2011 winter pir preview copy

7/31/2019 2011 Winter PIR Preview Copy

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1 FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS WWW.FAS.ORG

PIRWinter 2011 Volume 64 No 4

THE MAGAZINE FOR SCIENCE & SECURIT

BuildingTransparency

New UNMeasure

Road RulesFOR Space

Twitterin NorthKorea

THE ANTI-SATELLITE

CAPABILITY OF PHASED

ADAPTIVE APPROACHMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Managing riskin Space

Q&A:Harold Varmus

FAS$12.95US

The NewSpace SECURITYEnvironment

The Case for Collaborationand Data Fusion


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FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS WWW.FAS.ORG 2

PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011


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Winter 2011 Volume 64 No 4

FEATURES

12...Rules of the Road: Responsible Use of Weapons in SpaceShould a major outage of satellite capacity occur, financial and trade markets could collapse, a recessionspanning the globe would ensue, and security tensions would exacerbate. Should the United States seize theinitiative and secure low-Earth orbit while its allies are unchallenged in space?

By Everett Carl Dolman, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced

Air and Space Studies (SAASS).18... Managing Risk in SpaceSince the launch of Sputnik in 1957, governments and commercial companies have placed thousands of satellites in orbit aroundthe Earth. Today, there are more than 16,000 active satellites and debris in the public catalog of tracked objects. Governments andbusinesses operating spacecraft need to take a new approach to enhance the safety and efficacy of the space environment.

By Richard Dal Bello, Vice President of Legal and Government Affairs at Intelsat General Corporation.

25...The Anti-Satellite Capability of the Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense SystemOn February 14, 2008, General James Cartwright announced the United States would destroy a nonresponsive intelligence satellite

soon to re-enter the Earths atmosphere using the Aegis sea-based missile defense system. While framed as a public safety measure,some observers expressed skepticism that this risk was the real or entire motivation for the exercise. The interception demonstratedthe ASATcapability of the U.S. Aegis sea-based missile defense system.

By Laura Grego, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists.

31... How to Work in the New Space Security EnvironmentMore than 40 countries operate satellites in orbit. The increasing number of players presents a new and challenging space securityenvironment that demands new approaches.

By Simon P. Worden, Director at NASA Ames Research Center; Creon Levit, Research Scientist in the Advanced SupercomputingDivision at NASA Ames Research Center; James Mason, Researcher Associate at NASA Ames Research Center ; and Jan Stupl,

a Research Fellow at NASA Ames Research center.

37... Transparency and Confidence-Building in Outer Space: Inching Toward ActionAlthough concerns about the safety and security of humankinds operations in outer space have been with us since the dawn of thespace age in 1957, the past decade has seen a steady increase in attention to the issue at the multilateral level. How do we best coor-dinate international efforts?

By Theresa Hitchens, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

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CONTENTS

7... Presidents Message

Securing Nuclear Materials:Remaining Challenges

Charles D. Ferguson writes about the 2012 Nuclear SecuritySummit in Seoul and a threat that could have global

catastrophic consequences.

9... Q & A

Harold E. Varmus, Nobel laureate in medicine, wasinterviewed about many of the issues of concern to the

FAS founders that exist today.

44... Research ReportHow to Make Twitter Available in NorthKorea

Devabhaktuni Srikrishna and Rajeev Krishnamoorthy writeabout how citizens with wireless mesh-enabled smart phonesmight overcome government censorship.

52... Duly Noted

Ambassador Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution andDr. Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation disuss the pro-posed missile defense system from the NATO and Russianperspectives respectively.

55... Reviews

Book Merchants of Doubt by Naomi

Oreskes and Erik M. Conway

Film The Forgotten Bomb by Bud Ryanand Stuart Overbey.

60... FAS Matters

News and Notes from FAS Headquarters.

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MICHAELA BENDIKOVAShe is a research assistant for missile defense and foreign policyat the

Heritage Foundation.CHARLES P. BLAIRHe is theSenior Fellow on State and Non-State Threats at the Federa-tion of American Scientists.ARIEL COHENDr. Cohen is the Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Stuies at the Heritage Foundation. He brings firsthand knowledge of theformer Soviet Union and the Middle East through a wide range of stuies, covering issues such as economic development and political reformin the former Soviet republics, U.S. energy security, and the global Waon Terrorism. For more information seewww.arielcohen.com.

RICHARD DAL BELLOMr. DalBello is Vice President of Legal and Government Affairs at Intsat General Corp., responsible for managing the company's legal team,leading its government relations and public policy efforts, and represening it before numerous U.S. and international policy bodies. He alsoserved for four years as the Assistant Director for Aeronautics and Spain the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy.

EVERETT CARL DOLMANHis published works includeAstropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in theSpace Age (Frank Cass, 2002); The Warrior State: How Military Organ

zation Structures Politics (Palgrave, 2005) andPure Strategy: Power anPrinciple in the Information Age (Frank Cass, 2005). Dr. Dolman has

taught international relations and international political economy atThe College of William & Mary, Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville, and Berry College.

LAURA GREGOShe focuses on the technology and policy implications of space weapoand is primarily concerned with safeguarding the secure and equitableuse of space. She is the co-author ofSecuring the Skies and The Physics Space Security, and her essay, Security in Space appeared in the Wint2011-12 issue of Asian Perspective. She also is the author or co-authorofmore than 20peer-reviewed, published papers on a range oftopics.She also has testified before Congress and addressed the UnitedNations Conference on Disarmament on space security issues.

THERESA HITCHENSTheresa Hitchens is the director of the United Nations Institute for Darmament Research (UNIDIR), an autonomous institute within theU.N. Ms. Hitchens has years of experience in research and writing on abroad array of subjects in the field of international security, defence,disarmament and non-proliferation.Her latest publications include

Future Security in Space: Charting a Cooperative Course, September 20CDI, Washington, D.C.; Debris, Traffic Management, and Weaponiztion: Opportunities for and Challenges to Cooperation in Space,The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2007, Vol. XIV, Issueand The Perfect Storm: International Reaction to the Bush NationalSpace Polic y,High Frontier, March 2007, Vol. 3, No. 2.

CHARLES D. FERGUSONEditor in Chief

MONICA A. AMARELOManaging and Creative Editor

EDITORIAL BOARD

Gilman Louie, Rosina Bierbaum, Philip B. Carter,

David Franz, Alton Frye, Robert G. Gard, Jr, Richard L.

Garwin, Nathaniel Goldhaber, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty,

Lawrence M. Krauss, Rodney W. Nichols, Scott Sagan,

Maxine L. Savitz, Michael L. Telson, Valerie Thomas

LETTERS TO THE EDITORFAS Public Interest Report

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EMAIL:[email protected]

The PIR welcomes letters to the editor. Letters should not

exceed 300 words and may be edited for length and clarity.

Annual subscription is $50.00 per year. Archived FAS Pub-

lic Interest Reports are available online atwww.fas.org.

FOR ADVERTISING Call (202) 454-4680.

Copyright 2011 by the Federation of American Scientists.

Contributors

PIRWinter 2011 Volume 64 No 4

ESTABLISHED 1945
http://www.fas.org/mailto:[email protected]://www.fas.org/http://www.fas.org/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.arielcohen.com/http://www.arielcohen.com/http://www.fas.org/http://www.fas.org/


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ANDREW KARAMDr. Karamhas worked in radiation and radioactivity since 1981. He is a

science writer with more than 200 bylined articles in the encyclopediaseries "Science and its Times," books on science for middle-school students,and an account of life on a submarine, Rig Ship forUltra Quiet.

RAJEEV KRISHNAMOORTHYDr. Krishnamoorthy was most-recently the founder of TZero Technolo-gies, a pioneer in Ultrawideband RF radios. While at Bell Labs, he wasinstrumental in the design and development of the early 802.11 and802.11b systems and in the formation of the 802.11 (Wi-Fi standard).

CREON LEVITMr. Levit is a research scientist in the Advanced Supercomputing Divisionat NASA Ames Research Center.

JAMES MASONMr. Mason is a researcher associate at NASA Ames Research Center wherehe works on the growing problem of orbital space debris.

STEVEN PIFERHe is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer and directs the Arms ControlInitiative at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.

DEVABHAKTUNI SRIKRISHNASrikrishna was the founder and Chief Technology Officer of Tropos Net-

works which builds metro-scale wireless broadband (Wi-Fi) systems basedon cellular mesh technology and is deployed in several cities across theUnited States. His publications have spanned quantum computing, paral-

lel computing, wireless data communications, and nuclear detection.

