2009 - waxman outline

Download 2009 - Waxman Outline

Post on 05-Apr-2018

217 views

Category:

Documents

0 download

Embed Size (px)

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    1/21

    What is International Law?

    Definition:

    o Restatement: International law consists of rules and principles of general application dealing with

    the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relationships inter se, as well

    as with some of their relationships with persons, whether natural or juridical.

    o Brierly, The Law of Nations:The body of rules and principles which are binding upon civilized

    states in their relations with one another.

    IL Consists of:

    o ICJ, Art. 38:

    o International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly

    recognized by the contesting states;

    o International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law

    o The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations

    o Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various

    nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

    o Restatement Section 102:

    o A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the internationalcommunity of states

    In the form ofcustomary law

    By international agreement, OR

    By derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of the

    world.

    o Customary Law: results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by

    them from a sense of legal obligation. Opinio juris:sense of obligation to comply.

    Counter: Tends to be unclear, making cooperation and coordination by custom

    relatively fragile.

    o International Agreements: Create law for the parties thereto and may create customary

    international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally

    and are in fact widely accepted.

    In the US: Art. VI of the Constitution expressly makes treaties the supreme

    law of the land. But there is a question of self-executing, non-self executing.

    o Principles common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in

    customary law or international agreements, may be invoked as supplementary rules of IL

    where appropriate.

    Dissent: This is being challenged in recent years. So called 3rd World Countries

    have gained a numerical majority in the UN General Assembly, and while they

    have little bite enforcement wise they have enacted several declarations

    (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

    Peoples) that could have an effect on the global legal order.

    Changes in IL:o Creation and evolution of various and regional entities has been paralleled by substantial changes

    in international law.

    o (1) the individual has become a recognized actor along with states and international

    organizations

    o (2) national, regional, and international tribunals have become much more active and

    effective in enforcing international legal norms.

    Enforcement Mechanisms of International Law/Reasons to Follow Rule:

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    2/21

    o Reciprocity:A country will often comply with the well-accepted international norms protecting

    embassies and diplomats because the country realizes that it wants its own embassies and

    diplomats to be protected by other countries.

    o Intl Reputation:US vessels and rockets in the Persian Gulf. Intl rules of neutratlity have attained

    a high degree of recognized legitimacy and must not be violated lightly . They are well

    understood, enjoy a long pedigree and are part of a consistent framework of rules governing and

    restaining the use of force in conflicts. To violate a set of rules of such widely recognizedlegitimacy would transform the US posture in the gulf from that of netural to belligerent. Coud

    affect role as an honet broker seeking to promote peace negotiations. It would also undermine the

    carefully crafted historic rules of the game applicable to wars. Court of World Opinion

    o International Courts: Proliferation of regional and international courts. Often they only have

    jurisdiction to those who submit to their jurisdiction, and their procedural mechanisms are slow,expensive and cumbersome. Often not respected completely internationally. Do these help develop

    customary and/orinterntional common law?

    o Sense of Community: Legitimizing requirement of rule integrity assumes that each person is as

    worthy as any other, that each much be treated with equal concern according to some coherent

    conception of what that means.

    Why do States follow international law?

    o Instrumentalist Approach: States use international rules as a means to attain their interests inwealth, power and the like.

    o Liberal: Compliance depends on whether the state can be characterized as liberal. That is

    having a form of representative government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and a judicial

    system dedicated to the rule of law. Liberal democracies are more likely to do law with one

    another while relations between liberal and illiberal states will more likely transpire in a zone ofpolitics.

    o Constructivists: States and their interests are socially constructed by commonly held philosophic

    principles, identities, norms and behaviors. Norms as playing a critical role in shaping state

    identity. States obey international rules not just because of sophisticated calculations about how

    compliance or noncompliance will affect their interests, but because a repeated habit of obedience

    remakes their interests so that they come to value rule compliance. States follow rules because

    they have a long term interest in the maintenance of law-impregnated international community.

    o Transnational Legal Process: (1) One or more transnational actors provokes an interaction with

    another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the

    situation. The moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new

    interpretation of the international norm into the other partys internal normative system. The aim is

    to bind that other party to obey the interpretation.

    o NGOs: Highly influential in this process by creating internal factions.

    International Relations Theory:

    o Realists: States are principal actors in international politics. They interact in an environment of

    anarchy. Defined as the absence of any central government able to keep peace or enforce

    agreements. Security is their overriding goal, and self-help their guiding principle. Rules and

    institutions have little if any independent effect on state behavior. Might is right.

    o

    Institutionalists: Much the same as realists, but they see states as mere fictions that aggragate theinterests of their citizens.

    o Liberals: View individuals and private groups as the fundamental actors in international politics.

    But their preferences are determined by domestic politics rather than assumed interests or material

    factors like relative power. Requires attention to the domestic politics and constitutional structures

    of individual states a daunting prospect for analysis of international relations.

    o Transnational Liberals: would reject doctrines that limit law creation to states.

    Asserting that the domestic-international distinction has broken down, they would urge

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    3/21

    the significance of transnational norms created by private actors and governmental units,

    as well as domestic norms.

    Is IL really law?

    o No: IL is highly indeterminative and unenforceable. Not really law because international society is

    not really a society, the world of nations is a collection of sovereign states, not an effective body

    politic which can support effective law. There is no effective law-making body, and new lawscannot be imposed on any state. Even old law cannot survive is rejected by a few powerful states.

    Theres no judicial to clarify and develop the law, to resolve disputes impartially, and to impel

    nations to observe the law. The courts that do exist are wholly inadequate. Further, there is no

    executive to enforce the law. Nations only follow the rules when they wish to do so. International

    law then is wholly voluntary.

    o Counter: The unenforcement side focuses far too narrowly on the use of force, a

    relatively small sphere of IL.

    o Yes: Its a question of does IL have a pulling force on people and decision making? IL is often

    followed due to ideas of reciprocity. Some simply because the law is seen as legitimate and

    therefore should be obeyed (liberalist viewpoint.) Even without centralized adjudications and

    enforcement agencies such as through arbitration or unilateral self-help retaliatory measures.

