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Global warming raises troubltng ques-tions about the ecological and econo-mic future of large irrigated river basinssuch as the lndus River in Pakistan. Butit is not clear how potential impactsmight best be identified or addressed.This article reports on a multidisciplin-ary study of four distinct conceptualapproaches to climate change: climatescenarios assessment; critical watermanagement problems; historicantecedents and analogies; and Muslimpolitical reconstruction. Current scien-tific research emphasizes the firstapproach, but the other three may bemore important for water managers inthe basin. The article reviews previousresearch on water resources effects ofclimate change; introduces the lndusbasin; discusses the four conceptualapproaches; and finally discussesprospects for coordinating them.James L. Wescoat, Jr is with the Depart-ment of Geography, University of Colora-do, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.This research received support from theUS Environmental Protection Agency. I amendebted to my colleagues in Pakistan,especially in the Water and Power De-velopment Authority. I would also like tothank Bill Riebsamk, Micky Glantz, RobinLeichenko. Gilbert White. Ken Mitchell.and an anonymous reviewer for commentson an earlier draft. I take personal respon-sibility for the views expressed.Joel Smith and Dennis Tirpak, eds, ThePotential Effects of Global Climate Changeon the United States, App A, Water Re-

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Managing the lndusRiver basin in light ofclimate changeFour conceptual approaches

James L. Wescoat, Jr

In 1989, the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) completeda report on the effects of global climate change in the USA and, in thesame year, launched its first studies in developing countries. r One of thedeveloping country studies focused on water resources impacts in theIndus River basin of Pakistan (Figure l). Global warming is troublingin irrigated basins like the Indus, where some 75% of the cropland isirrigated. But it is not clear what the most serious problems might be orhow they might best be addressed. The Indus case study initiallyfollowed a climate scenario assessment approach widely used in theUSA. This article discusses the problems with that approach, thealternatives found to be relevant in the Indus basin, and their implica-tions for international research on global climate change.

Previous research in the USADuring the late 1970s and early 198Os, government and scientificresearch organizations began to study the potential effects of globalwarming on water resources in the USA.3 Although these studies differin emphasis, they share a common line of thought which may be termedclimate impact assessment, or more narrowly, climate scenarioassessment.4

Climate scenario assessment stems from a concern that under certainprojections or scenarios of climate change, expected water resourcespatterns would be disrupted. The scenarios are generally constructedwith general circulation models (GCMs), historical records, or sensitiv-ity analyses. Expected climatic, hydrologic, and water managementconditions define the baseline or reference for estimating impacts. Abaseline may be static or dynamic. Many studies consider how the watersystem might develop without climate change and use multiple baselinesto assess impacts under different water development scenarios.

Once scenarios and baselines are defined, the logic of assessmentproceeds as follows. Outputs from global climate models serve as inputs

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Managing the Indus Riv er basin

Figure 1. The lndus River basin andmajor structures and political units inPakistan.Source: US Environmental ProtectionAgency.continued from page 38 1sources, US Environmental ProtectionAgency, Washington, DC, 1989.The other river basin case studies are theMekong, Zambezi, Nile, and La Plats. Inaddition to the river basin studies, USEPAhas sponsored research on agricultural,forest, sea level, and health impacts.3For example, Peter H. Gleick, ed, TheColorado River Basin and the GreenhouseEffect: Water Resources and Water Man-agement, Pacific Institute, Berkeley, CA1990; National Research Council, WaterScience and Technology Board, ManagingWater Resources Under Conditions of Cli-mate Uncertainty, Conference papers from14-16 November 1990, Scottsdale, AZ;Will iam E. Riebsame, Adjusting water re-sources management to climate change,Climate Change, Vol 13, 1988, pp 69-97;P. Wagonner, ed, Climate Change and USWater Resources, John Wiley, New York,NY, 1990; and J.R. Wallis, ed, Climate,Climate Change, and Water Supply,National Academy of Sciences, Washing-ton, DC, 1977.4The term climate impact assessmentencompasses a wide range of modellingand empirical approaches. See RobertKates, et al, eds, Climate Impact Assess-ment, SCOPE Report No 27, John Wiley,New York, NY, 1985.For more detailed discussion of adjust-ment and adaptation, see Will iam E. Rieb-same, Assessing Social tmpacts of Cfi-mate Fluctuations, United Nations En-vironment Programme, Nairobi, 1988.International Seminar on Climate Fluctua-tions and Water Management: Abstracts,Government of Egypt, Waler ResearchCenter, Cairo, 1989. An important excep-tion is Kennet Hewitt, Climate hazardsand agricultural development: someaspects of the problem in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, in K. Hewitt, ed,interpretations of Calamity, pp 181-201,

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for regional hydrologic models. Outputs from the hydrologic modelsbecome inputs for water management models (eg reservoir operation,allocation, and river basin management models). Initial impacts thusinclude changes in physical hydrology and associated costs and benefits.Because most models allow for numerous water management adjust-ments, many studies go beyond initial impact assessment to estimate thephysical impacts after adjustment, the costs and benefits of adjustment,and the residual costs and benefits after adjustment. Impacts arecompared across scenarios and baselines to gauge the sensitivity,vulnerability, resilience, or robustness of the existing system.5 En-gineering and policy alternatives are inventoried to establish the rangeof potential adjustments to climate change. The consequences ofadjustment are then estimated to gauge the adaptability of the watersystem under each scenario.

This chain of scenario assessment proceeds from climate change tohuman adjustment. It requires plausible scenarios of climate change andan ability to complete each link of the physical impact assessment.Because human impacts and adjustments emerge only at the end of theanalytical process, provided analysis can proceed that far, climatescenario assessment may be characterized as a natural sciencesapproach.Extension to developing coun triesThe same approach has recently been extended to developingcountries.6 The justification for a similar research design is that itenhances the comparability across regions and resource sectors, and itestablishes a common frame of reference for international research andnegotiation. For example, the USEPA case studies began with uniformprocedures for constructing climate scenarios and baselines. Commonimpact assessment categories and measures were also sought.

