2013/06/11 areva epr dc docs - files for itaac/rai 469message 2513 6/11/2013 3:08:47 pm combined...

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ArevaEPRDCDocsPEm Resource

From: LENTZ Tony (EXTERNAL AREVA) [[email protected]]Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2013 3:08 PMTo: Buckberg, PerryCc: GUCWA Len (EXTERNAL AREVA); VANCE Brian (AREVA); CRIBB Arnie (EXTERNAL

AREVA); WILLIFORD Dennis (AREVA); Snyder, AmySubject: Files for ITAAC/RAI 469Attachments: Combined ITAAC Table - Rev 5 Interim by ITAAC - 6-11-13.docx; Combined ITAAC Table -

Rev 5 Interim by Group - 6-11-13.docx

Perry, Attached is a revised table that reflects the discussions at the Public Meeting on ITAAC/RAI 469 held on April 4-5, 2013. The table is a revision to the table provided to the NRC at the conclusion of the Public Meeting and is current to today. The first file “Combined ITAAC Table - Rev 5 Interim by ITAAC - 6-11-13” sorts the table by Tier 1 Section and ITAAC. The second file “Combined ITAAC Table - Rev 5 Interim by Group - 6-11-13” sorts the table by the Models (i.e., Groups) that are used to ensure consistency among similar subject ITAAC. The table in the files includes:

1. ITAAC changes in Final and Advanced RAI responses submitted to NRC through June 11, 2013, except to RAI 527, Question 14.03.07-63 and ITAAC changes for Advanced Response to RAI 541 which will be submitted by Friday 6/14/13.

2. The table does not include ITAAC that address the Response to RAI 527, Question 14.03.07-63 concerning radiation monitoring, which will be submitted by Friday 6/21/13.

U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1, Chapter 1, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3 will be revised as described in the tables and submitted in Revision 5 of the U.S. EPR FSAR, which is scheduled for July 19, 2013. A Final Response to RAI 469 will be submitted concurrent with Revision 5. Tony Lentz AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2797

From: WILLIFORD Dennis (RS/NB) Sent: Friday, July 20, 2012 2:59 PM To: [email protected] Cc: Jaffe, David; LENTZ Tony (External RS/NB); GARDNER Darrell (RS/NB) Subject: Files in Preparation for ITAAC/RAI 469 Meeting Getachew, Attached are 3 files in preparation for the upcoming ITAAC/RAI 469 meeting on July 26th. These files are intended to be used during the working portion of the meeting. Our goal is to review the “Model ITAAC Table” file during the meeting (total of 68 models). The “No Model ITAAC Table” file includes miscellaneous one-of-a-kind unique ITAAC. There are a total of 68 models. The combined ITAAC table contains both ITAAC categories and includes all non-programmatic ITAAC included in Tier 1 of the U.S. EPR FSAR. Thanks, Dennis

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Dennis Williford, P.E. U.S. EPR Design Certification Licensing Manager AREVA NP Inc. 7207 IBM Drive, Mail Code CLT 2B Charlotte, NC 28262 Phone: 704-805-2223 Email: [email protected]

Hearing Identifier: AREVA_EPR_DC_Docs_Public Email Number: 8 Mail Envelope Properties (792166F06B0786488C724574B8086EB4C70EA6) Subject: Files for ITAAC/RAI 469 Sent Date: 6/11/2013 3:08:17 PM Received Date: 6/11/2013 3:08:47 PM From: LENTZ Tony (EXTERNAL AREVA) Created By: [email protected] Recipients: "GUCWA Len (EXTERNAL AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "VANCE Brian (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "CRIBB Arnie (EXTERNAL AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "WILLIFORD Dennis (AREVA)" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "Snyder, Amy" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None "Buckberg, Perry" <[email protected]> Tracking Status: None Post Office: FUSLYNCMX01.fdom.ad.corp Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 2513 6/11/2013 3:08:47 PM Combined ITAAC Table - Rev 5 Interim by ITAAC - 6-11-13.docx 569997 Combined ITAAC Table - Rev 5 Interim by Group - 6-11-13.docx 446354 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date: Recipients Received:

US EPR RAI 469/Rev 5-Interim ITAAC (Sorted by ITAAC)

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GRP Sect No. Commitment ITA AC # G# NRC Comment Sort

B1 Model The basic configuration of the YYY is as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built YYY will be performed.

The basic configuration of the YYY is as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x.

1.1

B2 Model Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x through Figure 2.1.x-x separate XXX from YYY so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the XXX of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate XXX from YYY.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate XXX from YYY is as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x through Figure 2.1.x-x.

1.2

B3 Model Fire protection features provide separation within the YYY.

a. A fire protection and smoke effects analysis will be performed.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built configuration of barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations within the YYY.

a. The fire protection and smoke effects analysis concludes that barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations providing separation have a minimum 3-hour fire rating and mitigate the propagation of smoke to the extent that safe shutdown is not adversely affected.

b. The configuration of fire barriers, doors, dampers and penetrations within the YYY conforms to the fire protection and smoke effects analysis.

1.3

B4 Model The YYY structures are Seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions. • Normal plant operation (including

e.g., dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, equipment loads, hydrostatic, hydrodynamic, and temperature loads).

• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built YYY structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the YYY structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,

dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, equipment loads, hydrostatic, hydrodynamic, and temperature loads).

• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and pipe break loads, including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle

add e.g to the beginning of each parenthetical expression to identify the list is not all inclusive.

1.4


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pipe break loads, including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).

• External events (including e.g., wind, extreme winds, rain, snow, flood, tornado, tornadoextreme winds-generated missiles and earthquake).

pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


B5 Model The YYY structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table x.x.x-x.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built YYY structures.

The YYY structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table x.x.x-x.

1.5

B6 Model The ZZZ site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below the finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built ZZZ site grade level is located below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

The ZZZ site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

1.6

B7 Model Separation is provided between the XXX and the YYY as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x to preclude interaction between the XXX and the YYY.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the XXX and the YYY.

The XXX are separated from the YYY as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x. A minimum separation distance of ## ft exists between the XXX and the YYY.

1.7

B8 Model ZZZ structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built ZZZ structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

Watertight seals exist for exterior penetrations of ZZZ structural walls and floors located below grade elevation.

1.8

B9 Miscellaneous 1.9

A1 Model The functional arrangement of the ZZZ is as described in the Design Description of Section x.x.x, Tables x.x.x-1 and x.x.x-x, and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

An inspection of the as-built ZZZ functional arrangement will be performed.

The ZZZ conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section x.x.x, Tables x.x.x-1 and x.x.x-x, and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

2.1

A2 Model The location of the XXX is as listed in Table x.x.x-x.

An inspection of the location of the as-built XXX will be performed.

The XXX listed in Table x.x.x-x is located as listed in Table x.x.x-x.

2.3

A3a Model Physical separation exists between divisions of the ZZZ located in the YYY Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate YYY Buildings.

The divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate YYY Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

2.4


3

A3b Model Physical separation exists between divisions of the ZZZ as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure 2.x.x-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure 2.x.x-1.

2.5

A3c Miscellaneous Physical Separation 2.7

M01 Model Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table x.x.x-x.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table x.x.x-x including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

General Comment 4

Wording for the standard seismic ITAAC does not correctly reflect the necessary requirements. The commitment wording (CW) is not correct. Table 2.2.1-1 (and all tables in general) do not identify all required safety functions for each component that must be maintained (e.g. pressure boundy integrity) prior to, during, and after the seismic event. Please revise the CW and acceptance criteria (AC) in part a. of the ITAAC to conclude as follows: " --- can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s)." The AC in part a. of the ITAAC should not include the phrase "including the time required to perform the listed function." This terminology is associated with Environmental Qualification. The inspection, tests & analysis (ITA) and AC in part b. should verify the SSC is installed in a condition bounded by the tested or anlyzed condition. Please modify both the ITA and AC to state "--- including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions."

3.01

M02 Model ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems and components listed in Table x.x.x-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

An inspection of piping design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed. {{DAC}}

ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table x.x.x-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}

3.02


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M03 Model As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.

A reconciliation analysis of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed.

ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

General Comment 2

Areva combined the ASME piping and component ITAAC into one ITAAC and also deleted reference to the Tier 1 Tables. The Staff does not object to combining the piping ITAAC with the component ITAAC as ASME considers piping to be a component. However, the staff questions if Areva intended to take this action or thought the staff requested such action be taken based on prior discussions regarding the ASME ITAAC wording. The staff questions whether deletion of the referenced Tier 1 tables will impact closing the ITAAC.

General Comment 6

Add "complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III." to the end of the existing AC.

Class 1 and 2 are not applicable to XXX system IAW Tier 2, delete Class 1 and 2 from the ITAAC

3.03

M04 Model ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and documentation for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be conducted.

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

General Comment 2


3.04

M05 Model Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.

An inspection of the as-built pressure- boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed.

ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1.

General Comment 2


3.05

M06 Model ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components that are required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 comply

General Comment 2

Class 1 and 2 are not applicable to XXX system IAW Tier 2, delete Class 1 and 2 from the

3.06


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Code Section III. with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

ITAAC

z Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 3.07


z Deleted.Equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x as ASME AG-1 Code are designed in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

Deleted.An analysis will be performed of ASME AG-1 Code Design Verification Reports.

Deleted.ASME AG-1 Code Design Verification Reports (AA-4400) conclude that the design of equipment listed as ASME AG-1 Code in Table x.x.x-x complies with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

ITAAC deleted at Public Meeting on April 4-5, 2013.

3.09

z Deleted.Equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements, including welding requirements.

Deleted.An inspection of the as-built fabrication activities and documentation for ASME AG-1 Code equipment will be conducted.

Deleted.A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


3.1

M12 Model Equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and documentation for ASME AG-1 Code equipment will be conducted.

A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

3.11

M13 Model Check valves listed in Table x.x.x-x will function to change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of check valves to change position under normal operating conditions.

The check valves change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

3.12

M14 Model Class 1E valves listed in Table x.x.x-x will function to change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of Class 1E valves to change position under normal operating conditions.

Class 1E valves listed in Table x.x.x-x change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

3.13

M15 Model Class 1E dampers listed in Table x.x.x-x will function to change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of Class 1E dampers to change position under normal operating conditions.

Class 1E dampers listed in Table x.x.x-x change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

3.14

M16 Model Pumps and valves listed in Table x.x.x-x will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow,

Tests or type tests of pumps and valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature

A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table x.x.x-x are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the

General Comment 3

(Ref. RAI 7022 & QME-1)

a. The revised ITAAC language in Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 is not consistent with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.206, Section

3.15


6

ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

C.II.1.2.3, ITAAC for Piping Systems and Components, which states that ITAAC verify that installed pumps and valves “have the capability to perform their intended functions under expected ranges of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis conditions.” AREVA is requested to revise the ITAAC for functional qualification of pumps and valves in the applicable Tier 1 tables of the U.S. EPR FSAR to be consistent with RG 1.206 and the previously acceptable ITAAC language in Revision 3 to the U.S. EPR FSAR.

M17 Equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.x.x-1 can withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.x.x-1 will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.x.x-1 will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.

3.17

M18 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 3.18

I01 Model The location of the XXXX equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.x-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built XXXX equipment will be performed.

The XXXX equipment listed in Table 2.4.x-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.x-1.

4.01

I02 Model Physical separation exists between the divisions of the XXX as listed in Table 2.x.x-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the XXX are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the XXX are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1.

4.02

I03 Model Physical separation exists between Class 1E ZZZ equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E ZZZ equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E ZZZ equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E ZZZ equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Identify what hazards are being addressed by the physical separation (i.e. fire, flood, missiles, etc.)

This ITAAC addresses the requirement of IEEE Std 603, Clause 5.6.3 (physical, electrical, and communications independence). Physical separation for hazards in the Safeguard Buildings is addressed by ITAAC 2.2 in Table 2.1.1-10.

4.03


7

related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E ZZZ equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

I04 Model Displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.

General Comment 7

In general, it appears test signals are being overly relied upon to complete the ITAAC. The SRP Appendix C, Section A.VI "Alarms, Displays and Controls" states: "The intent is to test the integrated as-built system; however, separate testing of the actual operation of the system and the alarms, displays and control circuits using simulated signals may be acceptable where that is not practical." Use of the actual plant parameters during integrated system operation is more consistent with the definition "Test for Indication of a Display" provided in Tier 1.

4.04

I05 Model Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-x.

a. Tests will be performed using controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Tests will be performed using controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.

a. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-x.

b. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-x.

4.05

I06 Model Class 1E XXXX equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E XXXX equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Equipment identified as Class 1E in Table x.x.x-x can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

4.06

I07 Model Communications independence is provided between the XXXX divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that communications independence is provided between the XXXX

Communications independence between the XXXX divisions is provided by: • The XXXX function processors do not

interface directly with a network. Separate communication modules interface directly with the network.

4.07


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divisions. • Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the XXXX function processor.

• The XXXX function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The XXXX function processors operate asynchronously from the XXXX communications module.

I08 Model Communications independence is provided between XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the XXXX equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence between XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment is provided by: • Data communications between XXXX

function processors and non-Class 1E equipment are through a Monitoring and Service Interface (MSI).

• The MSI does not interface directly with a network. Separate communication modules interface directly with the network.

• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the MSI.

• The MSI operates in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The MSI operates asynchronously from the communications module.

• The XXXX uses a hardware device to ensure that unidirectional signals are sent to non-safety-related I&C systems.

4.08

I09 Model Electrical isolation is provided on connections between XXXX divisions to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices on connections between the XXXX divisions.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built XXXX divisions.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between XXXX divisions prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between XXXX divisions.

4.09


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I10 Model Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

4.1

I11 Model Locking mechanisms are provided on the XXXX cabinet doors. XXXX cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the XXXX cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that XXXX cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the XXXX cabinet doors operate properly.

b. XXXX cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

4.11

I12 Model The XXXX system design and application software are developed using a process composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following: 1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing

Phase. 5. Installation and Commissioning

Phase. 6. Final Documentation Phase.

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX basic design phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX detailed design phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX manufacturing phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX system integration and testing phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the basic design phase of the XXXX.

b. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the detailed design phase of the XXXX.

c. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the manufacturing phase of the XXXX.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the system integration and testing phase of the XXXX.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the installation and commissioning phase of the XXXX.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the final

4.12


10

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX installation and commissioning phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX final documentation phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

documentation phase of the XXXX.

I13 Model The XXXX is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

XXXX. • Failures caused by the single

failure. • Failures and spurious system

actions that cause or are caused by the AOO or PA requiring the safety function.

A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the XXXX at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the XXXX is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

XXXX. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions

that cause or are caused by the AOO or PA requiring the safety function.

4.13

I14 Model Equipment markings for each XXXX division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

An inspection will be performed on the as-built XXXX equipment to verify that the equipment markings for each XXXX division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

Equipment markings for each XXXX division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

4.14

I15 Model The XXXX receives input signals from the sources listed in Table x.x.x-x.

A test will be performed to verify that the XXXX receives input signals from the sources listed in Table x.x.x-x by the use of test input signals.

The XXXX receives input signals from the sources listed in Table x.x.x-x.

4.15

I16 Model The XXXX provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table x.x.x-x.

A test will be performed to verify that the XXXX provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table x.x.x-x.

The XXXX provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table x.x.x-x.

4.16

I17 Model Hardwired disconnects exist between a. An inspection of the as-built a. Hardwired disconnects exist between 4.17


11

the SU and each divisional MSI of the XXXX. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the XXXX.

hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the XXXX will be performed.

b. A test of the hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the XXXX will be performed.

the SU and each divisional MSI of the XXXX.

b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the XXXX.

I18 Model The XXXX is capable of performing its safety function when XXXX equipment is in maintenance bypass. Bypassed XXXX equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test of the XXXX will be performed to verify the maintenance bypass functionality.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify bypassed XXXX equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The XXXX can perform its safety functions when XXXX equipment is in maintenance bypass.

b. Bypassed XXXX equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

4.18

I19 Model The XXXX generates automatic ZZZ signals for the input variables listed in Table x.x.x-x. The ZZZ signals remain following removal of the input signal. The ZZZ signals are removed when input signals that represent the completion of the ZZZ function are present. Deliberate operator action is required to return the XXXX to normal.

A test will be performed on the XXXX using test input signals to verify that a ZZZ signal is generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.x.x-x when a test input signal reaches the trip limit.

The XXXX generates an ZZZ signal after the test input signal reaches the trip limit for the input variables listed in Table x.x.x-x. The ZZZ signals remain following removal of the test input signal. The ZZZ signals are removed when test input signals that represent the completion of the ZZZ function are present. Deliberate operator action is required to return the XXXX to normal.

4.19

I20 Model An interlock for the XXXX automatically YYYY.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically YYYY on a XXXX.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: XXXX automatically YYYY.

4.2

I21 Model Interlocks for the XXXX initiate the following: • Opening • Opening • Opening

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify interlocks initiate the following: • Opening • Opening • Opening

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Opening • Opening • Opening

4.21

I22 Model Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table x.x.x-x responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify equipment controlled by a PACS module responds to the state requested and

Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table x.x.x-x responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS

4.22


12

to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module.

module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

I23 Model During data communication, the ZZZ function processors receive only the pre-defined messages for that specific ZZZ function processor. Other messages are ignored.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages for that specific ZZZ function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the ZZZ function processors receive only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor and other messages are ignored.

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific ZZZ function processor.

b. The ZZZ function processors receive only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor. Other messages are ignored.

Please clarify the ITAAC . As written it implies that the PS function processors will only receive the pre-defined messages and, therefore how does it ignore others?

4.23

I25 Miscellaneous Inspection 4.24

I26 Miscellaneous Test 4.25

I27 Miscellaneous Analysis 4.26

I28 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 4.27

E01 Model Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table x.x.x-x are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table x.x.x-x in a normal or alternate feed condition.

a. Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each normally aligned division.

b. Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair.

a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table x.x.x-x.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table x.x.x-x.

5.01

E02 Model Without an alternate feed installed, independence is maintained between the XXXX divisions.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each XXXX division, one division at a time.

Without an alternate feed installed, the test input signal exists only in the XXXX division under test, when a test input signal is applied in each XXXX division.

5.02

E03 Model With the alternate feed installed from EPSS division W to division X, independence is maintained between the load group created by divisions W and X, and the load group created by

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EPSS division, one division at a time, while the alternate feed is installed from EPSS division W to

a. A test input signal exists only in the load group created by Class 1E divisions W and X when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division W or X.

In the 6th and 7th lines delete the words "the load group created by" the other divisions are independent of one another during the test and therefore do not constitute a load group by definition.

5.03


13

divisions Y and Z. EPSS divisions Y and Z which are independent of each other.

division X. b. A test input signal exists only in the division under test when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division Y or Z.

E04 Model Non-safety-related loads connected to the XXXX are electrically isolated from the XXXX by an isolation device.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the isolation devices will be performed.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built non-safety-related loads connected to the XXXX.

a. The isolation devices used between the XXXX and non-safety-related loads are qualified to provide electrical isolation.

b. A qualified electrical isolation device exists between non-safety-related loads connected to the XXXX and the XXXX.

5.04

E05 Model The XXXX inverters are sized to power the design XXXX loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX inverters are sized to power the design XXXX loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each XXXX inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

Verify capability by tests and analysis. 5.05

E06 Model XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table x.x.x-x, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table x.x.x-x, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes that ratings for XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table x.x.x-x, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are greater than their analyzed load requirements.

5.06

E07 Model XXXX cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes XXXX cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

5.07

E08 Model XXXX interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An equipment protection and coordination analysis concludes that the XXXX interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

5.08

E09a Model XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table x.x.x-x are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table x.x.x-x are rated to withstand fault currents

A short-circuit analysis concludes that current capability for XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table x.x.x-x is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time

5.09


14

for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by circuit interrupting device coordination analysis.

E09b Model The feeder and load circuit breakers for XXXX switchgear, load centers, and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built feeder and load circuit breakers for XXXX switchgear, load centers, and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

A short-circuit analysisreport concludes that the current interrupting capability for XXXX switchgear, load center, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers, is greater than the analyzed fault currents.

5.10

E10 Model Each XXXX battery is able to provide power for starting and operating design loads for a minimum of two hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built XXXX battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each XXXX battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

a. An analysis concludes each XXXX battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each XXXX battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

5.11

E11 Model Each XXXX battery charger supplies assigned XXXX loads while maintaining the respective XXXX battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built XXXX battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each XXXX battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned XXXX loads while maintaining the respective XXXX battery charged.

a. An analysis concludes each XXXX battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each XXXX battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned XXXX loads while maintaining the respective XXXX battery charged.

5.12

E12 Model Each XXDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective XXXX divisions.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built XXDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective XXXX

a. An analysis concludes each XXDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective XXXX divisions.

b. A report concludes that each as-built

5.13


15

divisions. b. A test and analysis shall be

performed to verify each as-built SBODG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under loaded conditions.

SBODG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under analyzed loaded conditions.

E13 5.14

E14 Miscellaneous Inspection 5.15

E15 Miscellaneous Analysis 5.16

E16 Miscellaneous Test 5.17

E17 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 5.18

Q1 Model Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 can perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 to perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses. anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 can perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2, including associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by type tests or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

General Comment 5

Wording for the standard environmental qualification (EQ) ITAAC does not correctly reflect the necessary requirements: The ITA in part b. does not include the correct required condition to be verified. The ITA should state "----including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses." The AC in part b. should state: "A report exists and concludes the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3, including associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by type tests or combination of type tests and analyses.

6.1

Q2 Model Equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x can

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mild environment in

General Comment 5 6.2


16

perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.

Table x.x.x-x can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform their function.

b. A report exists and concludes that the equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.

Wording for the standard environmental qualification (EQ) ITAAC does not correctly reflect the necessary requirements: The ITA in part b. does not include the correct required condition to be verified. The ITA should state "----including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses." The AC in part b. should state: "A report exists and concludes the as-built equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.2.1-3, including associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by type tests or combination of type tests and analyses.

S01 Model Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to demonstrate the ability of the containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 to close within the valve closure time after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal.

Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a-containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module.

7.01

S02 Model The pumps listed in Table x.x.x-x have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify pump NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.

The pumps listed in Table x.x.x-x have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.

Delete "that" in 3rd line of the ITA. 7.02

S03 Model Each ZZZ heat exchanger listed in Table x.x.x-x has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the WWW.

Tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the ZZZ heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the WWW.

Each ZZZ heat exchanger listed in Table 2.x.x-1 has the capacity to transfer a heat load of greater than or equal #### BTU/hr to the WWW.

7.03

S04 Model The ZZZ has provisions to allow flow testing of each ZZZ pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify ZZZ has provisions to allow flow testing of the ZZZ pumps during plant operation.

The ZZZ pump flow test line recirculates at least ### gpm back to the ZZZ.

7.04

S05a Model The ZZZ provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify ZZZ provides

a. The ZZZ provides the is capable of providing cooling to maintain a

7.05


17

in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

cooling to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the ZZZ fans will be performed to verify the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

maximum temperature of ##°F in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. Each ZZZ fan provides a flowrate of greater than ### scfm, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

S05b Model The ZZZ provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

Tests and analysis of the ZZZ heaters will be performed to verify ZZZ provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment

The ZZZ is capable of providing heating to maintain a minimum temperature of ##°F in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

7.06

S06 Model XXX provide relief capacity. Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity.

Each XXX provides relief capacity ≥ #### lbm/hr at #### psig.

7.07

S07 Model Valves listed in Table x.x.x-x fail to the position as listed in Table x.x.x-x on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that valves fail to the position as listed in Table x.x.x-x on loss of power.

Following loss of power, the valves listed in Table x.x.x-x fail to the position as listed in Table x.x.x-x.

7.08

S08 Miscellaneous Crane Related 7.09

S09 Miscellaneous Pump Flow Related 7.1

S10 Miscellaneous Volume Related 7.11

S11 Miscellaneous Inspection 7.12

S12 Miscellaneous Test 7.13

S13 Miscellaneous Analysis 7.14

S14 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 7.15

B1 2.1.1-4 2.1 The basic configuration of the NI structures is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-1, and Figure 2.1.1-2, Figure 2.1.1-9, Figure 2.1.1-15, and Figure 2.1.1-16.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built NI structures will be performed.

The basic configuration of the NI structures is as follows: • The RCB peripheral wall and dome is

within the RSB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

• SBs 1 and 4 are adjacent to the RSB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 and Figure

2 2.1 The commitment wording should, at minimum, include all figures referenced in the AC. Please add Figures 2.1.1-9, 2.1.1-15, and 2.1.1-16. The 5th bullet in the AC should specify a minimum value of how much thicker.

10


18

2.1.1-2. • SBs 2 and 3 are adjacent to the RSB as

shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The FB is adjacent to the RSB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The RSB cylindrical wall is at least 1 foot 6 ½ inches thicker above the point where this wall meets the FB and SB structures roofs as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

• The vent stack is located on top of the FB stair tower as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The main steam and feedwater valve rooms are located in SBs 1 and 4 as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The MCR, RSS, and TSC are located in the SBs 2 and 3, with the MCR and RSS separated, as shown on Figure 2.1.1-15 and Figure 2.1.1-16.

B2 2.1.1-4 3.1 Hazard protection features The basic configuration of the NI structures includes: • A continuous external hazards

barrier as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2 and Figure 2.1.1-3.

• Decoupling of SB 2/3 and FB internal structures from their outer external hazards barrier walls, at their exterior walls along the entire wall length and the upper ceiling, and from the RSB above Elevation 0 feet, 0 inches as shown on Figure 2.1.1-11, Figure 2.1.1-12, Figure 2.1.1-15 and Figure 2.1.1-17.

An inspection will be performed to verify the basic configuration of the as-built NI structures includes: • A continuous external hazards

barrier. • Decoupling of SB 2/3 and FB

internal structures from their outer external hazards barrier walls, at their exterior walls along the entire wall length and the upper ceiling, and from the RSB above Elevation 0 feet, 0 inches.

The basic configuration of the NI structures has the following hazard protection features: • The RB, SB 2/3, and the FB share a

common boundary exterior surface at the SBs and FB structures roofs and walls to form a continuous external hazards barrier for the RB, SB 2/3 and FB structures as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2 and Figure 2.1.1-3.

• SB 2/3 and the FB internal structures are decoupled from the outer external hazards barrier by a minimum of 3 inches at the external SBs and FB walls along entire length and the upper ceiling, and from the RSB above Elevation 0' feet 0" inches as shown on

The commitment wording should, at minimum, include all figures referenced in the AC.

11


19

Figure 2.1.1-11, Figure 2.1.1-12, Figure 2.1.1-15 and Figure 2.1.1-17.

B6 2.1.1-4 3.2 The NI site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built NI site grade level is located below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

The NI site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

12

B9 2.1.1-4 3.3 The NI structures include radiation barriers for normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding as listed in Table 2.1.1-3.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built NI structures include radiation barriers that provide normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding.

The NI structures radiation barriers provide normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding are as listed in Table 2.1.1-3 meet the specified minimum thickness requirements. Installed doors meet or exceed the radiation attenuation capability of the wall within which they are installed.

3 3.3 Modify the AC to clarify the intent of the ITAAC's purpose. The as-built radiation barriers listed in Table 2.1.1-3 meet the specified minimum thickness requirements. Installed doors meet or exceed the radiation attenuation capability of the wall they are installed within.

13

z 2.1.1-4 3.4 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 14


B8 2.1.1-4 3.6 NI structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built NI structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

Watertight seals exist for exterior penetrations of NI structural walls and floors located below grade elevation.

16

B5 2.1.1-4 3.7 The NI structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-1 and Table 2.1.1-2.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built NI structures.

The NI structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-1 and Table 2.1.1-2.

17

B9 2.1.1-8 2.1 Six rib support structures are provided at the bottom of the reactor cavity, as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9, limit lower reactor pressure vessel head deformation due to thermal expansion and creep during severe accident mitigation.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built reactor vessel cavity contains six rib support structures at the bottom of the reactor cavity.

Six rib support structures are provided at the bottom of the reactor cavity as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

18

B9 2.1.1-8 2.2 As shown on Figure 2.1.1-4, a flooding barrier is provided to prevent ingress of water into the core melt spreading area. Penetrations within the core melt water ingression barrier are protected by watertight seals. Doors within the core

An inspection will be performed to verify: • As-built core melt water

ingression barrier exists. • As-built penetrations within the

core melt water ingression barrier

The RCB provides a spreading area water ingression barrier as shown on Figure 2.1.1-4. Penetrations within the core melt water ingression barrier are protected by watertight seals.

19


20

melt water ingression barrier are watertight doors.

are protected by watertight seals. • As-built doors within the core

melt water ingression barrier are watertight doors.

Doors within the core melt water ingression barrier are watertight doors.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.3 Core melt cannot relocate to upper containment due to the existence of concrete barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built concrete barriers exist.

Concrete barriers are located within the RCB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9 to prevent core melt from locating to upper containment.

20

B4 2.1.1-8 2.4 The RB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including


• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and pipe break loads, including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RB structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the RB structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,




4 2.4 add e.g to the beginning of each parenthetical expression to identify the list is not all inclusive.

21

B9 2.1.1-8 2.5 The RCB, including the liner plate and penetration assemblies, maintains its pressure boundary integrity at the design pressure.

A Structural Integrity Test of the RCB, including the liner plate and penetration assemblies, will be performed in accordance with the requirements for prototype containments of ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Section III Data Report concludes that for the RCB, including the liner plate and penetration assemblies, the Structural Integrity Test results comply with ASME Code Section III, Division 2, CC-6400 requirements, including strain measurements, at a test pressure of 115% of the design pressure of 62 psig.

22


21

B9 2.1.1-8 2.6 The RCB is a post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure.

a. An analysis of ASME Code Section III Design Reports for the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure will be performed.

b. An inspection will be performed for the existence of ASME Code Section III Construction Report for the as-built RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure.

c. An analysis of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure using as-designed and as-built information and ASME Code Design Report (NCA-3550) will be performed.

a. ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550) concludes that the design of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure complies with ASME Code Section III, Division 2 requirements.

b. ASME Code Section III Construction Report (NCA-3454) exists for the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure.

c. ASME Code Data Report (NCA-8000) concludes that design reconciliation (NCA-3554) of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure with the Design Report (NCA-3550) has occurred. The report(s) document the results of the reconciliation analysis. ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550) concludes that design reconciliation (NCA-3554) has been completed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III for the as-built system. The report(s) document the results of the reconciliation analysis.

5 2.6

CW

ITA

AC

ITA

AC

ITA

AC

The ITAAC commitment is not complete. See below suggestion(s)

The RCB, a post-tensioned pre-stressed concrete structure, is designed, constructed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Section III requirements. The as-built structure is reconciled with the design requirements.

a. An inspection of the RCB design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed.

a. ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist and meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the Design of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Division 2.

b. An inspection of the as-built construction activities and ASME documentation for the RCB will be performed.

b. ASME Code Section III Construction Report(s) (NCA-3454) exist and conclude that the RCB, a post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure is constructed and inspected in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section III, Division 2.

c. Ok as written

c. General Comment 2

23

B2 2.1.1-8 2.7 Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-44 separate the RBA from the SBs and the FB, and the RBA from the RCB so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-line energy line break and missile impact, is

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate the RBA from the SBs and FB, and the RBA from the RCB.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate the RBA from the SBs and FB, and the RBA from the RCB is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-44.

6 2.7 Specify figures 2.1.1-20 thru 2.1.1-44 in the DC and AC

24


22

contained within the RBA. B9 2.1.1-8 2.8 The RCB includes provisions for water

flow to the IRWST: • As shown on Figure 2.1.1-4, RCB

rooms which are adjacent to the IRWST contain wall openings to allow water flow into the IRWST.

• As shown on Figure 2.1.1-5, RCB rooms which are directly above the IRWST, contain openings in the floor to allow water flow into the IRWST. The floor openings are protected by weirs and trash racks to provide a barrier against material transport into the IRWST.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built RCB includes provisions for water flow to the IRWST.

The RCB includes the following provisions for water flow to the IRWST: • As shown on Figure 2.1.1-4, the two

rooms labeled Areas for MHSI, LHSI & SAHRS pipe penetrations contain wall openings to allow water flow into the IRWST.

• As shown on Figure 2.1.1-5, the RCB rooms, which are directly above the IRWST, contain openings in the floor to allow water flow into the IRWST. The floor openings are provided with weirs and trash racks to provide a barrier against material transport into the IRWST.

25

B9 2.1.1-8 2.9 RBA penetrations that contain high-energy lines, as listed in Table 2.1.1-7, have guard pipes.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built RBA penetrations that contain high-energy lines have guard pipes.

RBA penetrations that contain high-energy lines, as listed in Table 2.1.1-7, have guard pipes.

26

B9 2.1.1-8 2.10 Safety-related equipment located in the RCB and RBA required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level, or are qualified for submergence.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify as-built safety-related equipment located in the RCB required safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level or are qualified for submergence.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify as-built safety-related equipment in the RBA required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level or are qualified for submergence.

a. Safety-related equipment located in the RCB required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level of -6 ft 2 inches or an EQDP concludes that the safety-related equipment is qualified for submergence.

b. Safety-related equipment in the RBA required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level of +0 ft or an EQDP concludes that the safety-related equipment is qualified for submergence.

7 2.10 Add missing word - required "for" safe shutdown to ITA (a.). See RAI 218 response. Where is the equipment defined? All safety-related equipment is intended.

27

B9 2.1.1-8 2.11 The reactor pressure vessel, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, steam generators, and interconnecting RCS piping are insulated with reflective

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built reactor pressure vessel, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, steam generators, and

The reactor pressure vessel, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, steam generators, and interconnecting RCS piping are insulated

28


23

metallic insulation. interconnecting RCS piping, are insulated with reflective metallic insulation.

with reflective metallic insulation.

B5 2.1.1-8 2.12 The RB structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-5.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built RB structures.

The RB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-5.

29

B9 2.1.1-8 2.13 The RCB has a minimum containment free volume.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum as-built containment free volume.

The RCB minimum containment free volume is greater than or equal to 2.755 x 106 ft3.

30

B9 2.1.1-8 2.14 The RCB and RCB internal structures have a minimum containment heat sink surface area.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum as-built containment heat sink surface area.

The RCB and RCB internal structures containment heat sink surface area is greater than or equal to 699,644.3633 ft2.

31

B9 2.1.1-8 2.15 The integrated leak rate from the RCB does not exceed the maximum allowable leakage rate.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the RCB air mass.

b. A Type A test will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B to measure the RCB overall integrated leak rate.

c. A Type B test will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B to measure leak rates across each pressure containing or leakage-limiting boundary. A Type C test will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B to measure containment isolation valve leak rates.A test will be performed to evaluate the RCB leakage rate.

a. A report defines the RCB air mass. b. The leak rate for the Type A test is less

than or equal to 0.75 La of RCB air mass per day at a containment test pressure of 55 psig.The RCB leakage rate does not exceed 0.25% of RCB air mass per day at a containment test pressure of 55 psig.

c. The combined leak rate (Type B and Type C Tests) for all penetrations and valves is less than 0.60 La.

32

A2 2.1.1-8 2.16 The location of the doors and blowout panels is as listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a).

An inspection of the location of the as-built doors and blowout panels will be performed.

The doors and blowout panels listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) are located as listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a).

33

B4 2.1.1-8 2.17 Pressure relief doors in the RCB listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) will withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the function listed in Table

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the pressure relief doors using

a. A report concludes that the pressure relief doors in the RCB listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) will withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the

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24

2.1.1-6(a). analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built pressure relief doors to verify that the pressure relief doors, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

function listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a). b. The pressure relief doors identified in

Table 2.1.1-6(a), including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.18 RCB doors and blowout panels listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) provide pressure relief.

a. Type tests will be performed for the swing doors to demonstrate the ability of the doors to open.

b. Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the blowout panels to open.

c. An inspection will be performed to verify the vent direction of as-built doors.

a. The pressure at which the swing doors listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) begins to open is less than or equal to 3.48 psid.

b. The pressure at which the blowout panels listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) open is less than or equal to 1.74 psid.

c. The doors listed in listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) provide the vent direction as identified.

8 2.18 Correct typo ("listed in") in first line of AC in part (c.)

35

B9 2.1.1-8 2.19 RCB doors with bBlowout panels in RCB doors listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) are provided with missile restraint.

a. An analysis will be performed to demonstrate that missile restraints in RCB doors are capable of performing the function.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify as-built RCB doors with blowout panels in RCB doors are provided with missile restraint.

a. An analysis concludes that the missile restraint in RCB doors is capable of performing the function.

b. RCB doors with bBlowout panels in RCB doors listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) have a missile restraint.

9 2.19 Are the missile restraints for the blowout panels, door, or both? Please clarify the ITAAC. Additionally analysis should be included to verify the restraint is capable of performing the function.

36

B9 2.1.1-8 2.20 RCB vent path areas provide pressure relief for the rooms listed in Table 2.1.1-6(b).

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built total vent path area in rooms requiring pressure relief.

The total vent path area is greater than or equal to the value listed in Table 2.1.1-6(b) for the corresponding room.

37

B9 2.1.1-8 2.21 The RCB has a maximum volume of Microtherm insulation within the zone of influence.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the zone of influence inside the RCB.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the maximum volume of Microtherm insulation within the zone of influence.

a. A report defines the zone of influence inside the RCB.

b. The equipment in the zone of influence will have less than or equal to 1 ft3 of Microtherm insulation.

38

B9 2.1.1-8 2.22 The RCB has a concrete missile protection shield on top of the refueling

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RCB

A report concludes that the RCB concrete missile protection shield on top of the

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25

canal wall provided for protection against a control rod ejection due to the postulated failure of the CRDM nozzle flange or pressure housing.Deleted.

concrete missile protection shield on top of the refueling canal wall provided for protection against a control rod ejection due to the postulated failure of the CRDM nozzle flange or pressure housing will withstand design basis loads without loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

refueling canal wall provided for protection against a control rod ejection due to the postulated failure of the CRDM nozzle flange or pressure housing will withstand the design basis loads without loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.23 Coatings in the RCB are consistent with the GSI 191 DBA evaluation.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built coatings used in the RCB are consistent with the GSI 191 DBA evaluation.

A report concludes that the coatings used in the RCB are consistent with the safety injection suction strainer debris generation, debris transport, and downstream effects evaluations.

40

B3 2.1.1-8 2.24 Fire protection features provide separation within the RBA.


b. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built configuration of barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations within the RBA.


b. The configuration of fire barriers, doors, dampers and penetrations within the RBA conforms to the fire protection and smoke effects analysis.

41

B3 2.1.1-8 2.25 Fire protection features provide separation within the RCB.


b. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built configuration of barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations within the RCB.


b. The configuration of fire barriers, doors, dampers and penetrations within the RCB conforms to the fire protection and smoke effects analysis.

42

B9 2.1.1-8 2.26 Thermal properties of the RCB concrete mix design are as defined in the Construction Specification.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of ASME Code Section III, Division 2 Construction Specification(s)

a. ASME Code Section III, Division 2, (CC-2230) test records exist for the RCB concrete mix design.

b. ASME Code Section III, Division 2,

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26

defining the thermal properties of the RCB concrete mix design.

b. Testing will be performed to verify the thermal properties of the RCB concrete mix design.

(CC-2230) test records exist for the RCB concrete mix design and conclude that it meets the thermal properties specified.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.27 Deleted.The IRWST has sufficient mass to compensate for water retention in the RCB and RCB internal structures.

Deleted.An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RCB and RCB internal structures water retention.

Deleted.The RCB and RCB internal structures water retention is less than or equal to 535,000 lbm.

44

M02 2.1.1-8 2.28 The RCB liner and penetration assemblies are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Division 2, Class MC requirements.

a. An analysis of ASME Code Section III Design Reports for the RCB liner and penetration assemblies will be performed.

b. An inspection will be performed for the existence of ASME Code Section III Construction Report for the as-built RCB liner and penetration assemblies,

a. ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550) concludes that the design of the RCB liner and penetration assemblies complies with ASME Code Section III, Division 2, Class MC requirements.

b. ASME Code Section III Construction Report (NCA-3454) exists for the RCB liner and penetration assemblies,

45

M03 2.1.1-8 2.29 As-built ASME Code Class MC liner and penetration assemblies are reconciled with the design requirements.

A reconciliation analysis of ASME Code Class MC liner and penetration assemblies will be performed.

ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class MC liner and penetration assemblies, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

46

B4 2.1.1-10 2.1 The SB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions. • Normal plant operation (including


• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built SB structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the SB structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,


• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and pipe break loads,


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27

loads, accident pipe reactions, and pipe break loads, including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


B2 2.1.1-10 2.2 Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-4437 separate each SB from the other SBs and the FB so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the SB of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate each SB from the other SBs and the FB.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate each SB from the other SBs and the FB is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-4437.

Specify figures 2.1.1-20 thru 2.1.1-44 in the DC and AC

48

B5 2.1.1-10 2.3 The SB structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-9.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built SB structures.

The SB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-9.

49

B4 2.1.1-11 2.1 The FB structure, including the vent stack, is Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including



An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built FB structures, including the vent stack, will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the FB structures, including the vent stack, will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,



• External events (including e.g., wind,


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wind, extreme winds, rain, snow, flood, tornado, tornadoextreme winds-generated missiles and earthquake).

B2 2.1.1-11 2.2 Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 and Figure 2.1.1-38 through Figure 2.1.1-44 separate independent divisions within the FB and the FB from other NI structures so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-line energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the independent divisions within the FB of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate independent divisions within the FB and the FB from other NI structures.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate independent divisions within the FB and the FB from other NI structures is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 and Figure 2.1.1-38 through Figure 2.1.1-44.

51

B9 2.1.1-11 2.3 The SFP has a minimum depth from the bottom of the SFP to the SFP operating floor.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built minimum depth from the bottom of the SFP to the SFP operating floor.

The SFP has a minimum depth of 47 feet, 2 inches as measured from the bottom of the SFP to the SFP operating floor.

52

B9 2.1.1-11 2.4 The SFP includes no gates, openings, or drains below an elevation corresponding to the top of stored fuel assemblies.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SFP includes no gates, openings, or drains below an elevation corresponding to the top of stored fuel assemblies.

The SFP includes no gates, openings, or drains below 16 feet, 6-11/16 inches as measured from the bottom of the SFP.

53

B9 2.1.1-11 2.5 The SFP includes no piping that extends below an elevation of 10 feet above the top of the stored fuel assemblies.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SFP includes no piping that extends below an elevation of 10 feet above the top of the stored fuel assemblies.

The SFP includes no piping that extends below 26 feet, 6-11/16 inches as measured from the bottom of the SFSP.

12 2.5 Typo in last line - change 'SFSP' to SFP 54

B1 2.1.2 2.1 The basic configuration of the EPGBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built EPGBs will be performed.

The basic configuration of the EPGBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1.

13 2.1 Specify Figures 2.1.2-1 thru 2.1.2-4 in the CW and AC

Figures 2.1.2-2 thru 2.1.2-4 are included in ITAAC for the internal hazards ITAAC 3.3, not for basic configuration ITAAC.

55

B7 2.1.2 3.1 Separation is provided between the EPGBs and the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the EPGBs and the

The EPGBs are separated from the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1. A minimum separation

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to preclude interaction between the EPGBs and NI common basemat structures.

NI common basemat structures. distance of at least 20 ft exists between the EPGBs and NI common basemat structures.

B6 2.1.2 3.2 The EPGBs site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built EPGBs site grade level is located below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

The EPGBs site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

57

B2 2.1.2 3.3 Internal hHazard protection barriers, as shown on Figure 2.1.2-4, separate internal rooms within each EPGB, and EPGB 1 from EPGB 2 and EPGB 3 from EPGB 4 each EPGB from the other EPGBs as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-37 so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the the respective room of the EPGB of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate internal rooms within each EPGB, and EPGB 1 from EPGB 2 and EPGB 3 from EPGB 4each EPGB from the other EPGBs .

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate internal rooms within each EPGB, and EPGB 1 from EPGB 2 and EPGB 3 from EPGB 4each EPGB from the other EPGBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-42.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-37.

14 3.3

DC

ITA

AC

The existing ITAAC is not correct, the referenced Figures are wrong and the ITAAC implies there are four buildings vs two, each with internal seperation. Figure 2.1.2-4 is not correct, it does not identify the wall between the diesel engine hall and the fuel oil storage tank room as a wall with hazard protection (i.e. bold) as specified in the design description. Figure 2.1.2-4 will be revised to conform to Tier 2 FSAR Figure 9A-1.

See suggested wording below.

Internal hazard protection barriers exist as shown on Figure 2.1.2-4 within the EPGBs to seperate each EPG from the other EPG and the EPGs from the fuel oil tanks so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high energy line break and missile impact is contained within the respective section of the EPGB of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built EPGBs contain internal hazard protection barriers that separate each EPG from the other EPG and the EPGs from the fuel oil storage tanks.

Internal hazard protection barriers, as shown on Figure 2.1.2-4, exist and separate each EPG from the other EPG and the EPGs from the fuel oil storage tanks so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high energy line break and missile impact is

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contained within the respective section of the EPGB of hazard origination.

B4 2.1.2 3.4 The EPGB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including

e.g., dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, hydrostatic loads, hydrodynamic loads, and temperature loads).

• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and pipe break loads – including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built EPGB structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the EPGB structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,

dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, hydrostatic loads, hydrodynamic loads, and temperature loads).




59

z 2.1.2 3.5 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 60

B5 2.1.2 3.6 The EPGB structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built EPGB structures.

The EPGB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2.

61

B1 2.1.3 2.1 The basic configuration of the NAB is as shown on Figure 2.1.3–1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built NAB will be performed.

The basic configuration of the NAB is as shown on Figure 2.1.3-1.

62

B4 2.1.3 3.1 The NAB is a Seismic Category II and RW-IIa structure and will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without loss of structural integrity.SSE and tornado wind loadings without failure onto the

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built NAB structure will withstand design basis loads.SSE and tornado wind loadings without failure onto the adjacent FB or SB Division 4.

A report concludes that the NAB structure will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without loss of structural integrity.SSE and tornado wind loadings without failure onto the adjacent FB or SB Division 4.


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adjacent FB or SB Division 4. z 2.1.3 3.2 Deleted.Separation is provided between

the NAB and the NI common basemat as shown on Figure 2.1.3-1 to preclude interaction between the NAB and NI common basemat structures.

Deleted.An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation between the NAB and the NI common basemat.

Deleted.The NAB is separated from the NI common basemat as shown on Figure 2.1.3-1. A minimum separation distance of 18 inches exists between the NAB and NI common basemat.

64

B1 2.1.4 2.1 The basic configuration of the RWB is shown on Figure 2.1.4-1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built RWB will be performed.

The basic configuration of the RWB is as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1.

65

B7 2.1.4 3.1 Separation is provided between the RWB and EPGB 3/4 as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1 to preclude interaction between the RWB and EPGB 3/4.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the RWB and EPGB 3/4.

The RWB is separated from EPGB 3/4 as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1. A minimum separation distance of at least 5349.5 ft exists between the RWB and EPGB 3/4.

66

B4 2.1.4 3.2 The RWB is a RW-IIa structure and will withstand a seismic design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 of ½ SSE without loss of structural integrity.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RWB will withstand the design basis loads of ½ SSE without loss of structural integrity.

A report concludes that the RWB will withstand the design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 of ½ SSE without loss of structural integrity.

67

B1 2.1.5 2.1 The basic configuration of the ESWBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built ESWBs will be performed.

The basic configuration of the ESWBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1.


Figures 2.1.5-2 thru 2.1.5-5 are included in ITAAC for the internal hazards ITAAC 3.3, not for basic c

onfiguration ITAAC.

68

B7 2.1.5 3.1 Separation is provided between the two pairs of ESWBs and the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1 to preclude interaction between the ESWBs and NI common basemat structures.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the ESWBs and the NI common basemat structures.

The two pairs of ESWBs are separated from the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1. A minimum separation distance of at least 20 ft exists between the two pairs of ESWBs and NI common basemat structures.

69

B9 2.1.5 3.2 The ESWBs have tornado-generated missile protection shields provided for the safety-related fans and pumps as shown on Figure 2.1.5-2, Figure 2.1.5-3, Figure 2.1.5-4, and Figure 2.1.5-5.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify of the as-built ESWB tornado-generated missile protection shields provided for the safety-related fans and pumps will withstand design basis tornado loads

A report concludes that the ESWB tornado-generated missile protection shields provided for the safety-related fans and pumps as shown on Figure 2.1.5-2, Figure 2.1.5-3, Figure 2.1.5-4, and Figure 2.1.5-5 will withstand the design basis

17 3.2 Correct wording in the ITA. The ITA must incorporate the term “will be performed.” Partial example - “An inspection and analysis will be performed on the as-built ESWB….”

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without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions.

tornado loads without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions.

B6 2.1.5 3.3 The ESWBs site grade level is located within +/- 3 inches of the building +0 ft elevation.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built ESWBs site grade level at building +0 ft elevation.

The ESWB site grade level is located within +/- 3 inches of the building +0 ft elevation.

71

B2 2.1.5 3.4 Internal hHazard protection barriers separate each ESWB structure from the other ESWBs structures as shown on Figure 2.1.5-6 so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the ESWB structure of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate each ESWB structure from the other ESWBs structures.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate each ESWB structure from the other ESWBs structures is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-6.

18 3.4 The commitment wording is not supported by what is shown on Figure 2.1.5-6, (i.e. darkened walls with hazard protection).

72

B4 2.1.5 3.5 The ESWB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including


• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reaction, and pipe break loads – including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


An inspection and analysis of the as-built ESWB structures for the design basis loads will be performed.

A report concludes that the ESWB structures will withstand the design basis loads as specified below without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,





73

B8 2.1.5 3.6 ESWB structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built ESWB structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations

Watertight seals exist for exterior penetrations of ESWB structural walls and floors located below grade elevation.

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external flooding by watertight seals. located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

B5 2.1.5 3.7 The ESWB structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Tables 2.1.5-1 and 2.1.5-2.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built ESWB structures.

The ESWB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Tables 2.1.5-1 and 2.1.5-2.

75

A1 2.2.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the RCS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Tables 2.2.1-1, 2.2.1-2, 2.2.1-3, 2.2.1-4, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built RCS functional arrangement will be performed.

The RCS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Tables 2.2.1-1, 2.2.1-2, 2.2.1-3, 2.2.1-4, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-1.

76

A1 2.2.1 2.2 The functional arrangement of the RPV and heavy reflector is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Table 2.2.1-6, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-2.

An inspection of the as-built RPV and heavy reflector functional arrangement will be performed.

The RPV and heavy reflector conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Table 2.2.1-6, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-2.

77


S11 2.2.1 2.4 The RCS loops are physically separated from each other.

An inspection will be performed to verify physical separation of the as-built RCS loops.

The RCS loops are physically separated from each other by a wall as shown on Figure 2.1.1-6.

79

M16 2.2.1 3.1 Pumps and vValves listed in Table 2.2.1-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

Tests or type tests of pumps and valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

20 3.1 General Comment 3 80

M13 2.2.1 3.2 Check valves listed in Table 2.2.1-1 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.2.1-1 under normal operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of check valves to change position under normal operating conditions.

The check valves change position as listed in Table 2.2.1-1 under normal operating conditions.

81

M01 2.2.1 3.3 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.1-1 can

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic



34

withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.2.1-1.

analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.1-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.1-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

Category I in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.2.1-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.1-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.


S11 2.2.1 3.5 The SG outlet nozzles include flow-limiting devices.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SG outlet nozzles include flow limiting devices.

The flow area through each SG outlet nozzle flow-limiting device is a maximum of 1.39 ft2.

84


S13 2.2.1 3.7 The piping and interconnected equipment nozzles listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are evaluated for LBB.

An analysis will be performed to verify the piping and interconnected equipment nozzles are evaluated for LBB. {{DAC}}

An analysis A report exists and concludes that design LBB analysis remains bounding for each piping system and provides a summary of the results of the as-built, plant-specific LBB analysis, including material properties of piping and welds, stress analyses, leakage detection capability, and degradation mechanisms.the piping and interconnected equipment nozzles listed in Table 2.2.1-1 meet the LBB acceptance criteria. {{DAC}}

22 3.7 Does the piping in Table 2.2.1-1 meet LBB criteria? The DC states they are evaluated for LBB and the acceptance criteria states they meet LBB acceptance criteria. Why the difference? What if they don't?

“A design report exists and concludes that the design LBB analysis remains bounding for each piping system and provides a summary of the results of the actual as-built, plant-specific LBB analysis, including material properties of piping and welds, stress analyses, leakage detection capability, and degradation mechanisms.”

86

S14 2.2.1 3.8 The RPV internals will withstand the effects of flow-induced vibration.

a. Tests and analyses of test results will be performed on a plant containing RPV internals representative of the U.S. EPR to

a. A comprehensive vibration assessment program report concludes that RPV internals have no observable damage, no loose parts, and stress is within

87


35

verify that the RPV internals have no observable damage, no loose parts, and stress is within ASME Code Section III limits.

b. An inspection will be performed after hot functional testing to verify the as-built RPV internals have no observable damage or loose parts.

c. An analysis will be performed on the effects of the RCP acoustic frequencies on RPV internals to verify that the RPV internals stress is within ASME Code Section III limits.

d. An analysis will be performed of the acoustic frequencies of the RCS volume to verify that the RCS stress is within the ASME Code Section III limits.

ASME Code Section III limits. b. The RPV internals have no observable

damage or loose parts. c. An analysis of the effects of RCP

acoustic frequencies on RPV internals concludes that RPV internals stress is within ASME Code Section III limits.

d. An analysis of the acoustic frequencies of the RCS volume concludes that stresses due to their loading impact to the RCS equipment when considering sources of flow excitation created by vortex shedding frequencies of the applicable structures and blade passing frequencies of the RCP is within the ASME Code Section III limits.

S14 2.2.1 3.9 The RCS allows movement of the equipment for thermal expansion and contraction.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the clearances and gaps between as-built RCS piping system and its equipment supports.

b An inspection of the RCS will be performed to verify the clearances and gaps for as-built RCS piping system and its equipment supports conform to the approved design.

a. A report defines clearances and gaps between RCS piping system and its equipment supports.

b. The measured clearances and gaps conform to the approved design for RCS piping system and its equipment supports.

23 3.9 The ITAAC is not clear. Is part a) a design analysis prior to construction? With b) being a check of the as-built system to verify design requirements are met? Yes When are the measurements taken cold, hot, or both cold and hot? Both cold and hot per Tier 2 Section 3.9.2.1 Clarify where the clearances and gaps are being measured.

88







36

M03 2.2.1 3.15 As-built RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.Deleted.

A reconciliation analysis of RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 will be performed.Deleted.

ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG.Deleted.

94

M02 2.2.1 3.16 As-built RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.RPV internals listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG requirements.

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and documentation for RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 will be conducted.An inspection of RPV internals design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG will be performed. {{DAC}}

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG.ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the RPV internals complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG. {{DAC}}

95

M05 2.2.1 3.17 Core support structure welds meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.

An inspection of the as-built core support structure welds will be performed.

ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of core support structure welds.

96

S11 2.2.1 3.18 The RPV internals are provided with irradiation specimen guide baskets to hold a capsules containing RPV material surveillance specimens.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built RPV internals are provided with irradiation specimen guide baskets and to hold capsules containing RPV material surveillance specimens.

Two guide baskets are providedinstalled and, are located on opposite sides of the RPV. , and each guide basket includes provisions to hold two material surveillance capsulesOne capsule containing RPV material surveillance specimens is installed in each guide basket.

24 3.18 ITAAC lacks sufficient detail to ensure guide baskets are in the proper location and it should verify the capsules are installed.

97

S14 2.2.1 3.19 Each RCP contains an oil collection system.

a. An analysis will be performed to verify the as-built oil collection system 1) will withstand a safe-shutdown earthquake, 2) will collect lube oil from leakage sites in the RCP lube oil system, and 3) is sized so that the

a. A report concludes the oil collection system 1) will withstand a safe-shutdown earthquake, 2) will collect lube oil from leakage sites in the RCP lube oil system, and 3) is sized so that the drain line and collection tank are large enough to

98


37

drain line and collection tank are large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify an oil collection system is installed on each as-built RCP.

accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

b. An oil collection system is installed on each RCP.






M02 2.2.1 3.25 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems and components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping and components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 system complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}

General Comment 2 104

M03 2.2.1 3.26 As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.


ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

25 3.26 General Comment 2

General Comment 6

105

M05 2.2.1 3.27 Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.

An inspection of the as-built pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be performed.

ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1.


M06 2.2.1 3.28 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components that are required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 comply



38

Code Section III. with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

S12 2.2.1 3.29 The RCP flywheel maintains its structural integrity during an overspeed event.

A vendor RCP overspeed test will be performed to verify that there is no loss of structural integrity of the RCP flywheel at 125 percent of the motor synchronous speed.

A report concludes that there is no loss of structural integrity of the RCP flywheel at 125 percent of the motor synchronous speed of 1200 rpm.

108

M04 2.2.1 3.30 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


I04 2.2.1 4.1 Displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.


I05 2.2.1 4.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-2.



a. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-2.

b. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-2.

111

I22 2.2.1 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.2.1-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify equipment controlled by a PACS module responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module.

Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.2.1-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

112


39

state. z 2.2.1 4.4 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 113

E01 2.2.1 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 in a normal or alternate feed condition.



a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3.

114


E15 2.2.1 5.3 The power supply design is such that only two EDGs are required to operate to supply power to the minimum number of PZR heaters.

An analysis will be performed to verify that only two EDGs are required to operate to supply power to the minimum number of PZR heaters.

An analysis concludes that only two EDGs are required to operate to supply power to the minimum numbertwo groups of emergency PZR heaters, which are rated at 144 kW per heater.

27 5.3 Specify the minimum number of pressurizer heaters or the total KW

116

Q1 2.2.1 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-2 can perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-2 to perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-2 can perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.



40

tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

Q1 2.2.1 6.2 Instrumentation designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3 will display as listed in Table 2.2.1-3 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.


M14 2.2.1 7.1 Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.2.1-2 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.2.1-1 under normal operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of Class 1E valves to change position under normal operating conditions.

Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.2.1-2 change position as listed in Table 2.2.1-1 under normal operating conditions.

119

S12 2.2.1 7.2 The RCPs have rotational inertia to provide coast down flow of reactor coolant as listed in Table 2.2.1-4 on loss of power to the RCP motors.

A test will be performed to verify the RCPs have rotational inertia to provide coast down flow of reactor coolant on loss of power to the RCP motors.

The RCPs provide the minimum coastdown flow of reactor coolant as listed in Table 2.2.1-4 on loss of power to the RCP motors.

120


41

S09 2.2.1 7.3 The RCPs provide flow. A test will be performed to verify the RCPs provide flow.

The RCPs provide flow greater than 119,692 124,741 gpm/loop and less than 134,662 gpm/loop.

30 7.3 Under what condition is the test accomplished (hot/cold). Tier 2 specified RCP flow is 124,741 gpm/loop. Considering the lower resistance in the RCS from lack of fuel, why is 119,692 gpm/loop acceptable?

121

S12 2.2.1 7.4 The RCP SSSS can be engaged when the RCP is stopped.

A test will be performed to verify the RCP SSSS can be engaged when the RCP is stopped.

The RCP SSSS can be engaged when the RCP is stopped.

122

S12 2.2.1 7.5 PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2 open. A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a test input signal, each PSRV opens.

Each PSRV opens within 0.70 seconds (including pilot valve opening time) after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

123

S12 2.2.1 7.6 PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2 open below the maximum setpoint.

Vendor tests will be performed to verify that each PSRV opens below the maximum setpoint.

Each PSRV opens below a maximum lift setting of 2600.4 psia.

124

S06 2.2.1 7.7 PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2 provide relief capacity.

Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity of PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2.

Each PSRV listed in Table 2.2.1-2 provides relief capacity ≥ 661,400 lbm/hr at 2535 psig.

125

S12 2.2.1 7.8 Each RCP breaker and RCP bus breaker is tripped by a protection system signal.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a protection system signal, each RCP breaker and RCP bus breaker trips.

Each RCP breaker and RCP bus breaker is tripped by a protection system signal.

126

A1 2.2.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the IRWSTS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.2, Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

An inspection of the as-built IRWSTS functional arrangement will be performed.

The IRWSTS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.2, Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

127


A3a 2.2.2 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the IRWSTS as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the IRWSTS are physically separated.

The divisions of the IRWSTS are physically separated in the Reactor Building as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1. The divisions of the IRWSTS equipment in the Safeguard Buildings is are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

31 2.3 The commitment wording is not consistent with the AC.

Is equipment located in the RB required to be seperated? Yes, as shown on sheets 2 and 3 of the figure.

129

M16 2.2.2 3.1 Valves listed in Table 2.2.2-1 will be Tests or type tests of valves will be A report concludes that the valves listed in 32 3.1 General Comment 3 130


42

functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

Table 2.2.2-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

M13 2.2.2 3.2 Check valves listed in Table 2.2.2-1 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of check valves to change position under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

The check valves change position as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

131

M01 2.2.2 3.3 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.2.2-1.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.2-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.2.2-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.









