2014.06.01 gwc evaluation final report d8€¦ · 8*...

Global WASH Cluster Evaluation of the Support Provided to National Coordination Platforms

In collaboration with:

DRAFT Final Report Date of submission 7 May 2014

GWC Evaluation of Support to National Coordination Platforms Copyright © Avenir Analytics, 2014

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Acknowledgements

Avenir Analytics thanks the many organizations and individuals that willingly contributed their time and insights to make this evaluation of Global WASH Cluster (GWC) support to national coordination platforms possible. Particular gratitude goes to Paul Shanahan, the GWC Coordinator and Franck Bouvet the GWC Deputy Coordinator, members of the GWC Strategic Advisory Group, current and past members of the GWC Rapid Response Team, Rapid Assessment Team, Regional Emergency Coordination Advisors and particularly Leilia Dore and Damien Brosnan. Their insights, support and guidance have been extremely helpful throughout the process. Ben Allen, the ACF-‐UK Evaluations, Learning & Accountability Manager, provided critical support, collaboration and guidance throughout the process and deserves special thanks for his expert contributions and sound advice.

Disclaimer

The statements of findings and conclusions in this report represent the best judgment of the evaluation team based on careful analysis of available data and do not necessarily represent the opinions of ACF International, the GWC and its members or UNICEF, which serves as the Cluster Lead Agency for WASH. Responsibility for the content of this report rests solely with Avenir Analytics.

www.aveniranalytics.com


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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. ii Disclaimer ............................................................................................................................................ ii Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................ iii Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 1 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 4

1.1 Objective ........................................................................................................................ 4 1.2 Evaluation Questions ..................................................................................................... 4 1.3 Approach and methodology .......................................................................................... 5

2. Findings ........................................................................................................................................ 7

2.1 Overall Findings .............................................................................................................. 7 2.2 Relevance / Appropriateness ......................................................................................... 8 2.3 Effectiveness ................................................................................................................ 10 2.4 Efficiency ...................................................................................................................... 12 2.5 Coherence / Connectedness ........................................................................................ 17 2.6 Coverage ...................................................................................................................... 18 2.7 Sustainability ................................................................................................................ 18

3. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................ 20 4. Recommendations ..................................................................................................................... 21 5. List of Annexes ........................................................................................................................... 23 6. Acronyms Used .......................................................................................................................... 24


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Executive Summary This evaluation was commissioned by the Global WASH Cluster (GWC) coordinator and ACF-‐UK as lead for learning and evaluation in consultation with the GWC Strategic Advisory Group (SAG). It seeks to generate credible evidence of results achieved or not achieved by the cluster’s Field Support Team (FST) in support of national WASH coordination. The GWC initiated its global surge capacity systems in 2007 to support coordination efforts during emergencies with the Rapid Response Team (RRT). With the support of different consortia of members, the RRT has been complemented by a Rapid Assessment Team (RAT) and Regional Emergency Cluster (Coordination) Advisors (RECA). Total GWC standing surge capacity has grown from 3 to as many as 18 personnel over the last 7 years and an effort is underway to integrate these mechanisms under the FST. Notwithstanding this dedicated investment, GWC capacity to meet the support needs of national coordination platforms stretched in 2013 and 2014 with 4 simultaneous Level 3 emergencies. This evaluation used systematic interviews, observation, focus groups and document review. Inquiry focused on 6 criteria: relevance / appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, coverage and sustainability. The evaluation focused on 4 critical case studies representing the L3 emergencies in 2013/2014. Key Findings Overall Overall the evaluation found the GWC’s support to national coordination platforms to be strong.

Across all 28 evaluation indicators, 26 found average responses of ‘adequate’ to ‘good’ based on key informants, documentary evidence and observation. The only indicators that revealed significant weaknesses related to the ability to determine the relationship between FST contributions and response outputs (assessment speed) and outcomes (delivering relief). The dependency of the FST on pre-‐existing coordination structures and partner capacities explained these weaknesses. While average responses to key evaluation questions showed strength, there was considerable variability across case studies and key informants. This variability was driven by significant differences in country context, type of emergency, pre-‐existing capacity and the experience of FST personnel deployed. Relevance/Appropriateness GWC efforts to support national coordination platforms are well aligned with IASC standards, including recent efforts of the Transformative Agenda (TA). 88% of 2013/2014 GWC surge capacity deployments were focused on the 4 IASC declared L3 emergencies. FST mechanisms have also allowed the GWC to support preparedness and capacity building, increasing GWC relevance to national platforms. The challenge of guiding vs. being responsive to requests from the national level presents a relevance dilemma. This was highlighted in efforts of the FST to identify risks and capacity gaps, which some felt could be perceived as shifting to an accountability focus. Effectiveness GWC support has been broadly effective in improving coordination and preparedness.


