(2008) presuppositionless scepticism-libre cskjclskmf
TRANSCRIPT
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* This is the first paper I have ever published! A much improved version of it can be found in Ioannis
Trisokkas, Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel╆s Theory of Judgement: A Treatise on the Possibility of
Scientific Inquiry (Boston: Brill, 2012), 11-42. As far as I know, this is the first time such a radical
interpretation of Pyrrhonian scepticism is put forth.
[100] PRESUPPOSITIONLESS SCEPTICISM
Ioannis Trisokkas
1. INTRODUCTION. The Pyrrhonian sceptics (c. 330 BC – c. 200 AD)1 developed an
exciting philosophical thought – well documented and maybe2 further developed
[101] by Sextus Empiricus3 – which aimed at the manifestation of the impossibility
of human knowledge of the true nature of any object or aspect of reality
whatsoever. 4 In stark contrast to the – then prevailing – heavily dogmatic
1 I have placed the chronological starting-point of Pyrrhonism at c. 330 BC because at that time Pyrrho of Ellis (c. 360 – c. 270), the founder of this school of scepticism, must have been around thirty years old, and the ending-point at c. 200 AD because it must have been around that time when Sextus Empiricus flourished; see House (1980) and Kudlien (1963) for more details. The best overall account of Pyrrhonism is given by Hankinson (1995); other important studies include Annas and Barnes (1985), Burnyeat and Frede (1997), Barnes (1990), Dal Pra (1975) and Stough (1969). Hankinson (1998) is a brief but very lucid and informative account of Pyrrhonism. For the immense influence exerted by Pyrrhonism on modern European thought see Schmitt (1983) and the majestic study by Popkin (1979). 2 There is controversy among scholars as to whether Sextus‟ work contains original thought or it is just a compilation and careful ordering of the teachings of older sceptics. See the discussion and references in Barnes (1988). 3 We possess two complete works by Sextus (PH and M I-VI), as well as the bulk of a third, which is now divided into three books (M VII-VIII, M IX-X, and M XI). For general accounts of Sextus Empiricus‟ life and work see Hankinson (1995: 6-7); House (1980); Heintz (1932); Janáček (1948); Janáček (1972); Vollgraff (1902). 4 The ultimate goal (kελてな) of a Pyrrhonist was to achieve tranquillity (or imperturbability, αkαとαつすα): PH I 12; I 25; cf. Sedley (1983: 19, 21, 23 n. 16). The means to achieve it is by suspension of judgment (επてχさ), which in my interpretation signifies or entails or suggests the absence of scientific beliefs (PH I 12-15). The means to achieve this is by opposing to every truth-claim a truth-claim of an equal status (equipollence, すjてjしεちεすα) (PH I 12). For the purposes of the present paper, which considers only the epistemological character and significance of Pyrrhonism, its ultimate goal (tranquillity) does not become an object of reflection. For a very good paper that discusses tranquillity as the ultimate goal of Pyrrhonism and its relation to επてχή see Sedley (1983). There are some passages in PH which suggest that the Pyrrhonist does not after all oppose scientific inquiries because she cannot explicitly say that knowledge is impossible, i.e. that reality is unknowable (see, for example, PH 1-4). In the course of the present essay I will show why this claim is a complete fallacy. If one examines the way Pyrrhonism makes use of the equipollence of truth-claims, one should have absolutely no doubt that the aim of scepticism is essentially the demolition of science (to wit, of the search for knowledge). On this matter see especially the last sentence in PH I 30. For the universality of this demolition see PH I 31: “[…] Tranquillity follows suspension of judgment about
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Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean philosophies,5 but also to modern scepticism,6 the Pyrrhonists╆ central concern was to provide such manifestation without the
employment of any dogmatic principles.7 The term ╅dogmatic principle╆ denotes a judgment ゅor ╅proposition╆ょ, syllogism ゅor ╅argument╆ょ or whole theory, which gives the impression that it purports to say, directly or indirectly, and certainly
voluntarily and [102] with ╅strong impulse or inclination╆, something true of the nature of reality.8 Thus, Pyrrhonian scepticism is making the strong claim that it
destroys any pretensions to knowledge in a totally presuppositionless manner.9 This
essay aims to substantiate the Pyrrhonian route to the manifestation of the
impossibility of knowledge by taking its claim for presuppositionlessness very seriously. The main textual material for the ╅substantiation╆ is provided by Sextus Empiricus╆ Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
[103] The analysis that follows aspires to do justice to the genuine spirit of
Pyrrhonism rather than to its letter; and to do that not in a philological or
historicophilosophical, but in a strictly philosophical, argumentative manner.
Accordingly I set out to provide a non-ambiguous, systematic account of Pyrrhonian
scepticism that would seem attractive to all those philosophers who strongly believe
everything […];” PH I 232: “[Arcesilaus] suspends judgment about everything;” Forster (2007: 5): “Is it likely that the Pyrrhonists, who so prided themselves on being at least as radical as the Academic sceptics, would have fallen short of Arcesilaus in his aspiration to do away with all belief? Surely not.” See also Sedley (1983: 11): “[…] When Arcesilaus advocated suspension of assent about everything, he meant suspension of all belief – refusal to regard any impression whatever, or its contradictory, as true.” Frede (1979) is against this interpretation; he believes that the Pyrrhonist attacks only a certain category of truth-claims, the ones asserted by those who Frede calls „scientists‟ and „philosophers‟; the Pyrrhonist does not, in his opinion, attack the truth-claims made by ordinary people. (Note that in the present essay when we are referring to the „scientists‟ we mean each and every human being who claims to have knowledge of the true nature of objects and aspects of the real). A critique of Frede‟s position can be found in Burnyeat (1980a). Barnes (1983: 159-160) claims that Sextus‟ text does not allow resolution of the Frede-Burnyeat dispute since it supports both. Barnes (1982) argues for a modest theory of Pyrrhonism, one that combines elements from both the Fredean and Burnyeatian theories. For a critique of Barnes‟ „modest theory‟ see Forster (1989: 203). Since the aim of the Pyrrhonists is the complete destruction of scientific inquiry, Pyrrhonian scepticism is fundamentally different from the Cartesian scepticism of the Meditations and the Socratic scepticism of the Meno, both of which are of a propaedeutic nature, clearing the ground for the acquisition of knowledge. See Descartes, Meditations; Plato, Meno 79e-80a, 84a-c. 5 Sextus calls Aristotle and the other dogmatic philosophers “deluded and self-satisfied dogmatists” (PH I 62). 6 See Forster (1989: 11ff.). 7 This is, according to some, the major difference between Pyrrhonian and Academic sceptics; see PH I 1-4; I 220-235. Cf. Frede (1987a: 212ff.); Striker (1981); Forster (1989: 198-200). 8 Cf. PH I 230. 9 Cf. Forster (1989: 11).
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that knowledge of the true nature of any aspect of reality is an impossibility. For, in
my view, it is this aim of Pyrrhonism that determines its genuine spirit and,
therefore, a genuinely Pyrrhonian argument would only be one which
unambiguously fulfils that aim. The single most important challenge one faces in
what follows is to reconstruct this genuinely Pyrrhonian argument without charging
the Pyrrhonists with the use of even a single dogmatic principle. What will emerge
from the forthcoming analysis is a novel and quite radical interpretation of
Pyrrhonian scepticism.