JAN STUPLDr. Jan Stupl is a Research Fellow at NASA Ames Research center wherehe works on space debris mitigation and satellite communication. He is anaffiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stan-ford University, where he analyzed current developments in laser technol-ogy regarding a possible application of lasers as anti-satellite weapons.

HAROLD E. VARMUSHarold Varmus, M.D., co-recipient of a Nobel Prize for studies of the ge-netic basis of cancer, was nominated by President Obama as Director ofthe National Cancer Institute on May 17, 2010. Varmus has authored over300 scientific papers and five books, including an introduction to the ge-netic basis of cancer for a general audience and a memoir, The Art and

Politics of Science, published in 2009.

SIMON PETE WORDENDr. Simon P. Worden (Brig. Gen., USAF, ret.) is the center director atNASA Ames Research Center. He is a recognized expert on space issues both civil and military. He has authored or co-authored more than 150scientific technical papers in astrophysics, space sciences, and strategicstudies.

Join FAS Today!

With a donation of $50 or more,you can become an FAS Member,which includes a subscription to

thePIR.

For more information on how tojoin the Federation of AmericanScientists, please contact KatieColten at [email protected] visit:www.FAS.org/member/index.html.

Your FAS Membership includes:

early access to four issues of

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legacy by performing rigorousanalysis of todays most

important security and science

policy issues.

Contributors
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FAS.orGDemise ofOsama bin Laden

Find the 1998 GrandJury indictments ofOsama bin Laden forhis role in thebombing of the WorldTrade Center. Thepage provides links toCRS reports, speeches,and U.S. policy in theMiddle East.

www.FAS.org/policy/binladen

Secrecy News

Read reports on newdevelopments ingovernment secrecy andaccess resources onsecrecy, intelligence andnational security policy.

www.FAS.org/blog/secrcy

Fukushima

Anniversary

Watch and listen toclips of FAS President

Charles Fergusonexplain the implicationsof the accident at theFukushima DaiichiNuclear Power Plant forthe global expansion ofnuclear power. Readopinions, reports, andnews stories about thecatastrophe.

www.FAS.org/policy/japan

BioBlog

Learn more aboutbiosecurity issues andnational policy as it relatesto health, biologicalsciences, and dual-usetechnologies.

www.FAS.org/blog/bio

SSP Blog

Expert opinions andanalyses of importannational andinternational securityissues.

www.FAS.org/blog/

ssp

FAS ONLINE

Physicists Havea Responsibilityto Society

The debate and controversy over theNational Science Foundation (NSF)criterion on the broader societal im-pacts of NSF-funded research haveserved the important function of chal-lenging the physics community to re-examine why public money shouldsupport pure and applied physics re-search and what is the role of physicistsin society.

On February 27, 2012, FAS PresidentDr. Charles D. Ferguson joined AAASPresident Alan Leshner, APS PresidentBarry C. Barish, and Dr. Don Prosnitzfor a discussion on the broader impactsof research and individual responsibil-ity at the March Meeting of theAmerican Physical Society in Boston,MA. Dr. Ferguson argued that whilethe NSF criterion is well intentioned,

it appears ill-informed and runs therisk of creating a checklist of activitiesto fulfill physicists responsibility toconnect their work to larger societalissues.

Most government-funded research isalready connected to larger societalimpacts such as national defense,energy research, and economic issues.

Dr. Ferguson's presentation argues thatscientists need to become better educa-tors to policymakers and the publicand apply their knowledge and skills tobetter society.

Read the presentation here:http://www.fas.org/blog/president/2012/02/physicists-and-society/
http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/http://www.fas.org/blog/president/2012/02/physicists-and-society/http://www.fas.org/blog/president/2012/02/physicists-and-society/http://www.fas.org/blog/president/2012/02/physicists-and-society/http://www.fas.org/blog/president/2012/02/physicists-and-society/http://www.fas.org/blog/president/2012/02/physicists-and-society/http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2011/meritreviewcriteria.pdfhttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssphttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssphttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssphttp://www.fas.org/blog/ssphttp://www.fas.org/blog/biohttp://www.fas.org/blog/biohttp://www.fas.org/blog/biohttp://www.fas.org/blog/biohttp://www.fas.org/policy/japanhttp://www.fas.org/policy/japanhttp://www.fas.org/policy/japanhttp://www.fas.org/policy/japanhttp://www.fas.org/blog/secrcyhttp://www.fas.org/blog/secrcyhttp://www.fas.org/blog/secrcyhttp://www.fas.org/blog/secrcyhttp://www.fas.org/policy/binladenhttp://www.fas.org/policy/binladenhttp://www.fas.org/policy/binladenhttp://www.fas.org/policy/binladenhttp://www.fas.org/http://www.fas.org/


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In April 2009 in Prague, President Barack Obama recommitted the United States to achieve anuclear-weapon-free world. Although he cautioned that reaching this goal might not occur inhis lifetime, he did pledge his administration to cooperate with other governments and inter-

national institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency to accomplish securingall vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. The motivation behind that goal was to preventterrorists from acquiring the essential fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium (HEU)and plutonium needed to make nuclear explosives. No matter how much terrorist groupsmight covet nuclear weapons, they cannot obtain them without buying, stealing, or beinggiven fissile material or intact nuclear warheads.

The Prague speech led to the first ever Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 in Washington,D.C. Remarkably, the 2010 summit brought together more than 40 heads of state. Even moreimportantly, they agreed that preventing nuclear terrorism is a top priority. Many of theseleaders pledged to take further steps to lock up nuclear material, phase out the use of HEU(which is the highest risk fissile material because of its relative ease of use in a crude nuclear

explosive), and form centers of excellence to promote nuclear security across the globe. Whilethe majority of national leaders were not at the Summit, the ones that were represented mostof the countries with large quantities of weapons-usable fissile material.

When the world is facing numerous challenges such as ensuring access to clean water, provid-ing for adequate amounts of nutritional food, and improving public health, it is fair to ask whynuclear security deserves such emphasis. These are not either or choices. Leaders need to worktogether to solve all these problems. Nonetheless, the motivation behind President ObamasNuclear Security Summit was to attract high-level political attention to a threat that couldhave catastrophic consequences worldwide. Nuclear terrorism is not just a threat to the UnitedStates or other Western countries. While a nuclear detonation by a terrorist group in any citywould immediately kill upwards of a hundred thousand people, this attack could cause panic

in numerous cities around the globe and could result in trillions of dollars worth of damage tothe global economy.

Encouragingly, 80 percent of the pledged commitments made by the Washington NuclearSecurity Summit have been accomplished. But much more work is needed. For example, doz-ens of research reactors still use HEU. One of the remaining technical hurdles is to develophigh-density low enriched uranium fuel and targets for isotope production in order to substi-tute for HEU. This effort could take several years meanwhile governments should ensure thatthey are providing the necessary funds for the R&D.

Securing Nuclear

Materials:Remaining Challenges

PRESIDEN

TSMESSAG

E
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But I would argue that the biggest hurdle is the political will for leaders to link preventingnuclear terrorism with achieving nuclear disarmament. As George Shultz, Sam Nunn,William Perry, and Henry Kissinger assessed in their first Wall Street Journalop-ed inJanuary 2007, nuclear weapons have become liabilities rather than assets. Although theybelieved that during the Cold War nuclear weapons served a purpose to prevent major warbetween the United States and the Soviet Union by threatening mutual assured destruction,

today the most likely route of nuclear weapons use is by a terrorist group. Nuclear-armedterrorists would most likely not be deterred. If the nuclear-armed nations could dismantletheir warheads and immediately turn the fissile material into physical states that are notreadily usable for weapons, they will have made major strides toward reducing the risk ofnuclear terrorism.

But the risk would not be zero as long as HEU or plutonium would continue to be used inresearch reactors, naval reactors, and commercial reactors. Although the Nuclear SecuritySummit on March 26 and 27 in Seoul, Republic of Korea, will focus on HEU in researchreactors, the agenda fails to call attention to naval reactors. The United States still usesHEU to fuel its submarines and aircraft carriers and is opposed to converting the reactorson these warships to low enriched uranium. Opposition arises from the fact that the HEU-fueled reactors have long-lived cores thus saving on refueling costs. Moreover, the UnitedStates has a huge stockpile of HEU dedicated to naval use. No security system, however, isperfect, and it is possible that some HEU from this stockpile may become unsecured. Evenif this stockpile remains highly secure, it can make the United States look hypocritical whenWashington requests other nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their weapons-usablefissile material.