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National and global cluster members unanimously agree FST support is equally available to all sector actors. The RECA project has increased GWC effectiveness in its focus countries and use of RECAs in a few responses shows cross-‐over value beyond the project’s scope. RRTs were broadly viewed as effective in augmenting coordination capacities, with some variance based on the experience and soft skills of members. The RAT project’s effectiveness was most frequently critiqued, largely based on divergent views on its purpose and management structure, though national key informants also reported some highly effective RAT deployments. Information Management (IM) approaches were also critiqued, though most often linked to a broader dilemma related to the upstream information demands compared with the actionable response information national actors value most. The GWC Cluster Advocacy and Support Team (CAST) also mobilizes significant support beyond the FST to support national coordination during emergencies. From January 2013 to April 2014 30% of GWC deployments came from other sources (e.g. stand-‐by partners). Efficiency The GWC provides strong value for money through its support to national coordination platforms based on analysis of cost, quality and speed. While 48% of total FST time recorded was spent on emergency deployments, significant time was also dedicated to remote, regional and global support for preparedness and capacity building.

The overall cost structure of the FST provides good value for money, largely because it relies on NGO personnel, which makes it 60% less costly than a comparable UN staff surge model. However, the fragmented evolution of the RRT, RAT and RECA under different management structures has led to significant variance in budgeted cost models. Combined with the days of work recorded within FST tracking systems, this variance in budget models leads to a significant difference in measured efficiency, with RRTs being most cost-‐efficient and RECAs being least cost efficient. The cost-‐efficiency of RRTs comes with a reported risk – that of a high risk of burnout and turnover. FST deployments were found to be timely as measured against the IASC L3 declarations. In all 4 cases studied the GWC had surge capacity staff in country before the IASC declaration. Ongoing efforts of the GWC to further integrate the components of the FST show potential for further increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of GWC support to national coordination platforms. Coherence/Connectedness The GWC has generally demonstrated strong inter-‐cluster and intra-‐cluster coordination to achieve coherence and connectedness. FST members mostly showed an understanding and respect for pre-‐existing coordination structures where they were present, including national government authorities where they were able to work with the humanitarian system. Coordination within national platforms was enhanced by the experience and diversity of FST personnel, which come from various major WASH actors not just the UN system.


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Coordination with other clusters/sectors was enhanced by the experience and relationships of FST personnel, but weaknesses still exist in the broader effectiveness of country level inter-‐cluster/sector coordination mechanisms, which is beyond the control of the FST. Connectedness between the GWC and UNICEF as the CLA is strong at global levels but linkages with UNICEF country offices is variable and can lead to challenges in deploying FST members. Coverage GWC coverage of the needs of national coordination platforms was found to be strong in case study countries during emergencies. FST deployments strengthened the capacity of national and sub-‐national coordination structures through augmentation, coaching and training. Coverage of technical advisory needs was more variable, though this is at least partly driven by different perspectives on the relative importance of coordination competencies vs. technical competencies. One dilemma regarding coverage relates to country level awareness and acceptance of GWC support. Key informants noted that many existing coordination platforms and key WASH actors are not familiar with the support available from the FST. This relates to the challenges for the GWC in establishing a balance between a pro-‐active vs. reactive stance and coordination between the GWC, national coordination platforms and various levels of the Cluster Lead Agency (CLA). Sustainability FST deployments were found to include strategies for transition and sustainability, though these plans can be undermined by

difficulties in recruitment, emergency context and funding. The lasting impacts of FST deployments were difficult to assess in most cases given the ongoing nature of the emergencies and depend heavily on partners that remain in a country. The sustainability of support for the FST structure was identified as a potential concern. While ongoing efforts to further integrate the FST are seen as having likely positive effects on efficiency and quality of support, a number of key risks were cited related to maintaining partner, donor and CLA support for the FST. Alternative funding models, such as a partial cost-‐recovery system, have been suggested but not fully analyzed to date. Recommendations 1. Proceed with the proposed further

integration of the FST under unified management of the CAST.

2. Analyze the potential for implementing a partial cost recovery model and other mechanisms to increase financial sustainability of the FST.

3. Strengthen adherence to a minimum staff reporting structure to enable unified management and value for money analysis.

4. Continue to closely collaborate with UNICEF as CLA to facilitate coordination preparedness, capacity building and other approaches to enhance continuity.

5. Develop a Theory of Change and monitoring and evaluation plan to accompany the next GWC strategy, including potential use of social network analysis.


