2002s-24 environmental performance of canadian pulp and … · 2003-01-14 · 1. see dasgupta et...

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2002s-24

Environmental Performance ofCanadian Pulp and PaperPlants: Why Some Do Well

and Others Do Not ?Julie Doonan, Paul Lanoie, Benoit Laplante

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Environmental Performance of Canadian Pulp and PaperPlants: Why Some Do Well and Others Do Not *?

Julie Doonan†, Paul Lanoie‡, Benoit Laplante§

Résumé / Abstract

Il est généralement reconnu que les firmes font face à des pressions internes et externes pourqu'elles améliorent leur performance environnementale. Cependant, peu d'études ont tenté d'identifierl'importance de ces différentes sources de pression tel que les gestionnaires les perçoivent. Dans cetteétude, nous montrons que les directeurs «environnement» de l’industrie canadienne des pâtes et papiersperçoivent le gouvernement et le public comme les sources de pression les plus importantes, devant lesmarchés financiers et les consommateurs. Nous montrons également que l’implication de la hautedirection à l’égard de l’environnement et la formation des employés par rapport à la problématiqueenvironnementale sont des déterminants importants de la performance environnementale. Cette recherchenous aide donc à mieux comprendre les déterminants de la performance environnementale et elle permetde réaffirmer le rôle crucial joué par une intervention gouvernementale vigoureuse dans le domaine.

It is generally recognized that firms face both internal and external pressure to improve theirenvironmental performance. However, few studies have attempted to delineate the importance of thosevarious sources of pressure as firms’ managers themselves perceive them. In this study, we show thatmanagers in the Canadian pulp and paper industry perceive government and public, but not financial andconsumer markets, as the most important source of pressure. We also show that involvement of the firm’shigher level management and environmental education of employees are important determinants of thefirm’s performance. While the paper provides a better understanding of the determinants of environmentalperformance, it re-asserts the crucial role of strong government regulatory intervention.

Mots-clés : Performance environnementale, Politique environnementale, Audit environnemental.

Keywords : Environmental performance, Environmental policy, Environmental audit.

* Please send correspondence to Paul Lanoie. Fax: 514-340-6469† École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Institut d’Économie Appliquée, Montréal, Canada, H3T 2A7.‡ École des Hautes Études Commerciales, Institut d’Économie Appliquée, Montréal, Canada, H3T 2A7.§ Independent scholar and consultant.

Environmental Performance of Canadian Pulp and Paper Plants :Why Some Do Well and Others Do Not ?

3

I. Introduction

A limited number of empirical studies have seeked to understand the determinants of firms’

environmental performance. In the economics literature, an essential issue of interest has been the

impact of the various monitoring and enforcement actions on the environmental performance of

polluters.1 Others have examined the role that communities may play to create incentives for local

industrial facilities to reduce their pollution.2 Finally, a number of authors have examined whether

or not the public disclosure of environmental performance may create incentives for pollution

control.3

While these various empirical analyses offer key understanding of firms’ environmental

behavior, none of these analyses rely on information provided by firms’ managers themselves.

An exception of interest is Henriques and Sadorsky (1995, 1996; henceforth H&S) who

conducted a survey of 750 Canadian corporations in 1992. These corporations covered a wide

range of sectors, from primary to service sectors. In their model, H&S seek to determine the

characteristics of firms that are likely to formulate an environmental plan. These authors find that

pressure from customers and shareholders represent the two most important determinants of the

formulation of an environmental plan. H&S also found that the commitment of senior

management to deal with environmental issues is an important determinant of the likelihood of

the existence of an environmental plan. However, interestingly, government regulation does not

appear as a statistically significant source of pressure. H&S explain this result by observing that

1. See Dasgupta et al. (2001), Gray and Deily (1996), Helland (1998), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Magat andViscusi (1990), and Nadeau (1997).2. See Blackman and Bannister (1998), and Pargal and Wheeler (1996).3 Comprehensive surveys of the role of communities and information markets are presented in Cohen (1998) andWorld Bank (2000).


4

a large number of firms have indicated by surveys that government regulation is an important

source of pressure. The lack of variability in the measure of government regulation thus reduces

the explanatory power of this variable.

In this paper, we extend and enrich the work of H&S in two directions. First, from a policy

perspective, we posit the variable of interest to be the environmental performance of the firms.

