2013-2014 cisec conferences : airbus embedded system architecture, pascal travserse

Airbus Embedded Systems

AIRBUS EMBEDDED SYSTEMS

Presented by Pascal TRAVERSE

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19/11/2013 Airbus Embedded Systems


•Aircraft system overview •Requirement capture

•Safety requirements & safety process

•Integration

•Time issues

•Concluding remarks

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Definition of a system

AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OVERVIEW

A combination of inter-related items arranged to perform a specific functions(s), see ARP 4754.

Example, an airplane is a system:

• which is a component of the transport system,

• which is, itself, made up of several airborne systems.

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Embedded system (systèmes embarqués, systèmes enfouis)


Prototype of artificial hart (CARMAT) PAssive Start and Entry

System (Continental AG)

Video telephony as imagined in 1910

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AIRFRAME SYSTEMS 21 AIR COND. 24 ELECTRICAL POWER 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 30 ICE & RAIN PROTECTION 33 LIGHTS 36 PNEUMATIC

22 AUTO FLIGHT 25 EQUIPMENT 28 FUEL 31 INSTRUMENTS 34 NAVIGATION .......

23 COMMUNICATIONS 26 FIRE PROTECTION 29 HYDRAULIC POWER 32 LANDING GEAR 35 OXYGEN

PERD

ATC

CAR EX TA DO ----


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Systems represent about 30% of the Aircraft price

Computers represent about 40% of the Systems price


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•Integration

•Time issues


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REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

•Explicit requirements classical allocation process General A380-800 objectives

•Mission and performance (8000 NM / 555 pax )

• Improve Aircraft safety

•Life cycle cost and COC (- 17% per seat)

•Service readiness at EIS (maturity at First Flight)

•Dispatch reliability : 99% at EIS

•A platform for 30 years of evolutions

Direct Weight

safety

Direct cost, maintenance

quality

reliability

Obsolescence, evolution

SYSTEMS

Integration / Trade-off between requirements

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Availability is mandatory (the direct cost of a

delay)

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

Maintainability In very diverse

conditions

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To Ensure and Preserve

AIRWORTHINESS and

AVIATION SAFETY

Airworthiness regulation is a legal obligation contracted by States signatories of the ICAO Convention

•Chicago Convention, signed 7th December 1944, established the International Civil Aviation Organization.

•To undertake International Air Transport, each nation has to be a signatory (currently 188 nations)

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

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FAR (US regulations) & CS (European regulations) are requirements, part of the A/C specification. Certification is encompassing process, not only product. Guidance provided (SAE ARP 4754A – EUROCAE ED79A “certification considerations for highly-integrated or complex systems”)

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

Airworthiness regulation: another

set of requirements to be cascaded & complied with

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Airbus Embedded Systems

•Industrial constraints Systems are expensive components and thus installed

as late as possible in A/C assembly process

Any failure at that time disrupts the assembly process and potentially delays the final delivery

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

Structural Assembly

Systems equip & test & Cabin Pre-customisation

Tests and adjustments

Wing/ fuselage join-up

1 PI Production Interval

A A A A A A

B B B B B To avoid these delays:

– quality of delivered equipment & installation drawings

– systems designed for assembly

– Design Office support to Assembly line

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•Design for Assembly

Define integration tests during the system development

Reduce these tests duration

Insert “hooks” (tests embedded in final software, system to output all key internal data etc)

Identify assembly line configuration (A/C jacked, specific power supply, ...)

Design for Robustness – damages,

– foreign objects, ...

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

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• Addressing environmental topics

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

• Reduction in drag, weight • Environmentally friendly material use

• Eco-design

• Elimination of hazardous materials in surface technologies (chromate, cadmium...)

• Disseminate best environment practices

• Integrating energy consumption as one major parameter Shape technologies to reduce the use of raw materials and waste

• Support airlines • Modernised air traffic management (SESAR)

• Biofuels

• Re-integration of

materials • New recycling

possibilities

Airbus: 1st Aircraft Manufacturer awarded ISO 14001 – all sites and products

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•Derived requirements – from design solution

•Implicit requirements From “expectations” to “needs” and then “requirements”

– Early focus groups with airlines personnel

– Prototyping

– Route proving / early long flight

– Feedback from in-service experience

Compliance with specification is not

sufficient

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

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Aircraft function Aircraft function Aircraft function

Equipment Equipment Equipment Equipment

A/C Fct Specification

System Specification

Equipment Specification

Aircraft Specification

SYSTEM

AIRCRAFT

SYSTEM SYSTEM

Design

Design

Design

Development

Customer needs

capture / allocation

Requirement allocation

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

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Are the needs acceptable?