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1. Introduction In 2007, the GWC established the Rapid Response Team (RRT) with three WASH Cluster Coordinators (WCC) to provide initial support to National Coordination Platforms during emergencies. This team was supplemented in 2009 by a Rapid Assessment Team (RAT) of 3 persons that support partners by carrying out entire emergency assessments in the early days of an emergency. RAT members are hosted by 3 partners (CARE USA, Oxfam GB and IFRC) grouped in a consortium, and until recently were directly managed by the consortium itself. Additionally, in 2009 6 Regional Emergency Cluster (Coordinator) Adviser positions were created by a consortium (of ACF, IFRC, NCA, CARE Germany/Luxemburg and TearFund) in order to operationalize the capacity building component of the GWC Strategic Plan. In 2013, the GWC partners consolidated these 3 teams (RRT, RAT and RECAs) under one Field Support Team (FST), and by the end of 2013 these units had provided the following support to national coordination platforms for emergencies, preparedness and capacity building: • RRT: support to 16 countries for an

equivalent of 2,708 person/days. • RAT: support to 10 countries for an

equivalent of 333 person/days. • RECAs: support to 12 countries for an

equivalent of 908 person/days.

The GWC has been under extreme pressure in providing surge support to National WASH Coordination Platforms during 2013 and 2014 because of the simultaneous triggering of 4 Level 3 (L3) emergencies in 2013 (Syria, the Philippines, South Sudan and Central African Republic (CAR)) in addition to 2 on-‐going L2 emergencies (Somalia, Mali). This context of geographic diversity, strained resources, and diversity of emergency type is an excellent opportunity for the GWC to evaluate the strategy and structure of the FST as it supports National WASH Coordination Platforms in the framework of the Transformative Agenda (TA), the IASC operational guidance on cluster coordination, and UNICEF’s Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) mandate. 1.1 Objective The broad evaluation objective was to generate credible evidence of results either achieved or not achieved by the FST in providing support to National WASH Coordination Platforms. Within this context, the primary intended use for this evaluation is to inform the new GWC Strategic Plan for 2016-‐2020 and guide the GWC to provide more effective support to National WASH Coordination Platforms. 1.2 Evaluation Questions The primary analytic framework for this evaluation is the OECD/DAC criteria, operationalized in the Terms of Reference by a series of eight focal questions as follows:


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Table 1 – Evaluation Questions

OECD/DAC Criteria: Focal Question(s): Relevance/ Appropriateness:

1. How closely aligned is the support from CAST and the FST to National WASH Coordination Platforms with the principles and standards found in the IASC Cluster Coordination Reference Modules?

2. How closely is FST support aligned with in-‐country coordination needs? Effectiveness: 3. To what degree has CAST and FST contributed to improved coordination,

preparedness and response through the support provided to countries? Efficiency: 4. To what extent can the GWC show value-‐for-‐money for their surge capacity

systems within the ‘balanced scorecard’ approach using the dimensions of cost, quality and speed?

5. To what extent has the FST proactively identified the most cost-‐effective means of achieving human resources and training needs of WASH Coordination Platforms?

Coherence/ Coordination:

6. How clearly have the FST support mechanisms demonstrated inter-‐cluster and intra-‐cluster coordination?

Coverage: 7. How well do the FST mechanisms enable coverage of country coordinator positions and functions as well as short-‐term technical needs?

Sustainability: 8. How well have FST members strengthened in-‐country coordination and technical capacity and ensured a smooth transition to ongoing leadership?

1.3 Approach and methodology Design The evaluation design followed the general approach outlined in the terms of reference, primarily involving qualitative methods of interviewing and document review, supplemented by a ‘balanced scorecard’ for cost analysis to address questions related to efficiency. The approach balanced both global-‐level and country-‐level data collection and inquiry in order to identify credible evidence of operational results and maximize the usefulness of those findings within the context of a global mandate. The four level three emergencies of 2013 (South Sudan, Philippines, Central African Republic, Syria) were selected as the focus for the country-‐level data for several reasons: since they are recent (and in 3 cases on-‐going) the feedback from key informants is more reliable and less subject to memory loss, they include both natural disasters and complex emergency contexts, represent relatively broad geographic

contexts, and comprise a natural ‘stress test’ scenario of responding to four disasters simultaneously. Data Collection The primary data collected for this evaluation included documents and key informant interviews, supplemented by feedback provided during small group discussions during the GWC annual meeting in Oslo in April 2014. As listed in Annex 3, a total of 187 documents were reviewed, which included both global and country-‐level data intentionally sampled to provide both complimentary and supplementary perspectives to the key informant interviews. A total of 38 key informants were interviewed, including 23 from the global level (CAST, SAG, RRT, RAT, members, donors and CLA) and 15 from the country and regional levels.