Hence, we seek to understand the determinants of that environmental performance, and prefer to

view the presence of an environmental plan simply as an input into the production of that

performance (output). Secondly, our conceptual model differs sensibly from H&S whose

statistical analysis relies on the estimation of a logit model. As described in the next section, we

prefer to model the firm’s environmental performance as a sequence of events whereby various

sources of pressure may induce various types of activities and actions by the enterprise, activities

and actions which then in turn have an impact on the environmental performance of the firm.

We test our model in the Canadian pulp and paper industry. Our interest to explain firms’

actual environmental performance necessitates that we focus our analysis on a single industrial

sector for which there is sufficient plant-level environmental performance data to test the model

(e.g. emissions data). The pulp and paper industry possesses this important characteristic. Unlike

H&S, our results reveal government regulation and public (local communities) to be important

sources of pressure inducing firms to undertake actions to improve their environmental

performance. This result re-asserts the important role of strong regulatory intervention. Capital

markets and consumer markets do not appear as a statistically significant source of pressure.


5

While earlier studies have revealed capital markets reacting to environmental information,4 this

result may indicate that firms’ environmental performance is not necessarily responsive to the

reaction of capital markets. However, along with H&S, we find the commitment of the higher

level of management to be a significant determinant of environmental performance.

We discuss the conceptual model in further details in the next section. The estimation

methodology and data are presented in Section 3, while results are presented in Section 4. We

briefly conclude in Section 5.

II. Conceptual Model

The model we develop relies on the premises that the environmental performance of an

industrial facility results from actions undertaken to improve and maintain this performance.

Whether or not such actions are undertaken depends in turn on pressure perceived or exercised

by various stakeholders.

As illustrated in Figure 1, we group the various sources of pressure into 4 categories: legal,

economic, social, and internal. The legal source of pressure pertains essentially to the nature of

the environmental regulation faced by the enterprises. It would include not only the stringency of

the regulation (e.g. effluent standards), but also the extent of implementation of the regulation.

We distinguish four sources of economic pressure: providers of financial capital as represented

by investors and creditors; customers; suppliers; and competitors. The social pressure is

4. See Dasgupta et al. (2000), Hamilton (1995), Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), Konar and Cohen (1996, 2001),Lanoie et al. (1994, 1998), and Muoghalu et al. (1990).


6

represented by community and non-governmental organizations. Finally, management and

employees capture internal sources of pressure.5

Figure 1Conceptual Model

5. For example, in their study of the impact of inspections on pollution emissions of pulp and paper plants inQuebec (Canada), Laplante and Rilstone (1996) found that unionised employees are very prone to inform theenvironmental regulator about a plant’s wrongdoing with respect to the management of its waste.

Attitude andactions

Sources ofpressure

Environmentalperformance

Legal

Regulation

Economic

Investors and creditorsCustomersSuppliers

Competitors

Social context

CommunityNGOs

Social

CommunityNGOs

Internal

ManagementEmployees

Involvement

Integration

Humanresources

Financial resources

Monitoring system

BOD and TSS effluentemissions

Spills

Use of chlorine

Fines and penalties

Air emissions

Use of alternativesources of energy


7

If and when effective, these various sources may exert pressure on firms to undertake actions

aimed at improving the environmental performance. We group these actions into 5 broad

categories. Involvement refers to the level of involvement of the higher level of management in

the environmental affairs of the company. Integration represents the level of integration between

the environmental services and the other administrative units of the industrial facility. Human

resources captures how human resources management takes into account environmental issues.

Financial resources refers to the physical and financial resources devoted to the improving and

maintaining the environmental performance of the facility. Finally, monitoring system represents

the facility’s environmental performance monitoring activities and system.

The environmental performance of the industrial facility is measured by a number of

variables all aimed at providing information on the overall nature of that performance. These

include not only pollution information such as air and water emissions, and spills, but as well

information on key inputs such as the use of alternative sources of energy and, given the

industrial sector of interest in this paper, the use of chlorine in the production process. The

presence of fines and penalties also aim to provide information on the environmental

performance of the facility.

In the next Section, we describe the methodology used to estimate the model presented in

Figure 1, the data collection process and present a descriptive analysis of the data.