Developing country case studies diverged from their US antecedentsin several respects. More emphasis was placed on social adjustment.The river basin was chosen as a common spatial framework forinvestigation. Modelling was complemented by a parallel stream ofempirical research to address unmodelled impacts. USEPA also empha-sized close collaboration with water managers in the case study basins. It

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coff tinued from page 382Allen 8. Unwin. Boston, MA, 1983.7These justifications were not problematicat the outset of the project, but they be-came so. It must be kept in mind thatUSEPA plays a dual role by supportinginternational research which shapes, inturn, the terminology and approach forinternational negotiations.Nigel Allan, Ecological effects of landintensification in the central and easternHindukush, in E. Groetzbach and G. Rins-chede, ed, Beitraege-zur VergleichendenKufturge~rapbie der f-focbebirge, 1984, F.Pustet, Regensberg, pp 193-212; TariqHusain, ~Deve~opment, politics, societyand the social contract: reflections on therelevance of AKRSP-type pa~icipato~approaches, unpublished paper, Islama-bad, 1990; and Edward Vander Velde,Irrigation management in Pakistan moun-tain environments, Country faper-Pakistan, No 3, International IrrigationManagement Institute, Columbo, SriLanka, 1989.gUpper In&s Basin - Karakorum Hima-laya, Final Report, Snow and Ice Hydrolo-gy Project, Wilfrid Laurier University,Waterloo, 1989.

Mmaging the fndus River basinwas this final difference which revealed the limitations of the scenarioassessment approach.

Some Pakistani water managers questioned the value of studyinghydroclimatic problems five to six decades in the future, in view ofpressing water problems facing the country today. Most were frustratedwith implausible GCM scenarios, model limitations, and scientificuncertainties. Some felt that scenario assessment was useful but thatalternative approaches were needed. These concerns led to an expan-sion of the research team and an exploration of four distinct conceptualapproaches:* Climate scenario assessment.0 Critical water management problems.0 Historical antecedents and analogies.@ Muslim political reconstruclion.If scenario assessment is largely a natural sciences approach, the otherthree begin with social issues and can be construed as social researchapproaches. The four approaches define water problems differently.They employ different spatial and temporal scales. They have differentaims and logic. They point to different types of solutions. To appreciatethese differences, it is useful to consider the context in which they arose.

Profile of water management in the Indus basinThe upper basinThe Indus originates in western Tibet and flows northwest throughprecipitous mountain gorges of India and northern Pakistan. Theclimate of the upper basin is dominated by westerly air masses whichcontribute late winter snowfall to massive glaciers and snowfields whosemeltwaters define the annual and long-term hydrologic regime of theIndus. Following a steep descent, the river swings south throughirrigated valleys of Gilgit and Swat into the Northwest Frontier Pro-vince.

Upper basin tribal groups have developed decentralized villageirrigation systems which produce grain and forage for local consumptionand fruit for regional markets.* Upper basin water supplies are regional-ly reliable but locally variable, especially in areas dependent on smallglaciers which rapidly advance, retreat, flood, or waste away.

Before the Indus reaches the plains, it is impounded behind Pakis-tans largest dam at Tarbela, built in the early 1970s with a live storagecapacity of 8.9 million acre-feet (maf). Siltation of Tarbela reservoir andescalating water and power demands have generated pressure foradditional dams on the Indus. Major dam construction has beenblocked, however, by water conflicts among Pakistans four provinces.Water released from Tarbela receives the Kabul River from Afghanis-tan, which is the only major tributary without international conflict todate.

Five eastern tributaries rise in mountains of India and Kashmir whereheadwaters receive winter snowfall. The foothills receive monsoonrainfall in late summer. Each river has a different hydroclimatic regime.Monsoon influence increases, and glaciological influence decreases, asone travels east. The easternmost rivers - Beas, Sutlej, and Ravi - carryheavy monsoon flows. The Chenab River is transitional, and the upperJhelum has almost no monsoon influence.

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Managing the Indus River basin

Michael Quick and Anthony Pipes,Manual: UBC Watershed Model, Depart-ment of Civil Engineering, University ofBritish Columbia, Vancouver.Aloys Michel, The lndus Rivers, YaleUniversity Press, New Haven, CT, 1967.E.H. Aitken, Gazetteer of fhe Province ofSind, lndus Publications, Karachi, 1988(first published 1907); Hunting TechnicalServices Ltd and Sir M. MacDonald andPartners, Lower lndus Report, Lion House,London, 1966: M. Rahman. Land tenuresystems in Sind Province, Pakistan, AsianProfile. Vol 6. No 1, 1980. DD 5565.3Government of Sind, &joinder of fheGovernment of Sind to the Representa-tions of Punjab and other units of theReport of the lndus Commission, Govern-ment Press, Karachi, 1944.G.M. Shah, The tragedy of Indo-Pakistan water and the robbery of thelndus waters, Sind Quarterly, 4 parts,1984-l 986.

A computer model of the upper Jhelum River, developed by Uni-versity of British Columbia scientists, forecasts inflows into Manglareservoir, the second of Pakistans two major storage dams.10 TheJhelum, which drains the disputed territory in Kashmir, is the onlyupper basin watershed modelled to date.The eastern riversInternational water conflicts occurred on all of the Indus tributariesbefore the treaty of 1960. The treaty allocated exclusive use of theIndus, Jhelum, and Chenab to Pakistan and exclusive use of the easternrivers - Ravi, Setlej, and Beas - to India. Allocation of entire riversrather than partial flows reflects an international situation whichrequires independent, rather than cooperative, river management.Depletion of the eastern rivers prompted massive construction in the1970s to transfer water from the western rivers to areas formerlyirrigated by the Sutlej and Ravi. Pakistan has assumed that inflows fromthe eastern tributaries will drop to zero by the turn of the century,except in times of flood.The main systemThe Indus and its tributaries enter the plains at locations known as rimstations where water is stored, measured, and diverted into an exten-sive network of canals in the province of Punjab (Figure 2). From therim stations to the sea, the irrigation system is managed more or less asan integrated system that is altogether different from the tribal irrigationsystems of the north.

