of the city, as is the Budokan (BCC Shuppan 2016: 39). This plan was also abandoned for more practical ground transport, but even that would be costly. The British charge d'qffaires wrote to London that he estimated the total cost of the Beatles'


mobilization to be £30,000 or ¥58,000,000, which was a very large sum at that

time (McClure 2016: 14). Just before the Beatles' anival in Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun published an at1icle

specifically on the security preparations, including the police's decision to conduct 'full-scale mobilisation' (jinkai senj111su) against the fans. Presumably this article was meant to inspire confidence in the public concerned with potential unrest, ai1d to warn fans that there would be little tolerance for antisocial behaviour. Despite the seriousness of the headline, the article stated that the police looked pained as they prepared, remarking 'are they boys or are they girls?' and 'what do the girls see in them?', lightening this message. The Tokyo Metropolitan Police reported that they would send 3,000 police to Haneda upon an-ival, and set up gates to prevent fans from entering the airport; the route to the hotel was top secret, and there would be 2,000 police, including female police, circling the hotel. There would be 2,200 police sent to the Budokan every day, including 350 officers who would stand in front of the stage to prevent fans from rushing the stage (Asahi Shim/nm, 21 June 1966, p. 15). These stage officers represented a new kind of security required at these concerts , and they were featured in press shots that were published during the Beatles ' stay: later, on I July 1966, Mainichi Shimbun published a shot of the comer of the stage with several security officers - three in un ifonn, one in a business suit - with the officers wearing white gloves. This was not usual practice, but a decision was made to outfit the uniformed police with white gloves to give a public impressio11 of politeness (BCC Shuppan 2016: 39). Furthennore, the mostly male police force did not want to be seen as too rough with the young women, with whom they likely had little experience (BCC Shuppan 2016: 40). Asahi Shimhun also reported on 21 June that hundreds of young women had gathered in areas such as Ginza and Shinjuku, and that 46 of them were deem ed 'runaways' from places such as Sapporo and Osaka who had_ come to catch a glimpse of the Beatles (Asahi Shimbun, 21 June 1966 , p. 15). Omura's research shows that young people were starting to gather in the capital city as early as 15 June, with one report mentioning a student as young as 11, who had taken cash from her father's wallet to come to Tokyo after having been disappointed in the ticket draw (2016: 244). Stories of minors 'gone wild for the Beatles' (b1toruzukyo) and taken into custody were also printed in the sports entertainment papers at this time (Omura 2016: 254).

The media played a double-agent role in the lead-up to the concerts, both by promoting the 'unbelievable news' (shin) irarenai yo na dekigoto) through a number of media outlets (Yazaki 1996: 19) and circulating 'negative news' about Beatles fans (Omura 2016: 245). Many of these press releases were circulated in magazine weeklies still active today, such as Shz,kan Bunshun, Josei Sebun, Shfikan Sankei. Sande Mainichi, Shiikan Jose i, Asahi Geino, Shiikan Shincho, Shiikan Gendai, and Shiikan Asahi (Yaz.aki 1996: 20). There were special events to commemorate the visit and 'images of the Beatles made a sweeping conquest across the country' (Yazaki 1996: 19). The publications of the major sponsor, Yomiuri Shimbunsha, promoted the group through special features and favourable reports,


but Yazaki asserts that at the time, virtually all the other media outlets. save the sponsors, published provocatively critical headlines, such as the following:

Kutabare bitoruzu.' (Drop dead, Beatles!) B'itoruzu nanka koroshichae.1 (Kill the Beat/es!) Go homu bTtone=u (Go home, Beatles)

Bitoruzu ga konran o hikiokosu! (The Beatles cause mayhem!) Bftoruzu nihon senkyo (The Beatles Occupation) 9

Bttoruzu to wa nani mono ka (What kind of people are the Beatles?) Bokoku h'itoru::;11 shiigeki keikaku ([They are] the ruin of our country:

An attack plan against the Beatles)

(I 996: 20)