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Preliminary findings from this evaluation were presented at the annual meeting of the GWC in Oslo in April 2014. Involvement in the meeting served three goals: i) the initial findings contributed to the ongoing discussion about refining the GWC strategy, ii) sharing initial findings facilitated a ‘member check’ of the findings as part of an ongoing analysis process, and iii) conducting small group discussions allowed a wider group of participants to provide feedback than would otherwise be possible. The evaluators also observed the full GWC meeting in Oslo, led a short group discussion during a follow-‐on FST meeting in Oslo and observed the remainder of this meeting. Analysis Data workbooks were developed in Excel to systematically compile the notes from the key informant interviews and excerpts from the document review. A total of 363 excerpts were collected from the document review and coded to analyze the data within the evaluation criteria. Notes from the key informant interviews were recorded by indicator, and analyzed within a level (country and global) and across levels to identify overall themes and situate the findings within a relevant and useful context. These interview notes were scored on a 0-‐4 scale in order to systematically condense the data from the 28 indicators into the 6 criteria (see Annex 7 Evaluation Matrix), and the coding and overall themes identified were checked and discussed by both members of the evaluation team in order to maximize the rigor of the analysis. The initial findings were shared and generally affirmed during the GWC annual meeting in Oslo in April; the only controversial finding was the

cost analysis comparison of the RECA, RRT and RAT, therefore additional analysis was conducted to confirm and clarify this finding. Reporting This report, and an accompanying presentation, seeks to present the findings and analysis from the evaluation and make specific recommendations for improvement of GWC support to national coordination platforms through its surge capacity systems. The findings and analysis are organized based on the criteria and present answers to the key questions agreed during the inception phase. Where applicable, unexpected findings that go beyond the key questions are also highlighted to represent critical information that was discovered during the evaluation. Quotes from key informant interviews are provided throughout the text of the findings section to illustrate key points and give key stakeholders an understanding of the diverse views encountered during data collection. However, all findings are the result of thorough triangulation across data sources and represent the balance of data and best judgment.


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2. Findings 2.1 Overall Findings There was extensive evidence of the overall strength of the Global Wash Cluster, both from the documents reviewed and in a diverse range of key informants. Several informants with broad experience within the cluster system noted that the GWC is the overall strongest, and pointed to evidence of other clusters following the GWC lead (e.g. the Nutrition Cluster recently implementing a similar field support team structure.)

Additionally, only two of the overall average responses within the 28 indicators revealed areas of overall weakness; on average, responses ranged from ‘adequate’ to ‘good.’ The two indicators with the weakest response were not related to FST activities directly, but included the indirect involvement of partners providing the response: the speed of completing the initial assessment and speed of providing response to SPHERE standards. While this is a relevant finding in itself, it underscores a broad theme highlighted by many participants; the lack of an overall theory of change for the FST and practical method to adequately link the activities of the FST to impacts received by beneficiaries. Despite the fact that “just brokering

relationships and getting people together has had clear impact,” a rigorous evidence base for the impact on response is widely perceived as a missing piece for not just the GWC but the broader cluster system itself.

While the average responses were generally positive, there was considerable variation of response within most of the criteria. (The two exceptions were relevance and coherence /connectedness, both of which were different in that they were more uniformly positive.) This variability of response was such that depending on participant and/or context, the indicators would be reported across the spectrum from extremely poor to extremely strong. Therefore, while the overall average strength of the GWC is the first primary finding, the second highlights a concerning caveat; that this strength is inconsistent, and the inconsistency is related to differences in country context, type of emergency, pre-‐existing capacity, and differences in the experience and training of the personnel deployed. Across most evaluation criteria, the unique context of the emergency was stressed as a determining factor for how the FST could and did support national coordination platforms. The diversity of the four case studies is illustrated in Table 2 below.

“There is no theory of change for the cluster system…no framework, so everyone sets their own benchmarks for success and dialog becomes very difficult because people can move the goalposts as they

“There is much work still to do and problems to address, but we should keep it in perspective of the strength and positive that has been achieved.”


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Table 2 – Diversity of Context in Evaluation Case Studies

2.2 Relevance/Appropriateness There was clear evidence of strength within the relevance/appropriateness criteria, and the findings demonstrated less variance of response as views within the other criteria. Both the documents reviewed and feedback from key informants showed that the goals, tools and approach of the CAST/FST are very well aligned with the IASC principles and standards. The four cases in this evaluation, each of which was designated as a Level 3 (L3) emergency by the IASC during the period of analysis, demonstrated broad GWC alignment with the IASC Transformative Agenda and Cluster

Coordination Reference Modules. L3 emergencies are declared in situations where the urgency, scale or complexity overwhelms regional and national capacity to respond and extraordinary resources are temporarily required. The Transformative Agenda calls on clusters to deploy on a ‘no-‐regrets’ basis once L3 emergencies are declared to ensure national coordination platforms are able to function. The scale of this response is meant to be determined based on the pre-‐existing resources and capacities of national coordination structures. Figure 1 below shows that during 2013 and early 2014, GWC surge capacity deployments were primarily focused (88%) on the four countries that became L3 emergencies.

