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Session Two: Non-reductive Physicalisms And The Problems They Face

Marianne Talbot

University of Oxford

26/27th November 2011

A Romp Through the Philosophy of Mind

1

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Session Two: Non-reductive Physicalisms And The

Problems They Face:

What is Non-reductive Physicalism?

Why is NRP attractive? Why isnt everyone a NRP?

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What is Non-reductive Physicalism?

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Well discuss two versions of Non-reductivePhysicalism (NRP):

Functionalism

Anomalous Monism

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Both versions of NRP reject reductionism

i.e. they deny that well ever find bridge laws

because they deny that mental state types

are numerically identical to

types of physical state

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Functionalism is the view that mental states

.are theoreticalorfunctionalstates.

states that are the states they are because

they play a particular role in a given theory

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The theory that generates our ontologicalcommitment to mental states

according to the functionalist is the theory ofFolk Psychology

the everyday theory to which we appeal in

explanation of behaviour

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In our everyday interactions we attribute mental

states

on the basis of observations of peoples

behaviour

and we think of the mental states we

attribute

as internalstates that are causally implicated in

the production of that behaviour

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Input

(EnvironmentalStimuli)

Output(Behaviour)

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So pains, for example, are internal states.

that are caused by tissue damage

and that cause exclamations and cries of

pain

and limb withdrawal

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Input(Tissue

Damage)

Output(Avoidance

Behaviour)

Pain

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Beliefs that it is raining are internal states

that are caused by perceptions of rain

and that cause umbrella raisings

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Input(Perception

of Rain)

Output

(Umbrella

Raising)

Belief

it israining

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So for the Functionalist mental states are functional

states

but this does not make the Functionalist a Physicalist

.because the claim that mental states are functionalstates

is consistent with Dualism.

the claim that mental states are not physical states

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Functionalism isphysicalist insofar as itinsists

that only physical states can play (orrealise)

the functional role of mental states

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Functionalism is non-reductive insofar as

it permits multiple realisability

so one and the same mental state type

can be realised by different physical states

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The class of pains multiply realised bydifferent physical states

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By such means the Functionalist avoids

Kripkes argument

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So one way of being a Non-reductive

Physicalist is to be a Functionalist

the other way is to be an Anomalous

Monist

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The Anomalous Monist believes that mental

states

causally interact with physical states

that causal interaction depends on law

and that all causal laws are physical

so all mental states must have a physical

description

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In virtue of the physical description of the states,

according to AM

the state is governed by a physical law

whilst in virtue of its mental description

the state can underwrite reason explanations of

behaviour

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NSM

Pain

Arm moving

Waving to friend

Reason

Cause

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Anomalous Monism isphysicalist insofar asit insists

that every causally efficacious mentalstate token

has a physical description

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Anomalous Monism is non-reductive insofaras

each token of a mental state type

might have a different physical

description

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The class of pains multiply realised by

different physical states

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Anomalous Monism is realist about the mental

in that it believes mental properties are real

properties

that cannot be reduced to properties of other

types

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Functionalism is reductionist about the mental

in that it thinks that mental properties arereal

but that they are in factfunctionalproperties

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It is easy to say why Non-reductive

Physicalism is attractive

so lets look at what is wrong with it

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According to the Functionalist mental states are

functional states

this means that so long as a thing has inside it

a state that is playing the functional role

characteristic of a given mental state

that thing enjoys that mental state according to

Functionalism

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But is this right?

Can we imagine something that is enjoying a given

mental state but that hasnt got inside it a state that

is playing the functional role characteristic of that

mental state?

Can we imagine something that has inside it

something that is playing the functional role

characteristic of a mental state but that isntenjoying that mental state?