Pic king up on this unease was Lhe televis ion media , espe cially thos e broa dcasting on competing channel s. A weekly Sunday-mornin g TBS televi sion news and current events show called Jiji HiJdan ran a number of spots on the Beatles in mid- to late May, in the run-up to the arrival of the band. 10 Regular contributors to this show were poli tical commentators Hosokawa Ryllgen and Fujiwara Hirotats u, and journ a list and form er head of the conservative financial paper Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Obama Toshie. The three discussed the Beat les' upcom ing tour on this show on 22 May (Omur a 20 16: 220; BCC Shupp an 2016: 131). Several of the qttotes from this show , broadcast nationally, were taken up in other reports as evidence of general public concern. Here, Hos okaw a and Obama call ed the Beat les 'c rappy' (kudaran mono) (BCC Shuppan 2016: 131) and that 'm onkey-dancin g to electr ic guitar [music] was an imped iment to human progre ss' (Omu ra 201 6: 220). On the next week's show, the commentators continued their harsh criticism of the tour. Hosokawa said: 'Do we have to endure the use of the Budokan by beggar artists?' (kojiki geinin; kojiki being a now offensive tenn for itinerant peop le) (Omura 2016 : 227). He also re ferred to Beatles fans as 'cra zy girls clamo ring ove r [these] beg gar artists' (BC C Shuppan 2016: 30). An escalat ion of these comments would have followed the announcement on 26 May lhat the Budokan had accepted the proposition. On the 5 June show, Obama went a step further: because the Beatles' music was 'trash', they should do the concert at Yumenoshima, an artificial island constructed from landfill in the prewar period, and at the time used as a garbage dump (BCC Shuppan 2016: 30, 132; Omura 2016: 233). Tt is not unusual that a television show broadcast by TBS, NTV's competitor, would be critica l; one might guess that some of the neg.ative press was st irred up by a desire to. raise viewe r ratings, but we cannot dismiss the fact that independent of media competition , certain peop le felt q uite strongly about this tour. and the ir comments made a significant. impact on public o pinion. In a final grand gestu re, Obama publi shed ac 1it ica l art icle in the Tokyo Sp orts Shimbun, entitled ' Bttoncu ni namerareru nihonjin' which co uld be translated as 'The Japanese , belittled by the Beatles ', where he referr ed LO Beatles fans as ' idiots who have no ability Lo U1ink or depth of knowledge ' (shiko,yoku mo /...yoyo mo nui obaka) who ' shoul d be ashamed to consider that [noise] music' (Omura 2016: 257).


Understanda bly, Yomiuri Shimbun coverage worked to balance the negative press . The newspaper printed an art icle that put Lhe Budokan decisio~ to rest, in confirming tha t the decision was based on the Beatles ' status as ' mus ical envoy s of international good will. as deco rated by the ir Queen ' on 9 June (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 132). About a week before the band's arrival, Sh11ka1~ Yomi1:1ri w~ekly magaz ine printed a translation of a Noel Whitcomb _(a repm:~r fo'.· Dally M_11.,.or) interview ; the content not on ly frames the Beatles 10 a posit ive light , but 1t a ls_o presents the Beatles' favourable impressions of Japan . -!ohn Le~non '~ quote 1s the mo st flattering (here, trans lated from the Japa nese as 1t was prmted m l 966):

.Each time J meet a Japan ese person, I thought T want to go to Japan. I love trans istor rad ios made in Japan. Ever since George got his hand s on a sitar, I've had an interest in Oriental [toyo] music. First we tried listening to Indian music and then we Lried Japanese mus ic. l thought both of them were wonderful'. I understood lhal modern jazz Was influenced by Ori enta l m usic, and what's more I understood that people in other countries are more advanced

than us. (BCC Shuppan 2016: 33)

In the same intervi ew, George Harrison is quoted as saying, 'There 's a lot of people the re and U1eir economy is strong, so I want to go and see the Tokyo lifesty le. I 'm readin g a lot of books about Or iental (18y8) re li~on [in~l~d ing] books on Japanes e Shin to ' (BCC Shuppan20 16: 33) . These flattermg dep1ct10ns of Japanese cult ure and people , purported ly straig ht from the Beatle s' mouths, were most likely intended to softe n the anxiety about their trip created by negative reports

from Yomiuri's competito rs. Even after the Budokan was confirmed, the more conservative factions of the

