2008.0821 flying lessons flying lessons.pdf · do not attempt to fly anywhere near the maximum...

©2008 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved. Contact [email protected] for reprint permission

For much more on flying safely see www.thomaspturner.net. ©2008 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved

FLYING LESSONS for August 21, 2008 suggested by this week’s mishap reports

FLYING LESSONS uses the past week’s mishap reports as the jumping-off point to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific make and model airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents, so apply these FLYING LESSONS to any airplane you fly. Feel free to forward this message for the purpose of pilot education. FLYING LESSONS is also available in PDF through a link in the left column at www.thomaspturner.net.

This week’s lessons:

Do not attempt to fly anywhere near the maximum endurance of your airplane when going into areas with few available airports, or when poor weather is widespread in the area of your destination. “Poor weather” generally includes widespread IMC for an IFR-current pilot flying an IFR-capable airplane in daylight, or widespread Marginal VFR at night. “Poor weather” consists of widespread Marginal VFR for pilots flying VFR, or any marginal VFR if flying visually at night.

See the Categorical Outlook Flying weather go/no-go decision-making matrix, on the Tools for Flying Safety page of www.thomaspturner.net. See www.thomaspturner.net/Categorical outlook matrix.htm

You never know when some unforeseen event (worsening weather; a closed runway from an all-too-common gear up landing or some other event outside your control; animals you can’t scare off the runway; etc.) will close your intended airport, requiring you to fly to an alternate with the fuel you have remaining.

If you have any doubt about the amount of fuel remaining in the tanks, land at the nearest suitable airport…whether or not you’ll immediately be able to refuel after you land.

If controllers begin to ask you about your fuel state, take that as a sign that you need to get on the ground NOW.

Carry extra food, water and survival gear in case you land at a remote airport expecting to top off, only to find the airport abandoned, employees gone for the day, the fuel pump broken, or fuel unavailable for any other reason. Your life may depend on camping out until you can get more fuel…and in turn, on the sustenance and shelter you bring with you.

Consider the extra fuel burn from climbs and missed approaches when calculating fuel remaining in a low-fuel emergency.

If you find yourself aloft in a minimum fuel state reduce power for maximum range to get to the nearest airport. Lean aggressively so long as your mixture continues to support smooth power.


(LEFT) Endurance (top) and Range (bottom) profiles for a 136-gallon B55 Baron, and (BELOW) for a Cessna 172S. Note that maximum range and endurance result from very low power settings. Range generally improves with altitude, assuming you’re not fighting headwinds and you don’t have to burn extra fuel to climb to a higher altitude.

These charts assume a 25˚F rich of peak EGT power setting; a lean of peak EGT setting will reduce fuel flows dramatically, as well as reduce power approximately 10% compared to the same manifold pressure (B55) and RPM (B55, C172S) if leaned on the rich side of peak EGT.

Note the times and distances derived from these charts include fuel burned during start, climb and one climb to altitude, with (stated in the Baron) a 45-minute reserve remaining when the computed time/distance is reached.


“Hope” is never an effective risk management strategy. If you ever find yourself thinking or saying “I hope this works out,” “I hope the weather improves,” “I hope I have enough fuel,” know that your subconscious is warning you “This probably won’t work out,” “the weather’s dangerous,” or “You’re running out of fuel”. Heed your mind’s warning and choose the nearest airport accordingly.

Any failure to accelerate as planned, or indication of engine hesitation or power loss on takeoff, is grounds for immediately aborting the takeoff. Once you’ve stopped safely you can troubleshoot the indications and, unless you find and correct an obvious cause, such as an improperly set mixture control or an out-of-detent fuel selector, take the airplane to a mechanic before attempting flight again.

Don’t let “get-home-itis” draw you into trying to continue the takeoff in the hopes everything will turn out okay, because abnormalities very rarely cure themselves.

Faced with a distraction event immediately after takeoff—even an engine failure—in almost all cases the best course of action is to climb straight ahead to pattern altitude if remaining power allows before attempting any maneuver back to the airport.

If launching IFR into clouds you may want to climb ahead even higher before attempting to turn back, although safely doing so requires you’ve pre-planned a safe climb route based on the climb gradient possible with partial power. This is when the MSA depiction on instrument approach charts means something…it gives you a minimum altitude to aim for before attempting to maneuver beyond turns needed for obstacle avoidance.

Even turboprops and jets, with tremendous power-to-weight ratios, have fatally crashed because the pilot was in too great a hurry to make it back to the runway. It’s not loss of performance per se that brings these airplanes down, but loss of pilot discipline to continue flying under the influence of distraction and imprudent action.