The other major left-out agenda item is to address the security challenge of the massiveplutonium stockpile slated for commercial reactors. About 250 metric tons of civilianplutoniumenough to make more than ten thousand nuclear weaponshas been sepa-rated from the protective barrier of highly radioactive fission products in spent nuclear fuel.

(This is comparable to the stockpile of military plutonium.) France, Japan, India, andRussia, in particular, have had plutonium-recycling programs. China may soon follow suit.But the Fukushima Daiichi accident and pending changes in Japans nuclear policy mightresult in further delays in Japans reuse of plutonium. This has called into question whatJapan will do with the almost 10 metric tons stored in Japan and the 35 metric tons storedin France and the United Kingdom. There are no easy solutions. One option could be todispose of the plutonium in deep boreholes; another is to surround it with highly radioac-tive materials; and another is to consume it in burner reactors, but this technology has con-fronted technical problems and could be used in a breeder mode to make more plutonium.

Making concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament, phasing out use of HEU in navalreactors, and disposing of the huge stockpile of civilian plutonium are serious political and

technical challenges that deserve to be on the agenda at the Seoul Summit and at futuresummits.

Charles D. FergusonPresident, Federation of American Scientists


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In the decade since you founded PubMedCentral and

cofounded the Public Library of Science, more than

6,000 open access journals have been created. PLoS

ONE published a study by a team of researchers from

the HANKEN School of Economics that showed veryrapid growth of Open Access (OA) publishing during

the period of 1993-2009. In 2009, an estimated

191,000 articles were published in 4,769 OA journals.

What more needs to be done to improve access to

scientific research? How can scientists increase and

improve the dissemination of their findings? How do

you refute the argument that the OA standard is not

as rigorous or objective as subscription journals be-

cause scientists are paying to publish their research?

As your numbers indicate, there has been a remarkable increase

over the past decade in the access that is now provided to much ofthe scientific literature, both through public access to digital ar-chives like PubMed Central and through full-fledged open accessto journals like those published by the Public Library of Science.

Still, there are shortcomings that we should not forget while weapplaud the progress that has been made. Effective use of PubMedCentral required Congress to mandate deposition; the mandateapplies only to NIH-supported articles, not those supported byother agencies; deposition can be (and often is) delayed for as long

as a year, despite the lack of evidence that shorter delays would sig-nificantly diminish journal revenues; and use of the material is oftencurtailed because the journals continue to hold copyright and donot license use under optimal terms, such as those advocated byCreative Commons. In an ideal world, all journals would use an

open access business model (it is sensible, and it works). But I am arealist and know that this complete transformation will take dec-ades. In the near future, I would be pleased if public access occurredmore quickly, if an open access option was standard for all jour-nals, and if an effort were made to build a public archive of the olderscientific literature which is becoming increasingly inaccessible de-spite its utility.

These changes are occurring slowly, despite their desirability,because some of the most lucrative, subscription-based journals con-tinue to wield an inappropriate influence over the behavior of manyscientists. The blame for this should be directed to the scientificcommunity, not the journals. Their influence depends on the inor-dinate importance that our colleagues place on the journal in whichan article appears, rather than on the content of article, in decisionsabout who wins grants and gets hired and promoted. In this fashionmany scientists have ceded power to the editors of a few highly se-lective traditional journals, which in turn have little incentive tochange their practices, even though an author-pays open accessmodel for publishing can be lucrative as well as beneficial. Untilscientists acknowledge this inappropriate standard (counting cita-tions in famous journals) and return to the traditional but moredifficult task of judging colleagues by actually reading their work, it

will be difficult to take open access to the next stage.


Q&A:HaroldVarmus

Many of the issues of concern to the FAS foun-ders till exist today. Harold E. Varmus is the di-rector of the National Cancer Institute. He re-ceived the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medi-

cine in 1989. Previously he served as Presidentand Chief Executive Officer of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (MSKCC) and as Direc-tor of the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

He supplied his answers to FAS questions viaemail.

Learn more about Harold Varmus by visiting:http://www.cancer.gov/aboutnci/director
http://www.fas.org/http://www.cancer.gov/aboutnci/directorhttp://www.cancer.gov/aboutnci/directorhttp://www.nih.gov/http://www.nih.gov/http://www.mskcc.org/mskcc/html/44.cfmhttp://www.mskcc.org/mskcc/html/44.cfmhttp://www.mskcc.org/mskcc/html/44.cfmhttp://www.mskcc.org/mskcc/html/44.cfmhttp://www.fas.org/http://www.fas.org/


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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011The suggestion that the review process used by open access

journals lacks rigor because authors pay has not been substantiatedand for good reason: all journals want their content to be scientifi-cally sound and highly reputable, otherwise they will not continueto receive submissions. It is important to note that publication on-line, whether in subscription-based or open access journals, offers anopportunity to make post-publication evaluation by open, onlinecommentary at least as important as secretive pre-publication re-

view. Unfortunately, movement in this direction has been relativelyslow.

In retrospect, what if anything - would you have

done differently when launching PubMedCentral

and PLoS? What changes would you like to see in

the next decade?

I dont think my co-founders (Pat Brown and Mike Eisen) andI made many large errors in the launch of PLoS, although we cer-

tainly made some small ones. While I cannot say weve achievedabsolutely all our goals, weve had tremendous success, with the helpof many great staff members and colleagues. The general strategy ofstarting our efforts with highly selective journals, likePLoS Biology,has helped to calm fears that standards would not be rigorous, andthe roaring success of the much more inclusive and generally speedy

PLoS ONEhas proven the soundness of the business model. NowId like to see open access journals process and present their articles

with new informatics tools, and to feature them more like newspa-pers do, with all reliable stories included but the most importantones highlighted (as on the front page above the fold) and others

positioned less ostentatiously---at least until post-publication com-mentary indicates that their profiles should be elevated.

The launch of PubMed Central was an earlier, more tortuous,and flawed process. I have tried to present my several missteps ashonestly as possible in my book, The Art and Politics of Science(2009). But, miraculously, that worked out pretty well too, with alot of help from others.

In an age dominated by fears of terrorism and the

dual use of scientific research, how do you balance

the inadvertent spread of knowledge that may aid

terrorists with the scientists need for access to the

latest discoveries?

As well known by those who are following the current dispute

over publication of papers about aerosol transmission between

mammals of avian H5N1 influenza viruses, this is a very difficult

question, and I dont pretend to have a simple answer. Of course,

such situations are easier to resolve when the potential for dual

use can be recognized before the work is undertaken, so that pro-

jects can be conducted as classified research. When the situation

is highly ambiguous, however, I suspect that the damage that is

done to the scientific process by not publishing a full account of

the work is likely to outweigh the likelihood of malign use in

most circumstances. In these cases in which work is openly con-

ducted before it is deemed potentially dangerous, the results are

likely to be known by too many people to be genuinely restricted

anyway.

The polarization of U.S. politics continues to grow

worse. With a skittish economic recovery and con-

tentious debate to cut the budget and reduce the

U.S. deficit, how would you advise the United

States in terms of its investment in health, science

and technology? Where would you focus more

money?

I am a strong believer in the idea that investments in science arecritical to the future of our country and the rest of the world, andhistory has shown that both major political parties have produced

champions for such views over the years. Even in economically diffi-cult times, critical investments in science and technology are mostlikely to be sustained by the federal government, at least in theUnited States, so the governments financial support will remaincrucial.

While I continue to advocate for spending on medical sciences(it is my job and my conviction), I am increasingly concerned aboutAmericas failure to devote adequate resources to studies of newsources of energy, earth and ocean sciences, and ecological condi-tions. In the long run, it is those sciences, not oncology, that mightsave us from extinction.

As director of the National Cancer Institute, and in

light of impending budget cuts, how do you deter-

mine research priorities? How do you prioritize

what programs get funding?

Weve already had some actual cuts to our budget and have beenreceiving sub-inflationary increases for almost a decade, so the pres-sure on our resources is long-standing, not impending. Like allNIH Institutes and other federal science agencies, we depend heav-ily on peer review of grant applications to help determine who getsfunded. We also have numerous meetings and workshops to surveythe landscape for missed opportunities that need to be advertised.