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We can certainly imagine the former

for example a person may be in pain

yet not have inside him a state

playing the functional role characteristic of pain

think of the actor or the stoic

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But the Functionalist can easily respond to thisobjection

by insisting that physical states that are playing the role

of mental states

..interact with each other in such a way as to produce

uncharacteristic behaviours

what matters to the Functionalist is the disposition to

behave in ways characteristic of given mental states

not that a person is actually exhibiting that behaviour

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InputOutput

Pain

Belief Im in pain

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But it is not so obvious the Functionalist canrespond to the second question:

the robot who is functionally equivalent to you the Chinese room the population of China

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In all these cases we are supposing that a thing hasinside it

something that functions in the way a mental

state supposedly functions

but that that is not sufficient for its enjoying a

given mental state

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InputOutput

State playing causalrole but not one with

the properties

characteristic of themental

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If something can have inside it something that is playingthe functional role

assigned by Functionalism to a given mental state

yet we can still doubt that that thing is enjoying the

mental state in question

Functionalism might be false

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A way to get around this:

Insist that anything that has inside it something playing

the functional role of a given mental state IS enjoying thatmental state even if it does lack the properties usually

believed to be essential to the mental

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Perhaps the Functionalist could say

that any state that causes a state ofbelieving that one is inpain

is a pain state

i.e. that pains do not essentially have qualia

instead they essentially cause beliefs about qualia(beliefs that may be false?)

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InputOutputBelief Im in pain

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On this story the Functionalist is reducing all talk ofqualia

to talk of beliefs

which means that the Functionalist story about belief

.becomes very important

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But at this point we might want to ask whether

there really are functional roles that are

characteristic of beliefs

.lets look again at the belief that it is raining

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The belief that it is raining may be caused by theperception of rain

but it may be caused by almost anything else too

.and it may cause umbrella raising

but it may cause almost any other behaviour

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The thing about beliefs is that they are reasons for

acting

and reasons are holistic

almost anybeliefcan be a reason for any otherbelief given the right context

so why should we think there is any such thing as

THE functional role characteristic of a belief?

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Functionalism faces major problemsbut are the

problems conclusive?

Not, it would seem if we are prepared to countenance thenon-existence of qualia

But are we?

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Anomalous Monism also faces problems

the key one being the problem of causalexclusion

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The causal exclusion argument points to the fact that theAnomalous Monist

acknowledges that all causally efficacious mental

events

have physical properties in virtue of which they are

subsumed by physical laws

and asks him how, in that case, he can maintain his claimthat mental properties are causally efficacious?

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If a hand withdrawal is caused by the activation of anevent that is both a pain and a CFF..

.and CFF and hand-withdrawals are correlated by some

causal law

then unless pains and CFF are related by some bridge

law (unless they are identical)

the pain has no causal role to play in causing the hand-withdrawal

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CFF

Pain

Hand-Withdraw

al

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CFF

Pain

Hand-Withdraw

al

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If the causal exclusion argument is right, then

even if the mental is real

on Anomalous Monism

it has no causal role to play and is

epiphenomenal

because Anomalous Monism denies theexistence of bridge laws

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The causal exclusion argument can be rejected

by rejecting the account of causation on which it is

based

an account of causation on which it isproperties of events

that are causally efficacious

not the events themselves

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If instead we claim that causation is a relation betweentoken events

and the belief that it isproperties that are causallyefficacious

is a function of the fact that it is laws we are interestedin

because it is laws that enable us to predict, explain andmanipulate events

.we can reject the causal exclusion argument

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On this story events that are both mental and physical

cause other events

thereby making true both causal claims backed bylaws

and reason explanations that are not law-governed

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On this story we must recognise two sorts of

property

the mental and the physical

and two sorts of explanation

the causal and the rational

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Like Functionalism then, Anomalous Monism facesserious problems.but are they conclusive?

Not, it would seem if we are prepared to countenance

the idea that the relata of the causal relation are notproperties but events.

But are we?

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So where are we on Physicalism?

Reductive Physicalism is scuppered by Kripke Functionalism seems to involve eliminating

qualia from our ontology

Anomalous Monism seems to involve embracingan unusual theory of causation

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Perhaps Physicalism in all its forms is simply

wrong?

But dualism also seems simply wrong (so long as

we continue to insist on the causal closure of

physics)

So what do we do now?

After dinner well look at a couple of suggestions

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References:

Heil, J: Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction chapters 7-11and 13

Chalmers, D: Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (2002

Oxford University Press) Section 1D, and paper by Donald

Davidson (p. 116), and Jaegwon Kim (p. 170)

Podcast: Rortys Discussion with Donald Davidon (6 part series, this is number one):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjWTuF35GtY

Podcast: Putnam on Mental States:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izqKc1SIFJQ