    Law includes the structures of governments, and the schemes under which they operate, not just

    police and judges. Includes status of people/states. Even though there is no internationalgovernment, there is an international society. IL provides the structure of that society, its

    institutions, forms, and procedures, the status and rights of the bodies that make it up. The idea of

    statehood and that being the building block of international relations is a legal concept. The laws

    that govern this are often taken for granted because they very rarely break down. Internal

    sovereignty is fundamental and often observed. Without a binding recognition to treaties and

    agreements as legal documents there could be no international relations. Nations that try to escape

    these agreements invoke legal principles to do so. Even if its difficult to make, it is made. It grows

    even. While the courts decisions are few, they are respected. No executive is met by horizontalenforcement.

    Why is IL law binding?

    o Fundamental Rights: Takes the idea of natural rights and imposes it onto states. Simply the fact

    that you are a state grants you some natural rights. Those being: self-preservation, independence,equality, respect, and intercourse.

    o Posner: IL emerges from states pursuing their interests to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes,

    and it is sustained to the degree to which it continues to serve those interests.

    o Positivists: IL is the sum of the rules by which states have consented to be bond, and that nothing

    can be law to which they have not consented. This consent may be given expressly, as in a treaty,

    or it may be implied by a state acquiescing in a customary rule. Counter:New nations simply

    dont consent to IL, they dont have much choice.

    o Precedent:Case of the S.S. Lotus (1927): Ships that collided. French crew prosecuted in

    Turkey. H: First and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary it may not exercise its power

    in any form in the territory of another state. Jurisdiction is territorial, it cannot be

    excercised outside a state except from a rule or customary law. They can however,

    exercise jurisdiction within their own border in respect to any case that has taken placeabroad.

    o Brierly: Ultimate explanation of the binding force of alllaw is that man, whether he is a single

    individual or whether he is associated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so far as he is areasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in

    which he has to live.

    Rule Legitimacy:

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    4/21

    o Determinancy: The ability of the text to convey a clear message, to appear transparent in the

    sense that one can through the language to the meaning. Indeterminancy has costs. It is more

    likely to be complied with if people know how to comply. Also, makes it harder to justify non-

    compliance. States will only follow a rule if they determine it sufficiently clear to expectcompliance by others In the future.

    o Symbolic Validation: When a signal is used as a cut to elicit compliance with a command.

    Reinforces relationship with the state. Serves to legitimize rules.o Ritual:

    o Pedigree: Seeks to religitimize compliance by stressing the historical foundations of a rule. Must

    be applied coherently.

    Use of Force

    Arguments for Use of Force:

    o Pro:

    o Art. 42: UN may take actions by military force.

    Strat: Consider if this will get vetoed.

    Strat: Look for a recommendation from the general assembly.

    o Art. 51:Collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack. Requires less imminence

    than under unilateral action according to the Chayes article.

    Interpretations: Some interpret armed attack broadly to cover a large range

    of threats, thus permitting anticipatory self-defense. Others say that inherent

    right of self-defense extends beyond cases of armed attack.

    o Art. 52:Regional arrangements could deal with such matters relating to the maintenant

    of peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.

    o Security Council Resolutions: Ultimately you really wish to base any military expedition

    on previous UN resolutions.

    Strat: If deadlocked, there is some support for the idea that regional bodies

    should take over to prevent the security council from hindering peace keeping.

    (Chayes)

    o General Assembly Recommendationo Regional Body Support

    o The Caroline: The Oh Canada case. Prime example of opinion juris and CL.

    Anticipatory Self-Defense:

    BoP: On the aggressor.

    Duration: The strictest possible time, and strictly confined within the narrowest

    limits imposed by that necessity.

    Necessity of self-defense. Instant. Present and inevitable.

    Judging Imminent:

    o Subjective: A nation, in good faith thought an attack was

    inevitable. Too hard to police.

    o Some Process: i,e. UN Security Council. Too slow.

    o Objective: Reasonableness standard. How defined? Over-whelming.

    No choice of means

    AND no moment for deliberation.

    Must be shown: Day light could not be waited for. That they could not

    possibly have negotiated with those on the Caroline.

    That the Canadians did nothing unreasonable or excessive forceimplied must be in relation to the necessity.

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    5/21

    o Monroe Doctrine: Might try to justify something with acquiescence to a doctrine like the

    Monroe doctrine, but its undoubtedly weak.

    Policy Args: If you dont go with war you undermine the UN altogether.

    o Con:

    o Art. 2(3-4) of UN Charter

    Counter: Use of self-defense in armed attack.

    o Art. 53: Possibly trumps collective self-defense.

    Strat: Chayes says that there is support for the idea that if the regional bodys

    decision is recommendatory, but not mandatory it cannot be considered

    enforcement action. From theICJopinion Certain Expenses of the UN.

    o Preamble of UN: Armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, to unite

    our strength to maintain international peace.

    Policy: If you go with war w/o express authorization you undermine the

    international legal system. Also, you want other nations to not resort to such

    means in the future, so you dont want to set a precedent.

    o Kellogg-Briand Pact: Extremely non-binding treaty that condemned war (Art. I), and

    pledged to use peaceful means to settle their international disputes (Art. II).

    Realists: Say that is hodge-podge bullshit with little or no force.

    Brianists: It is in the very least something that might make a country think

    twice.

    o Court of World Opinion

    UN Enforcement Mechanisms:

    o Art. 5: Can suspend any member state from the rights as a member if they are the subject of

    Security Council Action.

    o Art. 19: Can renig your right to vote if you fail to pay dues.

    o Art. 41: Security Council can resort to economic sanctions. Interruption of rail, air, sea, postal,

    telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and severance of diplomatic relations.

    o

    Waxmans Arg For Guantanamo: For a decade Al-Qaeda had been at war with the US at a lvl before onlyknown to states. If such had been state action nobody would have argued that they were in a state of war.During war you take prisoners and you dont release them until the war is over.

    o Law as Constraint: Whethre law operate as a constreaint, in the sense of narrowing choice or

    excluding certain courses of action. Obedience to law is most often perceived as response to an

    external constraint, but as the affirmation of valued and desired objectives. Even if it violates the

    law the law may in fact constrain the degree to which it is violated. Law simply acts to restrain

    choice and make cost/risk analyses. Is this soft law?