In the past year, weve expanded these consultations by engagingpeople from several disciplines relevant to oncology to help frameProvocative Questions that are intended to stimulate clever ap-

proaches to unsolved or novel problems in our field (see our essay inthe January 26, 2012, issue ofNature). Judging from the many en-thusiastic participants in our PQ workshops and the over 700 appli-cations for funds to answer PQs, this has been a successful strategy.
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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011Your 2009 memoir The Art and Politics of Science

emphasized the civic value of science. What is your

advice to scientists who want to get involved in pol-

icy?

I say, Go ahead, get involved! There are lots of ways to do

this, but they need to be titrated against commitments made toother things: bench-work, teaching, family life, and other inter-

ests. I am pleased to see the proliferation of stimulating programs

to train scientists to work in the policy arena, and many societies

and advocacy groups, including FAS, offer opportunities to de-

vote more limited amounts of time to experiences that can be

broadening and effective.

You also touched upon the role of science and

technology in foreign policy and the growing dis-

parities between the rich and the poor. How can the

United States expand the role of science and tech-

nology in developing countries? How realistic is thecreation of a Global Science Corps? How else

can the United States use medicine and science to

improve relations with developing countries?

There are lots of new ideas for training, scientific exchanges,collaborative research, partnerships between institutions, visits byeminent scientists, health-promoting programs and so on, but alimiting factor is money. At many agencies, efforts to improve con-

ditions in developing countries through scientific initiatives mustcompete with the good things we are doing domestically. So, ideaslike the Global Science Corps (http://sig.ias.edu/gsc) have not got-ten the funds they need.

At the NCI, we have established a new Center for GlobalHealth, in an effort to consolidate and improve international pro-

jects already underway and plan some new things too. I view suchwork as beneficial to both poor and rich countries, since it ofteninvolves the study of novel problems that will enhance our under-standing of cancer everywhere. Furthermore, improving the controlof cancer in all countries helps to create a healthier, more produc-tive, and more stable world, while enhancing American prestige and

displaying our best values. I have been very pleased to see from theresponse to our new Center that most scientists and cancer advo-cates agree strongly with this perspective.

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The world economy is so intrinsicallylinked to support from space that should amajor outage of satellite capacity occur,financial and trade markets could collapse.A recession spanning the globe would en-sue, and security tensions would exacer-bate. The increasingly chaotic interna-tional environment would be further de-stabilized by the disastrous incapacitationof U.S. military power. With-out the assuredness of space-based surveillance, communi-cations, and navigation sup-

port, American and all iedmilitary forces would be or-dered to hunker down in de-fensive crouch while preparingto withdraw from dozens ofthen-untenable foreign de-

ployments.Such a scenario is not

only possiblegiven thegrowing investment and reli-ance on space as a national

power enablerit is increas-ingly plausible. An attackagainst low-Earth orbit from a mediumrange ballistic missile adapted for detona-tion in space could cause inestimable harmto the national interests of developed anddeveloping states alike. Without a space-based defense against such events, the

world as we know it exists on borrowedtime.

Enabling Rules of the RoadWith great power comes great responsibil-ity. The United States Air Force has beencharged with ensuring access to space andspace support for all states in times of

peace and crisis, and when called upon todeny that access to its enemies in times of

war. As a martial organization, the AirForce naturally looks to military means inachievement of its assigned ends.

But weapons alone are not the decisiveor exclusive means for ensuring peace.Only when used in conjunction withcommon expectations of behavior, such asin support of domestic laws or interna-tional agreements can they be effective forthis purpose. In the international realm,this is because the intentions of potentiallyhostile actors must be constrained by a

calculation of self-interest and potentialrisk for violating norms and rules. Thedeterrent value ofsi vis pacem, para bellumis moot if understanding is not common.

Laws, too, are so constrained. As guidesfor behavior or shaping common expecta-tions, rules of thumb or traditional prac-tices can be very useful. But when used to

prevent a class of activities, especiallycriminal or hostile ones, rules are too frag-ile by themselves. Unless the ability to en-force the latter is evidentto find, appre-hend, assess, and, if guilty, punish those

who violate them, such agreements oncorrect behavior are no more likely to workthan when the mice infamously agreed tobell the cat.

For example, Declaration I of the 1899Hague Peace Conference banned the use

of balloons for combat purposes, specifi-cally the launching of projectiles or bombs.

With proof of powered flight coming justfour years later, an extension to the agree-ment was negotiated and accepted in 1907that banned the use ofany means of aerialcombat, existing or planned. With wardeclared in August of 1914, the prohibi-tions were void, and it was obvious thatthey had little or no effect on pre-war de-

velopment of combat aircraft.There are currently a number of rules-

of-the-road agreements proposed, fore-most among them sponsored by the Euro-

pean Union, China, and the U.S.-basedStimson Center, that offer compellinglogic for establishing a framework for co-operation in space by limiting specific ac-tivities or capabilities. Unless these agree-ments are brokered fairly among and ac-cepted byall space-faring states, however,

and they dont include unverifiable andunenforceable bans on weapons, an impor-tant and extremely beneficial internationalaccord may be missed.

Common to all the suggested ap-proaches is for signatories to avoid addingdebris to the increasingly cluttered commonorbits in near-earth space. This is an emi-nently agreeable issue, as debris in spacelimits all users, regardless of who is respon-sible for it. No space-faring or space-reliantstate should see disadvantage in limitingkinetic destruction of satellites, nuclear

detonations in space, or other such mutuallyundesirable effects. Where these approachesare less workable is in their efforts to con-comitantly limit the deployment and use of

weapons in space. Due to the risk entailedshould any state violate the rule, and the

very real problem of defining just what con-stitutes a space weapon, unless somemechanism for proper enforcement inspace is encumbered, these much neededtreaties are problematic.

Should a majoroutage of satellitecapacity occur,financial and trademarkets couldcollapse.


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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011Unlike the Hague conventions of

1899 and 1907, which proved utterly un-realistic with the onset of conflict, the par-allel Geneva Conventions limiting the useof non-discriminating weapons and requir-ing humane treatment of prisoners and

noncombatants have been relatively robustand effective. This is because there is anadvantage to abiding by these agreementseven when an opponent or other signatorydoes not. On the battlefield, the side that isknown to give food, shelter, and medicalaid to surrendering forces is less likely toencounter an opponent willing to fight tothe death than the side known for mis-treatment of its prisoners. As beneficial asthese conventions have been, they have notstopped war or even reduced the numberof conflicts. They have simply shaped the

conduct of violence.Ideally, an international agreement

creating a multi-national space force capa-ble of protecting the fragile environmentbeyond Earths atmosphere from hostileattack will someday be reached. Until then,the United States or some other space

power may find it necessary to develop and

field a space-based defensive capabilityagainst missiles, rockets, and directed en-ergy emanations that would enter intoorbit with hostile intent. Such a develop-ment is not necessarily welcome, but nei-ther should it be condemned out of hand.

Why Not Space Weapons?There are two classes of arguments in op-

position to the weaponization of space:1) it cannotbe done, and 2) itshouldnotbedone.

Arguments in the first category spillthe most ink in opposition, but are relativelyeasy to dispose of, especially the more radi-cal variants. History is littered with prophe-sies of technical and scientific inadequacy,such as Lord Kelvins famous retort,Heavier-than-air flying machines are im-

possible. Kelvin, a leading physicist andthen president of the Royal Society, madethis boast in 1895 and no less a personagethan Thomas Edison concurred. The pos-sibility of spaceflight prompted even moregloomy pessimism. A New York Times edi-torial in 1921 (an opinion it has since re-tracted), excoriated Robert Goddard for

his silly notions of rocket-propelled spaceexploration. Goddard does not know therelation between action and reaction and theneed to have something better than a vacuumagainst which to react. He seems to lack thebasic knowledge ladled out daily in high

schools. Compounding its error in judgment, in 1936, the Times stated flatly, Arocket will never be able to leave the Earthatmosphere.

We have learned much, it would seemor else bluntly negative scientific opinion onspace weapons has been weeded out overtime. Less encompassing arguments are nowthe standard. As the debate moved away fromthe impossibility of weapons and wars inspace to more subtle and scientifically sustainable arguments that a particular space

weapon is not feasible, mountains of scien

tific evidence are piled high in an effort, oneby one, simply to bury the concept. But theselimitations on specific systems are less due totheoretical analysis than toassumptions aboufuture funding, political context, and available technology. The real objection, too often hidden from view, is that a particula

weapons system or capability cannot be developed and deployed within the plannedbudget, or within narrowly specified means

When one relaxes those assumptions, opposition on technical grounds falls away.