43






An inspection of piping design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed {{DAC}}

ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 2.2.2-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}






General Comment 6

143






A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components that are required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.2-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.




ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.2-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III



44

requirements. I04 2.2.2 4.1 Displays listed in Table 2.2.2-2 are

indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.2.2-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.2.2-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Table 2.2.2-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Table 2.2.2-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.







148

I22 2.2.2 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.2.2-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify equipment input by a PACS module responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module.


149


E01 2.2.2 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.2.2-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.2.2-2 in a normal or alternate feed condition.



a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-2.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-2.

151


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Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.2.2-2 change position as listed inTable 2.2.2-1 under normal operating conditions.

154


S10 2.2.2 7.3 The IRWST provides a water volume for emergency core cooling.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built IRWST water volume.

The IRWST provides a minimum water volume of 66,886 ft3.

156

S14 2.2.2 7.4 Post-LOCA pH control is provided for the IRWST with TSP.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built capacity of the TSP baskets to provide post-LOCA pH control.

The TSP baskets listed in Table 2.2.2-1 hold a capacity of TSP of ≥ 12,200 lbm.

157


46

S14 2.2.2 7.5 The IRWST suction inlet line for each safety injection system division has a debris screen.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a debris screen is installed in the as-built IRWST suction inlet line for each safety injection system division.

b. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum surface area and maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built debris screen.

a. A debris screen is installed in the IRWST suction inlet line for each safety injection system division.

b. The debris screen has a minimum surface area of 753 ft2 and a maximum mesh grid opening of 0.08 x 0.08 inches.

158


S11 2.2.2 7.7 The IRWST provides water to flood the core spreading area.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built IRWST and interfacing severe accident heat removal system piping configuration provides a flow path to the core spreading area.

The IRWST and interfacing severe accident heat removal system piping configuration provides a flow path to the core spreading area.

160

S14 2.2.2 7.8 The IRWST has a retaining basket located directly below each heavy floor opening.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a retaining basket is installed in the as-built IRWST directly under each heavy floor opening.

b. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum surface area and maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built retaining basket.

a. A retaining basket is installed in the IRWST directly below each heavy floor opening.

b. The retaining basket has a minimum surface area of 721 ft2 and a maximum mesh grid opening of 0.08 x 0.08 inches.

161

S11 2.2.2 7.9 The IRWST has a trash rack located over each heavy floor opening.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a trash rack is installed over each as-built heavy floor opening.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built trash rack.

a. A trash rack is installed over each heavy floor opening to the IRWST.

b. The trash rack has a maximum mesh grid opening of 4 x 4 inches.

162

S11 2.2.2 7.10 The IRWST has a weir located around each trash rack at the heavy floor opening.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a weir is installed around each as-built trash rack at the heavy floor opening.

b. An inspection will be performed

a. A weir is installed around each trash rack at the heavy floor opening.

b. The weir has a maximum height of 2 inches.

37 7.10 Why were weir height verifications deleted? 163


47

to verify the height of the as-built weir around each trash rack at the heavy floor opening.

S11 2.2.2 7.11 The IRWST has a weir located at the annular space wall openings.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a weir is installed at the as-built annular space wall openings.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the height of the as-built weir at the annular space wall openings.

a. A weir is installed at the annular space wall opening.



A1 2.2.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SIS/RHRS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.3, Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.

An inspection of the as-built SIS/RHRS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SIS/RHRS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.3, Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.

165


A3a 2.2.3 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the SIS/RHRS located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SIS/RHRS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SIS/RHRS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.

Insert the table that identifyies the component locations for this ITAAC's components similar to the other ITAAC .

167

M16 2.2.3 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.3-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions with debris-laden coolant fluids up to and including design basis accident conditions.

Tests or type tests of pumps and valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions with debris-laden coolant fluids up to and including design basis accident conditions.

A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.3-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions with debris-laden coolant fluids up to and including design basis accident conditions.





169


48


















M02 2.2.3 3.15 ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 piping systems and components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist(s) that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 complies with the



49

requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}

M03 2.2.3 3.16 As-built ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.

A reconciliation analysis of ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components will be performed.

ASME Code Design Report(s) exist(s) that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.


General Comment 6

183

M05 2.2.3 3.17 Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.

An inspection of the as-built pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components will be performed.

ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1.


M06 2.2.3 3.18 ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components that are required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.


M04 2.2.3 3.19 ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and documentation for ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components will be conducted.

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


I04 2.2.3 4.1 Displays listed in Table 2.2.3-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.


b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.2.3-2 are indicated on the PICS





50

operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.






188




189

I21 2.2.3 4.4 Interlocks for the SIS/RHRS initiate the following: • Opening of the accumulator

injection path. • Opening authorization of the

residual heat removal system suction path from the reactor coolant system.

• Opening authorization of the hot leg safety injection path.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify interlocks initiate the following: • Opening of the accumulator

isolation valve. • Opening authorization of the

RHR 1st RCPB isolation valve and the RHR 2nd RCPB isolation valve.

• Opening authorization of the LHSI hot leg injection isolation valve.

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Opening of the accumulator isolation

valve. • Opening authorization of the RHR 1st

RCPB isolation valve and the RHR 2nd RCPB isolation valve.


190






191


51








S03 2.2.3 7.1 Each SIS/RHRS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.2.3-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the SIS/RHRS heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Each SIS/RHRS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.2.3-1 has the capacity to transfer a heat load of greater than or equal to 2.35E+08 BTU/hr to the CCWS.

194

S10 2.2.3 7.2 The accumulators listed in Table 2.2.3-1 provide a storage volume for emergency core cooling.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the water total volume of the as-built accumulators.

The accumulators listed in Table 2.2.3-1 provide a minimum total volume of 1942.3 ft3 per accumulator.

44 7.2 The ITA and AC are not aligned. Replace "water volume" in the ITA with "total volume."

195

S13 2.2.3 7.3 Each accumulator injection line to the RCS cold leg has a minimum head loss coefficient (fL/D + K).

An analysis will be performed to verify each as-built accumulator injection line to the RCS cold leg minimum head loss coefficient (fL/D + K).

Each accumulator injection line to the RCS cold leg has a minimum head loss coefficient (fL/D + K) of 3.71 for a flow area of 0.3941 ft2 and f = 0.014.

45 7.3 Is this a test and analyses or straight analyses?

Straight analysis.

Clarify the line being tested.

196


52

S02 2.2.3 7.4 The pumps listed in Table 2.2.3-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.


The pumps listed in Table 2.2.3-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.

Delete "that" in 3rd line of the ITA. 197

S12c 2.2.3 7.5 The SIS/RHRS delivers water to the RCS for core cooling.

Tests will be performed to verify the SIS/RHRS delivers water to the RCS for core cooling.

The SIS/RHRS delivers the following flows to the RCS: a. MHSI pump capacity:

≥ 600 gpm @ 580 psia (cold leg pressure).

b. LHSI pump capacity: ≥ 2200 gpm @ 25 psia (cold leg pressure).

ac. Minimum MHSI pump capacity: ≥ 165 gpm @ pressure greater than 1300.0 psia 3200 TDH (ft) (shutoff head condition).

bd. Minimum LHSI pump capacity: ≥ 525 530 gpm @ pressure greater than 300.0 psia 750 TDH (ft) (shutoff head condition).

ce. Maximum MHSI pump capacity: ≤ 1110 gpm @ 14.5 psia 328 TDH (ft) (run-out condition).

df. Maximum LHSI pump capacity: ≤ 3220 gpm @ 14.5 psia 108 TDH (ft) (run-out condition).

46 7.5 Please provide the basis for the flow and head combinations established in the AC. We have not been able to locate supporting documentation in either the DCD or ANP-10293.

198





200

S04 2.2.3 7.8 The SIS/RHRS has provisions to allow flow testing of each SIS/RHRS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify the SIS/RHRS has provisions to allow flow testing of each SIS/RHRS pump during plant operation.

The flow test line allows the each SIS/RHRS pump to deliver the following flow rates: a. MHSI pump:

Flow rate per pump is greater than or equal to 480 gpm.

b. LHSI pump:

201


53


S09 2.2.3 7.9 Safety injection pumped flow will be delivered to the RCS before the maximum elapsed time.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the safety injection pumped flow delivery time.

Time for safety injection flow to reach full flow does not exceed 15 seconds with offsite power available or 40 seconds with loss of offsite power after receipt of a safety injection test input signal from the PACS module.

202

S12c 2.2.3 7.10 Each LHSI pump delivers water to its respective RCS hot leg.

Tests will be performed to verify each LHSI pump delivers the flow to its respective RCS hot leg.

Each LHSI pump delivers a minimum flow of 1720 gpm to its respective RCS hot leg at an equivalent RCS pressure of greater than or equal to 69.27 psia.

47 7.10. Specify a tolerance for RCS pressure or state it’s a minimum value

203


S14 2.2.3 7.12 LHSI heat exchanger cools the post-LOCA fluid for a minimum of 30 days.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses for heat exchanger performance will be performed to demonstrate that the LHSI heat exchanger cools the post-LOCA fluid for a minimum of 30 days.

A report concludes that debris plugging and settlement in the LHSI heat exchanger tubes will not occur, and/or affect the performance of the LHSI heat exchanger for the 30-day mission time. A report concludes that failure due to abrasive wear will not degrade the performance of the LHSI heat exchanger below the 30-day acceptance criteria.

205

S13 2.2.3 7.13 LHSI and MHSI systems provide safety injection flow to the RCS during post-LOCA operation.

a. An analysis of pressure drop/overall system resistance across ECCS will be performed.

b. An analysis of plugging and wear rates of piping, valves, and orifices will be performed.

c. An analysis of plugging of ECCS instrument lines will be performed.

a. A report concludes that pressure drop/overall system resistance across ECCS is consistent with safety analysis results for 30 days of post-LOCA operation.

b. A report concludes that wear rates are acceptable for 30 days of post-LOCA operation based on provided equipment specification.

c. A report concludes that post-LOCA debris will not clog the ECCS instrument lines.

206

S14 2.2.3 7.14 The SIS/RHRS includes high point vents to avoid gas accumulation in the SIS/RHRS.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the locations of high point vents to avoid gas accumulation in the SIS/RHRS.


a. A report defines the locations of high point vents to avoid gas accumulation in the SIS/RHRS.

b. High point vents are installed in the SIS/RHRS.

48 7.14 What identifies the required number and location of high point vents? Suggest use an 'a' and 'b' approach where in part 'a' an analysis identifes required vent locations, and

207


54

to verify high point vents are installed in the as-built SIS/RHRS.

part 'b' verifes their installation.

A1 2.2.4 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EFWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.4, Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.

An inspection of the as-built EFWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EFWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.4, Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.

208


A3a 2.2.4 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the EFWS located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.4-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the EFWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the EFWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.4-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.


210

M16 2.2.4 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.4-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.







212



a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.4-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.2.4-1 including the time required to perform the listed



55

requirements. b. An inspection will be performed

of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.4-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

function. b. Inspection reports conclude that the

equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.4-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.
















ASME Code Design Report(s) exist(s) that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.4-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.


General Comment 6

225


56



ASME Code reports(s) exist(s) that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.4-1.




ASME Code Data Report(s) exist(s) and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.4-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

















230

I22 2.2.4 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.2.4-2 responds to the state requested and

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify equipment controlled by a PACS module

Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.2.4-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive

231


57

provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module.

monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.






232




b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.4-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design





58

requirements. S02 2.2.4 7.1 The pumps listed in Table 2.2.4-1 have

NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.




S12c 2.2.4 7.2 The EFWS delivers water to the steam generators at the required flowrate to restore and maintain SG water level and remove decay heat following the loss of normal feedwater supply.

Tests will be performed to verify the EFWS required flowrate to the steam generators to restore and maintain SG water level and remove decay heat following the loss of normal feedwater supply.

The EFWS delivers a minimum flow of 198,416 lbm/hr (or 399.4 400 gpm at 122°F) at a pressure of 1426.1 psia.

54 7.2 The value 399.4 is not consistent with Tier II (400 gpm).

Where do the other values come from?

236

S10 2.2.4 7.3 The EFWS combined storage pool available volume supports cooldown.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built EFWS combined storage pool volume.

The EFWS combined storage pool minimum volume is 365,000 gallons (total for 4 pools).

55 7.3 Why not 411,200 as specified in Tier II?

365,000 is the minimum as listed in Tech Spec 3.7.6.

237

S09 2.2.4 7.4 The EFWS limits the maximum flow rate to a depressurized steam generator.

Tests will be performed to verify the maximum EFWS flowrate to a depressurized steam generator.

The EFWS delivers a maximum flow of 490 gpm to a depressurized steam generator.

238

S11 2.2.4 7.5 EFWS cross-connections allow alignment of EFWS pump suction on all EFWS storage pools and pump discharge alignment with any SG.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built EFWS cross-connections allow alignment of each EFWS pump suction on all EFWS storage pools and each EFWS pump discharge alignment with any SG.

The EFWS cross-connections allow the following system alignments: 1. Each EFWS pump suction to all EFWS

storage pools. 2. Each EFWS pump discharge with any

SG.

239





241

S04 2.2.4 7.8 The EFWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EFW pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify the EFWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EFWS pump during plant operation.

The EFW pump flow test line recirculates a minimum of 360 gpm back to the EFW storage pool.

242

A1 2.2.5 2.1 The functional arrangement of the FPCPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.5, Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2, and as shown on

An inspection of the as-built FPCPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The FPCPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.5, Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2, and as shown on Figure

243


59

Figure 2.2.5-1. 2.2.5-1. z 2.2.5 2.2 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 244

A3a 2.2.5 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the FPCS located in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 through 2.1.1-422.2.5-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the FPCS are physically separated in the Fuel Building.

The divisions of the FPCS are physically separated by a wall in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 through 2.1.1-422.2.5-1.

Figure 2.2.5-1 will be revised to show a wall in the Fuel Building

245








247




b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.5-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved





60

design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

















General Comment 2

General Comment 6

260





M06 2.2.5 3.17 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 A hydrostatic test will be conducted ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and General Comment 2 262


61

components listed in Table 2.2.5-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity at their design pressure.

on ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components that are required to be hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code Section III.

conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.5-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.



ASME Code Data Report(s) exist(s) that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.5-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.













265




266

E01 2.2.5 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in a. Testing will be performed by a. The test input signal provided in the 267


62

Table 2.2.5-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.2.5-2 in a normal or alternate feed condition.

providing a test input signal in each normally aligned division.


normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-2.







b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.5-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses. anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


S03 2.2.5 7.1 Each FPCS heat exchangers listed in Table 2.2.5-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the FPCS heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Each FPCS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.2.5-1 has the capacity to transfer a heat load of greater than or equal to 19.8 MW to the CCWS and maintain the SFP temperature below 140°F via one heat exchanger.

61 7.1 Typo in CW 1st line - should be "exchanger" 270


63








272

S02 2.2.5 7.4 The pumps listed in Table 2.2.5-1 each have the capacity to provide flow to the FPCS heat exchangers.

Tests will be performed to verify the FPCS flowrate to the FPCS heat exchangers.

Each train of the FPCS delivers a minimum flow of 3576 gpm to the FPCS heat exchanger with one pump in operation.

273



A1 2.2.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CVCS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.6, Tables 2.2.6-1 and 2.2.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.6-1.

An inspection of the as-built CVCS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CVCS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.6, Tables 2.2.6-1 and 2.2.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.6-1.

276


M16 2.2.6 3.1 Pumps and Vvalves listed in Table 2.2.6-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.







279


64




















ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 2.2.6-1 complies with the requirements of



65

the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}




General Comment 2

General Comment 6

293















b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.2.6-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs





66

to PICS. I05 2.2.6 4.2 Controls on the PICS operator

workstations in the MCR and the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.2.6-2.





298




299

I21 2.2.6 4.4 Interlocks for the CVCS initiate the following: • Isolation of the charging pump

suction from the volume control tank and normal letdown path during a boron dilution event by closure of the boron dilution valves.

• Isolation of the charging line by closure of the charging line containment isolation valves and pressurizer spray isolation valve.

• Isolation of the letdown line on a Safety Injection actuation signal by closure of the RC pressure boundary valves.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the operation of the following interlocks initiate the following: • Isolation of the charging pump

suction from the volume control tank and normal letdown path by closure of the boron dilution valves.


• Isolation of the letdown line on a safety injection actuation signal by closure of the RC pressure boundary valves.

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Isolation of the charging pump suction

from the volume control tank and normal letdown path by closure of the boron dilution valves.



300



b. Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each division with the alternate


b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned

301


67

feed aligned to the divisional pair. to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.6-2.












305


S12 2.2.6 7.4 The CVCS run-out flow does not exceed the design maximum allowable.

A test will be performed to verify the CVCS run-out flow does not exceed the design maximum allowable.

The CVCS run-out flow is equal to or less than 112.66 lbm/s total with both CVCS pumps running.

307


68

S12 2.2.6 7.5 The CVCS charging pumps listed in Table 2.2.6-1 provide seal water flow for operation of the reactor coolant pumps.

Testing will be performed to verify each CVCS charging pump provides seal water flow to the reactor coolant pumps.

One CVCS charging pump delivers a minimum seal water flow of 6.15 gpm to each operating reactor coolant pump.

308

A1 2.2.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EBS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.7, Tables 2.2.7-1 and 2.2.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.7-1.

An inspection of the as-built EBS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EBS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.7, Tables 2.2.7-1 and 2.2.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.7-1.

309


A3a 2.2.7 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the EBS, except for the suction piping interconnect, located in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 and 2.1.1-39.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the EBS, except for the suction piping interconnect, are physically separated in the Fuel Building.

The divisions of the EBS, except for the suction piping interconnect, are physically separated by a wall in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 and 2.1.1-39.

311








313



a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.7-1 using

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s)



69

analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


listed in Table 2.2.7-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.














ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 2.2.7-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}




ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code

General Comment 2

General Comment 6

327


70

Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.7-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.





















b. Tests will be performed using


b. Controls on the PICS operator

332


71

controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.

workstations in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.2.7-2.




333






334



b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.7-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh





72

environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.








337

S04 2.2.7 7.3 The EBS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EBS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify EBS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EBS pump during plant operation.

The EBS pump flow test line recirculates a minimum of 49 gpm back to the EBS tank.

338

S12c 2.2.7 7.4 Deleted. The EBS delivers water to RCS cold legs 1 and 2.

Deleted. Tests will be performed to verify the EBS delivers water to RCS cold legs 1 and 2.

Deleted. Each EBS pump delivers a minimum flow of 52 gpm to RCS cold legs 1 and 2.

d. Table 2.2.7-3 (Extra Borating System ITAAC) in Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 does not appear to include ITAAC for pump preoperational flow testing. AREVA is requested to clarify whether ITAAC are included for pump preoperational flow testing for the Extra Borating System.

339

A1 2.2.8 2.1 The functional arrangement of the FHS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.8 and Table 2.2.8-1.

An inspection of the as-built FHS functional arrangement will be performed.

The FHS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.8 and Table 2.2.8-1.

340





b. Inspection reports conclude that the



73



M02 2.2.8 3.3 Deleted.ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Deleted.An inspection of piping design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed. {{DAC}}

Deleted.ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist(s) that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}

73 3.3 General Comment 2.

There are no piping systems in the table, are you referring to the transfer tube? Please clarify ITAAC.

343





General Comment 6

344





The ITAAC CW is not consistent with the ITA and AC. Incorporate the CW into the acceptance criteria.

345





M04 2.2.8 3.7 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.8-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and documentation for ASME Code

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist(s) that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.8-1 are



74

accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be conducted.

fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

S14 2.2.8 3.8 The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required limits during normal operations, during and after design basis seismic events, and during and after design basis dropped fuel assembly accidents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required limits during normal operations, during and after design basis seismic events, and during and after design basis dropped fuel assembly accidents.

Inspection reports and poison plate manufacturer reports verify the following fuel storage racks features: • Region 1 rack cell pitch is consistent

with rack model inputs of the criticality evaluation.

• Region 2 rack cell pitch is consistent with rack model inputs of the criticality evaluation.

• The configuration of the neutron absorber plates for Region 1 racks is consistent with rack model inputs of the criticality evaluation.


• The number of neutron absorber plates installed between storage cells in Region 1 racks agrees with design drawings.


• The layout of fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pool agrees with design drawings.

• The layout of fuel storage racks in the new fuel storage vault agrees with design drawings.

348





75




S14 2.2.8 3.15 The lift height of the Refueling Machine and Spent Fuel Machine gripper masts is limited such that the dose rate is less than 2.5 mrem/hr at the normal operating water level.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the minimum depth of water shielding required to limit the dose rate to less than 2.5 mrem/hr at the normal operating water level.

b. A test will be performed to verify the Refueling Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

c. A test will be performed to verify the Spent Fuel Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

a. A radiological analysis determines the minimum depth of water shielding required to limit the dose rate to less than 2.5 mrem/hr at the normal operating water level.

b. The Refueling Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

c. The Spent Fuel Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

355

S14 2.2.8 3.16 The SFCTF opening to the loading hall can be isolated from the spent fuel pool by closing each of the following four Seismic Category I fluid barriers: • Loading pit slot gate. • Loading pit swivel gate. • Penetration assembly upper cover. • Penetration assembly lower cover.

A test and inspection will be performed to verify each fluid barrier can isolate the spent fuel pool from the loading hall.

The loading hall can be isolated from the spent fuel pool by closing any one of the following Seismic Category I fluid barriers: • Loading pit slot gate. • Loading pit swivel gate. • Penetration assembly upper cover. • Penetration assembly lower cover.

76 N/A What ITAAC perform the load tests for the RM and SFM, verify interlocks, and verify the gripper can't be opened under load etc.?

Section 2.10.1, ITAAC 4.6 & 4.7

356

A1 2.3.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CGCS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.1 and Table 2.3.1-1.

An inspection of the as built CGCS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CGCS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.1 and Table 2.3.1-1.

357

M01 2.3.1 3.1 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.3.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s)

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic

a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.3.1-1 can



76

listed in Table 2.3.1-1. Category I in Table 2.3.1-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.3.1-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.







78

4.1

General Comment 7

Table 2.3.1-2 should be referenced not 2.3.1-1. Since there are no displays on the RSS, delete referece to RSS in the CW and delete step b. in the ITA and AC.

Table 2.3.1-2 will be revised to show indications in the RSS.

359






79 4.2 There are no controls listed in Table 2.3.1-2 as being on the RSS. Delete referece to RSS in the CW and delete step b. in the ITA and AC.


360




361


77

state. S07 2.3.1 5.1 Hydrogen mixing dampers listed in

Table 2.3.1-1 fail open on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that hydrogen mixing dampers fail open on loss of power.

Following loss of power, the hydrogen mixing dampers listed in Table 2.3.1-1 fail open.

362







S14 2.3.1 7.1 The hydrogen mixing dampers listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide pressure relief for design basis events.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built hydrogen mixing dampers provide sufficient area for pressure relief.

The hydrogen mixing dampers listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide a minimum combined total open area of 64 ft².

81 7.1, 7.2, 7.3

ITAAC requirements are not consistent with Tier II, (i.e., minimum value vs approximate value).

This value matches the value stated on Tier 2, Section 6.2.1, page 6.2-6.

No change required.

364

S14 2.3.1 7.2 The convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide pressure relief for design basis events.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built convection foils provide sufficient

The convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide a minimum combined total open area of 450 ft².

81 7.1, 7.2, 7.3


365


78

area for pressure relief. This value matches the value stated on Tier 2, Section 6.2.1, page 6.2-6.

No change required.

S14 2.3.1 7.3 The rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide pressure relief for design basis events.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built rupture foils provide sufficient area for pressure relief.

The rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide a minimum combined total open area of 420 ft².

81 7.1, 7.2, 7.3


This value matches the value stated on Tier 2, Section 6.2.1, page 6.2-6, i.e., 870-450 = 420.

No change required.

366

S12 2.3.1 7.4 The fusible link of the convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 fails at the designed temperature.

Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the fusible link to open.

The fusible link opens at or before reaching a temperature of 185 °F.

367

S12 2.3.1 7.5 The burst element of the convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens at the designed pressure.

Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the burst element of the convection foils to open.

The burst element of the convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens bi-directionally at a delta pressure of 0.7 psid ± 30%.

82 7.5 Typo 3rd line missing "of" 368

S12 2.3.1 7.6 The burst element of the rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens at the designed pressure.

Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the burst element of the rupture foils to open.

The burst element of the rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens bi-directionally at a delta pressure of 0.7 psid ± 30%.


S11 2.3.2 2.1 The bottom of the reactor pit is lined with sacrificial concrete backed by refractory brick.

An inspection of the as-built reactor pit will be performed to verify that the bottom of the reactor pit is lined with sacrificial concrete backed by refractory brick.

The bottom of the reactor pit is lined with a minimum of 19.7 inches of sacrificial concrete backed by refractory brick in room UJA11001.

370

S11 2.3.2 2.2 The CMSS has a melt plug and gate. An inspection of the as-built cavity gate will be performed to verify that the CMSS has a melt plug and gate.

The CMSS melt plug consists of a minimum of 19.7 inches of sacrificial concrete backed by an aluminum gate in room in UJA11001.

84 2.2 Typo in AC 4th line should be "in room" 371

S11 2.3.2 2.3 The CMSS has a melt discharge channel.

An inspection of the as-built melt discharge channel will be performed to verify that the CMSS has a melt discharge channel.

The CMSS melt discharge channel connecting rooms UJA11001 and UJA04002 is lined with refractory material and has a minimum cross-sectional area of 10.76 ft2 and is lined with refractory material.

85 2.3 Clarify the ITAAC by relocating "is lined with refractory material. (e.i.. " ---UJA04002 is lined with refractory material and has a minimum cross-sectional area of 10.76 ft^2.")

372

S11 2.3.2 2.4 The CMSS has a spreading room lined with sacrificial concrete.

An inspection of the as-built spreading room will be performed to

The CMSS spreading room (UJA04002) is lined with a minimum of 19.7 inches of

373


79

verify that the CMSS has a spreading room lined with sacrificial concrete.

sacrificial concrete.

S11 2.3.2 2.5 The floor and walls of the spreading room are provided with channels for cooling water.

An inspection of the as-built spreading room will be performed to verify that the floor and walls of the spreading room are provided with channels for cooling water.

The floor and walls of the spreading room (UJA04002) are provided with channels for cooling water.

374

A1 2.3.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SAHRS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.3, Tables 2.3.3-1 and 2.3.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.3.3-1.

An inspection of the as-built SAHRS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SAHRS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.3, Tables 2.3.3-1 and 2.3.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.3.3-1.

375






b. The ITA column in ITAAC 3.1 of Tables 2.2.6-3 and 2.3.3-3 of Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 indicates pumps in the tests or type tests to be performed. AREVA is requested to discuss its approach in establishing ITAAC for pumps with nonsafety-related functions listed in the Tier 1 tables of the U.S. EPR FSAR.

377




88 3.2 No check valves are listed in the table, yet based on the figure it appears there are check valves in the system. Note - these check valves are most likely tested by a freedom of motion test and not actual flow DP.

Table 2.3.3-1 will be revised to include the Containment Isolation Valves which are currently included in ITAAC Section 3.5. Table 2.3.3-2 will be revised accordingly to add CIVs.

378



80





















81





General Comment 6

391













I05 2.3.3 4.1 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 2.3.3-2.

Tests will be performed using controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 2.3.3-2.

395




396

E01 2.3.3 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in a. Testing will be performed by a. The test input signal provided in the 91 5.1 An alternate feed is not identified in Table 397


82


providing a test input signal in each normally aligned division.


normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.3-2.


2.3.3-2. Delete reference to an alternate feed in the CW and delete step b. in the ITA and AC.

Table 2.3.3-1 will be revised to include the Containment Isolation Valves which are currently included in ITAAC Section 3.5. Table 2.3.3-2 will be revised accordingly to add CIVs which have an alternate feed.







92 6.1 There is no equipment identified as being in a harsh environment. Is this ITAAC necessary?

General Comment 5

Table 2.3.3-1 will be revised to include the Containment Isolation Valves which are currently included in ITAAC Section 3.5. Table 2.3.3-2 will be revised accordingly to add CIVs which are in a harsh environment.

399

S12c 2.3.3 7.1 The SAHRS pump delivers water to the Reactor Containment.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to verify the SAHRS pump delivers water to the Reactor Containment.Deleted.

The SAHRS pump delivers a minimum flow of 232 lbm/s to the Reactor Containment.Deleted.

Table 2.3.3-3 does not include functional qualification or preoperational flow testing ITAAC for the SAHRS pump. AREVA is requested to discuss its approach in establishing ITAAC for pumps with nonsafety-

400


83

related functions listed in the Tier 1 tables of the U.S. EPR FSAR.




93 7.2 There are no valves listed in Table 2.3.3-2. Is this ITAAC necessary?


401


I01 2.4.1 2.1 The location of the PS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PS equipment will be performed.

The PS equipment listed in Table 2.4.1-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

94 2.1 Delete - The ITAAC is redundant to 2.2.

Prefer to leave location ITAAC to simplify closure.

403

I02 2.4.1 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the PS as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the PS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the PS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

95 2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of PS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.

Prefer to leave separation ITAAC to simplify closure.

As currently written you have not verified the field equipment within each division is separated from each other.

ITAAC systems sections will be revised to add the field instruments that feed PS and SAS.

404

I03 2.4.1 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E PS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

96 2.3 Identify what hazards are being addressed by the physical separation (i.e. fire, flood, missiles, etc.)


405


84

distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E PS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

M01 2.4.1 3.1 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).



a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).



I19 2.4.1 4.1 The PS generates automatic RT functions for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-2.

a. A test will be performed on the PS using test input signals to verify that an RT signal is generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-2 when a test input signal reaches the trip limit.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the RT breakers open when a trip limit in the PS is reached.

a. The PS generates an RT signal after the test input signal reaches the trip limit for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-2.

b. The RT breakers open after the PS reaches the trip limit for one RT function.

Tag numbers will be added to Table 2.4.1-2. 407

I19 2.4.1 4.2 The PS generates automatic ESF functions for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-3 when the trip limit is reached. The ESF functions remain following removal of the input signal. The ESF functions are removed when input signals that represent the completion of the ESF functions are

A test will be performed on the PS using test input signals to verify that automatic ESF functions is are generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-3 when a test input signal reaches the trip limit is reached.

The PS generates an ESF function after the test input signal reaches when the trip limit is reached for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-3. The ESF functions remain following removal of the test input signal. The ESF functions are removed when the ESF functions are manually reset. Deliberate manual action is required to

98 4.2 The CW, ITA, and AC are not aligned with one another. Please correct and clarify the ITAAC wording.

408


85

presentmanually reset. Deliberate operator manual action is required to return the safety systems to normal.

return the safety systems to normal.

I26 2.4.1 4.3 The permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5 provide operating bypass capability for the corresponding PS functions.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals for each function listed as being bypassed by an inhibited permissive in Table 2.4.1-5 to verify that each function is bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding inhibited permissive signal are present.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals for each function listed as being bypassed by a validated permissive in Table 2.4.1-5 to verify that each function is bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding validated permissive signal are present.

a. The functions listed as being bypassed by inhibited permissives in Table 2.4.1-5 are bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding inhibited permissive are present.

b. The functions listed as being bypassed by validated permissives in Table 2.4.1-5 are bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding validated permissive are present.

409

I07 2.4.1 4.4 Communications independence is provided between the PS divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that communications independence is provided between the PS divisions.

Communications independence between the PS divisions is provided by: • The PS function processors do not

interface directly with a network. Separate PS communication modules interface directly with the network.

• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the PS function processor.

• The PS function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The PS function processors operate asynchronously from the PS communications module.

410

I18 2.4.1 4.5 The PS is capable of performing its safety function when PS equipment is in maintenance bypass. Bypassed PS

a. A test of the PS will be performed to verify the maintenance bypass functionality.

a. The PS can perform its safety functions when PS equipment is in maintenance bypass.

99 4.5 Why are test input signals required? 411


86

equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify bypassed PS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Bypassed PS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

I27 2.4.1 4.6 PS setpoints associated with the automatic RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and the automatic ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3 are determined using a methodology that addresses: • The determination of applicable

contributors to instrumentation loop errors.

• The method in which the errors are combined.

• How the errors are applied to the design analytical limits.

An analysis will be performed to verify that PS setpoints are determined using a documented methodology that addresses: • The determination of applicable

contributors to instrumentation loop errors.



A report concludes that the PS setpoints associated with the automatic RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and the automatic ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3 are determined using a documented methodology: • For the determination of applicable

contributors to instrument loop error. • For combining instrument loop errors. • For how the errors are applied to the

design analytical limits.

412


I10 2.4.1 4.8 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

414

I26 2.4.1 4.9 The PS uses TXS system communication messages that are sent with a specific protocol.

A test will be performed on PS equipment to verify that PS communication messages are sent with a specific protocol.

The TXS system communication messages use a specific protocol structure and message error determination. Messages are validated by the following series of checks: • Message header check contains the

following: − Protocol version − Sender ID

415


87

− Receiver ID − Message ID − Message type − Message length

• Message age is monitored. • Message cyclic redundancy check is

performed so that if one of the checks fails, the affected data are marked with an error status.

I06 2.4.1 4.10 Class 1E PS equipment listed in Table 2.4.1-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E PS equipment listed in Table 2.4.1-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Equipment identified as Class 1E in Table 2.4.1-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

100 4.10 The ITA and AC should specify that the equipment can perform its safety function

416

I05 2.4.1 4.11 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the manual system actuation functions listed in Table 2.4.1-4.

Tests will be performed to verify the functionality of the using controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the manual system actuation functions listed in Table 2.4.1-4.

417

I05 2.4.1 4.12 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and RSS perform validation or inhibition of the manual permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5.

a. Tests will be performed to verify the functionality of the manual permissive controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Tests will be performed to verify the functionality of the manual permissive controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.

a. For the manual permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5, the permissive status is present in the PS actuation logic units (ALU) after the corresponding controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR are manually actuated.

b. For the manual permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5, the permissive status is present in the PS actuation logic units (ALU) after the corresponding controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS are manually actuated.

418

I20 2.4.1 4.13 The PS performs interlock functions listed in Table 2.4.1-6.

Tests will be performed on the PS using test input signals to verify operation of the interlocks.

The interlocks listed in Table 2.4.1-6 respond as specified when activated by a test input signal.

419

I12 2.4.1 4.14 The PS design and application software are developed using a process composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the Basic Design Phase of the PS.

b. A report concludes that the outputs

420


88

conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following: 1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing



b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Manufacturing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS System Integration and Testing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Installation and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Final Documentation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

conform to requirements of the Detailed Design Phase of the PS.

c. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Manufacturing Phase of the PS.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the System Integration and Testing Phase of the PS.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Installation and Commissioning Phase of the PS.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Final Documentation Phase of the PS.


I09 2.4.1 4.16 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between the PS divisions to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices on connections between the PS divisions.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built PS divisions.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between PS divisions prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between PS divisions.

422

I08 2.4.1 4.17 Communications independence is provided between PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the PS equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence is provided between PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment by: • Data communications between PS

function processors and non-Class 1E equipment are through a Monitoring

423


89

and Service Interface (MSI). • The MSI does not interface directly

with a network. Separate communication modules interface directly with the network.




• The PS uses a Class 1E hardware device to send unidirectional signals to non-safety-related I&C systems.

I13 2.4.1 4.18 The PS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

PS. • Failures caused by the single



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the PS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the PS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

PS. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions


424

I14 2.4.1 4.19 Equipment markings for each PS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

An inspection will be performed on the as-built PS equipment to verify that the equipment markings for each PS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

Equipment markings for each PS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

425

I11 2.4.1 4.20 Locking mechanisms are provided on the PS cabinet doors. PS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the PS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that PS cabinet doors that are not

a. The locking mechanisms on the PS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. PS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

426


90

closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

I05d 2.4.1 4.21 CPU state switches are provided at the PS cabinets to restrict modifications to the PS software.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of CPU state switches at the as-built PS cabinets that restrict modifications to the PS software.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the CPU state switches restrict modifications to the PS software.

a. CPU state switches are provided at the PS cabinets.

b. CPU state switches at the PS cabinets restrict modifications to the PS software.

427

I24 2.4.1 4.22 The operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and Table 2.4.1-3 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored

variable. • By introducing and varying, a

substitute input of the same nature as the measured variable.

• By cross-checking between channels that bear a known relationship to each other.

• By specifying equipment that is stable and the period of time it retains its calibration during post-accident conditions.

An analysis will be performed to demonstrate that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and Table 2.4.1-3 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored





A report concludes that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and Table 2.4.1-3 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored variable. • By introducing and varying, a




428


I26a 2.4.1 4.24 The PS response time from sensor output through equipment actuation to ALU output, including sensor delay, for the RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3 is less than the value

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required response time from sensor to ALU output, including sensor delay for RT functions and ESF functions.

b. Tests, analyses, or a

a. A report identifies the required response time from sensor to ALU output, including sensor delay, which supports the safety analysis response time assumptions for the RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and ESF

101 4.24 The ITAAC wording is not accurate. Response times are taken from the sensor to the completion of the protective action for that function - not the sensor to ALU output. Part b. should be through testing only.

430


91

required to satisfy the design basis safety analysis response time assumptions.

combination of tests and analysesTests will be performed on the PS equipment that contributes to RT and ESF to verify PS response times to verifyare less than the value required to satisfy the design basis safety analysis response time assumptions are satisfied.

functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3. b. A report concludes that PS response times are less than the value required to support the safety analysis response time assumptions for the RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3.

I17 2.4.1 4.25 Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the PS.

a. An inspection of the as-built hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS will be performed.

b. A test of the hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS will be performed.

a. Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS.

b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the PS.

431

I28b 2.4.1 4.26 PS self-test features are capable of detecting and responding to faults consistent with the design requirements of PS.

a. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that faults requiring detection through self-test features are detected by the PS equipment.

b. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that upon detection of faults through self-test features, the PS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

a. A report concludes that the PS equipment is capable of detecting faults required to be detected by self-test features.

b. A report concludes that upon detection of faults through self-test features, the PS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

102 4.26 Please restore the previously approved ITAAC wording in Rev 3. The wording is too vague. Specify that the self test features can detect and respond to faults consistent with the design requirements of PS.

432

I23 2.4.1 4.27 During data communication, the PS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific PS function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages for that specific PS function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the PS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. and

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific PS function processor.

b. The PS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

103 4.27 Please clarify the ITAAC . As written it implies that the PS function processors will only receive the pre-defined messages and, therefore how does it ignore others?

433


92

oOther messages are ignored. I28 2.4.1 4.28 For each AOO or PA, a primary and

secondary RT function using different sensors as input are identified and assigned to different PS subsystems.

a. An analysis will be performed to identify the primary and secondary RT function for each AOO or PA.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that for each AOO or PA, the primary and secondary RT function using different sensors as input are assigned to different as-built PS subsystems.

a. A report identifies the primary and secondary RT function for each AOO or PA.

b. For each AOO or PA, the primary and secondary RT function using different sensors as input are assigned to different PS subsystems.

434






435

Q2 2.4.1 6.1 Equipment listed as Class 1E in Table 2.4.1-12 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.1-12 to perform their function listed in Table 2.4.1-2 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.1-12 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.1-12 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.1-12, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


The wrong table appears to be referenced.

The I&C equipment is only qualified for a mild environment.

436


93

in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

I01 2.4.2 2.1 The location of the SICS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.2-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built SICS equipment will be performed.

The SICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.2-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.2-1.

437



I03 2.4.2 2.4 Physical separation exists between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E SICS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E SICS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.



440

I03 2.4.2 2.5 Physical separation exists between Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS as listed in Table 2.4.2-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS as listed in Table 2.4.2-1 are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

106 2.5 What about physical separation at the SICS.

SICS is only in the MCR. Discussion will be added in Tier 2 as to why we can’t have physical separation within SICS.

441

A3a 2.4.2 2.6 Physical separation exists between SICS.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS

The Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS as listed in Table 2.4.2 1 are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

442


94

are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.







I05b 2.4.2 4.1 The capability to transfer control of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS exists in a fire area separate from the MCR. The transfer switches are each associated with a single division of the safety-related control and allow transfer of control without entry into the MCR.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built controls exist for transfer of control of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that control of the SICS can be transferred from the MCR to the RSS.

a. Controls exist in a fire area separate from the MCR for transfer of control of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS.

b. Transfer switches are each associated with a single division of the safety-related control, and perform the transfer of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS without entry into the MCR.

444

I09 2.4.2 4.2 Electrical isolation is provided between the Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between the as-built Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used on between Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between the Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS.

108 4.2 The ITA and AC in part a. do not appear aligned with one another. Was it intended to qualify electrical isolation devices in the part a. ITA? Yes

445


95

I10 2.4.2 4.3 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

109 4.3 The ITA and AC in part a. do not appear aligned with one another. Was it intended to qualify electrical isolation devices in the part a. ITA ? Yes

446

I06 2.4.2 4.4 Class 1E SICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.2-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E SICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.2-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



447

I05b 2.4.2 4.5 Controls on the SICS in the MCR and RSS perform manual actuation of RT.

a. Tests will be performed to verify manual actuation of RT using SICS controls in the MCR.

b. Tests will be performed to verify manual actuation of RT using SICS controls in the RSS.

a. The reactor trip breakers and reactor trip contactors are opened following manual RT actuation from SICS in the MCR.

b. The reactor trip breakers and reactor trip contactors are opened following manual RT actuation from SICS in the RSS.

448

I10 2.4.2 4.6 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between the as-built RSS and the MCR for the SICS.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS.

449

I05b 2.4.2 4.7 Controls on the SICS in the MCR perform the functions listed in Table 2.4.2-2.

Tests will be performed using controls on the SICS in the MCR.

Controls on the SICS in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 2.4.2-2.

450

I04 2.4.2 4.8 The SICS provides indication of Type Tests will be performed to verify Type A, B, and C PAM variables are 111 4.8 General Comment 7 451


96

A, B, and C PAM variables in the MCR.

SICS provides indication of Type A, B and C PAM variables in the MCR using test input signals.

indicated on SICS in the MCR.

I05b 2.4.2 4.9 The SICS provides manual controls and indications necessary to reach and maintain safe shutdown following an AOO or PA in the MCR.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the manual controls and indications necessary to reach and maintain safe shutdown in the MCR following an AOO or PA.

b. Tests will be performed using controls on the SICS in the MCR.

c. Tests will be performed in the MCR using test input signals.

a. A report identifies the manual controls and indications necessary to reach and maintain safe shutdown in the MCR following an AOO or PA.

b. Controls on the SICS in the MCR are verified to be functional.

c. Displays on the SICS are indicated in the MCR.


I13 2.4.2 4.10 The SICS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SICS. • Failures caused by the single



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the SICS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the SICS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SICS. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions


453

I11 2.4.2 4.11 Locking mechanisms are provided on the SICS doors in the MCR and RSS. SICS doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the SICS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that SICS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the SICS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. SICS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

454

I05b 2.4.2 4.12 Controls on the SICS in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.4.2-3.

Tests will be performed using controls on the SICS in the RSS.

Controls on the SICS in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.4.2-3.

455

I05b 2.4.2 4.13 The SICS provides controls in the MCR for blocking the PAS signals in the PACS through a set of operational

Tests will be performed to verify that the operational I&C disable switches block the PAS signals in the PACS.

The operational I&C disable switches perform their function to block the PAS signals in the PACS.

456


97

I&C disable switches. I28 2.4.2 4.14 The SICS provides manual controls

and indications in the MCR necessary to support FLEX mitigation strategies.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the manual controls and indications in the MCR necessary to support FLEX mitigation strategies.



a. A report identifies the manual controls and indications in the MCR necessary to support FLEX mitigation strategies.



457









112 5.1 As currently written Table 2.4.2-1 does not support the ITAAC. Identify the divisions and if there is an alternate power supply.

Table 2.4.2-1 will be revised to show 4 divisions of SICS with normal and alternate feeds.

461

I01 2.4.4 2.1 The location of the SAS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built SAS equipment will be performed.

The SAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.4-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

113 2.1 462

I02 2.4.4 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the SAS as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

114 2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of SAS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.



Will be addressed in new RAI response.

463


98

I03 2.4.4 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E SAS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E SAS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

114 2.2 and 2.3





464







I06 2.4.4 4.1 Class 1E SAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.4-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E SAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.4-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI,



466


99

RFI, ESD, and power surges. z 2.4.4 4.2 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 467

I16 2.4.4 4.3 The SAS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.4-3.

A test will be performed to verify that the SAS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.4-3.

The SAS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.4-3.

468

I20 2.4.4 4.4 The SAS performs interlock functions listed in Table 2.4.4-3.

Tests will be performed on the SAS using test input signals to verify operation of the interlocks.


469

I12 2.4.4 4.5 The SAS design and application software are developed using a process composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following: 1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing



a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Manufacturing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS System Integration and Testing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Installation and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Final Documentation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the Basic Design Phase of the SAS.

b. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the Detailed Design Phase of the SAS.

c. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Manufacturing Phase of the SAS.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the System Integration and Testing Phase of the SAS.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Installation and Commissioning Phase of the SAS.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Final Documentation Phase of the SAS.

470

I09 2.4.4 4.6 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between the SAS divisions to prevent the propagation of credible

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between SAS divisions prevent the propagation of

471


100

electrical faults. electrical isolation devices on connections between the SAS divisions.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built SAS divisions.

credible electrical faults. b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices

exist on connections between SAS divisions.

I10 2.4.4 4.7 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

472

I07 2.4.4 4.8 Communications independence is provided between the SAS divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that communications independence is provided between the SAS divisions.

Communications independence between the SAS division is provided by: • The SAS function processors do not


• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the SAS function processor.

• The SAS function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The SAS function processors operate asynchronously from the SAS communications module.

473

I08 2.4.4 4.9 Communications independence is provided between SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the SAS equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence between SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment is provided by: • Data communications between SAS


• The MSI does not interface directly

474


101

with a network. Separate communication modules interface directly with the network.




• The SAS uses a hardware device to ensure that unidirectional signals are sent to non-safety-related I&C systems.

I13 2.4.4 4.10 The SAS is designed so that safety-related functions required for AOOs or PAs are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SAS. • Failures caused by the single



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the SAS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the SAS is designed so that safety-related functions required for AOOs or PAs are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SAS. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions


117 4.10. The CW and AC do not adequately convey that all SAS functionality, such as EAS functions, are verified.

No change required.

475

I14 2.4.4 4.11 Equipment markings for each SAS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

An inspection will be performed on the as-built SAS equipment to verify that the equipment markings for each SAS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

Equipment markings for each SAS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

476

I11 2.4.4 4.12 Locking mechanisms are provided on the SAS cabinet doors. SAS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the SAS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that SAS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the SAS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. SAS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

477


102

I05d 2.4.4 4.13 CPU state switches are present at the SAS cabinets to restrict modifications to the SAS software.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of CPU state switches at the as-built SAS cabinets that restrict modifications to the PS software.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the CPU state switches restrict modifications to the SAS software.

a. CPU state switches are provided at the SAS cabinets.

b. CPU state switches at the SAS cabinets restrict modifications to the SAS software.

478

I18 2.4.4 4.14 The SAS is capable of performing its safety function when SAS equipment is in maintenance bypass. Bypassed SAS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test of the SAS will be performed to verify the maintenance bypass functionality.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify bypassed SAS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The SAS can perform its safety functions when SAS equipment is in maintenance bypass.

b. Bypassed SAS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Why are test input signals required? 479

I24 2.4.4 4.15 The operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.4-2 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored





Analysis will be performed to demonstrate that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.4-2 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored





A report concludes that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.4-2 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored variable. • By introducing and varying, a




480


I17 2.4.4 4.17 Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the

a. An inspection of the as-built hardwired disconnects between

a. Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the

482


103

SAS. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the SAS.

the SU and each divisional MSI of the SAS will be performed.

b. A test of the hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the SAS will be performed.

SAS. b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the

connection of the SU to more than a single division of the SAS.

I19 2.4.4 4.18 The SAS generates automatic ESF and EAS functions for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.4-2 when the trip limit is reached. The ESF and EAS functions remain following removal of the input signal. The ESF and EAS functions are removed when input signals that represent the completion of the ESF and EAS functions are present. Deliberate operator action is required to return the safety systems to normal.

A test will be performed on the SAS using test input signals to verify that automatic ESF and EAS functions is are generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.4-2 when a test input signal reaches the trip limit is reached.

The SAS generates an ESF and EAS function after the test input signal reaches when the trip limit is reached for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.4-2. The ESF and EAS functions remain following removal of the test input signal. The ESF and EAS functions are removed when the ESF and EAS functions are manually reset.Deliberate manual action is required to return the SAS to normal.


483

I23 2.4.4 4.19 During data communication, the SAS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific SAS function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages for that specific SAS function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the SAS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. and oOther messages are ignored.

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific SAS function processor.

b. The SAS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

119 4.19 Please clarify the ITAAC . As written it implies it only receives the predefined messages, therefore how does it ignore others?

484

I28b 2.4.4 4.20 SAS self-test features are capable of detecting and responding to faults consistent with the design requirements of SAS.

a. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that faults requiring detection through self-test features are detected by the SAS equipment.

b. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that upon detection of faults through self-test features,

a. A report concludes that the SAS equipment is capable of detecting faults required to be detected by self-test features.

b. A report concludes that upon detection of faults through self-test features, the SAS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

120 4.20. Please restore the previously approved ITAAC wording in Rev 3. The wording is too vague. Specify that the self test features can detect and respond to faults consistent with the design requirements of SAS.

485


104

the SAS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

I25 2.4.4 4.21 SAS connections to the SICS are hardwired for manual grouped controls.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built SAS connections to the SICS are hardwired for manual grouped controls.

SAS connections to the SICS are hardwired for manual grouped controls.

486

I05b 2.4.4 4.22 SAS manual grouped controls and displays are available on the SICS in the MCR.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that SAS displays are indicated on the SICS in the MCR by using test input signals to SICS.

b. Tests will be performed using SAS manual grouped controls in the MCR.

a. SAS displays are indicated on the SICS in the MCR.

b. Controls on the SICS in the MCR perform manual grouped controls from the SICS in the MCR.


z 2.4.4 4.23 Deleted.Permissives P14 and P15 provide operating bypass capability for the following SAS interlocks: Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low Delta Psat. Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low-Low RCS Loop Level.

Deleted.A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the following interlocks are bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding inhibited or validated Permissives P14 and P15 signals are present: Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low Delta Psat. Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low-Low RCS Loop Level.

Deleted.Permissives P14 and P15 provide operating bypass capability for the following SAS interlocks: Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low Delta Psat. Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low-Low RCS Loop Level.

122 4.23 Should this ITAAC be deleted (see RAI 505 Q7.1-35)?

Yes

488






489

Q2 2.4.4 6.1 Equipment listed as Class 1E in Table 2.4.4-1 can perform their function


a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in


The I&C equipment is only qualified for a mild

490


105

under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.4-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.4-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

Table 2.4.4-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.


environment.

I01 2.4.5 2.1 The location of the PACS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PACS equipment will be performed.

The PACS equipment listed in Table 2.4.5-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.

124 2.1 Delete - The ITAAC is redundant to 2.2 491

I02 2.4.5 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the PACS as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the PACS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the PACS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.

125 2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of PACS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.




492

I03 2.4.5 2.3 Physical separation exists between a. An analysis will be performed to a. A report defines the required safety- 125 2.2 Recommend you combine these two ITAAC 493


106

Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E PACS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E PACS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

and 2.3

into one ITAAC for physical separation of PACS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.







a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s) including the time required to perform the listed function.



I26 2.4.5 4.1 The priority module prioritizes different system inputs in the following order from highest to lowest priority: • PS/DAS • SAS • SICS

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify PS signals received by each priority modules override other signals received by the priority module prioritizes different system inputs in the following order

The priority module prioritizes different system inputs in the following order from highest to lowest priority: • PS/DAS • SAS • SICS

Clarify the ITAAC to ensure priority logic for PACS module.

495


107

• PAS from highest to lowest priority:. • PS/DAS • SAS • SICS • PAS

• PAS

I10 2.4.5 4.2 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

496

I06 2.4.5 4.3 Class 1E PACS equipment listed in Table 2.4.5-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E PACS equipment listed in Table 2.4.5-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



497

z 2.4.5 4.4 Deleted.The input wiring from other I&C systems to the PACS is properly connected.

Deleted.An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built input wiring from other I&C systems to the PACS is properly connected.

Deleted.The input wiring from the other I&C systems to the PACS is properly connected.

128 4.4 Define 'properly connected.' Not applicable.

Deleted based on revision to 2.4.5, item 4.1.

498

I26 2.4.5 4.5 The capability for testing of the PACS is provided while retaining the capability of the PACS to accomplish its safety function. PACS divisions in test are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify the capability for testing of the PACS is provided while retaining the capability to accomplish its safety function.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify bypassed SAS equipment are is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The capability for testing of the PACS is provided while retaining the capability of the PACS to accomplish its safety functions.

b. PACS divisions in test are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

129 4.5 Why are test inputs signals required in part b.?

499

I11 2.4.5 4.6 Locking mechanisms are provided on the PACS cabinet doors. PACS

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on

a. The locking mechanisms on the PACS 500


108

cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

the PACS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that PACS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

cabinet doors operate properly. b. PACS cabinet doors that are not closed

are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

I14 2.4.5 4.7 Equipment markings for each PACS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

An inspection will be performed on the as-built PACS equipment to verify that the equipment markings for each PACS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

Equipment markings for each PACS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

501

I26 2.4.5 4.8 The PACS provides a position indication signal to the SICS for each containment isolation valve (Type B PAM variable) listed in Table 2.4.5-2.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that the PACS provides position indication signals to the SICS for each containment isolation valve listed in Table 2.4.5-2.

The PACS provides a position indication signal to the SICS for each containment isolation valve listed in Table 2.4.5-2.

502

I06a 2.4.5 4.9 Non-Class 1E PACS communication module associated with Class 1E PACS equipment will not cause a failure of a PACS priority module when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate thatthe non-Class 1E PACS communication module associated with Class 1E PACS equipment will not cause a failure of a PACS priority module when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Non-Class 1E PACS communication module associated with Class 1E PACS equipment will not cause a failure of a PACS priority module when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

503

I26 2.4.5 4.10 The capability of 100% combinatorial testing of the PACS priority module is provided to preclude consideration of a software common cause failure.

A type test will be performed on the PACS priority module to preclude consideration of a software common cause failure.

The capability of 100% combinatorial testing of the PACS priority module is provided to preclude consideration of a software common cause failure.

504

I13 2.4.5 4.11 The PACS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the PACS. • Failures caused by the single

failure.

A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the PACS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the PACS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the PACS. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions

505


109

• Failures and spurious system actions that cause or are caused by the AOO or PA requiring the safety function.







506


a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.5-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.






507

I04 2.4.6 2.1 Displays listed in Table 2.4.6-1 are indicated on the PICS operator

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table

a. Displays listed in Table 2.4.6-1 are indicated on the PICS operator



110

workstations in the MCR and the RSS. 2.4.6-1 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.


workstations in the MCR. b. Displays listed in Table 2.4.6-1 are

indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.

A2 2.4.6 2.2 The location of the PFAS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis will be performed to determine the location of the PFAS equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the location of the as-built PFAS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis determines the location of the PFAS equipment.

b. The PFAS equipment is located consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

509

I26 2.4.6 3.1 The PFAS is provided with both an electrically supervised primary and secondary power source that will transfer automatically to the secondary source upon loss of the primary source.

A test will be performed to verify the transfer of power of the PFAS from the primary source of power to the secondary source.

The PFAS is provided with an electrically supervised primary and secondary power source that will transfer automatically to the secondary source upon loss of the primary source.

510

I04 2.4.6 3.2 A trouble signal indication is provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR upon a loss of either power source to a LFCP or workstation.

A test will be performed using test input to verify the existence of a trouble signal indication on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR when either the primary or secondary power source is lost at any LFCP or workstation.

A trouble signal indication is indicated provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR upon a loss of either power source to a LFCP or workstation.


A2 2.4.7 2.1 The location of the SMS equipment is as described in Section 2.4.7.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the location of the SMS equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the location of the SMS equipment is consistent with the analysis.

a. An analysis determines the location of the SMS equipment.

b. The SMS equipment is located as per the analysis.

512

I28 2.4.7 3.1 The SMS can compute the CAV and a. Type tests, tests, analyses, or a a. The SMS can compute the CAV. 513


111

provides a display of the CAV on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

combination of type tests, tests, and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the SMS can compute the CAV.

b. Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify a display of CAV is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays of the CAV are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

I28 2.4.7 3.2 The SMS equipment has a dynamic range that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the dynamic range of the SMS equipment allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

The SMS has a dynamic range of at least 1000:1 zero-to-peak and is able to record at least 1.0 g zero-to-peak.


Is analysis required or can this be completed just by testing? Need analysis

514

I28 2.4.7 3.3 The SMS equipment has bandwidth that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the SMS equipment has bandwidth that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

The SMS has bandwidth of at least 0.2 to 50 Hertz.



515

I28 2.4.7 3.4 The SMS equipment has a sampling rate that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the SMS equipment has a sampling rate that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

The SMS has a sample rate of at least 200 samples per second in each of the three directions.



516

I28 2.4.7 3.5 The SMS equipment has a trigger threshold rate that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the SMS equipment has a trigger threshold rate that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

The SMS has an trigger threshold actuating level that is adjustable and within the range of 0.001g and 0.02g.



The CW and AC don't appear to be aligned (trigger rate or actuating level?).

517

I26 2.4.7 4.1 The SMS backup battery has capacity to power its instruments for continuous operation for a minimum of 25 minutesperiod of time.

A test will be performed to verify the SMS backup battery has capacity to power its instruments for continuous operation for a period of time.

The SMS has a backup battery that has a capacity for a minimum of 25 minutes of system operation.

135 4.1 Include '25 minutes' in the CW. 518

I04 2.4.8 2.1 Containment air cooler condensate flowrate is indicated on the PICS

Tests will be performed to verify that the containment air cooler

Containment air cooler condensate flowrate is indicated on the PICS operator



112

operator workstations in the MCR. condensate flowrate is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

workstations in the MCR.

I04 2.4.8 2.2 MSL local humidity indication is provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Tests will be performed to verify that the MSL local humidity indication is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

MSL local humidity is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I26 2.4.8 2.3 Containment air cooler condensate flowrate sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify containment air cooler condensate flowrate sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Containment air cooler condensate flowrate sensors can detect a flow of 0.5 gpm.

138 2.3 Why use test input signals? 521

I26 2.4.8 2.4 MSL local humidity detection system supports main steam line leakage detection.

Tests, analyses, or combination of tests and analyses will be performed to verify MSL local humidity detection system supports main steam line leakage detection.

MSL local humidity detection system can detect MSL leakage of 0.1 gpm within 4 hours.

522

I27 2.4.8 2.5 The Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

An analysis will be performed to verify that the sensitivity of the as built Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

A report concludes that the Reactor Building radiation monitor sensitivity of 3E-10 µCi/cc correlates to an ability to detect a leakage increase of 1 gpm within 1 hour.

346 4.3 An EGM was issued to the operating fleet to address changes in RCS activity that impact the ability to meet TS requirements similar to this ITAAC. The AC is missing the time requirements for detection and the assumed activity of the RCS coolant.

OK-AC

523

I01 2.4.9 2.1 The location of the PAS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.9-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PAS equipment will be performed.

The PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.9-1.

524

I27 2.4.9 3.1 Critical control functions and non-critical control functions are segmented in the PAS CUs.

An analysis will be performed to verify that critical control functions and non-critical control functions will be systematically located so that only one critical control function as well as different non-critical control functions are processed on each CU pair.

A report concludes that non-critical control functions are systematically located so that only one critical control function as well as different non-critical control functions are processed on each CU pair.

525

I12 2.4.9 3.2 The PAS design is accomplished a. Analyses will be performed to a. A report concludes that the outputs for 526


113

through a phased approach which includes the following (or equivalent) phases: 1. Software Basic Design Phase. 2. Software Detailed Design Phase. 3. Software Integration and Validation

Phase. 4. Site Acceptance Test and

Commissioning Phase.

verify that the outputs for the PAS Software Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PAS Software Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PAS Software Integration and Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PAS Site Acceptance Test and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

the PAS Software Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. A report concludes that the outputs for the PAS Software Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. A report concludes that the outputs for the PAS Software Integration and Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. A report concludes that the outputs for the PAS Site Acceptance Test and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

I06a 2.4.9 3.3 PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 can function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

527

I26b 2.4.9 3.4 The PAS provides self-diagnostic features for a real-time representation of system status.

A test will be performed that confirms that PAS performs self-diagnosis functions.

A report concludes that PAS software execution and hardware are monitored and switch-over to a redundant CU is initiated upon detection of a software or hardware failure.

528

I01 2.4.10 2.1 The location of the PICS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.10-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PICS equipment will be performed.

The PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.10-1.

529


I12 2.4.10 3.2 The PICS design is accomplished through a phased approach which includes the following (or equivalent) phases: 1. Software Basic Design Phase.

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software Basic Design Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

a. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software Basic Design Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. A report concludes that the outputs for

531


114

2. Software Detailed Design Phase. 3. Software Integration and Validation


Installation and Commissioning Phase.