popular press cont inued their pressur e to change the venue . App"'.·ently, discussions we nt as far up as the h ighest levels of government. Yazak1 writes that safety wa s brouoht up in Cab inet meetings at the time and a propo sa l made to cancel. or at least p;stpone. the tour ( 1996: 20). The mass media continued to print reservations and concerns over the ' bad influence' (akueikyo) the conce11s would have over the nation's youth. Jiji HiJdan critics Obam a Toshie and 1-losokawa Ryilgen continued to criticize the event. reportedly sayi ng ' b'itoncu nan :o ni danjite nilw n no 1.n ,chi wa /umasttnai' (we will never, ever allow bums like the Beatles to. step on Japanese ~oil), creat ing an 'uneasy' mood in the ~ay s_ lea.ding t~pto lh~ Beatl_es' arriva l a1. 1-laneda Airport (Yazaki 1996: 20). Earlier tn May , the radio stat'.on N ippon l-loso is reported as broadcasting the phrase' Kutabare ! BTtoru:m' (wh1cb could be trans lated as 'fuck off, Beatles!' ) (BCC Shuppan 20 16: 13 1). However , some say that the right-win g response to the Be.a.ties was a 'made up' movement. A Waseda university student al the time has wr itten that he guessed many student s from right-wing gro ups on campus had actua l.ly bought t!ckets to see the ~eat!es an,d their protest was not against the gro up and their 1.nu s1c p~r se , but agamst the Western imperial.is! influence their music repre sente d (S uzuki 200 I: 48).

British diplomat s were also concerned with the pot ential back lash. In a letter to London , the the n charge d 'a}Jaires at the British Embassy in Tokyo , Dudley


Cheke, wrote that he had learned that the Japanese Communist Party had published an article protesting the group as 'tools of American ... imperialism', ~ut that most mainstream newspape rs (including the sponso ring Yomiuri publications) wrote that they were 'agreeable, talented and quick witted young musicians' (McClure 2016: 14). Furthermore, Cheke noted that the danger to the band was not just protests; they had to be 'protected from fan and foe alike' with 'almost the same magnitude as the arrangements for the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964' (McClure 2016: 14).

There was also increasing apprehens ion regarding parallel development s in Japanese youth culture at the time . The Japanese police thought it high ly likely that the high-profi le event would draw further demonstrations from protesters ~-om other polit ical .ca111,ps, to take advantage of the media coverage - in particul ar, the anpo toso. movement again st the Treaty of Mutual Coope ration and Securi ty betwe en the United States and Japan (BCC Shuppan 2016: 39). As noted b~ Ya_zak! (l ~96) and in the illustrations from the Yomiuri Shimbun (fig. 2.1 ), the situation rn Vietnam was becoming more serious, and Japanese citizens were concerned aboUt thei r country 's role in the conflict given Japan 's commilment to suppor'.ing participating US forces via tbe security treaty, as well as gen.era! protest aga 111st the agreement. As we wi II see in the press conterence held at the Tokyo Hilton after their arrival , rhe Beatles had already come out in public about their oppos ition to the war, albeit in a mild way. In England, demonstrations had been held in opposirion to the US troops sent to South Vietnam in late 1965. Before then, tbe Beatles had not spoken out much about these developments. Norman notes that for the most pa1t, Lennon (usuall y the mo st politically vocal Beat ie) spent much ofthattime c loseted in either work or his comfortable suburban home (2009: 429). Late r in 2008, McCartney tells the story of how the band became politically aware about the conflict, after an undated meeting he had with the famous academic and pacifist Bertrand RusselJ, who changed his views:

He was fabulous. He told me about the Vietnam War - most of us didn't know about it - and also that it was a vel)' bad war ... I remember going to back to the studio either that evening or the next day and telling the guys, particularly John, about this meeting and sayin g what a bad war this was ... John would later lead peace protests, but at the time we didn't really know too much about it, so J credit Bertrand Russell. 11

(Garner 2016)

Today, an 'urban legend' persists that the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department was in touch with the CIA over U1e potential connection between the · heat over the protests over tlie Security Treaty and interest in the Beatles ' (BCC Shuppa11 2016: 40) . Headlines such as 'B efore the Beatles an-ive, the police put in place special guideli nes ' (tokub etsuhodotais ei), and 'Vi g ilance agains t runaway crazy fans ' were probably meant to reassure the public, but they aJso planted seeds of worry. Another artic le told of the taking into protective cust ody of four junior high school Beatles fans for ' iJlicit sexual relations ' (/i,jun'is eikoyu) and the article reporttlr went on to express concern that there was a kind of 'unhealthiness' in


the relationships between Beatles fans, and the confirmation of the Beatles' tour only accelerated this kind of behaviour (BCC Shuppan 2016: 40). These stories contributed to the impression that the fans had lost their common sense, including a report that a female tried to enter the Budokan by hiding in deliveries of food and bedding to the venue - as early as one month before the concerts (BCC Shuppa11 2016: 40).