Validation of the final product versus customer needs

Requirements validation

Assumptions validation

Verification: Get the assurance that the product is compliant to its specification Requirements V&V

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

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Some V&V means

REQUIREMENT CAPTURE

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•Integration

•Time issues


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SAFETY REQUIREMENTS & SAFETY PROCESS

Partially Systems related

Partially prevented By Systems

(TAWS, TCAS, Flight Envelope Prot.)

Fatal accidents: ≅ 0.5 / 106 departures On FbW A/C ≅ 0.2

(FbW A/C: B777/787, A320/330/340/380)

Data from NTSB & Boeing

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•« FAILURE CONDITION » DEFINITION FROM CS 25 1309

• A « Failure Condition » is defined at each system level by its effects on the functioning of the system. It is characterised by its effects on the other

systems and on the aircraft.

All single failures or combination of failures including failures of other systems that have the same effect on the considered system are grouped

together in the same « Failure Condition »


Software boundary System boundary

Latent software error in data or executable code

Fault System failure

Failure condition (effect at aircraft level)

Figure from DO178C

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Classes Objectives at FClevel

Objectives atAircraft level

CATASTROPHIC< 10-9/hr +

Fail Safe criterion< 10-7/hr +

Fail Safe criterion

HAZARDOUS < 10-7/hr no objective

MAJOR < 10-5/hr no objective

MINOR no objective no objective

SAFETY SEVERITY CLASSES AND ASSOCIATED OBJECTIVES

Gradation of effort

Assumption of less than 100 Cat. FC

Quantitative & qualitative

FC: Failure Condition


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Extremely Improbable 10-9/FH No single failure

Development Assurance Level

(DO178/ED12, ARP4754/ED79, .. DAL A)

Manufacturing Particular Risks

Environment

(DO160/ED14)

Zonal Safety Assessment

Human Machine Interface

(pilot & maintenance)


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Some particular risks

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Top level requirements

document

Top Level Product

Requirements

Top Level Program

Requirements

Airworthiness

regulation, MMEL

Aircraft manufacturer

directives

Cost requirement

s

2- Aircraft FHA (Functional Hazard

Analysis

Previous A/C design and “In

service” experience

A/C Functions List A/C constraints

1- S/R Common Data Document

√

√ √ √

√

√ √

Function /Systems allocation matrix

…

…

SRD

PSSA

PSSA 4- System function list

and System FHA

10-

Aircraft Safety/

Reliability

Synthesis

PSSA

PSSA

PSSA

PSSA 7- Equipment level Safety/Reliability studies

(FMEA/FMES, etc.)

PSSA

PSSA 9b- SSA System Safety

Assessment and MMEL safety justification

9a- PSSA first flight

PSSA

PSSA 3- System S/R Requirements

document

s y s t e m l i s t

Aircraft functions list

8- COMMON CAUSE

ANALYSIS (CCA):

- PRA (Particular Risk Analysis) - ZSA (Zonal Safety Analysis) - CMA (Common Mode Analysis) - HHA (Human Hazard Analysis

PSSA

PSSA 6- Equipment

S/R Requirements

PTS PTS PTS

5- PSSA: Prelim. system Safety Assessment

FIA: Function Implantation Analysis IHA/ECHA: Intrinsic/Environment

hazard Analysis

11-Airworthiness monitoring

12-Lessons learned

Aircraft certification

Aircraft in service

√

√

Safety & Reliability method and process - Research, - Standards, - Processes, - Methods, - Guidelines, - Tools, - In service follow up - S/R Rules and recom. - Regulation

Multi disciplinary activities Multi program, multi disciplinary activities

Multi system activities on one program

System/equipment activities on one program

Common Cause activities on one program

A/C Requirements/CRI, Significant Items, Aircraft S/R Reviews , Interface S/R Activities

System S/R Reviews

TOP (AIRCRAFT) –

DOWN (COMPONENT)

PROCESS

requirements allocation

BOTTOM - UP

evaluation


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document

Top Level Product

Requirements

Top Level Program

Requirements

Airworthiness

regulation, MMEL


directives

Cost requirement

s


Analysis





√

√ √ √

√

√ √


…

…

SRD

PSSA


and System FHA

10-

Aircraft Safety/

Reliability

Synthesis

PSSA

PSSA

PSSA


(FMEA/FMES, etc.)