1. System Requirements Phase. 2. System Design Phase. 3. Software/Hardware Requirements

Phase. 4. Software/Hardware Design Phase. 5. Software/Hardware Implementation

Phase. 6. Software/Hardware Validation

Phase. 7. System Integration Phase. 8. System Validation Phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software Integration and Validation Software/Hardware Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Site Acceptance Test and Installation and Commissioning Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

the PICS Software Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software Integration and Validation software/hardware requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Site Acceptance Test and Installation and Commissioning Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.


I10 2.4.10 3.4 Electrical isolation is provided on PICS connections between the RSS and the MCR to prevent the propagation of


a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between PICS connections between the RSS and the

533


115

credible electrical faults. electrical isolation devices between PICS connections between the RSS and the MCR.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between the as-built RSS and the as-built MCR.

MCR prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between the RSS and the MCR.

I05c 2.4.10 3.5 The capability to transfer control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS exists in a fire area separate from the MCR and allows transfer of control without entry into the MCR.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built controls exist in a fire area separate from the MCR for transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that controls allow transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS without entry into the MCR.

a. Controls exist in a fire area separate from the MCR for transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS.

b. Transfer switches perform transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS without entry into the MCR.

534

I06a 2.4.10 3.6 PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10 1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10 1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

535

I26b 2.4.10 3.7 The PICS provides self-diagnostic features for a real-time representation of system status.

A test will be performed that confirms that PICS performs self-diagnosis functions.

A report concludes that PICS software execution and hardware are monitored and switch-over to a fault-tolerant server unit is initiated upon detection of a software or hardware failure.

536

I25 2.4.10 3.8 Safety-related actuators located in multiple trains shall not be grouped together on PICS manual grouped commands.

An inspection shall be performed to verify that as-built safety related actuators located in multiple trains are not grouped together on PICS manual grouped commands.

Safety related actuators located in multiple trains are not grouped together on PICS manual grouped commands.

537

I01 2.4.11 2.1 The location of the BCMS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.11-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built BCMS equipment will be performed.

The BCMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.11-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.11-1.

538

M01 2.4.11 3.1 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads


a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.11-1 can



116

without a loss of safety function(s). equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.11-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s) including the time required to perform the listed function.


I16 2.4.11 4.1 The BCMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.11-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the BCMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.11-2.

The BCMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.11-2.

540

I06 2.4.11 4.2 Class 1E BCMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E BCMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



541

I11 2.4.11 4.3 Locking mechanisms are provided on the BCMS cabinet doors. BCMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the BCMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that BCMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the BCMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. BCMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

542

I13 2.4.11 4.4 The BCMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

BCMS concurrent with identifiable

A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the BCMS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the BCMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

BCMS concurrent with identifiable but

543


117

but non-detectable failures. • Failures caused by the single



non-detectable failures. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions







544

Q1 2.4.11 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.11-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.




118

Q2 2.4.11 6.2 Equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.11-1 to perform their function normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild environment Table 2.4.11-1 to verify installation that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

a. EQDPs conclude that equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform their function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the installation of equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.11-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


I01 2.4.13 2.1 The location of the CRDCS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.13-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built CRDCS equipment will be performed.

The CRDCS equipment listed in Table 2.4.13-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.13-1.

547



b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.13-1 to verify that the


b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.13-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or



119

equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

analyzed condition.

I06 2.4.13 4.1 Class 1E CRDCS equipment listed in Table 2.4.13-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E CRDCS equipment listed in Table 2.4.13-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



549

I15 2.4.13 4.2 The CRDCS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.13-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the CRDCS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.13-2 by the use of test input signals.

The CRDCS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.13-2.

550

I26 2.4.13 4.3 Each RT contactor listed in Table 2.4.13-1 opens when an RT signal is received from the corresponding PS division.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each RT contactor opens when an RT signal is received from the corresponding PS division.

Each RT contactor listed in Table 2.4.13-1 opens in response to a RT test input signal from the corresponding PS division.

551

I26 2.4.13 4.4 The CRDCS limits the RCCA bank withdrawal rate to a maximum value of 30 inches per minute or less.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify the maximum RCCA bank withdrawal rate.

The CRDCS limits the RCCA bank withdrawal rate to a maximum value of 30 inches per minute or less.

552

I16 2.4.13 4.5 The CRDCS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.13-3.

A test will be performed to verify that the CRDCS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.13-3.

The CRDCS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.13-3.

553

I13 2.4.13 4.6 The CRDCS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

CRDCS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.

• Failures caused by the single failure.

• Failures and spurious system

A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the CRDCS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the CRDCS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the


• Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions


554


120



a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.13-1 to perform the function listed in Table 2.4.13-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.13-1 can perform the function listed in Table 2.4.13-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.



Is this equipment qualified for a mild or harsh environment?

Mild

555

I01 2.4.14 2.1 The location of the HMS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.14-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built HMS equipment will be performed.

The HMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.14-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.14-1.

146 2.1 This ITAAC should be more specific than simply the RB.

No change required.

556


a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.14-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound




121

the Seismic Category I design requirements.



I06 2.4.14 4.1 Class 1E HMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E HMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



558

I16 2.4.14 4.2 The HMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.14-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the HMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.14-2.

The HMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.14-2.

149 4.2 Which 2 divisions clarify Table 2.4.14-2?

Table 2.4.14-2 will be revised to identify the 2 divisions that provide signals to SCDS.

559






560

Q1 2.4.14 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.14-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, andaccident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.


Should there also be a 6.2 for mild equipment in the table?

Yes, see new ITAAC 6.2

561


122

post-accident environmental conditions.



Q2 2.4.14 6.2 Equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes that the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.


I01 2.4.17 2.1 The location of the EIS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.17-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built EIS equipment will be performed.

The EIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.17-1is located as listed in Table 2.4.17-1.

563



a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that the



123

withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).



equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.17-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s) including the time required to perform the listed function.


I06 2.4.17 4.1 Class 1E EIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.17-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E EIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.17-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



565

I16 2.4.17 4.2 The EIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.17-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the EIS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.17-2.

The EIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.17-2.



566

I11 2.4.17 4.3 Locking mechanisms are provided on the EIS cabinet doors. EIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the EIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that EIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the EIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. EIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

567

I13 2.4.17 4.4 The EIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the EIS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the EIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

568


124

EIS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.











569








125

requirements. Q2 2.4.17 6.2 Equipment designated as mild

environment in Table 2.4.17-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.






I01 2.4.19 2.1 The location of the ICIS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.19-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built ICIS equipment will be performed.

The ICIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.19-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.19-1.

572



b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I


b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.19-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a



126

in Table 2.4.19-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

I06 2.4.19 4.1 Class 1E ICIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.19-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E ICIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.19-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



574

I16 2.4.19 4.2 The ICIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.19-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the ICIS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.19-2.

The ICIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.19-2.

575

I11 2.4.19 4.3 Locking mechanisms are provided on the ICIS cabinet doors. ICIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the ICIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that ICIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the ICIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. ICIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

576

I13 2.4.19 4.4 The ICIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

ICIS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the ICIS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the ICIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




577

Q1 2.4.19 5.1 Equipment designated as harsh a. Type tests or type tests and a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment 158 5.1 General Comment 5 578


127

environment in Table 2.4.19-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.19-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.19-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.




b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild environment Table 2.4.19-1 to verify installation that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located


b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the installation of equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.19-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the



128

in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

approved design requirements.

I01 2.4.22 2.1 The location of the RMS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.22-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built RMS equipment will be performed.

The RMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.22-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.22-1.

580







I16 2.4.22 4.1 The RMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.22-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the RMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.22-2.

The RMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.22-2.

582

I11 2.4.22 4.2 Locking mechanisms are provided on the RMS cabinet doors. RMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the RMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that RMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the RMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. RMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

583


129

I13 2.4.22 4.3 The RMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

RMS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the RMS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the RMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




584

I06 2.4.22 4.4 Class 1E RMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.22-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E RMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.22-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



585

I04 2.4.22 4.5 The RMS records the radiation level from the radiation monitors listed in Table 2.4.22-1. Display of containment radiation level is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the RMS records radiation monitor level.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the radiation monitor level is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The RMS records radiation level from the radiation monitors listed in Table 2.4.22-1.

b. Display of radiation level from the radiation monitors listed in Table 2.4.22-1 is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.








588


130









b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild environment Table 2.4.22-1 to verify installation that the equipment, including the associated cables,


b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the installation of equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.22-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and



131

wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


I01 2.4.24 2.1 The location of the DAS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built DAS equipment will be performed.

The DAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.24-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.


I02 2.4.24 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the DAS as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the DAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the DAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.

2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of DAS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.




593

I12 2.4.24 3.1 The DAS design is accomplished through a phased approach which includes the following (or equivalent) phases: 1. System Requirements Phase. 2. System Design Phase. 3. Software/Hardware Requirements




a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS System Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS System Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to

a. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. A report concludes that the outputs for

594


132

verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS System Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS System Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

the DAS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

I27 2.4.24 3.2 The technology used by the DAS is a technology that is not microprocessor based.

An analysis will be performed to verify that the technology in the DAS is a technology that is not microprocessor based.

A report concludes the technology used by the DAS is a technology that is not microprocessor based.

595

I19 2.4.24 3.3 The DAS generates signals for automatic actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2.

Tests will be performed using test input signals.

The DAS generates signals for automatic actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2.

596

I19 2.4.24 3.4 The DAS allows manual, system-level actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-3.

Tests will be performed using manual actuation test input signals.

The DAS allows manual actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-3.

166 3.4 Replace "test input signals" with "manual actuation signals".

597

I26a 2.4.24 3.5 The DAS response time from sensor output through equipment actuation for the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2 is less than the value required to satisfy the diverse actuation function response

Tests will be performed to verify DAS response times are less than the value required to satisfy the diverse actuation function response time assumptions.Deleted.

A report concludes that DAS response times are less than the value required to support the diverse actuation function response time assumptions for the DAS functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2.Deleted.

The ITAAC wording is not accurate. Response times are taken from the sensor to the completion of the protective action for that function - not the sensor to ALU output. Part b. should be through testing only.

598


133

time assumptions.Deleted. I01 2.4.25 2.1 Deleted.The location of the SCDS

equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.

Deleted.An inspection of the location of the as-built SCDS equipment will be performed.

Deleted.The SCDS equipment listed in Table 2.4.25-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.


I02 2.4.25 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the SCDS as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SCDS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SCDS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.

168 2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of SCDS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.




600

I03 2.4.25 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E SCDS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E SCDS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

168 2.2 and 2.3





601






134




I15 2.4.25 4.1 The SCDS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.25-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the SCDS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.25-2 by the use of test input signals.

The SCDS receives the input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.25-2.

603

I16 2.4.25 4.2 The SCDS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.25-3.

A test will be performed to verify that the SCDS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.25-3.

The SCDS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.25-3.

604

I04 2.4.25 4.3 Bypassed or inoperable SCDS status information is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

A test will be performed to verify bypassed or inoperable status information is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR using test input signals.

Bypassed or inoperable SCDS status information is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I10 2.4.25 4.4 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

171 4.4 Define 'properly connected.'

No change required, 'properly connected' not used in this ITAAC.

606

I06 2.4.25 4.5 Class 1E SCDS equipment listed in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI,

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E SCDS equipment listed

Equipment identified as Class 1E in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and


607


135

ESD, and power surges. in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

power surges.

I11 2.4.25 4.6 Locking mechanisms are provided on the SCDS cabinet doors. SCDS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the SCDS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that SCDS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the SCDS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. SCDS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

608

I13 2.4.25 4.7 The SCDS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

SCDS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the SCDS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the SCDS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




609






610

Q2 2.4.25 6.1 Equipment designated as mild environment listed as Class 1E in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions,



611


136

operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

2.4.25-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.


I01 2.4.26 2.1 Deleted.The location of the RPMS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.

Deleted.An inspection of the location of the as-built RPMS equipment will be performed.

Deleted.The RPMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.26-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.


I02 2.4.26 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the RPMS as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the RPMS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the RPMS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.

175 2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of RPMS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.




613

I03 2.4.26 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-

175 2.2 and 2.3


614


137

physical separation between as-built Class 1E RPMS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E RPMS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

Class 1E equipment. b. The required safety-related structures,

separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.










I15 2.4.26 4.1 The RPMS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.26-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the RPMS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.26-2 by the use of test input signals.

The RPMS receives the input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.26-2.

616

I16 2.4.26 4.2 The RPMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.26-3.

A test will be performed to verify that the RPMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.26-3.

The RPMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.26-3.

617


138

I12 2.4.26 4.3 The RPMS design and application software are developed using a process composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following: 1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing



a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Detailed Design phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Manufacturing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS System Integration and Testing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Installation and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Final Documentation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Basic Design Phase of the RPMS.

b. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Detailed Design Phase of the RPMS.

c. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Manufacturing Phase of the RPMS.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the System Integration and Testing Phase of the RPMS.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Installation and Commissioning Phase of the RPMS.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Final Documentation Phase of the RPMS.

618

I06 2.4.26 4.4 Class 1E RPMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.26-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E RPMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.26-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



619

I17 2.4.26 4.5 Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of SU to more

a. An inspection of the as-built hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS will be performed.

a. Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS.

b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the

620


139

than a single division of the RPMS. b. A test of the hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS will be performed.

connection of the SU to more than a single division of the RPMS.

I05d 2.4.26 4.6 CPU state switches are provided at the RPMS cabinets to restrict modifications to the RPMS software.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of CPU state switches at the as-built RPMS cabinets that restrict modifications to the RPMS software.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the CPU state switches restrict modifications to the RPMS software

a. CPU state switches are provided at the RPMS cabinets.

b. CPU state switches at the RPMS cabinets restrict modifications to the RPMS software.

621

I07 2.4.26 4.7 Communications independence is provided between the RPMS divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that communications independence is provided between the RPMS divisions.

Communications independence between the RPMS divisions is provided by: • The RPMS function processors do not


• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the RPMS function processor.

• The RPMS function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The RPMS function processors operate asynchronously from the RPMS communications module.

622

I11 2.4.26 4.8 Locking mechanisms are provided on the RPMS cabinet doors. RPMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the RPMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that RPMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the RPMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. RPMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

623

I13 2.4.26 4.9 The RPMS is designed so that safety- A failure modes and effects analysis A report concludes that the RPMS is 624


140

related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

RPMS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.



will be performed on the RPMS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




I10 2.4.26 4.10 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

625

I26 2.4.26 4.11 The RPMS uses TXS system communication messages that are sent with a specific protocol.

A test will be performed on RPMS equipment to verify that RPMS communication messages are sent with a specific protocol.


following: − Protocol version − Sender ID − Receiver ID − Message ID − Message type − Message length


626


141

performed so that if one of the checks fails, the affected data are marked with an error status.

I23 2.4.26 4.12 During data communication, the RPMS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific RPMS function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages for that specific RPMS function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the RPMS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. and oOther messages are ignored.

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific RPMS function processor.

b. The RPMS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.


627

I08 2.4.26 4.13 Communications independence is provided between RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the RPMS equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence between RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment is provided by: • Data communications between RPMS






• The RPMS uses a hardware device to ensure that unidirectional signals are sent to non-safety-related I&C systems.

628

E01 2.4.26 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.4.26-1 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table


a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment

629


142

2.4.26-1 in a normal or alternate feed condition.


identified in Table 2.4.26-1. b. The test input signal provided in each

division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.4.26-1.


a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1 to perform their function listed in Table 2.4.26-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1 can perform their function listed in Table 2.4.26-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.



630

A1 2.5.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EPSS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.1, Tables 2.5.1-1 and 2.5.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built EPSS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EPSS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.1, Tables 2.5.1-1 and 2.5.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.1-1.

631




143


M01 2.5.1 3.1 Equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.1-2 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.5.1-2.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.1-2 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.1-2 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.1-2 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.5.1-2 including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.1-2, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsby the tested or analyzed condition.













637

A3c 2.5.1 5.1 Physical separation exists between An inspection will be performed to The Class 1E EPSS equipment listed in 638


144

Class 1E EPSS equipment listed in Table 2.5.1-2 and non-Class 1E equipment.

verify that as-built Class 1E EPSS equipment is physically separated from as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

Table 2.5.1-2 is separated from non-Class 1E equipment by at least 3 ft horizontally and at least 5 ft vertically.

E04 2.5.1 5.2 Non-safety-related loads connected to the EPSS are electrically isolated from the EPSS by an isolation device.


b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built non-safety-related loads connected to the EPSS.

a. The isolation devices used between the EPSS and non-safety-related loads are qualified to provide electrical isolation.

b. A qualified electrical isolation device exists between non-safety-related loads connected to the EPSS and the EPSS.

639

E02 2.5.1 5.3 Without an alternate feed installed, independence is maintained between the EPSS divisions.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EPSS division, one division at a time.

Without an alternate feed installed, the test input signal exists only in the EPSS division under test, when a test input signal is applied in each EPSS division.

640

E03 2.5.1 5.4 With the alternate feed installed from EPSS division 1 to division 2, independence is maintained between the load group created by divisions 1 and 2, and the load group created by divisions 3 and 4. EPSS divisions 3 and 4 which are independent of each other.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EPSS division, one division at a time, while the alternate feed is installed from EPSS division 1 to division 2.

a. A test input signal exists only in the load group created by Class 1E divisions 1 and 2 when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division 1 or 2.

b. A test input signal exists only in the division under test when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division 3 or 4.

182 5.4 In the 6th and 7th lines delete the words "the load group created by" the other divisions are independent of one another during the test and therefore do not constitute a load group by definition.

641






642

E03 2.5.1 5.6 With the alternate feed installed from EPSS division 3 to division 4, independence is maintained between the load group created by divisions 3 and 4, and the load group created by divisions 1 and 2. EPSS divisions 1



b. A test input signal exists only in the


643


145

and 2 which are independent of each other.

division under test when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division 1 or 2.




b. A test input signal exists only in the division under test when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division 1 or 2


644

E13 2.5.1 5.8 Control power for EPSS switchgear and load centers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is provided by the EUPS from the respective division.

A Ttests will be performed to verify that control power for EPSS switchgear and load centers is provided by the EUPS from the respective division.by providing a test input signal in each Class 1E division separately.

A test input The signal exists only in the control power circuit of the EPSS division under test for EPSS switchgear and load centers listed in Table 2.5.1-2.

186 5.8 Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each Class 1E division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the EPSS division under test.

645



E06 2.5.1 5.11 EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table 2.5.1-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table 2.5.1-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes that ratings for EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table 2.5.1-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are greater than their analyzed load requirements.

648

E07 2.5.1 5.12 EPSS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes EPSS cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

649

E08 2.5.1 5.13 EPSS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other

An equipment protection and coordination analysis concludes that the EPSS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

650


146

devices. E09a 2.5.1 5.14 EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs,

and transformers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

A short-circuit analysis concludes that current capability for EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by circuit interrupting device coordination analysis.

651

E09b 2.5.1 5.15 The feeder and load circuit breakers for EPSS switchgear, load centers and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built feeder and load circuit breakers for EPSS switchgear, load centers, and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

A report concludes that the current interrupting capability for EPSS switchgear, load center, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers, is greater than the analyzed fault currents.

652

E16a 2.5.1 5.16 EPSS 6.9 kV and 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.

A bench test will be performed to verify as-built EPSS 6.9 kV and 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.

EPSS 6.9 kV and 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the trip setpoints.

187 5.15 A bench test of the as-built circuit breaker trip set points should be performed to verify the assumed breaker trip points in the preceding analysis.

653

E16 2.5.1 6.1 Each EPSS division has an assigned EDG that provides power if there is a loss of offsite power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each EPSS division has an assigned EDG that provides power if there is a loss of offsite power.

Each EPSS division has an assigned EDG that provides power if there is a loss of offsite power.

654

E16 2.5.1 6.2 Each EPSS 6.9 kV switchgear offsite power supply circuit breaker is opened by a protection system LOOP signal.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EPSS 6.9 kV switchgear offsite power supply circuit breaker is opened by a protection system LOOP signal.

Each EPSS 6.9 kV switchgear offsite power supply circuit breaker division automatically separates from the offsite power supply on a LOOP test input signal from the protection system.

188 6.2 Use the same terminology in the CW and the AC.

655

E17 2.5.1 6.3 The EPSS provides voltages at the supplied safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions that exceed the minimum required operating voltage of that equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to verify that the voltage at the supplied safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions exceeds the minimum required operating voltage of that equipment.

b. A test will be performed to verify that EPSS bus voltage measurements verify safety-related terminal voltages exceed

a. An analysis concludes the voltage at the supplied safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions exceeds the minimum required operating voltage of that equipment.

b. EPSS bus voltage measurements verify safety-related terminal voltages exceed the minimum required operating voltage for that equipment.

656


147

the minimum required operating voltage for that equipment.

E16 2.5.1 6.4 EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP or LOCA conditions.

a. A test will be performed on each EPSS division using test input signals to verify that EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA, and LOOP/LOCA conditions without the alternate feed installed.

b. A test will be performed on each EPSS division using test input signals to verify that EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA and LOOP/LOCA conditions with the alternate feed installed.

a. EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA, and LOOP/LOCA conditions without the alternate feed installed.

b. EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA and LOOP/LOCA conditions with the alternate feed installed.

657

E16 2.5.1 6.5 Each EPSS division transfers from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite power supply circuit on an emergency auxiliary transformer failure signal.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EPSS division transfers from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit on an emergency auxiliary transformer failure signal.

Each EPSS division transfers from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit on an emergency auxiliary transformer failure signal.

658

E16 2.5.1 6.6 EPSS loads that are sequenced by the protection system are shed by the protection system in an undervoltage condition prior to load sequencing.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that EPSS loads that are sequenced by the protection system are shed by the protection system in an undervoltage condition prior to load sequencing.

EPSS loads that are sequenced by the protection system are shed by the protection system in an undervoltage condition prior to load sequencing.

659

A1 2.5.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EUPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.2, Tables 2.5.2-1 and 2.5.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.2-1.

An inspection of the as-built EUPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EUPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.2, Tables 2.5.2-1 and 2.5.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.2-1.

660





148

M01 2.5.2 3.1 Equipment identified listed as Class 1E in Table 2.5.2-2 are qualified as Seismic Category I and can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).




b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.2-2, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.








A3c 2.5.2 5.1 Physical separation exists between Class 1E EUPS equipment listed in Table 2.5.2-2 and non-Class 1E equipment.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built Class 1E EUPS equipment is physically separated from as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

The Class 1E EUPS equipment listed in Table 2.5.2-2 is separated from non-Class 1E equipment by at least 3 ft horizontally and at least 5 ft vertically.

666

E04 2.5.2 5.2 Non-safety-related loads connected to the EUPS are electrically isolated from the EUPS by an isolation device.


a. The isolation devices used between the EUPS and non-safety-related loads are qualified to provide electrical isolation.

b. A qualified electrical isolation device

667


149

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built non-safety-related loads connected to the EUPS.

exists between non-safety-related loads connected to the EUPS and the EUPS.

E02 2.5.2 5.3 Without an alternate feed installed, independence is maintained between the EUPS divisions.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EUPS division, one division at a time.

Without an alternate feed installed, the test input signal exists only in the EUPS division under test, when a test input signal is applied in each EUPS division.

668

E03 2.5.2 5.4 With the alternate feed installed from EPSS division 1 to division 2, independence is maintained between the load group created by EUPS divisions 1 and 2, and the load group created by divisions 3 and 4. EUPS divisions 3 and 4 which are independent of each other.





669






670






671

E03 2.5.2 5.7 With the alternate feed installed from EPSS division 4 to division 3, independence is maintained between the load group created by EUPS divisions 3 and 4, and the load group

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EPSS division, one division at a time, while the alternate feed is installed from EPSS division 4 to



672


150

created by divisions 1 and 2. EUPS divisions 1 and 2 which are independent of each other.

division 3. b. A test input signal exists only in the division under test when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division 1 or 2.

E16a 2.5.2 5.8 EUPS 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.Deleted.

A bench test will be performed to verify as-built EUPS 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.Deleted.

EUPS 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the trip setpoints. Deleted.

673


E06 2.5.2 5.10 EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, panelboards, and converters, listed in Table 2.5.2-2 and their feeder breakers and load breakers, are sized to supply their load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, panelboards, and converters, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes that ratings for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, panelboards, and converters, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are greater than their analyzed load requirements.

675

E07 2.5.2 5.11 EUPS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes EUPS cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

676

E10 2.5.2 5.12 Each EUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating design loads for a minimum of two hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built EUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each EUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

a. An analysis concludes each EUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each EUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

677

E11 2.5.2 5.13 Each EUPS battery charger supplies assigned EUPS loads while maintaining the respective EUPS battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built EUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

a. An analysis concludes each EUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each EUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can

678


151

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each EUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned EUPS loads while maintaining the respective EUPS battery charged.

supply the assigned EUPS loads while maintaining the respective EUPS battery charged.

E05 2.5.2 5.14 The EUPS inverters are sized to power the design EUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS inverters are sized to power the design EUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each EUPS inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

Verify capability by tests and analysis. 679

E16 2.5.2 5.15 EUPS operating voltage remains within the terminal voltage range of the supplied safety-related equipment during the battery duty cycle.

A test will be performed to verify that EUPS operating voltage remains within the terminal voltage range of the supplied safety-related equipment during the battery duty cycle.

EUPS battery terminal voltage remains greater than minimum required terminal voltage after a period of no less than two hours with a discharge rate that is equal to or greater than the battery design duty cycle capacity.

680

E09a 2.5.2 5.16 EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers and panelboards listed in Table 2.5.2-2 are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, and panelboards, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

A short-circuit analysis concludes that current capability for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, and panelboards, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by circuit interrupting device coordination analysis.

681

E09b 2.5.2 5.17 The feeder and load circuit breakers for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, and panelboards are rated to interrupt fault currents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built feeder and load circuit breakers for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, and panelboards are rated to interrupt fault currents.

A short-circuit analysisreport concludes that the current interrupting capability for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, and panelboards feeder and load circuit breakers, is greater than the analyzed fault currents.

682

E08 2.5.2 5.18 EUPS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An equipment protection and coordination analysis concludes that the EUPS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

683


152

E15 2.5.2 5.19 Harmonic distortion does not prevent Class 1E buses from performing safety functions.

An analysis will be performed to verify that harmonic distortion does not prevent as-built Class 1E buses from performing safety functions.

An analysis of the Class 1E buses concludes that total harmonic distortion does not exceed 5 percent voltage distortion on the Class 1E buses.

684

E14 2.5.3 2.1 The mechanical portions of the Each SBODG air start system are is located in the Switchgear Building and each independent of the mechanical portions of the EDG air start system is located in each EPGB.

An inspection will be performed of the each as-built mechanical portions of the SBODG air start system to verify independence of the mechanical portions of the from each as-built EDG air start system.

The mechanical portion of the Each SBODG air start system is located in the switchgear building and each EDG air start system is located in each EPGB.

196 2.1 The CW, ITA, and AC wording are not aligned. 685

S10 2.5.3 2.2 Each SBODG has a fuel oil storage tank.

An test inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built SBODG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the continuous rating for 24 hours.

Each SBODG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the continuous rating for 24 hours.

197 2.2 ITA should be by test and analysis 686

S10 2.5.3 2.3 Each SBODG has a fuel oil day tank. An test inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built SBODG day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the continuous rating for two hours.

Each SBODG day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the continuous rating for two hours.


E16 2.5.3 2.4 Each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than SBODG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

A test will be performed to verify each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than SBODG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

The flow rate of each fuel oil transfer pump is greater than SBODG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

688








153






690

E14 2.5.3 4.1 The SBODGs are connected to the EPSS Class 1E buses through two in-series circuit breakers (one Class 1E circuit breaker at the Class 1E EPSS bus and one non-Class 1E circuit breaker at the non-Class 1E NPSS bus).

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SBODGs are connected to the EPSS Class 1E buses through two in-series circuit breakers.

The SBODGs are connected to the EPSS Class 1E buses through two in-series circuit breakers (one Class 1E circuit breaker at the Class 1E EPSS bus and one non-Class 1E circuit breaker at the non-Class 1E NPSS bus).

691

E16 2.5.3 4.2 SBODG #1 is capable of connecting to EPSS Divisions 1 and 2.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify SBODG #1 is capable of connecting to EPSS Divisions 1 and 2.

SBODG #1 starts and connects to EPSS Divisions 1 and 2 within 10 minutes of receiving a test input signal.

692



SBODG #2 starts and connects to EPSS Divisions 3 and 4 buses within 10 minutes of receiving a test input signal.

693

E12 2.5.3 4.4 Each SBODG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built SBODG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

b. A test shall be performed to verifyeach as-built SBODG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under loaded conditions.

a. An analysis concludes each SBODG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

b. A report concludes that each as-built SBODG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under analyzed loaded conditions.

200 4.4 Verify by test and analysis each as-built SBODG is capable of carrying the required loads.

Add portion deleted from ITAAC 3.14 regarding the EDG obtaining stable conditions while operating under rated loading conditions.

694

E14 2.5.3 4.5 The electrical portions of the SBODG air start system are independent of the electrical portions of the EDG air start system.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built electrical portions of the SBODG air start system are independent of the electrical portions of the EDG air start system.

a. The SBODG air start system is powered from the normal power supply system and is independent of the EDG air start system which is powered from the emergency power supply system.

b. The SBODG pilot air start solenoids are powered from the 12 hour uninterruptible power supply system buses and are independent of the EDG

695


154

air start system pilot air start solenoids which are powered from the Class 1E uninterruptible power supply system.

A1 2.5.4 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EDG fuel oil storage and transfer system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1.

An inspection of the as-built EDG fuel oil storage and transfer system functional arrangement will be performed.

The EDG fuel oil storage and transfer system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1.

696



A1 2.5.4 2.4 The functional arrangement of the EDG lubricating oil system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2.

An inspection of the as-built EDG lubricating oil system functional arrangement will be performed.

The EDG lubricating oil system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2.

699

A1 2.5.4 2.5 The functional arrangement of the EDG air intake and exhaust system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-3.

An inspection of the as-built EDG air intake and exhaust system functional arrangement will be performed.

a. The EDG air intake and exhaust system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-3.

b. The arrangement and location of the combustion air intake and exhaust gas discharge as shown on Figure 2.5.4-3 are such that dilution and contamination of the intake air will not prevent operation of the EDG at rated power output or cause engine shutdown as a consequence of any metrological or accident condition.

201 2.5 Adequate separation of the EDG exhaust and intake is not established by the given information.

700

A1 2.5.4 2.6 The functional arrangement of the EDG cooling water system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-4.

An inspection of the as-built EDG cooling water system functional arrangement will be performed.

The EDG cooling water system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-4.

701

A1 2.5.4 2.7 The functional arrangement of the EDG starting air system is as described

An inspection of the as-built EDG starting air system functional

The EDG starting air system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in

702


155

in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-5.

arrangement will be performed. the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-5.












b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.4-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed





156

condition. z 2.5.4 3.8 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 710

S10 2.5.4 3.9 Each EDG has a fuel oil storage tank. An test inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built EDG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for seven days.

Each EDG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for seven days.


S10 2.5.4 3.10 Each EDG has a fuel oil day tank. An test inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built EDG fuel oil day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for two hours.

Each EDG fuel oil day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for two hours.

205 3.10. ITA should be by test and analysis 712

E16 2.5.4 3.11 Each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than EDG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

A test will be performed to verify each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than EDG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

The flow rate of each fuel oil transfer pump is greater than EDG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

713

E16 2.5.4 3.12 Each EDG starting air system is capable of providing air to start the respective EDG without being recharged.

A test will be performed to verify each EDG starting air system is capable of providing air to start the respective EDG without being recharged.

Each EDG starts five consecutive times without recharging respective starting air receivers between EDG starts.

714




715

S10 2.5.4 3.14 Each EDG lubricating oil system provides lubrication to the engine and turbocharger wearing parts during engine operation.

a. An as-built test and analysis will be performed to demonstrates each EDG lubricating oil system oil volume is capable of supporting at least 7 days of full load operation

b. A test will be performed to verify that each EDG and lubricating oil system operating at rated load conditions achieves stable temperatures and pressures.

a. Analysis A report concludes each EDG lubricating oil system oil volume is capable of supporting at least 7 days of full load operation.

b. Each EDG and lubricating oil system operating at rated load conditions achieves stable temperatures and pressures stated in the approved design.

206 3.14 Part a. should specify test and analysis. How is lubricating oil consumption established in part a. without testing.

Part b. should only encompass the lubricating oil system. Delete the "and" between each EDG and lubricating oil system in the ITA and AC.

716


157

E16 2.5.4 3.15 Each EDG exhaust path has a bypass exhaust path.

Type tests will be performed on the EDG exhaust bypass device to demonstrate rupture pressure limits.

Type test results conclude that the EDG rupture disk will rupture within the pressure limits within the approved design.

717






M02 2.5.4 3.21 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}





724









M04 2.5.4 3.25 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.5.4-1 are

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3



158

fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

documentation for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be conducted.

components listed in Table 2.5.4-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

I04 2.5.4 4.1 Displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.


I05 2.5.4 4.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3.



a. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3.

b. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3.

729




730

E13 2.5.4 5.1 The EDG cControl power for the EDGsis provided by the EUPS from the respective division.

A test will be performed to verify that control power for the EDGs is provided by the EUPS from the respective division.by providing a test input signal in only one division.

The test input signal exists in only in the control power circuit of the EDG system under test when a test input signal is applied in the EDG system.

208 5.1 Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each Class 1E division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the EDG division under test.

731

E01 2.5.4 5.2 Equipment designated as Class 1E in A test will be performed by The test input signal provided in each 732


159

Table 2.5.4-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.5.4-2.

providing a test input signal in each division.

division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.4-2.

E12 2.5.4 5.3 Each EDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS division.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built EDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

b. A test shall be performed to verify each as-built EDG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under loaded conditions.

a. An analysis concludes each EDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

b. A report concludes that each as-built EDG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under analyzed loaded conditions.

209 5.3 Verify by test and analysis that each as-built EDG is capable of obtaining its output rating and carrying the required loads.


733

S07 2.5.4 5.4 Air start pilot Vvalves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 fail to the position as listed in Table 2.5.4-2 on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that air start pilot valves fail to the position as listed in Table 2.5.4-2 on loss of power.

Following loss of power, the air start pilot valves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 fail to the position as listed in Table 2.5.4-1.

c. Table 2.5.4-4 (Emergency Diesel Generator ITAAC) in Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 includes ITAAC to demonstrate that valves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 fail to the position listed in the table on loss of power. Other ITAAC tables do not include ITAAC for loss of power to valves. AREVA is requested to discuss its approach for establishing ITAAC for testing the fail safe position of valves on loss of power.

All MOVs fail as-is on loss of power.

734

E16 2.5.4 6.1 Each EDG is started by a protection system LOOP signal from the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EDG is started by a protection system LOOP signal from the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus.

Each EDG is started by a protection system LOOP signal from the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus, achieves rated speed and voltage and connects to the assigned EPSS bus in ≤ 15 seconds after receipt of a test input signal.

735

E16 2.5.4 6.2 Each EDG is started by a protection system SIS actuation signal.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EDG is started by a protection system SIS actuation signal.

Each EDG is started by a protection system SIS actuation signal, achieves rated speed and voltage and remains disconnected from the EPSS.

736

E16 2.5.4 6.3 Each EDG will start and connect to the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus in an undervoltage

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EDG will start and connect to the

Each EDG starts and connects to the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus in an undervoltage condition

737


160

condition concurrent with a SIS actuation signal.

respective EPSS division medium voltage bus in an undervoltage condition concurrent with a SIS actuation signal.

concurrent with a SIS actuation signal. As loads are sequenced onto EPSS buses, EDG nominal output voltage and frequency remain ≥ 75 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Voltage and frequency are restored to within 10 percent and 2 percent nominal, respectively within 60 percent of each load sequence step.

S03 2.5.4 6.4 The EDG lubricating oil system heat exchangers as listed in Table 2.5.4-1 have the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the essential service water system.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the EDG heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the essential service water system.

Each EDG lubricating oil system heat exchanger listed in Table 2.5.4-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load specified by the EDG manufacturer to the essential service water system.

738

M14 2.5.4 6.5 Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 can perform the will function to change position as listed in Table 2.5.4-1 under normal operating conditions.



210 6.5 Typo in CW 2nd line 739

S03 2.5.4 6.6 The EDG cooling water system heat exchangers as listed in Table 2.5.4-1 have the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the essential service water.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the EDG heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the essential service water.

Each EDG cooling water system heat exchanger listed in Table 2.5.4-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load specified by the EDG manufacturer to the essential service water system.

740

E16 2.5.4 6.7 Each EDG is capable of starting from standby conditions and achieving required voltage and frequency.

A test will be performed to verify that each EDG is capable of starting from standby conditions and achieving required voltage and frequency.

Each EDG starts from standby conditions and achieves voltage ≥ 6555 V and frequency ≥ 58.8 Hz in ≤ 15 seconds after receipt of a test input signal; and steady state voltage ≥ 6555 V and ≤ 7260 V, frequency ≥ 58.8 Hz and ≤ 61.2 Hz.

741


E14 2.5.5 3.1 Each EAT and NAT has an oil containment system.

An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built EAT and NAT has an oil containment system.

Each EAT and NAT has an oil containment system.

743

E14 2.5.5 3.2 Each EAT and NAT has a deluge fire protection system.

An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built EAT and NAT has a deluge fire protection system.

Each EAT and NAT has a deluge fire protection system.

744


E14 2.5.5 4.2 EAT power cables and instrumentation An inspection will be performed to The EAT power cables and 746


161

and control circuits are routed separately from NAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits.

verify that as-built EAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits are routed separately from NAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits.

instrumentation and control circuits are routed separately from NAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits.

E07 2.5.5 4.3 Each EAT and associated power cables are sized to power the EPSS safety-related and non-safety-related loads.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EAT cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes EAT cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

747

E07 2.5.5 4.4 Each NAT and associated electrical bus is sized to power the connected NPSS non-safety-related loads.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built NAT cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes NAT cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

748


E14 2.5.6 3.1 Each MSU has an oil containment system.

An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built MSU has an oil containment system.

Each MSU has an oil containment system. 750

E14 2.5.6 3.2 Each MSU has a deluge fire protection system.

An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built MSU has a deluge fire protection system.

Each MSU has a deluge fire protection system.

751

E07 2.5.6 4.1 The MSUs and associated isophase busses are sized to support the main generator rated output at generator rated power factor.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built MSUs and associated isophase busses inverters are sized to power the design MSU loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes each MSU and associated isophase bus inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

752

A1 2.5.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the NUPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.7, Table 2.5.7-1, and as shown on Figure 2.5.7-1.

An inspection of the as-built NUPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The NUPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.7, Table 2.5.7-1, and as shown on Figure 2.5.7-1.

753


M01 2.5.7 3.1 Equipment identified listed as Class 1E in Table 2.5.7-1 are qualified as Seismic Category 1 and can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.7-1 using analytical

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s) including the time required to perform



162

assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


the function. b. Inspection reports conclude that the

equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.7-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.












757

E10 2.5.7 5.1 Each NUPS battery is able to provide supplies power for starting and operating design loads for a minimum of two hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built NUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

a. An analysis concludes each NUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each NUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed

758


163

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each NUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

battery design duty cycle.

E11 2.5.7 5.2 Each NUPS battery charger supplies assigned NUPS loads while maintaining the respective NUPS battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built NUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each NUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned NUPS loads while maintaining the respective NUPS battery charged.

a. An analysis concludes each NUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each NUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned NUPS loads while maintaining the respective NUPS battery charged.

759

E05 2.5.7 5.3 The NUPS inverters are sized to power the design NUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built NUPS inverters are sized to power the design NUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each NUPS inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.


A3c 2.5.7 5.4 Physical separation exists between Class 1E division reactor trip breakers.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built Class 1E reactor trip breakers are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The Class 1E reactor trip breakers are located in separate cabinets within the control rod drive mechanism distribution panels in separate Safeguard Buildings.

761

E16 2.5.7 5.5 The reactor trip breakers open when a signal is provided to the shunt trip coil.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the reactor trip breakers open when a signal is provided to the shunt trip coil.

The reactor trip breakers open when the shunt trip coil is energized.

762

E16 2.5.7 6.1 The reactor trip breakers open on a protection system reactor trip signal.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the reactor trip breakers open on a protection system reactor trip signal.

The reactor trip breakers open on a protection system reactor trip test input signal.

763

E14 2.5.8 2.1 Surge arresters are provided for MSUs, NATs and EATs.

An inspection will be performed to verify that surge arresters are provided for each as-built MSU, NAT and EAT.

Surge arresters are provided for MSUs, NATs and EATs.

764

E14 2.5.8 2.2 The main generator, EDG, and An inspection will be performed to The main generator, EDG, and SBODG 765


164

SBODG neutrals are connected to the station grounding grid.

verify that the as-built main generator, EDG, and SBODG neutrals are connected to the station grounding grid.

neutrals are connected to the station grounding grid.

E14 2.5.8 2.3 AC distribution system transformer neutral points are connected to the station grounding grid.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built AC ac distribution system transformer neutral points are connected to the station grounding grid.

The ac distribution system transformer neutral points are connected to the station grounding grid.

766

E14 2.5.8 2.4 The ground bus of ac distribution system switchgear, loads centers, and MCCs listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is connected to the station grounding grid.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built ground bus of ac distribution system switchgear, loads centers, and MCCs are connected to the station grounding grid.

The ground bus of the ac distribution system switchgear, load centers, and MCCs listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is connected to the station grounding grid.

767

E14 2.5.8 2.5 Plant instrumentation grounding system is connected to the station grounding grid.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built plant instrumentation grounding system is connected to the station grounding grid.

The plant instrumentation grounding system is connected to the station grounding grid.

768

E17 2.5.8 2.6 Insulation coordination is achieved on surge arrestors on MSUs, NATs, and EATs.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the insulation ratings for MSU, NAT, and EAT surge arrestors.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built insulation ratings for MSU, NAT, and EAT surge arrestors meet the approved design criteria.

a. An analysis concludes: The lightning impulse protective ratio of the chopped wave withstand to the front-of-wave protection level is equal to or greater than 1.2. The lightning impulse protective ratio of the basic lightning impulse insulation level to the lightning impulse protective level is equal to or greater than 1.2. The switching impulse protective ratio of the basic switching impulse insulation level to the switching impulse protective level is equal to or greater than 1.15.

b. The insulation ratings for MSU, NAT, and EAT surge arrestors meet the approved design criteria.

769

M01 2.5.9 2.1 Lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS can withstand seismic design basis loads without affecting plant safety

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on

a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS



165

function(s). lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

can withstand seismic design basis loads without affecting safety a loss of the function(s).

b. Inspection reports conclude that lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

E16 2.5.9 3.1 Emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered from the EPSS.

A test will be performed to verify that the emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered from the EPSS.

a. The emergency lighting system provides lighting in the MCR and is powered from the EPSS.

b. The emergency lighting system provides lighting in the RSS and is powered from the EPSS.

213 3.1 771

E16 2.5.9 3.2 Special emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered by the EUPS.

A test will be performed to verify that the special emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered by the EUPS.

a. The special emergency lighting system provides lighting in the MCR and is powered from the EUPS.

b. The special emergency lighting system provides lighting in the RSS and is powered from the EUPS.

772

E16 2.5.9 3.3 The emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide illumination at the MCR and RSS workstations and safety-related panels.

A test will be performed to verify that the emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide illumination at the MCR and RSS workstations and safety-related panels.

a. The emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide at least 100 foot-candles illumination at the MCR workstations and at least 50 foot-candles at the safety-related panels.

b. The emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide at least 100 foot-candles illumination at the RSS workstations.

c. The special emergency lighting system provides at least ten foot-candles at the MCR operator workstation when it is the only MCR lighting system in operation.

773


166

d. The special emergency lighting system provides at least ten foot-candles at the RSS operator workstation when it is the only RSS lighting system in operation.


E16 2.5.9 3.5 Eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures provide illumination for post-fire shutdown activities performed by operators outside the MCR or RSS where eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures are utilized.

A test will be performed to verify that eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures provide illumination for post-fire shutdown activities performed by operators outside the MCR or RSS.

Eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures provide at least one foot-candle illumination in areas outside the MCR and RSS where post-fire shutdown activities are performed.

214 3.5 Expand the AC to define the area being measured.

775

A1 2.5.10 2.1 The functional arrangement of the NPSS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.10, Table 2.5.10-1, and as shown on Figure 2.5.10-1.

An inspection of the as-built NPSS functional arrangement will be performed.

The NPSS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.10, Table 2.5.10-1, and as shown on Figure 2.5.10-1.

776





a. Tests/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).








167










780

E13 2.5.10 5.1 Control power for the RCP circuit breakers located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 is provided by the EUPS from the respective same division.

A test will be performed to verify that control power for the RCP circuit breakers is provided by the EUPS from the respective same division.

The signal exists only in the Ccontrol power circuit for of the RCP circuit breaker located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 under testis provided by the EUPS from the same division.

Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the RCP circuit breaker under test.

781

E13 2.5.10 5.2 Control power for the switchgear feeder circuit breakers located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 is provided by the EUPS of a different division.

A test will be performed to verify that control power for the switchgear feeder circuit breakers is provided by the EUPS of a different division.

The signal exists only in the Ccontrol power circuit for of the switchgear feeder circuit breaker located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 under testis provided by the EUPS of a different division.

Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the switchgear feeder circuit breaker under test.

782



A1 2.5.11 2.1 The functional arrangement of the 12UPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.11, and as shown in Figure 2.5.11-1.

An inspection of the as-built 12UPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The 12UPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.11, and as shown in Figure 2.5.11-1.

785

E10 2.5.11 3.1 Each 12UPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating design loads for a minimum of 12 hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built 12UPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a

a. An analysis concludes each 12UPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of 12 hours while battery terminal voltage remains

786


168

minimum time of 12 hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each 12UPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each 12UPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

E11 2.5.11 3.2 Each 12UPS battery charger supplies assigned 12UPS loads while maintaining the respective 12UPS battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built 12UPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each 12UPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned 12UPS loads while maintaining the respective 12UPS battery charged.

a. An analysis concludes each 12UPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each 12UPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned 12UPS loads while maintaining the respective 12UPS battery charged.

787

E05 2.5.11 3.3 The 12UPS inverters are sized to power the design 12UPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built 12UPS inverters are sized to power the design 12UPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each 12UPS inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

217 3.3 Verify capability by tests and analysis. 788

E16 2.5.12 2.1 The digital telephone system, the public address and alarm system, sound powered system, and portable wireless communication system provide station to station communication and area broadcasting between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

Tests will be performed to verify that the digital telephone system, the public address and alarm system, sound powered system, and portable wireless communication system provide station to station communication and area broadcasting between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

a. The digital telephone system, public address and alarm system, and the sound powered system, and portable wireless communication system exist in the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

b. Voice transmission and reception via the digital telephone system and sound powered system is verified between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

c. The broadcasting of voice messages from the MCR to the locations listed in

789


169

Table 2.5.12-1 via the public address and alarm system is verified.

d. Voice transmission and reception via the portable wireless communication system is verified between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

A1 2.6.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CRACS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.1, Tables 2.6.1-1 and 2.6.1-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.1-1, 2.6.1-2, and 2.6.1-3.

An inspection of the as-built CRACS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CRACS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.1, Tables 2.6.1-1 and 2.6.1-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.1-1, 2.6.1-2, and 2.6.1-3.

790


A3b 2.6.1 2.3 Physical separation exists between the CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains as listed in Table 2.6.1-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains are located in separate rooms of Safeguard Buildings 2 and 3.

Physical separation exists between the as-built CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains as follows: • The CRACS fresh air intake train

30SAB01, iodine filtration train 30SAB11, and recirculation and air conditioning train 30SAB01 as listed in Table 2.6.1-1 are located in room 2UJK31034 of Safeguard Building 2.

• The CRACS fresh air intake train 30SAB04, iodine filtration train 30SAB14, and recirculation and air conditioning train 30SAB04 as listed in Table 2.6.1-1 are located in room 2UJK31034 of Safeguard Building 3.

• The CRACS recirculation and air conditioning train 30SAB02 as listed in Table 2.6.1-1 is located in room 2UJK31035 of Safeguard Building 2.


219 2.3 The CW and AC wording should be consistent. Add to the beginning of the AC and the CW "Physical separation exists between the as-built CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains as follows:

792



170

M15 2.6.1 3.2 Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.1-2 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.6.1-1 under normal operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of Class 1E dampers to change position under normal operating conditions.

Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.1-2 change position as listed in Table 2.6.1-1 under normal operating conditions.

794







z 2.6.1 3.4 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are designed in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


Deleted.ASME AG-1 Code Design Verification Reports (AA-4400) conclude that the design of equipment listed as ASME AG-1 Code in Table 2.6.1-1 complies with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

221 ITAAC deleted at Public Meeting on April 4-5, 2013.

796

z 2.6.1 3.5 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements, including welding requirements.


Deleted.A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table 2.6.1-1 are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


797

M12 2.6.1 3.6 Equipment listed in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table 2.6.1-1 are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

798

I04 2.6.1 4.1 Displays listed in Table 2.6.1-2 are a. Tests will be performed to verify a. Displays listed in Table 2.6.1-2 are 223 4.1 General Comment 7 799


171

indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

that the displays listed in Table 2.6.1-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.


indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.







800




801






802


S12d 2.6.1 6.1 The CRACS maintains a positive pressure in the CRE area relative to the outside environment and adjacent

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the CRACS maintains a positive

The CRACS maintains a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge in the CRE area relative to the

804


172

areas, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

pressure in the CRE area relative to the outside environment and adjacent areas, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

outside environment and adjacent areas, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

S12b 2.6.1 6.2 Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the iodine filtration train will start automatically, outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train, a minimum recirculation flowrate is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train and a positive pressure is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

a. A test will be performed to verify, upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, that the iodine filtration train will start automatically; and the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

b. A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, a minimum recirculation flowrate is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

c. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the CRACS maintains a positive pressure in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

a. Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the iodine filtration trains start automatically within 60 seconds and the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train.

b. Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, a recirculation flowrate of greater than or equal to 3000 scfm is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train.

c. Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the CRACS maintains a pressure of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

805

S12b 2.6.1 6.3 The CRACS is capable of detecting smoke in the outside air inlet duct, and alerting operators to take manual actions.Deleted.

A test of the CRACS smoke detection sensors and alarms will be performed.Deleted.

Upon receipt of a smoke detection signal, an alarm sounds in the MCR.Deleted.

226

CW

ITA

The ITAAC also does not address smoke detection aspect of the MCR ventillation system. An ITAAC should demonstrate smoke detection ability

The CRACS is capable of detecting smoke in the outside air inlet duct, and alerting operators to take manual actions.

Upon receipt of a smoke detection signal, an

806


173

AC

alarm sounds in the MCR.

S12 2.6.1 6.4 The CRE area ventilation unfiltered air in-leakage is minimized in order to maintain the MCR habitability.

A test will be performed to measure the unfiltered air in-leakage inside the CRE area boundary.

The unfiltered air in-leakage inside the CRE area boundary is less than or equal to 40 scfm.

807

S05a 2.6.1 6.5 The CRACS provides conditioned air to the CRE area to maintain the temperature within design limits of the CRE during normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.cooling to maintain the design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify the CRACS heating and cooling capability.provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the CRACS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each The CRACS system is capable of providing heating and cooling capacity sufficent to provide conditioned air to maintain the temperature within design limits of the CRE during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions.cooling coil is capable of providing design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. Each CRACS fan is capable of meeting meets the design air flow requirements during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions., while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

224 6.5

CW

ITA

AC

The DC and AC wording are not consistent with one another. The ITAAC scope is not sufficient and should cover normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Modify ITAAC as follows:

The CRACS provides conditioned air to the CRE area to maintain the temperature within design limits of the CRE during normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.

a) Tests and analyses of the as built CRACS will be performed to verify the heating and cooling capability.

b) A test of the CRACS fans will be perfomred to verify that the air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a) The as-built CRACS system is capable of providing heating and cooling capacity sufficent to provide conditioned air to maintain the temperature within design limits of the CRE during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions.

b) Each CRACS fan meets the design air flow requirements during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions.

808

S05b 2.6.1 6.6 The CREF heaters protect the carbon adsorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

Tests and analysis of the CREF heaters will be performed to verify the CREF heaters protect the carbon adsorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

a. The CREF heaters energize during operation of the CREF unit and each CREF heater provides equal to or, greater than, its required design heating capacity.

225 6.6 The AC lacks specifics. Suggest the AC contain 2 parts: (a). The CREF heaters energize during operation of the CREF unit and each CREF heater provides equal to or, greater than, its required design heating capacity. (b)

809


174

b. An report concludes that the The CREF heaters are capable of protecting protect the carbon adsorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

An analysis demonstrates that the CREF heaters protect the carbon absorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

S12b 2.6.1 6.7 Upon receipt of a high radiation alarm signal in the air intake duct, the iodine filtration train will start automatically, the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train, a minimum CRE recirculation flowrate is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train, and a positive pressure is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

a. A test will be performed to verify, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal in the air intake duct, that the iodine filtration train will start automatically; and the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

b. A test will be performed to verify, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal in the air intake duct, that a minimum CRE recirculation flowrate for each iodine filtration train is achieved. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

c. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal in the air intake duct, that a positive pressure is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

a. A separate test for each iodine filtration train confirms, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal from the PACS module, that the iodine filtration train will start automatically within 60 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module, and the outside air supply is diverted through the iodine filtration train.

b. A separate test for each iodine filtration train confirms, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal from the PACS module, that a CRE recirculation flowrate of greater than or equal to 3,000 scfm is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train.

c. A separate test for each iodine filtration train confirms, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal from the PACS module, that a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

226 6.7 Tier 1 DD references toxic gas but does not address it in ITAAC space. Open issue under RAI 511. Toxic gas deleted in RAI 511 Supplement 6, Q 06.04-10

810

S05b 2.6.1 6.8 Deleted.The CRACS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

Deleted.Tests and analysis of the CRACS heaters will be performed to verify CRACS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the

Deleted.Each CRACS air inlet heater is capable of providing design heating capacity to maintain design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design

227 6.8 Based on modifying ITAAC 6.5 as suggested, this ITAAC can be deleted. Comments made in 6.5 apply to this ITAAC as well.

811


175

CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

basis accident alignment.

A1 2.6.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the AVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.3, Tables 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2.

An inspection of the as-built AVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The AVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.3, Tables 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2.

812


A3a 2.6.3 2.3 Physical separation exists between AVS iodine filtration trains located in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.3-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built AVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms in the Fuel Building.

The AVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.3-1.

add reference to Figures 814





816







z 2.6.3 3.4 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table 2.6.3-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are designed in accordance with ASME


Deleted.ASME AG-1 Code Design Verification Reports (AA-4400) conclude that the design of equipment listed as


818


176

AG-1 Code requirements. ASME AG-1 Code in Table 2.6.3-1 complies with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.





819




820












822




823


177

state. E01 2.6.3 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in






824








S12d 2.6.3 7.1 The AVS maintains a negative pressure between the inner and outer containment walls, while operating in a

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify the capability of the AVS to provide a negative pressure between the inner and outer

The AVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge within 305 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module,

827


178

design basis accident alignment. containment walls, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

S12b 2.6.3 7.2 Upon receipt of containment isolation signal, the following actions occur automatically: • Isolation of the normal operation

train by closing the isolation dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Normal Operation Train.

• Start of the accident filtration trains and opening of the dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Accident Filtration Train.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of containment isolation test input signal, the following actions occur automatically: • The normal operation train

isolates by closing the isolation dampers.

• The accident filtration trains start, and the dampers for Accident Filtration Train to the iodine filtration train are aligned to the open position.

The following actions occur automatically within 60 seconds after receipt of an isolation test input signal from the PACS module: • The normal operation train is isolated

by closing the isolation dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Normal Operation Train.

• The accident filtration trains start, and the dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Accident Filtration Train are aligned to the open position.

828

A1 2.6.4 2.1 The functional arrangement of the FBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.4, Tables 2.6.4-1 and 2.6.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

An inspection of the as-built FBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The FBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.4, Tables 2.6.4-1 and 2.6.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

829


A3b 2.6.4 2.3 Physical separation exists between the FBVS ventilation trains located in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.4-12 and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built FBVS ventilation trains are located in separate cells in the Fuel Building.

The FBVS ventilation trains are located in separate cells in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.4-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

233 2.3 The ITAAC CW and AC reference two different tables.

Add Figure 2.6.4-1 to the CW and AC.

831




Class 1E dampers change position as listed in Table 2.6.4-1 under normal operating conditions.

833


a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.4-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the




179

Seismic Category I design requirements.








835





836




837








180






839




840






841






b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.4-2, including



181

of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.4-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

S12b 2.6.4 7.1 Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the FBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building relative to the outside environment.

Deleted.A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the FBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building relative to the outside environment.

Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the FBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge in the Fuel Building relative to the outside environment.

844

S12b 2.6.4 7.2 Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the FBVS isolation dampers identified in Table 2.6.4-1 realign to exhaust air to the SBVS iodine filtration exhaust to the plant vent stack.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the FBVS isolation dampers realign to exhaust air to the SBVS iodine filtration exhaust to the plant vent stack.

Within 60 seconds after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the FBVS isolation dampers identified in Table 2.6.4-1 realign to exhaust air to the SBVS iodine filtration exhaust to the plant vent stack.

239 7.2 Typo in AC

Added comma after module.

845

S05a 2.6.4 7.3 The FBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the pump rooms in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify that the FBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the pump rooms in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the FBVS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. The FBVS provides the is capable of providing design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the Fuel Building pump rooms.

b. Each FBVS fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

240 7.3 AC (a) : The as-built FBVS provides the design cooling capacity while operating in the design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the Fuel Building pump rooms.

ITA (b) delete design from the 3rd line

846

S05b 2.6.4 7.4 The FBVS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the Fuel Building rooms for with systems containing borated fluid in the Fuel

Tests and analysis of the FBVS heaters will be performed to verify that the FBVS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the

a. Each FBVS heater energizes and provides equal to, or greater, than its required design heating capacity.

b. The Each FBVS heater is capable of

241 7.4 AC : a.) Each FBVS heater energizes and provides equal to, or greater, than its required design heating capacity. b.) The as-built FBVS provides the required heating

847


182

Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

Fuel Building rooms for with systems containing borated fluid in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

providing design provides the required heating capacity to maintain design temperatures in the rooms with systems containing borated fluid in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

capacity to maintain design temperatures in the rooms containing borated fluid in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

S12b 2.6.4 7.5 ITAAC to be submitted in Response to RAI 527, Question 14.03.07-38 by June 21, 2013.

848


849

A1 2.6.5 2.1 The functional arrangement of the NABVS exhaust backdraft damper at the vent stack is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.5, Table 2.6.5-1, and as shown on Figure 2.6.5-1.

An inspection of the as-built NABVS exhaust backdraft damper at the vent stack functional arrangement will be performed.

The NABVS exhaust backdraft damper at the vent stack conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.5, Table 2.6.5-1, and as shown on Figure 2.6.5-1.

850


M15 2.6.5 3.1 The NABVS exhaust backdraft damper will function to change position as listed in Table 2.6.5-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of the NABVS exhaust backdraft damper to change position under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

The NABVS exhaust backdraft damper changes position as listed in Table 2.6.5-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

243 3.1 CW, ITA, and AC should reflect that 'Closed' is the correct alignment under emergency conditions.

No change, Function in the table is already listed as “Closed”

852



b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.5-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage,





183

are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

analyzed condition.





854





855




856

S12b 2.6.5 4.1 Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the NABVS is shut down, and the backdraft damper prevents the SBVS and AVS exhaust air flow from discharging into the NABVS.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, that the NABVS is shut down and the backdraft damper prevents the SBVS and AVS exhaust air flow discharging into NABVS.

Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the NABVS is shut down and the backdraft damper prevents the SBVS and AVS exhaust air flow from discharging into the NABVS.

857

A1 2.6.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.6, Tables 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2.

An inspection of the as-built SBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.6, Tables 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2.

858


A3b 2.6.6 2.3 Physical separation exists between the SBVS iodine filtration trains located in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.63-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.6-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built SBVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms in the Fuel Building.

The SBVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms of the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.6-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.6-1.

247 2.3 The ITAAC CW and AC reference two different tables - please correct.


860


184


M15 2.6.6 3.2 Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.6-2 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.6.6-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.


Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.6-2 change position as listed in Table 2.6.6-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

862











864





865




866


185












868




869






870


Q1 2.6.6 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.6-2 can


a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in



186

perform the function listed in Table 2.6.6-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.6-2 to perform the function listed in Table 2.6.6-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


Table 2.6.6-2 can perform the function listed in Table 2.6.6-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.



S12b 2.6.6 7.1 Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building and the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the adjacent areasoutside environment.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building and in the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the adjacent areasoutside environment.

The SBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge within 305 seconds in the Fuel Building and the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the outside environment after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module.Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge in the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the adjacent areas.

874



187

S12b 2.6.6 7.3 Upon receipt of a high radiation signal in the Fuel Building or Reactor Building, both SBVS iodine filtration trains start automatically, the FB isolation dampers open, the SBVS isolation dampers close, iodine filtration banks isolation dampers open, and the accident air is directed through the SBVS iodine filtration trains.