    o Application to CMC: Legal consideration influenced the outcome through the

    perspective of the players. Aldai, Bobby Kennedy, etc. Kennedy wanted a blockade

    because it was the moral thing to do given our nations history.

    o Law as Justification:Nay sayers cry that the law is simply an excuse, way of making the bad look

    good in retrospect of a decision made previously and justified later. But, the requirement of

    justification imposes the discipline and check of the necessity to formulate its decision in terms of

    the set legal rules and procedures within which the case is presented for determination. While this

    can never determine right/wrong, it can distinguish a good faith attempt from a trivial one. Ittherefore provides an important substantive check on the legality of action and ultimately on the

    responsibility of the decision-making process. Helps to legitimize the actions. Legal norms

    express values common to most men, and are therefore an excellent source of justification. Its a

    checks and balances system on the international level to have to persuade multiple countries to

    your view point.

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    6/21

    o Application to CMC: The decision to go to the OAS.

    o Law as Organization: The law is now formed by an explosion of international organizations.

    These often act independently of the nations they represent, even if their ambassadors haveexplicit instructions. The fact that they are there can shape how a country acts. They can express a

    common regional idea of the law. To simply ignore such organizations can mock the talk of big

    powers. The orgs can make it more efficient to formulate policy and to rally support. It can birth a

    declaration in the public spotlight through deliberation, thereby giving it moral force. Theyexpress political (and therefore legal) wills. Can help unify and produce specific, effective

    language. Can also foster information sharing. Can provide the doctrinal basis for the legal

    analysis.

    o CMC: Votes of the OAS gave it the legal authority. Missile placement in itself was not

    an attack in the legal sense. Could it be considered imminent? Russian had a legal streak

    going, so we had to match it. They decided to do a quarantine not a blockade. Is this

    soft law?

    o Argument that it was Illegal: US resorted to unilateral military action that cannot be

    reconciled with its obligations under the UN Charter to settle internatiuonal disputes by

    peaceful means and to refrain from the use of force (Art. 2, 3-4), except for individual or

    collective self-defense against armed attack (Art. 51), under authority of the UN (ar.t 24,

    39), or on invitation of the state where the force is to be used (art. 2, 1).

    o Kosovo (Humanitarian Intervention)

    o Lessons Learned

    Threats are possibly against the charters dedication to peaceful resolution of

    conflict.

    Without an ultimate use of force threats are worthless

    Russias veto power forced NATO to act w/o mandate

    Mixed signals impeded effective diplomacy

    Illegal, but legitimate

    Beneficial: This has some benefit in that it pushes the idea forward that

    this should have been deemed illegal and promotes change

    o

    Dangerous: Undermines adherence to the UN system. Argument: Serbs ignored and defied international law. Massive civilian

    casualties. Diplomacy had failed. Taken w/ regret in order to save lives. Main:

    Every means short of force has been tried to avert this situation. In thesecircumstances, and as an exceptional measure on the grounds of overwhelming

    humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force

    employed is necessary to prevent that crisis, and is the minimum judged

    necessary.

    Against: Its an internal matter, and should be resolved among the

    parties concerned.

    o China simply trying to avoid similar future arguments over

    Tibet.

    o Iraq

    o Official Argument

    1441 Authorized serious consequences.

    If UN doesnt act = obscurity

    His willingness to act is shown by gassing of Kurds

    He authorized his commanders to use them, showing intent

    Council recognized he was a threat to international peace and security.

    Unless act now the future can be even worse

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    7/21

    Foreign Relations Powero Little v. Barreme (US 1804)

    o F: Danish vessel captured under law allowing capture of American ships going to France with

    cargo for France. Capt received a communication from his superiors that he was to seize all ships,

    whether American orapparently American, going to orfrom a French port.

    o I: Is the Capt liable for violating the act as laid out by Congress, or is he excused based on prexys

    words.

    o H: There is a legislative intent to seize ships going to France, not comingfrom France. He is

    liable.

    o D: Hes a military man. He has a duty to obey the orders that come down to him. While

    they may not justify his actions, it should excuse him.

    o P: The instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which

    without those instructions would have been a plain trespass.

    Exec Powers at Issue: Commander-in-chief, power to make sure the laws are

    faithfully executed

    Congress: Regulate commerce and authority to make rules concerning capture

    on land an water

    Depends on how you interpret the silence of from.

    o Curtiss-Wright

    o F: Congress made a law saying that if prexy decided that selling arms to Bolivia was illegal, it

    would become illegal. Prexy did so, and Curtiss-Wright company challenged its constitutionality.

    o I: Assuming that the challenged delegation, if it were confined to internal affairs, would be

    invalid, may it nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclusive aim is to afford a remedyfor a hurtful condition within foreign territory?

    o H: The legislation is upheld, Congress shouldnt with prexy in intl affairs.

    o Reasoning: That fed govt can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in

    the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect

    the enumerated powers is true only in regards to domestic affairs. These powers were

    carved from the states. And since the states never had international powers, such powerscould not have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously wee transmitted

    to the US from some other source. Intl powers were transferred from the crown to the

    collective body.

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    8/21

    o The president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole

    representative with foreign nations.

    Counter: Taken in full context including does not require as a basis for its

    exercise an act of Congress this is dicta, because there was such an act.

    Normative: Interference by congress would diminish the negotiation capacity of

    the prexy, and impair the security of the nation. Requires caution and unity of

    design, and secrecy and dispatch. Speed of decision making. He has the bettermeans to know what is happening abroad (legions of diplomats). Allowing

    Congress to 2nd guess would hamper future negotiations.

    o This is not just a power granted to the Prexy from Congress, but such a power plus the

    very exclusive, plenary and sole power of prexy in international affairs. Congressional

    legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within theinternational field must often accord to Prexy a degree of latitude.

    o Youngstown

    o H: Indispensability of steel led the prez to determine that the stoppage would affect our national

    defense (Korean War). He decided to seize the mills. Congress has taken no action.

    o I: Whether the Prexy was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing

    the Secretary to take possession of an operate most of the Nations steel mills.

    o

    P: This amounts to an act of law making, and the constitution clearly gives that power toCongress.