ln recounting the media reports regarding incidents in the weeks leading up to the concerts, it is important to remember that these protests and criticisms about the Beatles' performance at the Budokan were hardly the first time the group had experienced negative press and even personal threats during their career, Most of the security concerns focused on guaranteeing not only the performers' safety but also the general safety of the audience members who might be injured in rushes towards the stage or climbing over fences and the like. However, there was precedence in more sinister matters: in September 1964, the Beatles received threats against their personal safety during their visit to MontTeal, as noted in the Anthology ( l 995) series, causing them to leave the city immediately after their concerts and fly to Florida in the early hours of the morning. During their 1965 American tour as well, members from white supremacist groups made death threats against the Beatles, who had always spoken out against segregation and racism against African Americans, and at the same time were vocal in their admiration of Motown and other black artists as inspirations for their own compositions (see Chapter 4).

The stress in the lead-up to the Japanese tour seems to have had an effect on the Beatles' management as well. Tony Barrow, who managed the Beatles' public relations from 1962 to 1968, entitled an entire chapter in his memoir 'Terror in Tokyo', in reference to the protests leading up to the concerts. He wrote in the most straightforward terms: 'The death threat was undoubted and unambiguous. The Beatles would lose their lives if they dared play even one of their five scheduled concerts in the sanctified setting of the Tokyo Budokan' (Barrow 2011: 182).

Epstein would have known about these issues, given that Nagashima took the time to go to New York to meet Brian Epstein to reassure him of the venue booking as late as l .lune (BCC Shuppan 2016: 132; Omura 2016: 229). But the public criticisms had not seemed to worry the Beatles' entourage; Barrow wrote that he was not so concerned by pufted up complaints from middle-aged bureaucrats and salary men published in the newspapers. Instead, Barrow was shaken by 'underground' information that he deemed far more sinister, and all of this came tumbling out soon after their arrival:

I found out just how serious the situation had become when a small group of tearful Japanese girls collared me in the hotel lobby and pleaded with me not to let the Fab Four endanger their lives by going ahead with the Budokan dates ... The girls explained that the threat to murder The Beatles had appeared initially in a semi-underground newsletter circulated mainly among a student readership and had then been given low-key coverage in the popular press.

(2011: 188)


Barrow learned that these threats arose from the complaint that the venue was ~onsi_der~~ too sacred f~r the p:ofane performance of rock and rol I, especia l Jy by outs1de1s . Wbat most likely disturbed Barrow, a seasoned professional in the PR

game, was the underground nature of tJ1is information, as the fans had explained that lhe threats had come from mini~lwmi (literally, ' mini communication', to be c~ntrasted with the mainstream mass media). This particular news piece had been picked up by some local outlets, but Barrnw writes thal ' the authorities and the mainstre~rn medi_a [had] c~nspir[ed) lo suppress the assassination threats' (20 11: 199) . Th_1s con~p1racy of silence was at the request of Cheke, who justified this suppression of rnfo1111ation because of his condescendin<> view that ' in a count1y [like Japan] where crowds can easily become rioting mobs, they [the Beatles] had to be protected' ( cited in Barrow 20 l 1: 199).

While there was thought to be an organized student protest movement aoa inst the Beatles. some reports suggest that tl1is was not the case: youth pro1esto~ had apparently been recruited by the right-wing Dainippon Aikokuto, or the Greater Japan Patriotic Party, which actually had no particular argument with the Beatles. Suzuki Kunio, a university student at the time , writes that the Oainippon Aikokuto chose to protesnhe concert because at the time ' there was nothing else around for them to seriously protest' (honki no hantai undo wa nan! mo nakatta) (200 l: 48).

These protests and speci:rre threats were kept secret from the band members as pa11 of the entourage's common practice of shfoldiug the perfonners from any unpleasantness. Barrow adds that 'the language barrier made it easier for us to do this' and that heavy-handed security experienced by the Beatles was shruooed off as ~ likely respons: to the Japanese Communist Party's criticisms (20 fl~ I 90), which were more mtellectual than physical. Vic Lewis arrived in Japan on 24 Jun~, and ~le nexr day he went to the Yorn iuri offices., and then the Metropolitan Police Station for meetings; after these were sat isfactorily concluded, he visited U1e Budokan, which was occupied hosting the fourteenth annual Student Kendo Ch.~~pionships on that date. ~e pronounced the venue as ' spectacu lar' (rippa na kauo) m the Japanese press (Omura 20 16: 264). New cars had been purchased to '.eny the members between hotel and venue (Omura 20 16: 266) ; all seemed to be m place for the Beatles' arrival.