2. THE UNIVERSE OF DISCOURSE. The problematic of the present inquiry – namely what
constitutes the object of our interest – concerns the possibility of human knowledge
of the true nature of reality. The generic name used for the sphere of human activity
that is meant to produce, incorporate and expand such knowledge is science
(εぱιぴτとづと, Wissenschaft).10 The production, incorporation and [104] expansion of
knowledge requires investigation or inquiry into the truth of things. Call this activity
scientific inquiry. The latter is manifested as something said or done. Anything that is
said or done must appear and anything that appears must appear somewhere. We call the abstract space ゅthe ╅somewhere╆ょ into which everything said appears the
universe of discourse and the abstract space into which everything done appears the
universe of praxis. Our problematic will focus on the universe of discourse (and not on
the universe of praxis).
The universe of discourse has been, therefore, disclosed as what must be
minimally thought in a problematic that concerns itself with the possibility of
science-as-something-said.11 In this universe, now, there appear claims made during
the activity of scientific inquiry. A number of those claims relate directly to the
10 Note, importantly, that the term „science‟ does not limit itself to positivistic conceptions of science, which allow only activities like physics and chemistry to hold that title. The term science is used quite loosely and means each and every human activity that purports to say something true about the real. Thus, each and every human being (and not just the physicists or the chemists) is potentially a scientist. In other words, if a farmer is making a claim to the true nature of reality, she obtains at that moment the status of a scientist. 11 All science begins with something said. The universe of discourse represents that space without which what is said could not appear. It is therefore a notion which requires no further grounding or justification (for without it no grounding or justification could appear).
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nature of things (or of reality) and some of these particular claims are (positive or
negative) claims about the true nature of things (or of reality). Given their specific
character, let us call them truth-claims. Narrowing the domain even further, we now
postulate that the present problematic deals only with truth-claims and the universe
of discourse will be thematized solely as a space in which truth-claims appear.
Whenever a truth-claim appears in the universe of discourse, it acquires existence.
The latter is entailed from the fact that the truth-claim is just there, has just
appeared, has just been posited in the universe of discourse. Its existence has,
therefore, an immediate character. This does not mean that the truth-claim could not
develop or disclose a more elaborate character, for example, through its relations
with other truth-claims. Rather, the emphasis here is on the very moment a truth-
claim arises in the universe of discourse; in that primordial, most minimal modus of
its existence, the truth-claim has a character of immediacy.
There is, then, a primordial state-of-affairs in which the elements of the universe
of discourse, the truth-claims, relate to each other in a [105] non-reflective,
indifferent manner. Exactly at this point the argument becomes distinctively
Pyrrhonian; for it is the Pyrrhonist who first pointed out that in such state of
immediacy and indifferent relationality there can be no privileging of a truth-claim
over any of the others. Indeed, in the universe of discourse there reigns initially a
state of equality or equipollence (ιぴばぴずεでεια) among the truth-claims.12 They simply
exist in the universe of discourse, standing indifferently next to one another, one
being no truer than the other.13
12 PH I 10. 13 This is a point where my interpretation differs crucially from an alternative, which can be convincingly supported by a number of passages found in the text of PH (e.g. I 29). My attempt is to ground the equipollence of the truth-claims on their simple existence in the universe of discourse; the alternative move would be to ground this equipollence on the equal force they have upon the conviction of some audience. I find the alternative unattractive because, in the case where the force varies, it allows for an allegedly valid hierarchical ordering of truth-claims based solely upon the subjective opinions of an audience. My approach avoids that danger. Sextus seems to agree with me on this issue in PH I 33-34, where he refuses to allow that universal agreement on an assertion suffices to show that it is true. Cf. Forster (1989: 20): “[…] Sextus Empiricus‟ commitment to the common views of men, although it surfaces at several points in his texts, has the appearance of being more a random accretion from external sources than an essential component of his sceptical position like the equipollence method.” Aenesidemus, on the other hand, seems to have accepted the principle that what is commonly believed must also be true; see Rist (1970).
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The equality of the truth-claims matters greatly when a conflict appears, when
namely the universe of discourse – or part of it – takes the specific form of a dispute.
This is because in case of conflict the truth regarding the nature of the object or
aspect of reality being affected hides itself and, therefore, cannot be expressed. In
such an event the universe of discourse is contaminated (for the expression of truth
is, with respect to our problematic, the very reason it exists in the first place),
something that calls for the removal or resolution of the conflict.14 At this point the
second most distinctive feature of Pyrrhonism – after ιぴばぴずεでεια –, and definitely its
most unsettling, enters the picture of our problematic. This is [106] the
manifestation that no conflict between truth-claims can ever be resolved and hence
the true nature of the real can never be expressed.15
Before the sceptic╆s argument for the impossibility of the resolution of conflict is examined, let me here point out what, surely, must have already become a source of
disquiet. Firstly, the sceptic seems to have moved quite arbitrarily from a universe
of discourse in which the truth-claims are related only in an indifferent manner to a
universe where such relations take the loaded form of conflict. The question is this:
How does the Pyrrhonist conceive the move from indifferent relations to conflicting
relations? Secondly, the sceptic suddenly employed a judgment affirming the
negative relation between truth and conflicting truth-claims. How does she, then,
understand this negative relation and how does she justify this understanding?
Thus, in what follows I will provide the Pyrrhonist╆s responses to these three questions:
(1) How does the Pyrhonist manifest the impossibility of the resolution of conflict
among truth-claims?
(2) How does the Pyrrhonist conceive a conflict between truth-claims on the level of
utmost immediacy in the universe of discourse?
(3) How does the Pyrrhonist argue for the negative relation between truth and
conflicting truth-claims on that level?
14 PH I 26: “[The] sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are true and which false […]” (my emphasis). 15 PH I 26: “[B]ut they [i.e. the sceptics] came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they suspended judgment.” See also PH I 135.
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3. CRITERION OF TRUTH. If, then, (a) certain truth-claims conflict with each other and
(b) conflict contaminates the universe of discourse, a choice must be made between
them so as to resolve the conflict.16 The decision should not be arbitrary; one has to
make sure it guarantees that the truth-claim chosen indeed [107] exemplifies the
true nature of the relevant object or aspect of reality. Otherwise, why should such
decision be accepted? This need for guarantee calls for a criterion of truth. To posit a
criterion of truth is to explicitly say why the one rather than the other truth-claim is
true.17 But in doing so one has to say something further (positive or negative) about
the real, for a conflict about the truth of the real can be resolved only if more is said
about it. Accordingly, the criterion, whatever its peculiar form (a judgment, a
syllogism, or a theory), is in turn itself a truth-claim, although one of a special status:
it provides the reason why an initially posited truth-claim is true (and hence why the
truth-claim which conflicts with it is false). Let us call all truth-claims that are
initially posited in the universe of discourse first-order truth-claims and the truth-
claims that are posited in order to resolve conflicts between first-order truth-claims
second-order truth-claims.
Recall now that a truth-claim, as soon as it appears, has an immediate existence in
the universe of discourse, just because it is posited therein. If, in this universe, a
truth-claim appears that conflicts with the posited criterion of truth, a decision has
to be made concerning the truth of the conflicting second-order truth-claims. But
this requires a criterion of truth, which would be nothing else than a third-order
truth-claim. It is clear that the activity of resolution of conflict in the universe of
discourse takes now the form of intolerable infinite regress. If, further, at some point
during this process a criterion of truth is invoked that has the same content as one
of the previously posited criteria, then the whole process takes the more specific
16 This claim is discussed below. 17 Cf. Hankinson (1998: 852).
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form of intolerable circularity.18 Call this whole Pyrrhonian argument the argument
from the criterion of truth.19
[108] Regress and/or circularity are intolerable because their structure20 does
not allow for the satisfaction of the desideratum at hand, which has been firmly
determined as the resolution of conflict between first-order truth-claims. Circularity
does not resolve that conflict, because the criterion simply repeats a truth-claim that
is still in conflict with another truth-claim; and the conceptual chain built by an
infinite regress might impress us due to the elaborate and continuous explanations it
produces, but these remain foreign to the truth of the initially posited truth-claims,
for they lead to no choice between the latter.