    Reasoning: Prezs power must come from an act of Congress or the

    Constitution itself. In fact Congress rejected such seizures in previous

    legislation. CIC power does not justify. He has expanded powers in theatres ofwar, but seizing private property is for Congress. His executive function in itself

    refutes the idea that he is to be lawmaker. Nothing is plainer than that the war

    power is entrusted in Congress. But the prez should not be able to master

    internal affairs with his command of external wars. Congress supplies the

    military. Only Congress can provide the army. Prez cant quarter troops

    domestically (3rd Amend.). Perhaps could do so if turned inward due to

    rebellion.

    o D: He was acting in his aggregate powers as the Nations Chief Exec and the

    Commander in Chief. Reasoning: C.C. power is to wage war effectively , and war needs vigorous

    decisive action, especially in modern industrialized warfare. Closing the steelmills hampered the prexy in doing that so he was right to interfere.

    o Blacks Boxes:

    Box 1: When the prez acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of

    Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in

    his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in

    these only, may he be said to personify the federal sovereignty. If

    unconstitutional it basically means feds lack that power. (Curtiss Wright)

    Box 2: When the Prez acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of

    authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone

    of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in whichits distribution is uncertain. Therefore Congressional inertia, indifference may

    sometimes enable, if not invite, independent prez measures.

    Cant let Prez just tell Congress to pass a new statute if they disagree

    with his interp. That would give him an extra Prez veto.

    o We want Congress to speak clearly in time of war.

    Box 3: When the Prez takes measures incompatible with the expressed or

    implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only

    upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    9/21

    Congress over the matter. Here it must be scrutinized with caution. (Steel

    Seizure/Barreme).

    ?: Does lowest ebb and incompatible suggest that he still has

    powers?

    Normative Concerns:

    o Perhaps it is good thing for an agile, decisive president having more power since world now hasquick threats. Supported by Fed #70

    o Maybe at least require exec decision to be out in the open?

    o Doesnt this disadvantage the prezs ability to keep secrets?

    o What if we are in Blackmuns 3rd Box?

    o Even at lowest ebb prez power is sufficiently strong to overcome

    Prez should have to rely on veto and expend political capital

    But, Congress can act w/o loss of political capital, Prez cant.

    o Congress better represents public opinion.

    o But public opinion swings widely, perhaps its better to have a solid policy stance.

    o Congress must have the chance to participate in the policy decision process, or else those

    decisions cant be called the policies of the United States

    o He has speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other govt institution can match.

    o Courts should not abstain from deciding these issues because what is at stake is the equilibrium of

    our constitiutional system.

    o Counter: Perhaps its a political question best left up to the other branches. (Jacksons

    concurrence in Youngstown is good for this, read again)

    Why Does the President Always Win?

    o Executive Initiative: Circumvention of legislative restraint. Included with his going around the

    War Powers Resolution. Congress is structurally poor for initiative with its bicameral structure,

    the presidency is ideal for such. He has speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other

    govt institution can match. Generation after FDR grew up believing in a muscular prexy ininternational affairs. Changing structure of intl org/diplomacy and swift action problems like

    terrorism make an active prexy needed. New image that prexy must act swiftly and forcefully has

    inevitably led to an active presidency. Counter: Shift of power to exec and his underlings facilitated swift and secret

    action, it sacrificed the technical expertise, institutional judgment, bureaucratic

    support, and bipartisan political approval that comes from consultative inter- and

    intrabranch decision making.

    o Congressional Acquiesence: Internal politics of congress lead them to be unable to build the

    consensus for action, and even then the supermajorities to overcome filibusters often are narrowly

    focused to known policy defects. Then, even if passed, bad drafting can impede its effectiveness.

    Consulting in every possible instance, or consulting with Congress gives prexy large latitudeto interpret. Congress also lacks adequate tools. Reporting and consultation reqs are easily dodged.

    Oversight is often post-facto. They could have used legislative vetoes or appropriations cut offs,butINS v. Chadha denied the veto. The more broad the language the better the prexy can argue

    that its hard to interpret, the more narrow the better his arg that its unconstitutional. Prez can also

    go around Congress by private companies and money. Lastly, a critical number of legislatures hasbeen unwilling to take initiative, preferring to leave the decision and the blame on the prexy. For

    instance, appropriations cut offs leave the legs responsible for leaving soldiers stranded in the

    field.

    Effective Counters: Disapproving by a joint resolution or by voting an

    unambiguous and complete denial of appropriated finds for the disfavored

    program. Still need to override an inevitable veto.

    o Judicial Tolerance: Would think less success given the few presidential powers specifically

    enumerated in Art. II. But he owes success to Curtiss Wrights sole organ of the national in

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    10/21

    external affairs. Prez now uses it fairly exclusively to justify anything. Plus, their statutory interp

    for foreign affairs: (1) ignores the legislative history and construes pro-president, (2) broadly

    construe it despite its impact on individual rights, and (3) rely on absence of express congressional

    disapproval, long history of prez deference to elevate to Box 1. UnderDames & Moore

    congressional inaction can be construed express approval. Yet to disapprove underChadha theymust have a supermajority, effectively allowing the Courts to move any action from Box 2 or 3 to

    Box 1. Then of course there isjusticiability

    issues.o Counter: The new judicial framework applies a special deference to executive acts in

    foreign affairs, a requirement that Jackson himself rejected in Youngstown.

    Treaty Power

    Alternative Ways to Make a Treaty:

    o Art. II Treaty: Senate gives advice and consent.

    o Function: It is the Prez, not the Senate that ratifies and makes treaties. The Senate advice

    and consent function can be plain advice or active participation in the negotiations, but its

    usually de minimus.

    Common Art II: Things that are enumerated under Art I. Commerce, or

    declaring war. Military alliances, common to war/peace, human rights.

    o Executive-Congressional Agreements: (NAFTA) Not passed by 2/3, but still has domestic effect.

    (Passed as a statute).

    Common: Trade/Finance

    o Executive Agreement: Prez acts on own w/o regard to congressional approval. Prez agrees to give

    warships in exchange for bases.

    o Counter: Hard to justify if the power is fully enumerated in Art. I only.