PSSA




PSSA


document

s y s t e m l i s t


8- COMMON CAUSE

ANALYSIS (CCA):


PSSA

PSSA 6- Equipment

S/R Requirements

PTS PTS PTS



hazard Analysis


12-Lessons learned


Aircraft in service

√

√







System S/R Reviews

IN-SERVICE AIRCRAFT

LESSONS LEARNED


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document

Top Level Product

Requirements

Top Level Program

Requirements

Airworthiness

regulation, MMEL


directives

Cost requirement

s


Analysis





√

√ √ √

√

√ √


…

…

SRD

PSSA


and System FHA

10-

Aircraft Safety/

Reliability

Synthesis

PSSA

PSSA

PSSA


(FMEA/FMES, etc.)

PSSA




PSSA


document

s y s t e m l i s t


8- COMMON CAUSE

ANALYSIS (CCA):


PSSA

PSSA 6- Equipment

S/R Requirements

PTS PTS PTS



hazard Analysis


12-Lessons learned


Aircraft in service

√

√







System S/R Reviews

COMMON CAUSE ANALYSIS: - Common Mode Analysis - Human Hazard Analysis - Particular Risk Analysis - Zonal Safety Analysis


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Certification major objective is to ensure safety 25.1309, 25.xyz, ARP4754/ED79, DO178/ED12, ED.zyx, … “Business” margins are taken on top of certification requirements Assumptions Operational reliability

Safety margins are taken too, based on each manufacturer unique

history. Confidence in the safety case: meaning of 10-9, what is a single

failure, coverage of tests etc. Not a pure mathematical demonstration Rigorous analysis with independent checks


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coordination with judicial authorities

“arrangements with judicial authorities shall respect the independence of the safety investigation authority and allow the technical investigation to be conducted diligently and efficiently.”

“all statements taken from persons by the safety investigation authority in the course of the safety investigation shall not be used for purposes other than safety investigation”

Mandatory reporting Regulation regular

update “Just culture”


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Baghdad Nov 2003 - A300 Loss of 3 hydraulic circuits + fire

Outstanding flight crew landed the aircraft using engine thrust to control the flight

Companies are merging Financial crisis Governments are

changing


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•Integration

•Time issues


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•Proper interfacing and integration Software modules

computer/actuator

systems

systems in aircraft

Aircraft in air traffic

Aircraft in overall society

INTEGRATION

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Mecha.gif

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INTEGRATION

From airplane to “nuts and bolts”

… and back

Integration in the

airplane

In air traffic

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INTEGRATION – Value Engineering

trades, exchange

rates

operator

A/C fly-away price

OWE

MTOW

high-speed drag

SFC

landing charges

fuel cost

flight crew cost

cost of ownership

DMC Maintenance intervals

and checks

reliability (OR)

manufacturer

RC primary and resizing

NRC level and distribution

time-to-market EIS

Production volume and cadence

A/C fly-away price as link

between operator and manufacturer

economics

environmental charges

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INTEGRATION

lighting EMI

hot cold

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INTEGRATION

Integration in the society

Integration in the world economy

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INTEGRATION

The worldwide leader in air and space platforms and systems Become the worldwide leader in air and space platforms and systems (mainly platform-related systems architecture and integration) with a complete portfolio of products, both commercial

and governmental (commercial aircraft, military transport, mission aircraft, helicopters, fighters, UAVs, missiles, launchers, satellites, systems and secure networks).

Profitability Achieve best-in-class operational and financial efficiency to reach 10% EBIT in the first half of

the decade 2010-2020. Focus on core and optimize financial means

Focus on core. This means a new business model approach and the reallocation of human/financial resources which are currently locked in non-core legacy activities.