Based on the argument from the criterion of truth, the Pyrrhonist maintains that
there has been given a manifestation of the impossibility of knowledge of the true
nature of any object or aspect of reality whatsoever, and this without the
employment of any dogmatic principle. Indeed, if we accept (a) the
presuppositionless notion of a universe of discourse, the elements of which have
initially an immediate, non-reflective existence, (b) the phenomenon of conflict
emerging in this universe and (c) the need for its resolution when it comes down to
arriving at knowledge of the true nature of the objects involved, then all the sceptic
has done is to exhibit a totally critical attitude toward the positing of criteria of truth
which purport to resolve the arising disputes.
Now, while it seems clear that the conflicting truth-claims which inhabit the
universe of discourse represent no dogmatic principles or claims espoused by the
Pyrrhonist herself, the same does not seem to be the case with the conclusion she
draws from the argument from the criterion of truth, namely that it is impossible to
18 For Sextus Empiricus‟ varied formulations of the argument from the criterion see PH I 114-117, 122-123, 166; II 20, 34ff.; M VII 16. For the specific form of circularity see PH I 116-117, 169; II 9, 36, 114, 196, 199, 202; M VIII 261, 342, 379-380. A good discussion of the argument from the criterion – which however remains a bit on the surface with respect to the really important philosophical issues connected with it – can be found in Barnes (1990: 36-57, 58-89, 113-144). The reason why Barnes‟ discussion does not go as deep as it should is that he artificially dissociates the mode of „infinite regression‟ from the phenomenon of dispute (which he calls the „mode of disagreement‟), i.e. from the existence of conflicting truth-claims within a universe of discourse. 19 On the notion of the criterion of truth see especially Brunschwig (1988); Long (1978); Striker (1990a). 20 See the interesting discussion of this point in Barnes (1990: 54-57).
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acquire knowledge of the true nature of any object whatsoever or simply that
nothing can be known. The claim that the inference is problematic could be based on
either one of the two following reasons: It is problematic either (a) because the
asserted conclusion can be read as a positive truth-claim and represents, therefore, a
dogmatic principle or (b) because it cannot be inferred from [109] the argument in
the first place. I will now examine these two objections in turn.
The first objection has it that the Pyrrhonist concludes by stating that nothing can
be known and that this is incompatible with what Pyrrhonism stands for, since it
definitely sounds like a firmly posited negative claim about the truth of any object
whatsoever. It appears namely as if the sceptic has arrived at the indisputable
knowledge that such truth can never be obtained. The significance of this can be
made more visible if we turn the negative claim into its positive equivalent; for the
Pyrrhonist would in this case positively (and in a self-contradictory manner)
maintain that any object whatsoever (i.e. reality in general) is unknowable. As
Hankinson points out, the Pyrrhonist would then accept, in a totally non-Pyrrhonian
spirit, that there is a special meta-language which allows higher-order truths to be
expressed.21
This objection would be valid, and therefore disastrous for Pyrrhonism, only if the
conclusion of the argument from the criterion of truth is such as stated above.
Fortunately for the sceptic, it is not. The Pyrrhonist is very careful never to conclude
her argument with a positively formulated proposition.22 Indeed, the argument from
the criterion is constructed in such a way as to be conceived as literally either
regressing or spinning in a circle forever. There is no need for the argument to close
with a positively formulated conclusion in order for it to obtain the significance of a
sceptical attitude; making us realize that it formally continues up to infinity suffices
for prompting all those involved in scientific inquiries to give them up, a
phenomenon referred to by Sextus as suspension of judgment (εぱばχと).23 The
Pyrrhonist, then, aims rather at a psychological condition or practical behaviour
21 Hankinson (1998: 851). 22 Cf. PH I 200-201, 326; Bibl. 212, 169b. 23 PH I 8, 10; II 7, 18, 196. Cf. Barnes (1990: 42-43). The first champion of επてχさ was probably Arcesilaus; see Sedley (1983: 10).
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than at a concluding proposition: the feeling of not wanting to go on or the actuality
of not going on with scientific inquiry.24 By showing that the argument from the
criterion of truth has an internal structure that leads to [110] circularity or infinite
regress, the sceptic positively states neither the conclusion that ╅knowledge is impossible to obtain╆ nor the conclusion that ╅the truth of reality is unknowable╆. )t is rather the structure of a never-concluding argument that imposes a sceptical
attitude upon the Pyrrhonist and all those who attend to her argument.25 As Annas and Barnes put it, suspension of judgment ╉is something that happens to us, not a
thing that we are obliged or can choose rationally to adopt.╊26 The sceptic and her
attendants are giving up the pursuit of knowledge by finding themselves in a psychological condition ゅor following a practiceょ in which they are ╉unable to say which of the objects presented [they] ought to believe and which [they] ought to disbelieve╊ ゅαぱばびια).27 And, according to the Pyrrhonist, such an abandonment of
science is immediately followed by tranquillity (αταびαどια).28
[111] Thus, the Pyrrhonian manifestation of the impossibility of knowledge does
not amount to positing a truth-claim in the universe of discourse stating (or, in Frede╆s terminology, taking the position)29 that nothing can be known. But since the
Pyrrhonist does make a case against scientific inquiry, there must be a concrete
difference between (a) positing that nothing can be known in the universe of
24 PH I 7. 25 If my argument is correct, Sextus‟ description of the sceptical conclusions as self-destroyed elements is superfluous. For this assumes that they first acquire existence and only then destroy themselves. In contrast, my claim is that such conclusions are never formulated as conclusions. Cf. Forster (1989: 18-19); VSP 231-233. Hegel seems to have the same wrong idea at VSP 248-249. 26 Annas and Barnes (1985: 49). Cf. Hankinson (1998: 854). 27 PH I 196 (my translation). See also PH I 7. 28 See especially the magnificent image of the painter Apelles in PH I 28: “A story told of the painter Apelles applies to the sceptics [i.e. the Pyrrhonists]. They say that he was painting a horse and wanted to represent in his picture the lather of the horse‟s mouth; but he was so unsuccessful that he gave up, took the sponge on which he had been wiping off the colours from his brush, and flung it at the picture. And when it hit the picture, it produced a perfect representation of the horse‟s lather.” Cf. Hankinson (1998: 848): “[…] The result was meant to be suspension of judgment about such matters, which would in turn lead to tranquillity of mind.” Clearly, the Pyrrhonian position that the abandonment of science entails tranquillity hits at the heart of our desire for knowledge; see Sedley (1983: 10): “There is no suggestion that any of [the] pre-Hellenistic philosophers derived much comfort from his admission of ignorance or thought of it as anything more than a regrettable expedient. Indeed, it is hard to see what comfort it could afford anybody who was not prepared to renounce a rather fundamental human trait, the desire for knowledge.” On the Pyrrhonian notion of tranquillity see Burnyeat (1980b); Striker (1990b). 29 Frede (1987a: 202ff.).