    Common: Things fully under Art II powers, Military Bases, Settling disputes

    over property.

    Normative:

    Isnt this good since we have more treaties these days?

    Isnt this unchecked expansion of exec power?

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    11/21

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    12/21

    o Cooper Memo/ABM Interp:

    o Prexy has dual role. (1) to negotiate the treaties. (2) To make sure they are faithfully

    executed, in doing this he is responsible for enforcing and executing international

    agreements, which means to interpret what the treaty means.

    Express Conditions:When the Senate imposes express conditions the Prez caneither resubmit or ratify. But if he ratifies with the conditions they are

    considered to be part of the US position in ratifying and binding. Statements in the Ratification Record:With exception to the representations

    from the committee reports, hearings, and debates we believe there is little

    probative value entitled in subsequent interpretations of the treaty. These are Ks

    between countries and they should be interpreted to give the meaning most in

    line with the with the shared expectations at the time of K. Best evidence of thisis the express language of the treaties and the language reflected in the

    negotiating record. Absent express interpretative statements the Senate does not

    participate in the negotiating process. Cannot amend treaties based on

    statements by Senators not transmitted to the other party. Statements made by

    the exec to the Senate during the process should have serious weight. Much like

    the leg record is useful in stat interp. Should give weight to current Exec interp,

    other wise you undermine his ability to shape policy by binding to statements of

    previous exec officials.

    Counter: If the prez makes an express statement that the Senate finds

    important and relies upon in voting then that would estop the prez from

    changing the provision. Otherwise you destroy their advisory role.

    Factors for Weight Given to Exec Statement: Formality of the

    statement, identity and position of the Exec making the statement, level

    of attention and interest focused on the meaning of the relevant treaty

    provision, and the consistency which members of the Exec branch

    adhered at the time to the view. These reflect the weight to which theSenate could have reasonably relied upon the statement.

    Biden Amendment:Pg 45

    Treaty Termination Can always argue changed circumstances to terminate.o Goldwater v. Carter (DC Circuit 1979) Ultimately Considered Not Jusiticiable

    o Reasoning: Treaty contained a provision to terminate on one years notice. Senate

    reserved no role for itself by amendment, reservation, or condition in the effectuation of

    this provision.

    Arg for Senate Role:Art. II, Sec. 2: Since the Prez clearly cannot enter a treaty

    w/o consent of the Senate, the inference is inescapable that he must in all

    circumstances seek the same senatorial consent to terminate that treaty. (2)

    Treaties, being supreme law of the land, can only be terminated by a subsequent

    statute. Maybe judges are better at interp than exec. Plus, the exec isnt good

    at checking itself (there is a post-facto political check.) We dont our entireforeign policy to change with every administration. Is this Box 3? Power to

    remove exec officials cant be compared to the power to this, its a power to

    remove purely executive officers and completely unrelated to the legislative orjudicial power. Treaty power has a substantial role in congress. He may be the

    sole organ of communication, but he is not the sole maker of foreign policy.

    Counter: If that is so then the prez would need senate confirmation to

    fire those they approve by his appointment, but the SC has held that is

    not so. Also never been so for ambassadors in foreign affairs. (2)

    Supremacy clause only is relation to state law, it does not mean such

    laws must be undone only in the way they are made. Extending the

    consultation of the Senate is an exceptional check on the Prez and

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    13/21

    should not be extended judicially by implication. Making a treaty is an

    entangling alliance, it does not follow that terminating a treaty should

    be considered as such. Powers in Art. I are specific and enumerated,

    while the powers in Art. II are general and undefined. External powers

    would have been granted even if never mentioned, and prez is the repto external affairs. Senate consent does not oblige him to go forward, so

    if he can refuse to enter he can terminate. To hold other wise wouldlock us into treaties even if the Prez and 2/3-1 of the Senate wanted out.

    Sole organ is not confined to prez as a channel of communication,

    but embraces an active policy determination as to the conduct of the US

    in regard to a treaty in response to numerous problems and

    circumstances as they arise. Maintaining diplomatic relationships is the

    substance of diplomacy and that is a Prez power. BOX 1 ExpressSenate consent to 1 year termination. Framers made it hard to get into

    treaties, so probly would want it easy to get out.

    o Distinguish: Treaty making as an international act and the

    consequences which flow domestically from such act.

    o SC Reasoning:

    Justiciability:Not ripe for judicial review until Congress and the Exec has taken

    action asserting its constitutional authority. If Congress choose not to confrontthe Prex, its not the Courts role to do so. But it could possibly be considered.

    Considerations for Justiciability:

    o Does the issue involve resolution of the questions committed

    by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of

    Government?

    Application:No express provision in theConstitution.

    o Would resolution of the question demand that a court move

    beyond areas of judicial expertise?

    o Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial

    intervention?

    International Law in US Courts

    o Moravcsik - US Exceptionalism

    o US is oldest constitutional system protecting a written bill of rights. Large public support

    for such laws, yet we are practically alone among Western nations in not signing onto

    treaties to promote these rights. We are unwilling to impose on the US general

    interational rules that the US govt accepts in principle as just. Stipulate that most treaties arent self-executing

    Refuse to accept the jurisdiction of international tribunalso Why Not?

    Rights Culture of the US: Long standing cultural values about procedural

    legitimacy render international norms intrinsically unattractive to Americans.

    These are popular sovereignty, local government, constitutional patriotism,

    nationalism and libertarianism.

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    14/21

    o Cons: US relativism obstructs the UNs resolve to promote

    universal respect for human rights.

    International obligations violate a widespread reverence toward the US

    Constitution and political institutions as sacred symbols among US

    legal elites and citizens.

    o Pros: Americans think our legal system, especially our

    constitution, provides a model that other countries would bewell advised to emulate. Americans are apt to be far less

    comfortable with the notion that when it comes to justice, we

    may have something to learn from other nations. This could be

    because lacking a distinct ethnocentral identity we identify

    ourselves to a liberal-democratic creed more than othernations.

    o Counters to This: The public has generally viewed intl human

    rights treaties more positively than do decision makers. Our

    policy is directed more by elites than the public. The ABA is

    pro-intl treaties like these, yet our politicians are not,

    suggesting that elite legal opinion is not the only driving force.