South&Sudan Central&African&Republic Syria Philippines

Emergency&Type Complex(humanitarian(emergency

Complex(humanitarian(emergency

Complex(humanitarian(emergency Natural(disaster

Initial&WASH&responseWater(and(sanitation(to(large(numbers(of(IDP's,(refugees(and(the(general(population

Water(and(sanitation(provided(to(IDP(camps

Water(and(sanitation(provided(to(refugees(and(IDP(camps

Restored(electricity(and(functionality(of(municipal(water(systems,(emergency(water(to(rural(areas(

Geographic&ScopeWASH(response(across(entire(country;(remote(with(difficult(accessibility

Primary(focus(on(IDP(camps(followed(by(efforts(to(reach(rural(areas

Very(constrained(response(opportunity(within(Syria;(Response(included(Jordan,(Southern(Turkey(and(Lebanon(

Large(area(with(urban,(periJurban(and(rural(contexts,(all(with(total(destruction(of(infrastructure

Pre@Existing&Coordination&Networks

Longstanding(cluster(activities(in(country(but(high(turnover(greatly(diminished(capacity(

Very(weak(preJexisting(networks(were(completely(destroyed(by(turnover,(violence(and(looting

Varied(levels(of(capacity(in(surrounding(country(contexts;(none(in(Syria(itself

Uniquely(strong(national(structure;(primary(need(was(expanding(local/subJnational(support

Status&of&National&Partners Very(few(partners(/(high(turnover(because(of(violence

Very(few(partners(/(high(turnover(because(of(violence

Adequate(number(of(partners(in(surrounding(countries

Large(number(of(very(capable(partners;(perhaps(too(many(

Primary&Challenges&Cited&by&Key&Informants

Adequately(scaling(response(within(fastJchanging(context(related(to(patterns(of(violence(and(weather

Extreme(lack(of(resources((i.e.(finding(office(supplies)(and(ongoing(violence(make(any(progress(extremely(difficult

Identifying(practical(opportunities(to(help(given(extreme(violence(and(political(constraints

Managing(the(chaos(of(a(huge(international(response(with(all(infrastructure(destroyed

Number&of&Globally&Deployed&Individuals&(includes&CAST,&FST&and&other&augmentation&support)

6(Individuals 9(Individuals 16(Individuals 13(Individuals


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Figure 1 – GWC Surge Staff Deployments

The three components of the FST provide a combined capacity that allows the GWC to provide ongoing support to national coordination platforms beyond deployments to large scale emergencies through remote, regional and short-‐term country level assistance. There was broad evidence of the flexibility of the combined FST mechanisms to facilitate context-‐appropriate support for national coordination mechanisms. For example, support is targeted to the specific national needs across many non-‐deployment dimensions, including capacity building and training for assessment, coordination, and information management; and assistance with setting up and facilitating extraordinary partnership, monitoring and learning exercises. RRT, RAT and RECA staff have served both gap-‐filling and capacity building roles. Additionally,

the structure utilizing NGO partners provides greater flexibility and ability to customize the support than is otherwise possible within the more rigid UN structure. To prioritize GWC support to national coordination platforms, the FST began using a capacity assessment tool in 2013 to map the strengths and gaps for coordination per country for all regions, based on an early version of the IASC cluster coordination performance assessment tool.

While this initiative is oriented towards enabling the GWC to best prioritize its assistance before

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Dec+12" Jan+13" Feb+13" Mar+13" Apr+13" May+13" Jun+13" Jul+13" Aug+13" Sep+13" Oct+13" Nov+13" Dec+13" Jan+14" Feb+14" Mar+14" Apr+14"

GWC$Surge$Staff$Deployed$by$Week$and$Emergency$

South"Sudan" CAR" Philippines" Syria" Other"

Philip-pines

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L3 Declared

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CAR Coup d’Etat

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South Sudan

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Includes RRT, RAT, RECA, CAST and other globally mobilized surge personnel

“There are questionnaires developed that are very linked to IASC global tools...but RECA struggles with how to present them to national partners because they don’t want to be perceived as evaluators but rather capacity builders…”


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and following emergencies, it has raised a tension among FST members related to being seen as an accountability mechanism rather than a resource. The long term relevance of these efforts to national coordination structures needs to be well communicated. The responses to the two sub-‐questions about relevance and appropriateness highlighted a dynamic tension within the overall cluster system itself which contributes to strain within the GWC: the tension between maintaining global standards (i.e. IASC cluster coordination reference modules and/or SPHERE standards) and the need to work in support of country/local organizations and processes.

While these are not mutually exclusive in concept, this evaluation found that the uniquely strong government, NGO and UN community in the Philippines was the only context that approximated the needed capacity to implement effective coordinated disaster response. Yet even in the Philippines there were significant gaps and needs, especially at the sub-‐national level. In complex emergency contexts involving violence (e.g. CAR, Syria and South Sudan) most or all of the pre-‐existing national structure and NGO capacity was quickly overwhelmed when the complexity and scale of needs rapidly escalated.