Four political provinces are involved: Punjab, Northwest FrontierProvince (NWFP), Sind, and Baluchistan. The Indus is, for part of itslength, the boundary between Punjab and NWFP in the northern plains.Punjab is the most populous, powerful, and economically productiveprovince in the country. Rainfall averages l&20 inches per year.Irrigated areas produce rice and wheat in the northeast, and cotton andwheat in the southwest. Farmers at the canal heads are powerful andtend to have excess water, while those in tail areas practise deficitirrigation. Rainfed cultivation areas (barani) are vulnerable to varia-tions in precipitation, so they produce low-value crops for the marketand soldiers for the army. NWFP is mountainous, renowned for itsorchards, and has elements of both large-scale centrally administeredirrigation and decentralized tribal irrigation.

The Indus and its tributaries converge in southern Punjab beforeentering the province of Sind, an arid, barely sloping landscape withchronic problems of waterlogging, salinization, economic disparity, andpolitical strife.* Irrigated crops are cotton, rice, and sugarcane. Yieldsare generally lower than in Punjab (and comparable areas of Egypt) dueto problems of soil drainage and social organization. The mountains andvalleys of Baluchistan lie to the west of Sind. They contribute a smallamount of runoff to the Indus from hill torrents, which provide somewater for local irrigation, and a few valleys still maintain the old Persiansystem of qanat irrigation.

Water conflicts between the provinces date back to the turn of thecentury. They combine classic upstream-downstream rivalry, withcultural conflict between Sindhis, Punjabis, and Pathans.14 Water wasallocated among the provinces on an annual ad hoc basis until March1991 when a final agreement was reached. Concern will now shift toproject selection and operating agreements.



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lndus JhelumManaging the Indus River basin

Chenab Ravi Sutlej

Figure 2. Schematic diagram of thelndus River, main system.

Robin Leichenko, The potential effectsof climate change on Karachi, Pakistan,Masters thesis, Department of Geonra-phy, University of Cdlorado, CO, 1991:6G.S. Qureshi. Variation in the lndusRiver discharges and their hazards, in M.I.El-Sabh and T.S. Murty, eds, natural andfan-jade Hazards, D. Reidel, Boston,MA, 1986, pp 36Q-375.Nazir Ahmad and G.R. Chaudury, Irriga-tion Agriculture of Pakistan, ShahzadNazir, Lahore, 1988; David Freeman et a/,Local Organizations for Social Develop-ment: Concepts and Cases of IrrigationOrganization, Westview Press, Boulder,CO, 1988; and G. Jones et al, Information-al Sources on Water Management for Agri-cultural Production in Pakistan with Spe-cial Reference to lnsfitutional and HumanFactors, 2 vols, Water Management Tech-nical Report No 31, Colorado State Uni-versity, Fort Collins, CO, 1974.

Kabul

/Delta

Arabian Sea

- River- Canali BarrageDam

Water supply in the lower basin is falling behind agriculture andurban demand, particularly in Karachi where population growth ex-ceeds the physicai and institutional capacity of the public watersystem. Conflict between Sindhis, Mohajirs, and Pathans - parallelledby conflicts between the urban and agricultural sectors - obstructscooperation on lower basin water issues.

Of the 140 maf of water annually available in Pakistan, some 40 mafreach the delta. The delta supports important fish and shellfish indus-tries. The lower reaches of the river have several unique aquatic andriparian species but are ecologically stressed by upstream impound-ments of freshwater and sediment.16

The 100 maf of water consumed over an area of 40 million acres ofPakistan, constitute one of the largest integrated irrigation systems inthe world. Bureaucratic responsibility for this system is complex andhierarchical. The federal Water and Power Development Authority(WAPDA) has responsibility for major dams, power production, andwater planning. Provincial irrigation departments operate the distribu-tion system from the major canals to farm watercourse outlets. Localwater-management groups are bound up with complex kin and classrelations. l7 In recent decades, surface irrigation and drainage problemshave stimulated massive groundwater development involving hundredsof thousands of public and private tubewells.

The Indus is one of the best documented basins in the world. Seasonal



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*H.G. Raverty, The Mihran of Sind and itstributaries, Sang-e-Meel, Lahore, 1979,reprint.?mran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperial-ism, 788!?-1947, Oxford University Press,Delhi, 1989; David Gilmartin, Scientificempire and imperial science: The colonialpolitics of irrigation technology in he lndusBasin, unpublished paper, 1990.20Masood Ahmad ef at, Guide to the fndusBasin Model Revised, World Bank En-vironment Operations and Strategy Divi-sion, Washington, DC, 1990; John Duloyand Gerald T. OMara, lssues of Efficiency

inundation canals date at least to the 3rd millenium BC. References tothe Indus have been traced from Greek, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persianchronicles.s The colonial irrigation system involved record-keeping onan unprecedented scale. Since independence in 1947, hundreds oftechnical studies, surveys, and plans have been prepared. One of themost sophisticated river basin optimization models in the world, theWorld Banks Indus Basin Model (IBMR), was developed to evaluateinvestment programmes.*

After 1980, emphasis shifted from water development to manage-ment. Management includes operations; maintenance; institutions;on-farm practices; irrigation system rehabilitation; and organizationaldevelopment. Although water-management programmes have becomeincreasingly sophisticated, there is concern that they are not meetingtheir social or institutional goals. Non-governmental organizationsstand out for their success in assisting local water management.22

Political stresses have compounded water problems - between Indiaand Pakistan; WAPDA and provincial irrigation departments; agricul-ture and water sectors; Sind and Punjab; political parties and militaryrule; landlords and tenants. International assistance is erratic, especiallyfrom the USA.The result is paradoxical: as water-resource information and planningadvance, so do river basin problems. Add the issue of change, and theuncertainties become overwhelming. It is not that climate change isunimaginable. Scientists have been studying paleoclimatic change in theIndus for a century. But managing the Indus is now so complex,interdependent, and contingent upon international events, that thecascade of potential climate impacts seems impossible to envisage. Somuch rides on the sustainability of the Indus, however, that few disputethe need to take climate change seriously. The question is how.