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discourse and (b) the content of her stance, namely what her stance does amount to. This difference can be described in terms of one╆s reaction to the structure of infinite
regress or circularity, which can take two different forms: One might feel that such
structure can invalidate scientific inquiry only if it leads to the explicit positing of
the truth-claim that nothing can be known in the universe of discourse; on the
contrary, one might be so shocked by the necessary impression of a universal-in-
scope and formally infinite or circular series of criteria of truth that one just gives up
scientific inquiry. Simply, one does not bother any more. The person does have a view ゅto use, again, Frede╆s terminologyょ, namely that nothing can be known, but she does
not take the position or actively assert that nothing can be known.30 In other words,
the Pyrrhonist manifests that nothing can be known without assenting to the truth-
claim that nothing can be known.
The only objection I can think of here is that the claim that nothing can be known
would have a force against science only if it were posited as a truth-claim in the
universe of discourse; simply a state-of-mind or a practical behaviour does not
suffice for the demolition of science. The Pyrrhonist╆s state-of-mind, however, is not
simply a state-of-mind. It is the specific state-of-mind that has resulted from the
inherent and eternally recurring structural inability of the universe of discourse to
satisfy its own demand for a conflict-solving criterion of truth. This inability makes
such powerful impression on those who attend to it that they, passively and without
pursuing it,31 abandon the sphere of science; [112] those who are not impressed in
this way will simply continue their futile infinite or circular journey. Given that this
state-of-affairs emerges actually from the Pyrrhonian argument, considered in both
of its necessary manifestations (namely (a) as a suspension of judgment and (b) as a
futile active pursuit of knowledge), one really wonders why the positing of the
30 Cf. Forster (1989: 22): “In response to this apparent problem, one might first point out that people quite often find themselves in a psychological condition which would naturally and probably be described as one of simultaneously believing that p and suspending belief on the question whether p or even denying that p.” 31 Cf. Frede (1987a: 207-208): “[This is] a passive acquiescence or acceptance of something, in the way in which a people might accept a ruler, not by some act of approval or acknowledgment, but by acquiescence in his rule, by failing to resist, to effectively reject his rule. […] One might, having considered matters, just acquiesce in the impression one is left with, resign oneself to it, accept the fact that this is the impression one is left with, without though taking the step to accept the impression positively by thinking the further thought that the impression is true.”
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truth-claim that nothing can be known would still be regarded as a prerequisite for
admitting the total destruction of scientific inquiry! Each and every human being
who strongly desires to acquire knowledge of the true nature of things finds him-
/herself – as a result of the Pyrrhonian argument – either (a) not actively pursuing
any scientific inquiry or (b) actively pursuing a futile scientific inquiry: Why should
anyone need to witness, in addition to this image, the truth-claim that nothing can be
known being posited in he universe of discourse in order to judge that scientific
inquiry has indeed been annihilated?!
Let us now address the second objection, which argues that the conclusion that
nothing can be known simply does not follow from the argument from the criterion
of truth. It would seem that our response to the first objection removes this second
one as well, because such conclusion is never actually formulated. Nonetheless,
those who put the second objection forward would really want to make an
altogether different point; they would like to say that the argument from the
criterion of truth establishes only local, not global, doubt. Thus, their problem with
the conclusion that nothing can be known is that its scope was universal, while, for
them, the scope of doubt should have included only those specific objects and
aspects of reality which the truth-claims actually considered were referring to. As Sedley puts it, ╉if [the sceptic] is really an open-minded inquirer, it may be that he
has always up to now found every dogmatist argument to be equally balanced by a
counterargument, but why should he suppose that the same will hold of theses he has yet to investigate?╊32 Plainly, this line of reasoning holds even after the removal
[113] of the notion of a positively posited conclusion, for it goes against the
complete denial of the possibility of scientific inquiry. In other words, if this
argument were valid, the Pyrrhonist, contrary to my interpretation, would never
stop her examination of truth-claims and, consequently, would never enjoy full
32 Sedley (1983: 21). He continues thus: “Some Skeptics responded to this problem by suggesting that in the Skeptic formula „To every argument an equal argument is opposed‟ the noncommittal infinitive form of the verb used in the Greek should be though of as expressing an injunction – to every argument let us oppose an equal argument – in order to avoid being misled into dogmatism at some future time. The move is ingenious, for an injunction is not an assertion at all, let alone a doctrinaire one.” In my opinion, this „solution‟ is of no value here, exactly because the problem is fictitious. The abandonment of scientific inquiry that follows from a global suspension of judgment does not imply a dogmatist attitude.
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tranquillity, only moments of it, interspersed with moments of anxiety and
disturbance (ταびαχと).
But this argument is completely false, since it mistakenly assumes that the
argument form the criterion of truth is applied separately and consecutively to
specific pairs of truth-claims. This is not the case, however, because it is,
deliberately, absolutely formal and its effectiveness is not depended upon the
content of the truth-claims. All it matters therein is the status or form of the truth-
claims as truth-claims. Whether a truth-claim has an empirical or a non-empirical
content, and whether its content is this or that, is absolutely irrelevant to the
argument from the criterion.33 Thence the necessity of an ongoing examination of
truth-claims cannot seriously be ascribed to a theory of Pyrrhonian scepticism.
When Sedley writes that it is not likely that ╉the onset of epoche signals the cessation of inquiry╊ and that ╉resistance to the snares of doctrine must involve lifelong open-minded investigation and reinvestigation of doctrinaire [i.e. dogmatic] arguments,╊34 he has, I [114] am afraid, provided us with a completely distorted
view of the genuine spirit of Pyrrhonism.
33 Cf. Forster (2007: 3): “[…] The Five Tropes of Agrippa seem quite indifferent as to the nature of the beliefs against which they are directed.” (The Five Tropes [or Modes] of Agrippa are at play in my reconstruction of the Pyrhonian problematic.) 34 Sedley (1983: 22). See also Frede (1987a: 210): “The skeptic has no stake in the truth of the impression he is left with. He is ever ready to consider the matter further, to change his mind. He has no attachment to the impressions he is left with. He is not responsible for having them, he did not seek them out. He is not out to prove anything, and hence feels no need to defend anything.” Although I myself agreeing with much of what Frede says in the 1987a paper, I disagree completely with the content of this excerpt and especially with the second sentence. For here he suggests that even after the Pyrrhonist has produced his non-concluding argument and received the crucial impression that allows him to abandon scientific inquiries and become tranquil, he will still attend to scientific debates and try to adjudicate between them. But, as far as I can see, this is absurd, since the structure of the argument is deliberately absolutely formal and, therefore, no content could ever affect it in such a way so as to stop exemplifying infinite regress or circularity. (Of course, as I point out in the conclusion, there is the intriguing possibility that the theories and/or assumptions that support the relational structures between the pure forms of the examined truth-claims could be totally removed from the universe of discourse. But, as soon as this happens, the Pyrrhonist will no more exist as Pyrrhonist, because his whole argumentation, which is pervaded through and through by those structures, will immediately collapse.) Thus, as far as I am concerned, the Pyrrhonist is not “ready to consider the matter further, to change his mind.” He has made a point and done so successfully, which means that scientific inquiry as a whole has for him collapsed. How would then be possible for the genuine Pyrrhonist to continue attending scientific debates and arguing against them if science as a whole no more exists? Would Apelles, after flinging his brush at the picture and achieving a perfect representation of the horse‟s lather, tear this picture apart and start painting the horse anew?! Compare this with what Timon, the disciple of Pyrrho, says about his master (DL IX 64; my emphasis): “Aged Pyrrho, how and whence did you find escape from slavery to the opinions and empty thought of the sophists, and break the bonds of all
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All in all, the argument from the criterion of truth manifests that knowledge of the
true nature of any object or aspect of reality whatsoever can never be achieved. This
manifestation does not emerge from a positively asserted truth-claim that would
function as the conclusion of the argument, but rather from the psychological and
practical ramifications of an attendance to the very formal structure of the
argument. Given these ramifications, Pyrrhonian scepticism leads necessarily to the
permanent abandonment of scientific inquiry. (Quite surprisingly, considered that
the argument from the criterion of truth is totally formal and the notion of truth-
claim that is at play therein is a pure form, Pyrrhonian doubt would still be what
William James would call real doubt, rather than Descartes╆ artificial doubt, because
it aspires to really change the lives of those who [115] attend to it: its function is to
turn them from troubled scientists into tranquil non-scientists.)