In CAR the pre-‐existing coordination capacity was judged very weak by key informants. Prior to the conflict in Syria, the countries affected by this regional emergency had little or no coordination structures in place. During the conflict, access issues made scaling up coordination in Syria highly difficult. While the humanitarian community had significantly invested in the cluster system in South Sudan prior to the outbreak of violence in December 2013, a combination of annual turnover in sub-‐national coordinators (covered by cluster member agencies) and unexpected personnel gaps at the national level coincided with the escalation of emergency needs. This led to a significant deterioration of WASH cluster capacity that was exacerbated by evacuations and access limitations due to the violence.

Because of these realities, in many situations the FST ‘supported’ national systems by significantly augmenting them or building or re-‐building them from scratch. While such contributions are clearly relevant and needed, they are substantially different than the more supplemental ‘support’ anticipated in theory. 2.3 Effectiveness The CAST and FST contribution to improved coordination and preparedness of national structures was generally considered strong. One indicator within this criteria related to the FST support being available to all WASH sector partners equally. This was the only indicator receiving unanimous and strong affirmation,

“They want to enable local structures, but when the circus comes to town you need lion trainers…it's such an arrogant system…not enough examples like the Philippines where there is a credible local platform that can be built on.”

“Unfortunately, at the onset of the recent emergency, the structures we had established before just collapsed like a house of cards….”


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such that there is very strong evidence that the FST is appropriately serving the sector. RECA contributions to preparedness through capacity building were generally seen as positive for the 8 focus countries that have received intense attention. In particular, the relationships formed and knowledge of local structures and capacities gained through on-‐going capacity building assistance were credited, with increasing country level acceptance of GWC resources during emergencies (e.g. the Philippines). Additionally, RECA efforts provided key mentoring and skill development opportunities for national coordination platforms in “peace time.” However, many key informants noted that the discrete mandate and project structure of the RECA limited its potential contribution to overall GWC effectiveness and sometimes created tension with other regional and FST actors.

The strengths within this criteria contrast with clear perceived weakness in the effects of the FST on the speed of total sector response, both in completing initial assessments and providing initial WASH relief up to SPHERE standards. While FST members generally deployed quickly (see timeline analysis in Section 2.4), the ability to influence achievement of operational objectives was highly dependent on government capacity and the capacity and ability of member NGOs to deliver in a consistent way, and was therefore highly variable across contexts.

Many participants further underscored that point by noting that there were no clear indicators of success for FST activities vs. national coordination platforms and the ability to attribute FST contributions to beneficiary impacts was difficult or impossible.

There was also clear variability of effectiveness between different facets of GWC surge capacity. The RRTs were reported as effective in their role to augment, support and develop coordination mechanisms during emergencies. However, the RAT and RRT-‐IM efforts were reported as less effective. It should be noted that there was substantial variability within these responses based on the experience and ‘fit’ of individual FST members to the needs of the context.

Key informants cited attributes such as adaptability to context, ability to handle ambiguity and appreciation for pre-‐existing coordination systems and initiatives when critiquing the effectiveness of particular deployed FST personnel. Documentation review showed that these and other coordination competencies are being addressed within a broader cluster coordination competency development initiative of UNICEF as Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) for WASH and other sectors, which should help further increase the effectiveness of FST members.

“What is quite frustrating is that there are few indicators of impact…a very difficult situation”

“…The weakness in last 6 years isn't the coordination side but the information management side…I have strongly pushed to have dual deployments of IM/RRT.”

“In countries with proper structure (i.e. Philippines) the FST has a strong added value; in countries without the structure, the contribution is questionable.”


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The weaknesses noted regarding the RAT and IM functions were presented by key informants within the context of substantial demands (often upstream Headquarters or inter-‐agency) related to information management, compared to actionable and operationally oriented information and assessment systems preferred by national coordination platform members. Similarly to the RRT, some key informants found RAT members to be highly effective, based on their technical competence and adaptability to context driven needs and capacities.

Limitations to the effectiveness of the RAT is that they were found to be largely driven by the project design and project management. RAT, like RECA, has been managed as a discreet project by GWC member agencies. Key informants noted highly variable expectations of the purpose and expectations of the RAT members, especially in comparison to broader and increasingly established cross-‐sectoral assessment tools and initiatives such as REACH, ACAPS and the assessment mechanisms tied to the Transformative Agenda (e.g. MIRA, IARRM). Until 2013, the RAT project did not have a dedicated project manager, with the three members instead reporting to their own agencies. Beginning in 2013 the RECA project manager assumed this function, though the expectations of this member-‐led role are evolving with ongoing integration efforts across the FST.