It might take several miles to climb to pattern altitude. On every takeoff consciously commit yourself to climbing to a safe altitude before beginning any turns, if some climb capability remains after you’re faced with an abnormality or emergency just after liftoff.

Although the record shows most landing gear-related mishaps (LGRMs) appear to be pilot-induced, expert mechanics frequently find landing gear systems excessively worn, improperly rigged, or with up- and down-tensions far outside tolerances: either too loose (little resistance to folding up) or too firm (placing excessive stress on the gear, leading to fatigue damage).

As airplanes accumulate flight hours (in other words, fatigue exposure) decades-old prevailing wisdom about landing gear inspection and maintenance becomes less and les valid. The old adage “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” does not work with retractable landing gear systems. It take proactive maintenance before trouble occurs, not repairs or adjustments after a problem shows up, to avoid a mechanically induced gear collapse or gear up (i.e., broken and won’t go down) event.

Adhere to the manufacturer’s recommendations for landing gear inspection, servicing and component overhaul or replacement, as found in the aircraft maintenance/shop manuals and the Handling, Servicing and Maintenance section of the Pilot’s Operating Handbook. Contact users groups and other experts on your landing gear system to learn what commonly breaks on your landing gear system, and how to proactively avoid failure.


Properly caring for your landing gear system may seem time-consuming and expensive, but consider the time lost and expense incurred if the landing gear system fails to fully extend, or collapses during takeoff or landing.

All pilots, regardless of the type of airplane you fly, can benefit from familiarity with the Handling, Servicing and Maintenance section of the aircraft’s Pilot’s Operating Handbook or equivalent.

If you own the airplane, or are otherwise responsible for its maintenance, you should maintain current copies of all maintenance manuals and bulletins for the aircraft. With the huge downturn in piston production since the early 1980s, gone are the days when mechanics train to specialize in one airplane type, or the products of a single manufacturer. Mechanics are now trained to be generalists, with type-specialists (even in turboprops and some jets) harder and harder to come by. In his Savvy Aviator seminar Mike Busch makes this point very strongly—it’s up to the airplane owner to be the expert on the specific make and model airplane, and to provide guidance to mechanics (including the required manuals and documents) if the owner wants to keep troubleshooting costs down and ensure the airplane is being maintained properly and safely. See www.savvyaviator.com Questions? Comments? Send me a note at [email protected].

CORRECTION

Concerning the recent Beech Sundowner hard landing at Augusta, KS, a FLYING LESSONS reader “in the know” writes the initial FAA report was mistaken, and there were two (not three) people aboard. He also confirms there were no injuries.

CROSSTALK

Mike Babler is a motivating force in recreational formation flying, primarily in training that leads up to the “Bonanzas to Oshkosh” (www.b2osh.org) flight that has become something of the “opening act” of EAA AirVenture. Mike writes about a change in pilot attitudes he’s observed in recent years as a result of his formation training experience:

I read your articles with great interest. After flying since 1957 I see a lot of repeat behavior and typical attitudes. There is a subtle difference that did not appear much years ago. Today's pilot flies for more than a “bug” to fly, or the love of flying. Today we have pilots flying for the image, or ego trip, as well as the love of flight.

One of the issues we see in formation training is a tendency to want to fly "MY" way, and that has no place in formation flying. Maybe the hardest thing for some new formation pilots is the pure discipline of knowing the procedures and following them to the letter.

Many people today have never had any pure application or living with discipline. Once a pilot learns and applies that attitude, it is a pleasure to help him learn the art of formation flying. Fewer and fewer of our pilots today have come through the disciplines of military flight training and experience. I am sure you have seen this in your experience as an instructor, but may not have recognized its underlying cause.

Interesting observation, Mike. Thank you.


DEBRIEF

Many of you commented about topics in last week’s FLYING LESSONS: Assumption of Risk

Concerning the discussion of risk acceptance and the greater impact it may have on personal and general aviation, AOPA Air Safety Foundation executive director (and FLYING LESSONS reader) Bruce Landsberg writes:

[I] appreciate the reference to my blog regarding the Oregon accident. I think your comments

were right on target. Sure wish we could ask pilots on these aircraft what they were thinking--

sadly those questions won't be answered. Best.....Bruce

Reader Jim Lauerman, veteran flight instructor and now president of AVEMCO Insurance, provides this insight:

From my perspective you are on target about the responsibility to people on the ground…. At the

risk of being accused of being callous, I would point out that due to the proliferation of new and

expensive houses near many of our GA airports, the financial cost of property damage claims is

increasing exponentially. 25 years ago it was quite rare for a GA plane to damage property on the

ground (much less bodily injury). Today those losses are much more frequent and financially

severe, significantly affecting insurance rates.