Investigation of the four approaches was partly a function of aresearch design which began with a mandate for climate scenarioassessment aligned with a commitment to addressing the complexity ofwater problems in the basin. The original research design did notenvisage four approaches, but rather some ten topics for investigation.The study expanded to 22 topics - stopping at the limit of its resources -and then sought to discern common patterns of inquiry. The discussionbelow recapitulates this process of expansion and clarification; and isthus a narrative, as well as a comparison, of the four approaches.

and Interdependence in Water ResourcesInvestment: Lessons from the lndus Basin Four approachesof Pakistan, World Bank Staff WorkingPaper No 665, Washington, DC, 1984; and Climate scenario assessmentP. Leiftinck et al, Water and Power Re-sources in West Pakistan: A Study in Sec- The study began with a scenario assessment approach, using the Jhelumtor Pfanning, 3 vols, John Hopkins Uni- River (UBC) model to assess hydrologic impacts in the upper basin andversity Press, Baltimore, MD, 1968. The to generate inflows to the main system. The Indus Basin Model (IBMR)tBMR was most recently applied to WAP-DAs massive Wafer Sector fnves~menf was used to assess economic and water management impacts in the mainP/arming Study, 5 vols, Lahore, 1996-91. system. The strengths of this approach are its clarity and logic (Table 1).*See, for example, the US Agency for Criteria for a successful scenario assessment are: plausible climateInternational Development (USAID), Mid-Term Evaluation of the Command Water scenarios; an unbroken chain of analysis that stretches from climateManagement Project, ISPAN Report No 5, change through hydrologic impacts and water management impacts to2 vols, Washington, DC, 1989. adjustments; a procedure that has the confidence and commitment of22World Bank, Operations Evaluation De- basin water managers; and output in the form of viable policy alterna-partment, The Aga Khan Rural Supporf tivesProgram in Pakistan: An fnterim Evafua- +*tion, Washington, DC, 1987. Difficulties were encountered in applying the scenario assessment

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Managing the Indus R iver basinTable 1. Climate impact assessment in the lndus basin.

(1) Assemble projec t team and obtain government approvals.(2) Construct regional climate scenarios and baselines.(3) Construct water management scenarios and baselines.(4) Adapt Jhelum model to examine upper basin scenarios.(5) Assess hydrologic impacts in the Jhelum.(6) Extended Jhelum results to other upper basin watersheds to simulate inflows into the

main system.(7) Adapt IBMR model to assess main system scenarios.(Rainfall, evaporation, crop water use tables; water policy assumptions; impact asses:criteria.)(8) Assess impacts in the main irrigation system.(9) Construct adjustment scenarios for the main system.(Project, policy, and management alternatives.)(10) Assess the adaptability of the main system.(Through modelling and expert opinion.)

23After the Simla Accords of 1972, Indiainsisted that South Asian water issueswere strictly bilateral affairs. Tensions be-tween India and Pakistan had a brief re-spite in 1988 followed by recent politicalconflict over Kashmir.*James L. Wescoat, Jr and RobinLeichenko, Climate change scenarios forthe lndus basin, Pakistan, TechnicalMemo, No 1, University of Colorado, Natu-ral Hazards Center, Boulder, CO, 1990.

approach in the Indus basin despite the cooperation of an outstandingteam of Pakistani engineers, planners, and scientists. It was notpolitically feasible to organize an international basin study with India.*Global climate models failed to simulate existing monsoon patterns,undermining the credibility of COZ warming scenarios.24 Climate mod-els and river basin models had different spatial configurations, requiringfurther modification of climate change scenarios. Only the Jhelum Riverhas been modelled in the upper basin, so runoff scenarios in adjacentwatersheds had to be derived from sub-basins of the Jhelum, introduc-ing problems of correlation and scale. Glaciological processes in themain stem of the upper Indus would not be modelled due to a lack ofdata and scientific knowledge.

Once upper basin inflows were projected at the rim stations, theIndus Basin Model (IBMR) was used to assess impacts on the plains.First, hydroclimatologic data in the IBMR were modified. Because themodel uses pan evaporation and crop water requirements rather thantemperature to estimate consumptive water use, temperature scenariosand water use were derived independently. The model also uses amonthly time step and mean data which dampen out interannualvariability, seasonality, and extreme events. A 20% change in monthlyrunoff is well within the range of water management experience, but a20% increase in extreme flows would breach every bund and barrage inthe system. Some of the most difficult problems - salinity, drainage, andflooding - can only be crudely assessed with the IBMR model. Finally,no model of the Indus main system can gauge raw hydrologic impacts,because the entire system is subject to human intervention and control.

The Indus basin model does help assess social impacts and adjust-ments to climate change. It provides output for land use, water use,production patterns, and farm revenue at various levels of aggregation -canal command, province, agroclimatic zone, and the irrigated basin asa whole. It includes a complex array of cropping technologies, farmbudgets, labour variables, water allocation rules, and investment possi-bilities which can be varied to gauge the efficacy of adjustment toclimate impacts. The number of adjustment combinations is enormous,but each model run requires six hours of computer time and producesabout 100 pages of output, so only a small number of well designedadjustment alternatives can reasonably be examined.

Moreover, because the model optimizes government and/or farmerirrigation decisions, thousands of adjustments are built into everyoptimization run. Most of them cannot be directly inferred from modeloutput. The model assumes that decision makers are economically



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Managing the lndus River basinTable 2. Critical water problems approach.

25A~, for example, in Peter Gleick, Theeffects of future climate change on interna-tional water resources: The Colorado Riv-er, the United States and Mexico, fo/;cySciences, Vol 21, 1988, pp 23-39; N.S.Jodha, Potential Strategies for adapting togreenhouse warming: Perspectives fromthe developing world, in N. Rosenberg etal, Greenhouse Warming: Abatement andAdaptation, Resources- for the Future,Washinoton, 1989, pp 147-158.26The concept of critical water factorswas suggested by Le Huu Ti of theMekong Secretariat at a project meeting inBoulder in February 1990. Whereas Tistressed critical factors for basin manage-ment, here the scope is extended to in-clude water problems in the basin that mayor may not fall within the scope of riverbasin planning.