4. CONFLICT. The Pyrrhonian project would, of course, succeed only if there was
nothing problematic regarding the move from a universe of discourse inhabited by
truth-claims that stand next to each other in relations of indifference to a universe of
discourse whose inhabitants are conflicting truth-claims. This brings us to the
second issue in need of clarification: What does it mean for two truth-claims to
stand in a relation of conflict? Let us initially focus on the truth-claims taken as
judgments. There are two reasons why we begin with the structure of the judgment
rather than with the structure of the syllogism or with the structure of a whole
theory. Firstly, both the syllogism and the whole theory are composed of judgments,
while the reverse does not hold; therefore, the judgment has a certain priority over
the other two possible forms of a truth-claim. Secondly, even if the Pyrrhonist does
not ascribe to the reason just given, she certainly applies the argument from the
criterion of truth to pairs of simple judgments or, as most philosophers nowadays
deceit and persuasion? You were not concerned to inquire what winds blow over Greece, and the origin and destination of each thing.” Cf. Forster (1989: 192): “At first sight this claim seems to involve a total misunderstanding of the ancient skeptic‟s position, since the ancient skeptic does not seek to prove anything, let alone with certainty, and does not seek to show the untruth of anything, but instead suspends judgment on all questions. [However, one could say that] the skeptic, in giving up all pretensions to describe reality or state truths, in a sense rejects the notion of truth altogether.”
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call them, ╅propositions╆;35 this fact alone would suffice to justify our isolation of the
notion of judgment from the notions of syllogism and whole theory. Indeed, it seems
that for the Pyrrhonist the object of attack does not have to have the form of
syllogism or theory: it could be just a simple judgment.36 Hence one should be
confident that the very character of the [116] Pyrrhonian problematic allows us to
isolate the truth-claim as judgment and focus on it separately from the other two
forms.
Thus, the truth-claim will henceforth be thematized as judgment and our question could also have the following form: ╅What does it mean for two judgments to stand in
a relation of conflict?╆ Observation of Sextus╆ many descriptions of the historically actual disputes of the dogmatists reveals that two truth-claims (considered now as
judgments) conflict with one another when (a) they refer to the same object or
aspect of reality and (b) the property or characteristic one of them assigns to this
object/aspect cannot co-exist with the property or characteristic the second of them
assigns to it.37 This impossibility of co-existence takes logically the specific form of
the one of the properties either being or being reducible to the negation of the
other.38 Thus, if (a) a certain truth-claim tc1 assigns the property p1 to a certain
object or aspect of reality and a certain other truth-claim tc2 assigns the property p2
to the same object or aspect of reality and (b) p2 either is or can be reduced to the
negation of p1, then tc1 and tc2 stand in relation of conflict to each other.
35 PH III 65: “It is assumed by ordinary life and by some philosophers that motion exists, but by Parmenides, Melissus, and certain others that it does not exist; while the sceptics have manifested that it is no more existent than non-existent.” 36 Cf. Forster (1989: 186): “On the one hand, Sextus Empiricus‟s method of bringing about a suspension of judgment is almost invariably in practice one of balancing opposed arguments, not merely propositions, so that this sense of logos must surely be involved in his definition of Pyrrhonist procedure. On the other hand, any opposition of arguments is of course at the same time an opposition of the propositions which are their conclusions, and more important, Sextus does not quite always advocate a balancing of opposed arguments. For example, in the fourth type of Agrippa opposed propositions are balanced against one another without any supporting arguments on either side as the means of including a suspension of judgment.” (Note that Forster is simply wrong when he writes that “Sextus Empiricus‟s method of bringing about a suspension of judgment is almost invariably in practice one of balancing opposed arguments, not merely propositions;” it is rather the opposite that is true.) 37 See e.g. PH I 32-33; II 55-56; and, of course, the discussion of the so-called Ten Modes of Aenesidemus in PH I 35-164. 38 Cf. PH I 10.
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This response makes two fundamental claims: Firstly, it is said that if we observe
the universe of discourse and see one truth-claim being the negative of another in
the manner just described, then we can immediately judge that they are in conflict.
Secondly, it is said that if a truth-claim, which assigns a certain property to an object,
can be transformed explicitly into the negative of some other truth-claim already
inhabiting the universe of discourse, then we can again conclude that they are in
conflict.
As far as ) can see, however, the second of these fundamental claims ゅcall it ╅the reductionist claim╆ょ is both ゅaょ a problematic and (b) an unnecessary addition to the
Pyrrhonian argument. It is problematic for the following two reasons:
[117] (1) Any property can be seen as the negation of any other property (to wit, it
is the property that it is and not any other property). But there are properties that
despite involving such a negation of a certain other property do not conflict with it;
for example, being a man with being wise: John is both a man and wise. So, the idea
of reducing certain properties to the negation of others must be qualified if it is to
satisfy the notion of conflict between truth-claims. Such qualification, however,
requires reflective consideration of relations among properties and their taxonomy
into comprehensive categories and systems. These constructions would require the
positing of truth-claims affirming the character and interrelations of properties.
Given her commitment to argue without using dogmatic principles, namely without
making claims about the true nature of reality, the Pyrrhonist would really want to
avoid such deliberations in the course of constructing her problematic.
(2) The second reason makes the same point as the first but from a slightly different
perspective. That is, even if one admits that a certain property can be reduced to the ゅ╅proper╆, namely conflict-inducing) negation of some other property, we are left in
darkness regarding such operations of reduction. What is the mechanism behind
such operations? The relations of indifference holding among the truth-claims of the
universe of discourse do not seem to allow for such reduction; and the explanation
for the meaning of a conflicting relation does not seem to matter, since a relation of
this kind becomes manifest only after the reduction has taken place. If this reduction
is to be possible, certain specific relations among the properties employed in the
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truth-claims of the universe of discourse must have already been existing and
become apparent before the event of the reduction itself, and certainly such
relations cannot be indifferent; otherwise, it remains a mystery how some property
p2 has suddenly become the (proper) negation of some property p1! Be this correct,
however, the Pyrrhonist should respond to the challenge by providing us with an
account as to how those non-indifferent relations have been produced in the first
place. An enterprise of this sort could be the cause of deep trouble for any
scepticism whatsoever and much more for the Pyrrhonian. For while positive and
complicated analysis (which is the sign of the involvement of truth-claims regarding
property-systems) would undoubtedly accompany it, the Pyrrhonist denies the
employment of any such analysis in the formulation of her position.
[118] This attempt to show the problematic character of the reductionist claim
might be strongly objected by those who read Sextus as saying that the construction
of conflict between truth-claims uses ╅data╆ ゅi.e. premisesょ offered exclusively by the dogmatic theories and debates themselves: The Pyrrhonist just takes truth-claims
that she finds here and there in the universe of discourse, which have been posited therein by the ╅scientists╆ ゅor ╅dogmatists╆ょ, makes a compilation of them and leaves it up to the ╅scientists╆ to decide whether they are in or can be reduced to conflict. As
soon as they characterize a relation as conflicting, the sceptic would just make
manifest – through the argument from the criterion of truth – the impossibility of
resolving it. In this way, the reductionist claim would clearly not entail the Pyrrhonist╆s commitment to a theory of property-categorization.