    Its more a fact that that introduction of such norms into our

    judicial system would be a problem for the conservativeagenda and so they attempt to fight against it, they fear them

    not because they are international, but because they are courts.

    Long-standing American belief in popular sovereignty and local

    government predisposes Americans to oppose centralized judicial

    norms

    o Pros: Contrast the dangers of unelected bureaucrats in

    international organizations with the legitimate role ofconstitutionally elected representative. There is neither a

    subjective sense of an international polity nor working global

    representative institutions, and thus there cannot be

    democratic accountability.

    o Counter: Strange because European countries are closer to

    this ideal in function and they are more accepting of thetreaties. Plus, the US is often seen the classic example of

    courts over coming popular bias to administer justice in the

    US. Courts have high respect in the US, and are often linkedto individual rights and freedom. Plus, there are other

    countries in the world with substantial commitment to local

    governance, that dont act as the US.

    A popular American rights culture of negative liberties rooted in an

    individualist worldview is incompatible with international human rights

    obligations.

    o Pros:Points to the absence of a true socialist party and toextensive social welfare institutions present in nearly all other

    industrial countries. Says US rejects global human rights

    norms because they embody a different philosophicalconception of rights. We stress liberty, they stress equality.

    We dont like socioeconomic rights. US rejects intl standards

    because they would undermine the high levels of exitsting

    protection afforded to particular individual rights by the more

    libertarian US system.

    o Counter: With the exception of the Universal Declaration

    which is wholly unenforceable all treaties have separated

    socioeconomic rights and human rights. We could if we

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    15/21

    wished ignore socioeconomic rights and enforce the others.

    Intl norms rarely undermine existing protections because they

    are almost always floors, and because they recognize the need

    to make a difference between state policies and intl ones.

    Pluralist Arguments

    Pros: Opposition to domestic application of multilateral norms is less

    likely in countries that possess strong unilateral bargaining powerabroad, stable democratic institutions at home, preferences aboutsubstantive rights that diverge from the international consensus, and

    decentralized political institutions that empower small veto groups.

    o Superpower Status of the US in World Affairs: Straight

    forward realist argument. The more you can act unilaterally to

    get what you want, the less willing you will be to sacrifice

    sovereignty to work multilaterally. Human rights norms are

    generally enforced through courts, where the powerful can

    loose sway, while things based on intl legislative forums allow

    the US a degree of bullying power.

    Counter: If this were really so true any US

    administration could simply ratify these treaties and

    then nonetheless pursue a unilateral human rightspolicy. This also fails to explain why the heateddebate internally? They are often more concerned

    with the domestic implications than the foreign ones.

    o Stability of Democratic Governance w/in Our Borders:

    While often linked towards liberal democracies, these

    established democracies have always been the countries most

    AGAINST enforceable intl norms. One reason is that they

    gain little at home from such treaties. And no national govtlikes to see its discretion limited through external constraints

    imposed by a judicial tribunal.

    Counter: Strange, since human rights are often

    linked to stable liberal democracies. Also, while theygain little at home, they can give a big boost to

    fledgling countries that may need the boost. Fact that

    we have an established ex post judicial review

    process undermines our desire to take it outside our

    courts, or for our courts to implement it at their own

    cost.

    o Concentration of a Small Conservative Minority: Oppose an

    expansion and enforcement of many individual rights. Since

    human rights norm protect neither property rights nor a right

    to education, and the right of religion is already widely

    recognized in the West, there is little incentive absent a fear of

    protecting domestic concerns. Also, the human rights

    promoted are often associated with egalitarian principles

    objected to by the right. They often been seen as attempts toimpose liberal federal standards on the southern states.

    o The Fragmented Nature of American Political Institutions:

    American system stands out in comparative perspective for its

    extreme commitment to the madisonian schema of separation

    for powers and checks and balances. And the more veto

    players the more difficult it is for a national government to

    accept international obligations. US system is exceptionally

    decentralized in this regard. For instance, the supermajority in

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    16/21

    the Senate lets 1/3 dissent in Senate block such treaties. Also

    need to get support of the Foregin Relations Committee chair.

    The federal system imposing burdens on the states is an

    incentive for conservative senators to block approval. There is

    supposedly concern that people could seek judicial help beforeUS courts, or we would be forced to prosecute our GIs at

    home to prevent prosecution abroad. US is only advanced industrial democracy that possesses all of (external power,

    democratic stability, conservative minorities, and veto-group politics).

    NORMATIVE CONCERNS Consequences of the Paradox:

    Encourages other countries to violate the norms. Ratification in the

    States would significantly legitimize these standards. It would also aid

    citizens in violent countries to raise such issues. The failure of the US

    to be seen as a country that protects human rights has undermined

    national security goals.

    o Counter: HR norms have spread widely w/o US backing. Tho

    some countries do cite American non-compliance there is little

    evidence that it is anything more than justification for policy

    decision based on other things. Anti-Americanism may even

    inflame moves towards these standards.

    Considering Foreign Law in US Cases (Normative Considertions):

    o Pros:Enrich our own decisions. Also creates that all-important good impression. When US courts

    are seen to be cognizant of other judicial systems, our ability to act as a rule-of-law model for

    other nations will be enhanced. The SC has done this since the founding, and they are not binding

    decisions but are entitled to the respect of wise men who thought it over. Our system was

    emulated everywhere, they are our constitutional offspring, how they decide can reflect on our

    system. When interpreting treaties its useful to look at foreign interpretations since the whole point

    is to make an intl deal. To ever increasing extent foreign countries have been democratizing, and

    sought to protect basic human. They often involved human beings deciding similar questions

    under similar statutes. We have to rely on counsel to find relevant citations, and judicial integrityto decide when a case is being picked purely to meet ends.

    o Cons: Its illegitimate, the constitution should be read under an originalist approach. Foreign

    rulings cannot help in that endevaour. Foreign judges are not accountable to the American people,

    and their decision should have no sway. You can find anything you want with foreign law, they

    could pick and choose to support their claims.