A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train to verify that upon receipt of a high radiation test input signal in the Fuel Building or Reactor Building, both SBVS iodine filtration trains start automatically, the FB isolation dampers (30KLC45 AA003/AA004) open, the SBVS isolation dampers (30KLC45 AA001/AA002) close, iodine filtration banks isolation dampers (30KLC41 /42 AA001/AA002 and 30KLC42 AA001/AA002) open, and the accident air is directed through the SBVS iodine filtration trains.

Upon receipt of a high radiation test input signal from the PACS module, both SBVS iodine filtration trains start automatically, the FB isolation dampers (30KLC45 AA003/AA004) open, the SBVS isolation dampers (30KLC45 AA001/AA002) close, iodine filtration banks isolation dampers (30KLC41 /42 AA001/AA002 and 30KLC42 AA001/AA002) open, and the accident air is directed through the SBVS iodine filtration trains. The isolation dampers close or open within 60 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

253 7.3 Typo in ITA - missing required position of FB isolation dampers.

Damper nomenclature is not consistent with the table headers.

876

S12b 2.6.6 7.4 Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure in the FB and SB relative to the outside environment.

Deleted.A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure inside the FB and SB relative to the outside environment.

Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge in the FB and SB relative to the outside environment.

254 7.4 Typo - safeguard buildings should be plural (SBs)

ITAAC deleted per RAI 511 Supplement 6, Q 06.04-9

877

S05a 2.6.6 7.5 The SBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify the SBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the SBVS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each SBVS cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings.

b. Each SBVS fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

255 7.5 AC (a) : Each as-built SBVS cooling coil provides the design cooling capacity while operating in the design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures within the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings.


878


879

A1 2.6.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SBVSE is as described in the Design

An inspection of the as-built SBVSE functional arrangement will be

The SBVSE conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design

880


188

Description of Section 2.6.7, Tables 2.6.7-1 and 2.6.7-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.7-1, 2.6.7-2, 2.6.7-3, and 2.6.7-4.

performed. Description of Section 2.6.7, Tables 2.6.7-1 and 2.6.7-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.7-1, 2.6.7-2, 2.6.7-3, and 2.6.7-4.


A3a 2.6.7 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the SBVSE located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.6.7-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.7-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SBVSE are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SBVSE are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.6.7-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.7-1.

256 2.3 Insert the table that identifyies the component locations for this ITAAC's components similar to the other ITAAC .

882





884











886


189





887




888












890




891

E01 2.6.7 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.6.7-2 are powered from the

a. Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in

a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at

892


190

Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.6.7-2 in a normal or alternate feed condition.

each normally aligned division. b. Testing will be performed by

providing a test input signal in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair.

the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.6.7-2.



S05a 2.6.7 6.1 The SBVSE provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify SBVSE provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the SBVSE fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each SBVSE cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings.

b. Each SBVSE fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

261 7.5 AC (a) : Each as-built SBVSE cooling coil provides the design cooling capacity while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures within the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings the Safeguard Buildings.


894

S12 2.6.7 6.2 The recirculation cooling units start and stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the room temperature reaches preset maximum and minimum temperatures in the pump rooms.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that recirculation cooling units start automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset maximum temperatures in the pump rooms.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that recirculation cooling units stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset minimum temperatures in the pump rooms.

a. The recirculation cooling units start automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset maximum temperatures in the pump roomsprior to allowing the pump rooms to exceed the maximum design temperature.

b. The recirculation cooling units stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset minimum temperatures in the pump roomsprior to allowing the pump rooms to fall below the minimum design temperature.

262 6.2 CW, ITA, and AC are not consistent. Modify acceptance criteria to reflect that the Units cycle on and off based on preset temperature limits.

895

S14 2.6.7 6.3 The SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent by volume.

Tests and analysis will be performed to verify the air flow capability of the SBVSE is adequate to maintain the

The air flow capability of the SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one

896


191

hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent.

percent by volume.

A1 2.6.8 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.8, Tables 2.6.8-1, 2.6.8-2 and 2.6.8-3, and as shown on Figure 2.6.8-1.

An inspection of the as-built CBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.8, Tables 2.6.8-1, 2.6.8-2 and 2.6.8-3, and as shown on Figure 2.6.8-1.

897


M16 2.6.8 3.1 Valves listed in Table 2.6.8-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

Tests or type tests of valves will be performed to demonstrate that the valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

A report concludes that the valves listed in Table 2.6.8-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.


M14 2.6.8 3.2 Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.6.8-3 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.6.8-1 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of Class 1E valves to change position under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.6.8-3 change position as listed Table 2.6.8-1 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

e. Table 2.6.8-4 (Containment Building Ventilation System ITAAC) in Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 does not appear to include ITAAC to demonstrate the function of valves in the system under normal operating conditions. AREVA is requested to clarify whether ITAAC are included for valve function testing under normal operating conditions for the Containment Building Ventilation System.

Motor operated CIVs will be added to Table 2.6.8-3.

900




901

M01 2.6.8 3.4 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 can withstand seismic design basis


a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2



192

loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2.

equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.





903





904




905




ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.6.8-1, and document that the results of

General Comment 2

General Comment 6

907


193

the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.






















a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.6.8-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to


b. Displays listed in Table 2.6.8-3 are indicated on the PICS operator



194

PICS. b. Tests will be performed to verify

that the displays listed in Table 2.6.8-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

workstations in the RSS.






917




918





a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in 2.6.8-3.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in 2.6.8-3.

920


Q1 2.6.8 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.8-3 can perform the function listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 under normal environmental conditions, containment

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.8-3 to

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.8-3 can perform the function listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 under normal environmental conditions,



195

test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

perform the function listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.


S12 2.6.8 7.1 The CBVS low flow purge exhaust subsystem exhausts through a CBVS iodine filtration train.

Tests will be performed to verify the capability of the low flow purge exhaust subsystem to exhaust through a CBVS iodine filtration train.

The CBVS exhausts through a CBVS iodine filtration train when the CBVS low flow purge exhaust subsystem is operating.

923


924

A1 2.6.9 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EPGBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.9, Tables 2.6.9-1 and 2.6.9-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.9-1, 2.6.9-2, 2.6.9-3, and 2.6.9-4.

An inspection of the as-built EPGBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EPGBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.9, Tables 2.6.9-1 and 2.6.9-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.9-1, 2.6.9-2, 2.6.9-3, and 2.6.9-4.

925


A3b 2.6.9 2.3 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the EPGBVS as listed in Table 2.6.9-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.9-1 through Figure 2.6.9-4.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built EPGBVS are located in separate EPGBs.

The divisions of the EPGBVS are located in separate EPGBs as listed in Table 2.6.9-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.9-1 through Figure 2.6.9-4.

269 2.3 add reference to Figures 2.6.9.1 - 2.6.9.4 927


196


M15 2.6.9 3.2 Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.9-2 will function to change position as listed in 2.6.9-1 under normal operating conditions.


Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.9-2 change position as listed in 2.6.9-1 under normal operating conditions.

929











931





932

M12 2.6.9 3.6 Equipment listed in Table 2.6.9-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated, installed, inspected,. and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.



933


197












935




936

E01 2.6.9 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.6.9-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.6.9-2 in a normal feed condition.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each normally aligned division.

The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.6.9-2.

937


S05a 2.6.9 6.1 The EPGBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the EPGB Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify EPGBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the EPGB Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the EPGBVS fans will

a. Each EPGBVS cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the EPGB Buildings.

b. Each EPGBVS fan is capable of

274 6.1 AC (a) : Each as-built EPGBVS cooling coil provides design cooling capacity while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the EPGB Buildings.


939


198

be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

A1 2.6.13 2.1 The functional arrangement of the ESWPBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.13, Tables 2.6.13-1 and 2.6.13-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.13-1.

An inspection of the as-built ESWPBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The ESWPBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.13, Tables 2.6.13-1 and 2.6.13-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.13-1.

940


A3b 2.6.13 2.3 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the ESWPBVS located in separate ESWPBs as listed in Table 2.6.13-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.13-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built ESWPBVS are located in separate ESWPBs.

The divisions of the ESWPBVS are located in separate ESWPBs as listed in Table 2.6.13-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.13-1.


942





944







z 2.6.13 3.4 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table Deleted.An analysis will be Deleted.ASME AG-1 Code Design 277 ITAAC deleted at Public Meeting on April 4-5, 946


199

2.6.13-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are designed in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

performed of ASME AG-1 Code Design Verification Reports.

Verification Reports (AA-4400) conclude that the design of equipment listed as ASME AG-1 Code in Table 2.6.13-1 complies with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

2013.





947




948












950

I22 2.6.13 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.6.13-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by


Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.6.13-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output

951


200

terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.




952

S05a 2.6.13 6.1 The ESWPBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the ESWPBs, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify ESWPBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the ESWPBs, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the ESWPBVS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each ESWPBVS safety-related cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the ESWPBs.

b. Each ESWPBVS safety-related fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

280 6.1 AC (a) : Each as-built ESWPBVS safety-related cooling coil provides design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the ESWPBs.


953

A1 2.7.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CCWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1, Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built CCWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CCWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1, Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.

954


A3a 2.7.1 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the CCWS located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.7.1-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built divisions of the CCWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the CCWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.7.1-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.


956

M16 2.7.1 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table 2.7.1-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and





201

including design basis accident conditions.




958


















202





Class 1 is not applicable to CCW system IAW Tier 2. Delete Class 1 from the ITAAC

970





General Comment 6

Missing components in the CW . Class 1 is not applicable to CCW system IAW Tier 2. Delete Class 1 from the ITAAC.

There is a typo in the CW - missing the word 'components'.

971





Class 1 is not applicable to CCW system IAW Tier 2 - delete Class 1 from the ITAAC

972






973






974




b. Displays listed in Table 2.7.1-2 are



203









976




977

I20 2.7.1 4.4 An interlock for the CCWS low flow condition automatically opens the LHSI/RHR HX inlet valve.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically opens the LHSI/RHR HX inlet valve on a CCWS low flow condition.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • CCWS low flow condition

automatically opens the LHSI/RHR HX inlet valve.

978

I20 2.7.1 4.5 An interlock for the CCWS surge tank level of MIN3 automatically isolates the associated train common header switchover valves.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically isolates the associated train common header switchover valves on a CCWS surge tank level of MIN3.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • CCWS surge tank level of MIN3

automatically isolates the associated train common header switchover valves.

979

I20 2.7.1 4.6 An interlock for the CCWS surge tank level of MIN4 automatically trips the associated CCWS pump and unlocks the common header switchover

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically trips the associated CCWS pump and unlocks the

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • CCWS surge tank level MIN4

980


204

function to allow restoration of flow to the common users.

common header switchover function to allow restoration of flow to the common users on a CCWS surge tank level of MIN4.

automatically trips the associated CCWS pump.

• CCWS surge tank level MIN4 automatically unlocks the common header switchover sequence. This interlock to be verified by performing a switchover function to allow restoration of flow to the common users.

I20 2.7.1 4.7 An interlock for the CCWS low surge tank level of MIN2 and when the supply flow rate to the NAB and the RWB is greater than the flow rate from NAB and RWB automatically isolates the non-safety-related branch.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically isolates the non-safety-related branch on a CCWS low surge tank level of MIN2 and when the supply flow rate to the NAB and the RWB is greater than the flow rate from NAB and RWB.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • A CCWS low surge tank level of MIN2

and the supply flow rate to NAB and RWB is greater than the flow rate from NAB and RWB automatically isolates the non-safety-related branch.

981

I20 2.7.1 4.8 An interlock for the loss of one CCWS train automatically initiates a switchover to allow cooling of the common “a” and/or “b” headers.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically initiates a switchover to allow cooling of the common “a” and/or “b” headers on loss of one CCWS train.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Loss of one CCWS train automatically

initiates a switchover to allow cooling of the common “a” and/or “b” headers.

982


I20 2.7.1 4.10 An interlock for the CCWS train separation to RCP thermal barriers requires CIVs associated with one common header to be closed before the other common header CIVs can be opened.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically initiates the operation of the following interlocks: • Thermal barrier CIVs associated

with common header 1 will not open while CIVs associated with common header 2 are opened and vice versa.

• Thermal barrier CIVs associated with common header 1 will open when CIVs associated with common header 2 are closed and vice versa.

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Thermal barrier CIVs associated with

common header 1 will not open while CIVs associated with common header 2 are opened and vice versa.


Clarify the ITA wording. "--- the interlock automatically initiates the following:"

984


205

I20 2.7.1 4.11 An interlock for the manual or automatic actuation of a CCWS pump automatically actuates the corresponding ESWS pump.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically actuates the corresponding ESWS pump on manual or automatic actuation of a CCWS pump.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Manual or automatic actuation of a

CCWS pump automatically actuates the corresponding ESWS pump.

985

I21 2.7.1 4.12 Upon receipt of an SIS actuation signal, interlocks initiate the following:• Start operable CCWS pumps, if not

previously running. • Open LHSI HX isolation valves. • Open LHSI pump seal cooler

isolation valves. • Close isolation valves for

non-safety-related users outside of the Reactor Building.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of an SIS actuation signal, interlocks initiate the following: • Start operable CCWS pumps, if

not previously running. • Open LHSI HX isolation valves. • Open LHSI pump seal cooler



The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by an SIS actuation signal test input signal: • CCWS operable pumps start (if not

previously running). • LHSI HX isolation valves open. • LHSI pump seal cooler isolation valves

open. • Isolation valves for non-safety-related

users outside of Reactor Building close.

986

I20 2.7.1 4.13 An interlock for the CCWS train to maintain cooling to the RCP thermal barriers requires opening the CIVs associated with the closed common header, when a CIV on the opened common header is closed.


with the closed common header 1 will open when a CIV on the opened common header 2 closes.

• Thermal barrier CIVs associated with the closed common header 2 will open when a CIV on the opened common header 1 closes.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Thermal barrier CIVs associated with

the closed common header 1 will open when a CIV on the opened common header 2 closes.


290 4.13 Clarify the ITA wording. "--- the interlock automatically initiates the following:"

987





b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment

988


206

identified in Table 2.7.1-2. S07 2.7.1 5.2 Hydraulic and motor operated valves

listed in Table 2.7.1-2 fail as shown in Table 2.7.1-2 is on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that hydraulic and motor operated valves listed in Table 2.7.1-2 fail as shown in Table 2.7.1-2 is on loss of power.

Following loss of power, hydraulic and motor operated valves listed in Table 2.7.1-2 fail as shown in Table 2.7.1-2is.

291 5.2 Do all hydraulic valves in Table 2.7.1-2 fails as is? It was our understanding KAB 80AA015, 16, and 19 and KAB 50AA001, 4, and 6 fail closed. (See related RAI)

A new column will be added to Table 2.7.1-2 to list valve failure position on loss of power. KAB80 AA015/016/019 and KAB50 AA001/004/006 fail closed on loss of power.

KAA10/20/30/40 AA006/010/032/033 fail as-is on loss of power.


989







S03 2.7.1 7.1 Each CCWS heat exchanger listed in Tests and analyses will be performed a. Each CCWS heat exchanger listed in 293 7.1 The AC is confusing. Is the 10% additional 991


207

Table 2.7.1-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the ESWS.

to verify the capability of the CCWS heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the ESWS.

Table 2.7.1-1 has the capacity to transfer the a heat load of greater than or equal to 293.35 E+06 BTU/hr to the ESWS.

b. Each CCWS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.7.1-1 has a heat transfer area that includeswith a minimum additional margin of 10% above the specified 10% tube plugging allowance to the ESWS.

margin with respect to additional tube plugging or heat load removal ability? What purpose does the specified heat load value provide?

S02 2.7.1 7.2 The pumps listed in Table 2.7.1-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum surge tank level.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify pump NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum surge tank level.

The pumps listed in Table 2.7.1-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum surge tank level.


S12c 2.7.1 7.3 The CCWS delivers water to the LHSI/RHRS heat exchangers to provide cooling.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the LHSI/RHRS heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 2.1906 x 106 lbm/hr to each LHSI/RHR train 1 and 4 heat exchangers and 2.984 x 106 lbm/hr to LHSI/RHR train 2 and 3 heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

294 7.3 Why is the AC value of 2.19 x 106 lb/hr less than stated in Tier 2?

Updated to match Tier 2 Table 9.2.2-2.

993

S12c 2.7.1 7.4 The CCWS delivers water to the RCP thermal barrier coolers at the required flow from Common 1.b header and also from Common 2.b header.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the thermal barrier coolers from Common 1.b header and also from Common 2.b header under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 0.0792 x 106 lbm/hr to the thermal barrier coolers from Common 1.b header and also from Common 2.b header under normal operating conditions.

994

S12c 2.7.1 7.5 The CCWS delivers water to Divisions 2 and 3 SCWS chiller heat exchangers.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the Divisions 2 and 3 SCWS chiller heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 0.514 x 106 lbm/hr to the Divisions 2 and 3 SCWS chiller heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

995

S12c 2.7.1 7.6 The CCWS delivers water to the spent fuel pool heat exchangers.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 0.8818 x 106 lbm/hr to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

996




997

S04 2.7.1 7.8 The CCWS has provisions to allow Tests will be performed to verify the Normal system alignment allows flow 998


208

flow testing of each CCWS pump during plant operation.

CCWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each CCWS pump during plant operation.

testing of each CCWS pump during plant operation.


S10 2.7.1 7.10 The CCWS surge tanks provide adequate capacity for normal system operation.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built CCWS surge tank capacity.

The CCWS surge tank capacity is equal to or greater than 950 ft3.

1000

S10 2.7.1 7.11 Each CCWS surge tank maintains a reserve volume of 750 gallons to accommodate potential total system leakage of 4 gallons per hour for seven days of continuous operation with no makeup source available.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to determine the total train leakage for each CCWS train.verify that each as-built CCWS surge tank maintains a reserve volume to accommodate system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

CCWS surge tank reserve volume of 750 gallons accommodates worst case total train leakage of less than or equal to 4 gph for seven days with no makeup source available. A report exists and concludes that the worst case leakage between trains is less than or equal to 4 gph assuming one train is running with its associated A/B switchover valves open and the opposite train depressurized. Testing to support this report should be performed with one train in standby and one train running with its associated A/B switchover valves open. This test should be performed on all four CCWS trains.

295 7.11 The ITAAC as currently written does not accomplish the intended purpose. Please revert to wording used in FSAR Revision 3 and incorporate the following change into the AC.

"A report exists and concludes that the worst case leakage from the operating train is less than or equal to 4 gph ---"

1001

A1 2.7.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SCWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.2, Tables 2.7.2-1, and 2.7.2-2, 2.7.2-3, and 2.7.2-4, and as shown on Figures 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-2.

An inspection of the as-built SCWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SCWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.2, Tables 2.7.2-1, and 2.7.2-2, 2.7.2-3, and 2.7.2-4, and as shown on Figures 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-2.

1002


A3a 2.7.2 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the SCWS located in the Safeguard Buildings, excluding cross-connected piping, as listed in Table 2.7.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.2-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SCWS, excluding cross-connected piping, are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SCWS, excluding cross-connected piping, are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.7.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.2-1.


1004

M16 2.7.2 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table 2.7.2-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and

Tests or type tests of pumps and valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and

A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table 2.7.2-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a



209

valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.




1006

M13 2.7.2 3.3 Check dampers listed in Table 2.7.2-3 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.7.2-3 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of check dampers to change position under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

The check dampers listed in Table 2.7.2-3 change position as listed in Table 2.7.2-3 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

1007

M01 2.7.2 3.4 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.7.2-1.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.7.2-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.






210












Class 1 and 2 are not applicable to SCWs system IAW Tier 2, delete Class 1 from the ITAAC

1018





General Comment 6

Class 1 and 2 are not applicable to CCW system IAW Tier 2, delete Class 1 from the ITAAC

1019






1020






1021

M04 2.7.2 3.18 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 An inspection of the as-built ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that 303 3.18 General Comment 2 1022


211


construction activities and documentation for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be conducted.

conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.7.2-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.





1023












1025




1026

I20 2.7.2 4.4 An interlock for the SCWS Division 1 and 2 or Division 3 and 4 cross-tied

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test

1027


212

condition automatically starts the non-running division chiller and pump(s) if the running division chiller or pump(s) trip.

automatically starts the non-running division chiller and pump(s) if the running division chiller or pump(s) trip when the SCWS Division 1 and 2 or Division 3 and 4 are cross-tied.

input signal: • With SCWS Division 1 and 2 or

Division 3 and 4 cross-tied, the non-running division chiller and pump(s) automatically start if the running division chiller or pumps(s) trip.






1028









213

requirements. S03 2.7.2 7.1 Each SCWS chiller refrigerating unit

has the capacity to provide chilled water at the temperature to support the heat removal requirements of each user.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the SCWS chiller refrigerating units heat exchangers to provide chilled water at the temperature to support the heat removal requirements of each user.

Each SCWS chiller refrigerating unit provides chilled water at a temperature of less than or equal to 41°F to support the heat removal requirements of each user.

306 7.1 Add a tolerance to the AC.

The CW, ITA, and AC are not aligned

1031

S02 2.7.2 7.2 The pumps listed in Table 2.7.2-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum expansion tank level.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify pump NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum expansion tank level.

The pumps listed in Table 2.7.2-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum expansion tank level.


S12c 2.7.2 7.3 The SCWS pump delivers water to the equipment listed in Table 2.7.2-1.

Tests will be performed to determine the SCWS pump flowrate to the equipment listed in Table 2.7.2-1 under normal operating conditions.

The Each SCWS pump delivers a minimum flow of 565 gpm to provide cooling to the equipment listed in Table 2.7.2-1 under normal operating conditions.

307 7.3 Clarify the AC to indicate that the flow is the total pump flow - it's not the flow to each component. Example wording..."Each SCWS pump delivers a minimum flow rate of 565 gpm to provide cooling to the equipment listed ..."

1033




1034

S04 2.7.2 7.5 The SCWS has provisions to allow full flow testing of each SCWS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify the SCWS has provisions to allow flow testing of the SCWS pumps during plant operation.

The flow test line allows full flow testing of each SCWS pump through the recirculation loop back to the pump suction.

1035

S10 2.7.2 7.6 Each SCWS expansion tank maintains a reserve volume to accommodate system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify that each as-built SCWS expansion tank maintains a reserve volume to accommodate system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

SCWS expansion tank maintains a reserve volume of 100 gallons to accommodates worst case total train system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

308 7.6 The ITAAC as currently written does not accomplish the intended purpose. Please revert to wording used in Revision 3.

1036





214














A2 2.7.5 4.4 The location of the FWDS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis will be performed to determine the location of the FWDS equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the location of the as-built FDWS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis determines the location of the FWDS equipment.

b. The FWDS equipment is located consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

1053




S10 2.7.5 7.1 The FWDS includes two separate fire water storage tanks.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built capacity of the fire water storage tanks.

The capacity of each of the two fire water storage tanks is greater than or equal to 300,000 gallons.

1057

S14 2.7.5 7.2 The FWDS pumps consist of at least one 100% capacity electric

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built FWDS

a. The FWDS consists of at least one 100% capacity electric motor-driven

310 7.2 Modify the CW to reflect the design specified in Tier 2 which states the FWDS contains

1058


215

motor-driven pump and one two 100% capacity diesel engine-driven pumps that provide 100% capacity assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power.

consists of at least one 100% capacity electric motor-driven pump and one two 100% capacity diesel engine-driven pumps.

b. An analysis test will be performed to verify that one as-builteach FWDS diesel and one electric pump provides 100% of the required flow capacity assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power.

pump and one two 100% capacity diesel engine-driven pumps.

b. A report concludes that one diesel and one electric each FWDS pump provides 100% of the required flow capacity assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power.

three 100% capacity pumps - two diesel driven pumps and one electric pump. Delete from "assuming failure ---." to the end in the CW, ITA, and AC and then modify the ITA and AC accordingly. Add testing to part b and specify that each pump is capable of providing 100% of the required flow capacity as determined by analysis.

S02 2.7.5 7.3 FWDS pumps have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.


The FWDS pumps have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.



S04 2.7.5 7.5 The FWDS has provisions to allow flow testing of the FWDS pumps during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify FWDS has provisions to allow flow testing of the FWDS pumps during plant operation.

A flow test line allows flow testing of each FWDS pump during plant operation.

1061


S13 2.7.5 7.7 The standpipe and hose systems in areas containing systems and components required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a SSE, including the water supply to these standpipes, are capable of remaining functional and supplying two hose stations following an SSE.

An analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the as-built standpipe and hose systems in areas containing systems and components required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a SSE to remain functional and supply two hose stations following a SSE.

An analysis concludes the FWDS will remain functional following a SSE and is capable of supplying the two hydraulically most remote hose stations with at least 75 gpm per hose stream.

311 7.7 Please reword the ITAAC for clarity.

No change

1063

A1 2.7.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the GFES is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.6.

An inspection of the as-built GFES functional arrangement will be performed.

The GFES conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.6.

1064




A2 2.7.6 3.4 The location of the GFES equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis will be performed to

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis determines the location of the GFES

1068


216

shutdown analysis. determine the location of the GFES equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the location of the as-built GFES equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

equipment. b. The GFES equipment is located

consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

I28 2.7.6 4.1 The GFES provides the required suppression agent concentration within the required discharge timeframe and maintain the concentration for a period of time within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure for flame extinguishment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required suppression agent concentration for the GFES within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure for flame extinguishment.

b. Tests, analyses, or combination of tests and analyses will be performed to determine the GFES suppression agent concentration level and discharge times.

c. Tests, analyses, or combination of tests and analyses will be performed to determine the time the suppression agent concentration can be maintained.

a. A report determines the required suppression agent concentration for the GFES within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure for flame extinguishment.

b. The discharge time for the GFES required to achieve 95 percent of the minimum suppression agent concentration for flame extinguishment based on a 20 percent safety factor is a maximum of 10 seconds.

c. The suppression agent concentration for the GFES within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure is maintained for at least 15 minutes.

1069


A1 2.7.11 2.1 The functional arrangement of the ESWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.11, Tables 2.7.11-1 and 2.7.11-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.

An inspection of the as-built ESWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The ESWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.11, Tables 2.7.11-1 and 2.7.11-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.

1071


A3a 2.7.11 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the ESWS as listed in Table 2.7.11-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the ESWS are located in separate ESWS and Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the ESWS are located in separate ESWS and Safeguard Buildings aslisted in Table 2.7.11-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.


1073



M16 2.7.11 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table Tests or type tests of pumps and A report concludes that the pumps and 312 3.1 General Comment 3 1076


217

2.7.11-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

valves listed in Table 2.7.11-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.




1077










ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table


Class 1 and 2 are not applicable to ESWS system IAW Tier 2, delete Class 1 from the ITAAC

1080


218

2.7.11-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}





General Comment 6


1081






1082






1083






1084









219


M01 2.7.11 3.18 The UHS fans are capable of withstanding the effects of tornado including differential pressure effects, overspeed, and the impact of differential pressure effects on other equipment located within the cooling tower structure (e.g., capability to function, potential to become missile/debris hazard).

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the UHS fans using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the tornado design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built UHS fans to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the UHS fans can withstand tornado design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the UHS fans, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.













1095




1096


220



I20 2.7.11 4.4 An interlock for failure of one ESWS pump during normal operation results in a switchover to the other ESWS train and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically initiates the CCWS Switchover sequence on failure of one ESWS pump during normal operation which results in a switchover to the other ESWS train.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • If one ESWS pump fails during normal

operation, a switchover to the other ESWS train is carried out and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

1097

I20 2.7.11 4.5 An interlock for a spurious closure of the ESWS pump discharge valve results in a switchover to the other ESWS train and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically initiates the CCWS Switchover sequence on a spurious closure of the ESWS pump discharge valve which results in a switchover to the other ESWS train.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • A spurious closure of the ESWS pump

discharge valve results in a switchover to the other ESWS train and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

1098








1101



S12 2.7.11 5.4 Equipment identified as “Dedicated” ESWS motor-operated equipment (including Division 4 cooling tower fans) in Table 2.7.11-2 are capable of being powered by a SBODG.

Testing will be performed for equipment identified as “Dedicated” ESWS motor-operated equipment (including Division 4 cooling tower fans) in Table 2.7.11-2 by providing

The test input signal provided from the SBODG is present at the equipment identified as “Dedicated” ESWS motor-operated equipment (including Division 4 cooling tower fans) in Table

1104


221

a test input signal from an SBODG. 2.7.11-2. z 2.7.11 6.1 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 1105

S03 2.7.11 7.1 Each ESWS UHS as listed in Table 2.7.11-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load from the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers, and the ESWPBVS room coolers, and the ESW pump mechanical room.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the ESWS UHS to transfer the design heat load from the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers, and the ESWPBVS room coolers, and the ESW pump mechanical room.

Each ESWS UHS as listed in Table 2.7.11-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load from the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers, and the ESWPBVS room coolers, and the ESW pump mechanical room.

321 7.1 Cooler should be plural. Delete "and the ESW pump mechanical room." From end of the CW, ITA, and AC and add "and" in the appropriate spot to accommodate the change.

1106

S02 2.7.11 7.2 The pumps listed in Table 2.7.11-1 have sufficient NPSHA at the minimum cooling tower basin level.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify pump NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum cooling tower basin level.

A report exists and concludes that The the pumps listed in Table 2.7.11-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at the the maximum ESWS flow rate with consideration for minimum allowable cooling tower basin water level (as corrected to account for vortex effects and actual temperature and atmospheric conditions).minimum cooling tower basin level.

322 7.2 Delete "that" in 3rd line of the ITA. Why was water temperature removed from the ITAAC? Revert to Rev. 3.

1107




1108

S04 2.7.11 7.4 The ESWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each ESWS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify ESWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each ESWS pump during plant operation.

The closed loop allows ESWS pump flow back to the ESW cooling tower basin during plant operation.

1109


S12c 2.7.11 7.6 The ESWS pump delivers water to the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers and the ESWPBVS room coolers.

Tests will be performed to determine the ESWS pump flowrate to the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers and the ESWPBVS room coolers.

The ESWS pump delivers water at greater than or equal to the Normal Flow Rate for the ESW pump to the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers and the ESWPBVS room coolers within 120 seconds after receipt of a start signal from the PACS module.

323 7.6 Cooler should be plural. The current ITAAC omits the timing requirement of 120 seconds.

1111

S12 2.7.11 7.7 The ESWS debris filters listed in Table 2.7.11-1 function to backwash upon high differential pressure.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the ESWS debris filters function to backwash on high differential pressure.

The filters initiate backwash flow to filter blowdown on high differential pressure.

1112


222

S11 2.7.11 7.8 The inlet between the cooling tower basin and pump intake structure has a coarse and a fine debris screen for each ESW pump.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the installation of as-built coarse and as-built fine debris screen at the inlet between the cooling tower basin and pump intake structure for each ESW pump.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built debris screens.

a. A coarse and a fine debris screen is installed at the inlet between the cooling tower basin and pump intake structure for each ESW pump.

b. The coarse debris screen has a maximum mesh grid opening of 2 x 2 inches. The fine debris screen has a maximum mesh grid opening of 0.5 x 0.5 inches.

1113

S03 2.7.11 7.9 The UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load without exceeding the maximum design temperature limit for ESWS.

Tests and analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses, will be performed to demonstrate that the UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design basis heat load without exceeding the maximum design temperature limit for ESWS.

A report concludes that the UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load for a minimum of 30 days following a design basis accident, assuming the most limiting design conditions of heat removal and assuming worst-case (or most limiting) site-specific meteorological conditions (including the effects of concentrating impurities on the ESWS), without exceeding the maximum design temperature limit for ESWS.

1114

S03 2.7.11 7.10 The UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load without water level dropping below the minimum design level in the cooling tower basin.

Tests and analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses, will be performed to demonstrate that the UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load without water level dropping below the minimum design level in the cooling tower basin.

A report concludes that the UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load for a minimum of 30 days following a design basis accident, assuming the most limiting design conditions for water usage and assuming worst-case (or most limiting) site-specific meteorological conditions (including the effects of concentrating impurities on the ESWS), without water level dropping below the minimum design level in the cooling tower basin.

1115

S10 2.7.11 7.11 The cooling tower basin is sized for the minimum basin water volume.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the size of the as-built cooling tower basin is capable of holding the minimum basin water volume.

The cooling tower basin size is capable of holding the minimum basin water volume.

1116


223

A1 2.8.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the turbine generator system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.1, Tables 2.8.1-1 and 2.8.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built turbine generator system functional arrangement will be performed.

The turbine generator system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.1, Tables 2.8.1-1 and 2.8.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.1-1.

1117

S11 2.8.1 2.2 The axis of the turbine rotor shafts is positioned favorable to the Reactor Building and other essential such that safety-related structures, except for two of the four Essential Service Water Buildings and the two Emergency Power Generating Buildings, such that the safety-related structures are located outside the turbine missile low trajectory hazard zone. The low-trajectory hazard zone is defined as an area bounded by lines that are inclined at 25 degrees to the turbine wheel planes and pass through the end wheels of the low pressure stages.

An inspection of the as-built as-built location of the axis of the turbine rotor shafts, with respect to will be performed to verify that safety-related structures will be performed., except for two of the four Essential Service Water Buildings and two of the four Emergency Power Generating Buildings, are located outside the turbine low trajectory hazard zone.

Safety-related structures, except for two of the four Essential Service Water Buildings and the two Emergency Power Generating Buildings, are located outside the turbine missile low trajectory hazard zone.

Since the inspection is based on the as-built turbine, why was “as-built” deleted from Tier 1, Table 2.8.1-3, Item 2.2?

“as-built” added back

1118


S13 2.8.1 2.4 Turbine rotor integrity is provided through the combined use of selected materials with suitable toughness, analyses, testing, and inspections.

A plant-specific analysis will be conducted of the as-built turbine rotor material property data, turbine rotor and blade design, and inspection and testing requirements.

An analysis A report exists and concludes that the as-built turbine rotor plant specific turbine rotor meets the requirements of the manufacturer’s turbine missile probability analysis: 1. Turbine material property data, rotor

and blade design analyses (including loading combinations, assumptions and warm-up time) demonstrating safety margin to withstand loadings from overspeed events, and

2. The results of inspection and testing, and the requirements for inservice inspection and testing.

324 2.4 Modify the AC as follows: "A report exists and concludes the as-built turbine rotor integrity is provided through the combined use of selected materials with suitable toughness, analyses, testing, and inspections which meet the requirements of the manufacturer's turbine missile probability analysis:

1120

S13 2.8.1 2.5 The probability of turbine material and overspeed related failures resulting in external turbine missiles is < less than

A material and overspeed failures analysis will be performed on the as-built turbine design.

An analysis concludes that the probability of turbine material and overspeed related failures resulting in external turbine

1121


224

1x10-54 per turbine year. missiles is < less than 1x10-54 per turbine year.

I05 2.8.1 3.1 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR trip the turbine-generator.


Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR trip the turbine-generator.

1122

I28 2.8.1 3.2 The turbine generator has diverse and independent overspeed protection systems.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed on the as-built overspeed protection systems to verify that the turbine generator has diverse and independent overspeed protection systems.

b. Tests will be performed to verify the overspeed and backup overspeed protection systems trip the turbine within design limits.

a. A report concludes that the turbine overspeed protection systems are diverse and independent by verifying: − Each system is designed and

manufactured by a different vendor. − Software used to transform the

analog speed signal into a digital signal is diverse between the two systems.

− Components, process inputs and process outputs are not shared between the two systems.

− The two systems are installed in separate cabinets.

− The two systems are powered by separate power sources.

b. Overspeed and backup overspeed turbine trips occur within the design limits for the systems listed in Table 2.8.1-2.

1123

S07 2.8.1 4.1 Turbine stop valves and turbine control valves as listed in Table 2.8.1-1 fail closed on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that turbine stop valves and turbine control valves fail closed on loss of power.

Following loss of power, turbine stop valves and turbine control valves as listed in Table 2.8.1-1 fail closed.

1124

A1 2.8.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the MSS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.2, Tables 2.8.2-1 and 2.8.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.2-1.

An inspection of the as-built MSS functional arrangement will be performed.

The MSS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.2, Tables 2.8.2-1 and 2.8.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.2-1.

1125


A3a 2.8.2 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the safety-related portions of the MSS as listed in Table 2.8.2-

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built safety-related portions of the MSS are located in

The divisions of the safety-related portions of the MSS are located in separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4 as



225

1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23, 2.1.1-24, 2.1.1-36, and 2.1.1-37.

separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4.

listed in Table 2.8.2-1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23, 2.1.1-24, 2.1.1-36, and 2.1.1-37.














ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 2.8.2-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

General Comment 2.

1131


226

{{DAC}} M03 2.8.2 3.5 As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3

components listed in Table 2.8.2-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.



General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1132





















b. Displays listed in Table 2.8.2-2 are indicated on the PICS operator



227



workstations in the RSS.






1142




1143






1144

S07 2.8.2 5.2 Each main steam relief isolation valve fails closed on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each main steam relief isolation valve fails closed on loss of power.

Following loss of power, each main steam relief isolation valve fails closed.

1145

S07 2.8.2 5.3 Each MSIV fails closed on loss of hydraulic pressure or loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each MSIV fails closed on loss of hydraulic pressure or loss of power.

Following loss of hydraulic pressure or loss of power, each MSIV fails closed.

1146

S07 2.8.2 5.4 Each turbine bypass valve fails closed on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each turbine bypass valve fails closed

Following loss of power, each turbine bypass valve fails closed.

1147


228

on loss of power. S07 2.8.2 5.5 Each main steam relief control valve

fails as-is on loss of power. Tests will be performed to verify that each main steam relief control valve fails as-is on loss of power.

Following loss of power, each main steam relief control valve fails as-is.

1148










1150

S06 2.8.2 7.2 Each of the two MSSVs per main steam line provides relief capacity for the main steam system.

Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity of the two MSSVs per main steam line.

Each MSSV provides relief capacity ≥ 1,422,073 lbm/hr. The MSSV on the main steam line with the lower pressure setting delivers that rated capacity at ≤ 1504 psig. The MSSV on the main steam line with the higher pressure setting delivers that rated capacity at ≤ 1535 psig.

1151


229

S06 2.8.2 7.3 MSRTs provide relief capacity. Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity of the MSRTs.

Each MSRT provides relief capacity ≥ 2,844,146 lbm/hr at valve inlet static pressure of 1370 psig. With pressure measurement uncertainty of 30 psi, the maximum relieving pressure is 1400 psig.

1152

S12 2.8.2 7.4 Each MSRIV per main steam line opens upon receipt of a signal.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a test input signal, each MSRIV per main steam line opens.

Each MSRIV opens within 1.8 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

1153

S12 2.8.2 7.5 Each MSIV per main steam line closes upon receipt of a signal.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a test input signal, each MSIV per main steam line closes.

Each MSIV closes within 5 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

1154


S12 2.8.2 7.7 Upon safety injection actuation, the MSRT controls secondary system cooldown at a pre-defined rate.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test input signal, the MSRT controls secondary system cooldown at a pre-defined rate.

The MSRT pressure control set-point is ramped from 1414.7 psia to 900 psia within 19 minutes.

1156

A1 2.8.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the MFWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.6, Tables 2.8.6-1 and 2.8.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.6-1.

An inspection of the as-built MFWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The MFWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.6, Tables 2.8.6-1 and 2.8.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.6-1.

1157


A3a 2.8.6 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the safety-related portions of MFWS as listed in Table 2.8.6-1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23 and 2.1.1-36.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built safety-related portions of the MFWS are located in separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4.

The divisions of the safety-related portions of the MFWS are located in separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4 as listed in Table 2.8.6-1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23 and 2.1.1-36.

add reference to Figures

Figure 2.1.1-24 & 2.1.1-37 will be revised to delete reference to MFWS.

1159

M16 2.8.6 3.1 Valves listed in Table 2.8.6-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid


A report concludes that the valves listed in Table 2.8.6-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature



230

flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.





1161











General Comment 2. 1164




General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1165


231

Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.8.6-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.




















b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.8.6-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS





232

by using test input signals inputs to PICS.




1175




1176






1177

S07 2.8.6 5.2 The MFWFLIVs fail closed on loss of hydraulic pressure in each redundant dump line.

Tests will be performed to verify that the MFWFLIVs fail closed on loss of hydraulic pressure in each redundant dump line.

Following loss of hydraulic pressure in each redundant dump line, the MFWFLIVs fail closed.

1178



a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.8.6-2 to perform the function listed in Table 2.8.6-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and


b. A report exists and concludes



233



Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.8.6-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.




1181

A1 2.8.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SGBS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.7, Tables 2.8.7-1 and 2.8.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.7-1.

An inspection of the as-built SGBS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SGBS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.7, Tables 2.8.7-1 and 2.8.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.7-1.

1182



Tests or type tests of valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.



M17 2.8.7 3.2 Equipment identified as RW-IIc in Table 2.8.7-1 can withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built equipment identified as RW-IIc in

A report concludes that the equipment identified as RW-IIc in Table 2.8.7-1 will withstand design basis loads listed in

1185


234

1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

Table 2.8.7-1 will withstand design basis loads.Deleted.

Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.














General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1188

M05 2.8.7 3.6 Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.8.7-1 meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive


ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code



235

examination requirements. Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.8.7-1.

























1198


236




1199

I21 2.8.7 4.4 ITAAC to be submitted in Response to RAI 527, Question 14.03.07-38 by June 21, 2013.

336 4.4 Typo in the AC 4th line - should be "SG valves" at end of line

1200






1201




b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.8.7-2 to verify that the


b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.8.7-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type



237

equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.




1204


A1 2.8.9 2.1 ITAAC to be submitted in Response to RAI 527, Question 14.03.07-38 by June 21, 2013.

1206


1207

A1 2.9.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the LWMS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.1, and Tables 2.9.1-1 and 2.9.1-2.

An inspection of the as-built LWMS functional arrangement will be performed.

The LWMS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.1, and Tables 2.9.1-1 and 2.9.1-2.

1208


Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.9.1-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

Displays listed in Table 2.9.1-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I05 2.9.1 3.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in the MCR as listed in Table 2.9.1-2.



1210

S14 2.9.1 4.1 The LWMS processing equipment contains the proper types and amounts of filter media or treatment media.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built LWMS processing equipment contains filter/treatment media capable of maintaining offsite doses to members of the public within 10

A report concludes that the LWMS processing equipment contains a minmum of 30 ft3 per ion exchange column of filter/treatment media capable of maintaining offsite doses to members of the public within 10 CFR 20 limits and

Add specific minimum quantity of filter/treatment media in lieu of referring to 10CFR20.

1211


238

CFR 20 limits and effluent concentrations below the annual average concentration limits of 10 CFR 20.

effluent concentrations below the annual average concentration limits of 10 CFR 20.


339 4.2 Eliminate "test input" in the ITA and AC. Replace 'PACS module' in the AC with 'activity monitors'. ITAAC should verify function is accomplished using low level rad signal to trip a reduced setpoint and then should verify LWMS discharge valve closure. CW can not be verified by using a low level rad signal. That is why a test signal was being used to simulate a high rad signal that can not be reproduced using a source.

1212

M17 2.9.1 4.4 Equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.1-1 can withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.1-1 will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.1-1 will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.

1213


340 Please add ITAAC to verify the LWMS discharge valves close upon receiving :

1) a low in-plant dilution flow rate signal and a high-radiation signal on the LWMS radioactive discharge line for the radiation monitors and discharge valves listed in Table 2.9.1-2

Will be addressed in RAI 528

2) a low in-plant dilution flow rate signal but no high-radiation signal on the LWMS radioactive discharge line for the radiation monitors and discharge valves listed in Table 2.9.1-2

1214

S10 2.9.2 2.1 The SWMS provides the non-safety related function of storing radioactive liquid and wet wastes in preparation and solids prior to storage and

An inspection and analysis will be performed of the as-built SWMS tanks to verify the nominal volumes of each of the SWMS tanks.

The nominal volume of each of the SWMS tanks is as follows: • Resin proportioning tank: 150 gal.

341 2.1 CW should state: "The SWMS provides the non-safety related function of storing radioactive liquid and wet wastes in preparation and prior to storage and

1215


239

shipment. • Concentrate buffer tank: 3000 gal. • Condensate collection tank: 150 gal. • Scrubber tank: 53 gal. the nominal value as listed in Table 2.9.2-1.

shipment."




1216

A1 2.9.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the GWPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.3, Tables 2.9.3-1 and 2.9.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.9.3-1.

An inspection of the as-built GWPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The GWPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.3, Tables 2.9.3-1 and 2.9.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.9.3-1.

1217


M17 2.9.3 3.1 Equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.3-1 can withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.3-1 will withstand design basis loads.Deleted.

A report concludes that the equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.3-1 will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

1219












Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.9.3-2

Displays listed in Table 2.9.3-2 are indicated on the PICS operator



240

workstations in the MCR. are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.





1231



S14 2.9.3 7.1 The GWPS processing equipment contains delay beds listed in Table 2.9.3-1 filled with activated charcoal.

Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify the as-built mass of activated charcoal loaded in each delay bed.

Each delay bed listed in Table 2.9.3-1 contains a minimum of 5,440 lbm of activated charcoal.

1234


343 7.2 Eliminate "test input" in the ITA and AC. Replace 'PACS module' in the AC with 'activity monitors'.

A high radiation signal cannot be generated in the activity monitor using a source. ITAAC should verify function is accomplished using low level rad signal to trip a reduced setpoint and verifying valve closure (See table 2.9.1-3 cITTAC 4.2 comment above). CW can not be verified by using a low level rad signal. That is why a test signal was being used to simulate a high rad signal that can not be reproduced using a source.

1235



1237



a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.9.4-1 using analytical assumptions, or under

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.9.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.9.4-1 including the



241

conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


time required to perform the listed function.



I04 2.9.4 4.2 Displays listed in Table 2.9.4-1 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.




z 2.9.4 4.3 Deleted.The Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

Deleted.An analysis will be performed to verify that the sensitivity of the as built Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

Deleted.A report concludes that the Reactor Building radiation monitor sensitivity of 3E-10 µCi/cc correlates to an ability to detect a leakage increase of 1 gpm.

ITAAC moved to Section 2.4.8 1242

E01 2.9.4 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.9.4-2 are powered from a Class 1E division in a normal or alternate feed condition.





1243


347 6.1 Please correct the ITA wording for clarity. 1244

A2 2.9.5 2.1 The location of the sump level sensors is as listed in Table 2.9.5-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built sump level sensors will be performed.

The sump level sensors listed in Table 2.9.5-1 are located as listed in Table 2.9.5-1.

1245


242





I20 2.9.5 3.2 An interlock for the sump level sensors in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.9.5-1 trips the ESWS pump and closes the pump discharge valve in response to a flooding signal in the respective Safeguard Building.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock for the sump level sensors automatically trips the ESWS pump and closes the pump discharge valve in response to a flooding signal in the respective Safeguard Building.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a flooding test input signal: • The sump level sensors in each of the

Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.9.5-1 trip the ESWS pump and close the pump discharge valve in response to a flooding signal in the respective Safeguard Building.

1247

S12 2.9.5 3.3 Containment sump level sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that Containment sump level sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Containment sump level sensors can detect a level increase of 0.5 gpm within one hour.

349 3.3 This ITAAC can not be performed using test input signals.

1248

E01 2.9.5 4.1 The sump level sensors designated as Class 1E in Table 2.9.5-1 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.9.5-1 in a normal feed condition.

Tests will be performed by providing a test input signal to the aligned Class 1E division.

The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the sump level sensors identified in Table 2.9.5-1.

1249

Q1 2.9.5 5.1 The sump level sensors listed in Table 2.9.5-1 designated as harsh environment can initiate an alarm in the MCR under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1 to initiate an alarm in the MCR under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1 to verify that the equipment, including the

a. EQDPs conclude that the sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1 can initiate an alarm in the MCR under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to initiate an alarm in the MCR.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type



243

associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


A2 2.10.1 2.1 The locations of the containment polar crane, and the FB auxiliary crane, the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist, and the SFCTF biological lid handling station are as listed in Table 2.10.1-1.

An inspection of location of the as-built containment polar crane, and the FB auxiliary crane, the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist, and the SFCTF biological lid handling station will be performed.

The containment polar crane, and the FB auxiliary crane, the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist, and the SFCTF biological lid handling station are located as listed in Table 2.10.1-1.

1251

M01 2.10.1 2.2 Non-Seismic Category I Eequipment identified in Table 2.10.1-1 will not impair the ability is designed to prohibit unacceptable interaction or failure of Seismic Category I SSC to perform their safety function(s).

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category II design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1 to verify that the components, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without impairing the ability of Seismic Category I SSC a loss of the function listed in Table 2.10.1-1, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.



S08 2.10.1 3.2 The containment polar crane main hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

An inspection of the as-built containment polar crane will be performed to verify that the main hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

The containment polar crane main hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

1254


244

S08 2.10.1 3.3 The FB auxiliary crane hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

An inspection of the as-built FB auxiliary crane will be performed to verify that the hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

The FB auxiliary crane hoist is equipped with a dual load path from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

1255

S08 2.10.1 3.4 The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the load attachment point to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

An inspection of the as-built cask loading penetration upper cover hoist will be performed to verify that the hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the load attachment point to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the load attachment point to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

1256

S08 2.10.1 3.5 The SFCTF biological lid handling station is provided with a load support mechanism (screw drive).

An inspection of the as-built SFCTF biological lid handling station will be performed to verify that the station is provided with a load support mechanism (screw drive).

The SFCTF biological lid handling station is provided with a load support mechanism (screw drive).

1257



S08 2.10.1 4.3 The containment polar crane main hoist is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the containment polar crane main hoist.

b. A full load test will be performed on the containment polar crane main hoist.

c. A no load test will be performed on the containment polar crane main hoist.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the containment polar crane.

a. Containment polar crane main hoist passes rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

b. Containment polar crane main hoist passes full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. Containment polar crane main hoist passes no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE non-destructive examination of welded structural connections of the containment polar crane comply with ASME NOG-1 requirements.

1260

S08 2.10.1 4.4 The FB auxiliary crane hoist is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the FB auxiliary crane hoist.

a. FB auxiliary crane hoist has passed rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

1261


245

b. A full load test will be performed on the FB auxiliary crane hoist.

c. A no load test will be performed on the FB auxiliary crane hoist.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the FB auxiliary crane.

b. FB auxiliary crane hoist has passed full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. FB auxiliary crane hoist has passed no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE non-destructive examination of welded structural connections of the FB auxiliary crane comply with ASME NOG-1 requirements.

S08 2.10.1 4.5 Special lifting devices and slings used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist for critical lifts have dual load paths or double safety factors.

a. An inspection will be performed on the on the as-built special lifting devices used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist to verify that they have dual load paths.

b. An inspection will be performed on the on the as-built slings used with the containment polar crane main hoist and FB auxiliary crane hoist to verify that they have double safety factors.

a. The special lifting devices used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist for critical lifts have dual load paths.

b. Slings used with used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist for critical lifts have double safety factors.

1262

S08 2.10.1 4.6 The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.Deleted.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist.

b. A full load test will be performed on the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist.

c. A no load test will be performed on the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist. Deleted.

a. The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist has passed rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

b. The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist has passed full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist has passed no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE of welded structural connections of the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist comply with ASME NOG-1

1263


246

requirements. Deleted. S08 2.10.1 4.7 The SFCTF biological lid handling

station is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

b. A full load test will be performed on the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

c. A no load test will be performed on the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

e. A load test will be performed by the vendor on the screw drive of the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

a. The SFCTF biological lid handling station has passed rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

b. The SFCTF biological lid handling station has passed full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. The SFCTF biological lid handling station has passed no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE of welded structural connections of the SFCTF biological lid handling station comply with ASME NOG-1 requirements.

e. The screw drive of the SFCTF biological handling station has passed a load test for 150% of the rated load.

1264

A1 3.5 2.1 The functional arrangement of the containment isolation equipment is as described in the Design Description of Section 3.5, and Tables 3.5-1, 3.5-2, and 3.5-3, and as shown on Figure 3.5-1.

An inspection of the as-built containment isolation equipment functional arrangement will be performed.

The containment isolation equipment conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 3.5, and Tables 3.5-1, 3.5-2, and 3.5-3, and as shown on Figure 3.5-1.

1265

z 3.5 2.2 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 1266

M16 3.5 3.1 Valves listed in Table 3.5-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.


A report concludes that the valves listed in Table 3.5-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.


M13 3.5 3.2 Check valves listed in Table 3.5-1 will function to change position as listed in

Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of check

The check valves change position as listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal operating

1268


247

Table 3.5-1 under normal operating conditions.

valves to change position under normal operating conditions.

conditions.


M01 3.5 3.4 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 3.5-1.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 3.5-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.









M02 3.5 3.12 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems and components listed in Table 3.5-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 3.5-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}



248

M03 3.5 3.13 As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.


ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1279

M05 3.5 3.14 Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.


ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1.


M06 3.5 3.15 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity at their design pressure.


ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.


M04 3.5 3.16 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


M18 3.5 3.17 Containment isolation valves outside the containment as listed in Table 3.5-3 are located as close to the containment penetrations as practical, consistent with General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57. with consideration of the following: • Access for inspection of welds. • Containment leak testing. • Replacement. Valve maintenance.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built location of outside containment isolation valves. {{DAC}}

A report concludes that the outside containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 are located as close to the containment penetrations as practical with consideration of the following: • Access for inspection of welds. • Containment leak testing. • Replacement. • Valve maintenance. {{DAC}}

1283

I04 3.5 4.1 Displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator


a. Displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator



249

workstations in the MCR and the RSS. 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

workstations in the MCR. b. Displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are


I05 3.5 4.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 3.5-2.


Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 3.5-2.

1285

I22 3.5 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 3.5-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.


Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 3.5-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

1286

E01 3.5 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 3.5-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 3.5-2 in a normal or alternate feed condition.



a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-2.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-2.

1287




E09b 3.5 5.5 Containment electrical penetrations are protected from fault currents that are greater than continuous current rating.

a. An analysis will be performed to verify that containment electrical penetrations are protected from fault currents that are greater than

a. Analysis concludes for electrical penetration assemblies that either maximum current through the containment electrical penetration does

1291


250

continuous current rating. b. An inspection will be performed

to verify that as-built containment electrical penetration assembly circuits have redundant in-series protection devices which are coordinated with the protected containment electrical penetration assembly’s rated short-circuit thermal capacity.

not exceed continuous current rating or the containment electrical penetration assembly circuits have redundant in-series protection devices which are coordinated with the protected containment electrical penetration assembly’s rated short-circuit thermal capacity, preventing the analyzed current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the associated containment electrical penetration.

b. Containment electrical penetration assembly circuits have redundant in-series protection devices which are coordinated with the protected containment electrical penetration assembly’s rated short-circuit thermal capacity.

Q1 3.5 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform the function listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to perform the function listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform the function listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.



251

installed per the approved design requirements.

Q1 3.5 6.2 Containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to perform their safety function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to verify that the containment electrical penetration assemblies, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

a. EQDPs conclude that the containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform their safety function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


M14 3.5 7.1 Class 1E valves listed in Table 3.5-2 will function to change position as listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal operating conditions.


Class 1E valves listed in Table 3.5-2 change position as listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal operating conditions.

1294

S01 3.5 7.2 Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to demonstrate the ability of the containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 to close within the valve closure time after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module.

1295


252

I14 3.6 2.1 Equipment markings for Class 1E divisions cables and raceways are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the Class 1E divisions cables and raceways.

An inspection will be performed on the as--built Class 1E divisions cables and raceways to verify that the equipment markings for each Class 1E division cable and raceway are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the Class 1E division cable and raceway.

Equipment markings for each Class 1E division cable and raceway are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the Class 1E division cable and raceway.

1296

A3c 3.6 2.2 Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between Class 1E divisions cables and raceways and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables and raceways.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that physical separation or electrical isolation exists between as-built Class 1E divisions cables and raceways and between as-built Class 1E divisions and as-built non-Class 1E cables and raceways.

Physical separation exists between raceways containing Class 1E cables of different divisions; and between raceways containing Class 1E cables and raceways containing non-Class 1E cables; or a combination of separation and barriers exists; or an analysis exists as follows: a. Within the MCR and RSS (non-hazard

area) the minimum separation distances meet one of the following criteria: • 1 in horizontally and 3 in

vertically. Vertical separation may be reduced to 1 in if the enclosed raceway is below an open raceway.

• Circuits routed in an enclosed-to-enclosed configuration the minimum separation is 1 in horizontally and vertically.

b. Within limited hazard plant areas, minimum separation distances meet one of the following criteria: • 3 ft horizontally and 5 ft vertically.• Circuits routed in an enclosed-to-

enclosed configuration the minimum separation is 1 in horizontally and vertically.

• For interactions involving low-voltage power circuits with cable sizes ≤ 2/0 AWG the minimum separation is 6 in horizontally and

358 2.2 Where is limited hazard defined?

Tier 2, Section 8.3, page 8.3-21& IEEE 384.

1297


253

12 in vertically. Minimum separation may be reduced to 1 in horizontally and 3 in vertically if the circuits in the open configuration in an enclosed-to-open configuration are limited to control and instrumentation circuits

• For interactions involving only control and instrumentation cables the minimum separation is 1 in horizontally and 3 inches vertically. Vertical separation may be reduced to 1 in if the enclosed raceway is below an open raceway.

c. Circuits that do not meet minimum separation distances have barriers provided between circuits requiring separation.

d. Circuits that do not meet minimum separation distances or have barriers provided between circuits requiring separation are analyzed.

e. Non-Class 1E circuits that are not analyzed and do not meet the minimum separation distances or have barriers providing separation between Class 1E circuits are treated as Class 1E.

I04 3.7 2.1 Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation are provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR to perform accident management functions.

Tests will be performed to verify that Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals.

Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I28 3.7 2.2 Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation is designed and qualified based on the level of importance of the instrument type that each instrument supports.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the performance, design, and qualification criteria for each Type A, B, and C PAM instrument based on the level of importance of the instrument type

a. A report documents the performance, design, and qualification, criteria for each Type A, B, and C PAM instrument.

b. A report concludes that the Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation meets the

1299


254

that each instrument supports. b. Inspections, tests, or analyses will

be performed to verify that the Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation meets the performance, design, and qualification criteria.

performance, design, and qualification criteria.

M18 3.8 2.1 Systems, structures, and componentsSSC that are required to be functional during and following an SSE are protected against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in Seismic Category 1 and non-safety-related piping systems.

a. An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis will be performed.

{{DAC}} b. A reconciliation analysis will be

performed for as-built safety-related SSC protection features against high and moderate energy pipe failures.Inspections of as-built features for protection against pipe break will be performed.

c. Ananalyses will be performed to reconcile deviations with the pipe break hazards analysis.

a. An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis report exists and concludes the plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe break with loss of offsite power. For postulated pipe breaks, the pipe break hazards analysis report confirms that: − Piping stresses in the RCB

penetration area are within allowable stress limits.

− Pipe whip restraints and jet shield designs for protection of the essential systems and components can mitigate pipe break loads.

− Loads on safety-related SSCs are within design load limits.

− SSCs are protected or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects of postulated failures, including cubicle pressurization effects.

− A summary of the dynamic analyses applicable to high-energy piping systems, including:

− Sketches showing the location of the resulting postulated pipe ruptures, including identification of longitudinal and circumferential breaks; structural barriers, if any; restraint locations; and the constrained directions in each

360 2.1 Modify the start of ITA for part a. as follows: "An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis will be performed." Modify the AC similarly: "An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis report exists and concludes -----"

Combine parts b. and c. similar to the following:

"An as-built pipe break hazards analysis report exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related systems, structures and components are protected against or qualified to withstand the effects of postulated pipe failures without loss of required safety functions. Therefore, the plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe failure with loss of off-site power."

1300


255

restraint. − A summary of the data

developed to select postulated break locations, including, for each point, the calculated stress, the calculated primary plus secondary stress/stress intensity range, and the calculated cumulative usage factor.

− For failure in the moderate-energy piping systems, descriptions showing how safety-related systems are protected from spray wetting, flooding, and other adverse environmental effects.

{{DAC}} b. An as-built pipe break hazards analysis

report exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related SSC are protected against or qualified to withstand the effects of postulated pipe failures without loss of required safety functions, and the plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe failure with loss of off-site power.The required features for protection against pipe break exist.

c. Reconciliation of deviations to the as-designed pipe break hazards analysis has been performed and concludes that the plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe break with loss of offsite power.

M01 3.9 2.1 Non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC will not impair the ability of the Seismic Category I

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Seismic Category I SSC

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC can withstand



256

SSC to perform their intended safety function.

located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection and analysis will be performed of the to confirm that as-built non-Seismic Category I SSC will not impair the ability of Seismic Category I SSC to perform their safety functionSSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC verify that non-Seismic Category I SSC, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

seismic design basis loads without impairing the ability of the Seismic Category I SSC to perform their intended safety function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

A report exists that concludes that a non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC will not impair the ability of the Seismic Category I SSC to perform its safety function as demonstrated by one of the following criteria: • Seismic Category I SSC are isolated

from non-Seismic Category I SSC so that interaction does not occur.

• Seismic Category I SSC are analyzed to confirm that its safety function is not lost as a result of impact from a non-Seismic Category I SSC.