During the course of the evaluation the role of the CAST in managing and mobilizing surge capacity became clear in expected and unexpected ways. The Global WASH Cluster Coordinator and Deputy Cluster Coordinator play an active and effective role in facilitating the recruitment, selection and placement of RRTs in coordination with NGO members. These GWC leaders also deploy in L3 emergencies to help initiate operations, coach national coordinators and facilitate acceptance of GWC support by governments and the Cluster Lead Agency. Together the global coordinator and deputy spent approximately 14 weeks in the four L3 countries during the period covered by this evaluation in addition to 2 joint monitoring missions with donors and members. The analysis of operational timelines and documentation showed that the global coordinator and deputy play an effective role in mobilizing additional support beyond the resources of the FST. From January 2013 to April 2014 approximately 30% of GWC globally directed surge capacity support for national coordination was mobilized from non-‐FST sources with direct involvement of the global coordinator and deputy. The sources of this additional surge capacity help to augment the FST and include stand-‐by partner staff, national cluster coordinators that are temporarily reassigned to an acute emergency, former FST members, GWC member staff and other individuals with on-‐going relationships with the GWC. 2.4 Efficiency

“The RAT member provided very good work and had substantial knowledge of his work. After his deployment finished he provided remote support that was very valuable…”

“For a national cluster, calling on the FST is heads and shoulders above the other options for support.”


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The ‘value for money’ of GWC FST support to national coordination was considered based on the combination of three elements – cost, quality and speed. Overall, the evaluation found that partners and national coordination staff believe the FST provides strong value for money. First, the overall value provided to national partners and national coordinators was viewed positively at country level. This is partly because partners and national coordination platforms do not pay for surge support. Participants therefore typically expressed either gratitude for the ‘free’ support they received or were unaware of the costs entirely (i.e. working in roles removed from administrative hubs.).

However, there are real costs associated with this support and global GWC partners have helped to mobilize funding for all three elements of the FST, through stand-‐by partnerships for RRTs and other surge augmentation deployments and resource mobilization for the RAT and RECA projects. Table 3 shows the overall recorded time for all FST members and the estimated actual costs of this support. Costs were estimated based on the budget analysis presented in Table 4 and the time allocations captured in the FST monitoring dashboard.

Table 3 – Recorded allocation of FST time and estimated costs

The second aspect was considerably more difficult, and included an effort to provide a ‘balanced scorecard’ cost analysis. As noted above, the speed and quality of services (the other factors within this analysis) were either unclear or unfavorable, such that a clear measure of efficiency was extremely difficult to determine within the scope of this evaluation.

Within those limitations, the FST was broadly perceived as a good value in terms of the cost structure, which because of its reliance on NGO members is regarded as less expensive than similar deployments within the UN structure. While the cost structure of RRTs was found to be 60% less than a comparable UN staff surge model there is significant variance in the budgeted cost models for each component of the FST as shown in Table 4 below.

Days%Deployed%

Remote%Support

Regional Global%Cluster%

Agency%%Support

Other%(Admin,(

medical,(etc)

Time%Off Total%

Days%Recorded 1,587 254 142 610 220 327 172 3,311

%%of%Total%Time%Recorded

48% 8% 4% 18% 7% 10% 5%

Estimated%Total%Cost

$1,099,289 $271,479 $172,201 $499,406 $161,077 $290,765 $155,351 $2,649,569

Full%FST%L%January%2013%to%midLFebruary%2014


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Table 4 – Budgeted annual costs per FST member/type and UN staff equivalent costs

While FST costs are generally viewed as well managed by knowledgeable key informants, the fragmented evolution of the RRT (under management of the CAST) and the RAT and RECA (under project funding led by consortia of members) has led to significant cost differences for each component. Many key informants believe the differences are related to the amount of time deployed or regionally based vs. home based, but analysis of the budgets shows

that the drivers of the cost differences are actually based on salary, management and coordination costs. The variable cost effectiveness of each component of the FST was further analyzed based on recorded utilization rates. Using the GWC FST monitoring dashboard data collected by the CAST, the recorded utilization rates and cost per day recorded were calculated as shown in Table 5.

Table 5 – FST component recorded utilization and cost efficiency

RRT members provide the greatest overall cost efficiency based on the lower budgeted cost basis and the higher amount of time they are deployed in the field (68% for RRTs vs. 29% for RAT and 20% for RECA) where they often work 7 days a week. Key informants noted that this cost

efficiency comes with a significant downside risk of burnout and potential for turnover among RRT members, which could lessen overall effectiveness if the most experience staff leave without suitable replacements.