Jim hopes to find the time to provide more precise figures, and if he’s able he’ll pass them along for a future FLYING LESSONS report. Lost on the approach

You provided quite a bit of input about the G35 Bonanza that went out of control while attempting to intercept the ILS at Boston’s Logan Airport, killing all three aboard. One FLYING LESSONS reader from the Detroit area (I apologize for not writing down your name) telephoned. He not only listened to the ATC audio of the event, but also watched simultaneously a recoding of the radar traffic into Logan (if you read this, please remind me of your name and let me know how to see the radar stream). The caller suggests wake turbulence may have been a cause of the initial upset. Although airplanes appeared to be well spaced along the final approach course, the caller said, and it appears all ATC wake turbulence protocols were being followed, the Bonanza was 1000 feet below the general flow of jet traffic when the upset occurred…suggesting a wake turbulence encounter was at least a possibility.

Aeromedical and paramilitary flights

Reader Kevin Smith, the pilot whom at Oshkosh told me he’d send the US Coast Guard Auxiliary mission risk management evaluation tool, has come through. The checklist is considered “mandatory” for all USCG Auxiliary “mission” flights, and it’ll be obvious (once you look at it) that

(1) It is very specifically oriented toward USCG Aux flight operations; and

(2) It would take a good bit of training to be able to be used effectively (training I’m sure the USCG Aux provides).

It may be possible for individual pilots to translate this into a personal risk management tool, so long as they maintain a strict level of objectivity and don’t fall into the “mission” trap when considering a business or personal flight. The checklist is posted here for your consideration and adaptation. Scroll down the column on the left until you find (and select) Risk Assessment. Please let me know how it works for you.

See www.auxodept.org/airoperations.htm


Other reader comments about “mission” flights:

I fly Angel Flight missions. With respect to the Bonanza down near KBOS, let me say a few

words about "priority". There is NO assignment of priority for Angel Flight missions, i.e.,

there is no such thing as low or high priority missions, with one exception: Some (a very

small percentage) of Angel Flight missions are transplant missions, and for these the

passenger typically has a 4-hour window from notification of organ availability to get to the

destination airport. So these might be considered high-priority missions, but the word

"priority" is never used. On normal Angel Flight missions, pilots use the call sign Angel

Flight, which does not give any priority to the mission at all (though in general ATC expedites

such missions on their own accord). For transplant missions, which are time-critical, pilots

use the "Lifeguard" call sign, which of course does get them priority from ATC. Best, Steve

Weintraub

I replied: Excellent information, Steve. I suspected from the pilot's hesitant answer on the ATC audio that perhaps the controller was mistaken (I mentioned this possibility in last week’s FLYING LESSONS). Steve later added:

I've [now] had a chance to listen to the ATC tapes on the Angel Flight crash. The first

approach controller asks the pilot what his priority is, and sometime later tells the pilot that

the next controller will sequence him in between the jets. This reinforces my belief that this

controller was just trying to be particularly helpful to the Angel Flight (and that if the pilot

had replied that he would like to get in in a hurry for some reason, that the controller would

have tried to squeeze him in).

Listening to the tapes it seems like this pilot flew a perfectly good airplane into the ground,

and that this one really was due to pilot error. Without knowing how this plane was equipped,

I think your conjecture that he got distracted by his navigational equipment (his autopilot or

GPS or whatever), or worse, that his navigational equipment didn't perform the way he

expected it to, is a good one. I read the ASRS datasets every now and then, and a frequent

theme is deviations caused by having one's head down programming the FMS rather than

paying attention to flying the airplane.

In this case it wasn't an altitude bust when one member of a two-person crew wasn't paying

enough attention, but a crash when the only pilot stopped paying attention to flying the

airplane and wound up in a situation where he was too far behind the airplane to realize and/or

get out of the trouble he was in. Towards the end of the tape, he does acknowledge the

controller's warning that he's too low by stating that he's climbing, but he didn't appear to treat

it as an emergency and climb at Vx.

Back on the subject of “automation distraction”, reader (and retired TWA captain) Tom Rosen relates:

When TWA first got the "glass cockpit" aircraft, it was the B767. The most common reason

for check ride failures on that aircraft was an attempt by the PIC to reprogram the auto flight

system during an approach. Failures were occurring that never occurred before on the steam

gage aircraft, i.e B707, B727, B747, L1011 and DC9/MD80.

I could be wrong, but I believe that the one airport that resulted in the most failures was

LAX. The aircraft would be stabilized on the ILS to either the 24 or the 25 runways, and

prior to the FAF, ATC would change the runway to the other side [switch from rwy 24 to 25

or vice versa].