• A Seismic Category II restraint system designed to Seismic Category I requirements is used to verify that no interaction occurs between the Seismic Category I SSC and the non-Seismic Category I SSC.

US EPR RAI 469/Rev 5-Interim ITAAC (Sorted by GROUP)

1

GRP Sect No. Commitment ITA AC # G# NRC Comment Sort

A1 Model The functional arrangement of the ZZZ is as described in the Design Description of Section x.x.x, Tables x.x.x-1 and x.x.x-x, and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

An inspection of the as-built ZZZ functional arrangement will be performed.

The ZZZ conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section x.x.x, Tables x.x.x-1 and x.x.x-x, and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

2.1

A1 2.2.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the RCS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Tables 2.2.1-1, 2.2.1-2, 2.2.1-3, 2.2.1-4, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built RCS functional arrangement will be performed.

The RCS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Tables 2.2.1-1, 2.2.1-2, 2.2.1-3, 2.2.1-4, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-1.

76

A1 2.2.1 2.2 The functional arrangement of the RPV and heavy reflector is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Table 2.2.1-6, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-2.

An inspection of the as-built RPV and heavy reflector functional arrangement will be performed.

The RPV and heavy reflector conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.1, Table 2.2.1-6, and as shown on Figure 2.2.1-2.

77

A1 2.2.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the IRWSTS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.2, Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

An inspection of the as-built IRWSTS functional arrangement will be performed.

The IRWSTS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.2, Tables 2.2.2-1 and 2.2.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

127

A1 2.2.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SIS/RHRS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.3, Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.

An inspection of the as-built SIS/RHRS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SIS/RHRS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.3, Tables 2.2.3-1 and 2.2.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.

165

A1 2.2.4 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EFWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.4, Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.

An inspection of the as-built EFWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EFWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.4, Tables 2.2.4-1 and 2.2.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.

208

A1 2.2.5 2.1 The functional arrangement of the FPCPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.5, Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.5-1.

An inspection of the as-built FPCPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The FPCPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.5, Tables 2.2.5-1 and 2.2.5-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.5-1.

243

A1 2.2.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the An inspection of the as-built CVCS The CVCS conforms to the functional 276


2

CVCS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.6, Tables 2.2.6-1 and 2.2.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.6-1.

functional arrangement will be performed.

arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.6, Tables 2.2.6-1 and 2.2.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.6-1.

A1 2.2.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EBS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.7, Tables 2.2.7-1 and 2.2.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.7-1.

An inspection of the as-built EBS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EBS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.7, Tables 2.2.7-1 and 2.2.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.2.7-1.

309

A1 2.2.8 2.1 The functional arrangement of the FHS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.8 and Table 2.2.8-1.

An inspection of the as-built FHS functional arrangement will be performed.

The FHS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.2.8 and Table 2.2.8-1.

340

A1 2.3.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CGCS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.1 and Table 2.3.1-1.

An inspection of the as built CGCS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CGCS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.1 and Table 2.3.1-1.

357

A1 2.3.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SAHRS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.3, Tables 2.3.3-1 and 2.3.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.3.3-1.

An inspection of the as-built SAHRS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SAHRS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.3.3, Tables 2.3.3-1 and 2.3.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.3.3-1.

375

A1 2.5.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EPSS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.1, Tables 2.5.1-1 and 2.5.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built EPSS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EPSS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.1, Tables 2.5.1-1 and 2.5.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.1-1.

631

A1 2.5.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EUPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.2, Tables 2.5.2-1 and 2.5.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.2-1.

An inspection of the as-built EUPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EUPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.2, Tables 2.5.2-1 and 2.5.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.2-1.

660

A1 2.5.4 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EDG fuel oil storage and transfer system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1.

An inspection of the as-built EDG fuel oil storage and transfer system functional arrangement will be performed.

The EDG fuel oil storage and transfer system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1.

696


3

A1 2.5.4 2.4 The functional arrangement of the EDG lubricating oil system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2.

An inspection of the as-built EDG lubricating oil system functional arrangement will be performed.

The EDG lubricating oil system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2.

699

A1 2.5.4 2.5 The functional arrangement of the EDG air intake and exhaust system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-3.

An inspection of the as-built EDG air intake and exhaust system functional arrangement will be performed.

a. The EDG air intake and exhaust system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-3.

b. The arrangement and location of the combustion air intake and exhaust gas discharge as shown on Figure 2.5.4-3 are such that dilution and contamination of the intake air will not prevent operation of the EDG at rated power output or cause engine shutdown as a consequence of any metrological or accident condition.

201 2.5 Adequate separation of the EDG exhaust and intake is not established by the given information.

700

A1 2.5.4 2.6 The functional arrangement of the EDG cooling water system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-4.

An inspection of the as-built EDG cooling water system functional arrangement will be performed.

The EDG cooling water system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-4.

701

A1 2.5.4 2.7 The functional arrangement of the EDG starting air system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-5.

An inspection of the as-built EDG starting air system functional arrangement will be performed.

The EDG starting air system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.4, Tables 2.5.4-1 and 2.5.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.5.4-5.

702

A1 2.5.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the NUPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.7, Table 2.5.7-1, and as shown on Figure 2.5.7-1.

An inspection of the as-built NUPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The NUPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.7, Table 2.5.7-1, and as shown on Figure 2.5.7-1.

753

A1 2.5.10 2.1 The functional arrangement of the NPSS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.10, Table 2.5.10-1, and as shown on Figure

An inspection of the as-built NPSS functional arrangement will be performed.

The NPSS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.10, Table 2.5.10-1, and as shown on Figure 2.5.10-1.

776


4

2.5.10-1. A1 2.5.11 2.1 The functional arrangement of the

12UPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.11, and as shown in Figure 2.5.11-1.

An inspection of the as-built 12UPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The 12UPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.5.11, and as shown in Figure 2.5.11-1.

785

A1 2.6.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CRACS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.1, Tables 2.6.1-1 and 2.6.1-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.1-1, 2.6.1-2, and 2.6.1-3.

An inspection of the as-built CRACS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CRACS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.1, Tables 2.6.1-1 and 2.6.1-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.1-1, 2.6.1-2, and 2.6.1-3.

790

A1 2.6.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the AVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.3, Tables 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2.

An inspection of the as-built AVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The AVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.3, Tables 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2.

812

A1 2.6.4 2.1 The functional arrangement of the FBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.4, Tables 2.6.4-1 and 2.6.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

An inspection of the as-built FBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The FBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.4, Tables 2.6.4-1 and 2.6.4-2, and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

829

A1 2.6.5 2.1 The functional arrangement of the NABVS exhaust backdraft damper at the vent stack is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.5, Table 2.6.5-1, and as shown on Figure 2.6.5-1.

An inspection of the as-built NABVS exhaust backdraft damper at the vent stack functional arrangement will be performed.

The NABVS exhaust backdraft damper at the vent stack conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.5, Table 2.6.5-1, and as shown on Figure 2.6.5-1.

850

A1 2.6.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.6, Tables 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2.

An inspection of the as-built SBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.6, Tables 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.6-1 and 2.6.6-2.

858

A1 2.6.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SBVSE is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.7, Tables 2.6.7-1 and 2.6.7-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.7-1, 2.6.7-2, 2.6.7-3, and 2.6.7-4.

An inspection of the as-built SBVSE functional arrangement will be performed.

The SBVSE conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.7, Tables 2.6.7-1 and 2.6.7-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.7-1, 2.6.7-2, 2.6.7-3, and 2.6.7-4.

880

A1 2.6.8 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CBVS is as described in the Design

An inspection of the as-built CBVS functional arrangement will be

The CBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design

897


5

Description of Section 2.6.8, Tables 2.6.8-1, 2.6.8-2 and 2.6.8-3, and as shown on Figure 2.6.8-1.

performed. Description of Section 2.6.8, Tables 2.6.8-1, 2.6.8-2 and 2.6.8-3, and as shown on Figure 2.6.8-1.

A1 2.6.9 2.1 The functional arrangement of the EPGBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.9, Tables 2.6.9-1 and 2.6.9-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.9-1, 2.6.9-2, 2.6.9-3, and 2.6.9-4.

An inspection of the as-built EPGBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The EPGBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.9, Tables 2.6.9-1 and 2.6.9-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.9-1, 2.6.9-2, 2.6.9-3, and 2.6.9-4.

925

A1 2.6.13 2.1 The functional arrangement of the ESWPBVS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.13, Tables 2.6.13-1 and 2.6.13-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.13-1.

An inspection of the as-built ESWPBVS functional arrangement will be performed.

The ESWPBVS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.6.13, Tables 2.6.13-1 and 2.6.13-2, and as shown on Figures 2.6.13-1.

940

A1 2.7.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the CCWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1, Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built CCWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The CCWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.1, Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.

954

A1 2.7.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SCWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.2, Tables 2.7.2-1, and 2.7.2-2, 2.7.2-3, and 2.7.2-4, and as shown on Figures 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-2.

An inspection of the as-built SCWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SCWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.2, Tables 2.7.2-1, and 2.7.2-2, 2.7.2-3, and 2.7.2-4, and as shown on Figures 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-2.

1002

A1 2.7.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the GFES is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.6.

An inspection of the as-built GFES functional arrangement will be performed.

The GFES conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.6.

1064

A1 2.7.11 2.1 The functional arrangement of the ESWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.11, Tables 2.7.11-1 and 2.7.11-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.

An inspection of the as-built ESWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The ESWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.7.11, Tables 2.7.11-1 and 2.7.11-2, and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.

1071

A1 2.8.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the turbine generator system is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.1, Tables 2.8.1-1 and 2.8.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.1-1.

An inspection of the as-built turbine generator system functional arrangement will be performed.

The turbine generator system conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.1, Tables 2.8.1-1 and 2.8.1-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.1-1.

1117


6

A1 2.8.2 2.1 The functional arrangement of the MSS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.2, Tables 2.8.2-1 and 2.8.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.2-1.

An inspection of the as-built MSS functional arrangement will be performed.

The MSS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.2, Tables 2.8.2-1 and 2.8.2-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.2-1.

1125

A1 2.8.6 2.1 The functional arrangement of the MFWS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.6, Tables 2.8.6-1 and 2.8.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.6-1.

An inspection of the as-built MFWS functional arrangement will be performed.

The MFWS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.6, Tables 2.8.6-1 and 2.8.6-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.6-1.

1157

A1 2.8.7 2.1 The functional arrangement of the SGBS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.7, Tables 2.8.7-1 and 2.8.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.7-1.

An inspection of the as-built SGBS functional arrangement will be performed.

The SGBS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.8.7, Tables 2.8.7-1 and 2.8.7-2, and as shown on Figure 2.8.7-1.

1182


1206

A1 2.9.1 2.1 The functional arrangement of the LWMS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.1, and Tables 2.9.1-1 and 2.9.1-2.

An inspection of the as-built LWMS functional arrangement will be performed.

The LWMS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.1, and Tables 2.9.1-1 and 2.9.1-2.

1208

A1 2.9.3 2.1 The functional arrangement of the GWPS is as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.3, Tables 2.9.3-1 and 2.9.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.9.3-1.

An inspection of the as-built GWPS functional arrangement will be performed.

The GWPS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.9.3, Tables 2.9.3-1 and 2.9.3-2, and as shown on Figure 2.9.3-1.

1217


1237

A1 3.5 2.1 The functional arrangement of the containment isolation equipment is as described in the Design Description of Section 3.5, and Tables 3.5-1, 3.5-2, and 3.5-3, and as shown on Figure 3.5-1.

An inspection of the as-built containment isolation equipment functional arrangement will be performed.

The containment isolation equipment conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 3.5, and Tables 3.5-1, 3.5-2, and 3.5-3, and as shown on Figure 3.5-1.

1265

A2 Model The location of the XXX is as listed in Table x.x.x-x.

An inspection of the location of the as-built XXX will be performed.

The XXX listed in Table x.x.x-x is located as listed in Table x.x.x-x.

2.3


7

A2 2.1.1-8 2.16 The location of the doors and blowout panels is as listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a).

An inspection of the location of the as-built doors and blowout panels will be performed.

The doors and blowout panels listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) are located as listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a).

33

A2 2.4.6 2.2 The location of the PFAS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis will be performed to determine the location of the PFAS equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the location of the as-built PFAS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis determines the location of the PFAS equipment.

b. The PFAS equipment is located consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

509

A2 2.4.7 2.1 The location of the SMS equipment is as described in Section 2.4.7.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the location of the SMS equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the location of the SMS equipment is consistent with the analysis.

a. An analysis determines the location of the SMS equipment.

b. The SMS equipment is located as per the analysis.

512

A2 2.7.5 4.4 The location of the FWDS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis will be performed to determine the location of the FWDS equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the location of the as-built FDWS equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis determines the location of the FWDS equipment.

b. The FWDS equipment is located consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

1053

A2 2.7.6 3.4 The location of the GFES equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis will be performed to determine the location of the GFES equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the location of the as-built GFES equipment is consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

a. A post-fire safe shutdown analysis determines the location of the GFES equipment.

b. The GFES equipment is located consistent with the post-fire safe shutdown analysis.

1068

A2 2.9.5 2.1 The location of the sump level sensors is as listed in Table 2.9.5-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built sump level sensors will be

The sump level sensors listed in Table 2.9.5-1 are located as listed in Table

1245


8

performed. 2.9.5-1. A2 2.10.1 2.1 The locations of the containment polar

crane, and the FB auxiliary crane, the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist, and the SFCTF biological lid handling station are as listed in Table 2.10.1-1.

An inspection of location of the as-built containment polar crane, and the FB auxiliary crane, the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist, and the SFCTF biological lid handling station will be performed.

The containment polar crane, and the FB auxiliary crane, the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist, and the SFCTF biological lid handling station are located as listed in Table 2.10.1-1.

1251

A3a Model Physical separation exists between divisions of the ZZZ located in the YYY Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate YYY Buildings.

The divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate YYY Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure x.x.x-1.

2.4

A3a 2.2.2 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the IRWSTS as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the IRWSTS are physically separated.

The divisions of the IRWSTS are physically separated in the Reactor Building as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1. The divisions of the IRWSTS equipment in the Safeguard Buildings is are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.2-1.

31 2.3 The commitment wording is not consistent with the AC.

Is equipment located in the RB required to be seperated? Yes, as shown on sheets 2 and 3 of the figure.

129

A3a 2.2.3 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the SIS/RHRS located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SIS/RHRS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SIS/RHRS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.3-1.


167

A3a 2.2.4 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the EFWS located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.4-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the EFWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the EFWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.2.4-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.4-1.


210

A3a 2.2.5 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the FPCS located in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 through 2.1.1-422.2.5-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the FPCS are physically separated in the Fuel Building.

The divisions of the FPCS are physically separated by a wall in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 through 2.1.1-422.2.5-1.

Figure 2.2.5-1 will be revised to show a wall in the Fuel Building

245

A3a 2.2.7 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the EBS, except for the suction piping interconnect, located in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 and 2.1.1-39.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the EBS, except for the suction piping interconnect, are physically separated in the Fuel Building.

The divisions of the EBS, except for the suction piping interconnect, are physically separated by a wall in the Fuel Building as shown on Figures 2.1.1-38 and 2.1.1-39.

311

A3a 2.4.2 2.6 Physical separation exists between An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built Class 1E

The Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the

442


9

SICS. electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

SICS as listed in Table 2.4.2 1 are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

A3a 2.6.3 2.3 Physical separation exists between AVS iodine filtration trains located in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.3-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built AVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms in the Fuel Building.

The AVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.3-1.


A3a 2.6.7 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the SBVSE located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.6.7-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.7-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SBVSE are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SBVSE are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.6.7-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.7-1.


882

A3a 2.7.1 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the CCWS located in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.7.1-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built divisions of the CCWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the CCWS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.7.1-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.1-1.


956

A3a 2.7.2 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the SCWS located in the Safeguard Buildings, excluding cross-connected piping, as listed in Table 2.7.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.2-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SCWS, excluding cross-connected piping, are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SCWS, excluding cross-connected piping, are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.7.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.2-1.


1004

A3a 2.7.11 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the ESWS as listed in Table 2.7.11-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the ESWS are located in separate ESWS and Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the ESWS are located in separate ESWS and Safeguard Buildings aslisted in Table 2.7.11-1 and as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1.


1073

A3a 2.8.2 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the safety-related portions of the MSS as listed in Table 2.8.2-1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23, 2.1.1-24, 2.1.1-36, and 2.1.1-37.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built safety-related portions of the MSS are located in separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4.

The divisions of the safety-related portions of the MSS are located in separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4 as listed in Table 2.8.2-1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23, 2.1.1-24, 2.1.1-36, and 2.1.1-37.


A3a 2.8.6 2.3 Physical separation exists between divisions of the safety-related portions of MFWS as listed in Table 2.8.6-1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23 and 2.1.1-36.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built safety-related portions of the MFWS are located in separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4.

The divisions of the safety-related portions of the MFWS are located in separate valve rooms in Safeguard Buildings 1 and 4 as listed in Table 2.8.6-1shown on Figures 2.1.1-23 and 2.1.1-36.

add reference to Figures

Figure 2.1.1-24 & 2.1.1-37 will be revised to delete reference to MFWS.

1159

A3b Model Physical separation exists between divisions of the ZZZ as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure 2.x.x-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the ZZZ are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1 and as shown on Figure 2.x.x-1.

2.5


10

A3b 2.6.1 2.3 Physical separation exists between the CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains as listed in Table 2.6.1-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains are located in separate rooms of Safeguard Buildings 2 and 3.

Physical separation exists between the as-built CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains as follows: • The CRACS fresh air intake train

30SAB01, iodine filtration train 30SAB11, and recirculation and air conditioning train 30SAB01 as listed in Table 2.6.1-1 are located in room 2UJK31034 of Safeguard Building 2.

• The CRACS fresh air intake train 30SAB04, iodine filtration train 30SAB14, and recirculation and air conditioning train 30SAB04 as listed in Table 2.6.1-1 are located in room 2UJK31034 of Safeguard Building 3.



219 2.3 The CW and AC wording should be consistent. Add to the beginning of the AC and the CW "Physical separation exists between the as-built CRACS fresh air intake, iodine filtration, and recirculation and air conditioning trains as follows:

792

A3b 2.6.4 2.3 Physical separation exists between the FBVS ventilation trains located in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.4-12 and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built FBVS ventilation trains are located in separate cells in the Fuel Building.

The FBVS ventilation trains are located in separate cells in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.4-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.4-1.

233 2.3 The ITAAC CW and AC reference two different tables.


831

A3b 2.6.6 2.3 Physical separation exists between the SBVS iodine filtration trains located in the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.63-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.6-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built SBVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms in the Fuel Building.

The SBVS iodine filtration trains are located in separate rooms of the Fuel Building as listed in Table 2.6.6-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.6-1.

247 2.3 The ITAAC CW and AC reference two different tables - please correct.


860

A3b 2.6.9 2.3 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the EPGBVS as listed in Table 2.6.9-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.9-1 through Figure 2.6.9-4.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built EPGBVS are located in separate EPGBs.

The divisions of the EPGBVS are located in separate EPGBs as listed in Table 2.6.9-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.9-1 through Figure 2.6.9-4.

269 2.3 add reference to Figures 2.6.9.1 - 2.6.9.4 927

A3b 2.6.13 2.3 Physical separation exists between the An inspection will be performed to The divisions of the ESWPBVS are 275 2.3 Insert the table that identifyies the 942


11

divisions of the ESWPBVS located in separate ESWPBs as listed in Table 2.6.13-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.13-1.

verify that the as-built ESWPBVS are located in separate ESWPBs.

located in separate ESWPBs as listed in Table 2.6.13-1 and as shown on Figure 2.6.13-1.

component locations for this ITAAC's components similar to the other ITAAC .

A3c Miscellaneous Physical Separation 2.7

A3c 2.5.1 5.1 Physical separation exists between Class 1E EPSS equipment listed in Table 2.5.1-2 and non-Class 1E equipment.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built Class 1E EPSS equipment is physically separated from as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

The Class 1E EPSS equipment listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is separated from non-Class 1E equipment by at least 3 ft horizontally and at least 5 ft vertically.

638

A3c 2.5.2 5.1 Physical separation exists between Class 1E EUPS equipment listed in Table 2.5.2-2 and non-Class 1E equipment.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built Class 1E EUPS equipment is physically separated from as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

The Class 1E EUPS equipment listed in Table 2.5.2-2 is separated from non-Class 1E equipment by at least 3 ft horizontally and at least 5 ft vertically.

666

A3c 2.5.7 5.4 Physical separation exists between Class 1E division reactor trip breakers.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built Class 1E reactor trip breakers are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The Class 1E reactor trip breakers are located in separate cabinets within the control rod drive mechanism distribution panels in separate Safeguard Buildings.

761

A3c 3.6 2.2 Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between Class 1E divisions cables and raceways and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables and raceways.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that physical separation or electrical isolation exists between as-built Class 1E divisions cables and raceways and between as-built Class 1E divisions and as-built non-Class 1E cables and raceways.

Physical separation exists between raceways containing Class 1E cables of different divisions; and between raceways containing Class 1E cables and raceways containing non-Class 1E cables; or a combination of separation and barriers exists; or an analysis exists as follows: a. Within the MCR and RSS (non-hazard

area) the minimum separation distances meet one of the following criteria: • 1 in horizontally and 3 in

vertically. Vertical separation may be reduced to 1 in if the enclosed raceway is below an open raceway.

• Circuits routed in an enclosed-to-enclosed configuration the minimum separation is 1 in horizontally and vertically.

b. Within limited hazard plant areas,

358 2.2 Where is limited hazard defined?

Tier 2, Section 8.3, page 8.3-21& IEEE 384.

1297


12

minimum separation distances meet one of the following criteria: • 3 ft horizontally and 5 ft vertically.• Circuits routed in an enclosed-to-

enclosed configuration the minimum separation is 1 in horizontally and vertically.

• For interactions involving low-voltage power circuits with cable sizes ≤ 2/0 AWG the minimum separation is 6 in horizontally and 12 in vertically. Minimum separation may be reduced to 1 in horizontally and 3 in vertically if the circuits in the open configuration in an enclosed-to-open configuration are limited to control and instrumentation circuits

• For interactions involving only control and instrumentation cables the minimum separation is 1 in horizontally and 3 inches vertically. Vertical separation may be reduced to 1 in if the enclosed raceway is below an open raceway.

c. Circuits that do not meet minimum separation distances have barriers provided between circuits requiring separation.

d. Circuits that do not meet minimum separation distances or have barriers provided between circuits requiring separation are analyzed.

e. Non-Class 1E circuits that are not analyzed and do not meet the minimum separation distances or have barriers providing separation between Class 1E circuits are treated as Class 1E.


13

B1 Model The basic configuration of the YYY is as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built YYY will be performed.

The basic configuration of the YYY is as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x.

1.1

B1 2.1.1-4 2.1 The basic configuration of the NI structures is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-1, and Figure 2.1.1-2, Figure 2.1.1-9, Figure 2.1.1-15, and Figure 2.1.1-16.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built NI structures will be performed.

The basic configuration of the NI structures is as follows: • The RCB peripheral wall and dome is

within the RSB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

• SBs 1 and 4 are adjacent to the RSB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-2.

• SBs 2 and 3 are adjacent to the RSB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The FB is adjacent to the RSB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The RSB cylindrical wall is at least 1 foot 6 ½ inches thicker above the point where this wall meets the FB and SB structures roofs as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

• The vent stack is located on top of the FB stair tower as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The main steam and feedwater valve rooms are located in SBs 1 and 4 as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.

• The MCR, RSS, and TSC are located in the SBs 2 and 3, with the MCR and RSS separated, as shown on Figure 2.1.1-15 and Figure 2.1.1-16.

2 2.1 The commitment wording should, at minimum, include all figures referenced in the AC. Please add Figures 2.1.1-9, 2.1.1-15, and 2.1.1-16. The 5th bullet in the AC should specify a minimum value of how much thicker.

10

B1 2.1.2 2.1 The basic configuration of the EPGBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built EPGBs will be performed.

The basic configuration of the EPGBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1.


Figures 2.1.2-2 thru 2.1.2-4 are included in ITAAC for the internal hazards ITAAC 3.3, not for basic configuration ITAAC.

55


14

B1 2.1.3 2.1 The basic configuration of the NAB is as shown on Figure 2.1.3–1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built NAB will be performed.

The basic configuration of the NAB is as shown on Figure 2.1.3-1.

62

B1 2.1.4 2.1 The basic configuration of the RWB is shown on Figure 2.1.4-1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built RWB will be performed.

The basic configuration of the RWB is as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1.

65

B1 2.1.5 2.1 The basic configuration of the ESWBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1.

An inspection of the basic configuration of the as-built ESWBs will be performed.

The basic configuration of the ESWBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1.


Figures 2.1.5-2 thru 2.1.5-5 are included in ITAAC for the internal hazards ITAAC 3.3, not for basic c

onfiguration ITAAC.

68

B2 Model Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x through Figure 2.1.x-x separate XXX from YYY so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the XXX of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate XXX from YYY.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate XXX from YYY is as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x through Figure 2.1.x-x.

1.2

B2 2.1.1-4 3.1 Hazard protection features The basic configuration of the NI structures includes: • A continuous external hazards

barrier as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2 and Figure 2.1.1-3.

• Decoupling of SB 2/3 and FB internal structures from their outer external hazards barrier walls, at their exterior walls along the entire wall length and the upper ceiling, and from the RSB above Elevation 0 feet, 0 inches as shown on Figure 2.1.1-11, Figure 2.1.1-12, Figure 2.1.1-15 and Figure 2.1.1-17.

An inspection will be performed to verify the basic configuration of the as-built NI structures includes: • A continuous external hazards

barrier. • Decoupling of SB 2/3 and FB

internal structures from their outer external hazards barrier walls, at their exterior walls along the entire wall length and the upper ceiling, and from the RSB above Elevation 0 feet, 0 inches.

The basic configuration of the NI structures has the following hazard protection features: • The RB, SB 2/3, and the FB share a

common boundary exterior surface at the SBs and FB structures roofs and walls to form a continuous external hazards barrier for the RB, SB 2/3 and FB structures as shown on Figure 2.1.1-2 and Figure 2.1.1-3.

• SB 2/3 and the FB internal structures are decoupled from the outer external hazards barrier by a minimum of 3 inches at the external SBs and FB walls along entire length and the upper ceiling, and from the RSB above Elevation 0' feet 0" inches as shown on

The commitment wording should, at minimum, include all figures referenced in the AC.

11


15

Figure 2.1.1-11, Figure 2.1.1-12, Figure 2.1.1-15 and Figure 2.1.1-17.

B2 2.1.1-8 2.7 Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-44 separate the RBA from the SBs and the FB, and the RBA from the RCB so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-line energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the RBA.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate the RBA from the SBs and FB, and the RBA from the RCB.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate the RBA from the SBs and FB, and the RBA from the RCB is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-44.

6 2.7 Specify figures 2.1.1-20 thru 2.1.1-44 in the DC and AC

24

B2 2.1.1-10 2.2 Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-4437 separate each SB from the other SBs and the FB so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the SB of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate each SB from the other SBs and the FB.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate each SB from the other SBs and the FB is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-4437.

Specify figures 2.1.1-20 thru 2.1.1-44 in the DC and AC

48

B2 2.1.1-11 2.2 Internal hHazard protection barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 and Figure 2.1.1-38 through Figure 2.1.1-44 separate independent divisions within the FB and the FB from other NI structures so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-line energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the independent divisions within the FB of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate independent divisions within the FB and the FB from other NI structures.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate independent divisions within the FB and the FB from other NI structures is as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 and Figure 2.1.1-38 through Figure 2.1.1-44.

51

B2 2.1.2 3.3 Internal hHazard protection barriers, as shown on Figure 2.1.2-4, separate internal rooms within each EPGB, and EPGB 1 from EPGB 2 and EPGB 3 from EPGB 4 each EPGB from the other EPGBs as shown on Figure 2.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-37 so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the the respective room of the

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate internal rooms within each EPGB, and EPGB 1 from EPGB 2 and EPGB 3 from EPGB 4each EPGB from the other EPGBs .

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate internal rooms within each EPGB, and EPGB 1 from EPGB 2 and EPGB 3 from EPGB 4each EPGB from the other EPGBs is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-42.1.1-20 through Figure 2.1.1-37.

14 3.3

The existing ITAAC is not correct, the referenced Figures are wrong and the ITAAC implies there are four buildings vs two, each with internal seperation. Figure 2.1.2-4 is not correct, it does not identify the wall between the diesel engine hall and the fuel oil storage tank room as a wall with hazard protection (i.e. bold) as specified in the design description. Figure 2.1.2-4 will be revised to conform to Tier 2 FSAR Figure 9A-1.

58


16

EPGB of hazard origination.

DC

ITA

AC

See suggested wording below.

Internal hazard protection barriers exist as shown on Figure 2.1.2-4 within the EPGBs to seperate each EPG from the other EPG and the EPGs from the fuel oil tanks so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high energy line break and missile impact is contained within the respective section of the EPGB of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built EPGBs contain internal hazard protection barriers that separate each EPG from the other EPG and the EPGs from the fuel oil storage tanks.

Internal hazard protection barriers, as shown on Figure 2.1.2-4, exist and separate each EPG from the other EPG and the EPGs from the fuel oil storage tanks so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high energy line break and missile impact is contained within the respective section of the EPGB of hazard origination.

B2 2.1.5 3.4 Internal hHazard protection barriers separate each ESWB structure from the other ESWBs structures as shown on Figure 2.1.5-6 so that the impact of internal hazards, including fire, flood, high-energy line break and missile impact, is contained within the ESWB structure of hazard origination.

An inspection will be performed to verify the configuration of as-built internal hazard protection barriers that separate each ESWB structure from the other ESWBs structures.

The configuration of internal hazard protection barriers that separate each ESWB structure from the other ESWBs structures is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-6.

18 3.4 The commitment wording is not supported by what is shown on Figure 2.1.5-6, (i.e. darkened walls with hazard protection).

72

B3 Model Fire protection features provide separation within the YYY.


b. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built configuration of barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations within


b. The configuration of fire barriers,

1.3


17

the YYY. doors, dampers and penetrations within the YYY conforms to the fire protection and smoke effects analysis.

B3 2.1.1-8 2.24 Fire protection features provide separation within the RBA.


b. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built configuration of barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations within the RBA.


b. The configuration of fire barriers, doors, dampers and penetrations within the RBA conforms to the fire protection and smoke effects analysis.

41

B3 2.1.1-8 2.25 Fire protection features provide separation within the RCB.


b. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built configuration of barriers, doors, dampers, and penetrations within the RCB.


b. The configuration of fire barriers, doors, dampers and penetrations within the RCB conforms to the fire protection and smoke effects analysis.

42

B4 Model The YYY structures are Seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions. • Normal plant operation (including


• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built YYY structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the YYY structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,


• Internal events (including e.g., internal flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and pipe break loads, including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle


1.4


18

pipe break loads, including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).


B4 2.1.1-8 2.4 The RB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including




An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RB structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the RB structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,





21

B4 2.1.1-8 2.17 Pressure relief doors in the RCB listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) will withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the function listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a).

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the pressure relief doors using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

a. A report concludes that the pressure relief doors in the RCB listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) will withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the function listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a).

b. The pressure relief doors identified in Table 2.1.1-6(a), including anchorage, are installed per the approved design

34


19

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built pressure relief doors to verify that the pressure relief doors, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

requirements.

B4 2.1.1-10 2.1 The SB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions. • Normal plant operation (including




An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built SB structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the SB structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,





47

B4 2.1.1-11 2.1 The FB structure, including the vent stack, is Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including


An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built FB structures, including the vent stack, will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the FB structures, including the vent stack, will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,


• Internal events (including e.g., internal


50


20



flood loads, accident pressure loads, accident thermal loads, accident pipe reactions, and pipe break loads, including reaction loads, jet impingement loads, cubicle pressurization loads, and missile impact loads).

• External events (including e.g., wind, wind, extreme winds, rain, snow, flood, tornado, tornadoextreme winds-generated missiles and earthquake).

B4 2.1.2 3.4 The EPGB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including




An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built EPGB structures will withstand design basis loads.

A report concludes that the EPGB structures will withstand the design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,





59

B4 2.1.3 3.1 The NAB is a Seismic Category II and RW-IIa structure and will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without loss of structural

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built NAB structure will withstand design basis loads.SSE and tornado wind loadings

A report concludes that the NAB structure will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without loss of structural integrity.SSE and tornado wind


63


21

integrity.SSE and tornado wind loadings without failure onto the adjacent FB or SB Division 4.

without failure onto the adjacent FB or SB Division 4.

loadings without failure onto the adjacent FB or SB Division 4.

B4 2.1.4 3.2 The RWB is a RW-IIa structure and will withstand a seismic design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 of ½ SSE without loss of structural integrity.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RWB will withstand the design basis loads of ½ SSE without loss of structural integrity.

A report concludes that the RWB will withstand the design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 of ½ SSE without loss of structural integrity.

67

B4 2.1.5 3.5 The ESWB structures are Seismic Category I and will withstand design basis loads, as specified below, without loss of structural integrity and safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including




An inspection and analysis of the as-built ESWB structures for the design basis loads will be performed.

A report concludes that the ESWB structures will withstand the design basis loads as specified below without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions: • Normal plant operation (including e.g.,





73

B5 Model The YYY structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table x.x.x-x.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built YYY structures.

The YYY structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table x.x.x-x.

1.5

B5 2.1.1-4 3.7 The NI structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-1 and Table 2.1.1-2.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built NI structures.

The NI structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-1 and Table 2.1.1-2.

17

B5 2.1.1-8 2.12 The RB structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances

The RB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in

29


22

5. of the as-built RB structures. Table 2.1.1-5. B5 2.1.1-10 2.3 The SB structures have key dimensions

and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-9.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built SB structures.

The SB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.1-9.

49

B5 2.1.2 3.6 The EPGB structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built EPGB structures.

The EPGB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2.

61

B5 2.1.5 3.7 The ESWB structures have key dimensions and tolerances specified in Tables 2.1.5-1 and 2.1.5-2.

An inspection will be performed to verify key dimensions and tolerances of the as-built ESWB structures.

The ESWB structures conform to the key dimensions and tolerances specified in Tables 2.1.5-1 and 2.1.5-2.

75

B6 Model The ZZZ site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below the finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built ZZZ site grade level is located below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

The ZZZ site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

1.6

B6 2.1.1-4 3.2 The NI site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built NI site grade level is located below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

The NI site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

12

B6 2.1.2 3.2 The EPGBs site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built EPGBs site grade level is located below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

The EPGBs site grade level is located between 12 inches and 18 inches below finish floor elevation at ground entrances.

57

B6 2.1.5 3.3 The ESWBs site grade level is located within +/- 3 inches of the building +0 ft elevation.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built ESWBs site grade level at building +0 ft elevation.

The ESWB site grade level is located within +/- 3 inches of the building +0 ft elevation.

71

B7 Model Separation is provided between the XXX and the YYY as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x to preclude interaction between the XXX and the YYY.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the XXX and the YYY.

The XXX are separated from the YYY as shown on Figure 2.1.x-x. A minimum separation distance of ## ft exists between the XXX and the YYY.

1.7

B7 2.1.2 3.1 Separation is provided between the EPGBs and the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1 to preclude interaction between the EPGBs and NI common basemat structures.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the EPGBs and the NI common basemat structures.

The EPGBs are separated from the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1. A minimum separation distance of at least 20 ft exists between the EPGBs and NI common basemat structures.

56

B7 2.1.4 3.1 Separation is provided between the RWB and EPGB 3/4 as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1 to preclude interaction

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the RWB and

The RWB is separated from EPGB 3/4 as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1. A minimum separation distance of at least 5349.5 ft

66


23

between the RWB and EPGB 3/4. EPGB 3/4. exists between the RWB and EPGB 3/4. B7 2.1.5 3.1 Separation is provided between the two

pairs of ESWBs and the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1 to preclude interaction between the ESWBs and NI common basemat structures.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation distance between the ESWBs and the NI common basemat structures.

The two pairs of ESWBs are separated from the NI common basemat structures as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1. A minimum separation distance of at least 20 ft exists between the two pairs of ESWBs and NI common basemat structures.

69

B8 Model ZZZ structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built ZZZ structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

Watertight seals exist for exterior penetrations of ZZZ structural walls and floors located below grade elevation.

1.8

B8 2.1.1-4 3.6 NI structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built NI structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

Watertight seals exist for exterior penetrations of NI structural walls and floors located below grade elevation.

16

B8 2.1.5 3.6 ESWB structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built ESWB structural walls or floors having exterior penetrations located below grade elevation are protected against external flooding by watertight seals.

Watertight seals exist for exterior penetrations of ESWB structural walls and floors located below grade elevation.

74

B9 Miscellaneous 1.9

B9 2.1.1-4 3.3 The NI structures include radiation barriers for normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding as listed in Table 2.1.1-3.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built NI structures include radiation barriers that provide normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding.

The NI structures radiation barriers provide normal operation and post-accident radiation shielding are as listed in Table 2.1.1-3 meet the specified minimum thickness requirements. Installed doors meet or exceed the radiation attenuation capability of the wall within which they are installed.

3 3.3 Modify the AC to clarify the intent of the ITAAC's purpose. The as-built radiation barriers listed in Table 2.1.1-3 meet the specified minimum thickness requirements. Installed doors meet or exceed the radiation attenuation capability of the wall they are installed within.

13

B9 2.1.1-8 2.1 Six rib support structures are provided at the bottom of the reactor cavity, as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9, limit lower reactor pressure vessel head deformation due to thermal expansion

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built reactor vessel cavity contains six rib support structures at the bottom of the reactor cavity.

Six rib support structures are provided at the bottom of the reactor cavity as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

18


24

and creep during severe accident mitigation.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.2 As shown on Figure 2.1.1-4, a flooding barrier is provided to prevent ingress of water into the core melt spreading area. Penetrations within the core melt water ingression barrier are protected by watertight seals. Doors within the core melt water ingression barrier are watertight doors.

An inspection will be performed to verify: • As-built core melt water

ingression barrier exists. • As-built penetrations within the

core melt water ingression barrier are protected by watertight seals.

• As-built doors within the core melt water ingression barrier are watertight doors.

The RCB provides a spreading area water ingression barrier as shown on Figure 2.1.1-4. Penetrations within the core melt water ingression barrier are protected by watertight seals. Doors within the core melt water ingression barrier are watertight doors.

19

B9 2.1.1-8 2.3 Core melt cannot relocate to upper containment due to the existence of concrete barriers as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built concrete barriers exist.

Concrete barriers are located within the RCB as shown on Figure 2.1.1-9 to prevent core melt from locating to upper containment.

20

B9 2.1.1-8 2.5 The RCB, including the liner plate and penetration assemblies, maintains its pressure boundary integrity at the design pressure.

A Structural Integrity Test of the RCB, including the liner plate and penetration assemblies, will be performed in accordance with the requirements for prototype containments of ASME Code Section III.

ASME Code Section III Data Report concludes that for the RCB, including the liner plate and penetration assemblies, the Structural Integrity Test results comply with ASME Code Section III, Division 2, CC-6400 requirements, including strain measurements, at a test pressure of 115% of the design pressure of 62 psig.

22

B9 2.1.1-8 2.6 The RCB is a post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure.

a. An analysis of ASME Code Section III Design Reports for the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure will be performed.

b. An inspection will be performed for the existence of ASME Code Section III Construction Report for the as-built RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure.

c. An analysis of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure using as-designed and as-built information

a. ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550) concludes that the design of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure complies with ASME Code Section III, Division 2 requirements.

b. ASME Code Section III Construction Report (NCA-3454) exists for the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure.

c. ASME Code Data Report (NCA-8000) concludes that design reconciliation (NCA-3554) of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure with the Design Report

5 2.6

CW

ITA

AC

The ITAAC commitment is not complete. See below suggestion(s)

The RCB, a post-tensioned pre-stressed concrete structure, is designed, constructed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Section III requirements. The as-built structure is reconciled with the design requirements.

a. An inspection of the RCB design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed.

a. ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist and meet the requirements of NCA-3550

23


25

and ASME Code Design Report (NCA-3550) will be performed.

(NCA-3550) has occurred. The report(s) document the results of the reconciliation analysis. ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550) concludes that design reconciliation (NCA-3554) has been completed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III for the as-built system. The report(s) document the results of the reconciliation analysis.

ITA

AC

ITA

AC

and conclude that the Design of the RCB post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Division 2.

b. An inspection of the as-built construction activities and ASME documentation for the RCB will be performed.

b. ASME Code Section III Construction Report(s) (NCA-3454) exist and conclude that the RCB, a post-tensioned, pre-stressed concrete structure is constructed and inspected in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section III, Division 2.

c. Ok as written

c. General Comment 2

B9 2.1.1-8 2.8 The RCB includes provisions for water flow to the IRWST: • As shown on Figure 2.1.1-4, RCB

rooms which are adjacent to the IRWST contain wall openings to allow water flow into the IRWST.

• As shown on Figure 2.1.1-5, RCB rooms which are directly above the IRWST, contain openings in the floor to allow water flow into the IRWST. The floor openings are protected by weirs and trash racks to provide a barrier against material transport into the IRWST.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built RCB includes provisions for water flow to the IRWST.

The RCB includes the following provisions for water flow to the IRWST: • As shown on Figure 2.1.1-4, the two

rooms labeled Areas for MHSI, LHSI & SAHRS pipe penetrations contain wall openings to allow water flow into the IRWST.

• As shown on Figure 2.1.1-5, the RCB rooms, which are directly above the IRWST, contain openings in the floor to allow water flow into the IRWST. The floor openings are provided with weirs and trash racks to provide a barrier against material transport into the IRWST.

25

B9 2.1.1-8 2.9 RBA penetrations that contain high-energy lines, as listed in Table 2.1.1-7, have guard pipes.

An inspection will be performed to verify as-built RBA penetrations that contain high-energy lines have guard pipes.

RBA penetrations that contain high-energy lines, as listed in Table 2.1.1-7, have guard pipes.

26

B9 2.1.1-8 2.10 Safety-related equipment located in the RCB and RBA required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the

a. An inspection will be performed to verify as-built safety-related equipment located in the RCB

a. Safety-related equipment located in the RCB required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an

7 2.10 Add missing word - required "for" safe shutdown to ITA (a.). See RAI 218 response. Where is the equipment defined? All safety-

27


26

consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level, or are qualified for submergence.

required safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level or are qualified for submergence.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify as-built safety-related equipment in the RBA required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level or are qualified for submergence.

accident are either located above the internal flood level of -6 ft 2 inches or an EQDP concludes that the safety-related equipment is qualified for submergence.

b. Safety-related equipment in the RBA required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident are either located above the internal flood level of +0 ft or an EQDP concludes that the safety-related equipment is qualified for submergence.

related equipment is intended.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.11 The reactor pressure vessel, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, steam generators, and interconnecting RCS piping are insulated with reflective metallic insulation.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built reactor pressure vessel, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, steam generators, and interconnecting RCS piping, are insulated with reflective metallic insulation.

The reactor pressure vessel, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, steam generators, and interconnecting RCS piping are insulated with reflective metallic insulation.

28

B9 2.1.1-8 2.13 The RCB has a minimum containment free volume.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum as-built containment free volume.

The RCB minimum containment free volume is greater than or equal to 2.755 x 106 ft3.

30

B9 2.1.1-8 2.14 The RCB and RCB internal structures have a minimum containment heat sink surface area.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum as-built containment heat sink surface area.

The RCB and RCB internal structures containment heat sink surface area is greater than or equal to 699,644.3633 ft2.

31

B9 2.1.1-8 2.15 The integrated leak rate from the RCB does not exceed the maximum allowable leakage rate.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the RCB air mass.

b. A Type A test will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B to measure the RCB overall integrated leak rate.

c. A Type B test will be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B to measure leak rates across each pressure containing or leakage-limiting boundary. A Type C test will be

a. A report defines the RCB air mass. b. The leak rate for the Type A test is less

than or equal to 0.75 La of RCB air mass per day at a containment test pressure of 55 psig.The RCB leakage rate does not exceed 0.25% of RCB air mass per day at a containment test pressure of 55 psig.

c. The combined leak rate (Type B and Type C Tests) for all penetrations and valves is less than 0.60 La.

32


27

performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Option B to measure containment isolation valve leak rates.A test will be performed to evaluate the RCB leakage rate.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.18 RCB doors and blowout panels listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) provide pressure relief.

a. Type tests will be performed for the swing doors to demonstrate the ability of the doors to open.

b. Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the blowout panels to open.

c. An inspection will be performed to verify the vent direction of as-built doors.

a. The pressure at which the swing doors listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) begins to open is less than or equal to 3.48 psid.

b. The pressure at which the blowout panels listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) open is less than or equal to 1.74 psid.

c. The doors listed in listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) provide the vent direction as identified.

8 2.18 Correct typo ("listed in") in first line of AC in part (c.)

35

B9 2.1.1-8 2.19 RCB doors with bBlowout panels in RCB doors listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) are provided with missile restraint.

a. An analysis will be performed to demonstrate that missile restraints in RCB doors are capable of performing the function.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify as-built RCB doors with blowout panels in RCB doors are provided with missile restraint.

a. An analysis concludes that the missile restraint in RCB doors is capable of performing the function.

b. RCB doors with bBlowout panels in RCB doors listed in Table 2.1.1-6(a) have a missile restraint.

9 2.19 Are the missile restraints for the blowout panels, door, or both? Please clarify the ITAAC. Additionally analysis should be included to verify the restraint is capable of performing the function.

36

B9 2.1.1-8 2.20 RCB vent path areas provide pressure relief for the rooms listed in Table 2.1.1-6(b).

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built total vent path area in rooms requiring pressure relief.

The total vent path area is greater than or equal to the value listed in Table 2.1.1-6(b) for the corresponding room.

37

B9 2.1.1-8 2.21 The RCB has a maximum volume of Microtherm insulation within the zone of influence.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the zone of influence inside the RCB.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the maximum volume of Microtherm insulation within the zone of influence.

a. A report defines the zone of influence inside the RCB.

b. The equipment in the zone of influence will have less than or equal to 1 ft3 of Microtherm insulation.

38

B9 2.1.1-8 2.22 The RCB has a concrete missile protection shield on top of the refueling canal wall provided for protection against a control rod ejection due to the postulated failure of the CRDM nozzle flange or pressure housing.Deleted.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RCB concrete missile protection shield on top of the refueling canal wall provided for protection against a control rod ejection due to the

A report concludes that the RCB concrete missile protection shield on top of the refueling canal wall provided for protection against a control rod ejection due to the postulated failure of the CRDM nozzle flange or pressure housing will

39


28

postulated failure of the CRDM nozzle flange or pressure housing will withstand design basis loads without loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

withstand the design basis loads without loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

B9 2.1.1-8 2.23 Coatings in the RCB are consistent with the GSI 191 DBA evaluation.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built coatings used in the RCB are consistent with the GSI 191 DBA evaluation.

A report concludes that the coatings used in the RCB are consistent with the safety injection suction strainer debris generation, debris transport, and downstream effects evaluations.

40

B9 2.1.1-8 2.26 Thermal properties of the RCB concrete mix design are as defined in the Construction Specification.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of ASME Code Section III, Division 2 Construction Specification(s) defining the thermal properties of the RCB concrete mix design.

b. Testing will be performed to verify the thermal properties of the RCB concrete mix design.

a. ASME Code Section III, Division 2, (CC-2230) test records exist for the RCB concrete mix design.

b. ASME Code Section III, Division 2, (CC-2230) test records exist for the RCB concrete mix design and conclude that it meets the thermal properties specified.

43

B9 2.1.1-8 2.27 Deleted.The IRWST has sufficient mass to compensate for water retention in the RCB and RCB internal structures.

Deleted.An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built RCB and RCB internal structures water retention.

Deleted.The RCB and RCB internal structures water retention is less than or equal to 535,000 lbm.

44

B9 2.1.1-11 2.3 The SFP has a minimum depth from the bottom of the SFP to the SFP operating floor.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built minimum depth from the bottom of the SFP to the SFP operating floor.

The SFP has a minimum depth of 47 feet, 2 inches as measured from the bottom of the SFP to the SFP operating floor.

52

B9 2.1.1-11 2.4 The SFP includes no gates, openings, or drains below an elevation corresponding to the top of stored fuel assemblies.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SFP includes no gates, openings, or drains below an elevation corresponding to the top of stored fuel assemblies.

The SFP includes no gates, openings, or drains below 16 feet, 6-11/16 inches as measured from the bottom of the SFP.

53

B9 2.1.1-11 2.5 The SFP includes no piping that extends below an elevation of 10 feet above the top of the stored fuel assemblies.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SFP includes no piping that extends below an elevation of 10 feet above the top of the stored fuel assemblies.

The SFP includes no piping that extends below 26 feet, 6-11/16 inches as measured from the bottom of the SFSP.

12 2.5 Typo in last line - change 'SFSP' to SFP 54

B9 2.1.5 3.2 The ESWBs have tornado-generated missile protection shields provided for

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify of the as-built

A report concludes that the ESWB tornado-generated missile protection

17 3.2 Correct wording in the ITA. The ITA must incorporate the term “will be performed.”

70


29

the safety-related fans and pumps as shown on Figure 2.1.5-2, Figure 2.1.5-3, Figure 2.1.5-4, and Figure 2.1.5-5.

ESWB tornado-generated missile protection shields provided for the safety-related fans and pumps will withstand design basis tornado loads without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions.

shields provided for the safety-related fans and pumps as shown on Figure 2.1.5-2, Figure 2.1.5-3, Figure 2.1.5-4, and Figure 2.1.5-5 will withstand the design basis tornado loads without loss of structural integrity or safety-related functions.

Partial example - “An inspection and analysis will be performed on the as-built ESWB….”

E01 Model Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table x.x.x-x are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table x.x.x-x in a normal or alternate feed condition.



a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table x.x.x-x.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table x.x.x-x.

5.01

E01 2.2.1 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 in a normal or alternate feed condition.



a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3.

114






151



b. Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each division with the alternate


b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned

191


30

feed aligned to the divisional pair. to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-2.






232






267






301






334


31






91 5.1 An alternate feed is not identified in Table 2.3.3-2. Delete reference to an alternate feed in the CW and delete step b. in the ITA and AC.

Table 2.3.3-1 will be revised to include the Containment Isolation Valves which are currently included in ITAAC Section 3.5. Table 2.3.3-2 will be revised accordingly to add CIVs which have an alternate feed.

397






435






112 5.1 As currently written Table 2.4.2-1 does not support the ITAAC. Identify the divisions and if there is an alternate power supply.

Table 2.4.2-1 will be revised to show 4 divisions of SICS with normal and alternate feeds.

461






489




506


32











544






560






569



b. Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in


b. The test input signal provided in each

588


33

each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair.

division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.4.22-1.






610






629

E01 2.5.4 5.2 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.5.4-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.5.4-2.

A test will be performed by providing a test input signal in each division.

The test input signal provided in each division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.4-2.

732






802

E01 2.6.3 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.6.3-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.6.3-2 in a normal or alternate feed


b. Testing will be performed by


824


34

condition. providing a test input signal in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair.







841






870






892




a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in 2.6.8-3.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the

920


35

respective Class 1E equipment identified in 2.6.8-3.




937




952






988






1028






1101




1144


36











1177






1201

E01 2.9.4 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 2.9.4-2 are powered from a Class 1E division in a normal or alternate feed condition.





1243

E01 2.9.5 4.1 The sump level sensors designated as Class 1E in Table 2.9.5-1 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 2.9.5-1 in a normal feed condition.

Tests will be performed by providing a test input signal to the aligned Class 1E division.

The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the sump level sensors identified in Table 2.9.5-1.

1249


37

E01 3.5 5.1 Equipment designated as Class 1E in Table 3.5-2 are powered from the Class 1E division as listed in Table 3.5-2 in a normal or alternate feed condition.



a. The test input signal provided in the normally aligned division is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-2.

b. The test input signal provided in each division with the alternate feed aligned to the divisional pair is present at the respective Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-2.

1287

E02 Model Without an alternate feed installed, independence is maintained between the XXXX divisions.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each XXXX division, one division at a time.

Without an alternate feed installed, the test input signal exists only in the XXXX division under test, when a test input signal is applied in each XXXX division.

5.02

E02 2.5.1 5.3 Without an alternate feed installed, independence is maintained between the EPSS divisions.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EPSS division, one division at a time.

Without an alternate feed installed, the test input signal exists only in the EPSS division under test, when a test input signal is applied in each EPSS division.

640

E02 2.5.2 5.3 Without an alternate feed installed, independence is maintained between the EUPS divisions.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EUPS division, one division at a time.

Without an alternate feed installed, the test input signal exists only in the EUPS division under test, when a test input signal is applied in each EUPS division.

668

E03 Model With the alternate feed installed from EPSS division W to division X, independence is maintained between the load group created by divisions W and X, and the load group created by divisions Y and Z. EPSS divisions Y and Z which are independent of each other.

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EPSS division, one division at a time, while the alternate feed is installed from EPSS division W to division X.

a. A test input signal exists only in the load group created by Class 1E divisions W and X when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division W or X.

b. A test input signal exists only in the division under test when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division Y or Z.

In the 6th and 7th lines delete the words "the load group created by" the other divisions are independent of one another during the test and therefore do not constitute a load group by definition.

5.03






641


38






642






643




b. A test input signal exists only in the division under test when the test input signal is provided in Class 1E division 1 or 2


644






669

E03 2.5.2 5.5 With the alternate feed installed from EPSS division 2 to division 1, independence is maintained between

Testing will be performed by providing a test input signal in each EPSS division, one division at a

a. A test input signal exists only in the load group created by Class 1E divisions 1 and 2 when the test input

192 5.5 In the 6th and 7th lines delete the words "the load group created by" the other divisions are independent of one another during the test

670


39

the load group created by EUPS divisions 1 and 2, and the load group created by divisions 3 and 4. EUPS divisions 3 and 4 which are independent of each other.

time, while the alternate feed is installed from EPSS division 2 to division 1.

signal is provided in Class 1E division 1 or 2.


and therefore do not constitute a load group by definition.






671






672

E04 Model Non-safety-related loads connected to the XXXX are electrically isolated from the XXXX by an isolation device.


b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built non-safety-related loads connected to the XXXX.

a. The isolation devices used between the XXXX and non-safety-related loads are qualified to provide electrical isolation.

b. A qualified electrical isolation device exists between non-safety-related loads connected to the XXXX and the XXXX.

5.04

E04 2.5.1 5.2 Non-safety-related loads connected to the EPSS are electrically isolated from the EPSS by an isolation device.


b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built non-safety-related loads connected to the EPSS.

a. The isolation devices used between the EPSS and non-safety-related loads are qualified to provide electrical isolation.

b. A qualified electrical isolation device exists between non-safety-related loads connected to the EPSS and the EPSS.

639

E04 2.5.2 5.2 Non-safety-related loads connected to a. Type tests, analyses, or a a. The isolation devices used between the 667


40

the EUPS are electrically isolated from the EUPS by an isolation device.

combination of type tests and analyses of the isolation devices will be performed.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built non-safety-related loads connected to the EUPS.

EUPS and non-safety-related loads are qualified to provide electrical isolation.

b. A qualified electrical isolation device exists between non-safety-related loads connected to the EUPS and the EUPS.

E05 Model The XXXX inverters are sized to power the design XXXX loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX inverters are sized to power the design XXXX loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each XXXX inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

Verify capability by tests and analysis. 5.05

E05 2.5.2 5.14 The EUPS inverters are sized to power the design EUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS inverters are sized to power the design EUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each EUPS inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.


E05 2.5.7 5.3 The NUPS inverters are sized to power the design NUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built NUPS inverters are sized to power the design NUPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each NUPS inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.


E05 2.5.11 3.3 The 12UPS inverters are sized to power the design 12UPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify as-built 12UPS inverters are sized to power the design 12UPS loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis A report concludes each 12UPS inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

217 3.3 Verify capability by tests and analysis. 788

E06 Model XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table x.x.x-x, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table x.x.x-x, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes that ratings for XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table x.x.x-x, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are greater than their analyzed load requirements.

5.06

E06 2.5.1 5.11 EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table 2.5.1-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table 2.5.1-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their

An equipment sizing analysis concludes that ratings for EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers, listed in Table 2.5.1-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are greater than their analyzed load requirements.

648


41

load requirements. E06 2.5.2 5.10 EUPS switchboards, MCCs,

transformers, panelboards, and converters, listed in Table 2.5.2-2 and their feeder breakers and load breakers, are sized to supply their load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, panelboards, and converters, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are sized to supply their load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes that ratings for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, panelboards, and converters, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, and their feeder breakers and load breakers are greater than their analyzed load requirements.

675

E07 Model XXXX cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes XXXX cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

5.07

E07 2.5.1 5.12 EPSS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes EPSS cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

649

E07 2.5.2 5.11 EUPS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes EUPS cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

676

E07 2.5.5 4.3 Each EAT and associated power cables are sized to power the EPSS safety-related and non-safety-related loads.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EAT cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes EAT cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

747

E07 2.5.5 4.4 Each NAT and associated electrical bus is sized to power the connected NPSS non-safety-related loads.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built NAT cables and buses are sized to supply their assigned load requirements.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes NAT cables and buses are sized to supply analyzed load requirements.

748

E07 2.5.6 4.1 The MSUs and associated isophase busses are sized to support the main generator rated output at generator rated power factor.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built MSUs and associated isophase busses inverters are sized to power the design MSU loads on the respective supplied MCC.

An equipment sizing analysis concludes each MSU and associated isophase bus inverter rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

752

E08 Model XXXX interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device

An equipment protection and coordination analysis concludes that the XXXX interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the

5.08


42

closest to the fault opens before other devices.

fault opens before other devices.

E08 2.5.1 5.13 EPSS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An equipment protection and coordination analysis concludes that the EPSS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

650

E08 2.5.2 5.18 EUPS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

An equipment protection and coordination analysis concludes that the EUPS interrupting devices (e.g., circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device closest to the fault opens before other devices.

683

E09a Model XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table x.x.x-x are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table x.x.x-x are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

A short-circuit analysis concludes that current capability for XXXX switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table x.x.x-x is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by circuit interrupting device coordination analysis.

5.09

E09a 2.5.1 5.14 EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

A short-circuit analysis concludes that current capability for EPSS switchgear, load centers, MCCs, and transformers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by circuit interrupting device coordination analysis.

651

E09a 2.5.2 5.16 EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers and panelboards listed in Table 2.5.2-2 are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, and panelboards, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

A short-circuit analysis concludes that current capability for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, transformers, and panelboards, listed in Table 2.5.2-2, is greater than the analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by circuit interrupting device coordination analysis.

681


43

E09b Model The feeder and load circuit breakers for XXXX switchgear, load centers, and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built feeder and load circuit breakers for XXXX switchgear, load centers, and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

A short-circuit analysisreport concludes that the current interrupting capability for XXXX switchgear, load center, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers, is greater than the analyzed fault currents.

5.10

E09b 2.5.1 5.15 The feeder and load circuit breakers for EPSS switchgear, load centers and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built feeder and load circuit breakers for EPSS switchgear, load centers, and MCCs are rated to interrupt fault currents.

A report concludes that the current interrupting capability for EPSS switchgear, load center, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers, is greater than the analyzed fault currents.

652

E09b 2.5.2 5.17 The feeder and load circuit breakers for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, and panelboards are rated to interrupt fault currents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify as-built feeder and load circuit breakers for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, and panelboards are rated to interrupt fault currents.

A short-circuit analysisreport concludes that the current interrupting capability for EUPS switchboards, MCCs, and panelboards feeder and load circuit breakers, is greater than the analyzed fault currents.

682

E09b 3.5 5.5 Containment electrical penetrations are protected from fault currents that are greater than continuous current rating.

a. An analysis will be performed to verify that containment electrical penetrations are protected from fault currents that are greater than continuous current rating.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built containment electrical penetration assembly circuits have redundant in-series protection devices which are coordinated with the protected containment electrical penetration assembly’s rated short-circuit thermal capacity.

a. Analysis concludes for electrical penetration assemblies that either maximum current through the containment electrical penetration does not exceed continuous current rating or the containment electrical penetration assembly circuits have redundant in-series protection devices which are coordinated with the protected containment electrical penetration assembly’s rated short-circuit thermal capacity, preventing the analyzed current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the associated containment electrical penetration.

b. Containment electrical penetration assembly circuits have redundant in-series protection devices which are coordinated with the protected containment electrical penetration assembly’s rated short-circuit thermal capacity.

1291

E10 Model Each XXXX battery is able to provide power for starting and operating design

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built XXXX

a. An analysis concludes each XXXX battery is able to provide power for

5.11


44

loads for a minimum of two hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each XXXX battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each XXXX battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

E10 2.5.2 5.12 Each EUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating design loads for a minimum of two hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built EUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each EUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

a. An analysis concludes each EUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each EUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

677

E10 2.5.7 5.1 Each NUPS battery is able to provide supplies power for starting and operating design loads for a minimum of two hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built NUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each NUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

a. An analysis concludes each NUPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of two hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each NUPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

758


45

E10 2.5.11 3.1 Each 12UPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating design loads for a minimum of 12 hours when the ac supply to the battery charger is lost.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built 12UPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of 12 hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. A battery discharge test will be performed to verify the capacity of each 12UPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

a. An analysis concludes each 12UPS battery is able to provide power for starting and operating analyzed design loads for a minimum time of 12 hours while battery terminal voltage remains above minimum voltage required for the design loads.

b. The capacity of each 12UPS battery is equal to or greater than the analyzed battery design duty cycle.