Divestments in non-core areas have to be implemented. Balanced revenues

Achieve around €80bn turnover by 2020 and reach a 50/50 balance in Airbus / other Divisions' revenues.

Mission-critical service provider to our customers Achieve a 25% services share – against 10% – of business by 2020 (hence €20bn), focusing on high-value services initially related to platforms, requiring and developing both customer

intimacy and product intimacy. Globalisation

Become a true global industrial company with 40% of EADS sourcing and 20% of EADS employees outside of Europe. Achieve $10bn revenues in North America in non-Airbus

businesses and gain a prime position with US Government. Moving towards an eco-efficient enterprise

Move towards an eco-efficient company. Environmental issues are to become a transversal driver towards sustainable development. Airbus' ambitious targets are already defined. To be

done for non-Airbus Divisions.

EADS

Vis

ion

2020

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Dependability

Quality

Human-Machine interface

Design (AI-B612 …)

English, French, German …, management, ethics, …

Production, … intellectual property …, maths, …

Mechanics

Electricity

Fluids

Aeronautics

Automatic control

Electronics

Computer science

Internet

INTEGRATION

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•Integration

•Time issues


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•Need to make trade-off System weight vs. cost; reliability vs. weight … never safety

System complexity (reliability etc.) vs. overall aircraft weight

Early

TIME ISSUES

1kg ≈ 2kg “snow ball effect”

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TIME ISSUES

Plan the system

development

Specify the

system

Design the

system

Integrated processes : Validate, Verify, Safety studies, Maintainability studies, Modifications

Other supporting processes : Certification coordination, Configuration management, Process Assurance, Reviews, Supplier monitoring…

Specify the

equipment

Specify the installation & wiring

Develop, Verify the equipment

The project, definition: unique process, consisting of • a set of coordinated and controlled activities • with start and finish dates, • undertaken to achieve an objective • conforming to specific requirements, including the constraints of time, cost and resources.

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End of ramp-up

Type Certification

Flight tests

Integration tests

Definition freeze

Equipment & Harness Production

Concept freeze

Start of Production

Start of Assembly

TIME ISSUES

Entry into Service

End of studies

Authorization to offer ATO

5 to 6 years

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Technical challenges

TIME ISSUES

Side-stick: •1st test in flight on a modified Concorde in 1978, then an A300 in 1982

•Entry into Service in 1988

Brake To Vacate: •PhD thesis in 1998-2002

•Research in Airbus 2002-2005

•Development on A380 2006 to 2009 ( 30 Oct. 2009, A380 – MSN 033)

“COVAS” law (flexible A/C control)

• PhD thesis in 1995

•Entry into Service in 2002 (A340-600)

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Continuous improvement Safety innovation, customer new expectation ...

TIME ISSUES

On A380 in 2010

On A380 in 2010 for the mail, 2012 for the mobile

2012 - Flight plan preparation (A/C performance computation)

TCAS Alert Prevention (TCAP)

On all Airbus FbW 2012 - 2013

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•Integration

•Time issues


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•Some lessons

The system will function if properly integrated within its environment (other systems,

platform, people …)

requirements are correctly integrated (no inconsistency, correct balance between requirements)

The system will be successful if the overall aircraft (at least) is successful (= if optimisation is

done at aircraft level)

for the whole development & in-service life of the aircraft

the customer needs are well understood


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Safety is the priority in aviation – flying is safe Nothing is granted Duty for continuous improvement

Need to forecast future threat

Continuous need to Look at the global picture (complete airplane, design ..

Certification .. In-service, stack of redundancy vs. common point) Management to be supportive and pro-active

Never compromise on safety & ethics


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Club Inter-associations Systèmes Embarqués Critiques - CISEC

• Association Aéronautique et Astronautique de France • Société de l’électricité, de l’Electronique et des Technologies de l’information et de la communication • Société des Ingénieurs de l’Automobile

Séminaires, journées d’étude, ateliers … http://asso-cisec.org

cesic cesic

http://asso-cisec.org/



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THANK YOU – QUESTIONS?

CISEC - http://asso-cisec.org Airbus Innovation - www.thefuturebyairbus.com

THANK YOU - QUESTIONS?




http://www.thefuturebyairbus.com/

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