The devil may very well be in the details

but if ones stance opposing an entire class oweapons is premised upon analyses that showparticularweapons will not work, what happens when a fresh concept or new technologycannot be narrowly disproved? What hap

pens when technology X, the unexpected(perhaps unforeseeable) scientific breakthrough that changes all notions of currencapabilities, inevitably arrives? Have wethought out the details enough that we cansay categorically that no technology will allow for a viable space weapons capability? Iso, then the argument is pat; no counter i

possible. But, if there are technologies oconditions that couldallow for the successfu

weaponization of space, then ought we noargue the policy details first, lest we be sweptaway by a course of action that merely chasethe technology wherever it may go?

Those who argue that space weaponshouldnot be deployed generally do so on thgrounds that they are too expensive or are

otentiall destabilizin .


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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011To be sure, a space weapons program

would be very expensivetens if not hun-dreds of billions of dollars. But this money

will not come from funds set aside forschools or roads or humanitarian assis-tance. Federal budgets are not so fungible.Peace dividends fail to materialize. Themoney for space weapons would comefrom existing and projected defense expen-ditures, and this means fewer tanks andsoldiers, ships and sailors, aircraft and air-men. Herein is the trade-off in creating

what would amount to a space-heavy mili-tary force structure. The state would con-tinue to maintain its capacity to intervenein affairs abroad, with violence if deemednecessary, but now with precise and meas-ured doses of very accurate, very deadly

violence anywhere on the earth, in a very,

very short time. But it would not be bulkviolence. This is still the purview of tradi-tional land, sea, and air forces. The state

would trade the capacity to intervenequickly and precisely for the ability to doso massively, with lots of collateral damage.

Ramifications for the most criticalcurrentfunction of Americas armed forcesare profoundpacification, occupation,and control of foreign territory. With thedownsizing of traditional weapons to ac-commodate heightened space expendi-tures, the ability of the U.S. to do all three

will wane significantly. At a time whenmany are calling for increasedcapability to

pacify and police foreign lands, spaceweapons proponents must advocate reduc-tion of these capabilities in favor of a sys-tem that will have no direct potential to doso. It will be a hard sell.

It will not be any easier for those whoconsider defensive capabilities reasonable,but offensive capabilities abhorrent. Space

weapons are inherently offensive. Theydefend by attempting to destroy the incom-ing threat. They deter violence by the om-nipresent promise of precise, measured,and unstoppable retaliation. Systemically,they offer no advantage if the target setconsidered is not global. But as they offerno advantage in the mission of territorialoccupation, they are far less threateningthan any combination of terrestrial weap-ons employed in their stead. A state em-

ploying offensive deterrence through space-weapons can punish a transgressor, but is in

a poor position to challenge its sovereignty.Such states are less likely to succumb to thesecurity dilemma if they perceive their na-tional survival is not at risk. What is morethreatening, a half dozen lasers deployed inspace or, for about the same price, six divi-sions of ground troops massed on the bor-der? Moreover, the tremendous expense ofspace weapons inhibits their indiscriminateuse. Over time, the world of sovereignstates will recognize that space power doesnot threaten self-determination internally,though it challenges any attempts to inter-

vene militarily inthe politics of oth-ers, and has severelyrestricted its owncapacity to do so.

P e r h a p s t h e

largest collection ofarguments againstthe weaponizationof space is that it

would force a crip-pling space armsrace. Especially ifthe United States

were to act first,responsible nations

w o u l d b e c o m-pelled to respond inkind, and a space arms race mustensue. So

long as the Unitd States. refrains, otherstates will also. The logic escapes me.

The United States has embarked on arevolutionary military transformation de-signed to extend its dominance in militaryengagements. Space capabilities are thelynchpin of this transformation, enabling alevel of precision, stealth, command andcontrol, intelligence gathering, speed, ma-neuverability, flexibility, and lethality here-tofore unknown. Because of its demon-strated utility and reliance, there is noquestion the United States mustguaranteespace access if it is to be successful in futureconflicts. It is simply not possible to goback to the violently spasmodic mode ofcombat typical of pre-space American in-tervention. The United States is nowhighly discriminating in the projection of

violence, parsimonious in the intendedbreadth of its destruction. For the positive

process of transformation to continue,however, space weapons must enter the

combat inventory of the United States.Indeed, Americas reliance on space today isso heavy that any nation desiring an asym-metric military advantage would be hard-

pressed not to consider attacking its cur-rently undefended space assets. This is par-ticularly true for states or organizationsthat are vastly less reliant on space for theireconomic or military needs.

I have argued elsewhere, primarily in mybookAstropolitik, that any state with themeans and political will to quickly place asmall network of weapons in low-Earth

orbit capableof engagingm i s s i l e s o rr o c k e t s i ntheir boost

pha se would

e f f e c t i v e l y gain control oft h e g l o b a lhigh groundand all of thetactical advan-tages that haveh i s t o r i c a l l y accrued to thecontroller oft h e b a t-tlespaces most

advantageous position. The longer Amer-

ica and the international community ditheron their responsibility to protect spacefrom states or organizations that wouldattack on-orbit assets, the longer the win-dow of opportunity for a potential over-throw of the current international systemstays open, and the more likely a debilitatingarms race will emerge.

If America or some U.S.-included inter-national consortium were to place weaponsin space today, it is unlikely that any otherstate or group of states would find it ra-tional to counter in kind. Americas spaceinfrastructure, particularly its militaryspace potential, is enormous. The entrycost to generate an equivalent capacitynecessary to counter its lead in space is toohigh; hundreds of billions of dollars, atminimum. Without question, states not

party to the new weapons regime wouldobject, and try to oppose its actionsbutthey would do so asymmetrically.

Space weaponsare inherentlyoffensive. Theydefend byattempting todestroy theincoming threat.


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Diplomatic condemnation, eco-nomic embargo, and probably conven-tional arms increases can be expected. Ifthe new regime was shown over time notto be a potent new kind of coercive tool,used non-arbitrarily only to enforce

treaties and laws in and for outer space,the capacities to police space would beseen as no more detrimental to interna-tional peace than the U.S. militarys par-allel activities for the worlds commonareasthe open oceans and non-territorial airspace. Even more so spacecommerce would be able to thrive. Justas its military limits the activities ofbrigands and pirates, ensures that dis-

puted regions are not closed to com-merce, intervenes to stem the flow ofhuman trafficking, drugs, and illicit

arms, business is more likely to be safeand reliable. On the other hand, withoutany enforcement mechanism in space, inten to fifteen years perhaps, peer com-

petitors could emerge that would bemore than willing to challenge the cur-rently dominant space powers. If youdesire a space arms race, do nothing, it

will come.This is because America must re-

spond to another states attempt to seizecontrol of outer space. Its position ofhegemonic power is based on its poten-

tial to control the sea and air, to mobi-lize quickly and move from place to

place faster than an opponent, and thesecapabilities are predicated on continuingsupport from space. A threat to thatsupport would correctly be viewed as anattempt to overturn the current interna-tional order, to replace American he-gemony with a new global leader.

ConclusionsAmerica will maintain the capacity toinfluence decisions and events beyondits borders, with military force if neces-sary. It will not be bound by treaties thatdeny such ability. For the most part,

America uses its hegemonic power tomaintain global stability, ensure freecommerce, lessen human suffering, andoppose aggression. The operational de-

ployment of space weapons would in-crease these capacities by providing fornearly instantaneous force projection

worldwide. This force would be precise,unstoppable, and deadly. At the sametime, the United States must foregosome of its ability to intervene directly inother states because its capacity to do so

will have been diminished in the budg-

etary trade-offs required.Seizing the initiative and securing

low-Earth orbit now, while the UnitedStates and its allies are unchallenged inspace, would do much to stabilize theinternational system and prevent anarms race in space. If peace desiringstates could come to an internationalagreement in which a multinationalspace force would be capable of main-taining effective order in space, partici-

pate in the reduction of debris in orbit,promote commerce, and did so in a way

that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action

would serve to discourage competingstates from fielding opposing systems.Should they use this advantage to policethe heavens (assuming the entire cost),and allow unhindered peaceful use ofspace by any and all nations for eco-nomic and scientific development, over

time their control of low-Earth orbitcould be viewed as a global asset and a

public good.As leader of the international com-

munity, the United States finds itself inthe unenviable position that it must

make decisions for the good of all. Onthe issue of space weaponization, thereappears no one best option. No matterthe choice selected, there are those who

will benefit and those who will suffer.The tragedy of American power is that itmust make a choice, and the worstchoice is to do nothing.