Although this suggestion is apparently closer to Sextus╆ text,39 it has a major
disadvantage, a feature that weakens the universal appeal (or global scope) of
Pyrrhonian scepticism and is, therefore, foreign to its spirit. For now, whether a
relation between truth-claims is conflicting or not depends upon the arbitrary
subjectivity of the scientists ゅor ╅dogmatists╆ょ. )t is they who will now be deciding
whether a truth-claim tc1 conflicts with a certain truth-claim tc2. If that were the
case, however, Pyrrhonian scepticism, due to its universality, would immediately
39 See Annas and Barnes (1985: 45).
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collapse, since it would allow the possibility of the existence of truth-claims in the
universe of discourse that are not entangled in conflicting relations and, therefore, it
would not be the case that the true nature of any object or aspect of reality
whatsoever can be manifested as being beyond human knowledge. Simply, the sheer
agreement in a scientific community that tc1 does not conflict with tc2 (or any other
truth-claim) would entail that tc1 indeed does not conflict with tc2 (or any other
truth-claim) and, therefore, that tc1 is true. In this way, my argument for the
problematic character of the reductionist claim has survived the challenge raised by
the above objection.
The reductionist claim, though, is not only problematic but also unnecessary for
the successful formulation of Pyrrhonian scepticism. This is so because any truth-
claim in the universe of discourse can be undogmatically brought to a state of
conflict by simply using the notion [119] of immediate positing, which renders the
idea of reduction superfluous: If there is a truth-claim in the universe of discourse
that assigns the property p1 to a certain object or aspect of reality, the Pyrrhonist
herself will posit another truth-claim in this universe which denies the assignment of
p1 to that object or aspect of reality. If, for example, there exists the truth-claim ╅the world is governed by providence╆, the sceptic will posit the truth-claim ╅the world is not governed by providence╆. As soon as the latter truth-claim is posited, it acquires
an immediate existence in the universe of discourse and this allows it to have an
equal truth-status with the former truth-claim.40 And as soon as this takes place any
attempt to adjudicate between them would be entangled in the whirlwind of the
argument from the criterion of truth.
This argument could be attacked only on the basis that there is something
philosophically wrong with the Pyrrhonist herself positing a truth-claim in the
universe of discourse. There are two points I would like to make here: ゅなょ This positing done by the Pyrrhonist in no way implies that she should ╅assent╆ or be committed to the relevant truth-claim; such criticism is trivial, boring and
totally irrelevant to the matter at hand. The sceptic could posit a truth-claim only for
40 See PH I 202-205; I 8-10; I 31.
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the sake of argument ゅas a ╅mere thought╆, in Sextus╆ wordsょ, as much as she could use a truth-claim that is actually espoused by a dogmatist.41
(2) To forbid the Pyrrhonist (who represents in this instance each and every human
being) to posit the negation of a truth-claim (that is, another truth-claim) in the
universe of discourse is to explicitly conceive the universe of discourse as having a
despotic, fascistic or terrorizing character, to conceive it namely as an element that
strips human beings of their freedom to say whatever they want to say at the
beginning of a scientific inquiry. But even for the scientists themselves, who would
not really want to be gagged by someone who disagrees with them, it is a [120]
fundamental feature of the universe of discourse that it exemplifies the freedom of
scientific expression, which therefore is a constituting feature of its
presuppositionless character. Thus, in the same way you are free to assign truth to
any claim you like in a context of immediacy (to wit, at the very beginning of a
discussion or scientific inquiry), so the sceptic is free to deny the truth of your claim ゅjust for the sake of argument, of courseょ. Consequently, unless the ╅scientists╆ are prepared to accept the cancellation of discourse altogether (something that would
suit the Pyrrhonist perfectly), any attempt to forbid the sceptic to posit negations of
truth-claims in the universe of discourse seems to be doomed to failure.
Given then (a) the proven failure of the reductionist claim to be incorporated in a
successful model of Pyrrhonian scepticism and (b) the indisputable right of the
Pyrrhonist to posit the negation of any truth-claim in the immediate context of the
universe of discourse, let us hold fast that a conflict between two truth-claims
(regarded as judgments) takes place just when the one is simply negated by the
other (in the way described, that is, in terms of properties, characteristics, or
predicates). But since the Pyrrhonist is able to show that each and every truth-claim
taken as judgment is always paired with its negation in the universe of discourse
and since she manifests that conflicts between simple judgments establish the
impossibility of human knowledge of the truth of the real and, consequently, the
41 See PH II 10; I 31. Cf. Barnes (1990: 55); Forster (1989: 12): “For the ancient skeptic‟s strategy of setting up opposing propositions or arguments of equal weight on each issue in order to induce a suspension of belief did not require that they believe any of the propositions or arguments thus deployed.”
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impossibility of scientific inquiry, the consideration of the other two possible forms
of the truth-claim, namely the syllogism and the whole theory, does not add any
extra effectiveness to Pyrrhonian scepticism. Simply, the first judgment one makes on one╆s way to construct or expound an argument or a theory will be immediately
negated in the universe of discourse. We are all familiar with those discussions
where a certain speaker is always interrupted by the negative comments of one of
his interlocutors and despite the fact that he gets immensely angry, asking that person to ╅let him finish╆, this never happens. The Pyrrhonist represents exactly that
interlocutor who always interrupts the flow of scientific talk; but she does that
based on her absolute freedom as a human being and her strong desire to allow only
an undogmatic way of doing science. Given then that the Pyrrhonist can manifest the
total annihilation of scientific inquiry by making a case against truth-claims taken as
judgments, any further attack on the other two forms of the truth-claim would be
meaningless. We can therefore now conclude that the construction of simple
negations and their relation [121] to positive truth-claims, considered as having the
form of a judgment, will be here taken as the only content of the notion of conflict
that can be incorporated in the genuine spirit of Pyrrhonian scepticism.
This conclusion turns my interpretation into one of the most radical
interpretations of Pyrrhonian scepticism ever suggested. While important
Pyrrhonism scholars like Sedley, Frede, Hankinson and others, present the
Pyrrhonist as someone who spends quite a lot of time in trying to understand the
scientific arguments and theories proposed by the scientists and then come up with
a clever counterargument or countertheory so as to convince an audience of their
equal strength, my systematic analysis of Pyrrhonian scepticism has shown
(convincingly I hope) that such picture is completely mistaken. The Pyrrhonist, as a
philosopher of freedom and presuppositionlessness, simply constructs or
acknowledges conflicting relations between simple scientific judgments (truth-
claims)42 and then applies the argument from the criterion of truth to them so as to
42 Cf. PH I 9 (my emphasis): “[…] We take the phrase with „the things which appear and are thought of‟, to show that we are not to investigate how what appears appears or how what is thought of is thought of, but are simply to take them for granted;” M IX 1: “With regard to the physical division of philosophy we shall
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manifest the impossibility of knowledge of truth. The only way for my argument to
collapse is if those scholars could convince us that the Pyrrhonist has something
extra to gain from making a case not only against truth-claims as judgments (or
propositions) but also against truth-claims as syllogisms (or arguments) or whole
theories. But, in my opinion (which is based on the previous laborious analysis), this
cannot possibly be done.