8

III.Methodology and Data

The model

The model presented in Figure 1 can be translated into a structural equation model of the

following general form:

η = βη + Γξ + ζ

where:

η is a m X 1 vector of latent endogenous variables;

β is a m X m matrix of coefficients to be estimated;

Γ is a m X n matrix of coefficients to be estimated;

ξ is a n X 1 vector of latent exogenous variables;

ζ is a m X 1 vector of residual errors.

Specifically, the model can be written as :

ζβ +Γ+

=

PRESSURE

EPERFORMANCMONITORING

RESOURCESFINANCIALRESOURCESHUMAN

NINTEGRATIOTINVOLVEMEN

EPERFORMANCMONITORING

RESOURCESFINANCIALRESOURCESHUMAN

NINTEGRATIOTINVOLVEMEN


9

In this linear structural equation model, the endogenous and exogenous variables are latent

variables which are not directly observed, but are proxied by a series of observed indicators.

These indicators are then combined through a principal component analysis (see, Stevens, 2001)

to provide a representation of the latent variables. For instance, the level of integration of

environment services into other administrative units is not directly observed. However, a series

of indicators can be used (e.g. the frequency of contacts between the environment services and

the other units), measured by means of surveys, and combined by means of principal component

analysis to proxy this latent variable.

The structural model is estimated using the popular EQS software which is very flexible

allowing for all variables except the pressure variables to be potentially endogenous.6 The

estimated model is thus tantamount to a simultaneous equation system in which the variance-

covariance matrix is adjusted to account for the fact that the latent variables are not precisely

measured.

The survey

For the purpose of the analysis, almost all the information was collected by means of a

survey conducted among the environment directors of all Canadian pulp and paper plants. The

nature of the compliance status of the plants with respect to water emissions regulation was

collected directly from the Department of environment in the Canadian provinces where the

plants are located.

6. See Hoyle (1995) or Lacroix et al. (1991) for more details.


10

In the course of preparation of the survey, two pulp and paper plants were visited, and

discussions were held with four environment directors. The relevance of the questions presented

in the survey, and the wording of technical features of the survey were thus validated.

Furthermore, a draft form of the questionnaire was pre-tested with 10 directors.7

The survey was conducted by phone during the winter of 1997. A total of 101 out of 150

directors were then reached, for a response rate of 67 %. This appears relatively good given the

extensive nature of the interview which lasted approximately 45 minutes. Fifteen of these

questionnaires were eliminated for too much information being missing. As a result, responses

from 86 questionnaires were used for purpose of estimation.

Descriptive analysis of the data

To capture the variable pressure, respondents were presented with the sources of pressure

described in Figure 1, and were asked which three of those were the most important sources of

pressure affecting the environmental behaviour of the facilities in the course of the last five

years. Respondents were also asked which of these sources had increased most over that period

of time. As shown in Table 1, 70% of the environment directors of the industrial facilities

responded that the government (regulation) was the most important source of pressure, followed

with pressure from top management, and clients. Note that 35% and 26% of the respondents

indicated public pressure and employees to be the second and third most important source of

pressure respectively. Interestingly, the financial market is not identified as an important source

of pressure although a number of recent studies (Lanoie et al., 1998, Konar and Cohen, 2001)

7. The complete survey is presented in Appendix 1.


11

have shown that capital markets tend to “punish” firms with bad environmental performance.

Similarly, Henriques and Sadorsky (1995) identified the clients as a major pressure group, which

is not the case here.

Table 1Sources of pressure

Sources 1st 2nd 3rd Increased the most inthe last 5 years

Government 70 19 6 56

Clients 9 11 13 9

Suppliers 0 0 0 0

Investors/bankers 0 2 3 0

Ecologists 0 4 4 1

Competitors 2 1 5 0

Community, public 8 35 22 16

Employees 0 10 26 1

Top management 11 16 17 16

None 0 2 2 2

The level of involvement of the top management was captured by means of eight different

questions aimed at collecting both objective and subjective information on this aspect. In

particular, 66 % of the respondents indicated the presence of a vice-president environment, and

70 % indicated the presence of an environment committee on the board of directors.

The level of integration of environment across administrative units is captured through a

series of questions pertaining to the following features: existence of an integrated environment

management system (EMS); existence of a joint employer – employee committee on

environmental issues; firm’s intention with regard to the ISO 14000 certification; frequency of


12

contact between the environment director and the managers of other units; consideration of

environmental issues when planning major changes in the plant; and participation of employees

in the elaboration of the environmental policy.