Conclusion

The_ Beatles' :,-isit represented a new benchmark in the trajectory that Japan had set itself on smce the end of the Second World War. The Occupation had ended, the Olympics had been a success: to stop the momentum ofmee tino international e~~e:tation and scrutiny was to go backwards. But the build-up ~ the Beatles' v1s1t-111 J~pan sho_wed much dread as well as excitement. Pait of the heavy-handedness of the mainstream response, and the authorities ' response, had to do with lhe ~en~ral conse~vativ ism at the time. but there were other factors. Many mass media pieces published in the lead-up to the concerts focused on t.he behaviour of lhe fans and die need to control them, or on t he ·oddness ' of the Beatles' music and the 'danger ' that arose from the phenomenon in general. which no doub~ influenced the way the authorities responded to the proposal and planned their


response (Hirota 2016: 50). In th is sense, the press, surely in the pursuit of selling papers, whipped up a sentiment of fear and loathing that had not previously existed.

In hindsight, there are several points that can be made about these protests and the heavy security that followed. Yazaki asks pointedly, 'What made the Beatles dangerous?' (1996: 19). The first was related to ideas about cultural integrity, and related economic concerns. Japan was not the first country to view the Beatles as a threat. Two years before, the American press wrote about the 'British Invasion' of the American music market. The word 'invasion' jokingly played on notions of Jong outdated historical tensions between the US and England, but suggested that there were still concerns that the Beatles and others would carve out American artists' and record companies' profits from the large audience for pop music in the US. In Japan, however, the local music scene had been dominated by American and British imports since the Occupation started in 1945. In the early postwar period, Japanese pop music mainly consisted of adaptations of American pop and jazz standards, as well as some 'Japanese sty!e' songs that relied on traditional minor keys (Take 1999: 20). To some extent, the invasion had already occmTcd and was receding by the time the Beatles came to Japan, as Japanese bands were honing and refining their versions of Western pop.

Another aspect was fear about public morals and ensuing concerns about physical safety. While the personal safety of the Beatles was certainly a concern, the heavy security presence in Tokyo was also put in place to ensure the safety of fans, who might inadvertently be injured in a crowded, highly emotive environment. There seems to be a conflation between the need to protect fans from the potential dangers of the pop concert event itself and from the emotionally charged atmosphere that accompanied the massive protests that had periodically filled the streets from 1959 to 1960. This was the first time authorities viewed youth as violent individuals to be controlled (Hirota 2016: 50), rather than merely immature members of society who needed paternalistic guidance.

Meanwhile, on 15 June 1966 , the Beatles' new single 'Paperback Writer' (backed with 'Rain') went on sale in Japan (Omura 2016: 245). In reaching as far as number three in the Japanese charts, this was the first Beatles single in three years which had not hit number one in the first week of its release (BCC Shuppan 2016: 66). It was the lowest selling single since their debut (Beatles Bible 20 ! 7a), a worrying sign of the inclement weather and turbulent atmosphere to come.

Notes While ffelp. 1 was a commercial success, the band members felt dissatisfied with the experience, so they wanted to be more discriminating in choosing a third script (Norman 2016: 485).

2 Aside from Europe and the US, the Beatles toured Australia and New Zealand in 1964 with u stopover in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the Beatles played_ a short set at the Hritish embassy for invi Led guests, rather than a general audience. See Norman (2003: 219-313) for details of their touring years.

3 Kyodo Kikaku Agency is the name the company used in 1964; the company look the name Kyodo Tokyo in 1970, which it still uses today (Yazaki 1996: 17). Nagashima died in 1999, but the agency is sti11 operating as of 2017.

50 The road to the B11duka11

4 Ki_mu~a was a politician, lawyer and kendoisl, and \1atsumae a bureaucrat politician sc1ent1st and educator; Kimura and Malsumue were nctuallv the oroaniz~t'o •. · . '. ch·iirs and ,, ti sh· ·k· · "" '

1 n s vice; .' , . s 1ve'.1 iat on 1 was the chair, it is likdy that Yomiuri did not \!.'ant to

prml this potential for conflict of intercst. 5 In June 1966 the exchange rate was US$]= ¥360. 6 t

3~ore recent estimate is thul only 43,000 al(endcd the Ii vc shows (McClure 2016:

7 Se~u'.it'. measures take~ in the 11:ad-up to the conci;:rt included the installation o fa two-mctr~ 11 ~ll1s to prevent fol Is from the second-floor balcony and orders were made not t p_ut the li~~ts ?ut at any :in:e during the_ eoneei:t at the venue (BCC Shuppan 2016: 39~

8 !he Budo~an s home p.igc states that its srntmg capacity 1s 14,471. hut this includes the upper_figurc of2,946 scats in the arena directly in front of the stage. The rennin in~ seats are in the _first and second floor balconies. Sec www.nipponbudokan.or.jp/;tbouU g.:uyou !or details. ·

9 The te~m senkyo w?uld have conjured up mernmics of Lbe Supreme Commander for the Allied l'owers (SCAP) Occupution which lr1(i •'ndcd ·1n 195" 11 · I d i • • • • . , , v _ on . 1e main an , an( was still ongoing in Okmawa in 1966.