Rather than revert to a boiler plate approach to the new runway, the pilot would attempt to

program the auto flight system and in doing this, would fail to "fly the aircraft." That is a

deadly sin, and the usual result was a “down”. Happened to lots of guys. Just thought you


might be interested in this history lesson. Once again, bottom line, don't forget to fly the

airplane.

Asking for clarification I asked:

Tom: I assume a "down" was an unsatisfactory rating on the check. What were the

consequences? Or by a "down" you mean a simulated crash [in a simulator]?

To which he replied:

Yes, the check pilot would allow the trainee to deal with the issue until it almost became

unsafe (the check pilot felt that if the trainee was allowed to continue it would have

jeopardized the safety of the flight), and then take over the aircraft and complete the

approach. We are talking regularly scheduled passenger flights where the trainee has already

completed 99% of the transition training. [This error] always resulted in a failure of the check

ride.

Keep in mind that the pilots undergoing the check were very experienced TWA pilots - both

captains and first officers who were transitioning from another aircraft to the 767. The

consequences varied depending upon the overall perception of the trainee in question by the

instructor and prior instructors. A pilot who was doing fine previously would most likely be

given additional training and then rechecked. A "weak-sister" who was borderline would be

sent back to his previous aircraft. A first officer who was checking out as captain for the first

time (a very, very comprehensive program at TWA that far exceeded the requirement of the

FAA for a type rating and from what I know all of the other airlines ) usually would end up

flying the remainder of his career in the right seat as a result of that failure.

The point is that a pilot who had previously been line qualified and had flown many years

successfully in aircraft with steam gages and unsophisticated autoflight systems (the L1011

with the first Cat IIIA landing capability being included in the unsophisticated category)

would let himself become overwhelmed by the new system and forget about flying the plane

close in to the airport. Maybe the training environment had some influence, but the check

captain had know way to know that and had to assume the worst.

The gold standard criteria at TWA regarding allowing a pilot to fly as the PIC was always,

"would you put your family onboard with him in any weather conditions?" Any answer other

than “yes” would be unacceptable. It was a tough standard, but I believe it was warranted.

Thank you all, readers, for a superb discussion…exactly what FLYING LESSONS is meant to provoke.

DVD from MFT!

You know you’ve heard it: there are those who have, and those who will have a gear up landing. Become one of Those Who Won’t with this DVD detailing 10 tips for avoiding landing gear-related mishaps. By Master CFI Thomas P. Turner, the 15-minute DVD is the result of over six years of studying why pilots make landing-gear mistakes. Great for airport, flying club and FAASTeam safety meetings. $25 plus shipping and handling online or by calling 316-945-1700.

See https://secure5.webfirst.com/ABS/Store/#ThoseWhoWont


NEW PISTON BEECHCRAFT REPORTS THIS WEEK

The August 21, 2008 Weekly Accident Update is now posted at www.thomaspturner.net, including these reports:

• A Baron 58TC crashed and burned immediately after takeoff, killing the pilot….

• A C55’s gear collapsed on landing….

• A B35 landed gear up….

• An A36 struck a deer on takeoff….

There are also NTSB updates, with significant Mastery Flight Training and reader commentary, on a B35’s collision with obstacles on takeoff at Buffalo, NY, and a double-fatality B55 fuel exhaustion event near Sitka, AK.

For more information, commentary and analysis see the Beech Weekly Accident Update link at www.thomaspturner.net. See www.thomaspturner.net/WAU 2008.htm

Fly safe, and have fun! I welcome your comments and suggestions. Contact Mastery Flight Training, Inc. If someone has forwarded this message to you and you want to have FLYING LESSONS sent directly to you each week, tell me. If you received this message directly (as opposed to through a digest or chat room) and wish to be removed from the FLYING LESSONS list, tell me. ©2008 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. All rights reserved.

Holder of an ATP certificate with instructor, CFII and MEI ratings, a Masters Degree in Aviation Safety, and 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year, Master CFI Thomas P. Turner (resume) has been Lead Instructor for FlightSafety International's Bonanza pilot training program at the Beechcraft factory; production test pilot for engine modifications; aviation insurance underwriter; corporate pilot and safety expert; Captain in the United States Air Force; and contract course developer for Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. He is now the Manager of Technical Services for the American Bonanza Society. With over 3500 hours logged, including more than 2200 as an instructor, Tom writes, lectures and instructs extensively from his home at THE AIR CAPITAL--Wichita, Kansas.

See www.thomaspturner.net/TTweb.2008.0619/Resume.htm

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