Table 2 indicates that, while 81 % of the directors express an intention to obtain the ISO

14 000 certification, only 23 % of the plants have an integrated EMS. Most plants appear to

experience very frequent and formal contacts between the environment services and the other

units of the plants (e.g. engineering and production), and 50 % of the plants have a joint

committee on environmental issues. 45 % of the respondents indicate that employees actively

participate in the development of the facility’s environmental policy.

Table 2Integration of environmental issues

Yes NoExistence of an EMS 23 % 77 %Intention to obtain ISO 14000 certification 81 % 19 %Existence of a joint committee on environment 50 % 50 %Contact of environmentalservices with

Formal andfrequent

Formal andoccasional Informal Very few

contacts None

engineering 78 % 12 % 7 % 1 % 2 %production 85 % 11 % 4 % 0 % 0 %

Employees activelyparticipate in thedevelopment of theenvironmental policy

14 % agreetotally

31 % agreesomewhat

23 %somewhatdisagree

32 %totally

disagree


13

As for human resources, questions were asked on whether environmental training of different

types of employees, and whether or not employees’ compensation and performance evaluation

reflected the environmental performance of the facility. Table 3 shows that most plants provide

some form of training on environmental issues to all types of workers, while approximately 30 %

and 80% of the plants consider environmental performance in the compensation package and

workers’ performance evaluation respectively.

Table 3Human resources and the environment

Categories of employees who havereceived an environmental training: All employees Some employees None

Production employees 51 % 43 % 6 %Foremen 71 % 28 % 1 %

New employees 52 % 29 % 19 %Professional technicians 77 % 17 % 6 %

Managers 71 % 21 % 8 %Environmental issue isconsidered in:

Agreetotally

Agreesomewhat

Somewhatdisagree

Totallydisagree

Compensation package 15 % 16 % 23 % 46 %Workers’ performance

evaluation 32 % 47 % 13 % 8 %

The measure of financial resources is based on questions related to the date of

implementation of a secondary treatment system and of an emergency basin, the evolution of the

environmental services in terms of budget and number of employees, and the evolution of the

research on environmental issues within the firm. Table 4 shows, that in most cases, budget and

personnel devoted to the environmental services have increased during the five years preceding

the survey (63 % of the plants report such increases in the personnel, and 79 % for the budget). It

also appears that a large percentage of the plants have started to operate a secondary effluent


14

treatment system over the period 1992-97. Furthermore, a very large fraction of the plants (92 %)

are involved in research activities surrounding environmental issues.

Table 4Financial resources

Number of years since the installationof : None

Between1 and

5 years

Between 6and

10 years

More than10 years

Secondary effluent treatment system 19 % 43 % 12 % 26 %Emergency basin 17 % 41 % 18 % 24 %

Evolution of the resources devoted tothe environment Increase Status quo Reduction

Personnel 63 % 26 % 11 %Budget 79 % 15 % 6 %

The environmental performance monitoring system relates to the evolution of the number of

environmental audits, the extent to which the recommendations of the auditors have been

followed, and the existence of chemical risk assessment. Table 5 shows that most plants (85 %)

are involved in an auditing process. However, it would appear that recommendations emerging

from this process are not necessarily followed.

Table 5Monitoring

Yes NoExternal auditing during the last five years 85 % 15 %Chemical risk assessment during the lastfive years 81 % 19 %

Always Often Rarely NeverRecommendations from audits are followed 0 % 42 % 57 % 1 %

As mentioned earlier, the environmental performance is based on five ‘objective indicators’

measure of performance. This contrasts with previous studies which used much more


15

rudimentary environmental performance measures such as the existence of an environmental

plan. First, managers were asked if the plants had been fined for non compliance with

environmental regulation during the five-years period preceding the survey. Second, various

provincial Departments of environment provided information on the plant’s compliance rate with

biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS) standards for the year

1995. Third, it was found whether or not plants had contravened their atmospheric emissions

standards in the course of 1995. Fourth, information was requested on the use of alternative

sources of energy (like biomass or pulping liquor). Finally, information was obtained on the use

of chlorine in the whitening process.