786

E11 Model Each XXXX battery charger supplies assigned XXXX loads while maintaining the respective XXXX battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built XXXX battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each XXXX battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned XXXX loads while maintaining the respective XXXX battery charged.

a. An analysis concludes each XXXX battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each XXXX battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned XXXX loads while maintaining the respective XXXX battery charged.

5.12

E11 2.5.2 5.13 Each EUPS battery charger supplies assigned EUPS loads while maintaining the respective EUPS battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built EUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each EUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned EUPS loads while maintaining the respective EUPS battery charged.

a. An analysis concludes each EUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each EUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned EUPS loads while maintaining the respective EUPS battery charged.

678


46

E11 2.5.7 5.2 Each NUPS battery charger supplies assigned NUPS loads while maintaining the respective NUPS battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built NUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each NUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned NUPS loads while maintaining the respective NUPS battery charged.

a. An analysis concludes each NUPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each NUPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned NUPS loads while maintaining the respective NUPS battery charged.

759

E11 2.5.11 3.2 Each 12UPS battery charger supplies assigned 12UPS loads while maintaining the respective 12UPS battery charged.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine if each as-built 12UPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. A battery charger capacity test will be performed to verify each 12UPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned 12UPS loads while maintaining the respective 12UPS battery charged.

a. An analysis concludes each 12UPS battery charger rating is greater than the analyzed load requirements.

b. Each 12UPS battery charger can maintain an output current that can supply the assigned 12UPS loads while maintaining the respective 12UPS battery charged.

787

E12 Model Each XXDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective XXXX divisions.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built XXDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective XXXX divisions.

b. A test and analysis shall be performed to verify each as-built SBODG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under loaded conditions.

a. An analysis concludes each XXDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective XXXX divisions.


5.13

E12 2.5.3 4.4 Each SBODG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built SBODG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned

a. An analysis concludes each SBODG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

200 4.4 Verify by test and analysis each as-built SBODG is capable of carrying the required loads.

694


47

in the respective EPSS divisions. b. A test shall be performed to verify

each as-built SBODG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under loaded conditions.



E12 2.5.4 5.3 Each EDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS division.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built EDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

b. A test shall be performed to verify each as-built EDG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under loaded conditions.

a. An analysis concludes each EDG output rating is greater than the analyzed loads assigned in the respective EPSS divisions.

b. A report concludes that each as-built EDG is capable of obtaining stable conditions while operating under analyzed loaded conditions.

209 5.3 Verify by test and analysis that each as-built EDG is capable of obtaining its output rating and carrying the required loads.


733

E13 5.14

E13 2.5.1 5.8 Control power for EPSS switchgear and load centers listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is provided by the EUPS from the respective division.

A Ttests will be performed to verify that control power for EPSS switchgear and load centers is provided by the EUPS from the respective division.by providing a test input signal in each Class 1E division separately.

A test input The signal exists only in the control power circuit of the EPSS division under test for EPSS switchgear and load centers listed in Table 2.5.1-2.

186 5.8 Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each Class 1E division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the EPSS division under test.

645

E13 2.5.4 5.1 The EDG cControl power for the EDGsis provided by the EUPS from the respective division.

A test will be performed to verify that control power for the EDGs is provided by the EUPS from the respective division.by providing a test input signal in only one division.

The test input signal exists in only in the control power circuit of the EDG system under test when a test input signal is applied in the EDG system.

208 5.1 Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each Class 1E division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the EDG division under test.

731

E13 2.5.10 5.1 Control power for the RCP circuit breakers located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 is provided by the EUPS from the respective same division.

A test will be performed to verify that control power for the RCP circuit breakers is provided by the EUPS from the respective same division.

The signal exists only in the Ccontrol power circuit for of the RCP circuit breaker located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 under testis provided by the EUPS from the same division.

Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the RCP circuit breaker under test.

781

E13 2.5.10 5.2 Control power for the switchgear feeder circuit breakers located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 is provided by the EUPS of a different

A test will be performed to verify that control power for the switchgear feeder circuit breakers is provided by the EUPS of a different division.

The signal exists only in the Ccontrol power circuit for of the switchgear feeder circuit breaker located in the switchgear listed in Table 2.5.10-1 under testis

Specify in the ITA that the test signal is inserted into the control power circuit in each division. In the AC specify that the signal exists only in the control power circuit of the

782


48

division. provided by the EUPS of a different division.

switchgear feeder circuit breaker under test.

E14 Miscellaneous Inspection 5.15

E14 2.5.3 2.1 The mechanical portions of the Each SBODG air start system are is located in the Switchgear Building and each independent of the mechanical portions of the EDG air start system is located in each EPGB.

An inspection will be performed of the each as-built mechanical portions of the SBODG air start system to verify independence of the mechanical portions of the from each as-built EDG air start system.

The mechanical portion of the Each SBODG air start system is located in the switchgear building and each EDG air start system is located in each EPGB.

196 2.1 The CW, ITA, and AC wording are not aligned. 685

E14 2.5.3 4.1 The SBODGs are connected to the EPSS Class 1E buses through two in-series circuit breakers (one Class 1E circuit breaker at the Class 1E EPSS bus and one non-Class 1E circuit breaker at the non-Class 1E NPSS bus).

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SBODGs are connected to the EPSS Class 1E buses through two in-series circuit breakers.

The SBODGs are connected to the EPSS Class 1E buses through two in-series circuit breakers (one Class 1E circuit breaker at the Class 1E EPSS bus and one non-Class 1E circuit breaker at the non-Class 1E NPSS bus).

691

E14 2.5.3 4.5 The electrical portions of the SBODG air start system are independent of the electrical portions of the EDG air start system.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built electrical portions of the SBODG air start system are independent of the electrical portions of the EDG air start system.

a. The SBODG air start system is powered from the normal power supply system and is independent of the EDG air start system which is powered from the emergency power supply system.

b. The SBODG pilot air start solenoids are powered from the 12 hour uninterruptible power supply system buses and are independent of the EDG air start system pilot air start solenoids which are powered from the Class 1E uninterruptible power supply system.

695

E14 2.5.5 3.1 Each EAT and NAT has an oil containment system.

An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built EAT and NAT has an oil containment system.

Each EAT and NAT has an oil containment system.

743

E14 2.5.5 3.2 Each EAT and NAT has a deluge fire protection system.

An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built EAT and NAT has a deluge fire protection system.

Each EAT and NAT has a deluge fire protection system.

744

E14 2.5.5 4.2 EAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits are routed separately from NAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built EAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits are routed separately from NAT power cables and

The EAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits are routed separately from NAT power cables and instrumentation and control circuits.

746


49

instrumentation and control circuits. E14 2.5.6 3.1 Each MSU has an oil containment

system. An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built MSU has an oil containment system.

Each MSU has an oil containment system. 750

E14 2.5.6 3.2 Each MSU has a deluge fire protection system.

An inspection will be performed to verify that each as-built MSU has a deluge fire protection system.

Each MSU has a deluge fire protection system.

751

E14 2.5.8 2.1 Surge arresters are provided for MSUs, NATs and EATs.

An inspection will be performed to verify that surge arresters are provided for each as-built MSU, NAT and EAT.

Surge arresters are provided for MSUs, NATs and EATs.

764

E14 2.5.8 2.2 The main generator, EDG, and SBODG neutrals are connected to the station grounding grid.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built main generator, EDG, and SBODG neutrals are connected to the station grounding grid.

The main generator, EDG, and SBODG neutrals are connected to the station grounding grid.

765

E14 2.5.8 2.3 AC distribution system transformer neutral points are connected to the station grounding grid.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built AC ac distribution system transformer neutral points are connected to the station grounding grid.

The ac distribution system transformer neutral points are connected to the station grounding grid.

766

E14 2.5.8 2.4 The ground bus of ac distribution system switchgear, loads centers, and MCCs listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is connected to the station grounding grid.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built ground bus of ac distribution system switchgear, loads centers, and MCCs are connected to the station grounding grid.

The ground bus of the ac distribution system switchgear, load centers, and MCCs listed in Table 2.5.1-2 is connected to the station grounding grid.

767

E14 2.5.8 2.5 Plant instrumentation grounding system is connected to the station grounding grid.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built plant instrumentation grounding system is connected to the station grounding grid.

The plant instrumentation grounding system is connected to the station grounding grid.

768

E15 Miscellaneous Analysis 5.16

E15 2.2.1 5.3 The power supply design is such that only two EDGs are required to operate to supply power to the minimum number of PZR heaters.

An analysis will be performed to verify that only two EDGs are required to operate to supply power to the minimum number of PZR heaters.

An analysis concludes that only two EDGs are required to operate to supply power to the minimum numbertwo groups of emergency PZR heaters, which are rated at 144 kW per heater.

27 5.3 Specify the minimum number of pressurizer heaters or the total KW

116


50

E15 2.5.2 5.19 Harmonic distortion does not prevent Class 1E buses from performing safety functions.

An analysis will be performed to verify that harmonic distortion does not prevent as-built Class 1E buses from performing safety functions.

An analysis of the Class 1E buses concludes that total harmonic distortion does not exceed 5 percent voltage distortion on the Class 1E buses.

684

E16 Miscellaneous Test 5.17

E16 2.5.1 6.1 Each EPSS division has an assigned EDG that provides power if there is a loss of offsite power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each EPSS division has an assigned EDG that provides power if there is a loss of offsite power.

Each EPSS division has an assigned EDG that provides power if there is a loss of offsite power.

654

E16 2.5.1 6.2 Each EPSS 6.9 kV switchgear offsite power supply circuit breaker is opened by a protection system LOOP signal.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EPSS 6.9 kV switchgear offsite power supply circuit breaker is opened by a protection system LOOP signal.

Each EPSS 6.9 kV switchgear offsite power supply circuit breaker division automatically separates from the offsite power supply on a LOOP test input signal from the protection system.

188 6.2 Use the same terminology in the CW and the AC.

655

E16 2.5.1 6.4 EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP or LOCA conditions.

a. A test will be performed on each EPSS division using test input signals to verify that EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA, and LOOP/LOCA conditions without the alternate feed installed.

b. A test will be performed on each EPSS division using test input signals to verify that EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA and LOOP/LOCA conditions with the alternate feed installed.

a. EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA, and LOOP/LOCA conditions without the alternate feed installed.

b. EPSS loads are sequentially energized by the protection system during LOOP, LOCA and LOOP/LOCA conditions with the alternate feed installed.

657

E16 2.5.1 6.5 Each EPSS division transfers from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite power supply circuit on an emergency auxiliary transformer failure signal.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EPSS division transfers from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit on an emergency auxiliary transformer failure signal.

Each EPSS division transfers from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit on an emergency auxiliary transformer failure signal.

658

E16 2.5.1 6.6 EPSS loads that are sequenced by the protection system are shed by the

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that EPSS

EPSS loads that are sequenced by the protection system are shed by the

659


51

protection system in an undervoltage condition prior to load sequencing.

loads that are sequenced by the protection system are shed by the protection system in an undervoltage condition prior to load sequencing.

protection system in an undervoltage condition prior to load sequencing.

E16 2.5.2 5.15 EUPS operating voltage remains within the terminal voltage range of the supplied safety-related equipment during the battery duty cycle.

A test will be performed to verify that EUPS operating voltage remains within the terminal voltage range of the supplied safety-related equipment during the battery duty cycle.

EUPS battery terminal voltage remains greater than minimum required terminal voltage after a period of no less than two hours with a discharge rate that is equal to or greater than the battery design duty cycle capacity.

680

E16 2.5.3 2.4 Each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than SBODG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

A test will be performed to verify each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than SBODG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

The flow rate of each fuel oil transfer pump is greater than SBODG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

688



SBODG #1 starts and connects to EPSS Divisions 1 and 2 within 10 minutes of receiving a test input signal.

692



SBODG #2 starts and connects to EPSS Divisions 3 and 4 buses within 10 minutes of receiving a test input signal.

693

E16 2.5.4 3.11 Each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than EDG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

A test will be performed to verify each fuel oil transfer pump capacity is greater than EDG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

The flow rate of each fuel oil transfer pump is greater than EDG fuel oil consumption at the continuous rating.

713

E16 2.5.4 3.12 Each EDG starting air system is capable of providing air to start the respective EDG without being recharged.

A test will be performed to verify each EDG starting air system is capable of providing air to start the respective EDG without being recharged.

Each EDG starts five consecutive times without recharging respective starting air receivers between EDG starts.

714

E16 2.5.4 3.15 Each EDG exhaust path has a bypass exhaust path.

Type tests will be performed on the EDG exhaust bypass device to demonstrate rupture pressure limits.

Type test results conclude that the EDG rupture disk will rupture within the pressure limits within the approved design.

717

E16 2.5.4 6.1 Each EDG is started by a protection system LOOP signal from the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EDG is started by a protection system LOOP signal from the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus.

Each EDG is started by a protection system LOOP signal from the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus, achieves rated speed and voltage and connects to the assigned EPSS bus in ≤ 15 seconds after

735


52

receipt of a test input signal. E16 2.5.4 6.2 Each EDG is started by a protection

system SIS actuation signal. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EDG is started by a protection system SIS actuation signal.

Each EDG is started by a protection system SIS actuation signal, achieves rated speed and voltage and remains disconnected from the EPSS.

736

E16 2.5.4 6.3 Each EDG will start and connect to the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus in an undervoltage condition concurrent with a SIS actuation signal.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each EDG will start and connect to the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus in an undervoltage condition concurrent with a SIS actuation signal.

Each EDG starts and connects to the respective EPSS division medium voltage bus in an undervoltage condition concurrent with a SIS actuation signal. As loads are sequenced onto EPSS buses, EDG nominal output voltage and frequency remain ≥ 75 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Voltage and frequency are restored to within 10 percent and 2 percent nominal, respectively within 60 percent of each load sequence step.

737

E16 2.5.4 6.7 Each EDG is capable of starting from standby conditions and achieving required voltage and frequency.

A test will be performed to verify that each EDG is capable of starting from standby conditions and achieving required voltage and frequency.

Each EDG starts from standby conditions and achieves voltage ≥ 6555 V and frequency ≥ 58.8 Hz in ≤ 15 seconds after receipt of a test input signal; and steady state voltage ≥ 6555 V and ≤ 7260 V, frequency ≥ 58.8 Hz and ≤ 61.2 Hz.

741

E16 2.5.7 5.5 The reactor trip breakers open when a signal is provided to the shunt trip coil.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the reactor trip breakers open when a signal is provided to the shunt trip coil.

The reactor trip breakers open when the shunt trip coil is energized.

762

E16 2.5.7 6.1 The reactor trip breakers open on a protection system reactor trip signal.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the reactor trip breakers open on a protection system reactor trip signal.

The reactor trip breakers open on a protection system reactor trip test input signal.

763

E16 2.5.9 3.1 Emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered from the EPSS.

A test will be performed to verify that the emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered from the EPSS.

a. The emergency lighting system provides lighting in the MCR and is powered from the EPSS.

b. The emergency lighting system provides lighting in the RSS and is powered from the EPSS.

213 3.1 771

E16 2.5.9 3.2 Special emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered by the EUPS.

A test will be performed to verify that the special emergency lighting in the MCR and RSS is powered by the

a. The special emergency lighting system provides lighting in the MCR and is powered from the EUPS.

772


53

EUPS. b. The special emergency lighting system provides lighting in the RSS and is powered from the EUPS.

E16 2.5.9 3.3 The emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide illumination at the MCR and RSS workstations and safety-related panels.

A test will be performed to verify that the emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide illumination at the MCR and RSS workstations and safety-related panels.

a. The emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide at least 100 foot-candles illumination at the MCR workstations and at least 50 foot-candles at the safety-related panels.

b. The emergency lighting and special emergency lighting sub-systems provide at least 100 foot-candles illumination at the RSS workstations.

c. The special emergency lighting system provides at least ten foot-candles at the MCR operator workstation when it is the only MCR lighting system in operation.

d. The special emergency lighting system provides at least ten foot-candles at the RSS operator workstation when it is the only RSS lighting system in operation.

773

E16 2.5.9 3.5 Eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures provide illumination for post-fire shutdown activities performed by operators outside the MCR or RSS where eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures are utilized.

A test will be performed to verify that eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures provide illumination for post-fire shutdown activities performed by operators outside the MCR or RSS.

Eight-hour battery pack emergency lighting fixtures provide at least one foot-candle illumination in areas outside the MCR and RSS where post-fire shutdown activities are performed.

214 3.5 Expand the AC to define the area being measured.

775

E16 2.5.12 2.1 The digital telephone system, the public address and alarm system, sound powered system, and portable wireless communication system provide station to station communication and area broadcasting between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

Tests will be performed to verify that the digital telephone system, the public address and alarm system, sound powered system, and portable wireless communication system provide station to station communication and area broadcasting between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

a. The digital telephone system, public address and alarm system, and the sound powered system, and portable wireless communication system exist in the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

b. Voice transmission and reception via the digital telephone system and sound powered system is verified between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

789


54

c. The broadcasting of voice messages from the MCR to the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1 via the public address and alarm system is verified.

d. Voice transmission and reception via the portable wireless communication system is verified between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.5.12-1.

E16a 2.5.1 5.16 EPSS 6.9 kV and 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.

A bench test will be performed to verify as-built EPSS 6.9 kV and 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.

EPSS 6.9 kV and 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the trip setpoints.

187 5.15 A bench test of the as-built circuit breaker trip set points should be performed to verify the assumed breaker trip points in the preceding analysis.

653

E16a 2.5.2 5.8 EUPS 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.Deleted.

A bench test will be performed to verify as-built EUPS 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the breaker trip setpoints.Deleted.

EUPS 480V feeder and load circuit breakers open at the trip setpoints. Deleted.

673

E17 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 5.18

E17 2.5.1 6.3 The EPSS provides voltages at the supplied safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions that exceed the minimum required operating voltage of that equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to verify that the voltage at the supplied safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions exceeds the minimum required operating voltage of that equipment.

b. A test will be performed to verify that EPSS bus voltage measurements verify safety-related terminal voltages exceed the minimum required operating voltage for that equipment.

a. An analysis concludes the voltage at the supplied safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions exceeds the minimum required operating voltage of that equipment.

b. EPSS bus voltage measurements verify safety-related terminal voltages exceed the minimum required operating voltage for that equipment.

656

E17 2.5.8 2.6 Insulation coordination is achieved on surge arrestors on MSUs, NATs, and EATs.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the insulation ratings for MSU, NAT, and EAT surge arrestors.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built insulation ratings for MSU, NAT, and EAT surge arrestors meet the

a. An analysis concludes: The lightning impulse protective ratio of the chopped wave withstand to the front-of-wave protection level is equal to or greater than 1.2. The lightning impulse protective ratio of the basic lightning impulse insulation level to the lightning impulse protective

769


55

approved design criteria. level is equal to or greater than 1.2. The switching impulse protective ratio of the basic switching impulse insulation level to the switching impulse protective level is equal to or greater than 1.15.

b. The insulation ratings for MSU, NAT, and EAT surge arrestors meet the approved design criteria.

I01 Model The location of the XXXX equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.x-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built XXXX equipment will be performed.

The XXXX equipment listed in Table 2.4.x-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.x-1.

4.01

I01 2.4.1 2.1 The location of the PS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PS equipment will be performed.

The PS equipment listed in Table 2.4.1-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

94 2.1 Delete - The ITAAC is redundant to 2.2.

Prefer to leave location ITAAC to simplify closure.

403

I01 2.4.2 2.1 The location of the SICS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.2-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built SICS equipment will be performed.

The SICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.2-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.2-1.

437

I01 2.4.4 2.1 The location of the SAS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built SAS equipment will be performed.

The SAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.4-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

113 2.1 462

I01 2.4.5 2.1 The location of the PACS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PACS equipment will be performed.

The PACS equipment listed in Table 2.4.5-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.


I01 2.4.9 2.1 The location of the PAS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.9-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PAS equipment will be performed.

The PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.9-1.

524

I01 2.4.10 2.1 The location of the PICS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.10-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built PICS equipment will be performed.

The PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.10-1.

529

I01 2.4.11 2.1 The location of the BCMS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.11-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built BCMS equipment will be performed.

The BCMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.11-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.11-1.

538

I01 2.4.13 2.1 The location of the CRDCS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.13-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built CRDCS equipment will be performed.

The CRDCS equipment listed in Table 2.4.13-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.13-1.

547

I01 2.4.14 2.1 The location of the HMS equipment is An inspection of the location of the The HMS equipment listed in Table 146 2.1 This ITAAC should be more specific than 556


56

as listed in Table 2.4.14-1. as-built HMS equipment will be performed.

2.4.14-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.14-1.

simply the RB.

No change required.

I01 2.4.17 2.1 The location of the EIS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.17-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built EIS equipment will be performed.

The EIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.17-1is located as listed in Table 2.4.17-1.

563

I01 2.4.19 2.1 The location of the ICIS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.19-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built ICIS equipment will be performed.

The ICIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.19-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.19-1.

572

I01 2.4.22 2.1 The location of the RMS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.22-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built RMS equipment will be performed.

The RMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.22-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.22-1.

580

I01 2.4.24 2.1 The location of the DAS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.

An inspection of the location of the as-built DAS equipment will be performed.

The DAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.24-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.


I01 2.4.25 2.1 Deleted.The location of the SCDS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.

Deleted.An inspection of the location of the as-built SCDS equipment will be performed.

Deleted.The SCDS equipment listed in Table 2.4.25-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.


I01 2.4.26 2.1 Deleted.The location of the RPMS equipment is as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.

Deleted.An inspection of the location of the as-built RPMS equipment will be performed.

Deleted.The RPMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.26-1 is located as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.


I02 Model Physical separation exists between the divisions of the XXX as listed in Table 2.x.x-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the XXX are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the XXX are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.x.x-1.

4.02

I02 2.4.1 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the PS as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the PS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the PS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.1-1.

95 2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of PS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.



ITAAC systems sections will be revised to add the field instruments that feed PS and SAS.

404


57

I02 2.4.4 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the SAS as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.4-1.

114 2.2 and 2.3





463

I02 2.4.5 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the PACS as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the PACS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the PACS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.5-1.

125 2.2 and 2.3





492

I02 2.4.24 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the DAS as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the DAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the DAS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.24-1.

2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of DAS between divisions and between Class 1E and non-Class 1E equipment.




593

I02 2.4.25 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the SCDS as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the SCDS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the SCDS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.25-1.

168 2.2 and 2.3

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of SCDS between divisions and between Class 1E

600


58

and non-Class 1E equipment.




I02 2.4.26 2.2 Physical separation exists between the divisions of the RPMS as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built divisions of the RPMS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The divisions of the RPMS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.4.26-1.

175 2.2 and 2.3





613

I03 Model Physical separation exists between Class 1E ZZZ equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E ZZZ equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E ZZZ equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E ZZZ equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E ZZZ equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Identify what hazards are being addressed by the physical separation (i.e. fire, flood, missiles, etc.)


4.03

I03 2.4.1 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance,

96 2.3 Identify what hazards are being addressed by the physical separation (i.e. fire, flood,

405


59

1E equipment. related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E PS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E PS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

missiles, etc.)


I03 2.4.2 2.4 Physical separation exists between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E SICS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E SICS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.



440

I03 2.4.2 2.5 Physical separation exists between Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS as listed in Table 2.4.2-1.

An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

The Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS as listed in Table 2.4.2-1 are located in separate Safeguard Buildings.

106 2.5 What about physical separation at the SICS.

SICS is only in the MCR. Discussion will be added in Tier 2 as to why we can’t have physical separation within SICS.

441

I03 2.4.4 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to

114 2.2 and

Recommend you combine these two ITAAC into one ITAAC for physical separation of SAS between divisions and between Class 1E and

464


60

distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E SAS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E SAS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

achieve physical separation between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

2.3 non-Class 1E equipment.




I03 2.4.5 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E PACS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E PACS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

125 2.2 and 2.3





493

I03 2.4.25 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E SCDS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between

168 2.2 and 2.3



As currently written you have not verified the field equipment within each division is

601


61

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E SCDS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

separated from each other.


I03 2.4.26 2.3 Physical separation exists between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between as-built Class 1E RPMS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between as-built Class 1E RPMS equipment and as-built non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report defines the required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof to achieve physical separation between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. The required safety-related structures, separation distance, barriers, or any combination thereof exist between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

175 2.2 and 2.3





614

I04 Model Displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Table x.x.x-x are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.

General Comment 7

In general, it appears test signals are being overly relied upon to complete the ITAAC. The SRP Appendix C, Section A.VI "Alarms, Displays and Controls" states: "The intent is to test the integrated as-built system; however, separate testing of the actual operation of the system and the alarms, displays and control circuits using simulated signals may be acceptable where that is not practical." Use of the actual plant parameters during integrated system operation is more consistent with the definition "Test for Indication of a Display" provided in Tier 1.

4.04


62

I04 2.2.1 4.1 Displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Tables 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.















a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.2.4-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR


b. Displays listed in Table 2.2.4-2 are



63

by using test input signals to PICS.

















b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table





64

2.2.7-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.






78

4.1

General Comment 7

Table 2.3.1-2 should be referenced not 2.3.1-1. Since there are no displays on the RSS, delete referece to RSS in the CW and delete step b. in the ITA and AC.


359

I04 2.4.2 4.8 The SICS provides indication of Type A, B, and C PAM variables in the MCR.

Tests will be performed to verify SICS provides indication of Type A, B and C PAM variables in the MCR using test input signals.

Type A, B, and C PAM variables are indicated on SICS in the MCR.








I04 2.4.6 3.2 A trouble signal indication is provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR upon a loss of either power source to a LFCP or workstation.

A test will be performed using test input to verify the existence of a trouble signal indication on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR when either the primary or secondary power source is lost at any LFCP or workstation.

A trouble signal indication is indicated provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR upon a loss of either power source to a LFCP or workstation.



65

I04 2.4.8 2.1 Containment air cooler condensate flowrate is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Tests will be performed to verify that the containment air cooler condensate flowrate is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

Containment air cooler condensate flowrate is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I04 2.4.8 2.2 MSL local humidity indication is provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Tests will be performed to verify that the MSL local humidity indication is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

MSL local humidity is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I04 2.4.22 4.5 The RMS records the radiation level from the radiation monitors listed in Table 2.4.22-1. Display of containment radiation level is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the RMS records radiation monitor level.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the radiation monitor level is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The RMS records radiation level from the radiation monitors listed in Table 2.4.22-1.

b. Display of radiation level from the radiation monitors listed in Table 2.4.22-1 is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I04 2.4.25 4.3 Bypassed or inoperable SCDS status information is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

A test will be performed to verify bypassed or inoperable status information is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR using test input signals.

Bypassed or inoperable SCDS status information is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.













66











I04 2.5.4 4.1 Displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.








67





















68

























69























70





















71















1207










72









I04 3.5 4.1 Displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals to PICS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS by using test input signals inputs to PICS.

a. Displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Displays listed in Table 3.5-2 are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.


I04 3.7 2.1 Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation are provided on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR to perform accident management functions.

Tests will be performed to verify that Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR by using test input signals.

Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I05 Model Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-x.



a. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-x.

b. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-x.

4.05






111


73






148






188






230






265






298






332

I05 2.3.1 4.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS

a. Tests will be performed using controls on the PICS operator

a. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the

79 4.2 There are no controls listed in Table 2.3.1-2 as being on the RSS. Delete referece to RSS in

360


74

perform the function listed in Table 2.3.1-2.

workstations in the MCR. b. Tests will be performed using


function listed in Table 2.3.1-2. b. Controls on the PICS operator


the CW and delete step b. in the ITA and AC.





395

I05 2.4.1 4.11 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the manual system actuation functions listed in Table 2.4.1-4.

Tests will be performed to verify the functionality of the using controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the manual system actuation functions listed in Table 2.4.1-4.

417

I05 2.4.1 4.12 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and RSS perform validation or inhibition of the manual permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5.

a. Tests will be performed to verify the functionality of the manual permissive controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

b. Tests will be performed to verify the functionality of the manual permissive controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS.

a. For the manual permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5, the permissive status is present in the PS actuation logic units (ALU) after the corresponding controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR are manually actuated.

b. For the manual permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5, the permissive status is present in the PS actuation logic units (ALU) after the corresponding controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS are manually actuated.

418






637






690

I05 2.5.4 4.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR and the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3.



a. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3.

729


75


b. Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.5.4-2 and Table 2.5.4-3.






757






780






800






822






839





b. Controls on the PICS operator

868


76








890






917






935






950






976






1025


77






1095

I05 2.8.1 3.1 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR trip the turbine-generator.


Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR trip the turbine-generator.

1122






1142




1175






1198

I05 2.9.1 3.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in the MCR as listed in Table 2.9.1-2.



1210




1231

I05 3.5 4.2 Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 3.5-2.


Controls on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 3.5-2.

1285

I05b 2.4.2 4.1 The capability to transfer control of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS exists in a fire area separate from the MCR. The transfer switches are each

a. An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built controls exist for transfer of control of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS.

a. Controls exist in a fire area separate from the MCR for transfer of control of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS.

b. Transfer switches are each associated

444


78

associated with a single division of the safety-related control and allow transfer of control without entry into the MCR.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that control of the SICS can be transferred from the MCR to the RSS.

with a single division of the safety-related control, and perform the transfer of the SICS from the MCR to the RSS without entry into the MCR.

I05b 2.4.2 4.5 Controls on the SICS in the MCR and RSS perform manual actuation of RT.

a. Tests will be performed to verify manual actuation of RT using SICS controls in the MCR.

b. Tests will be performed to verify manual actuation of RT using SICS controls in the RSS.

a. The reactor trip breakers and reactor trip contactors are opened following manual RT actuation from SICS in the MCR.

b. The reactor trip breakers and reactor trip contactors are opened following manual RT actuation from SICS in the RSS.

448

I05b 2.4.2 4.7 Controls on the SICS in the MCR perform the functions listed in Table 2.4.2-2.

Tests will be performed using controls on the SICS in the MCR.

Controls on the SICS in the MCR perform the function listed in Table 2.4.2-2.

450

I05b 2.4.2 4.9 The SICS provides manual controls and indications necessary to reach and maintain safe shutdown following an AOO or PA in the MCR.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the manual controls and indications necessary to reach and maintain safe shutdown in the MCR following an AOO or PA.



a. A report identifies the manual controls and indications necessary to reach and maintain safe shutdown in the MCR following an AOO or PA.




I05b 2.4.2 4.12 Controls on the SICS in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.4.2-3.

Tests will be performed using controls on the SICS in the RSS.

Controls on the SICS in the RSS perform the function listed in Table 2.4.2-3.

455

I05b 2.4.2 4.13 The SICS provides controls in the MCR for blocking the PAS signals in the PACS through a set of operational I&C disable switches.

Tests will be performed to verify that the operational I&C disable switches block the PAS signals in the PACS.

The operational I&C disable switches perform their function to block the PAS signals in the PACS.

456

I05b 2.4.4 4.22 SAS manual grouped controls and displays are available on the SICS in the MCR.

a. Tests will be performed to verify that SAS displays are indicated on the SICS in the MCR by using test input signals to SICS.

b. Tests will be performed using SAS manual grouped controls in the MCR.

a. SAS displays are indicated on the SICS in the MCR.

b. Controls on the SICS in the MCR perform manual grouped controls from the SICS in the MCR.



79

I05c 2.4.10 3.5 The capability to transfer control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS exists in a fire area separate from the MCR and allows transfer of control without entry into the MCR.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built controls exist in a fire area separate from the MCR for transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that controls allow transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS without entry into the MCR.

a. Controls exist in a fire area separate from the MCR for transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS.

b. Transfer switches perform transfer of control of the PICS from the MCR to the RSS without entry into the MCR.

534

I05d 2.4.1 4.21 CPU state switches are provided at the PS cabinets to restrict modifications to the PS software.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of CPU state switches at the as-built PS cabinets that restrict modifications to the PS software.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the CPU state switches restrict modifications to the PS software.

a. CPU state switches are provided at the PS cabinets.

b. CPU state switches at the PS cabinets restrict modifications to the PS software.

427

I05d 2.4.4 4.13 CPU state switches are present at the SAS cabinets to restrict modifications to the SAS software.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of CPU state switches at the as-built SAS cabinets that restrict modifications to the PS software.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the CPU state switches restrict modifications to the SAS software.

a. CPU state switches are provided at the SAS cabinets.

b. CPU state switches at the SAS cabinets restrict modifications to the SAS software.

478

I05d 2.4.26 4.6 CPU state switches are provided at the RPMS cabinets to restrict modifications to the RPMS software.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the existence of CPU state switches at the as-built RPMS cabinets that restrict modifications to the RPMS software.

b. Tests will be performed to verify that the CPU state switches restrict modifications to the RPMS software

a. CPU state switches are provided at the RPMS cabinets.

b. CPU state switches at the RPMS cabinets restrict modifications to the RPMS software.

621


80

I06 Model Class 1E XXXX equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E XXXX equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Equipment identified as Class 1E in Table x.x.x-x can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

4.06

I06 2.4.1 4.10 Class 1E PS equipment listed in Table 2.4.1-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E PS equipment listed in Table 2.4.1-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



416

I06 2.4.2 4.4 Class 1E SICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.2-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E SICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.2-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



447

I06 2.4.4 4.1 Class 1E SAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.4-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E SAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.4-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



466

I06 2.4.5 4.3 Class 1E PACS equipment listed in Table 2.4.5-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E PACS equipment listed in Table 2.4.5-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



497

I06 2.4.11 4.2 Class 1E BCMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E BCMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



541

I06 2.4.13 4.1 Class 1E CRDCS equipment listed in Table 2.4.13-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI,

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E CRDCS equipment

Equipment identified as Class 1E in Table 2.4.13-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and


549


81

ESD, and power surges. listed in Table 2.4.13-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

power surges.

I06 2.4.14 4.1 Class 1E HMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E HMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



558

I06 2.4.17 4.1 Class 1E EIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.17-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E EIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.17-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



565

I06 2.4.19 4.1 Class 1E ICIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.19-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E ICIS equipment listed in Table 2.4.19-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



574

I06 2.4.22 4.4 Class 1E RMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.22-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E RMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.22-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



585

I06 2.4.25 4.5 Class 1E SCDS equipment listed in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E SCDS equipment listed in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



607

I06 2.4.26 4.4 Class 1E RPMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.26-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E RPMS equipment listed in Table 2.4.26-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.



619


82

I06a 2.4.5 4.9 Non-Class 1E PACS communication module associated with Class 1E PACS equipment will not cause a failure of a PACS priority module when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the non-Class 1E PACS communication module associated with Class 1E PACS equipment will not cause a failure of a PACS priority module when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

Non-Class 1E PACS communication module associated with Class 1E PACS equipment will not cause a failure of a PACS priority module when subjected to EMI, RFI, ESD, and power surges.

503

I06a 2.4.9 3.3 PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 can function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

PAS equipment listed in Table 2.4.9-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

527

I06a 2.4.10 3.6 PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10-1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

Type tests or type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that the PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10 1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

PICS equipment listed in Table 2.4.10 1 can perform its safety function when subjected to EMI and RFI.

535

I07 Model Communications independence is provided between the XXXX divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that communications independence is provided between the XXXX divisions.

Communications independence between the XXXX divisions is provided by: • The XXXX function processors do not


• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the XXXX function processor.

• The XXXX function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The XXXX function processors operate asynchronously from the XXXX communications module.

4.07

I07 2.4.1 4.4 Communications independence is provided between the PS divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that

Communications independence between the PS divisions is provided by: • The PS function processors do not

interface directly with a network.

410


83

communications independence is provided between the PS divisions.

Separate PS communication modules interface directly with the network.

• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the PS function processor.

• The PS function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The PS function processors operate asynchronously from the PS communications module.

I07 2.4.4 4.8 Communications independence is provided between the SAS divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that communications independence is provided between the SAS divisions.

Communications independence between the SAS division is provided by: • The SAS function processors do not


• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the SAS function processor.

• The SAS function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

• The SAS function processors operate asynchronously from the SAS communications module.

473

I07 2.4.26 4.7 Communications independence is provided between the RPMS divisions.

Tests using test input signals, analyses, or a combination of tests using test input signals and analyses will be performed to verify that communications independence is provided between the RPMS divisions.

Communications independence between the RPMS divisions is provided by: • The RPMS function processors do not


• Separate send and receive data channels are used in both the communications module and the RPMS function processor.

• The RPMS function processors operate in a strictly cyclic manner.

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84

• The RPMS function processors operate asynchronously from the RPMS communications module.

I08 Model Communications independence is provided between XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the XXXX equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence between XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment is provided by: • Data communications between XXXX






• The XXXX uses a hardware device to ensure that unidirectional signals are sent to non-safety-related I&C systems.

4.08

I08 2.4.1 4.17 Communications independence is provided between PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the PS equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence is provided between PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment by: • Data communications between PS




• The MSI operates in a strictly cyclic

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85

manner. • The MSI operates asynchronously from

the communications module. • The PS uses a Class 1E hardware

device to send unidirectional signals to non-safety-related I&C systems.

I08 2.4.4 4.9 Communications independence is provided between SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the SAS equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence between SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment is provided by: • Data communications between SAS






• The SAS uses a hardware device to ensure that unidirectional signals are sent to non-safety-related I&C systems.

474

I08 2.4.26 4.13 Communications independence is provided between RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses will be performed on the RPMS equipment to verify that communications independence is provided between RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

Communications independence between RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment is provided by: • Data communications between RPMS



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86




• The RPMS uses a hardware device to ensure that unidirectional signals are sent to non-safety-related I&C systems.

I09 Model Electrical isolation is provided on connections between XXXX divisions to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices on connections between the XXXX divisions.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built XXXX divisions.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between XXXX divisions prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between XXXX divisions.

4.09

I09 2.4.1 4.16 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between the PS divisions to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices on connections between the PS divisions.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built PS divisions.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between PS divisions prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between PS divisions.

422

I09 2.4.2 4.2 Electrical isolation is provided between the Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between the as-built Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used on between Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between the Class 1E electrical divisions that power the controls and indications of the SICS.

108 4.2 The ITA and AC in part a. do not appear aligned with one another. Was it intended to qualify electrical isolation devices in the part a. ITA? Yes

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87

indications of the SICS. I09 2.4.4 4.6 Electrical isolation is provided on

connections between the SAS divisions to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices on connections between the SAS divisions.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built SAS divisions.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between SAS divisions prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between SAS divisions.

471

I10 Model Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E XXXX equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

4.1

I10 2.4.1 4.8 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E PS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

414

I10 2.4.2 4.3 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.


a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E

109 4.3 The ITA and AC in part a. do not appear aligned with one another. Was it intended to qualify electrical isolation devices in the part a. ITA ? Yes

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on connections between as-built Class 1E SICS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

equipment.

I10 2.4.2 4.6 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between the as-built RSS and the MCR for the SICS.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between the RSS and the MCR for the SICS.

449

I10 2.4.4 4.7 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E SAS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

472

I10 2.4.5 4.2 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E PACS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

496

I10 2.4.10 3.4 Electrical isolation is provided on PICS connections between the RSS and the MCR to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between PICS connections

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between PICS connections between the RSS and the MCR prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

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89

between the RSS and the MCR. b. An inspection will be performed

on connections between the as-built RSS and the as-built MCR.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between the RSS and the MCR.

I10 2.4.25 4.4 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E SCDS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

171 4.4 Define 'properly connected.'

No change required, 'properly connected' not used in this ITAAC.

606

I10 2.4.26 4.10 Electrical isolation is provided on connections between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment to prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the electrical isolation devices between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

b. An inspection will be performed on connections between as-built Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

a. A report concludes that the Class 1E isolation devices used between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment prevent the propagation of credible electrical faults.

b. Class 1E electrical isolation devices exist on connections between Class 1E RPMS equipment and non-Class 1E equipment.

625

I11 Model Locking mechanisms are provided on the XXXX cabinet doors. XXXX cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the XXXX cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that XXXX cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the XXXX cabinet doors operate properly.

b. XXXX cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

4.11

I11 2.4.1 4.20 Locking mechanisms are provided on the PS cabinet doors. PS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the PS cabinet doors operate properly.

a. The locking mechanisms on the PS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. PS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator

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90

MCR. b. A test will be performed to verify that PS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.


I11 2.4.2 4.11 Locking mechanisms are provided on the SICS doors in the MCR and RSS. SICS doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the SICS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that SICS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the SICS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. SICS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

454

I11 2.4.4 4.12 Locking mechanisms are provided on the SAS cabinet doors. SAS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the SAS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that SAS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the SAS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. SAS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

477

I11 2.4.5 4.6 Locking mechanisms are provided on the PACS cabinet doors. PACS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the PACS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that PACS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the PACS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. PACS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

500

I11 2.4.11 4.3 Locking mechanisms are provided on the BCMS cabinet doors. BCMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the BCMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that BCMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the

a. The locking mechanisms on the BCMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. BCMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

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PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

I11 2.4.17 4.3 Locking mechanisms are provided on the EIS cabinet doors. EIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the EIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that EIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the EIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. EIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

567

I11 2.4.19 4.3 Locking mechanisms are provided on the ICIS cabinet doors. ICIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the ICIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that ICIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the ICIS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. ICIS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

576

I11 2.4.22 4.2 Locking mechanisms are provided on the RMS cabinet doors. RMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the RMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that RMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the RMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. RMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

583

I11 2.4.25 4.6 Locking mechanisms are provided on the SCDS cabinet doors. SCDS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed to verify that the locking mechanisms on the SCDS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that SCDS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The locking mechanisms on the SCDS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. SCDS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

608

I11 2.4.26 4.8 Locking mechanisms are provided on a. A test will be performed to verify a. The locking mechanisms on the RPMS 623


92

the RPMS cabinet doors. RPMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

that the locking mechanisms on the RPMS cabinet doors operate properly.

b. A test will be performed to verify that RPMS cabinet doors that are not closed are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

cabinet doors operate properly. b. RPMS cabinet doors that are not closed

are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

I12 Model The XXXX system design and application software are developed using a process composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following: 1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing



a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX basic design phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX detailed design phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX manufacturing phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX system integration and testing phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX installation and commissioning phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the XXXX final documentation phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the basic design phase of the XXXX.

b. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the detailed design phase of the XXXX.

c. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the manufacturing phase of the XXXX.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the system integration and testing phase of the XXXX.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the installation and commissioning phase of the XXXX.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the final documentation phase of the XXXX.

4.12

I12 2.4.1 4.14 The PS design and application software are developed using a process

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the Basic

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composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following: 1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing



Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Manufacturing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS System Integration and Testing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Installation and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PS Final Documentation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

Design Phase of the PS. b. A report concludes that the outputs

conform to requirements of the Detailed Design Phase of the PS.

c. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Manufacturing Phase of the PS.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the System Integration and Testing Phase of the PS.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Installation and Commissioning Phase of the PS.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Final Documentation Phase of the PS.

I12 2.4.4 4.5 The SAS design and application software are developed using a process composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following: 1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing


Phase.

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Manufacturing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS System Integration and Testing

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the Basic Design Phase of the SAS.

b. A report concludes that the outputs conform to requirements of the Detailed Design Phase of the SAS.

c. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Manufacturing Phase of the SAS.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the System Integration and Testing Phase of the SAS.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the

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6. Final Documentation Phase. Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Installation and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the SAS Final Documentation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

Installation and Commissioning Phase of the SAS.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Final Documentation Phase of the SAS.

I12 2.4.9 3.2 The PAS design is accomplished through a phased approach which includes the following (or equivalent) phases: 1. Software Basic Design Phase. 2. Software Detailed Design Phase. 3. Software Integration and Validation


Commissioning Phase.

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PAS Software Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PAS Software Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PAS Software Integration and Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PAS Site Acceptance Test and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

a. A report concludes that the outputs for the PAS Software Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. A report concludes that the outputs for the PAS Software Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. A report concludes that the outputs for the PAS Software Integration and Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. A report concludes that the outputs for the PAS Site Acceptance Test and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

526

I12 2.4.10 3.2 The PICS design is accomplished through a phased approach which includes the following (or equivalent) phases: 1. Software Basic Design Phase. 2. Software Detailed Design Phase. 3. Software Integration and Validation

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software Basic Design Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software Detailed Design

a. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software Basic Design Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software Detailed Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

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Installation and Commissioning Phase.

1. System Requirements Phase. 2. System Design Phase. 3. Software/Hardware Requirements




Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software Integration and Validation Software/Hardware Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Site Acceptance Test and Installation and Commissioning Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the PICS Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software Integration and Validation software/hardware requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Site Acceptance Test and Installation and Commissioning Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. A report concludes that the outputs for the PICS Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

I12 2.4.24 3.1 The DAS design is accomplished through a phased approach which includes the following (or equivalent) phases: 1. System Requirements Phase. 2. System Design Phase. 3. Software/Hardware Requirements

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS System Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the

a. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

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96




DAS System Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS System Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the DAS System Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Requirements Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Implementation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS Software/Hardware Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

g. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Integration Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

h. A report concludes that the outputs for the DAS System Validation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

I12 2.4.26 4.3 The RPMS design and application software are developed using a process composed of six lifecycle phases, with each phase having outputs which must conform to the requirements of that phase. The six lifecycle phases are the following:

a. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Basic Design Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

b. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the

a. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Basic Design Phase of the RPMS.

b. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Detailed Design Phase of the RPMS.

c. A report concludes that the outputs

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97

1. Basic Design Phase. 2. Detailed Design Phase. 3. Manufacturing Phase. 4. System Integration and Testing



RPMS Detailed Design phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

c. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Manufacturing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

d. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS System Integration and Testing Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

e. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Installation and Commissioning Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

f. Analyses will be performed to verify that the outputs for the RPMS Final Documentation Phase conform to the requirements of that phase.

conform to the requirements of the Manufacturing Phase of the RPMS.

d. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the System Integration and Testing Phase of the RPMS.

e. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Installation and Commissioning Phase of the RPMS.

f. A report concludes that the outputs conform to the requirements of the Final Documentation Phase of the RPMS.

I13 Model The XXXX is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

XXXX. • Failures caused by the single



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the XXXX at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the XXXX is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

XXXX. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions


4.13

I13 2.4.1 4.18 The PS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following:

A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the PS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the PS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following:

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• Single detectable failures within the PS.



• Single detectable failures within the PS.



I13 2.4.2 4.10 The SICS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SICS. • Failures caused by the single



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the SICS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the SICS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SICS. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions


453

I13 2.4.4 4.10 The SAS is designed so that safety-related functions required for AOOs or PAs are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SAS. • Failures caused by the single



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the SAS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the SAS is designed so that safety-related functions required for AOOs or PAs are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the SAS. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions


117 4.10. The CW and AC do not adequately convey that all SAS functionality, such as EAS functions, are verified.

No change required.

475

I13 2.4.5 4.11 The PACS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the PACS. • Failures caused by the single


A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the PACS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the PACS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single failures within the PACS. • Failures caused by the single failure. • Failures and spurious system actions

that cause or are caused by the AOO or

505


99


PA requiring the safety function.

I13 2.4.11 4.4 The BCMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

BCMS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the BCMS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the BCMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the

BCMS concurrent with identifiable but non-detectable failures.



543

I13 2.4.13 4.6 The CRDCS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the CRDCS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the CRDCS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




554

I13 2.4.17 4.4 The EIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the



A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the EIS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the EIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the



568


100



I13 2.4.19 4.4 The ICIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the ICIS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the ICIS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




577

I13 2.4.22 4.3 The RMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the RMS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the RMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




584

I13 2.4.25 4.7 The SCDS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the


• Failures caused by the single

A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the SCDS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the SCDS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the



609


101




I13 2.4.26 4.9 The RPMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




A failure modes and effects analysis will be performed on the RPMS at the level of replaceable modules and components.

A report concludes that the RPMS is designed so that safety-related functions required for an AOO or PA are performed in the presence of the following: • Single detectable failures within the




624

I14 Model Equipment markings for each XXXX division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

An inspection will be performed on the as-built XXXX equipment to verify that the equipment markings for each XXXX division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

Equipment markings for each XXXX division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

4.14

I14 2.4.1 4.19 Equipment markings for each PS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

An inspection will be performed on the as-built PS equipment to verify that the equipment markings for each PS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

Equipment markings for each PS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

425

I14 2.4.4 4.11 Equipment markings for each SAS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

An inspection will be performed on the as-built SAS equipment to verify that the equipment markings for each SAS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

Equipment markings for each SAS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

476

I14 2.4.5 4.7 Equipment markings for each PACS division are distinctly identified and

An inspection will be performed on the as-built PACS equipment to

Equipment markings for each PACS division are distinctly identified and

501


102

distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

verify that the equipment markings for each PACS division are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the equipment.

distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the equipment.

I14 3.6 2.1 Equipment markings for Class 1E divisions cables and raceways are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the Class 1E divisions cables and raceways.

An inspection will be performed on the as--built Class 1E divisions cables and raceways to verify that the equipment markings for each Class 1E division cable and raceway are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other markings placed on the Class 1E division cable and raceway.

Equipment markings for each Class 1E division cable and raceway are distinctly identified and distinguishable from other identifying markings placed on the Class 1E division cable and raceway.

1296

I15 Model The XXXX receives input signals from the sources listed in Table x.x.x-x.

A test will be performed to verify that the XXXX receives input signals from the sources listed in Table x.x.x-x by the use of test input signals.

The XXXX receives input signals from the sources listed in Table x.x.x-x.

4.15

I15 2.4.13 4.2 The CRDCS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.13-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the CRDCS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.13-2 by the use of test input signals.

The CRDCS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.13-2.

550

I15 2.4.25 4.1 The SCDS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.25-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the SCDS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.25-2 by the use of test input signals.

The SCDS receives the input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.25-2.

603

I15 2.4.26 4.1 The RPMS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.26-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the RPMS receives input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.26-2 by the use of test input signals.

The RPMS receives the input signals from the sources listed in Table 2.4.26-2.

616

I16 Model The XXXX provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table x.x.x-x.

A test will be performed to verify that the XXXX provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table x.x.x-x.

The XXXX provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table x.x.x-x.

4.16

I16 2.4.4 4.3 The SAS provides output signals to the A test will be performed to verify The SAS provides output signals to the 468


103

recipients listed in Table 2.4.4-3. that the SAS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.4-3.

recipients listed in Table 2.4.4-3.

I16 2.4.11 4.1 The BCMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.11-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the BCMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.11-2.

The BCMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.11-2.

540

I16 2.4.13 4.5 The CRDCS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.13-3.

A test will be performed to verify that the CRDCS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.13-3.

The CRDCS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.13-3.

553

I16 2.4.14 4.2 The HMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.14-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the HMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.14-2.

The HMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.14-2.



559

I16 2.4.17 4.2 The EIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.17-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the EIS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.17-2.

The EIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.17-2.



566

I16 2.4.19 4.2 The ICIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.19-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the ICIS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.19-2.

The ICIS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.19-2.

575

I16 2.4.22 4.1 The RMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.22-2.

A test will be performed to verify that the RMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.22-2.

The RMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.22-2.

582

I16 2.4.25 4.2 The SCDS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.25-3.

A test will be performed to verify that the SCDS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.25-3.

The SCDS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.25-3.

604

I16 2.4.26 4.2 The RPMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.26-3.

A test will be performed to verify that the RPMS provides the output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.26-3.

The RPMS provides output signals to the recipients listed in Table 2.4.26-3.

617

I17 Model Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the XXXX. The hardwired disconnects

a. An inspection of the as-built hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI

a. Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the XXXX.

4.17


104

prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the XXXX.

of the XXXX will be performed. b. A test of the hardwired

disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the XXXX will be performed.

b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the XXXX.

I17 2.4.1 4.25 Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the PS.

a. An inspection of the as-built hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS will be performed.

b. A test of the hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS will be performed.

a. Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the PS.

b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the PS.

431

I17 2.4.4 4.17 Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the SAS. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the SAS.

a. An inspection of the as-built hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the SAS will be performed.

b. A test of the hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the SAS will be performed.

a. Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the SAS.

b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the SAS.

482

I17 2.4.26 4.5 Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of SU to more than a single division of the RPMS.

a. An inspection of the as-built hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS will be performed.

b. A test of the hardwired disconnects between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS will be performed.

a. Hardwired disconnects exist between the SU and each divisional MSI of the RPMS.

b. The hardwired disconnects prevent the connection of the SU to more than a single division of the RPMS.

620

I18 Model The XXXX is capable of performing its safety function when XXXX equipment is in maintenance bypass. Bypassed XXXX equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test of the XXXX will be performed to verify the maintenance bypass functionality.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify bypassed XXXX equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The XXXX can perform its safety functions when XXXX equipment is in maintenance bypass.

b. Bypassed XXXX equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

4.18

I18 2.4.1 4.5 The PS is capable of performing its safety function when PS equipment is

a. A test of the PS will be performed to verify the maintenance bypass

a. The PS can perform its safety functions when PS equipment is in maintenance

99 4.5 Why are test input signals required? 411


105

in maintenance bypass. Bypassed PS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

functionality. b. A test will be performed using

test input signals to verify bypassed PS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

bypass. b. Bypassed PS equipment is indicated on

the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

I18 2.4.4 4.14 The SAS is capable of performing its safety function when SAS equipment is in maintenance bypass. Bypassed SAS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test of the SAS will be performed to verify the maintenance bypass functionality.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify bypassed SAS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The SAS can perform its safety functions when SAS equipment is in maintenance bypass.

b. Bypassed SAS equipment is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

Why are test input signals required? 479

I19 Model The XXXX generates automatic ZZZ signals for the input variables listed in Table x.x.x-x. The ZZZ signals remain following removal of the input signal. The ZZZ signals are removed when input signals that represent the completion of the ZZZ function are present. Deliberate operator action is required to return the XXXX to normal.

A test will be performed on the XXXX using test input signals to verify that a ZZZ signal is generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.x.x-x when a test input signal reaches the trip limit.

The XXXX generates an ZZZ signal after the test input signal reaches the trip limit for the input variables listed in Table x.x.x-x. The ZZZ signals remain following removal of the test input signal. The ZZZ signals are removed when test input signals that represent the completion of the ZZZ function are present. Deliberate operator action is required to return the XXXX to normal.

4.19

I19 2.4.1 4.1 The PS generates automatic RT functions for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-2.

a. A test will be performed on the PS using test input signals to verify that an RT signal is generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-2 when a test input signal reaches the trip limit.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the RT breakers open when a trip limit in the PS is reached.

a. The PS generates an RT signal after the test input signal reaches the trip limit for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-2.

b. The RT breakers open after the PS reaches the trip limit for one RT function.

Tag numbers will be added to Table 2.4.1-2. 407

I19 2.4.1 4.2 The PS generates automatic ESF functions for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-3 when the trip limit is reached. The ESF functions remain following removal of the input signal. The ESF functions are removed when input signals that represent the

A test will be performed on the PS using test input signals to verify that automatic ESF functions is are generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-3 when a test input signal reaches the trip limit is

The PS generates an ESF function after the test input signal reaches when the trip limit is reached for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.1-3. The ESF functions remain following removal of the test input signal. The ESF functions are removed when the ESF functions are manually reset.


408


106

completion of the ESF functions are presentmanually reset. Deliberate operator manual action is required to return the safety systems to normal.

reached. Deliberate manual action is required to return the safety systems to normal.

I19 2.4.4 4.18 The SAS generates automatic ESF and EAS functions for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.4-2 when the trip limit is reached. The ESF and EAS functions remain following removal of the input signal. The ESF and EAS functions are removed when input signals that represent the completion of the ESF and EAS functions are present. Deliberate operator action is required to return the safety systems to normal.

A test will be performed on the SAS using test input signals to verify that automatic ESF and EAS functions is are generated for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.4-2 when a test input signal reaches the trip limit is reached.

The SAS generates an ESF and EAS function after the test input signal reaches when the trip limit is reached for the input variables listed in Table 2.4.4-2. The ESF and EAS functions remain following removal of the test input signal. The ESF and EAS functions are removed when the ESF and EAS functions are manually reset.Deliberate manual action is required to return the SAS to normal.


483

I19 2.4.24 3.3 The DAS generates signals for automatic actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2.

Tests will be performed using test input signals.

The DAS generates signals for automatic actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2.

596

I19 2.4.24 3.4 The DAS allows manual, system-level actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-3.

Tests will be performed using manual actuation test input signals.

The DAS allows manual actuation of the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-3.

166 3.4 Replace "test input signals" with "manual actuation signals".

597

I20 Model An interlock for the XXXX automatically YYYY.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically YYYY on a XXXX.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: XXXX automatically YYYY.

4.2

I20 2.4.1 4.13 The PS performs interlock functions listed in Table 2.4.1-6.

Tests will be performed on the PS using test input signals to verify operation of the interlocks.


419

I20 2.4.4 4.4 The SAS performs interlock functions listed in Table 2.4.4-3.

Tests will be performed on the SAS using test input signals to verify operation of the interlocks.


469

I20 2.7.1 4.4 An interlock for the CCWS low flow condition automatically opens the LHSI/RHR HX inlet valve.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically opens the LHSI/RHR HX inlet valve on a CCWS low flow condition.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • CCWS low flow condition

automatically opens the LHSI/RHR HX inlet valve.

978

I20 2.7.1 4.5 An interlock for the CCWS surge tank Tests will be performed using test The following interlock responds as 979


107

level of MIN3 automatically isolates the associated train common header switchover valves.

input signals to verify the interlock automatically isolates the associated train common header switchover valves on a CCWS surge tank level of MIN3.

specified below when activated by a test input signal: • CCWS surge tank level of MIN3

automatically isolates the associated train common header switchover valves.

I20 2.7.1 4.6 An interlock for the CCWS surge tank level of MIN4 automatically trips the associated CCWS pump and unlocks the common header switchover function to allow restoration of flow to the common users.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically trips the associated CCWS pump and unlocks the common header switchover function to allow restoration of flow to the common users on a CCWS surge tank level of MIN4.

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • CCWS surge tank level MIN4

automatically trips the associated CCWS pump.

• CCWS surge tank level MIN4 automatically unlocks the common header switchover sequence. This interlock to be verified by performing a switchover function to allow restoration of flow to the common users.

980

I20 2.7.1 4.7 An interlock for the CCWS low surge tank level of MIN2 and when the supply flow rate to the NAB and the RWB is greater than the flow rate from NAB and RWB automatically isolates the non-safety-related branch.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically isolates the non-safety-related branch on a CCWS low surge tank level of MIN2 and when the supply flow rate to the NAB and the RWB is greater than the flow rate from NAB and RWB.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • A CCWS low surge tank level of MIN2

and the supply flow rate to NAB and RWB is greater than the flow rate from NAB and RWB automatically isolates the non-safety-related branch.

981

I20 2.7.1 4.8 An interlock for the loss of one CCWS train automatically initiates a switchover to allow cooling of the common “a” and/or “b” headers.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically initiates a switchover to allow cooling of the common “a” and/or “b” headers on loss of one CCWS train.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Loss of one CCWS train automatically

initiates a switchover to allow cooling of the common “a” and/or “b” headers.

982

I20 2.7.1 4.10 An interlock for the CCWS train separation to RCP thermal barriers requires CIVs associated with one common header to be closed before the other common header CIVs can be opened.


with common header 1 will not

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Thermal barrier CIVs associated with

common header 1 will not open while CIVs associated with common header 2

Clarify the ITA wording. "--- the interlock automatically initiates the following:"

984


108

open while CIVs associated with common header 2 are opened and vice versa.


are opened and vice versa. • Thermal barrier CIVs associated with

common header 1 will open when CIVs associated with common header 2 are closed and vice versa.

I20 2.7.1 4.11 An interlock for the manual or automatic actuation of a CCWS pump automatically actuates the corresponding ESWS pump.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically actuates the corresponding ESWS pump on manual or automatic actuation of a CCWS pump.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Manual or automatic actuation of a

CCWS pump automatically actuates the corresponding ESWS pump.

985

I20 2.7.1 4.13 An interlock for the CCWS train to maintain cooling to the RCP thermal barriers requires opening the CIVs associated with the closed common header, when a CIV on the opened common header is closed.


with the closed common header 1 will open when a CIV on the opened common header 2 closes.


The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Thermal barrier CIVs associated with

the closed common header 1 will open when a CIV on the opened common header 2 closes.


290 4.13 Clarify the ITA wording. "--- the interlock automatically initiates the following:"

987

I20 2.7.2 4.4 An interlock for the SCWS Division 1 and 2 or Division 3 and 4 cross-tied condition automatically starts the non-running division chiller and pump(s) if the running division chiller or pump(s) trip.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically starts the non-running division chiller and pump(s) if the running division chiller or pump(s) trip when the SCWS Division 1 and 2 or Division 3 and 4 are cross-tied.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • With SCWS Division 1 and 2 or

Division 3 and 4 cross-tied, the non-running division chiller and pump(s) automatically start if the running division chiller or pumps(s) trip.