(1) Survey current water problems.(2) Survey current plans and policies for dealing with them.(3) Identify water problems and plans likely to be especially sensitive to climate change.(4) Refine spatial and temporal scales of assessment.(5) Evaluate the potential effects of climate change on selected problems and plans.(6) Evaluate alternative plans.(7) Draw practical conclusions.

rational, but it is calibrated with data reflecting all of the problemsmentioned earlier. It does not identify, explain, or examine thoseembedded water management problems.Critical water management problemsSome Pakistani water managers asked why they should spend time onclimate change issues that might emerge 50 years from now when criticalwater management problems confront them today. Some suggested thatsuch speculative studies should be conducted by a university ratherthan a government agency. Others argued that all the global and riverbasin models were unrealistic. In response, the Pakistani case studyleaders argued that climate change is relevant to medium- and long-terminvestment planning, that climate change is an emerging theme ininternational irrigation programmes, and that government is the onlyorganization with the expertise and tools to conduct the research.

It was concluded that the study should shift its attention to a set ofcritical water problems that might be influenced by climate change.Table 2 outlines the logic of the critical water problems approach.26

An inventory of problems was compiled from unstructured interviewswith project participants, previous water sector studies, and the follow-ing studies underway between 1988 and 1991:0 Water Sector Investment Planning Study.0 National Flood Protection Study.0 National Drainage Sector Study.0 Command Water Management Mid-term Evaluation.0 Irrigation Systems Management Research Project.0 National Conservation Strategy.The Water Sector Investment Planning Study (WSIPS) included athorough review of previous plans and investigations through 1991.Table 3 lists the problems given priority in that study. The WSIPS studyalso used the Indus Basin model to evaluate a range of water develop-ment scenarios for the year 2000, taking into account the level offinancing available and the projects likely to be built. These currentgovernment water development scenarios provided the baselines forassessing climate impacts.

The case study team selected eight problems for attention: salinity,waterlogging, and drainage; flood hazards; local irrigation managementproblems; ecological conditions in deltaic and riparian ecosystems;lower basin water conflicts; reservoir management; bureaucratic orga-nization and performance; and coordination with the agricultural sector,particularly on crop water requirements. One team member tookresponsibility for each problem area and prepared a research program-me to study the implications of climate warming for that problem.

The spatial and temporal scale of investigation are key issues in thecritical problems approach. Water problems are often addressed at a



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Source: Water and Power Development Author-ity, Draft, Federal Report, 1990.


Managing the Indus R iver basinTable 3. Water sector problems and constraints.FinancialInadequate levels of funding.Inefficient control and disbursement of funds.Coordination of public and private investment (eg for tubewells).InstitutionalWater allocation agreement between provinces.Inadequate environmental, social and technical assessment in project planning and design.Project selection and approval delays.Contractor capability and performance.Mismanagement of Annual Development Programme and Special Development Programme funds.Poor coordination with Agriculture Sector.Poor cost recovery (water charges and collection).Obstacles to conjunctive management of reservoirs; and surface and groundwater.Technical constraintsWaterlogging and drainage.Inflexible water allocation.Deficit irrigation.Inadequate storage.Constraints on new storage, especially provincial water allocation and conflict.Increasing crop water demands.

scale smaller than the river basin, making it difficult to determine theimplications of findings in one area for other areas in the basin or thebasin as a whole.

Within the scope of this study, it was only possible to assess problemsat the scale of previous investigations. The full Indus basin model wasused to generate scenarios for sub-basin case studies of flooding,salinity, and canal water management. Broader inferences were drawnby comparing the local results with analogous investigations in otherareas in the basin or with sector studies at a larger scale.

Timescales for water planning are generally 1 year, 5 years, 10 years,and 15 years. Aside from engineering analysis of extreme events, the50-60 year timeframe of climate change is rarely employed, Thisdifference in timescales can be dealt with in three ways (Figure 3):a

a

a

Use transient clim ate chan ge scenarios (ie, where 10 years ofclimate change correspond with 10 years of water development).This is the most scientifically appropriate approach. Unfortunate-ly, it is often difficult to discern the water resources effects of smallchanges in climate normals.Collapse 50 years of clim ate chan ge onto t he present or near-termwater m anagement system . The purpose of the investigation is toidentify potential water impacts, so it may be useful to exaggerateimpacts. Moreover, the water plan imagined for 10 years hencemay require a much longer period to implement.Extrap olate water developm ent trends 50 or 60 years into the futu re.In light of the past 50 years of water development, it would behighly speculative, and of dubious value, to project water develop-ment trends beyond conventional planning periods.

The second strategy was judged most appropriate for the Indus casestudy and its models, for it combines the best available estimates offuture climate with the best available estimates of future water manage-ment. It must be kept in mind that impacts are exaggerated with thisapproach.Once impacts have been examined, adjustment workshops weredesigned to focus on planning alternatives. The critical water problemsapproach is distinguished by its assessment of alternatives in the light ofclimate change, rather than as responses to climate change.


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Managing the 1ndu.t Riv er basin1990 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Water development

Climate change

(1) Use equal timescales

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050Water development

Climate change

(2) Exaggerate climate impacts

Water development

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Climate change

(3) Extrapolate water planning scenariosFigure 3. Water development and climate change timescales in the critical water problems approach.

Hist orical ant ecedents and analogiesAntecedents help explain the current situation: how it arose; why someproblems were avoided and others were not; why adjustments suc-ceeded in some areas and not others. Determining the antecedents of aproblem establishes its depth and structure. For example, water pricingis often recommended to improve water-use efficiency and systemmaintenance. International agencies blame Pakistani government agen-cies and officials for avoiding price reforms. But a survey of colonialirrigation records reveals that water pricing was considered many timesin the late 19th and early 20th century - and dropped each time forpolitical and practical reasons.27 After 100 years, circumstances favour-able to water pricing reform are still not evident. Would climate impactsbe more or less likely to make pricing a feasible or appropriateadjustment?