Table 6Environmental performance

Compliance ratea

BOD -0.15TSS -0.075

Yes NoFine during the last five years 27 % 73 %Spills (during the last year) 60 % 40 %Non-compliance with regulation on atmosphericemissions 16 % 84 %

Never Between95 and 97

Between90 and 95

Before1990

When did you stop using chlorine for whiteningpulp? 24 % 22 % 42 % 13 %

a Compliance rate is measured as: (actual average emissions – emissions standards) / emissionsstandards

Table 6 shows that 27 % of the plants had experienced a fine within the five-years period

preceding the survey. On average, the plants were below their BOD limits by 15 %, and below

their TSS limits by 7.5 %. Only 16 % of the plants asserted not complying with atmospheric


16

emissions regulations. A majority of the plants (65 %) report using alternative sources of energy.

Finally, most plants report having ceased to use chlorine in the production of pulp since 1990.

IV. Empirical Results

Main results are presented in Figure 2. The figure represents the relationships between the

latent variables which best fit the data. Given that the model is tantamount to a simultaneous

equation system, the relationship between different latent variables can go in both directions as

indicated in the diagram. The good statistical fit of the model is confirmed by a certain number

of indicators (Hoyle, 1995). First, it is acknowledged that a model is ‘significant’ when the

goodness-of-fit indices are greater than 0.9. Here the Bentler-Bonett index (BBNNFI = 0,949),

the LISREL GFI index (GFI = 0,943), and the CFI index (CFI = 0,972) are indeed greater than

the threshold. Furthermore, when we compare the estimated model with one where we constraint

all the coefficients to be equal to zero, we obtain a χ2 statistic of 0,2592, which is to be compared

with a critical value of 0,1. We can thus reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal

to zero. The resulting model is consistent with our theoretical predictions.

First, it appears clearly that the three most important sources of pressure perceived by

environmental directors are the government, the general public (including the neighbouring

community), and the higher level of management. As mentioned earlier, financial market is not

perceived as an important source of pressure on the firm’s environmental performance.


17

Figure 2Statistical results

GOVERNMENT

PUBLIC

TOPMANAGEMENT

INVOLVEMENT INTEGRATION

HUMANRESOURCES

MONITORING

FINANCIALRESOURCES

ENVIRONMENTALPERFORMANCE

EOS SUMMARY STATISTICS

Method : ML

Chi-Square : 23.62df = 20pvalue = 0.2592

BBNFI = 0.856BBNNFI = 0.949CFI = 0.972


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The involvement of the higher level of management appears to be an important factor in the

chain of causality that follows. It influences the way human resources management integrates

environmental concerns. It also affects the level of integration between the environmental

services and the other administrative units in the rest of the plant, and the intensity of the

monitoring activities. It is often asserted in the management literature that the environmental

involvement of the top management is a primary determinant of the environmental performance

of the firms (e.g., Deschamps and Beaulieu, 1996). To our knowledge, this is the first empirical

evidence that confirms this common wisdom. This study also allows us to identify by which

channels the influence of the top management is exerted.

The way by which environmental issues are taken into account in the human resources

management is an indirect driver of the environmental performance through its impact on the

level of integration. This seems normal given that the participation of all employees in the

environmental management was an important element in the earlier definition of integration.

This result is consistent with previous results of Boiral (1998) and Dasgupta et al. (1997) who

find, in particular, that the level of environmental training is associated with a better

environmental performance.

The level of integration between the environmental services and the other administrative

units has an indirect effect on the environmental performance through its impact on the

monitoring system and on the financial resources devoted to the environment. This is a very

interesting result given that, to our knowledge, the notion of integration has been developed only

recently, and applied to a single case study (Deschamps and Beaulieu, 1996). Using a more


19

systematic sample of data, we thus present evidence and confirm the empirical significance of

this variable.

The environmental performance monitoring system has an indirect impact on the

environmental performance through its effect on the level of financial resources. It suggests that

the recommendations emerging from the monitoring system lead the plants to devote more

financial resources to pollution control. It is also interesting to note that pressure from the public

influences directly the intensity of the monitoring activities.

Financial resources devoted to pollution control remains the most important driver of

environmental performance. This is not necessarily surprising in the context of the pulp and

paper industry where a large part of the environmental performance relies on the utilization of

extensive and expensive pollution abatement devices such as secondary effluent treatment

system.