Everett Carl Dolman isProfessor ofComparative Military Studies atthe U.S. Air Forces School of

Advanced Air and Space Studies(SAASS).His focus is on interna-tional relations and theory, and hehas been identified as AirUniversitys first space theorist.

Dr. Dolman began his career as anintelligence analyst for the

National Security Agency, andmoved to the United States SpaceCommand in 1986. In 1991, hereceived the Director of Central

Intelligence Agencys OutstandingIntelligence Analyst award.Dol-man is the author ofAstropolitik:Classical Geopolitics in the SpaceAge (Routledge, October 2001).



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On February 6, 2012, FAS held the2011 Awards Ceremony at the CarnegieInstitution for Science in Washington,DC.

The Honorable Steven Chu, the UnitedStates Secretary of Energy, received the2011 Hans Bethe Award.

The inaugural 2011 Richard L. GarwinAward was presented to Dr. Richard A.Meserve, President of the CarnegieInstitution of Science.

The evenings Master of Ceremonies wasDr. John Holdren, the Director of theWhite House Office of Science andTechnology Policy and Science Advisorto the President of the United States.

For more information, to watch video,

see images and view the powerpoint,please visit:www.FAS.org/about/2011awards.html.

The FAS Awards

dinner and ceremony

FAS THANKS THE 2011 SPONSORS

GOLD

General AtomicsHBO

SILVER

BP America

Denjiren/The Federation of ElectricPower Companies of JapanLawrence Brown

BRONZE

Babcock & WilcoxGABI

Energy Future Holdings/TXUFairview Builders, LLC

Wine was compliments ofFairview Builders, LLC.
http://www.fas.org/about/2011awards.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/about/2011awards.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/about/2011awards.htmlhttp://www.fas.org/http://www.fas.org/


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Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, gov-ernments and commercial companies have

placed thousands of satellites in orbitaround the Earth. Most of them have longsince burned up reentering the atmosphereor disintegrated into space debris. Today,there are over 16,000 active satellites anddebris objects in the public catalog oftracked objects.

The region of space near Earth inwhich satellites orbit is so large extendingout 22,200 miles for commercial satellites

that one might believe a collision of orbitingspacecraft would be impossible. For exam-

ple, communications satellites are typicallyspaced a degree apart - more than 700 km.That would be the same as parking oneminibus-sized satellite in Washington, DCand the next in Ottawa. But some satellitesare spaced significantly closer, and in factthe International Telecommunications Un-ion (ITU) does not ensure there is any suchseparation. And as every statistitian knows,there is a big difference between a highly

improbable event and an impossible eventJust three years ago, a satellite operated byIridium Communications for the companyglobal communication network collided

with an uncontrolled Russian spacecrafthat had been out of service since 1995. Thecollision, 490 miles above Siberia, producedover 2,000 pieces of debris larger than 10centimeters (3.9 inches) in diameter, eachone large enough to destroy any orbitingsatellite in its path.1

Managing Risk in Space

BY RICHARD DAL BELLO


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To avoid collisions in the increasinglycrowded orbital arcs, agencies and compa-nies operating satellites have informallyshared position and orbit data for many

years. But one problem with informal in-formation sharing is that satellite operatorsdont use the same standard to representthe position of a satellite in orbit or anobject in space. Many different types ofsoftware are used to track and maneuversatellites and the data is stored in a varietyof formats. So, even operators who wish toshare data cant rely on a single, agreed-upon protocol for sharing information. Asa result, operators sharing informationmust maintain redundant file transfer pro-tocols and tools to convert and reformatdata so that it is consistent with their ownsoftware systems to compute close ap-

proaches. While some operators use third-party software for predicting close ap-proaches, others write their own softwaretools. As the number of satellite operatorsincreases, the problem of maintainingspace situational awareness grows morecomplex. And the smallest operators maynot be able to afford, or have the techni-cians, to participate in the data sharing

process.Recently, the worlds leading commer-

cial satellite operators formed the SpaceData Association (SDA) to formalize the

process of exchanging information and todeal with the overall data compatibility

problem. Clearly, the best path to mini-mize risk in space is for all operators toshare what they know about the movement

and position of their own satellites in a waythat all other companies can use. Whilethis sounds like common sense, govern-ments and commercial companies aroundthe world have each historically acted ontheir own in launching and monitoringsatellites. Agencies and companies coordi-nate frequency allocation and orbital slots

prior to launch, but once a satellite is inorbit, data about the movement of com-mercial satellites was shared only infor-mally until the establishment of the SDA.Information about the operation and loca-tion of many military satellites is stillshrouded in secrecy.

The most critical times to share dataabout satellites are when a new satellite isbeing placed in orbit or an existing satelliteis being shifted from one orbital slot to

another. A typical communications satel-lite is as big and massive as a loaded semi-trailer, and though it appears fixed abovethe Earth, it is actually traveling thousandsof kilometers per hour. Putting a satelliteinto an orbital slot or moving it to another

position above Earth without disturbingany of the other 250+ commercial com-munications satellites in the GEO2 plane,as Intelsat routinely does, is a very delicateoperation. Yet this process is managed en-tirely by commercial operators using in-formal, de facto rules developed through

experience and implemented by consensus.This cooperative process has been

used effectively and without incident sincethe commercial satellite communicationsera began in the 1960s, primarily because

everyone involved realizes that a satellitecollision would be catastrophic. Buildingand launching a satellite costs hundreds ofmillions of dollars, and this type of invest-ment gives operators a very strong incen-tive to avoid space collisions at all costs.The increase in the number of satellitesand satellite operators has made the needto share data even more acute.

The evolution of how satellite positiondata is collected has some parallels with thedevelopment of air traffic control for com-mercial aircraft. In the decade following the

Wright brothers first controlled, poweredflight at Kitty Hawk in 1903, so few air-

planes were in the sky at any given time thathuman flight required little if any monitor-ing from the ground. However, after theflight experiences during World War I accel-

erated advances in airplane design, the in-dustry began to flourish, and the first airtraffic control systems were put in place.

The formation of the SDA is a majorstep toward creating a voluntary air trafficcontrol system for space. The SDA is aninteractive repository for commercial satel-lite orbit, maneuver, and payload fre-quency information.3 The SDAs principalgoal is to promote safe space operations byencouraging coordination and communi-cation among its operator members.Through the SDAs Space Data Center, the

satellite operators maintain the most accu-rate information available on their fleets;augment


Image courtesy of Intelsat.


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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011augment existing government-supplieddata with precise orbit data and maneuver

plans; and retrieve information from othermember operators when necessary. As aresult, the data center:

Enhances safety of flight. Provides efficient, timely, accurate con-

junction assessments for members. Reduces false alarms, missed events. Minimizes member time and

resources devoted to conjunction as-sessment.

Establishes common format conversionsand a common information repository.

Provides radio frequency interference(RFI) geo-location and resolution sup-

port, allowing operators to more rapidlyfind and address interference sources.

Encourages the evolution of best prac-tices for members.

Because of the proprietarynature of the operational data,the SDA has been designed to

protect information and preventmembers from using for com-mercial purposes the data sup-

plied by competing companies.The members of the SDA con-tribute operational data througha secure web-based interface on a

daily basis and can access datarelated only to the operation oftheir own satellites. For example,an operator who only has satel-lites covering Latin Americacannot access data from other

parts of the globe. The data cen-ter processes information to per-form real time identification of"conjunctions" (very close ap-

proaches that may lead to a colli-sion) and RFI analysis for SDAmembers satellites.

So far, the SDA has actualposition information on 237 sat-ellites in geostationary Earth orbit (GEO),and another 110 in low Earth orbit (LEO).The greater the membership of the SDA,the more comprehensive the data and theresulting analysis will be. As new satelliteoperators continue to join the SDA, thedata center will continually improve its reli-ability in all satellite arcs and develop the

system into a truly global and comprehen-sive database for space situational awareness.