The pricing example also contains an analogy: pricing is an adjust-lmran Ali, personal communication, ment to non-climate problems; climate impacts are analogous to some1990. of these non-climate problems; therefore the use of pricing as an



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28MichaelGlantz, ed. Societal Responsesto R~ionat Cf~matic Change: Forecastingby Anat~y, Westview Press, Boulder, CO,1988.*II H Fischer, Historians Faflacies: To-.ward a logic of Historical Thoughf, Harper,New York, NY, 1970, pp 243-262.30Dale Jamieson, Grappling for a glimpseof the future, in Michael Glantz, ed,Societal Responses to Climate Change:Forecasting by Analogy, Westview Press,Boulder, CO, 1988, pp 73-94.3Michael Glantz, The use of analogies inassessing physical and societal responsesto global warming, unpublished paper,1990.32R L Raikes and R.H. Dyson, The pre-.historic climate of Baluch~stan and the In-dus Valley, in G.L. Possehl, ed, AncientCities of the Indus, Vikas PublishingHouse, New Delhi, 1979, pp 223-233.Gurdip Singh, Stratigraphical and palyno-loaical evidence for desertification in theGreat Indian Desert, Annals of the AridZone. Vol 16. 1977. DD 310-320: A.M.Swain et al, istimaiesof holocene pre-cipitation for Rajasthan, India, based onpollen and lake-level data, QuaternaryResearch, Vol 19, 1983, pp l-l 7.33Louis Flam, The fale&eography andPrehistoric Settlement Patterns in Sind.P&k&fan (ca #~Zff~ SC), unpublishedPhD dissertation, South A&an -RegionalStudies. Univers~~ of Pennsvlvania. 1981.34Mich& op cit. def 11. I35B Allchin, A. Goudie and K. Hegde, ThePrehistory and Pateogeography of theGreat Indian Desert, Academic Press,New York, NY, 1978; Rafique Mughal,The present state of research on the lndusValley civilization, in G. Possehl, Ed,Ancient Cities of the Indus, Vikas Pub-lishing House, New Delhi, 1979, pp QC-100; R.L. Raikes and G.F. Dales, TheMohenjo-Daro floods reconsidered, Jour-nal of the Palaeontologicaf Society of In-dia, Vol 20, 1977, pp 251-260.

Managers the Indm River basinadjustment to climate change may be analogous to the use of pricing inother contexts.

Analogies are widely employed in studies of climate change, but theyare not well understood and must be used with care.** Fischer wouldnarrowly restrict historical analogies to those formal cases where:29

AX:BX::AY:BYSituation A is analogous to B, because both possess property X (egwarm temperatures, severe flooding); therefore A and B are alsoanalogous with respect to Y (eg an impact or adjustment relevant toclimate change).

Dale Jamieson has criticized such formal approaches, suggesting thatanalogies be viewed as stories about climate change which are more orless salient, more or less useful.) He argues that the effectiveness of ananalogy depends more upon the significance, than upon the number orformal logic, of comparisons. He is careful to point out pitfalls as well asthe power of analogies. Glantz has stressed the importance of specifyingthe exact purpose (eg education, generation of alternatives, or forecast-ing) and limits of the analogy to avoid vague or misleadingcomparisons.l

Three types of analogy have been employed in climate impactsresearch. The most common involves previous instances of climatechange in historic, protohistoric, or prehistoric times. The more recentthe climate analog, the more it may reveal about adjustment incomplex societies. In the case of the Indus, some archaeologists believewarming occurred in the second millenium BC, triggering massiveenvironmental and cultural adjustments.* Others have disputed theregional applicability of local paleoclimatic evidence and questioned theimportance of climate in protohistoric social change.

A second type of analogy involves hydrometeorological phenomenasuch as floods and droughts. Although not climatic phenomena, per se,extreme events illuminate short-ter? adjustments which may be analo-gous to long-term adjustments. For example, 1990 was a warm wet yearin the upper Indus. Snowmelt came early. The warm weather wasanalogous to climate change scenarios in the upper basin, so the Chief ofDam Operations and Power (WAPDA) kept a detailed record ofproblems and actions taken during this period to include in his discus-sion of the potential effects of climate change on reservoir operations.

A third type of analogy is not climate-related. For example, partitionled to a diminution of flows into Pakistan, followed by construction ofdams and link canals to transfer water into the affected areas.34 Theseengineering adjustments, built to deal with dwindling water supplies,provide a useful analogy for some climate change scenarios.Four periods were selected for detailed historical investigation:protohistoric (3000-1OOOBC); medieval (100~17OOAD); colonial(1800-1948); and Pakistani (1948-90).Protohistoric. Environmental archaeologists have sought connectionsbetween evidence of climatic fluctuation and river channel change,sea-level change, and flooding. They have sought to associate theseenvironmental linkages with archaeological evidence of changes in theregional settlement system and social organization during the secondmillenium.35 Although inundation canals and floodplain farming inprotohistoric times bear little comparison with the modern watersystem, research on the protohistoric period reminds us that the



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Managing the Indm Riv er basin

36M.A. Stein, Memoir on maps illustratingthe ancient geography of Kashmir (Ra-jatarangini), Journal of the Asiatic Societyof Bengal, Extra No 2, 1899; and James L.Wescoat, Jr, Early water systems inMughal India, Environmental Design:Journal of the lslamic Environmental De-sign Research Centre, Vol 2, 1985, pp50-57.37Abul Fazl, Ain-i Akbari, Vol 2, (Tr H.Bolchmann). Low Price Publications, De-lhi, 1989 (f&t translated 1927-49).38Ali op tit, Ref 19; Gilmartin, op tit, Ref19. 39Anita M. Weiss, Culture, C/ass, and De-velopment in Pakistan: the Emergence ofan Industrial Bourgeoisie in Punjab, West-view Press, Boulder, Co, 1991.