V. Conclusion

A number of authors have examined the role and impact of inspections, communities, and

markets (consumer and capital) on the environmental performance of industrial facilities. None

of these studies however have seeked to understand how managers themselves perceive these

sources of pressure.

In this paper, building but departing from the analysis presented by Henriques and Sadorsky

(1995, 1996), we provide evidence that in this age of information, the government remains the


20

most important source of pressure on enterprises of the pulp and paper industry to improve their

environmental performance. We however also show that the public is increasingly an important

source of pressure thereby justifying programmes which aim to disclose the environmental

performance of industrial facilities. We confirm the crucial impact of an involved higher level of

management in environmental affairs, and offer evidence that the environmental training of

employees is an important determinant of the environmental performance. Further studies in the

area shall reveal if these results hold more generally in other, perhaps broader set of

circumstances.


21

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Zerbe, P.M. (1997), Evaluation of Predominant Environmental Management Practices in theCanadian Pulp and Paper Industry, Department of Resource Management andEnvironmental Studies, University of British Columbia.

Liste des publications au CIRANO*

Série Scientifique / Scientific Series (ISSN 1198-8177)

2002s-24 Environmental Performance of Canadian Pulp and Paper Plants: Why Some Do Welland Others Do Not ? / Julie Doonan, Paul Lanoie et Benoit Laplante

2002s-23 A Rule-driven Approach for Defining the Behavior of Negotiating Software Agents/ Morad Benyoucef, Hakim Alj, Kim Levy et Rudolf K. Keller

2002s-22 Occupational Gender Segregation and Women’s Wages in Canada: An HistoricalPerspective / Nicole M. Fortin et Michael Huberman

2002s-21 Information Content of Volatility Forecasts at Medium-term Horizons / John W.Galbraith et Turgut Kisinbay

2002s-20 Earnings Dispersion, Risk Aversion and Education / Christian Belzil et Jörgen Hansen2002s-19 Unobserved Ability and the Return to Schooling / Christian Belzil et Jörgen Hansen2002s-18 Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis / Marie-

Cécile Fagart et Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné2002s-17 The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation? /

Marcel Boyer, Donatella Porrini2002s-16 Asymmetric Information and Product Differentiation / Marcel Boyer, Philippe

Mahenc et Michel Moreaux2002s-15 Entry Preventing Locations Under Incomplete Information / Marcel Boyer, Philippe

Mahenc et Michel Moreaux2002s-14 On the Relationship Between Financial Status and Investment in Technological

Flexibility / Marcel Boyer, Armel Jacques et Michel Moreaux2002s-13 Modeling the Choice Between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare

/ Marcel Boyer et Donatella Porrini2002s-12 Observation, Flexibilité et Structures Technologiques des Industries / Marcel Boyer,

Armel Jacques et Michel Moreaux2002s-11 Idiosyncratic Consumption Risk and the Cross-Section of Asset Returns / Kris Jacobs

et Kevin Q. Wang2002s-10 The Demand for the Arts / Louis Lévy-Garboua et Claude Montmarquette2002s-09 Relative Wealth, Status Seeking, and Catching Up / Ngo Van Long, Koji Shimomura2002s-08 The Rate of Risk Aversion May Be Lower Than You Think / Kris Jacobs2002s-07 A Structural Analysis of the Correlated Random Coefficient Wage Regression Model

/ Christian Belzil et Jörgen Hansen2002s-06 Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize / Åke Blomqvist

et Pierre Thomas Léger2002s-05 Coping with Stressful Decisions: Individual Differences, Appraisals and Choice /

Ann-Renée Blais

* Consultez la liste complète des publications du CIRANO et les publications elles-mêmes sur notre site Internet :

http://www.cirano.qc.ca/publication/documents.html

2002s-04 A New Proof Of The Maximum Principle / Ngo Van Long et Koji Shimomura2002s-03 Macro Surprises And Short-Term Behaviour In Bond Futures / Eugene Durenard et

David Veredas2002s-02 Financial Asset Returns, Market Timing, and Volatility Dynamics / Peter F.