5. TRUTH. In the previous section an explanation has been offered as to what it
means for truth-claims to be in conflict and how this conflict comes about in the
universe of discourse. That explanation, however, does not provide an explicit
characterization of the asserted negative relation between truth [122] and
conflicting truth-claims. The present section attempts to satisfy this demand and
thereby respond to the third question raised earlier.
The Pyrrhonian argument, as it has been described in the preceding discussion,
can be sustained only if assent is given to the claim that conflicting relations
between truth-claims cause the true nature of the relevant object or aspect of reality
to go, as it were, out of sight. In other words, it seems that for the Pyrrhonist the
conjunction of a is p and a is not p, where a denotes an object or aspect of reality and
p a property or characteristic of a, cannot possibly exemplify the true nature of a.
From this it can be derived (a) that knowledge of the truth of a is p requires that a is
not p does not exist in the universe of discourse and (b) that the truth of a is p
excludes the truth of a is not p. More generally, (1) knowledge of the true nature of
an object or aspect of reality requires that this object or aspect is not said to
accommodate both a certain property and its negation and (2) the true nature of
that object or aspect does not include both that property and its negation.
For the Pyrrhonian argument to be sustained, therefore, the Pyrrhonist herself
must assent to the law of non-contradiction, taken here as saying that it is impossible
that a is p and a is not p. If no assent is given to this law, the simple description of a
pursue again the same method of inquiry, and not delay long on particular points as Clitomachus has done and the rest of the Academic troupe (for by plunging into alien subject-matter and framing their arguments on the basis of dogmatic assumptions not their own have unduly prolonged their counterstatement).”
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conflicting relation in the universe of discourse has no bearing on the issue of truth
and, therefore, cannot be used against scientific inquiry. Indeed, the existence of
conflicting truth-claims in the universe of discourse constitutes a problem (an ╅anomaly in things╆, as Sextus puts itょ43 only if the sceptic accepts that the conflict
must be resolved, and the only reason that can be given for such demand is the truth
of the law of non-contradiction.
If this argument were correct, Pyrrhonian scepticism would immediately collapse:
While the programmatic statements of the sceptical project leave no doubt that
absolutely no dogmatic principles should be employed in its actualization, the law of
non-contradiction is a dogmatic principle, for it purports to say something true of
the nature of reality. The Pyrrhonist, however, has already a powerful reply up her sleeve: ╉You╆ve got it all wrong once more,╊ she would say; ╉the law of non-
contradiction [123] is a principle averred by all those who get involved in scientific
inquiry and I, the Pyrrhonist, employ that principle only in order to show those ╅scientists╆ that if they accept the law, then no knowledge of truth is ever possible. If,
on the other hand, they do not accept the law as true, (a) there remains a picture of
the universe of discourse in which any given truth-claim (that is, not only the
positive truth-claims but also their negations) would be accommodated therein and
(b) all these truth-claims would then have to be taken as being true. In other words,
anything said would be true. And I really do not have a problem with this image because all it pictures is chaos in the sphere of science!╊44
As far as I can see, this response clears the Pyrrhonist off the accusation that she ╅assents╆ to the law of non-contradiction. )t is rather up to the ╅scientists╆ or ╅dogmatists╆ themselves whether the law would be asserted as true or false or not be
asserted at all. If they deny the law of non-contradiction or remain indifferent to its
truth, they will get nothing but a scientific framework in which – as often said – ╅anything goes╆, and such state-of-affairs would just prove the Pyrrhonist╆s point. )f, on the other hand, they accept the truth of the law, they will allow the involvement
of the argument from the criterion of truth, which – as shown – manifests that no
43 PH I 12; I 29. 44 Cf. Aristotle, Met. III.1005b22-35; III.1006a11-b34.
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conflict in the universe of discourse (including the one between the law and its
negation) can ever be resolved.45
6. CONCLUSION.
(1) Pyrrhonian or presuppositionless scepticism is a philosophy46 (a) of freedom
and (b) of the impossibility of knowledge of truth. It is the first because it actualises
our freedom as scientists to posit any truth-claim we want in the universe of
discourse. It is the second because it manifests that no conflict between truth-claims
(considered as judgments) could [124] ever be resolved and, consequently, that
scientific inquiry is a futile enterprise. The manifestation of the impossibility of
knowledge is supported by (a) the belief that a conflict must be resolved if truth is to
be disclosed (i.e. the belief in the truth of the law of non-contradiction) and (b) the
argument from the criterion of truth. This essay has shown (a) how exactly these
two pillars of the Pyrrhonian argument support that manifestation and (b) why it is
immensely difficult or even maybe impossible to invalidate them.
(2) This form of scepticism is presuppositionless because neither the premises nor
the conclusion of its argument are dogmatic principles espoused by the Pyrrhonist
herself. Rather, they are all either (a) dogmatic principles espoused by the
╅dogmatists╆ or ╅scientists╆ or (b) negative truth-claims that are posited in the
universe of discourse by the Pyrrhonist for the sake of argument. Given this
presuppositionless character of Pyrrhonian scepticism, its refutation could be
achieved – if at all – only through the destruction of those philosophical theories
and/or assumptions which are, consciously or unconsciously, espoused by the
scientists themselves and which, despite the fact that they are not truth-claims, i.e.
expressions about the true nature of reality, still provide premises that the
Pyrrhonist uses in order to destroy the knowledge-aspirations of those scientists.
Such refutation would mean that knowledge of the true nature of reality has been
45 On the relation between scepticism and the classical logical laws see the interesting remark in Forster (1989: 195-197). 46 One should not be puzzled by or object to the description of Pyrrhonian scepticism as „philosophy‟. This derives from the innocent fact that Sextus wrote a book in which he expounds what the label „Pyrrhonism‟ means; the word „philosophy‟ does not here imply commitment to dogmatic beliefs (i.e. truth-claims).
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restored, but in a framework whose character is now determined by some other
philosophical theories and/or assumptions, which, however, would (somehow)
manage to escape falling once more into the trap of Pyrrhonism.
(3) The huge difficulty in formulating those ╅other╆ theories lies in that the
problematic itself, which asks for a successful way of grounding or actualizing the
possibility of scientific inquiry, has a necessary basis, the universe of discourse, the
revealed fundamental features of which have been shown to be themselves
presuppositionless, in the sense that their removal would destroy the problematic
itself. These were (a) that a conflict between truth-claims must be resolved for truth to be restored ゅotherwise, as pointed out, ╅anything would go╆ and, therefore, Pyrrhonian scepticism would not be refuted) and (b) that in a context of immediacy
the negations of positive truth-claims will continue to pop up and acquire [125]
equal truth-status to their positive counterparts (and, therefore, contexts of
immediacy will always be characterized by conflict). Crucially, then, any successful
refutation of Pyrrhonian scepticism must keep those presuppositionless features of
the basis of the problematic intact. The challenge, then, seems to be to discover
some other principles, distinct from those two, which are at play in the formulation
of the Pyrrhonian attack against science and whose removal would somehow force
Pyrrhonism to collapse.