1027

I20 2.7.11 4.4 An interlock for failure of one ESWS pump during normal operation results in a switchover to the other ESWS train and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically initiates the CCWS Switchover sequence on failure of one ESWS pump during normal

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • If one ESWS pump fails during normal

operation, a switchover to the other

1097


109

operation which results in a switchover to the other ESWS train.

ESWS train is carried out and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

I20 2.7.11 4.5 An interlock for a spurious closure of the ESWS pump discharge valve results in a switchover to the other ESWS train and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock automatically initiates the CCWS Switchover sequence on a spurious closure of the ESWS pump discharge valve which results in a switchover to the other ESWS train.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • A spurious closure of the ESWS pump

discharge valve results in a switchover to the other ESWS train and is automatically initiated by the CCWS Switchover sequence.

1098

I20 2.9.5 3.2 An interlock for the sump level sensors in the Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.9.5-1 trips the ESWS pump and closes the pump discharge valve in response to a flooding signal in the respective Safeguard Building.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the interlock for the sump level sensors automatically trips the ESWS pump and closes the pump discharge valve in response to a flooding signal in the respective Safeguard Building.

The following interlock responds as specified below when activated by a flooding test input signal: • The sump level sensors in each of the

Safeguard Buildings as listed in Table 2.9.5-1 trip the ESWS pump and close the pump discharge valve in response to a flooding signal in the respective Safeguard Building.

1247

I21 Model Interlocks for the XXXX initiate the following: • Opening • Opening • Opening

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify interlocks initiate the following: • Opening • Opening • Opening

The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Opening • Opening • Opening

4.21

I21 2.2.3 4.4 Interlocks for the SIS/RHRS initiate the following: • Opening of the accumulator

injection path. • Opening authorization of the

residual heat removal system suction path from the reactor coolant system.

• Opening authorization of the hot leg safety injection path.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify interlocks initiate the following: • Opening of the accumulator

isolation valve. • Opening authorization of the

RHR 1st RCPB isolation valve and the RHR 2nd RCPB isolation valve.


The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Opening of the accumulator isolation

valve. • Opening authorization of the RHR 1st

RCPB isolation valve and the RHR 2nd RCPB isolation valve.


190


110

I21 2.2.6 4.4 Interlocks for the CVCS initiate the following: • Isolation of the charging pump

suction from the volume control tank and normal letdown path during a boron dilution event by closure of the boron dilution valves.


• Isolation of the letdown line on a Safety Injection actuation signal by closure of the RC pressure boundary valves.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the operation of the following interlocks initiate the following: • Isolation of the charging pump

suction from the volume control tank and normal letdown path by closure of the boron dilution valves.



The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by a test input signal: • Isolation of the charging pump suction

from the volume control tank and normal letdown path by closure of the boron dilution valves.



300

I21 2.7.1 4.12 Upon receipt of an SIS actuation signal, interlocks initiate the following:• Start operable CCWS pumps, if not

previously running. • Open LHSI HX isolation valves. • Open LHSI pump seal cooler



Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of an SIS actuation signal, interlocks initiate the following: • Start operable CCWS pumps, if

not previously running. • Open LHSI HX isolation valves. • Open LHSI pump seal cooler



The following interlocks respond as specified below when activated by an SIS actuation signal test input signal: • CCWS operable pumps start (if not

previously running). • LHSI HX isolation valves open. • LHSI pump seal cooler isolation valves

open. • Isolation valves for non-safety-related

users outside of Reactor Building close.

986


336 4.4 Typo in the AC 4th line - should be "SG valves" at end of line

1200

I22 Model Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table x.x.x-x responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon


Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table x.x.x-x responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the

4.22


111

the equipment reaching the requested state.

requested state.




112


A test will be performed using test input signals to verify equipment input by a PACS module responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module.


149




189




231

I22 2.2.5 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.2.5-2

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify equipment

Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.2.5-2 responds to

266


112

responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

controlled by a PACS module responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module.

the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.




299




333




361




396


113






730




801




823




840


114




869




891




918




936

I22 2.6.13 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.6.13-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify equipment controlled by a PACS module responds to the state requested and

Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 2.6.13-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS

951


115

to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module.

module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.




977




1026




1096




1143


116

state. I22 2.8.6 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by

a PACS module in Table 2.8.6-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.



1176




1199

I22 3.5 4.3 Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 3.5-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.


Equipment listed as being controlled by a PACS module in Table 3.5-2 responds to the state requested and provides drive monitoring signals back to the PACS module. The PACS module will protect the equipment by terminating the output command upon the equipment reaching the requested state.

1286

I23 Model During data communication, the ZZZ function processors receive only the pre-defined messages for that specific ZZZ function processor. Other messages are ignored.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages for that specific ZZZ function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the ZZZ function processors receive only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor and other messages are ignored.

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific ZZZ function processor.

b. The ZZZ function processors receive only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor. Other messages are ignored.

Please clarify the ITAAC . As written it implies that the PS function processors will only receive the pre-defined messages and, therefore how does it ignore others?

4.23

I23 2.4.1 4.27 During data communication, the PS function processors receive all

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific PS function

103 4.27 Please clarify the ITAAC . As written it implies that the PS function processors will only

433


117

messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific PS function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

for that specific PS function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the PS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. and oOther messages are ignored.

processor. b. The PS function processors receive all

messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

receive the pre-defined messages and, therefore how does it ignore others?

I23 2.4.4 4.19 During data communication, the SAS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific SAS function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages for that specific SAS function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the SAS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. and oOther messages are ignored.

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific SAS function processor.

b. The SAS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.


484

I23 2.4.26 4.12 During data communication, the RPMS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific RPMS function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.

a. An analysis will be performed to define the pre-defined messages for that specific RPMS function processor.

b. A test will be performed to verify that the RPMS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. and oOther messages are ignored.

a. A report defines the pre-defined messages for that specific RPMS function processor.

b. The RPMS function processors receive all messages, but only the pre-defined messages for that specific function processor are considered valid and used. Other messages are ignored.


627

I24 2.4.1 4.22 The operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and Table 2.4.1-3 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored

variable.

An analysis will be performed to demonstrate that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and Table 2.4.1-3 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods:

A report concludes that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and Table 2.4.1-3 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored variable. • By introducing and varying, a

428


118

• By introducing and varying, a substitute input of the same nature as the measured variable.



• By perturbing the monitored variable.

• By introducing and varying, a substitute input of the same nature as the measured variable.






I24 2.4.4 4.15 The operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.4-2 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored





Analysis will be performed to demonstrate that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.4-2 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored





A report concludes that the operational availability of each input variable listed in Table 2.4.4-2 can be confirmed during reactor operation including post-accident periods by one of the following methods: • By perturbing the monitored variable. • By introducing and varying, a




480

I25 Miscellaneous Inspection 4.24

I25 2.4.4 4.21 SAS connections to the SICS are hardwired for manual grouped controls.

An inspection will be performed to verify that as-built SAS connections to the SICS are hardwired for manual grouped controls.

SAS connections to the SICS are hardwired for manual grouped controls.

486

I25 2.4.10 3.8 Safety-related actuators located in multiple trains shall not be grouped

An inspection shall be performed to verify that as-built safety related

Safety related actuators located in multiple trains are not grouped together on PICS

537


119

together on PICS manual grouped commands.

actuators located in multiple trains are not grouped together on PICS manual grouped commands.

manual grouped commands.

I26 Miscellaneous Test 4.25

I26 2.4.1 4.3 The permissives listed in Table 2.4.1-5 provide operating bypass capability for the corresponding PS functions.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals for each function listed as being bypassed by an inhibited permissive in Table 2.4.1-5 to verify that each function is bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding inhibited permissive signal are present.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals for each function listed as being bypassed by a validated permissive in Table 2.4.1-5 to verify that each function is bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding validated permissive signal are present.

a. The functions listed as being bypassed by inhibited permissives in Table 2.4.1-5 are bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding inhibited permissive are present.

b. The functions listed as being bypassed by validated permissives in Table 2.4.1-5 are bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding validated permissive are present.

409

I26 2.4.1 4.9 The PS uses TXS system communication messages that are sent with a specific protocol.

A test will be performed on PS equipment to verify that PS communication messages are sent with a specific protocol.




performed so that if one of the checks

415


120

fails, the affected data are marked with an error status.

I26 2.4.5 4.1 The priority module prioritizes different system inputs in the following order from highest to lowest priority: • PS/DAS • SAS • SICS • PAS

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify PS signals received by each priority modules override other signals received by the priority module prioritizes different system inputs in the following order from highest to lowest priority:. • PS/DAS • SAS • SICS • PAS

The priority module prioritizes different system inputs in the following order from highest to lowest priority: • PS/DAS • SAS • SICS • PAS

Clarify the ITAAC to ensure priority logic for PACS module.

495

I26 2.4.5 4.5 The capability for testing of the PACS is provided while retaining the capability of the PACS to accomplish its safety function. PACS divisions in test are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify the capability for testing of the PACS is provided while retaining the capability to accomplish its safety function.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify bypassed SAS equipment are is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The capability for testing of the PACS is provided while retaining the capability of the PACS to accomplish its safety functions.

b. PACS divisions in test are indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

129 4.5 Why are test inputs signals required in part b.?

499

I26 2.4.5 4.8 The PACS provides a position indication signal to the SICS for each containment isolation valve (Type B PAM variable) listed in Table 2.4.5-2.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that the PACS provides position indication signals to the SICS for each containment isolation valve listed in Table 2.4.5-2.

The PACS provides a position indication signal to the SICS for each containment isolation valve listed in Table 2.4.5-2.

502

I26 2.4.5 4.10 The capability of 100% combinatorial testing of the PACS priority module is provided to preclude consideration of a software common cause failure.

A type test will be performed on the PACS priority module to preclude consideration of a software common cause failure.

The capability of 100% combinatorial testing of the PACS priority module is provided to preclude consideration of a software common cause failure.

504

I26 2.4.6 3.1 The PFAS is provided with both an electrically supervised primary and secondary power source that will transfer automatically to the secondary source upon loss of the primary source.

A test will be performed to verify the transfer of power of the PFAS from the primary source of power to the secondary source.

The PFAS is provided with an electrically supervised primary and secondary power source that will transfer automatically to the secondary source upon loss of the primary source.

510


121

I26 2.4.7 4.1 The SMS backup battery has capacity to power its instruments for continuous operation for a minimum of 25 minutesperiod of time.

A test will be performed to verify the SMS backup battery has capacity to power its instruments for continuous operation for a period of time.

The SMS has a backup battery that has a capacity for a minimum of 25 minutes of system operation.

135 4.1 Include '25 minutes' in the CW. 518

I26 2.4.8 2.3 Containment air cooler condensate flowrate sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify containment air cooler condensate flowrate sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Containment air cooler condensate flowrate sensors can detect a flow of 0.5 gpm.

138 2.3 Why use test input signals? 521

I26 2.4.8 2.4 MSL local humidity detection system supports main steam line leakage detection.

Tests, analyses, or combination of tests and analyses will be performed to verify MSL local humidity detection system supports main steam line leakage detection.

MSL local humidity detection system can detect MSL leakage of 0.1 gpm within 4 hours.

522

I26 2.4.13 4.3 Each RT contactor listed in Table 2.4.13-1 opens when an RT signal is received from the corresponding PS division.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that each RT contactor opens when an RT signal is received from the corresponding PS division.

Each RT contactor listed in Table 2.4.13-1 opens in response to a RT test input signal from the corresponding PS division.

551

I26 2.4.13 4.4 The CRDCS limits the RCCA bank withdrawal rate to a maximum value of 30 inches per minute or less.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify the maximum RCCA bank withdrawal rate.

The CRDCS limits the RCCA bank withdrawal rate to a maximum value of 30 inches per minute or less.

552

I26 2.4.26 4.11 The RPMS uses TXS system communication messages that are sent with a specific protocol.

A test will be performed on RPMS equipment to verify that RPMS communication messages are sent with a specific protocol.




performed so that if one of the checks

626


122

fails, the affected data are marked with an error status.

I26a 2.4.1 4.24 The PS response time from sensor output through equipment actuation to ALU output, including sensor delay, for the RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3 is less than the value required to satisfy the design basis safety analysis response time assumptions.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required response time from sensor to ALU output, including sensor delay for RT functions and ESF functions.

b. Tests, analyses, or a combination of tests and analysesTests will be performed on the PS equipment that contributes to RT and ESF to verify PS response times to verifyare less than the value required to satisfy the design basis safety analysis response time assumptions are satisfied.

a. A report identifies the required response time from sensor to ALU output, including sensor delay, which supports the safety analysis response time assumptions for the RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3.

b. A report concludes that PS response times are less than the value required to support the safety analysis response time assumptions for the RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3.

101 4.24 The ITAAC wording is not accurate. Response times are taken from the sensor to the completion of the protective action for that function - not the sensor to ALU output. Part b. should be through testing only.

430

I26a 2.4.24 3.5 The DAS response time from sensor output through equipment actuation for the functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2 is less than the value required to satisfy the diverse actuation function response time assumptions.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to verify DAS response times are less than the value required to satisfy the diverse actuation function response time assumptions.Deleted.

A report concludes that DAS response times are less than the value required to support the diverse actuation function response time assumptions for the DAS functions listed in Table 2.4.24-2.Deleted.

The ITAAC wording is not accurate. Response times are taken from the sensor to the completion of the protective action for that function - not the sensor to ALU output. Part b. should be through testing only.

598

I26b 2.4.9 3.4 The PAS provides self-diagnostic features for a real-time representation of system status.

A test will be performed that confirms that PAS performs self-diagnosis functions.

A report concludes that PAS software execution and hardware are monitored and switch-over to a redundant CU is initiated upon detection of a software or hardware failure.

528

I26b 2.4.10 3.7 The PICS provides self-diagnostic features for a real-time representation of system status.

A test will be performed that confirms that PICS performs self-diagnosis functions.

A report concludes that PICS software execution and hardware are monitored and switch-over to a fault-tolerant server unit is initiated upon detection of a software or hardware failure.

536

I27 Miscellaneous Analysis 4.26

I27 2.4.1 4.6 PS setpoints associated with the automatic RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and the automatic ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3 are determined using a methodology that addresses:

An analysis will be performed to verify that PS setpoints are determined using a documented methodology that addresses: • The determination of applicable

contributors to instrumentation

A report concludes that the PS setpoints associated with the automatic RT functions listed in Table 2.4.1-2 and the automatic ESF functions listed in Table 2.4.1-3 are determined using a documented methodology:

412


123

• The determination of applicable contributors to instrumentation loop errors.



loop errors. • The method in which the errors

are combined. • How the errors are applied to the


• For the determination of applicable contributors to instrument loop error.

• For combining instrument loop errors. • For how the errors are applied to the


I27 2.4.8 2.5 The Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

An analysis will be performed to verify that the sensitivity of the as built Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

A report concludes that the Reactor Building radiation monitor sensitivity of 3E-10 µCi/cc correlates to an ability to detect a leakage increase of 1 gpm within 1 hour.

346 4.3 An EGM was issued to the operating fleet to address changes in RCS activity that impact the ability to meet TS requirements similar to this ITAAC. The AC is missing the time requirements for detection and the assumed activity of the RCS coolant.

OK-AC

523

I27 2.4.9 3.1 Critical control functions and non-critical control functions are segmented in the PAS CUs.

An analysis will be performed to verify that critical control functions and non-critical control functions will be systematically located so that only one critical control function as well as different non-critical control functions are processed on each CU pair.

A report concludes that non-critical control functions are systematically located so that only one critical control function as well as different non-critical control functions are processed on each CU pair.

525

I27 2.4.24 3.2 The technology used by the DAS is a technology that is not microprocessor based.

An analysis will be performed to verify that the technology in the DAS is a technology that is not microprocessor based.

A report concludes the technology used by the DAS is a technology that is not microprocessor based.

595

I28 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 4.27

I28 2.4.1 4.28 For each AOO or PA, a primary and secondary RT function using different sensors as input are identified and assigned to different PS subsystems.

a. An analysis will be performed to identify the primary and secondary RT function for each AOO or PA.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify that for each AOO or PA, the primary and secondary RT function using different sensors as input are assigned to different as-built PS subsystems.

a. A report identifies the primary and secondary RT function for each AOO or PA.

b. For each AOO or PA, the primary and secondary RT function using different sensors as input are assigned to different PS subsystems.

434


124

I28 2.4.2 4.14 The SICS provides manual controls and indications in the MCR necessary to support FLEX mitigation strategies.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the manual controls and indications in the MCR necessary to support FLEX mitigation strategies.



a. A report identifies the manual controls and indications in the MCR necessary to support FLEX mitigation strategies.



457

I28 2.4.7 3.1 The SMS can compute the CAV and provides a display of the CAV on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. Type tests, tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests, tests, and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the SMS can compute the CAV.

b. Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify a display of CAV is indicated on the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

a. The SMS can compute the CAV. b. Displays of the CAV are indicated on

the PICS operator workstations in the MCR.

513

I28 2.4.7 3.2 The SMS equipment has a dynamic range that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the dynamic range of the SMS equipment allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

The SMS has a dynamic range of at least 1000:1 zero-to-peak and is able to record at least 1.0 g zero-to-peak.



514

I28 2.4.7 3.3 The SMS equipment has bandwidth that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the SMS equipment has bandwidth that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

The SMS has bandwidth of at least 0.2 to 50 Hertz.



515

I28 2.4.7 3.4 The SMS equipment has a sampling rate that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the SMS equipment has a sampling rate that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

The SMS has a sample rate of at least 200 samples per second in each of the three directions.



516

I28 2.4.7 3.5 The SMS equipment has a trigger threshold rate that allows measurement

Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be

The SMS has an trigger threshold actuating level that is adjustable and within the range


Is analysis required or can this be completed

517


125

of the effects of seismic events. performed to demonstrate the SMS equipment has a trigger threshold rate that allows measurement of the effects of seismic events.

of 0.001g and 0.02g. just by testing? Need analysis

The CW and AC don't appear to be aligned (trigger rate or actuating level?).

I28 2.7.6 4.1 The GFES provides the required suppression agent concentration within the required discharge timeframe and maintain the concentration for a period of time within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure for flame extinguishment.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the required suppression agent concentration for the GFES within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure for flame extinguishment.

b. Tests, analyses, or combination of tests and analyses will be performed to determine the GFES suppression agent concentration level and discharge times.

c. Tests, analyses, or combination of tests and analyses will be performed to determine the time the suppression agent concentration can be maintained.

a. A report determines the required suppression agent concentration for the GFES within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure for flame extinguishment.

b. The discharge time for the GFES required to achieve 95 percent of the minimum suppression agent concentration for flame extinguishment based on a 20 percent safety factor is a maximum of 10 seconds.

c. The suppression agent concentration for the GFES within the MCR sub-floor area enclosure is maintained for at least 15 minutes.

1069

I28 2.8.1 3.2 The turbine generator has diverse and independent overspeed protection systems.

a. An inspection and analysis will be performed on the as-built overspeed protection systems to verify that the turbine generator has diverse and independent overspeed protection systems.

b. Tests will be performed to verify the overspeed and backup overspeed protection systems trip the turbine within design limits.

a. A report concludes that the turbine overspeed protection systems are diverse and independent by verifying: − Each system is designed and

manufactured by a different vendor. − Software used to transform the

analog speed signal into a digital signal is diverse between the two systems.

− Components, process inputs and process outputs are not shared between the two systems.

− The two systems are installed in separate cabinets.

− The two systems are powered by separate power sources.

b. Overspeed and backup overspeed turbine trips occur within the design limits for the systems listed in Table

1123


126

2.8.1-2. I28 3.7 2.2 Type A, B, and C PAM

instrumentation is designed and qualified based on the level of importance of the instrument type that each instrument supports.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the performance, design, and qualification criteria for each Type A, B, and C PAM instrument based on the level of importance of the instrument type that each instrument supports.

b. Inspections, tests, or analyses will be performed to verify that the Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation meets the performance, design, and qualification criteria.

a. A report documents the performance, design, and qualification, criteria for each Type A, B, and C PAM instrument.

b. A report concludes that the Type A, B, and C PAM instrumentation meets the performance, design, and qualification criteria.

1299

I28b 2.4.1 4.26 PS self-test features are capable of detecting and responding to faults consistent with the design requirements of PS.

a. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that faults requiring detection through self-test features are detected by the PS equipment.

b. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that upon detection of faults through self-test features, the PS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

a. A report concludes that the PS equipment is capable of detecting faults required to be detected by self-test features.

b. A report concludes that upon detection of faults through self-test features, the PS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

102 4.26 Please restore the previously approved ITAAC wording in Rev 3. The wording is too vague. Specify that the self test features can detect and respond to faults consistent with the design requirements of PS.

432

I28b 2.4.4 4.20 SAS self-test features are capable of detecting and responding to faults consistent with the design requirements of SAS.

a. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that faults requiring detection through self-test features are detected by the SAS equipment.

b. Type tests, analyses or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate that upon detection of faults through self-test features,

a. A report concludes that the SAS equipment is capable of detecting faults required to be detected by self-test features.

b. A report concludes that upon detection of faults through self-test features, the SAS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

120 4.20. Please restore the previously approved ITAAC wording in Rev 3. The wording is too vague. Specify that the self test features can detect and respond to faults consistent with the design requirements of SAS.

485


127

the SAS equipment responds according to the type of fault.

M01 Model Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table x.x.x-x.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table x.x.x-x including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table x.x.x-x, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

General Comment 4

Wording for the standard seismic ITAAC does not correctly reflect the necessary requirements. The commitment wording (CW) is not correct. Table 2.2.1-1 (and all tables in general) do not identify all required safety functions for each component that must be maintained (e.g. pressure boundy integrity) prior to, during, and after the seismic event. Please revise the CW and acceptance criteria (AC) in part a. of the ITAAC to conclude as follows: " --- can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s)." The AC in part a. of the ITAAC should not include the phrase "including the time required to perform the listed function." This terminology is associated with Environmental Qualification. The inspection, tests & analysis (ITA) and AC in part b. should verify the SSC is installed in a condition bounded by the tested or anlyzed condition. Please modify both the ITA and AC to state "--- including anchorage, is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions."

3.01



b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment


b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.1-1, including



128

identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.1-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.









b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.3-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition





129

bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.


















130

withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.2.6-1.



Category I in Table 2.2.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.2.6-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.









a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.8-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the




131

Seismic Category I design requirements.







a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.3.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.3.1-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.







b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.3.3-1, including



132

identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.3.3-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.














133



















134

withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).



Category I in Table 2.4.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s) including the time required to perform the listed function.










a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.14-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s) including the time required to perform



135



the listed function. b. Inspection reports conclude that the





a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.17-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s) including the time required to perform the listed function.







b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.19-1, including anchorage, are installed per the



136

identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.4.19-1 to verify that theequipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.














137








M01 2.5.1 3.1 Equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.1-2 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.5.1-2.




b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.1-2, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsby the tested or analyzed condition.


M01 2.5.2 3.1 Equipment identified listed as Class 1E a. Type tests, analyses, or a a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the 189 3.1 General Comment 4 664


138

in Table 2.5.2-2 are qualified as Seismic Category I and can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).

combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.2-2 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.2-2 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.5.2-2 including the time required to perform the listed function.








M01 2.5.7 3.1 Equipment identified listed as Class 1E in Table 2.5.7-1 are qualified as Seismic Category 1 and can withstand seismic design basis loads without a

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s)



139

loss of safety function(s). 2.5.7-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


including the time required to perform the function.


M01 2.5.9 2.1 Lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS can withstand seismic design basis loads without affecting plant safety function(s).

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Seismic qualification reports (SQDP, EQDP, or analyses) conclude that lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS can withstand seismic design basis loads without affecting safety a loss of the function(s).

b. Inspection reports conclude that lighting fixtures in the MCR and RSS, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.





a. Tests/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of safety function(s).

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.10-1, including anchorage, are installed per



140

of the as-built equipment identified as Class 1E Seismic Category I in Table 2.5.10-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.









b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.3-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage,





141

are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

analyzed condition.














142













M01 2.6.8 3.4 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2can withstand seismic design basis



143

function(s) listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2.

Category I in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 including the time required to perform the listed function.









a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.13-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design




144

requirements. b. An inspection will be performed

of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.6.13-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.









M01 2.7.2 3.4 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.7.2-1.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.7.2-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3, including anchorage, are installed per



145

in Tables 2.7.2-1 and 2.7.2-3 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.







M01 2.7.11 3.18 The UHS fans are capable of withstanding the effects of tornado including differential pressure effects, overspeed, and the impact of differential pressure effects on other equipment located within the cooling tower structure (e.g., capability to function, potential to become missile/debris hazard).

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the UHS fans using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the tornado design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built UHS fans to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the UHS fans can withstand tornado design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the UHS fans, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.


M01 2.8.2 3.3 Equipment identified as Seismic a. Type tests, analyses, or a a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the 326 3.3 General Comment 4 1130


146

Category I in Table 2.8.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.8.2-1.

combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.8.2-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.8.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.8.2-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.









a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.8.7-1 using analytical assumptions, or under

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.8.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 2.8.7-1 including the



147

conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.


time required to perform the listed function.








M01 2.10.1 2.2 Non-Seismic Category I Eequipment identified in Table 2.10.1-1 will not impair the ability is designed to prohibit unacceptable interaction or failure of Seismic Category I SSC to perform their safety function(s).

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category II design requirements.


a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without impairing the ability of Seismic Category I SSC a loss of the function listed in Table 2.10.1-1, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the



148

of the as-built equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1 to verify that the components, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

equipment identified as non-Seismic Category I in Table 2.10.1-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

M01 3.5 3.4 Equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 3.5-1.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 to verify that the equipment, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without a loss of the safety function(s) listed in Table 3.5-1 including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that the equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 3.5-1, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirementsin a condition bounded by the tested or analyzed condition.


M01 3.9 2.1 Non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC will not impair the ability of the Seismic Category I SSC to perform their intended safety function.

a. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC using analytical assumptions, or under conditions, which bound the Seismic Category I design requirements.

b. An inspection and analysis will be performed of the to confirm that as-built non-Seismic Category I SSC will not impair the ability of

a. Test/analysis reports conclude that non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC can withstand seismic design basis loads without impairing the ability of the Seismic Category I SSC to perform their intended safety function.

b. Inspection reports conclude that non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC, including anchorage, are installed per the



149

Seismic Category I SSC to perform their safety functionSSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC verify that non-Seismic Category I SSC, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

approved design requirements. A report exists that concludes that a non-Seismic Category I SSC located within a potential impact zone of a Seismic Category I SSC will not impair the ability of the Seismic Category I SSC to perform its safety function as demonstrated by one of the following criteria: • Seismic Category I SSC are isolated

from non-Seismic Category I SSC so that interaction does not occur.

• Seismic Category I SSC are analyzed to confirm that its safety function is not lost as a result of impact from a non-Seismic Category I SSC.

• A Seismic Category II restraint system designed to Seismic Category I requirements is used to verify that no interaction occurs between the Seismic Category I SSC and the non-Seismic Category I SSC.

M02 Model ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems and components listed in Table x.x.x-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table x.x.x-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}

3.02

M02 2.1.1-8 2.28 The RCB liner and penetration assemblies are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Division 2, Class MC requirements.

a. An analysis of ASME Code Section III Design Reports for the RCB liner and penetration assemblies will be performed.

b. An inspection will be performed for the existence of ASME Code Section III Construction Report for the as-built RCB liner and penetration assemblies,

a. ASME Code Section III Design Report (NCA-3550) concludes that the design of the RCB liner and penetration assemblies complies with ASME Code Section III, Division 2, Class MC requirements.

b. ASME Code Section III Construction Report (NCA-3454) exists for the RCB liner and penetration assemblies,

45

M02 2.2.1 3.16 As-built RPV internals listed as ASME An inspection of the as-built ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that 95


150

Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.RPV internals listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG requirements.

construction activities and documentation for RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 will be conducted.An inspection of RPV internals design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG will be performed. {{DAC}}

conclude that RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG.ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the RPV internals complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG. {{DAC}}



ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping and components listed in Table 2.2.1-1 system complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}



An inspection of piping design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed {{DAC}}





ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist(s) that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 2.2.3-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}



An inspection of piping design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed.

ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping



151

{{DAC}} system and components listed in Table 2.2.4-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}











ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 2.2.7-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}


M02 2.2.8 3.3 Deleted.ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Deleted.An inspection of piping design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed. {{DAC}}

Deleted.ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist(s) that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}


There are no piping systems in the table, are you referring to the transfer tube? Please clarify ITAAC.

343

M02 2.3.3 3.14 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems and components listed in Table 2.3.3-1 are designed in accordance withASME Code Section III requirements.

An inspection of piping design and analysis documentation required by the ASME Code Section III will be performed.

ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping



152

{{DAC}} system and components listed in Table 2.3.3-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}

M02 2.5.4 3.21 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}










Class 1 is not applicable to CCW system IAW Tier 2. Delete Class 1 from the ITAAC

970





Class 1 and 2 are not applicable to SCWs system IAW Tier 2, delete Class 1 from the ITAAC

1018



ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table



1080


153

2.7.11-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}




General Comment 2.

1131









M02 3.5 3.12 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping systems and components listed in Table 3.5-1 are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Section III Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550 and conclude that the design of the ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 piping system and components listed in Table 3.5-1 complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. {{DAC}}


M03 Model As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.


ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table

General Comment 2

Areva combined the ASME piping and component ITAAC into one ITAAC and also deleted reference to the Tier 1 Tables. The

3.03


154

2.x.x-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

Staff does not object to combining the piping ITAAC with the component ITAAC as ASME considers piping to be a component. However, the staff questions if Areva intended to take this action or thought the staff requested such action be taken based on prior discussions regarding the ASME ITAAC wording. The staff questions whether deletion of the referenced Tier 1 tables will impact closing the ITAAC.

General Comment 6

Add "complies with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III." to the end of the existing AC.


M03 2.1.1-8 2.29 As-built ASME Code Class MC liner and penetration assemblies are reconciled with the design requirements.

A reconciliation analysis of ASME Code Class MC liner and penetration assemblies will be performed.

ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class MC liner and penetration assemblies, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

46

M03 2.2.1 3.15 As-built RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.Deleted.

A reconciliation analysis of RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1 will be performed.Deleted.

ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for the as-built RPV internals listed as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.1-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III, Subsection NG.Deleted.

94





General Comment 6

105


155

Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.1-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.





General Comment 6

143



ASME Code Design Report(s) exist(s) that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.3-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.


General Comment 6

183





General Comment 6

225




General Comment 2

General Comment 6

260

M03 2.2.6 3.16 As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.6-1 are reconciled with the design


ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has

General Comment 2

General Comment 6

293


156

requirements. been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.6-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.



ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, and 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.7-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

General Comment 2

General Comment 6

327





General Comment 6

344





General Comment 6

391




724

M03 2.6.8 3.9 As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.6.8-1 are

A reconciliation analysis of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components

ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550,



157

reconciled with the design requirements.

will be performed. conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.6.8-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

General Comment 6





General Comment 6

Missing components in the CW . Class 1 is not applicable to CCW system IAW Tier 2. Delete Class 1 from the ITAAC.

There is a typo in the CW - missing the word 'components'.

971





General Comment 6


1019





General Comment 6


1081




General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1132


158




General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1165




General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1188

M03 3.5 3.13 As-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 are reconciled with the design requirements.


ASME Code Design Report(s) exist that meet the requirements of NCA-3550, conclude that the design reconciliation has been completed for as-built ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1, and document that the results of the reconciliation analysis comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

General Comment 2

General Comment 6

1279

M04 Model ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

General Comment 2


3.04





M04 2.2.2 3.17 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.2-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and documentation for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.2-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in



159

III requirements. conducted. accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

























M04 2.3.3 3.18 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 An inspection of the as-built ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that General Comment 2 394


160


construction activities and documentation for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be conducted.

conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.3.3-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.














974






1022






1084

M04 2.8.2 3.8 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.8.2-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section

An inspection of the as-built construction activities and documentation for ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components will be

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.8.2-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in



161

III requirements. conducted. accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.









M04 3.5 3.16 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


ASME Code Data Report(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.


M05 Model Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.


ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1.

General Comment 2


3.05

M05 2.2.1 3.17 Core support structure welds meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.

An inspection of the as-built core support structure welds will be performed.

ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of core support structure welds.

96





M05 2.2.2 3.15 Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.2-1 meet ASME

An inspection of the as-built pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components

ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of



162

Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.

will be performed. pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.2.2-1.

























The ITAAC CW is not consistent with the ITA and AC. Incorporate the CW into the acceptance criteria.

345


163


















972






1020






1082

M05 2.8.2 3.6 Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.8.2-1 meet ASME

An inspection of the as-built pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components

ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of



164

Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.

will be performed. pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.8.2-1.









M05 3.5 3.14 Pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.


ASME Code reports(s) exist that conclude that ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure-boundary welds in ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1.


M06 Model ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity at their design pressure.


ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.x.x-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

General Comment 2


3.06










165

























M06 2.3.3 3.17 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 2.3.3-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity

A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components that are required to be

ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3



166

at their design pressure. hydrostatically tested by the ASME Code Section III.

components listed in Table 2.3.3-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.














973






1021






1083






167









M06 3.5 3.15 ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 retain their pressure-boundary integrity at their design pressure.


ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and conclude that the results of the hydrostatic test of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components listed in Table 3.5-1 comply with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.


M12 Model Equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

3.11




798




820




837

M12 2.6.5 3.5 Equipment listed in Table 2.6.5-1 as An inspection of the as-built A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code 856


168

ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

construction activities and documentation for ASME AG-1 Code equipment will be conducted.

equipment listed in Table 2.6.5-1 are fabricated, installed, inspected, and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.




866




888




905

M12 2.6.9 3.6 Equipment listed in Table 2.6.9-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated, installed, inspected,. and tested in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.



933




948




1023

M13 Model Check valves listed in Table x.x.x-x will function to change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.


The check valves change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

3.12


169




81

M13 2.2.2 3.2 Check valves listed in Table 2.2.2-1 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of check valves to change position under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

The check valves change position as listed in Table 2.2.2-1 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

131




169




212




247




279




313




88 3.2 No check valves are listed in the table, yet based on the figure it appears there are check valves in the system. Note - these check valves are most likely tested by a freedom of motion test and not actual flow DP.

Table 2.3.3-1 will be revised to include the Containment Isolation Valves which are currently included in ITAAC Section 3.5. Table 2.3.3-2 will be revised accordingly to add

378


170

CIVs.




715




958




1006

M13 2.7.2 3.3 Check dampers listed in Table 2.7.2-3 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.7.2-3 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of check dampers to change position under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

The check dampers listed in Table 2.7.2-3 change position as listed in Table 2.7.2-3 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

1007




1077




1161

M13 3.5 3.2 Check valves listed in Table 3.5-1 will function to change position as listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal operating conditions.


The check valves change position as listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal operating conditions.

1268

M14 Model Class 1E valves listed in Table x.x.x-x will function to change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.


Class 1E valves listed in Table x.x.x-x change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

3.13




119


171




154




200




241




272




305




337




93 7.2 There are no valves listed in Table 2.3.3-2. Is this ITAAC necessary?


401

M14 2.5.4 6.5 Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 can perform the will function to change position as listed in Table 2.5.4-1 under normal operating conditions.



210 6.5 Typo in CW 2nd line 739

M14 2.6.8 3.2 Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.6.8-3 will function to change position as

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of Class 1E valves to change

Class 1E valves listed in Table 2.6.8-3 change position as listed Table 2.6.8-1

e. Table 2.6.8-4 (Containment Building Ventilation System ITAAC) in Revision 4 to the

900


172

listed in Table 2.6.8-1 under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

position under normal operating conditions.Deleted.

under normal operating conditions.Deleted. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 does not appear to include ITAAC to demonstrate the function of valves in the system under normal operating conditions. AREVA is requested to clarify whether ITAAC are included for valve function testing under normal operating conditions for the Containment Building Ventilation System.

Motor operated CIVs will be added to Table 2.6.8-3.




997




1034




1108




1150




1181




1204

M14 3.5 7.1 Class 1E valves listed in Table 3.5-2 will function to change position as listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal operating conditions.


Class 1E valves listed in Table 3.5-2 change position as listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal operating conditions.

1294


173

M15 Model Class 1E dampers listed in Table x.x.x-x will function to change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of Class 1E dampers to change position under normal operating conditions.

Class 1E dampers listed in Table x.x.x-x change position as listed in Table x.x.x-x under normal operating conditions.

3.14




794




816



Class 1E dampers change position as listed in Table 2.6.4-1 under normal operating conditions.

833

M15 2.6.5 3.1 The NABVS exhaust backdraft damper will function to change position as listed in Table 2.6.5-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

Tests will be performed to verify the ability of the NABVS exhaust backdraft damper to change position under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

The NABVS exhaust backdraft damper changes position as listed in Table 2.6.5-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

243 3.1 CW, ITA, and AC should reflect that 'Closed' is the correct alignment under emergency conditions.

No change, Function in the table is already listed as “Closed”

852

M15 2.6.6 3.2 Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.6-2 will function to change position as listed in Table 2.6.6-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.


Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.6-2 change position as listed in Table 2.6.6-1 under normal and post-accident operating conditions.

862




884




901

M15 2.6.9 3.2 Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.9-2 will function to change position as listed in 2.6.9-1 under normal operating conditions.


Class 1E dampers listed in Table 2.6.9-2 change position as listed in 2.6.9-1 under normal operating conditions.

929


174




944

M16 Model Pumps and valves listed in Table x.x.x-x will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.


A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table x.x.x-x are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

General Comment 3

(Ref. RAI 7022 & QME-1)

a. The revised ITAAC language in Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 is not consistent with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.206, Section C.II.1.2.3, ITAAC for Piping Systems and Components, which states that ITAAC verify that installed pumps and valves “have the capability to perform their intended functions under expected ranges of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis conditions.” AREVA is requested to revise the ITAAC for functional qualification of pumps and valves in the applicable Tier 1 tables of the U.S. EPR FSAR to be consistent with RG 1.206 and the previously acceptable ITAAC language in Revision 3 to the U.S. EPR FSAR.

3.15

M16 2.2.1 3.1 Pumps and vValves listed in Table 2.2.1-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.




M16 2.2.2 3.1 Valves listed in Table 2.2.2-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of

Tests or type tests of valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the

A report concludes that the valves listed in Table 2.2.2-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of



175

performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.


system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

M16 2.2.3 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.3-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions with debris-laden coolant fluids up to and including design basis accident conditions.

Tests or type tests of pumps and valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions with debris-laden coolant fluids up to and including design basis accident conditions.

A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.3-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions with debris-laden coolant fluids up to and including design basis accident conditions.






M16 2.2.5 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.5-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of

Tests or type tests of pumps and valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure,

A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table 2.2.5-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and



176

system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.









M16 2.3.3 3.1 Pumps and Vvalves listed in Table 2.3.3-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow,

Tests or type tests of pumps and valves will be performed to demonstrate that the pumps and valves function under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature

A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table 2.3.3-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the


b. The ITA column in ITAAC 3.1 of Tables 2.2.6-3 and 2.3.3-3 of Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 indicates pumps in the tests or type tests to be performed. AREVA is requested to discuss its approach in

377


177

ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.



establishing ITAAC for pumps with nonsafety-related functions listed in the Tier 1 tables of the U.S. EPR FSAR.









M16 2.7.1 3.1 Pumps and valves listed in Table 2.7.1-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each pump and valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full


A report concludes that the pumps and valves listed in Table 2.7.1-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and



178

range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.









M16 2.8.2 3.1 Valves listed in Table 2.8.2-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical


A report concludes that the valves listed in Table 2.8.2-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis



179

conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.

accident conditions.









M16 3.5 3.1 Valves listed in Table 3.5-1 will be functionally designed and qualified such that each valve is capable of performing its intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.


A report concludes that the valves listed in Table 3.5-1 are capable of performing their intended function for a full range of system differential pressure and flow, ambient temperatures, and available voltage (as applicable) under the full range of fluid flow, differential pressure, electrical conditions, and temperature conditions up to and including design basis accident conditions.


M17 Equipment identified as RW-IIa in An inspection and analysis will be A report concludes that the equipment 3.17


180

Table 2.x.x-1 can withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.

performed to verify the as-built equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.x.x-1 will withstand design basis loads.

identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.x.x-1 will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.

M17 2.8.7 3.2 Equipment identified as RW-IIc in Table 2.8.7-1 can withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built equipment identified as RW-IIc in Table 2.8.7-1 will withstand design basis loads.Deleted.

A report concludes that the equipment identified as RW-IIc in Table 2.8.7-1 will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

1185




1213




1216

M17 2.9.3 3.1 Equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.3-1 can withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.3-1 will withstand design basis loads.Deleted.

A report concludes that the equipment identified as RW-IIa in Table 2.9.3-1 will withstand design basis loads listed in Regulatory Guide 1.143 without a loss of structural integrity.Deleted.

1219

M18 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 3.18

M18 3.5 3.17 Containment isolation valves outside the containment as listed in Table 3.5-3 are located as close to the containment penetrations as practical, consistent with General Design Criteria 55, 56, and 57. with consideration of the following: • Access for inspection of welds. • Containment leak testing. • Replacement. Valve maintenance.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built location of outside containment isolation valves. {{DAC}}

A report concludes that the outside containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 are located as close to the containment penetrations as practical with consideration of the following: • Access for inspection of welds. • Containment leak testing. • Replacement. • Valve maintenance. {{DAC}}

1283

M18 3.8 2.1 Systems, structures, and componentsSSC that are required to be

a. An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis will be

a. An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis report exists and concludes the

360 2.1 Modify the start of ITA for part a. as follows: "An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis

1300


181

functional during and following an SSE are protected against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects associated with postulated failures in Seismic Category 1 and non-safety-related piping systems.

performed. {{DAC}} b. A reconciliation analysis will be

performed for as-built safety-related SSC protection features against high and moderate energy pipe failures.Inspections of as-built features for protection against pipe break will be performed.

c. Ananalyses will be performed to reconcile deviations with the pipe break hazards analysis.

plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe break with loss of offsite power. For postulated pipe breaks, the pipe break hazards analysis report confirms that: − Piping stresses in the RCB

penetration area are within allowable stress limits.

− Pipe whip restraints and jet shield designs for protection of the essential systems and components can mitigate pipe break loads.

− Loads on safety-related SSCs are within design load limits.

− SSCs are protected or qualified to withstand the dynamic and environmental effects of postulated failures, including cubicle pressurization effects.

− A summary of the dynamic analyses applicable to high-energy piping systems, including:

− Sketches showing the location of the resulting postulated pipe ruptures, including identification of longitudinal and circumferential breaks; structural barriers, if any; restraint locations; and the constrained directions in each restraint.

− A summary of the data developed to select postulated break locations, including, for each point, the calculated stress, the calculated primary plus secondary stress/stress intensity range, and the calculated cumulative usage

will be performed." Modify the AC similarly: "An as-designed pipe break hazards analysis report exists and concludes -----"

Combine parts b. and c. similar to the following:

"An as-built pipe break hazards analysis report exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related systems, structures and components are protected against or qualified to withstand the effects of postulated pipe failures without loss of required safety functions. Therefore, the plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe failure with loss of off-site power."


182

factor. − For failure in the moderate-energy

piping systems, descriptions showing how safety-related systems are protected from spray wetting, flooding, and other adverse environmental effects.

{{DAC}} b. An as-built pipe break hazards analysis

report exists and concludes that the as-built safety-related SSC are protected against or qualified to withstand the effects of postulated pipe failures without loss of required safety functions, and the plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe failure with loss of off-site power.The required features for protection against pipe break exist.

c. Reconciliation of deviations to the as-designed pipe break hazards analysis has been performed and concludes that the plant can be shut down safely and maintained in cold safe shutdown following a pipe break with loss of offsite power.

Q1 Model Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 can perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 to perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 can perform the function listed in Table x.x.x-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh

General Comment 5

Wording for the standard environmental qualification (EQ) ITAAC does not correctly reflect the necessary requirements: The ITA in part b. does not include the correct required condition to be verified. The ITA should state "----including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses." The AC in part b. should state: "A report exists

6.1


183

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table x.x.x-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses. anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

environment in Table x.x.x-2, including associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by type tests or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

and concludes the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3, including associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by type tests or combination of type tests and analyses.







Q1 2.2.1 6.2 Instrumentation designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3 will display as listed in Table 2.2.1-3 under normal environmental conditions,

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3 can perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-3 under normal



184

containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

environment in Table 2.2.1-3 to perform the function listed in Table 2.2.1-3 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.1-3, including anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.



b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.2-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh





185









a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.4-2 to perform the function listed in Table 2.2.4-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and


b. A report exists and concludes



186








b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.5-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses. anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.







187








b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.7-2 to verify that the equipment, including the


b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.2.7-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and



188










a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.3.3-2 to perform the function listed in Table 2.3.3-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions,

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.3.3-2 can perform the function listed in Table 2.3.3-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform

92 6.1 There is no equipment identified as being in a harsh environment. Is this ITAAC necessary?

General Comment 5

Table 2.3.3-1 will be revised to include the Containment Isolation Valves which are currently included in ITAAC Section 3.5. Table 2.3.3-2 will be revised accordingly to add CIVs

399


189

anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


the listed function. b. A report exists and concludes


which are in a harsh environment.

Q1 2.4.11 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.11-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.







190







Should there also be a 6.2 for mild equipment in the table?

Yes, see new ITAAC 6.2

561





b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.17-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type



191










a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.4.22-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and




192















193










b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.6-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and



194



Q1 2.6.8 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.8-3 can perform the function listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.8-3 to perform the function listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.6.8-3 can perform the function listed in Tables 2.6.8-1 and 2.6.8-2 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.




a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.7.1-2 to perform the function listed in Table 2.7.1-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions,

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.7.1-2 can perform the function listed in Table 2.7.1-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform



195

anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


the listed function. b. A report exists and concludes









196









b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment


b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 2.8.6-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh



197

in Table 2.8.6-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.








Q1 2.9.5 5.1 The sump level sensors listed in Table 2.9.5-1 designated as harsh environment can initiate an alarm in the MCR under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1 to initiate an alarm in the MCR under normal environmental

a. EQDPs conclude that the sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1 can initiate an alarm in the MCR under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident



198

environmental conditions. conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to initiate an alarm in the MCR.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the sump level sensors designated as harsh environment in Table 2.9.5-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

Q1 3.5 6.1 Equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform the function listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to perform the function listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform the function listed in Table 3.5-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.



199

requirements. Q1 3.5 6.2 Containment electrical penetration

assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to perform their safety function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 to verify that the containment electrical penetration assemblies, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

a. EQDPs conclude that the containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2 can perform their safety function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the containment electrical penetration assemblies designated as harsh environment in Table 3.5-2, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a harsh environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.


Q2 Model Equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform their function.

b. A report exists and concludes that the equipment designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x, including the associated cables, wiring, and

General Comment 5

Wording for the standard environmental qualification (EQ) ITAAC does not correctly reflect the necessary requirements: The ITA in part b. does not include the correct required condition to be verified. The ITA should state "----including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses." The AC in part b. should state: "A report exists

6.2


200

designated as mild environment in Table x.x.x-x to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.

terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.

and concludes the as-built equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.2.1-3, including associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by type tests or combination of type tests and analyses.


a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.1-12 to perform their function listed in Table 2.4.1-2 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.





The wrong table appears to be referenced.


436


a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.4-1 to perform their function under normal

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.4-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident



490


201

environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.




b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.5-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and





507


202









a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.13-1 to perform the function listed in Table 2.4.13-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.13-1 can perform the function listed in Table 2.4.13-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.13-1,


Is this equipment qualified for a mild or harsh environment?

Mild

555


203

of the as-built equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.13-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

Q2 2.4.14 6.2 Equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 to perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes that the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.14-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.



a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.17-1 to perform their function normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational

a. EQDPs conclude that equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.17-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required



204

occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


to perform their function. b. A report exists and concludes

Inspection reports conclude that the installation of equipment designated as mild environment in Table 2.4.17-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.








205







Q2 2.4.25 6.1 Equipment designated as mild environment listed as Class 1E in Table 2.4.25-1 can perform their function under normal environmental conditions, AOOsanticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.


b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.25-1 to verify that the equipment,


b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as mildharsh environment in Table 2.4.25-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type



611


206

including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.



a. Type tests or type tests and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1 to perform their function listed in Table 2.4.26-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions.

b. An inspection will be performed of the as-built equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1 to verify that the equipment, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.

a. EQDPs conclude that the equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1 can perform their function listed in Table 2.4.26-1 under normal environmental conditions, containment test conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, and accident and post-accident environmental conditions, including the time required to perform the listed function.

b. A report exists and concludes Inspection reports conclude that the equipment designated as mild harsh environment in Table 2.4.26-1, including the associated cables, wiring, and terminations located in a mild environment, are bounded by the type test or combination of type tests and analyses.anchorage, are installed per the approved design requirements.



630

S01 Model Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to demonstrate the ability of the containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 to close within the valve closure time after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal.

Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a-containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module.

7.01


207

S01 3.5 7.2 Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to demonstrate the ability of the containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 to close within the valve closure time after receipt of a containment isolation signal.

Containment isolation valves listed in Table 3.5-3 close within the valve closure time listed in Table 3.5-3 after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module.

1295

S02 Model The pumps listed in Table x.x.x-x have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.


The pumps listed in Table x.x.x-x have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.

Delete "that" in 3rd line of the ITA. 7.02













S02 2.2.5 7.4 The pumps listed in Table 2.2.5-1 each have the capacity to provide flow to the FPCS heat exchangers.

Tests will be performed to verify the FPCS flowrate to the FPCS heat exchangers.

Each train of the FPCS delivers a minimum flow of 3576 gpm to the FPCS heat exchanger with one pump in operation.

273





S02 2.7.1 7.2 The pumps listed in Table 2.7.1-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum surge tank level.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify pump NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum surge tank level.

The pumps listed in Table 2.7.1-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum surge tank level.


S02 2.7.2 7.2 The pumps listed in Table 2.7.2-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify pump NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-

The pumps listed in Table 2.7.2-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum



208

expansion tank level. out flow at the minimum expansion tank level.

expansion tank level.

S02 2.7.5 7.3 FWDS pumps have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.


The FWDS pumps have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow.


S02 2.7.11 7.2 The pumps listed in Table 2.7.11-1 have sufficient NPSHA at the minimum cooling tower basin level.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify pump NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at system run-out flow at the minimum cooling tower basin level.

A report exists and concludes that The the pumps listed in Table 2.7.11-1 have NPSHA that is greater than NPSHR at the the maximum ESWS flow rate with consideration for minimum allowable cooling tower basin water level (as corrected to account for vortex effects and actual temperature and atmospheric conditions).minimum cooling tower basin level.

322 7.2 Delete "that" in 3rd line of the ITA. Why was water temperature removed from the ITAAC? Revert to Rev. 3.

1107

S03 Model Each ZZZ heat exchanger listed in Table x.x.x-x has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the WWW.

Tests and analyses will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the ZZZ heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the WWW.

Each ZZZ heat exchanger listed in Table 2.x.x-1 has the capacity to transfer a heat load of greater than or equal #### BTU/hr to the WWW.

7.03

S03 2.2.3 7.1 Each SIS/RHRS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.2.3-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the SIS/RHRS heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Each SIS/RHRS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.2.3-1 has the capacity to transfer a heat load of greater than or equal to 2.35E+08 BTU/hr to the CCWS.

194

S03 2.2.5 7.1 Each FPCS heat exchangers listed in Table 2.2.5-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the FPCS heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the CCWS.

Each FPCS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.2.5-1 has the capacity to transfer a heat load of greater than or equal to 19.8 MW to the CCWS and maintain the SFP temperature below 140°F via one heat exchanger.

61 7.1 Typo in CW 1st line - should be "exchanger" 270

S03 2.5.4 6.4 The EDG lubricating oil system heat exchangers as listed in Table 2.5.4-1 have the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the essential service water system.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the EDG heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the essential service water system.

Each EDG lubricating oil system heat exchanger listed in Table 2.5.4-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load specified by the EDG manufacturer to the essential service water system.

738

S03 2.5.4 6.6 The EDG cooling water system heat exchangers as listed in Table 2.5.4-1 have the capacity to transfer the design

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the EDG heat exchangers to transfer the design

Each EDG cooling water system heat exchanger listed in Table 2.5.4-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load

740


209

heat load to the essential service water. heat load to the essential service water.

specified by the EDG manufacturer to the essential service water system.

S03 2.7.1 7.1 Each CCWS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.7.1-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load to the ESWS.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the CCWS heat exchangers to transfer the design heat load to the ESWS.

a. Each CCWS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.7.1-1 has the capacity to transfer the a heat load of greater than or equal to 293.35 E+06 BTU/hr to the ESWS.

b. Each CCWS heat exchanger listed in Table 2.7.1-1 has a heat transfer area that includeswith a minimum additional margin of 10% above the specified 10% tube plugging allowance to the ESWS.

293 7.1 The AC is confusing. Is the 10% additional margin with respect to additional tube plugging or heat load removal ability? What purpose does the specified heat load value provide?

991

S03 2.7.2 7.1 Each SCWS chiller refrigerating unit has the capacity to provide chilled water at the temperature to support the heat removal requirements of each user.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the SCWS chiller refrigerating units heat exchangers to provide chilled water at the temperature to support the heat removal requirements of each user.

Each SCWS chiller refrigerating unit provides chilled water at a temperature of less than or equal to 41°F to support the heat removal requirements of each user.

306 7.1 Add a tolerance to the AC.

The CW, ITA, and AC are not aligned

1031

S03 2.7.11 7.1 Each ESWS UHS as listed in Table 2.7.11-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load from the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers, and the ESWPBVS room coolers, and the ESW pump mechanical room.

Tests and analyses will be performed to verify the capability of the ESWS UHS to transfer the design heat load from the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers, and the ESWPBVS room coolers, and the ESW pump mechanical room.

Each ESWS UHS as listed in Table 2.7.11-1 has the capacity to transfer the design heat load from the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers, and the ESWPBVS room coolers, and the ESW pump mechanical room.

321 7.1 Cooler should be plural. Delete "and the ESW pump mechanical room." From end of the CW, ITA, and AC and add "and" in the appropriate spot to accommodate the change.

1106

S03 2.7.11 7.9 The UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load without exceeding the maximum design temperature limit for ESWS.

Tests and analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses, will be performed to demonstrate that the UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design basis heat load without exceeding the maximum design temperature limit for ESWS.

A report concludes that the UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load for a minimum of 30 days following a design basis accident, assuming the most limiting design conditions of heat removal and assuming worst-case (or most limiting) site-specific meteorological conditions (including the effects of concentrating impurities on the ESWS), without exceeding the maximum design temperature limit for ESWS.

1114

S03 2.7.11 7.10 The UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load without water level dropping below the minimum design level in the cooling

Tests and analyses, or a combination of tests and analyses, will be performed to demonstrate that the UHS cooling towers are capable of

A report concludes that the UHS cooling towers are capable of removing the design heat load for a minimum of 30 days following a design basis accident,

1115


210

tower basin. removing the design heat load without water level dropping below the minimum design level in the cooling tower basin.

assuming the most limiting design conditions for water usage and assuming worst-case (or most limiting) site-specific meteorological conditions (including the effects of concentrating impurities on the ESWS), without water level dropping below the minimum design level in the cooling tower basin.

S04 Model The ZZZ has provisions to allow flow testing of each ZZZ pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify ZZZ has provisions to allow flow testing of the ZZZ pumps during plant operation.

The ZZZ pump flow test line recirculates at least ### gpm back to the ZZZ.

7.04

S04 2.2.3 7.8 The SIS/RHRS has provisions to allow flow testing of each SIS/RHRS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify the SIS/RHRS has provisions to allow flow testing of each SIS/RHRS pump during plant operation.

The flow test line allows the each SIS/RHRS pump to deliver the following flow rates: a. MHSI pump:


b. LHSI pump: Flow rate per pump is greater than or equal to 1760 gpm.

201

S04 2.2.4 7.8 The EFWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EFW pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify the EFWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EFWS pump during plant operation.

The EFW pump flow test line recirculates a minimum of 360 gpm back to the EFW storage pool.

242

S04 2.2.7 7.3 The EBS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EBS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify EBS has provisions to allow flow testing of each EBS pump during plant operation.

The EBS pump flow test line recirculates a minimum of 49 gpm back to the EBS tank.

338

S04 2.7.1 7.8 The CCWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each CCWS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each CCWS pump during plant operation.

Normal system alignment allows flow testing of each CCWS pump during plant operation.

998

S04 2.7.2 7.5 The SCWS has provisions to allow full flow testing of each SCWS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify the SCWS has provisions to allow flow testing of the SCWS pumps during plant operation.

The flow test line allows full flow testing of each SCWS pump through the recirculation loop back to the pump suction.

1035

S04 2.7.5 7.5 The FWDS has provisions to allow flow testing of the FWDS pumps

Tests will be performed to verify FWDS has provisions to allow flow

A flow test line allows flow testing of each FWDS pump during plant operation.

1061


211

during plant operation. testing of the FWDS pumps during plant operation.

S04 2.7.11 7.4 The ESWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each ESWS pump during plant operation.

Tests will be performed to verify ESWS has provisions to allow flow testing of each ESWS pump during plant operation.

The closed loop allows ESWS pump flow back to the ESW cooling tower basin during plant operation.

1109

S05a Model The ZZZ provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify ZZZ provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the ZZZ fans will be performed to verify the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. The ZZZ provides the is capable of providing cooling to maintain a maximum temperature of ##°F in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. Each ZZZ fan provides a flowrate of greater than ### scfm, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

7.05

S05a 2.6.1 6.5 The CRACS provides conditioned air to the CRE area to maintain the temperature within design limits of the CRE during normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.cooling to maintain the design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify the CRACS heating and cooling capability.provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the CRACS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each The CRACS system is capable of providing heating and cooling capacity sufficent to provide conditioned air to maintain the temperature within design limits of the CRE during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions.cooling coil is capable of providing design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. Each CRACS fan is capable of meeting meets the design air flow requirements during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions., while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

224 6.5

CW

ITA

AC

The DC and AC wording are not consistent with one another. The ITAAC scope is not sufficient and should cover normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. Modify ITAAC as follows:

The CRACS provides conditioned air to the CRE area to maintain the temperature within design limits of the CRE during normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions of the plant.

a) Tests and analyses of the as built CRACS will be performed to verify the heating and cooling capability.

b) A test of the CRACS fans will be perfomred to verify that the air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a) The as-built CRACS system is capable of providing heating and cooling capacity sufficent to provide conditioned air to maintain the temperature within design limits

808


212

of the CRE during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions.

b) Each CRACS fan meets the design air flow requirements during plant normal operations, abnormal and accident conditions.

S05a 2.6.4 7.3 The FBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the pump rooms in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify that the FBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the pump rooms in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the FBVS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. The FBVS provides the is capable of providing design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the Fuel Building pump rooms.

b. Each FBVS fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

240 7.3 AC (a) : The as-built FBVS provides the design cooling capacity while operating in the design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the Fuel Building pump rooms.


846

S05a 2.6.6 7.5 The SBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify the SBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the SBVS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each SBVS cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings.

b. Each SBVS fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

255 7.5 AC (a) : Each as-built SBVS cooling coil provides the design cooling capacity while operating in the design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures within the hot mechanical rooms in the Safeguard Buildings.


878

S05a 2.6.7 6.1 The SBVSE provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify SBVSE provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the SBVSE fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the

a. Each SBVSE cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings.

b. Each SBVSE fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

261 7.5 AC (a) : Each as-built SBVSE cooling coil provides the design cooling capacity while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures within the Electrical Division of the Safeguard Buildings the Safeguard Buildings.


894


213

approved design requirement. S05a 2.6.9 6.1 The EPGBVS provides cooling to

maintain design temperatures in the EPGB Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify EPGBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the EPGB Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the EPGBVS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each EPGBVS cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the EPGB Buildings.

b. Each EPGBVS fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

274 6.1 AC (a) : Each as-built EPGBVS cooling coil provides design cooling capacity while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the EPGB Buildings.


939

S05a 2.6.13 6.1 The ESWPBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the ESWPBs, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Tests and analysis will be performed to verify ESWPBVS provides cooling to maintain design temperatures in the ESWPBs, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

b. A test of the ESWPBVS fans will be performed to verify that the design air flow is greater than the approved design requirement.

a. Each ESWPBVS safety-related cooling coil provides the is capable of providing design cooling requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining temperatures in the ESWPBs.

b. Each ESWPBVS safety-related fan is capable of meeting the design air flow requirements, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

280 6.1 AC (a) : Each as-built ESWPBVS safety-related cooling coil provides design cooling capacity, while operating in a design basis accident alignment, and is capable of maintaining design temperatures in the ESWPBs.


953

S05b Model The ZZZ provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

Tests and analysis of the ZZZ heaters will be performed to verify ZZZ provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment

The ZZZ is capable of providing heating to maintain a minimum temperature of ##°F in the XXX rooms in the WWW Buildings, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

7.06

S05b 2.6.1 6.6 The CREF heaters protect the carbon adsorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

Tests and analysis of the CREF heaters will be performed to verify the CREF heaters protect the carbon adsorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

a. The CREF heaters energize during operation of the CREF unit and each CREF heater provides equal to or, greater than, its required design heating capacity.

b. An report concludes that the The CREF heaters are capable of protecting protect the carbon adsorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

225 6.6 The AC lacks specifics. Suggest the AC contain 2 parts: (a). The CREF heaters energize during operation of the CREF unit and each CREF heater provides equal to or, greater than, its required design heating capacity. (b) An analysis demonstrates that the CREF heaters protect the carbon absorber from high humidity during operation of the CREF unit.