Several years ago, the U.S. governmentbegan providing commercial operators withsatellite position data gathered by the U.S.Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)

using radars and sensors. The position infor-mation provided initially for close-approachmonitoring, called two-line element (TLE)data, had several drawbacks. First, there wasno available and transparent standard forTLE modeling. Second, TLE data did nothave the required accuracy for credible colli-sion detection, forcing operators who wantedto avoid collisions to increase the calculatedcollision margins. This required an increasednumber of maneuvers, which wasted fuel andcould shorten the life of a satellite. TLE dataalso lacked reliable planned maneuver infor-

mation, which limited the usefulness of datafor longer-term predictions.

Recently, USSTRATCOM admittedthat the TLE data was imprecise and devel-oped a procedure for providing commercialoperators with additional information inthe form of conjunction summary messages(CSMs) to operators whose satellites havebeen identified as closely approaching an-other space object.4 These CSMs contain

vector and covariance information com-puted from other data, making it more ac-curate than TLEs.

However, recent studies funded byIntelsat and SES have concluded that toensure the highest level of accuracy, it

would be beneficial for USSTRATCOMto incorporate data from routine satellitemaneuvers. The SDA has offered to aug-ment the global sensor data maintained byUSSTRATCOM with more preciseoperator-generated data to improve theaccuracy of conjunction monitoring. TheSDA could also provide a standardizedmethod and focal point for operators toshare information and facilitate communi-cations between satellite operators andgovernments interested in making availabletimely space object catalogues. Hopefully,

with the passage of time, the U.S. and othergovernments will be able to fully capitalizeon this industry-sponsored and fundedinitiative. Solving the problem ofgovernment/industry data sharing and therole of the SDA should be a key objectiveof future international discussions on thistopic.

Another major risk to operators is theproliferation of orbital debris from rocketstages, defunct satellites, equipment lost byastronauts and the fragments left from ex-

plosions and collisions of satellites. For ex-

ample, Vanguard 1, launched by the UnitedStates in 1958, is expected to remain inorbit at least another 200 years beforeslowly burning up as it drifts down into theatmosphere.5 The debris problem is mostsevere in LEO, where the majority of satel-lites used for communications and remotesensing operate. Because these satellites arenot geostationary and orbit the Earthabout every 90 minutes, several satellitesare required to provide continuous cover-age of any given area. Using observationdata produced by radar and optical detec-tors, operators on Earth maneuver LEOsatellites through a debris field of thou-sands of objects every day.

While GEO is less cluttered withdebris than LEO, any objects in GEO posemore of a threat because all of the satellitesare in the same orbital plane. In addition,the atmospheric drag that serves to self-cleanse the lower LEO regime of orbitaldebris is non-existent in the GEO regime,

The evolution ofhow satelliteposition data is

collected has someparallels with thedevelopment of airtraffic control forcommercialaircraft.


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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011and only the lesser gravity from the sunand moon serve to slowly pull a GEO sat-ellite out of its initial equatorial, circularorbit. In addition, a GEO space object is sodistant that any size less than 1 meter (3feet, 3 inches) in diameter is difficult to

see, making the precise nature of the threatunknown.6

International efforts are being made toprovide better sharing of informationabout those practices that contribute mostto the space debris problem. One is theInter-Agency Space Debris CoordinationCommittee (IADC), a coordinating forumfor national space agencies that created animportant set of voluntary guidelines re-garding the mitigation of man-made andnatural debris in space.7 The primary ob-

jectives of the IADC are to exchange in-

formation on space debris research activi-ties between member national space agen-cies, to facilitate cooperation in space de-bris research, to review the progress ofongoing cooperative activities, and to iden-tify debris mitigation options. Although

important, the IADCs work is still only aset of guidelines for national regulators toconsider.

Because of the major investment re-quired to design, build and launch a satel-lite, the commercial industry is rightly

concerned that the tragedy of the com-mons not be replicated in Earth orbit.8The number of operating satellites and the

volume of space debris are both increasingsteadily, a fact that does not bode well for acleaner and safer space environment. Asland is on Earth, the orbital planes in spaceare finite resources that can be depleted or

polluted in ways that make continued useimpossible.

Today, the valuable LEO environmentis in some jeopardy of suffering the trag-edy of the commons as a result of the sig-

nificant increase in both space debris andRFI interference. As these threats multiply,satellite operators and their customers areat risk of losing access to a satellite servicethat benefits both commercial and con-sumer markets.

Space is indeed a limited resource. Avast as it appears when looking toward theheavens on a starry night, the portion ospace that can be used effectively for communications, weather monitoring, remote sensing and other satellite-based applications i

really just a thin shell that extends outwardfrom Earth less than one tenth of the distanceto the Moon. Governments and private com

panies around the planet are investing billions of dollars in next-generation spacetechnology. Every one of those users and

potential users of the orbital environmenhave a stake in its long-term preservation.

While governments were the first tosend satellites to near-Earth space, commercial enterprises and consumer services will bethe primary users of the orbital arcs in the21st century and, hopefully, beyond. Conse

quently, governments and companies operating spacecraft need to take a new approach toenhancing the safety and efficacy of the spaceenvironment, an approach that includes moreinternational cooperation among all partiesThe Space Data Association is the major stepon this path, and that step should be followed by firm actions of governments and alspace users to create an international frame-

work that assures the preservation of thivaluable resource.

Richard Dal Bello is Vice President,Legal and Government Affairs atIntelsat General Corp., responsible formanaging the company's legal team,leading its government relations and

public policy efforts, and representingit before numerous U.S. and interna-tional policy bodies. Mr. Dal Belloearned a Bachelor's Degree in Politi-cal Science from the University of

Illinois, a Master's in Law from

McGill University, and a Doctoratein Jurisprudence from the Universityof San Francisco.


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REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 NASA Orbital Debris Quarterly News, July 2011.

2

Most commercial and military satellites operate in one of two orbit planes. The first, low-Earth orbit (LEO), is between 160 and 2,000 meters (100-1,240miles) above Earths surface. The other, geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), is a circular orbit 35,786 kilometers (22,236 miles) above the equator.

3 See:www.space-data.org.

4 Statement of Major Duane Bird, USAF, US Strategic Command to AMOS Conference, September 2010.

5 NASAs National Space Science Data Center.

6 David Portree and Joseph Loftus."Orbital Debris: A Chronology," NASA, 1999.7 See: http://www.iadc-online.org. The IADC member agencies include the following: ASI (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana), CNES (Centre National d'EtudesSpatiales), CNSA (China National Space Administration), CSA (Canadian Space Agency), DLR (German Aerospace Center), ESA (European Space Agency),ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation), JAXA ( Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency), NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), NSAU

(National Space Agency of Ukraine), ROSCOSMOS (Russian Federal Space Agency), UKSpace (UK Space Agency).

8 Concept first presented in the seminal article by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859 (December 13, 1968). Thetragedy of the commons posits the situation where rational individuals, acting in their own self-interest, may ultimately render a shared and limited resourceunusable, even when it is clearly not in their interest to do so.
http://www.iadc-online.org/http://www.iadc-online.org/http://www.iadc-online.org/http://www.space-data.org/http://www.space-data.org/http://www.fas.org/http://www.fas.org/


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The SDA was formed by leading satellite owners and operatorswith the goal of increasing the safety and efficiency of their opera-tions in space. To achieve this goal, the operator members need toreceive actionable Space Situational Awareness (SSA), particularlyin the areas of Conjunction Assessment (CA) and Radio FrequencyInterference (RFI) mitigation.

The SDAs Space Data Center (SDC) comprises the only SSA

analysis system incorporating truly-authoritative maneuver plansand RF data for 70percent of all activesatellites in geostationary Earth orbit(GEO). Currently, SDA membersshare actual position information on237 satellites in GEO, and another110 in low Earth orbit (LEO). Fromthe data provided thus far, the SDAhas identified significant levels of dataincompatibility in the orbit determina-tion and analysis packages used in thespace operations community, whichincludes radar/optical networks, satel-

lite operators, and launch providers.The SDC has systematically addressedthis issue by conducting extensive re-search, operator interchange and as-trodynamics development to facilitatethe technical rectification of operatordata into compatible, shared referenceframes.

The SDC also uses a combinationof quarterly, independent orbit deter-mination (OD) verifications and

weekly comparisons against externalradar and optical data to ensure theongoing success of this rectification

process. When discrepancies are detected, this diverse-comparisonapproach allows follow-on investigations to clarify whether opera-tor data or radar and optical data are suspect.