dramatic demographic and settlement changes are not taken intoaccount in the Indus basin model.Medieval. The medieval period provides the earliest antecedents ofmodern water development. Perennial canal systems were developed inKashmir during the 8th century and in Punjab and Sind during the13th-16th centuries.6 Modern land revenue and administrative recordssurvive from the 16th century.j7 These brief periods of large-scale waterdevelopment were punctuated by military conquests, courtly intrigues,and frequent political restructuring. Well-irrigation was the most com-mon technology during periods of instability and decentralization. Thus,the medieval period indicates that large-scale integrated water develop-ment occurs during brief periods of internal and external politicalstability or imperial expansion. At all other times, the system decentral-izes. Established water systems are at best maintained, and at worstdegraded or abandoned.Colonial. The modern irrigation system was laid out between 1880 and193O.s Most of the problems faced by Pakistani water managers today,including salinity, drainage, water pricing, maintenance, provincialconflict, and bureaucratic organization, began during the colonialperiod and have been studied for over 100 years. For example, Pakistaniirrigation officers are sometimes criticized for not going into the field toknow what is happening in their jurisdictions. Part of the problem is thatthey are transferred often. Policies of administrative rotation date backto British and even Mughal times, where it is clearly indicated that theaim of rotation is to maintain loyalty to the state rather than to thelocale. The sobering lesson from the colonial period is that a problemmay be well understood, and potential solutions may be well known, butit may take decades or centuries before the problem can be resolved.Early modern. Partition of India and Pakistan led to serious uncertain-ties about water supplies for Pakistan. The mobilization of domestic andinternational water development discussed earlier provides an analogyfor potential adjustments to climate change. But the lesson from thatanalogy is complex. Notwithstanding its benefits, national water de-velopment may have contributed to the decline of provincial and localirrigation organizations. If concerns that global change were further toconcentrate water management authority at the national scale, provin-cial and local organizations might be further weakened, and problems atthose scales exacerbated. The successes of the 1960s Indus basindevelopment programme were not always sustained in subsequentprojects. If one could explain why, it would clarify both the currentsituation and the prospects for adjustment.Muslim Political ReconstructionThe Indus case study began during the transition from martial law andIslamization under General Zia ul-Haq to the more secular democracyof Benazir Bhutto. Pakistan had been closely aligned with the USA andwas the third largest recipient of US foreign aid. As the Soviet-Afghanconflict subsided, US-Pakistan relations entered a turbulent phase.Prime Minister Bhutto was removed from office by President GhulamIshaq Khan, shortly after the onset of the Persian Gulf conflict inAugust 1990. A new goveinment under Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabiindustrialist, marked a shift in the cultural and economic politics of thecountry. The Pakistani military has remained an everpresent factor in



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40Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter,eds. Pa/r&fan under the ~ilita~: Elevenyears 0fZia ul-Haq, Westview P&s, Soul-der, CO, 1991.4K. Arif, America-Pakistan Relations. 2vols, Vanguard, Lahore, 1984; Bashir A.Tahir and Shabbir A. Khalid. fakistan-United States Relations: A bhronology,7947-1985, Quaid-i-Azam University, Isla-mabad, 1986.42Eqbal Ahmed, Islam and politics, inAshgar Khan, ed, Islam, Politics, and theState: the Pakistani Experience, pp 13-30,Zed Press, London, 1985.

Managing the lndus River basinnational governance .40 At the same time, escalating law and orderproblems, especially in Sind, are disrupting all aspects of public lifeincluding water management. US aid was suspended in October 1990over compliance with a nuclear non-proliferation law. When the Gulfwar began in January 1991, US personnel in Pakistan were greatlyreduced in number. Anti-American demonstrations occurred in Rawal-pindi, Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore.Turbulence has more often been the rule than the exception in thepast four decades of Pakistans independence and in its relations withthe USA.4 During some periods, relations between Pakistan and theUSA have been close, especially in the water resource field. Hundredsof Americans have worked on water issues in Pakistan; and hundreds ofPakistanis have studied in water resources programmes in the USA.Other periods have been characterized by bitter political, economic,and cultural tensions that have adversely affected international waterprogrammes.

Pakistan is especially sensitive to American misrepresentations ofIslam and interference in the domestic politics of Muslim societies.42 Inprinciple, Islam calls for complete integration of political and religiouslife and for brotherhood among fellow Muslims regardless of ethnicity,nationality, or class. This ideal has been difficult to achieve. Pakistan isover 93% Muslim, but religious, political, and ethnic tensions havehaunted every political leader since independence. When a water mainbreaks in an ethnic political centre of Karachi, for example, waterdepartment personnel from other ethnic groups will not go to fix it, bothfrom fear and politics.

Yet every day at l.OOpm, the call to prayer sounds in the headquartersof WAPDA, and hundreds of employees from all ethnic backgroundsleave their offices to pray in the hallways or in nearby mosques.Meetings begin with the words bismillah al-rahman al-rahim (In thename of God, the merciful and compassionate). On one occasion whenmy colleagues left the office for prayers, a clerk asked:Why do you negiect the most obvious aspect of climate change? It happens bythe will of God and is a sign for men of understanding; it indicates that we arenot living as we should. If we do not change our ways, the problems will becomeworse. If we live in accordance with our faith, we will be sustained. This is themost important thing.Statements of this sort are not taken to be taken lightly. They sparkintense theological debates in Pakistan about the relation betweendivine will, spiritual intercession, and human agency - and they carryover into debates about political parties and public policy. Religion andpolitics are intertwined.Not surprisingly, water officials have developed a dual strategy ofexpanding their relatively powerful bureaucratic position while insulat-ing themselves from the precarious realms of cultural politics. Thesemi-autonomous character of some water agencies, such as WAPDAand urban development authorities, provides some insulation. How-ever, as the largest employers and construction agencies in theirjurisdictions, water agencies are subject to intense political pressure inall matters of hiring, budgets, appointments, project selection, andcontracts. Economic decisions are shaped by political considerationsand political decisions are designed to have a complex mix of economicrepercussions.



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Managing the Indus R iver basinResearchers have rarely examined the political economy or culture of

water management, despite their importance at all levels. Perhaps it ispolitic for some matters to be left unsaid or beyond debate. However,the problems described earlier suggest that a Pakistani cultural perspec-tive may be the best way to explain certain water problems and to assessfuture adjustments to climate change. This idea was informally discus-sed by the project team, which identified several promising lines ofinquiry.

First, Islam has a rich heritage of values with respect to water.43 Rainis a sign of divine benificence. 44 Paradise gardens, underneath whichrivers flow, await the faithful on the day of judgement.45 The ProphetMuhammad emphasized the cleansing role of water and the importanceof providing water for the basic human needs of all, without charge.46

Some Muslim writers have stressed the need to increase publicconsciousness of religious traditions and to view orthodox, mystical, andpragmatic beliefs as potential sources of water reform. Others argue fora revival of scientific rationality by Muslim societies and an end to thequest for Islamic science.47 Is there any basis for dialogue?