10 This long-running show was broadcast from 1957 to 1987 on 'fl3S () s d , . . ( . . . . . . . , n un ay morn-1~gs, )mura writes that part of !ls appeal lay in the eomrnenlators' 'doku::c:tsu' or •ibu-s1,ve ~a~guage t~nc~ (_201 ~: 220). A clip ,ur o~c of these shows can be seen (muted) at \\WV>:)Outube.com1\\atchlv=119a8wrOF8w. I he details of their discussion are rtotcd Ill wnttcn texts, but the visual is intc1·csting bet:uusc it shows that two of the three dist:ussants (Hosokawa and Obama) arc wearing kimonos on stage h ·1 r · · a business suit. . ~-• w i c . UJ I wara wears

11 McC~rtney ,docs not give a date for !his meeting, hut the Li mcframe could Ii t with a meet mg bel ~re the B_eatles _d_cparted for thi;: Asi nn leg of the 1966 tour. Garner notes that R~ssell tir~t pubh~ly cnt1c1zc_d the war in 1963. He then argued against the exi;:culio~ of demonstrators rn North V1elmun in 1965, and published a major cssav on the lop1c on 4 July 1966, ,vhich would have come out just as the l-3eaties were' leaving Japan (Garner 2016 ). ·

3 The Beatles at the Budokan

The storm hits

On 25 June 1966, three days before the Beatles were scheduled to arrive, Yomiuri

Shimbun printed this special message from the Beatles to their fans in Japan: 'be well behaved!' (setsudo molle) (Omura 2016: 267). But amid the anticipation, a stonn was brewing. On 22 June, a cyclonic weather system had begun to develop in the Pacific Ocean and was making its way n01thwest towards Japan's east coast (Kitamoto 2016; Asahi Shimbun, 29 June 1966, p. 1 ). By 28 June, 'Tropical Srorm Kit' had become a Category 5 'super typhoon' that ravaged the entire length of the eastern coast of Honshu. The storm and the ensuing floods and landslides were responsible for the confirmed deaths of 64 people, with a further 19 missing and

91 injured (Kitamoto 2016). The Beatles had depai1cd for Tokyo from Hamburg on 28 Jllnc at 12.25 am,

Japan time, on JAL flight number 412, on the 'Matsushima' aircraft, a Douglas DC-8 jet (BCC Shuppan 2016: 40; Omura 2016: 271). 1 'lheir plane stopped over in London, but the flight from there was disrupted by the stomi and they were forced to stop in Anchorage (BCC Shuppan 2016: 40). During this time, word got out that the Beatles were grounded, and the English-language Japan Times

reported that there had been a 'riot in Anchorage' as '400 teenagers tried to crash a hotel' where the pop stars stayed during their layover. They eventually anived at Haneda airport on the 29th, making their trip crossing the dateline almost two

days in length (/',,fusic: l/fe 2016b: 8). The Beatles' flight was more than 10 hours behind schedule, and police had

begun dive11ing traffic and people away from the airport in the early hours of the 28th by putting up signs to restrict entry; on that day, four male and eight female fans were taken into custody, presumably for trespassing (Omura 2016: 271 )." The security at Haneda was deemed a success compared to the chaos that had been seen at other Beatles arrival points. Because of their experience with student demonstrators from Zengakuren, the national student union, the Tokyo police had come to consider themselves lo be 'specialists' in handling youths in public (wakamono kanri wa ote no mono ni nalleita) and were able to control the crowd (Kitayama 2009: 83). Later, fans recalled that despite this perceived efficiency, the police were 'terrible; quite ordinary girls were pushed, and verbally abused' (Kitayama::?.009: 83). Photographer Asai Shimpei, who was there to cover

the Beatles' arrival, said:

2 the road to the budokantheoplothe.com/stevens-ch2.pdf · 2 the road to the budokan setting the...

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