809


214

S05b 2.6.1 6.8 Deleted.The CRACS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

Deleted.Tests and analysis of the CRACS heaters will be performed to verify CRACS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

Deleted.Each CRACS air inlet heater is capable of providing design heating capacity to maintain design temperatures in the CRE area, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

227 6.8 Based on modifying ITAAC 6.5 as suggested, this ITAAC can be deleted. Comments made in 6.5 apply to this ITAAC as well.

811

S05b 2.6.4 7.4 The FBVS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the Fuel Building rooms for with systems containing borated fluid in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

Tests and analysis of the FBVS heaters will be performed to verify that the FBVS provides heating to maintain design temperatures in the Fuel Building rooms for with systems containing borated fluid in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

a. Each FBVS heater energizes and provides equal to, or greater, than its required design heating capacity.

b. The Each FBVS heater is capable of providing design provides the required heating capacity to maintain design temperatures in the rooms with systems containing borated fluid in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

241 7.4 AC : a.) Each FBVS heater energizes and provides equal to, or greater, than its required design heating capacity. b.) The as-built FBVS provides the required heating capacity to maintain design temperatures in the rooms containing borated fluid in the Fuel Building, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

847

S06 Model XXX provide relief capacity. Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity.

Each XXX provides relief capacity ≥ #### lbm/hr at #### psig.

7.07

S06 2.2.1 7.7 PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2 provide relief capacity.

Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity of PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2.

Each PSRV listed in Table 2.2.1-2 provides relief capacity ≥ 661,400 lbm/hr at 2535 psig.

125

S06 2.8.2 7.2 Each of the two MSSVs per main steam line provides relief capacity for the main steam system.

Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity of the two MSSVs per main steam line.

Each MSSV provides relief capacity ≥ 1,422,073 lbm/hr. The MSSV on the main steam line with the lower pressure setting delivers that rated capacity at ≤ 1504 psig. The MSSV on the main steam line with the higher pressure setting delivers that rated capacity at ≤ 1535 psig.

1151

S06 2.8.2 7.3 MSRTs provide relief capacity. Vendor tests and analysis will be performed to verify relief capacity of the MSRTs.

Each MSRT provides relief capacity ≥ 2,844,146 lbm/hr at valve inlet static pressure of 1370 psig. With pressure measurement uncertainty of 30 psi, the maximum relieving pressure is 1400 psig.

1152

S07 Model Valves listed in Table x.x.x-x fail to the position as listed in Table x.x.x-x on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that valves fail to the position as listed in Table x.x.x-x on loss of power.

Following loss of power, the valves listed in Table x.x.x-x fail to the position as listed in Table x.x.x-x.

7.08

S07 2.3.1 5.1 Hydrogen mixing dampers listed in Table 2.3.1-1 fail open on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that hydrogen mixing dampers fail open on loss of power.

Following loss of power, the hydrogen mixing dampers listed in Table 2.3.1-1 fail open.

362


215

S07 2.5.4 5.4 Air start pilot Vvalves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 fail to the position as listed in Table 2.5.4-2 on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that air start pilot valves fail to the position as listed in Table 2.5.4-2 on loss of power.

Following loss of power, the air start pilot valves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 fail to the position as listed in Table 2.5.4-1.

c. Table 2.5.4-4 (Emergency Diesel Generator ITAAC) in Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 includes ITAAC to demonstrate that valves listed in Table 2.5.4-2 fail to the position listed in the table on loss of power. Other ITAAC tables do not include ITAAC for loss of power to valves. AREVA is requested to discuss its approach for establishing ITAAC for testing the fail safe position of valves on loss of power.


734

S07 2.7.1 5.2 Hydraulic and motor operated valves listed in Table 2.7.1-2 fail as shown in Table 2.7.1-2 is on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that hydraulic and motor operated valves listed in Table 2.7.1-2 fail as shown in Table 2.7.1-2 is on loss of power.

Following loss of power, hydraulic and motor operated valves listed in Table 2.7.1-2 fail as shown in Table 2.7.1-2is.

291 5.2 Do all hydraulic valves in Table 2.7.1-2 fails as is? It was our understanding KAB 80AA015, 16, and 19 and KAB 50AA001, 4, and 6 fail closed. (See related RAI)

A new column will be added to Table 2.7.1-2 to list valve failure position on loss of power. KAB80 AA015/016/019 and KAB50 AA001/004/006 fail closed on loss of power.

KAA10/20/30/40 AA006/010/032/033 fail as-is on loss of power.


989

S07 2.8.1 4.1 Turbine stop valves and turbine control valves as listed in Table 2.8.1-1 fail closed on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that turbine stop valves and turbine control valves fail closed on loss of power.

Following loss of power, turbine stop valves and turbine control valves as listed in Table 2.8.1-1 fail closed.

1124

S07 2.8.2 5.2 Each main steam relief isolation valve fails closed on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each main steam relief isolation valve fails closed on loss of power.

Following loss of power, each main steam relief isolation valve fails closed.

1145

S07 2.8.2 5.3 Each MSIV fails closed on loss of hydraulic pressure or loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each MSIV fails closed on loss of hydraulic pressure or loss of power.

Following loss of hydraulic pressure or loss of power, each MSIV fails closed.

1146

S07 2.8.2 5.4 Each turbine bypass valve fails closed on loss of power.

Tests will be performed to verify that each turbine bypass valve fails closed

Following loss of power, each turbine bypass valve fails closed.

1147


216

on loss of power. S07 2.8.2 5.5 Each main steam relief control valve

fails as-is on loss of power. Tests will be performed to verify that each main steam relief control valve fails as-is on loss of power.

Following loss of power, each main steam relief control valve fails as-is.

1148

S07 2.8.6 5.2 The MFWFLIVs fail closed on loss of hydraulic pressure in each redundant dump line.

Tests will be performed to verify that the MFWFLIVs fail closed on loss of hydraulic pressure in each redundant dump line.

Following loss of hydraulic pressure in each redundant dump line, the MFWFLIVs fail closed.

1178

S08 Miscellaneous Crane Related 7.09

S08 2.10.1 3.2 The containment polar crane main hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

An inspection of the as-built containment polar crane will be performed to verify that the main hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

The containment polar crane main hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

1254

S08 2.10.1 3.3 The FB auxiliary crane hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

An inspection of the as-built FB auxiliary crane will be performed to verify that the hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

The FB auxiliary crane hoist is equipped with a dual load path from the hook to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

1255

S08 2.10.1 3.4 The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the load attachment point to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

An inspection of the as-built cask loading penetration upper cover hoist will be performed to verify that the hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the load attachment point to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist is equipped with a dual load path reeving system from the load attachment point to the hoist brakes and redundant holding brakes.

1256

S08 2.10.1 3.5 The SFCTF biological lid handling station is provided with a load support mechanism (screw drive).

An inspection of the as-built SFCTF biological lid handling station will be performed to verify that the station is provided with a load support mechanism (screw drive).

The SFCTF biological lid handling station is provided with a load support mechanism (screw drive).

1257

S08 2.10.1 4.3 The containment polar crane main hoist is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the containment polar crane main hoist.

b. A full load test will be performed

a. Containment polar crane main hoist passes rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

b. Containment polar crane main hoist

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on the containment polar crane main hoist.

c. A no load test will be performed on the containment polar crane main hoist.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the containment polar crane.

passes full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. Containment polar crane main hoist passes no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE non-destructive examination of welded structural connections of the containment polar crane comply with ASME NOG-1 requirements.

S08 2.10.1 4.4 The FB auxiliary crane hoist is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the FB auxiliary crane hoist.

b. A full load test will be performed on the FB auxiliary crane hoist.

c. A no load test will be performed on the FB auxiliary crane hoist.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the FB auxiliary crane.

a. FB auxiliary crane hoist has passed rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

b. FB auxiliary crane hoist has passed full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. FB auxiliary crane hoist has passed no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE non-destructive examination of welded structural connections of the FB auxiliary crane comply with ASME NOG-1 requirements.

1261

S08 2.10.1 4.5 Special lifting devices and slings used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist for critical lifts have dual load paths or double safety factors.

a. An inspection will be performed on the on the as-built special lifting devices used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist to verify that they have dual load paths.

b. An inspection will be performed on the on the as-built slings used with the containment polar crane main hoist and FB auxiliary crane hoist to verify that they have double safety factors.

a. The special lifting devices used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist for critical lifts have dual load paths.

b. Slings used with used with the containment polar crane main hoist and the FB auxiliary crane hoist for critical lifts have double safety factors.

1262


218

S08 2.10.1 4.6 The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.Deleted.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist.

b. A full load test will be performed on the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist.

c. A no load test will be performed on the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist. Deleted.

a. The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist has passed rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

b. The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist has passed full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. The cask loading penetration upper cover hoist has passed no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE of welded structural connections of the cask loading penetration upper cover hoist comply with ASME NOG-1 requirements. Deleted.

1263

S08 2.10.1 4.7 The SFCTF biological lid handling station is load tested followed by NDE of critical welds.

a. A rated load test will be performed on the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

b. A full load test will be performed on the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

c. A no load test will be performed on the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

d. An inspection will be performed on the as-built welded structural connections of the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

e. A load test will be performed by the vendor on the screw drive of the SFCTF biological lid handling station.

a. The SFCTF biological lid handling station has passed rated load testing at a minimum of 125% of the rated load.

b. The SFCTF biological lid handling station has passed full-load testing at a minimum of 100% rated load.

c. The SFCTF biological lid handling station has passed no load testing to verify proper operation of limit switches, interlock and stop settings.

d. A report concludes that NDE of welded structural connections of the SFCTF biological lid handling station comply with ASME NOG-1 requirements.

e. The screw drive of the SFCTF biological handling station has passed a load test for 150% of the rated load.

1264

S09 Miscellaneous Pump Flow Related 7.1


219

S09 2.2.1 7.3 The RCPs provide flow. A test will be performed to verify the RCPs provide flow.

The RCPs provide flow greater than 119,692 124,741 gpm/loop and less than 134,662 gpm/loop.

30 7.3 Under what condition is the test accomplished (hot/cold). Tier 2 specified RCP flow is 124,741 gpm/loop. Considering the lower resistance in the RCS from lack of fuel, why is 119,692 gpm/loop acceptable?

121

S09 2.2.3 7.9 Safety injection pumped flow will be delivered to the RCS before the maximum elapsed time.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the safety injection pumped flow delivery time.

Time for safety injection flow to reach full flow does not exceed 15 seconds with offsite power available or 40 seconds with loss of offsite power after receipt of a safety injection test input signal from the PACS module.

202

S09 2.2.4 7.4 The EFWS limits the maximum flow rate to a depressurized steam generator.

Tests will be performed to verify the maximum EFWS flowrate to a depressurized steam generator.

The EFWS delivers a maximum flow of 490 gpm to a depressurized steam generator.

238

S10 Miscellaneous Volume Related 7.11

S10 2.2.2 7.3 The IRWST provides a water volume for emergency core cooling.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built IRWST water volume.

The IRWST provides a minimum water volume of 66,886 ft3.

156

S10 2.2.3 7.2 The accumulators listed in Table 2.2.3-1 provide a storage volume for emergency core cooling.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the water total volume of the as-built accumulators.

The accumulators listed in Table 2.2.3-1 provide a minimum total volume of 1942.3 ft3 per accumulator.

44 7.2 The ITA and AC are not aligned. Replace "water volume" in the ITA with "total volume."

195

S10 2.2.4 7.3 The EFWS combined storage pool available volume supports cooldown.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built EFWS combined storage pool volume.

The EFWS combined storage pool minimum volume is 365,000 gallons (total for 4 pools).

55 7.3 Why not 411,200 as specified in Tier II?

365,000 is the minimum as listed in Tech Spec 3.7.6.

237

S10 2.5.3 2.2 Each SBODG has a fuel oil storage tank.

An test inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built SBODG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the continuous rating for 24 hours.

Each SBODG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the continuous rating for 24 hours.


S10 2.5.3 2.3 Each SBODG has a fuel oil day tank. An test inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built SBODG day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the

Each SBODG day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the SBODG operating at the continuous rating for two hours.



220

continuous rating for two hours. S10 2.5.4 3.9 Each EDG has a fuel oil storage tank. An test inspection and analysis will

be performed to verify each as-built EDG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for seven days.

Each EDG fuel oil storage tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for seven days.


S10 2.5.4 3.10 Each EDG has a fuel oil day tank. An test inspection and analysis will be performed to verify each as-built EDG fuel oil day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for two hours.

Each EDG fuel oil day tank capacity is greater than the volume of fuel oil consumed by the EDG operating at the continuous rating for two hours.

205 3.10. ITA should be by test and analysis 712

S10 2.5.4 3.14 Each EDG lubricating oil system provides lubrication to the engine and turbocharger wearing parts during engine operation.

a. An as-built test and analysis will be performed to demonstrates each EDG lubricating oil system oil volume is capable of supporting at least 7 days of full load operation

b. A test will be performed to verify that each EDG and lubricating oil system operating at rated load conditions achieves stable temperatures and pressures.

a. Analysis A report concludes each EDG lubricating oil system oil volume is capable of supporting at least 7 days of full load operation.

b. Each EDG and lubricating oil system operating at rated load conditions achieves stable temperatures and pressures stated in the approved design.

206 3.14 Part a. should specify test and analysis. How is lubricating oil consumption established in part a. without testing.

Part b. should only encompass the lubricating oil system. Delete the "and" between each EDG and lubricating oil system in the ITA and AC.

716

S10 2.7.1 7.10 The CCWS surge tanks provide adequate capacity for normal system operation.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built CCWS surge tank capacity.

The CCWS surge tank capacity is equal to or greater than 950 ft3.

1000

S10 2.7.1 7.11 Each CCWS surge tank maintains a reserve volume of 750 gallons to accommodate potential total system leakage of 4 gallons per hour for seven days of continuous operation with no makeup source available.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to determine the total train leakage for each CCWS train.verify that each as-built CCWS surge tank maintains a reserve volume to accommodate system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

CCWS surge tank reserve volume of 750 gallons accommodates worst case total train leakage of less than or equal to 4 gph for seven days with no makeup source available. A report exists and concludes that the worst case leakage between trains is less than or equal to 4 gph assuming one train is running with its associated A/B switchover valves open and the opposite train depressurized. Testing to support this report should be performed with one train

295 7.11 The ITAAC as currently written does not accomplish the intended purpose. Please revert to wording used in FSAR Revision 3 and incorporate the following change into the AC.

"A report exists and concludes that the worst case leakage from the operating train is less than or equal to 4 gph ---"

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in standby and one train running with its associated A/B switchover valves open. This test should be performed on all four CCWS trains.

S10 2.7.2 7.6 Each SCWS expansion tank maintains a reserve volume to accommodate system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

An inspection test and analysis will be performed to verify that each as-built SCWS expansion tank maintains a reserve volume to accommodate system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

SCWS expansion tank maintains a reserve volume of 100 gallons to accommodates worst case total train system leakage for seven days with no makeup source available.

308 7.6 The ITAAC as currently written does not accomplish the intended purpose. Please revert to wording used in Revision 3.

1036

S10 2.7.5 7.1 The FWDS includes two separate fire water storage tanks.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built capacity of the fire water storage tanks.

The capacity of each of the two fire water storage tanks is greater than or equal to 300,000 gallons.

1057

S10 2.7.11 7.11 The cooling tower basin is sized for the minimum basin water volume.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to demonstrate the size of the as-built cooling tower basin is capable of holding the minimum basin water volume.

The cooling tower basin size is capable of holding the minimum basin water volume.

1116

S10 2.9.2 2.1 The SWMS provides the non-safety related function of storing radioactive liquid and wet wastes in preparation and solids prior to storage and shipment.

An inspection and analysis will be performed of the as-built SWMS tanks to verify the nominal volumes of each of the SWMS tanks.

The nominal volume of each of the SWMS tanks is as follows: • Resin proportioning tank: 150 gal. • Concentrate buffer tank: 3000 gal. • Condensate collection tank: 150 gal. • Scrubber tank: 53 gal. the nominal value as listed in Table 2.9.2-1.

341 2.1 CW should state: "The SWMS provides the non-safety related function of storing radioactive liquid and wet wastes in preparation and prior to storage and shipment."

1215

S11 Miscellaneous Inspection 7.12

S11 2.2.1 2.4 The RCS loops are physically separated from each other.

An inspection will be performed to verify physical separation of the as-built RCS loops.

The RCS loops are physically separated from each other by a wall as shown on Figure 2.1.1-6.

79

S11 2.2.1 3.5 The SG outlet nozzles include flow-limiting devices.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built SG outlet nozzles include flow limiting devices.

The flow area through each SG outlet nozzle flow-limiting device is a maximum of 1.39 ft2.

84

S11 2.2.1 3.18 The RPV internals are provided with irradiation specimen guide baskets to

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built RPV internals are

Two guide baskets are providedinstalled and, are located on opposite sides of the

24 3.18 ITAAC lacks sufficient detail to ensure guide baskets are in the proper location and it

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hold a capsules containing RPV material surveillance specimens.

provided with irradiation specimen guide baskets and to hold capsules containing RPV material surveillance specimens.

RPV. , and each guide basket includes provisions to hold two material surveillance capsulesOne capsule containing RPV material surveillance specimens is installed in each guide basket.

should verify the capsules are installed.

S11 2.2.2 7.7 The IRWST provides water to flood the core spreading area.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built IRWST and interfacing severe accident heat removal system piping configuration provides a flow path to the core spreading area.

The IRWST and interfacing severe accident heat removal system piping configuration provides a flow path to the core spreading area.

160

S11 2.2.2 7.9 The IRWST has a trash rack located over each heavy floor opening.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a trash rack is installed over each as-built heavy floor opening.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built trash rack.

a. A trash rack is installed over each heavy floor opening to the IRWST.

b. The trash rack has a maximum mesh grid opening of 4 x 4 inches.

162

S11 2.2.2 7.10 The IRWST has a weir located around each trash rack at the heavy floor opening.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a weir is installed around each as-built trash rack at the heavy floor opening.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the height of the as-built weir around each trash rack at the heavy floor opening.

a. A weir is installed around each trash rack at the heavy floor opening.



S11 2.2.2 7.11 The IRWST has a weir located at the annular space wall openings.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a weir is installed at the as-built annular space wall openings.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the height of the as-built weir at the annular space wall openings.

a. A weir is installed at the annular space wall opening.



S11 2.2.4 7.5 EFWS cross-connections allow alignment of EFWS pump suction on all EFWS storage pools and pump discharge alignment with any SG.

An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built EFWS cross-connections allow alignment of each EFWS pump suction on all EFWS storage pools and each EFWS

The EFWS cross-connections allow the following system alignments: 1. Each EFWS pump suction to all EFWS

storage pools. 2. Each EFWS pump discharge with any

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pump discharge alignment with any SG.

SG.

S11 2.3.2 2.1 The bottom of the reactor pit is lined with sacrificial concrete backed by refractory brick.

An inspection of the as-built reactor pit will be performed to verify that the bottom of the reactor pit is lined with sacrificial concrete backed by refractory brick.

The bottom of the reactor pit is lined with a minimum of 19.7 inches of sacrificial concrete backed by refractory brick in room UJA11001.

370

S11 2.3.2 2.2 The CMSS has a melt plug and gate. An inspection of the as-built cavity gate will be performed to verify that the CMSS has a melt plug and gate.

The CMSS melt plug consists of a minimum of 19.7 inches of sacrificial concrete backed by an aluminum gate in room in UJA11001.

84 2.2 Typo in AC 4th line should be "in room" 371

S11 2.3.2 2.3 The CMSS has a melt discharge channel.

An inspection of the as-built melt discharge channel will be performed to verify that the CMSS has a melt discharge channel.

The CMSS melt discharge channel connecting rooms UJA11001 and UJA04002 is lined with refractory material and has a minimum cross-sectional area of 10.76 ft2 and is lined with refractory material.

85 2.3 Clarify the ITAAC by relocating "is lined with refractory material. (e.i.. " ---UJA04002 is lined with refractory material and has a minimum cross-sectional area of 10.76 ft^2.")

372

S11 2.3.2 2.4 The CMSS has a spreading room lined with sacrificial concrete.

An inspection of the as-built spreading room will be performed to verify that the CMSS has a spreading room lined with sacrificial concrete.

The CMSS spreading room (UJA04002) is lined with a minimum of 19.7 inches of sacrificial concrete.

373

S11 2.3.2 2.5 The floor and walls of the spreading room are provided with channels for cooling water.

An inspection of the as-built spreading room will be performed to verify that the floor and walls of the spreading room are provided with channels for cooling water.

The floor and walls of the spreading room (UJA04002) are provided with channels for cooling water.

374

S11 2.7.11 7.8 The inlet between the cooling tower basin and pump intake structure has a coarse and a fine debris screen for each ESW pump.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the installation of as-built coarse and as-built fine debris screen at the inlet between the cooling tower basin and pump intake structure for each ESW pump.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify the maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built debris screens.

a. A coarse and a fine debris screen is installed at the inlet between the cooling tower basin and pump intake structure for each ESW pump.

b. The coarse debris screen has a maximum mesh grid opening of 2 x 2 inches. The fine debris screen has a maximum mesh grid opening of 0.5 x 0.5 inches.

1113

S11 2.8.1 2.2 The axis of the turbine rotor shafts is positioned favorable to the Reactor

An inspection of the as-built as-built location of the axis of the turbine

Safety-related structures, except for two of the four Essential Service Water Buildings

Since the inspection is based on the as-built turbine, why was “as-built” deleted from Tier

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224

Building and other essential such that safety-related structures, except for two of the four Essential Service Water Buildings and the two Emergency Power Generating Buildings, such that the safety-related structures are located outside the turbine missile low trajectory hazard zone. The low-trajectory hazard zone is defined as an area bounded by lines that are inclined at 25 degrees to the turbine wheel planes and pass through the end wheels of the low pressure stages.

rotor shafts, with respect to will be performed to verify that safety-related structures will be performed., except for two of the four Essential Service Water Buildings and two of the four Emergency Power Generating Buildings, are located outside the turbine low trajectory hazard zone.

and the two Emergency Power Generating Buildings, are located outside the turbine missile low trajectory hazard zone.

1, Table 2.8.1-3, Item 2.2?

“as-built” added back

S12 Miscellaneous Test 7.13

S12 2.2.1 3.29 The RCP flywheel maintains its structural integrity during an overspeed event.

A vendor RCP overspeed test will be performed to verify that there is no loss of structural integrity of the RCP flywheel at 125 percent of the motor synchronous speed.

A report concludes that there is no loss of structural integrity of the RCP flywheel at 125 percent of the motor synchronous speed of 1200 rpm.

108

S12 2.2.1 7.2 The RCPs have rotational inertia to provide coast down flow of reactor coolant as listed in Table 2.2.1-4 on loss of power to the RCP motors.

A test will be performed to verify the RCPs have rotational inertia to provide coast down flow of reactor coolant on loss of power to the RCP motors.

The RCPs provide the minimum coastdown flow of reactor coolant as listed in Table 2.2.1-4 on loss of power to the RCP motors.

120

S12 2.2.1 7.4 The RCP SSSS can be engaged when the RCP is stopped.

A test will be performed to verify the RCP SSSS can be engaged when the RCP is stopped.

The RCP SSSS can be engaged when the RCP is stopped.

122

S12 2.2.1 7.5 PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2 open. A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a test input signal, each PSRV opens.

Each PSRV opens within 0.70 seconds (including pilot valve opening time) after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

123

S12 2.2.1 7.6 PSRVs listed in Table 2.2.1-2 open below the maximum setpoint.

Vendor tests will be performed to verify that each PSRV opens below the maximum setpoint.

Each PSRV opens below a maximum lift setting of 2600.4 psia.

124

S12 2.2.1 7.8 Each RCP breaker and RCP bus breaker is tripped by a protection system signal.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a protection system signal, each RCP breaker and RCP bus breaker trips.

Each RCP breaker and RCP bus breaker is tripped by a protection system signal.

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S12 2.2.6 7.4 The CVCS run-out flow does not exceed the design maximum allowable.

A test will be performed to verify the CVCS run-out flow does not exceed the design maximum allowable.

The CVCS run-out flow is equal to or less than 112.66 lbm/s total with both CVCS pumps running.

307

S12 2.2.6 7.5 The CVCS charging pumps listed in Table 2.2.6-1 provide seal water flow for operation of the reactor coolant pumps.

Testing will be performed to verify each CVCS charging pump provides seal water flow to the reactor coolant pumps.

One CVCS charging pump delivers a minimum seal water flow of 6.15 gpm to each operating reactor coolant pump.

308

S12 2.3.1 7.4 The fusible link of the convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 fails at the designed temperature.

Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the fusible link to open.

The fusible link opens at or before reaching a temperature of 185 °F.

367

S12 2.3.1 7.5 The burst element of the convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens at the designed pressure.

Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the burst element of the convection foils to open.

The burst element of the convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens bi-directionally at a delta pressure of 0.7 psid ± 30%.


S12 2.3.1 7.6 The burst element of the rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens at the designed pressure.

Type tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the burst element of the rupture foils to open.

The burst element of the rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 opens bi-directionally at a delta pressure of 0.7 psid ± 30%.


S12 2.6.1 6.4 The CRE area ventilation unfiltered air in-leakage is minimized in order to maintain the MCR habitability.

A test will be performed to measure the unfiltered air in-leakage inside the CRE area boundary.

The unfiltered air in-leakage inside the CRE area boundary is less than or equal to 40 scfm.

807

S12 2.6.7 6.2 The recirculation cooling units start and stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the room temperature reaches preset maximum and minimum temperatures in the pump rooms.

a. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that recirculation cooling units start automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset maximum temperatures in the pump rooms.

b. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that recirculation cooling units stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset minimum temperatures in the pump rooms.

a. The recirculation cooling units start automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset maximum temperatures in the pump roomsprior to allowing the pump rooms to exceed the maximum design temperature.

b. The recirculation cooling units stop automatically in the EFWS and CCWS pump rooms when the pump room temperature reaches preset minimum temperatures in the pump roomsprior to allowing the pump rooms to fall below the minimum design temperature.

262 6.2 CW, ITA, and AC are not consistent. Modify acceptance criteria to reflect that the Units cycle on and off based on preset temperature limits.

895

S12 2.6.8 7.1 The CBVS low flow purge exhaust subsystem exhausts through a CBVS iodine filtration train.

Tests will be performed to verify the capability of the low flow purge exhaust subsystem to exhaust

The CBVS exhausts through a CBVS iodine filtration train when the CBVS low flow purge exhaust subsystem is operating.

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226

through a CBVS iodine filtration train.

S12 2.7.11 5.4 Equipment identified as “Dedicated” ESWS motor-operated equipment (including Division 4 cooling tower fans) in Table 2.7.11-2 are capable of being powered by a SBODG.

Testing will be performed for equipment identified as “Dedicated” ESWS motor-operated equipment (including Division 4 cooling tower fans) in Table 2.7.11-2 by providing a test input signal from an SBODG.

The test input signal provided from the SBODG is present at the equipment identified as “Dedicated” ESWS motor-operated equipment (including Division 4 cooling tower fans) in Table 2.7.11-2.

1104

S12 2.7.11 7.7 The ESWS debris filters listed in Table 2.7.11-1 function to backwash upon high differential pressure.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify the ESWS debris filters function to backwash on high differential pressure.

The filters initiate backwash flow to filter blowdown on high differential pressure.

1112

S12 2.8.2 7.4 Each MSRIV per main steam line opens upon receipt of a signal.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a test input signal, each MSRIV per main steam line opens.

Each MSRIV opens within 1.8 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

1153

S12 2.8.2 7.5 Each MSIV per main steam line closes upon receipt of a signal.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a test input signal, each MSIV per main steam line closes.

Each MSIV closes within 5 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

1154

S12 2.8.2 7.7 Upon safety injection actuation, the MSRT controls secondary system cooldown at a pre-defined rate.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test input signal, the MSRT controls secondary system cooldown at a pre-defined rate.

The MSRT pressure control set-point is ramped from 1414.7 psia to 900 psia within 19 minutes.

1156

S12 2.9.5 3.3 Containment sump level sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Tests will be performed using test input signals to verify that Containment sump level sensors support RCS leakage detection.

Containment sump level sensors can detect a level increase of 0.5 gpm within one hour.

349 3.3 This ITAAC can not be performed using test input signals.

1248

S12b 2.6.1 6.2 Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the iodine filtration train will start automatically, outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train, a minimum recirculation flowrate is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train and a positive pressure is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

a. A test will be performed to verify, upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, that the iodine filtration train will start automatically; and the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input

a. Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the iodine filtration trains start automatically within 60 seconds and the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train.

b. Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, a recirculation flowrate of

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signals. b. A test will be performed to verify

that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, a minimum recirculation flowrate is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

c. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the CRACS maintains a positive pressure in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

greater than or equal to 3000 scfm is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train.

c. Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the CRACS maintains a pressure of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

S12b 2.6.1 6.3 The CRACS is capable of detecting smoke in the outside air inlet duct, and alerting operators to take manual actions.Deleted.

A test of the CRACS smoke detection sensors and alarms will be performed.Deleted.

Upon receipt of a smoke detection signal, an alarm sounds in the MCR.Deleted.

226

CW

ITA

AC

The ITAAC also does not address smoke detection aspect of the MCR ventillation system. An ITAAC should demonstrate smoke detection ability

The CRACS is capable of detecting smoke in the outside air inlet duct, and alerting operators to take manual actions.

Upon receipt of a smoke detection signal, an alarm sounds in the MCR.

806

S12b 2.6.1 6.7 Upon receipt of a high radiation alarm signal in the air intake duct, the iodine filtration train will start automatically, the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train, a minimum CRE recirculation flowrate is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train, and a positive pressure is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

a. A test will be performed to verify, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal in the air intake duct, that the iodine filtration train will start automatically; and the outside air supply to the CRE area is diverted through the iodine filtration train. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input

a. A separate test for each iodine filtration train confirms, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal from the PACS module, that the iodine filtration train will start automatically within 60 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module, and the outside air supply is diverted through the iodine filtration train.

b. A separate test for each iodine filtration train confirms, upon receipt of high

226 6.7 Tier 1 DD references toxic gas but does not address it in ITAAC space. Open issue under RAI 511. Toxic gas deleted in RAI 511 Supplement 6, Q 06.04-10

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228

signals. b. A test will be performed to verify,

upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal in the air intake duct, that a minimum CRE recirculation flowrate for each iodine filtration train is achieved. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

c. A test will be performed using test input signals to verify, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal in the air intake duct, that a positive pressure is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas. A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train using test input signals.

radiation alarm test input signal from the PACS module, that a CRE recirculation flowrate of greater than or equal to 3,000 scfm is established from the CRE area to the iodine filtration train.

c. A separate test for each iodine filtration train confirms, upon receipt of high radiation alarm test input signal from the PACS module, that a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge is maintained in the CRE area relative to the adjacent areas.

S12b 2.6.3 7.2 Upon receipt of containment isolation signal, the following actions occur automatically: • Isolation of the normal operation

train by closing the isolation dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Normal Operation Train.

• Start of the accident filtration trains and opening of the dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Accident Filtration Train.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of containment isolation test input signal, the following actions occur automatically: • The normal operation train

isolates by closing the isolation dampers.

• The accident filtration trains start, and the dampers for Accident Filtration Train to the iodine filtration train are aligned to the open position.

The following actions occur automatically within 60 seconds after receipt of an isolation test input signal from the PACS module: • The normal operation train is isolated

by closing the isolation dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Normal Operation Train.

• The accident filtration trains start, and the dampers listed in Table 2.6.3-1 for Accident Filtration Train are aligned to the open position.

828

S12b 2.6.4 7.1 Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the FBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building relative to the outside environment.

Deleted.A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the FBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building relative to the outside

Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the FBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge in the Fuel Building relative to the outside environment.

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environment. S12b 2.6.4 7.2 Upon receipt of a containment isolation

signal, the FBVS isolation dampers identified in Table 2.6.4-1 realign to exhaust air to the SBVS iodine filtration exhaust to the plant vent stack.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the FBVS isolation dampers realign to exhaust air to the SBVS iodine filtration exhaust to the plant vent stack.

Within 60 seconds after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the FBVS isolation dampers identified in Table 2.6.4-1 realign to exhaust air to the SBVS iodine filtration exhaust to the plant vent stack.

239 7.2 Typo in AC

Added comma after module.

845


848


849

S12b 2.6.5 4.1 Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the NABVS is shut down, and the backdraft damper prevents the SBVS and AVS exhaust air flow from discharging into the NABVS.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, that the NABVS is shut down and the backdraft damper prevents the SBVS and AVS exhaust air flow discharging into NABVS.

Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the NABVS is shut down and the backdraft damper prevents the SBVS and AVS exhaust air flow from discharging into the NABVS.

857

S12b 2.6.6 7.1 Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building and the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the adjacent areasoutside environment.

A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure in the Fuel Building and in the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the adjacent areasoutside environment.

The SBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge within 305 seconds in the Fuel Building and the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the outside environment after receipt of a containment isolation test input signal fromthe PACS module.Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge in the hot mechanical rooms of the Safeguard Buildings relative to the adjacent areas.

874

S12b 2.6.6 7.3 Upon receipt of a high radiation signal in the Fuel Building or Reactor Building, both SBVS iodine filtration trains start automatically, the FB isolation dampers open, the SBVS

A test will be performed separately for each iodine filtration train to verify that upon receipt of a high radiation test input signal in the Fuel Building or Reactor Building, both

Upon receipt of a high radiation test input signal from the PACS module, both SBVS iodine filtration trains start automatically, the FB isolation dampers (30KLC45 AA003/AA004) open, the SBVS isolation

253 7.3 Typo in ITA - missing required position of FB isolation dampers.

Damper nomenclature is not consistent with the table headers.

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isolation dampers close, iodine filtration banks isolation dampers open, and the accident air is directed through the SBVS iodine filtration trains.

SBVS iodine filtration trains start automatically, the FB isolation dampers (30KLC45 AA003/AA004) open, the SBVS isolation dampers (30KLC45 AA001/AA002) close, iodine filtration banks isolation dampers (30KLC41 /42 AA001/AA002 and 30KLC42 AA001/AA002) open, and the accident air is directed through the SBVS iodine filtration trains.

dampers (30KLC45 AA001/AA002) close, iodine filtration banks isolation dampers (30KLC41 /42 AA001/AA002 and 30KLC42 AA001/AA002) open, and the accident air is directed through the SBVS iodine filtration trains. The isolation dampers close or open within 60 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module.

S12b 2.6.6 7.4 Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure in the FB and SB relative to the outside environment.

Deleted.A test will be performed to verify that upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure inside the FB and SB relative to the outside environment.

Deleted.Upon receipt of a containment isolation test input signal from the PACS module, the SBVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge in the FB and SB relative to the outside environment.

254 7.4 Typo - safeguard buildings should be plural (SBs)

ITAAC deleted per RAI 511 Supplement 6, Q 06.04-9

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879


924


339 4.2 Eliminate "test input" in the ITA and AC. Replace 'PACS module' in the AC with 'activity monitors'. ITAAC should verify function is accomplished using low level rad signal to trip a reduced setpoint and then should verify LWMS discharge valve closure. CW can not be verified by using a low level rad signal. That is why a test signal was being used to simulate a high rad signal that can not be reproduced using a source.

1212


340 Please add ITAAC to verify the LWMS discharge valves close upon receiving :

1) a low in-plant dilution flow rate signal and

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231

a high-radiation signal on the LWMS radioactive discharge line for the radiation monitors and discharge valves listed in Table 2.9.1-2

Will be addressed in RAI 528

2) a low in-plant dilution flow rate signal but no high-radiation signal on the LWMS radioactive discharge line for the radiation monitors and discharge valves listed in Table 2.9.1-2


343 7.2 Eliminate "test input" in the ITA and AC. Replace 'PACS module' in the AC with 'activity monitors'.

A high radiation signal cannot be generated in the activity monitor using a source. ITAAC should verify function is accomplished using low level rad signal to trip a reduced setpoint and verifying valve closure (See table 2.9.1-3 cITTAC 4.2 comment above). CW can not be verified by using a low level rad signal. That is why a test signal was being used to simulate a high rad signal that can not be reproduced using a source.

1235


347 6.1 Please correct the ITA wording for clarity. 1244


232

S12c 2.2.3 7.5 The SIS/RHRS delivers water to the RCS for core cooling.

Tests will be performed to verify the SIS/RHRS delivers water to the RCS for core cooling.

The SIS/RHRS delivers the following flows to the RCS: a. MHSI pump capacity:

≥ 600 gpm @ 580 psia (cold leg pressure).

b. LHSI pump capacity: ≥ 2200 gpm @ 25 psia (cold leg pressure).

ac. Minimum MHSI pump capacity: ≥ 165 gpm @ pressure greater than 1300.0 psia 3200 TDH (ft) (shutoff head condition).

bd. Minimum LHSI pump capacity: ≥ 525 530 gpm @ pressure greater than 300.0 psia 750 TDH (ft) (shutoff head condition).

ce. Maximum MHSI pump capacity: ≤ 1110 gpm @ 14.5 psia 328 TDH (ft) (run-out condition).

df. Maximum LHSI pump capacity: ≤ 3220 gpm @ 14.5 psia 108 TDH (ft) (run-out condition).

46 7.5 Please provide the basis for the flow and head combinations established in the AC. We have not been able to locate supporting documentation in either the DCD or ANP-10293.

198

S12c 2.2.3 7.10 Each LHSI pump delivers water to its respective RCS hot leg.

Tests will be performed to verify each LHSI pump delivers the flow to its respective RCS hot leg.

Each LHSI pump delivers a minimum flow of 1720 gpm to its respective RCS hot leg at an equivalent RCS pressure of greater than or equal to 69.27 psia.

47 7.10. Specify a tolerance for RCS pressure or state it’s a minimum value

203

S12c 2.2.4 7.2 The EFWS delivers water to the steam generators at the required flowrate to restore and maintain SG water level and remove decay heat following the loss of normal feedwater supply.

Tests will be performed to verify the EFWS required flowrate to the steam generators to restore and maintain SG water level and remove decay heat following the loss of normal feedwater supply.

The EFWS delivers a minimum flow of 198,416 lbm/hr (or 399.4 400 gpm at 122°F) at a pressure of 1426.1 psia.

54 7.2 The value 399.4 is not consistent with Tier II (400 gpm).

Where do the other values come from?

236

S12c 2.2.7 7.4 Deleted. The EBS delivers water to RCS cold legs 1 and 2.

Deleted. Tests will be performed to verify the EBS delivers water to RCS cold legs 1 and 2.

Deleted. Each EBS pump delivers a minimum flow of 52 gpm to RCS cold legs 1 and 2.

d. Table 2.2.7-3 (Extra Borating System ITAAC) in Revision 4 to the U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1 does not appear to include ITAAC for pump preoperational flow testing. AREVA is requested to clarify whether ITAAC are included for pump preoperational flow testing for the Extra Borating System.

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233

S12c 2.3.3 7.1 The SAHRS pump delivers water to the Reactor Containment.Deleted.

Tests will be performed to verify the SAHRS pump delivers water to the Reactor Containment.Deleted.

The SAHRS pump delivers a minimum flow of 232 lbm/s to the Reactor Containment.Deleted.

Table 2.3.3-3 does not include functional qualification or preoperational flow testing ITAAC for the SAHRS pump. AREVA is requested to discuss its approach in establishing ITAAC for pumps with nonsafety-related functions listed in the Tier 1 tables of the U.S. EPR FSAR.

400

S12c 2.7.1 7.3 The CCWS delivers water to the LHSI/RHRS heat exchangers to provide cooling.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the LHSI/RHRS heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 2.1906 x 106 lbm/hr to each LHSI/RHR train 1 and 4 heat exchangers and 2.984 x 106 lbm/hr to LHSI/RHR train 2 and 3 heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

294 7.3 Why is the AC value of 2.19 x 106 lb/hr less than stated in Tier 2?

Updated to match Tier 2 Table 9.2.2-2.

993

S12c 2.7.1 7.4 The CCWS delivers water to the RCP thermal barrier coolers at the required flow from Common 1.b header and also from Common 2.b header.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the thermal barrier coolers from Common 1.b header and also from Common 2.b header under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 0.0792 x 106 lbm/hr to the thermal barrier coolers from Common 1.b header and also from Common 2.b header under normal operating conditions.

994

S12c 2.7.1 7.5 The CCWS delivers water to Divisions 2 and 3 SCWS chiller heat exchangers.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the Divisions 2 and 3 SCWS chiller heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 0.514 x 106 lbm/hr to the Divisions 2 and 3 SCWS chiller heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

995

S12c 2.7.1 7.6 The CCWS delivers water to the spent fuel pool heat exchangers.

Tests will be performed to verify the CCWS flowrate to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

The CCWS delivers a minimum flow of 0.8818 x 106 lbm/hr to the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers under normal operating conditions.

996

S12c 2.7.2 7.3 The SCWS pump delivers water to the equipment listed in Table 2.7.2-1.

Tests will be performed to determine the SCWS pump flowrate to the equipment listed in Table 2.7.2-1 under normal operating conditions.

The Each SCWS pump delivers a minimum flow of 565 gpm to provide cooling to the equipment listed in Table 2.7.2-1 under normal operating conditions.

307 7.3 Clarify the AC to indicate that the flow is the total pump flow - it's not the flow to each component. Example wording..."Each SCWS pump delivers a minimum flow rate of 565 gpm to provide cooling to the equipment listed ..."

1033

S12c 2.7.11 7.6 The ESWS pump delivers water to the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers and the ESWPBVS room coolers.

Tests will be performed to determine the ESWS pump flowrate to the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers and the ESWPBVS room coolers.

The ESWS pump delivers water at greater than or equal to the Normal Flow Rate for the ESW pump to the CCWS and EDG heat exchangers and the ESWPBVS room coolers within 120 seconds after receipt of

323 7.6 Cooler should be plural. The current ITAAC omits the timing requirement of 120 seconds.

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a start signal from the PACS module. S12d 2.6.1 6.1 The CRACS maintains a positive

pressure in the CRE area relative to the outside environment and adjacent areas, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the CRACS maintains a positive pressure in the CRE area relative to the outside environment and adjacent areas, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

The CRACS maintains a positive pressure of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge in the CRE area relative to the outside environment and adjacent areas, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

804

S12d 2.6.3 7.1 The AVS maintains a negative pressure between the inner and outer containment walls, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

A test will be performed using test input signals to verify the capability of the AVS to provide a negative pressure between the inner and outer containment walls, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

The AVS maintains a negative pressure of less than or equal to -0.25 inches water gauge within 305 seconds after receipt of a test input signal from the PACS module, while operating in a design basis accident alignment.

827

S13 Miscellaneous Analysis 7.14

S13 2.2.1 3.7 The piping and interconnected equipment nozzles listed in Table 2.2.1-1 are evaluated for LBB.

An analysis will be performed to verify the piping and interconnected equipment nozzles are evaluated for LBB. {{DAC}}

An analysis A report exists and concludes that design LBB analysis remains bounding for each piping system and provides a summary of the results of the as-built, plant-specific LBB analysis, including material properties of piping and welds, stress analyses, leakage detection capability, and degradation mechanisms.the piping and interconnected equipment nozzles listed in Table 2.2.1-1 meet the LBB acceptance criteria. {{DAC}}

22 3.7 Does the piping in Table 2.2.1-1 meet LBB criteria? The DC states they are evaluated for LBB and the acceptance criteria states they meet LBB acceptance criteria. Why the difference? What if they don't?

“A design report exists and concludes that the design LBB analysis remains bounding for each piping system and provides a summary of the results of the actual as-built, plant-specific LBB analysis, including material properties of piping and welds, stress analyses, leakage detection capability, and degradation mechanisms.”

86

S13 2.2.3 7.3 Each accumulator injection line to the RCS cold leg has a minimum head loss coefficient (fL/D + K).

An analysis will be performed to verify each as-built accumulator injection line to the RCS cold leg minimum head loss coefficient (fL/D + K).

Each accumulator injection line to the RCS cold leg has a minimum head loss coefficient (fL/D + K) of 3.71 for a flow area of 0.3941 ft2 and f = 0.014.

45 7.3 Is this a test and analyses or straight analyses?

Straight analysis.

Clarify the line being tested.

196

S13 2.2.3 7.13 LHSI and MHSI systems provide safety injection flow to the RCS during post-LOCA operation.

a. An analysis of pressure drop/overall system resistance across ECCS will be performed.

b. An analysis of plugging and wear

a. A report concludes that pressure drop/overall system resistance across ECCS is consistent with safety analysis results for 30 days of post-LOCA

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rates of piping, valves, and orifices will be performed.

c. An analysis of plugging of ECCS instrument lines will be performed.

operation. b. A report concludes that wear rates are

acceptable for 30 days of post-LOCA operation based on provided equipment specification.

c. A report concludes that post-LOCA debris will not clog the ECCS instrument lines.

S13 2.7.5 7.7 The standpipe and hose systems in areas containing systems and components required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a SSE, including the water supply to these standpipes, are capable of remaining functional and supplying two hose stations following an SSE.

An analysis will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the as-built standpipe and hose systems in areas containing systems and components required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a SSE to remain functional and supply two hose stations following a SSE.

An analysis concludes the FWDS will remain functional following a SSE and is capable of supplying the two hydraulically most remote hose stations with at least 75 gpm per hose stream.

311 7.7 Please reword the ITAAC for clarity.

No change

1063

S13 2.8.1 2.4 Turbine rotor integrity is provided through the combined use of selected materials with suitable toughness, analyses, testing, and inspections.

A plant-specific analysis will be conducted of the as-built turbine rotor material property data, turbine rotor and blade design, and inspection and testing requirements.

An analysis A report exists and concludes that the as-built turbine rotor plant specific turbine rotor meets the requirements of the manufacturer’s turbine missile probability analysis: 1. Turbine material property data, rotor

and blade design analyses (including loading combinations, assumptions and warm-up time) demonstrating safety margin to withstand loadings from overspeed events, and

2. The results of inspection and testing, and the requirements for inservice inspection and testing.

324 2.4 Modify the AC as follows: "A report exists and concludes the as-built turbine rotor integrity is provided through the combined use of selected materials with suitable toughness, analyses, testing, and inspections which meet the requirements of the manufacturer's turbine missile probability analysis:

1120

S13 2.8.1 2.5 The probability of turbine material and overspeed related failures resulting in external turbine missiles is < less than 1x10-54 per turbine year.

A material and overspeed failures analysis will be performed on the as-built turbine design.

An analysis concludes that the probability of turbine material and overspeed related failures resulting in external turbine missiles is < less than 1x10-54 per turbine year.

1121

S14 Miscellaneous Combination of ITA 7.15

S14 2.2.1 3.8 The RPV internals will withstand the effects of flow-induced vibration.

a. Tests and analyses of test results will be performed on a plant containing RPV internals

a. A comprehensive vibration assessment program report concludes that RPV internals have no observable damage,

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representative of the U.S. EPR to verify that the RPV internals have no observable damage, no loose parts, and stress is within ASME Code Section III limits.

b. An inspection will be performed after hot functional testing to verify the as-built RPV internals have no observable damage or loose parts.

c. An analysis will be performed on the effects of the RCP acoustic frequencies on RPV internals to verify that the RPV internals stress is within ASME Code Section III limits.

d. An analysis will be performed of the acoustic frequencies of the RCS volume to verify that the RCS stress is within the ASME Code Section III limits.

no loose parts, and stress is within ASME Code Section III limits.

b. The RPV internals have no observable damage or loose parts.

c. An analysis of the effects of RCP acoustic frequencies on RPV internals concludes that RPV internals stress is within ASME Code Section III limits.

d. An analysis of the acoustic frequencies of the RCS volume concludes that stresses due to their loading impact to the RCS equipment when considering sources of flow excitation created by vortex shedding frequencies of the applicable structures and blade passing frequencies of the RCP is within the ASME Code Section III limits.

S14 2.2.1 3.9 The RCS allows movement of the equipment for thermal expansion and contraction.

a. An analysis will be performed to determine the clearances and gaps between as-built RCS piping system and its equipment supports.

b An inspection of the RCS will be performed to verify the clearances and gaps for as-built RCS piping system and its equipment supports conform to the approved design.

a. A report defines clearances and gaps between RCS piping system and its equipment supports.

b. The measured clearances and gaps conform to the approved design for RCS piping system and its equipment supports.

23 3.9 The ITAAC is not clear. Is part a) a design analysis prior to construction? With b) being a check of the as-built system to verify design requirements are met? Yes When are the measurements taken cold, hot, or both cold and hot? Both cold and hot per Tier 2 Section 3.9.2.1 Clarify where the clearances and gaps are being measured.

88

S14 2.2.1 3.19 Each RCP contains an oil collection system.

a. An analysis will be performed to verify the as-built oil collection system 1) will withstand a safe-shutdown earthquake, 2) will collect lube oil from leakage sites in the RCP lube oil system, and 3) is sized so that the drain line and collection tank are

a. A report concludes the oil collection system 1) will withstand a safe-shutdown earthquake, 2) will collect lube oil from leakage sites in the RCP lube oil system, and 3) is sized so that the drain line and collection tank are large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil

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large enough to accommodate the largest potential oil leak.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify an oil collection system is installed on each as-built RCP.

leak. b. An oil collection system is installed on

each RCP.

S14 2.2.2 7.4 Post-LOCA pH control is provided for the IRWST with TSP.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built capacity of the TSP baskets to provide post-LOCA pH control.

The TSP baskets listed in Table 2.2.2-1 hold a capacity of TSP of ≥ 12,200 lbm.

157

S14 2.2.2 7.5 The IRWST suction inlet line for each safety injection system division has a debris screen.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a debris screen is installed in the as-built IRWST suction inlet line for each safety injection system division.

b. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum surface area and maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built debris screen.

a. A debris screen is installed in the IRWST suction inlet line for each safety injection system division.

b. The debris screen has a minimum surface area of 753 ft2 and a maximum mesh grid opening of 0.08 x 0.08 inches.

158

S14 2.2.2 7.8 The IRWST has a retaining basket located directly below each heavy floor opening.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify a retaining basket is installed in the as-built IRWST directly under each heavy floor opening.

b. An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the minimum surface area and maximum mesh grid opening of the as-built retaining basket.

a. A retaining basket is installed in the IRWST directly below each heavy floor opening.

b. The retaining basket has a minimum surface area of 721 ft2 and a maximum mesh grid opening of 0.08 x 0.08 inches.

161

S14 2.2.3 7.12 LHSI heat exchanger cools the post-LOCA fluid for a minimum of 30 days.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses for heat exchanger performance will be performed to demonstrate that the LHSI heat exchanger cools the post-LOCA fluid for a minimum of 30 days.

A report concludes that debris plugging and settlement in the LHSI heat exchanger tubes will not occur, and/or affect the performance of the LHSI heat exchanger for the 30-day mission time. A report concludes that failure due to abrasive wear will not degrade the performance of the LHSI heat exchanger below the 30-day acceptance criteria.

205

S14 2.2.3 7.14 The SIS/RHRS includes high point a. An analysis will be performed to a. A report defines the locations of high 48 7.14 What identifies the required number and 207


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vents to avoid gas accumulation in the SIS/RHRS.

determine the locations of high point vents to avoid gas accumulation in the SIS/RHRS.

b. An inspection will be performed to verify high point vents are installed in the as-built SIS/RHRS.

point vents to avoid gas accumulation in the SIS/RHRS.

b. High point vents are installed in the SIS/RHRS.

location of high point vents? Suggest use an 'a' and 'b' approach where in part 'a' an analysis identifes required vent locations, and part 'b' verifes their installation.

S14 2.2.8 3.8 The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required limits during normal operations, during and after design basis seismic events, and during and after design basis dropped fuel assembly accidents.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required limits during normal operations, during and after design basis seismic events, and during and after design basis dropped fuel assembly accidents.

Inspection reports and poison plate manufacturer reports verify the following fuel storage racks features: • Region 1 rack cell pitch is consistent

with rack model inputs of the criticality evaluation.

• Region 2 rack cell pitch is consistent with rack model inputs of the criticality evaluation.





• The layout of fuel storage racks in the spent fuel pool agrees with design drawings.

• The layout of fuel storage racks in the new fuel storage vault agrees with design drawings.

348

S14 2.2.8 3.15 The lift height of the Refueling a. An analysis will be performed to a. A radiological analysis determines the 355


239

Machine and Spent Fuel Machine gripper masts is limited such that the dose rate is less than 2.5 mrem/hr at the normal operating water level.

determine the minimum depth of water shielding required to limit the dose rate to less than 2.5 mrem/hr at the normal operating water level.

b. A test will be performed to verify the Refueling Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

c. A test will be performed to verify the Spent Fuel Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

minimum depth of water shielding required to limit the dose rate to less than 2.5 mrem/hr at the normal operating water level.

b. The Refueling Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

c. The Spent Fuel Machine gripper mast limit switch prevents lifting the mast above the level required to maintain the minimum depth of water above a fuel assembly.

S14 2.2.8 3.16 The SFCTF opening to the loading hall can be isolated from the spent fuel pool by closing each of the following four Seismic Category I fluid barriers: • Loading pit slot gate. • Loading pit swivel gate. • Penetration assembly upper cover. • Penetration assembly lower cover.

A test and inspection will be performed to verify each fluid barrier can isolate the spent fuel pool from the loading hall.

The loading hall can be isolated from the spent fuel pool by closing any one of the following Seismic Category I fluid barriers: • Loading pit slot gate. • Loading pit swivel gate. • Penetration assembly upper cover. • Penetration assembly lower cover.

76 N/A What ITAAC perform the load tests for the RM and SFM, verify interlocks, and verify the gripper can't be opened under load etc.?

Section 2.10.1, ITAAC 4.6 & 4.7

356

S14 2.3.1 7.1 The hydrogen mixing dampers listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide pressure relief for design basis events.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built hydrogen mixing dampers provide sufficient area for pressure relief.

The hydrogen mixing dampers listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide a minimum combined total open area of 64 ft².

81 7.1, 7.2, 7.3



No change required.

364

S14 2.3.1 7.2 The convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide pressure relief for design basis events.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built convection foils provide sufficient area for pressure relief.

The convection foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide a minimum combined total open area of 450 ft².

81 7.1, 7.2, 7.3



365


240

No change required.

S14 2.3.1 7.3 The rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide pressure relief for design basis events.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify that the as-built rupture foils provide sufficient area for pressure relief.

The rupture foils listed in Table 2.3.1-1 provide a minimum combined total open area of 420 ft².

81 7.1, 7.2, 7.3


This value matches the value stated on Tier 2, Section 6.2.1, page 6.2-6, i.e., 870-450 = 420.

No change required.

366

S14 2.6.7 6.3 The SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent by volume.

Tests and analysis will be performed to verify the air flow capability of the SBVSE is adequate to maintain the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent.

The air flow capability of the SBVSE maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below one percent by volume.

896

S14 2.7.5 7.2 The FWDS pumps consist of at least one 100% capacity electric motor-driven pump and one two 100% capacity diesel engine-driven pumps that provide 100% capacity assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power.

a. An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built FWDS consists of at least one 100% capacity electric motor-driven pump and one two 100% capacity diesel engine-driven pumps.

b. An analysis test will be performed to verify that one as-builteach FWDS diesel and one electric pump provides 100% of the required flow capacity assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power.

a. The FWDS consists of at least one 100% capacity electric motor-driven pump and one two 100% capacity diesel engine-driven pumps.

b. A report concludes that one diesel and one electric each FWDS pump provides 100% of the required flow capacity assuming failure of the largest pump or loss of offsite power.

310 7.2 Modify the CW to reflect the design specified in Tier 2 which states the FWDS contains three 100% capacity pumps - two diesel driven pumps and one electric pump. Delete from "assuming failure ---." to the end in the CW, ITA, and AC and then modify the ITA and AC accordingly. Add testing to part b and specify that each pump is capable of providing 100% of the required flow capacity as determined by analysis.

1058

S14 2.9.1 4.1 The LWMS processing equipment contains the proper types and amounts of filter media or treatment media.

An inspection and analysis will be performed to verify the as-built LWMS processing equipment contains filter/treatment media capable of maintaining offsite doses to members of the public within 10 CFR 20 limits and effluent concentrations below the annual average concentration limits of 10 CFR 20.

A report concludes that the LWMS processing equipment contains a minmum of 30 ft3 per ion exchange column of filter/treatment media capable of maintaining offsite doses to members of the public within 10 CFR 20 limits and effluent concentrations below the annual average concentration limits of 10 CFR 20.

Add specific minimum quantity of filter/treatment media in lieu of referring to 10CFR20.

1211

S14 2.9.3 7.1 The GWPS processing equipment contains delay beds listed in Table 2.9.3-1 filled with activated charcoal.

Inspections and analyses will be performed to verify the as-built mass of activated charcoal loaded in each

Each delay bed listed in Table 2.9.3-1 contains a minimum of 5,440 lbm of activated charcoal.

1234


241

delay bed. z Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 3.07


z Deleted.Equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x as ASME AG-1 Code are designed in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


Deleted.ASME AG-1 Code Design Verification Reports (AA-4400) conclude that the design of equipment listed as ASME AG-1 Code in Table x.x.x-x complies with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


3.09

z Deleted.Equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements, including welding requirements.


Deleted.A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table x.x.x-x are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.


3.1




z 2.1.3 3.2 Deleted.Separation is provided between the NAB and the NI common basemat as shown on Figure 2.1.3-1 to preclude interaction between the NAB and NI common basemat structures.

Deleted.An inspection will be performed to verify the as-built physical separation between the NAB and the NI common basemat.

Deleted.The NAB is separated from the NI common basemat as shown on Figure 2.1.3-1. A minimum separation distance of 18 inches exists between the NAB and NI common basemat.

64












242




























243




























244




























245




























246















z 2.4.4 4.23 Deleted.Permissives P14 and P15 provide operating bypass capability for the following SAS interlocks: Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low Delta Psat. Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low-Low RCS Loop Level.

Deleted.A test will be performed using test input signals to verify that the following interlocks are bypassed when test input signals representing the corresponding inhibited or validated Permissives P14 and P15 signals are present: Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low Delta Psat. Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low-Low RCS Loop Level.

Deleted.Permissives P14 and P15 provide operating bypass capability for the following SAS interlocks: Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low Delta Psat. Safety Injection and Heat Removal System - Automatic Trip of LHSI Pump (in RHR Mode) on Low-Low RCS Loop Level.

122 4.23 Should this ITAAC be deleted (see RAI 505 Q7.1-35)?

Yes

488

z 2.4.5 4.4 Deleted.The input wiring from other I&C systems to the PACS is properly connected.

Deleted.An inspection will be performed to verify that the as-built input wiring from other I&C systems

Deleted.The input wiring from the other I&C systems to the PACS is properly connected.

128 4.4 Define 'properly connected.' Not applicable.

Deleted based on revision to 2.4.5, item 4.1.

498


247

to the PACS is properly connected. z 2.4.10 3.1 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 530


























248
















796





797








818

z 2.6.3 3.5 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table Deleted.An inspection of the as-built Deleted.A report concludes that ASME 230 ITAAC deleted at Public Meeting on April 4-5, 819


249

2.6.3-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements, including welding requirements.

fabrication activities and documentation for ASME AG-1 Code equipment will be conducted.

AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table 2.6.3-1 are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.

2013.








835





836







854





855



z 2.6.6 3.4 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table 2.6.6-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are designed in accordance with ASME


Deleted.ASME AG-1 Code Design Verification Reports (AA-4400) conclude that the design of equipment listed as


864


250

AG-1 Code requirements. ASME AG-1 Code in Table 2.6.6-1 complies with ASME AG-1 Code requirements.





865










886





887







903

z 2.6.8 3.6 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table 2.6.8-2 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated in accordance with ASME AG-1 Code requirements, including




904


251

welding requirements. z 2.6.8 3.8 Deleted. Deleted. Deleted. 906













931





932








946

z 2.6.13 3.5 Deleted.Equipment listed in Table 2.6.13-1 as ASME AG-1 Code are fabricated in accordance with ASME

Deleted.An inspection of the as-built fabrication activities and documentation for ASME AG-1

Deleted.A report concludes that ASME AG-1 Code equipment listed in Table 2.6.13-1 are fabricated in accordance with


947


252

AG-1 Code requirements, including welding requirements.

Code equipment will be conducted. ASME AG-1 Code requirements.



























253




























254




























255




























256






z 2.9.4 4.3 Deleted.The Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

Deleted.An analysis will be performed to verify that the sensitivity of the as built Reactor Building radiation monitor supports RCPB leakage detection.

Deleted.A report concludes that the Reactor Building radiation monitor sensitivity of 3E-10 µCi/cc correlates to an ability to detect a leakage increase of 1 gpm.

ITAAC moved to Section 2.4.8 1242
















2013/06/11 areva epr dc docs - files for itaac/rai 469message 2513 6/11/2013 3:08:47 pm combined...

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