Christoffersen et Francis X. Diebold2002s-01 An Empirical Analysis of Water Supply Contracts / Serge Garcia et Alban

Thomas2001s-71 A Theoretical Comparison Between Integrated and Realized Volatilities Modeling

/ Nour Meddahi2001s-70 An Eigenfunction Approach for Volatility Modeling / Nour Meddahi2001s-69 Dynamic Prevention in Short Term Insurance Contracts / M. Martin Boyer et

Karine Gobert2001s-68 Serial Cost Sharing in Multidimensional Contexts / Cyril Téjédo et Michel

Truchon2001s-67 Learning from Strike / Fabienne Tournadre et Marie-Claire Villeval2001s-66 Incentives in Common Agency / Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné2001s-65 Detecting Mutiple Breaks in Financial Market Volatility Dynamics / Elena

Andreou et Eric Ghysels2001s-64 Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments / Marcel Boyer,

Pierre Lasserre, Thomas Mariotti et Michel Moreaux2001s-63 Dropout, School Performance and Working while in School: An Econometric Model

with Heterogeneous Groups / Marcel Dagenais, Claude Montmarquette et NathalieViennot-Briot

2001s-62 Derivatives Do Affect Mutual Funds Returns : How and When? / Charles Cao,Eric Ghysels et Frank Hatheway

2001s-61 Conditional Quantiles of Volatility in Equity Index and Foreign Exchange Data /John W. Galbraith, Serguei Zernov and Victoria Zinde-Walsh

2001s-60 The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat.System" / Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin et Erwann Michel-Kerjan

2001s-59 Compensation and Auditing with Correlated Information / M. Martin Boyer etPatrick González

2001s-58 Resistance is Futile: An Essay in Crime and Commitment / M. Martin Boyer2001s-57 The Unreliability of Output Gap Estimates in Real Time / Athanasios Orphanides

et Simon van Norden2001s-56 Exact Nonparametric Two-Sample Homogeneity Tests for Possibly Discrete

Distributions / Jean-Marie Dufour et Abdeljelil Farhat2001s-55 Les coûts de la réglementation : une revue de la littérature / Robert Gagné, Paul

Lanoie, Pierre-Carl Micheud et Michel Patry2001s-54 Testing for structural Change in the Presence of Auxiliary Models / Eric Ghysels

et Alain Guay2001s-53 Environmental Regulation and Productivity: New Findings on the Porter

Hypothesis / Paul Lanoie, Michel Patry et Richard Lajeunesse2001s-52 The Aftermarket Performance of Initial Public Offerings in Canada / Maher Kooli

et Jean-Marc Suret

2001s-51 Capital Structure and Risk Management / Karine Gobert2001s-50 The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings: Futher Canadian Evidence / Maher

Kooli et Jean-Marc Suret2001s-49 How Innovative Are Canadian Firms Compared to Some European Firms? A

Comparative Look at Innovation Surveys / Pierre Mohnen et Pierre Therrien2001s-48 A Tale of Two Ports / Ngo Van Long et Kar-yiu Wong2001s-47 Wage Policy of Firms: An Empirical Investigation / Stéphanie Lluis2001s-46 Forecasting Some Low-Predictability Time Series Using Diffusion Indices / Marc

Brisson, Bryan Campbell et John W. Galbraith2001s-45 The Importance of the Loss Function in Option Pricing / Peter Christoffersen et

Kris Jacobs2001s-44 Let's Get "Real" about Using Economic Data / Peter Christoffersen, Eric Ghysels

et Norman R. Swanson2001s-43 Fragmentation, Outsourcing and the Service Sector / Ngo Van Long, Ray

Riezman et Antoine Soubeyran2001s-42 Nonlinear Features of Realized FX Volatility / John M. Maheu et Thomas H.

McCurdy2001s-41 Job Satisfaction and Quits: Theory and Evidence from the German

Socioeconomic Panel / Louis Lévy-Garboua, Claude Montmarquette et VéroniqueSimonnet

2001s-40 Logique et tests d'hypothèse : réflexions sur les problèmes mal posés enéconométrie / Jean-Marie Dufour

2001s-39 Managing IT Outsourcing Risk: Lessons Learned / Benoit A. Aubert, SuzanneRivard et Michel Patry

2001s-38 Organizational Design of R&D Activities / Stefan Ambec et Michel Poitevin

2002s-24 environmental performance of canadian pulp and … · 2003-01-14 · 1. see dasgupta et...

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