    Possible Functions of Foreign Law in the US

    o Interpret like terms. Due Process in treaties, etc.

    o Examining empirical effects.

    o Establishing community norms. (Such as cruel and unsual)

    Application of Foreign Law to US Cases

    o Lawerence v. Texas

    o Kennedy:Other Judeo-Christian nations have ruled against prohibiting homosexual

    conduct as well. The European Court of Human Rights held that law proscribing the

    conduct were invalid under the European Convention of Human Rights. Shows that

    reasoning in the previous case was rejected elsewhere. These rights have been accepted

    as integral parts of human freedom in many other countries. No showing that in this

    country the govt interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimateor urgent.

    o Scalia: Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because some States

    choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior. Much less when

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    17/21

    other nations criminalize such behavior. The court should not impose foreign moods,

    fads, or fashions on Americans.

    o Roper v.Simmons:

    o Kennedy:D argues that when the US signed the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights we did so subject to a reservation to a section that prohibited capital

    punishment for juveniles, showing it should be legally accepted here. The fact that US is

    the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to death for juvenilessupports the view that it should be abolished. We have pointed to foreign decisions for

    years to define cruel and unusual. Art. 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child

    contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles

    under 18. The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, doesprovide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions. It does not

    lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that theexpress affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply

    underscores the centrality of those same rights w/in our own heritage of freedom.

    o OConnor: Does not believe that a genuine nationalconsensus against the juvenile death

    penalty has yet developed, and because I do not believe the Courts moral proportionality

    supports a constitutional rule, can assign not belief to the role that international consensus

    described by the Court.

    o Scalia: The court is not the one with the power to join and ratify treaties on behalf of theUS. Art. II gives that power to the prexy and the Senate. Court fails to look at how many

    foreign countries adhere to these rules, and how many have mandatory death penalties for

    other crimes, a power we cannot accept. Many foreign laws are different (right to trial by

    jury, ECHR ruling that illegally seized evidence does not violate fair trials.)

    Foreign Suits in US Courts

    o Filartiga

    o Exec Brief:Sec. 1350 encompasses the law of nations as that body of law may evolve,

    not as the law of nations may have existed in 1789. Before entertaining a suit alleging a

    violation of human rights, a court must first conclude that three is a consensus in the

    international community, that the right is protected and that there is a widely shared

    understanding of the scope of this protection. Norm:A refusal to recognize these suitsmay damage the credibility of our commitment to the protection of human rights.Customary international law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively by the

    federal courts. An action for tort under international law is therefore a case arising

    under the law of the US w/in Art. III.

    o 2nd Circuit: Relied on intl agreements, declarations, and state policy and practice as

    evidence that the law of nations prohibits torture. ATCA does not grant new rights to

    aliens, it simply allows them to enforce rights already recognized by international law.

    Because the customary international law norm against torture was definable, obligagtory,

    and universal it constituted an actionable tort in violation of the law of nations for

    purposes of the staute.

    o Sosa Slightly Alters Filartiga

    o 3 Questions a Court Should Ask (current approach/revised Filartiga approach)

    1. Assess whether the asserted claim constitutes a violation of the present day

    law of nations, not the law of nations as it existed in 1789.

    Application: Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or

    legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customsand usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works

    of jurists and commentators.

    2. Determine whether the asserted violation of the law of nations is accepted by

    the civilized world and defined with specificity comparable to the features of the

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    18/21

    18th century paradigms we have recognized as existing at the time of the

    enactment.

    Application: Must be defined to the level of piracy, violations of safe

    conduct, and offenses against ambassadors.

    3. Whether an ATCA claim is judicially enforceable must account for the

    collateral consequences of recognizing such an action, particularly the foreign

    policy implications of permitting a judicial remedy for such a claim.

    Application: Even though many national constitutions revealed that

    many countries prohibit arbitrary detention, the consensus about this

    prohibition was at a high level of generality. But the claim of

    temporary arbitrary arrest did not rise to the level of specificity or

    acceptance of the acknowledged arrest did not rise to the level of

    specificity or acceptance of the acknowledged human rights prohibition

    against prolonged arbitrary detention.

    o Arguments Against these Claims (Rejected by SC in Sosa)

    Nonjustiticable Political Questions: If courts are simply construing an enacted

    statute, and the words being interpreted are the words torts in violation of law

    of nations, it is hard to see why constuing those words should not be

    quintessential judicial task.

    Origanlist Approach: That is, claims could only be heard under ATCA if they

    existed at the time of its creation in the 18th century. This would ban a claim for

    genocide, even though the international law has long expanded to incorporate

    such bans.

    Nationalist Perspective: Courts should recognize no cause of action unless the

    political branches expressly consent by enacting such claims into positive law. If

    there is not implementing act by the political branches, then intl law has no

    status in the US, or must be construed as some species of state law. They basedthis onEerie which said that federal common law decision making was against

    State rights. But, if youre interpreting customary intl law, which operates

    outside the realm of State powers, there is no such problem.

    o Transnational Public Law Litigation

    o Expanding effort by state and individual Ps to fuse intl legal rights w/ domestic judicialremedies. This is characterized by:

    A transnational party structure, in which states and nonstate entities equally

    participate.

    A transnational claim structure in which violations of domestic and intl, private,

    and public law are all alleged in a single action

    Aprospective focus directed as much upon obtaining judicial declaration of

    transnational norms as upon resolving past disputes

    The litigants strategic awareness of the transportabilityof those norms to other

    domestic and international for a for use in judicial interpretation or political

    bargaining, AND

    Subsequent process ofinstitutional dialogue among various domestic and

    international, judicial and political fora to achieve ultimate settlement.o Norms Considerations for Such Cases: Enunciates the clearly established intl human rights

    norms, gets compensation, detterence, and denial of a safe haven to the HR violator D.

    o Transnational Legal Process: The transsubstantive process whereby states and other transnational

    private actors use the blend of domestic and international legal process to internalize international

    legal norms into domestic law. An agent triggers an interaction at the intl level, works together

    with other agents of internalization to force an interpretation of the international legal norm in an

    interpretive forum, and then continues to work with those agents to persuade a resisting nation-

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    19/21

    state to internalize that interpretation into domestic law. Through these repeated process

    international norms are taken into domestic law.

    o Application: The US called Filartiga a demonstration of its commitment to torture, in

    response several UN bodies and other human rights orgs have cited Filartiga, and its beencited by intl courts. Foreign domestic courts have also incorporated elements of FIlartiga

    into their domestic approaches. This theory shows international law development being

    internalized absent a central Leviathan.

    o Filartiga v. Pena-Irala

    o H: Deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally

    accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of

    the parties.