Although computing CA is complex, the concept is actuallyvery simple. Assuming one has precise and reliable data, answeringthe question, When will these space objects get too close? is nottechnically challenging. There are several reliable COTS softwaresolutions for rapidly detecting such threats. The significant chal-lenge is in making sure that inputs and outputs of the CA and RFI

analyses are accurate enough to warrant operator confidence in theresults so that managers can select and implement viable risk-mitigation strategies.

Information provided to the SDA by satellite operators isaugmented by data from the U.S. Joint Space Operations Center( JSpOC), which operates one of only a handful of global radar andoptical sensor networks collecting satellite positioning data. In

addition to tracking operational satellites, such networks are theonly source for orbital debris in-formation. The JSpOC data iscomprised of analytic or general

perturbations (GP) data (such asthe ubiquitous two-line elementset or TLE) and higher-fidelityspecial perturbations (SP) data.Using radar and optical sensornetworks to track objects in space

presents a host of unique technicaland programmatic challenges.These include not accounting for

routine maneuvers by satellite op-erators; limited sensor observa-tions; difficulties acquiring satel-lites; lost satellites; conflictingmission priorities; track mis-association problems; lack of sen-sor scheduling; and sensor lightingconstraints. These challenges arechiefly a reflection of the non-cooperative tracking (NCT) tech-nology and not a reflection ofNCT staff or tool capabilities.

Satellite operators feel uniquelyqualified to generate authoritative

satellite data for their space assets because they typically performhourly transponder ranging sessions with their satellites; have well-calibrated maneuver times, magnitudes and directions; and oftenhave dedicated assets for tracking their spacecraft. Independentanalysis of the orbit solutions from satellite operator data has typi-cally revealed very good performance. However, satellite operatorsface unique challenges as well, including initial difficulties sharingtheir data with other operators in a mutually-compatible and un-derstandable format and a lack of data for space debris objects.

Space Data AssociationThe Case for SSA Collaboration and Data Fusion

BY RICHARD DAL BELLO

Assuming one hasprecise and reliabledata, answering the

question, Whenwill these space ob-

jects get too close?is not technicallychallenging.


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PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT WINTER 2011For an operator to take action based on SSA products, the

analyses must bepredictive, timely, precise (i.e., reproducible andconvergent) andaccurate.

It is fairly easy to assess whether a process is predictive andtimely. For CA, space operators typically need a final and defini-tive assessment of collision risk approximately two days prior tothe event. This lead time is sufficient for analyzing the conjunc-

tion; planning an avoidance maneuver; briefing the companysdecision authority; getting the go-ahead to perform the avoid-ance maneuver; and executing the maneuver early enough toavoid wasting fuel (because the magnitude of the maneuver re-quired to avoid a conjunction increases as the objects get closertogether). Warnings that come with less than two days noticeare problematic because more drastic measures are required toavoid a threat.

To characterizeprecision andaccuracy in the real world, SSAanalysts have a responsibility to apply statistically-relevant,transparent and on-going evaluations of convergence, reproduci-bility and comparison with complementary data are required. ACA process which predicts satellite conjunction events well in

advance and for which predictions of the conjunction vary littlefrom the original prediction or from one another can be said tobe precise (i.e., reproducible and convergent). Comparisons ofSSA predictions with truth models and post-event, best-estimatetrajectories can be used to assess SSA whether the prediction is

accurate.The SDA members have conducted many systematic stud-

ies of CA and RFI analysis convergence. SDA member orbitshave been regularly and independently verified for consistencyand accuracy. From these studies, the SDA has determined thatSSA products are highly sensitive to input errors and processdeficiencies.

Consider:1. For optical sensors, up to 15percent of a satellites ob-

servations are confused or cross-tagged with datafrom another satellite within the sensors field-of-view,most commonly during the greatest collision threatintervals.2

2. By evaluating CA results for a variety of simulated

collisions, analysts have determined that SSA based onradar and optical data that neglects satellite maneuverscan drastically underestimate collision risk to the

point of predicting a probability of collision of 1chance in 10300 (thats 300 zeroes) for two objects thatare in fact on a collision course.3

3. Government-led time-difference-of-arrival tests indi-cate a ten-fold improvement in positional accuracy

when operator data is used instead of public data.4

4. Because telescopes perform best at night, GEO orbitsderived from optical telescopes can experience accuracydegradations of up to 35 km in the daytime.5

5. The absence of a radar and optical sensor scheduling

algorithm in JSpOCs Space Surveillance Network(SSN)6 leads to undersampling, cross-tagging, and aninability to improve orbit accuracy.

6. For active satellites being maneuvered, the SDA hasfound that optical-sensor-derived orbits are usually a

week late and can be more than 1,000 km behind op-erator data in reflecting maneuvers.

The failure of governments and commercial satellite opera-tors to generate a collaborative and accurate SSA picture couldresult in a geosynchronous satellite collision with potentiallydire consequences.7 Yet there is a clear path for managing thisrisk, and that path is active collaboration and data fusion.Radar/optical networks and space operators both offer trulyunique and complementary capabilities that, when fused to-gether, offer substantially improved SSA.

1 Oltrogge, D.L. and Alfano, S., Determination Of Orbit Cross-Tag Events And Maneuvers With Orbit Detective, Paper AAS 11-413, Girdwood AK, 1August 2011.

2 Oltrogge, D.L., Space Data Actionability Metrics for SSA, 2011 Improving Our Vision SSA Conference, Luxemburg, 29 June 2011.

3 Oltrogge, D.L., User Requirements Analysis for Astro Standards, Presentation to the Committee for the Assessment of the U.S. Air Forces AstrodynamicsStandards, National Research Council, 7 February 2012.

4 Comments from Meeting #3, Committee for the Assessment of the U.S. Air Forces Astrodynamics Standards, National Research Council, 7 February 2012.

5 Oltrogge, D.L. and Finkleman, D., Phenomenology of Explosions and Collisions in the GEO Belt, Paper AIAA-2008-7375, 2008 AAS/AIAA Astrodynam-

ics Specialist Conference, Honolulu, HI, 21 August 2008.

REFERENCES AND NOTES


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In early 2008, President Bush tasked U.S.Strategic Command with Operation BurntFrost: mitigating the threat posed by a non-responsive intelligence satellite that was soonto re-enter the Earths atmosphere. USA-193had been launched into orbit just over a yearearlier, and its fate was sealed after the Na-tional Reconnaissance Office was unable toestablish control over the satellite after launch.

While the imminent re-entry of a satellite wasnot in itself at all remarkable70 tons of

space debris and scores of large objects dropout of orbit each year without any casualtyand without any operations mounted in re-sponseadministration officials expressedconcern that leftover hydrazine fuel aboardthe satellite might survive re-entry and hurtsomeone on the ground.

On February 14, 2008, General JamesCartwright announced the United States

would destroy the satellite using the Aegis sea-

based missile defense system. After a few daysof waiting out rough seas, on February 20, theU.S. Navy Ticonderoga-class cruiser Lake Erielaunched an SM-3 missile which interceptedthe USA-193 satellite.

While framed as a public safety measure,some observers expressed skepticism that thisrisk was the real or entire motivation for theexercise. The interception, at an altitude of240 kilometers (km), vividly demonstratedthe ASAT capability of the U.S. Aegis sea-

based missile defense system. The interceptreportedly required only modification of thesystem software,1 and could have been donefrom any of the 5 cruisers or 16 destroyersequipped with the Aegis system at the time(two destroyers were slated to be backups tothe USS Lake Erie).

The context is important. This was thefirst time the United States had deliberatelydestroyed a satellite since 1985; Russia hadnt

done so since 1982.2 This unofficial moratorium had been recently broken by China in2007, when it destroyed its own aging

weather satellite at 800 km altitude. The Bushadministration had withdrawn from the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and expressedinterest in a range of new military uses forspace, including space-based weapons andanti-satellite weapons. Just a week before Operation Burnt Frost was carried out, Chinaand Russia had circulated to the Conference

on Disarmament a draft treaty that wouldban putting weapons in space and using forceagainst satellites.3 The United States responded with little interest, saying that there

was no need for arms control in space.4

Operation Burnt Frost, in turn, is important context for the announcement eighteenmonths later of the Obama administrationnew plans for European missile defense, thePhased Adaptive Approach (PAA).

The Anti-SatelliteCapabilityof thePhasedAdaptiveApproach

MissileDefenseSystem

BY LAURA GREGO


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This new PAA plan replaced theGeorge W. Bush administrations plan thataimed to protect European allies frommissile threats in the Middle East using

powerful ground-based interceptors inPoland and a radar i

2011 winter pir preview copy

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