Muslim fraternity represents one basis for collective social adjust-ment. In a situation where class, ethnic, and political conflict constantlydisrupt water management, it is crucial to understand the possibilitiesand pitfalls of pan-Islamic ideologies, and to strengthen commoncommitments and responsibilities with respect to water. The challenge isto build communities which guard against communalism and rectifyclass conflict.

Water researchers have made little use of the massive literature onPakistani politics, bureaucracy, religion, and economic policy.48 Re-

43Environmental Design: Journal of the search on the social organization of community irrigation systemsIslamic Environmental Desion Research renresents an imoortant exceotion.4 Higher echelons of Pakistani waterCentre, special issue on -Water and I Iarchitecture, Vol 2, 1985; M.A. Haleem, management deserve additional study. Collaboration between federalWater in the Qwan, The lslamic Quarter- and provincial planners and the implications of the new provincial waterIy, Vol 33, 1989, pp 34-50.44The Qwan 30:48. allocation law will affect all aspects of water management in Pakistan.45The Qwan 55:1-78. Political-economic and cultural conflicts are the most serious prob-A.J. Wensinck, A Handbook of Ear/y lems facing the Indus basin. They are also the largest uncertaintiesMuhammadan Tradition, E.J. Brill, Leiden, related to climate change. It would be naive to envisage government-1960.47Pervez A. Hoodbhoy, Muslims and Sci- sponsored research on the cultural conflicts and politics of waterence: Religious Orthodoxy and the Strug- management. On the other hand, the Indus basin case study demons-g/e for Rationality, Vanguard Press, La- trates that when international research teams develop a sense ofhore, 1991. -4BL Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakis-tan; University of California, Berkeley, CA,1961; FL Braibanti, Research on theBureaucracy in Pakistan, Duke Universitv

community and trust, they can address such issues with the sensitivityand directness required.

Press, Duiham, NC, 1966; Charles i.Kennedv. Bureaucracv in Pakistan. Oxford Summary questionsUnivers& Press, Karachi, 1987.4QR.Kurin, Indigenous agronomics and The four approaches discussed here remain at an early stage ofaaricultural develooment in the lndus conceDtua1 development. Many studies have used the climate scenarioB&in, Human Org&ization, Vol42, 1983,pp 283-294; Douglas Merrey, irrigation approach. Some have examined critical water problems, or drawnand Honor: Cultural impediments to the analogies from past experience. Very few have explored indigenousImprovement of Local Level Water Man- political and cultural perspectives on climate change. None, to myagement in Punjab, Pakistan, Water Man-agement Technical Report No 53, Colora- knowledge, has asked which approach has the highest priority, or howdo State University, Fort Collins, CO, different approaches might be coordinated? If we ask who has the most1979. at stake in the event of climate change and which approach deals mostFL LaPorte and M.B. Ahmed, fuolic En-terprises in Pakistan: The Hidden Crisis in directly with those stakes, then the chtical water problems and culturalEconomic Development, Westview Press, approaches emerge as the most important. Climate scenario assessmentBoulder, CO, 1989. can identify the stakes and raise the consciousness of water managers,



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5G.F. White, Preface, Integrated RiverBasin Development, rev ed, pp ix-xiii , Un-ited Nations Department of Economic andSocial Affairs, New York, NY, 1970.52Allama lqbal is given credit for the ideaof Pakistan in the early 20th century, anddevoted his philosophical writings to therelations between Islam, nature, and thephilosophy of science (Allama MuhammadIqbal, The Reconstruction of ReligiousThought in Islam, ed M. Saeed Sheikh, 2ed, Lahore, Institute of Islamic Culture andlqbal Academy of Pakistan, 1989. Formore recent cultural perspectives, seeFazlur Rahman, /s/am and Modernity, Uni-versity of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 1982;Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan Society: /s/am,Ethnicity, and Leadership in Soith Asia,Oxford Universitv Press, Karachi, 1986.53For a more general discussion of thispoint, see James L. Wescoat, Jr, Re-source management: the long term globaltrend, Progress in Human Geography, Vol15, No 1, 1991, pp 81-93.

Managing the lndus Riv er basinbut it is doubtful that scenario assessment would ever be the principleguide for action.

The more important question is: how can the four approaches becoordinated? For exploratory studies like the Indus case study, the goalis first to identify the relevant approaches, along with the knowledgeand resources needed to address them. This case study showed that fourdistinct approaches could be pursued concurrently, interactively, and tothe mutual benefit of the participants. It also identified points of tensionand potential conflict among the different approaches.

The challenge for future research is thus to incorporate and coordin-ate different and often conflicting approaches. It is easy to visualize howthree of the four approaches discussed here can complement oneanother. After all, river basin planning has always sought to integratediverse aims and interests. Integration of climate impact modellingand empirical research is moving ahead. However, the fourth approach,Muslim political reconstruction, presents a more complex picture of theconflicts and contradictions in modern water management. Fortunately,there are historic leaders, like Allama Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah,and historic experiments which address the alternative meanings ofIslamic reconstruction, tradition, and relations with the West.52 Thoseexperiments must not be ignored by water researchers, for they embodyand help explain some of the longstanding water problems in the region.They also offer creative analogies for human adjustment to climatechange.

This pluralistic situation in the Indus has broader implications forresearch on global change. First, we are not at a point where it isappropriate to focus on a single approach to impact assessment, evenone which incorporates those discussed above.5 At this stage, it isimportant to expand the domain of investigation and communication: toinclude a wider range of social groups and disciplines in a sustaineddialogue. Second, the Indus case study revealed that differentapproaches are taken up sequentially, beginning with scenario assess-ment and proceeding toward more academic and cultural approachesunder the right set of certain circumstances. A systematic understandingof those circumstances is essential for understanding the prospects andlimits of scientific inquiry in the region. This suggests that researchdesign should aim at an expansive process rather than a comprehen-sive plan.

At the same time, the aims of international research on climatechange problems must be realistically and concretely assessed. Climateimpacts research, if it is to make a difference, will have to deliverpractical insights in a political context. It will have to be increasinglyconcrete about the linkage between climate change and other water-resource problems. It will have to achieve this with limited data,models, and political influence. If it succeeds in these respects - inexpanding the domain of practical inquiry - it will make an importantcontribution in a changing climate and uncertain times.


2 wescoat managing the ind us full

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