    Evidence of International Law: Numerous intl agreements, and renunciation of

    torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the

    world. Works of jurists, writing professedly on intl law, or by the general usage

    and practices of nations, or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that

    law. But, the requirement that the rule have the general assent of civilizednations to become binding upon them all is a stringent one. Otherwise courts of

    one nation could impose idiosyncratic rules on antoher.

    Application: Torture is in the Universal Declaration, and that states tobe basic principles of intl law. Because of these declarations nationscan no longer claim to not know what they have signed onto.

    Norms:

    Pros: US must have the power to vindicate the rights of foreigners in

    this country to protect our reputation as a country that deals justice to

    all.

    o Sosa

    o H:Courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on anorm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a

    specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century paradigms we have recognized.

    Reasons for Judicial Caution: Prevailing conception of common law has

    changed greatly since the founding. Also, there is no federal common law, andthe courts are bound tightly on what sorts of federal law they can make. Would

    also pose a potential problem for the legislative and executive branches in

    maintaining foreign relations. US courts must be very cautious before imposinga ruling that effectively limits a foreign nations domestic powers. Fifth,

    Congress has done nothing as a body to promote further causes of action.

    o Determining an International Norm: Where there is not treaty, and no controlling

    executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort myst be had to the customs and

    usages of civilized nations, and, as evidecen of these, to the work of jurists and

    commentators. Executive opinions on the foreign relations consequences is due great

    weight. Footnote 21. BUT, it is not controlling. Separation of powers requires the court

    to do an independent inquiry (Khulumani).

    Treaty: Here he cited a treaty, but the court says it was signed with the

    reservation that it was not self-executing, so therefore it cannot be a basis forjudicial decisions (minus some showing of enacting legislation.) So they turn to

    customary international law.

    Customary IL:

    Norm Concerns: His argument would create a cause of action for

    ANY arrest, anywhere in the world, not under the jurisdiction of the

    place it took place w/o regard to the circumstances. His argument

    exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we require.

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    20/21

    o Khlumani

    o Courts are free to deny a remedy to a breach of an international law, regardless of

    whether it is recognized as international law. But, to assure itself that it has jurisdiction it

    must establish that there is such an international recognition. Whether or not a treaty isself-executing is evidence of whether or not that norm is sufficiently accepted by the intl

    community, but simply because a treaty is not self-executing does not make it of no value

    in that determination.o Hall: Federal courts must turn to intl law to divine standards of primary liability under

    ATCA. But to derive a standard of accessorial liability a federal court should consult the

    federal common law. Intl law does not define the means of its domestic enforcement.

    These means encompass at least some aiding and abetting issues.

    o Dissent: Judicial acquiescence to the executive on foreign relation questions has been

    established under the political question doctrine. Creation of aiding and abetting liability

    is a legislative act, removed from creating causes of action. Because there is criminal

    aiding and abetting in international law does not mean that there is civil aiding and

    abetting liability as well. There should be a presumption against the extraterritorial

    projection of US law on foreign nations. The original ATS was meants to avoid conflict

    with foreign nations, not provoke it, it was originally intended to redress harms to foreign

    ambassadors ON American soil, not injuries originating outside the states.

    Factors for Dismissing based On Foreign Opinion: Degree to which theinterests of a foreign sovereign are legitimately affronted by the conduct of

    litigation in a US forum, steps the foreign sovereign may have taken to address

    the issues in the litigation, and the extent of our own interest in the underlying

    issues. Also, whether its a democratically govt w/ independent judiciary.(perhaps most important.) Is there a legit chance they can seek fair redress in

    their own courts?

    o Concerns of Foreign Governments:

    US Foreign Relations Considerations: This promotes law suits challenging the

    conduct of foreign governments toward their own citizens in their own

    countries, charges they would normally be immune from, by naming as Ds those

    companies that legally did business with them. This leads to tensions between

    the US and the other govt. Should be especially cautious about pronouncing

    limitations to what foreign govts can do in their own territories and when thosecountries have gone out of bounds. Aiding and abetting means you have to have

    a principal that was committing illegal activities. So you are putting South

    Africas official conduct on trial. This seriously undermines the political

    branches ability to conduct foreign policy. This will deter US companies from

    making investment in developing countries, thus hurting our interest in helpingthem develop. This will also affect the govts ability to use the fiull range of

    options available to change foreign policies.

    UK: Such litigation interferes with national sovereignty, creates legal

    uncertainty and costs,and risks damaging international relations. This treats theATS to extend US jurisdiction far beyond the limits recognized by IL. This will

    subject these companies to confusion and risk of conflicting legal standards.

    South Africa: This will intrude upon and disrupt SAs own attempts atreconciliation. They have chosen a no finger pointing approach, and this

    litigation threatens to undermind that. Matters central to the future of domestic

    SA affairs should not be adjudicated in foreign countries. The democratically

    elected govt of SA is charged with a mandate to deal with Apartheid, not US

    courts. It remains an issue for the court of SA to define reparations. This will

    discourage direct foreign investment in SA. This directly infringes on SA

    sovereignty.

    o Limitations on ATS: (1) Forum non-conviens. (2) Foreign Sovereign Immunity

    o Norms for ATS

  • 8/2/2019 2009 - Waxman Outline

    21/21

    Pros: (1) Hold people accountable, (2) provide victims w/ acknowledgement

    reparations, (3) promote awareness of abuses, (4) contribute in international

    norms (transnational legal process), (5) catalyze foreign efforts to prosecute, (6)

    prevent US as safe haven, and (7) determinancy.

    Cons: (1) Interfere w/ foreign policy, (2) effective?, (3) reciprocity, and (4) US

    as Court of 1st Pesort