(4) Note, finally, that the battle against Pyrrhonian scepticism would necessarily
have nothing to do with a scepticism that is grounded on the dogmatic assumption
that there is a distinction between the internal mind and the external reality (i.e. that
the true nature of reality is that it is distinct from human cognition).47 For, as shown,
47 Frede (1987a: 221), somewhat reluctantly, acknowledges this crucial point: “For all he [i.e. the Pyrrhonist] knows it might be a mistake to distinguish quite generally and globally between how things appear and how they really are. There are some cases where it seems to be useful to make such distinctions, e.g., in the case of illusions, or in the case of deception. But for these cases we have ways to ascertain what really is the case which allow us in the first place to draw, for these cases, a reasonably clear distinction between how things appear and how they really are. But how are we supposed to know what is asked for when we are asked what things are really like in cases where we have not yet found that out? In short, I see no reason why a classical skeptic should accept the global contrast between appearance and reality.” This point is also acknowledged by Hegel (VSP 225, 247-248). Forster (2007: 10), in contrast, seems to understand, mistakenly, the Pyrrhonist as one who accepts the distinction between an internal mind and an external reality: “[…] It is an acceptance by the skeptic that his mental affections are thus and so in him, but without any implication that they represent the external realities correctly, and hence it [sic] does not
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in her manifestation of the impossibility of knowledge of truth the Pyrrhonist makes
no use of an alleged fundamental discrepancy between what appears and what really
[126] is. Her essential worry is rather that in the universe of discourse a positive
truth-claim has an equal truth-status to its negation. Thus, the refutation of Kantian,
Humean or Cartesian scepticism does not entail the refutation of Pyrrhonism. Heed
should be paid to this particular point by all those philosophers, who maintain that
the refutation of these forms of scepticism would mean the refutation of any serious
philosophical scepticism. Unfortunately, the presuppositionless scepticism of the
Pyrrhonists, which is arguably the most gripping and depressing case against
scientific inquiry that has ever appeared in the history of human thought, persists
even after those dogmatic expressions of scepticism have been removed from the
philosophical plane.
attain truth or constitute belief.” Maybe Forster has been misled by the fact that Sextus himself sometimes succumbs to this dogma; see PH I 10 (my emphasis): “When we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant […] that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself;” PHB I 20 (my emphasis): “Honey appears to us to be sweet – and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses – but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt […].” Hopefully the reader agrees with me that these passages are completely incompatible with the genuine Pyrrhonist‟s commitment to presuppositionlessness.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ancient Texts
Aristotle
[Met.] Metaphysics, vols. I-II, books I-XIV, trans. by H. Tredennick (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1979)
Diogenes Laertius
[DL] Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. II, books VI-X, trans. by R. D. Hicks
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925)
Photius
[Bibl.] Bibliothèque [Bibliotheke], Vol. III, ed. by R. (enry ゅParis: Société d╆ édition ╉Les Belles Lettres╊, なひはにょ
Plato
[Meno] ‘Meno╆, in Plato, Protagoras and Meno, trans. by A. Beresford (London:
Penguin, 2005), 81-166
Sextus Empiricus
[PH] Outlines of Scepticism [Pyrrhoneioi Hypotyposeis], ed. and trans. by J. Annas and
J. Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
[PHB] Outlines of Pyrrhonism [Pyrrhoneioi Hypotyposeis], trans. by R. G. Bury
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933)
[M I-VI] Against the Professors [Adversus Mathematicos I-VI], trans. by R. G. Bury
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949)
[M VII-VIII] Against the Logicians [Adversus Mathematicos VII-VIII], trans. by R. G.
Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935)
[M IX-X] Against the Physicists [Adversus Mathematicos M IX-X], trans. by R. G. Bury
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936)
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[M XI] Against the Ethicists [Adversus Mathematicos M XI], trans. by R. G. Bury
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936)
Secondary Literature
Annas, J. and Barnes, J.
(1985) The Modes of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Barnes, J.
(1982) ╅The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist╆, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological
Society 208, pp. 1-29
(1983) ╅Ancient scepticism and causation╆, in Burnyeat (1983), 149-203
(1988) ╅Scepticism and the arts╆, in (ankinson ゅなひぱぱょ, のぬ-77
(1990) The Toils of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Brunschwig, J.
(1988) ╅Sextus Empiricus on the kriterion: the Skeptic as conceptual legatee╆, in Dillon and Long (1988), 145-175
Burnyeat, M.
(1980a) ╅Can the Sceptic live his Scepticism?╆ in Burnyeat ゅなひぱぬょ, ななば-148
(1980b) ╅Tranquillity without a stop: Timon frag. はぱ╆, Classical Quarterly 30, 86-93
(1983) (ed.) The Skeptical Tradition (California: University of California Press)
Burnyeat, M. and Frede, M.
(1997) (eds.) The Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Indianapolis/Cambridge:
Hackett)
Dal Pra, M.
(19752) Lo scetticismo greco (Rome and Barri: La Terza)
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Descartes, R.
[Meditations] ╅Meditations on First Philosophy╆ in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch (editors and translators), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. II
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 6-62
Dillon, J. M. and Long, A. A.
(1988) (eds.) The Question of ╅Eclecticism: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy
(Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press)
Everson, S.
(1990) Epistemology, Companions to Ancient Thought I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press)
Forster, M. N.
(1989) Hegel and Skepticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989)
(2007), ╅(egelian vs. Kantian interpretations of Pyrrhonism: revolution or reaction?╆, http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/forster/BurnyeatFrede2.doc, 1-24
Frede, M.
(1987) Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press)
(1987a) ╅The Skeptic╆s two kinds of assent and the question of the possibility of knowledge╆, in Frede ゅなひぱばょ, にどな-222
Hankinson, R. J.
(1988) (ed.) Method, Medicine and Metaphysics (Edmonton, Alberta: Academic
Printing and Publishing)
(1995) The Sceptics (London and New York: Routledge)
(1998) ╅Pyrrhonism╆, in E. Craig ゅed.ょ, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7
(London and New York: Routledge), 849-854
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Hegel, G. W. F.
[VSP] ╅Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie. Darstellung seiner verschiedenen Modifikationen und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten╆, in G. W. F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften (1801-1807), ed. by E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel
(Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1970), 213-272
Heintz, W.
(1932) Studien zu Sextus Empiricus (Halle: Niemeyer Verlag)
House, D. K.
(1980) ╅The life of Sextus Empiricus╆, Classical Quarterly 30, 227-238
Janáček, K.
(1948) ╅Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus╆, Acta Universitatis Palackianae
Olomucensis 4, 1-64
(1972) Sextus Empiricus╆ Sceptical Methods (Prague: Universita Karlova)
Kudlien, F.
(1963) ╅Die Datierung des Sextus Empiricus und des Diogenes Laertius╆, Rheinisches
Museum 106, 251-254
Long, A. A.
(1978) ╅Sextus Empiricus on the criterion of truth╆, Bulletin of the Institute of
Classical Studies 25, 35-49
Popkin, R.
(19722) A History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (California, Berkeley:
University of California Press)
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Rist, J. M.
(1970), ╅The (eracliteanism of Aenesidemus╆, Phoenix 24 (1970), 309-319
Schmitt, C.B.
(1983) ╅The rediscovery of ancient scepticism in modern times╆, in Burnyeat ゅなひぱぬょ, 225-251
Sedley, D.
(1983), ╅The motivation of Greek Skepticism╆, in M. Burnyeat ゅなひぱぬょ, ひ-29
Stough, C. L.
(1969) Greek Skepticism (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press)
Striker, G.
(1981) ╅Über den Unterschied zwischen den Pyrrhoneern und den Akademikern╆, Phronesis 26, 153-169
(1990a) ╅The problem of the criterion╆, in Everson ゅなひひどょ, なねぬ-160
(1990b) ╅(appiness as tranquility╆, Monist 73, 97-110
Vollgraff, J. C.
(1902) ╅La vie de Sextus Empiricus╆, Revue de Psychologie 26, 195-210