Budget'Categories RRT'Members*

RAT'Members**

RECA'Members***

UN'Staff****'comparison'(P4/L4'level)

Annual'Salary'(including'insurance,'benefits) $119,727 $98,640 $152,673 $236,340Communications'Annual $2,159 $8,333 $4,467 $2,159Deployments'Annual $44,407 $45,387 $47,526 $50,232Direct'Mgmt'and'Coord'Costs $4,737 $4,000 $13,397Indirect'Costs $11,972 $15,264 $20,211Total&Annual&Costs $183,002 $156,360 $233,328 $308,942*'Based'on'RRT'budgets'for'PCA'funded'posts.

**'Based'on'RAT'budget.'Does'not'include'$113,487'annual'cost'in'RAT'budget'for'local/national'acessor'costs.

***'Based'on'RECA'project'budget.'Does'not'include'RECA'project'manager,'training','visibility'costs,'evaluation'and'joint'monitoring'mission'costs.

****'Salary'based'on'fully'loaded'standard'position'cost'rates.'Travel'based'on'average'DSA'rates'and'UN'travel'rules.'Indirect'estimated'at'7%.

Recorded'Utilization*'(January'2013'to'February'2014)

RRT'Members

RAT'Members

RECA'Members

Days'Recorded'(including'deployed'and'nonFdeployed'work'and'time'off)

1,814 635 862

%'Recorded'Utilization'(days'recorded'vs.'nonFweekend'days'on'contract)**

116% 74% 73%

Cost'per'Day'Recorded'(based'on'total'annual'cost,'adjusted'for'days'on'contract)

$603 $799 $1,217

**'Vacant'positions'not'included'in'analysis.*Recorded'days'are'based'on'GWC'Field'Support'Team'monitoring'dashboard'data.


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A few key informants cited weaknesses in this analysis when presented with preliminary findings based on concerns with the quality of the data reported by RAT and RECA members and variability in understanding of the categories for time allocation. This suggests a potential for improving the accuracy of future cost analysis by strengthening adherence to time based reporting systems. However, as the budgeted cost basis for each component is also quite variable, improved

accuracy of time reporting would not be likely to significantly change the outcome of this analysis unless components of the FST are managed differently in the future. While effects of the FST on the speed of response to beneficiary needs is difficult to determine as noted above, the speed of deployments was analyzed based on timelines reconstructed from emails, the FST dashboard deployment data and other documentary evidence. In all four cases from 2013 and 2014, GWC FST members or other globally mobilized staff (facilitated directly by CAST) were present before the declaration of an L3 emergency by the IASC as shown in Figure 2 below.

Figures 2 -‐ Timeline analysis for Syria, Philippines, South Sudan and CAR

Dec$13 Jan$14 Feb$14Jan$13 Feb$13 Mar$13 Apr$13 May$13 Mar$14 Apr$14Jun$13 Jul$13 Aug$13 Sep$13 Oct$13 Nov$13Trigger UNICEFAL3ADeclaration

IASCALA3ADeclarationCASTRRT

RRTA$AIM

RATRECAOtherAAugmentation

Syria

Deploy$ments

Dec$13 Jan$14 Feb$14Nov$13Trigger Typhoon7Haiyan7Landfall

UNICEF7L37DeclarationIASC7L37DeclarationIASC7L37Deactivation

Deployments CAST

Philipp

ines RRT

RRT7$7IM

Philipp

ines

RATRECAOther7Augmentation

Philipp

ines

Monitoring JMM

Philipp

ines

“When you see number of days provided and extent of support RRT provides as compared to price of project, it's cheap…the project is efficient.”


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To further enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the FST, the SAG and CAST initiated an effort in 2013 to better integrate the three components of the FST. Donors and NGO consortia that have supported the RAT and RECA projects agreed to experiment with more flexibly allocating their project staff to serve the most critical current surge capacity needs and broadening the capacity assessment and building initiatives somewhat beyond the 8 RECA focus countries. Based on the initial positive learning from these initiatives, the CAST provided the SAG and other key stakeholders with a discussion paper in early 2014 that envisions a completely integrated FST under the direct management of the CAST. Under this proposal, FST members would be more flexibly assigned to cover 7 functional areas including: assessment, information management, quality assurance, coordination, continuity, capacity building and preparedness. The discussion paper envisions loosely organizing

FST staff into two functional sub-‐teams: i) assessment, information management and quality assurance, and ii) coordination, continuity, capacity building and preparedness. To facilitate better contact with and support to national coordination platforms the discussion paper suggests organizing most staff into teams based on a decentralized hub system, while maintaining flexibility by stressing the expectation that hub-‐based staff will be routinely redeployed to support needs outside of their region based on risk and demand.

Apr$14Dec$13 Jan$14 Feb$14 Mar$14Trigger Outbreak8of8Violence

IASC8L38DeclarationDeployments CAST

RRT

RRT8$8IMRATRECAOther8Augmentation

South8Sudan

Dec$13 Jan$14 Feb$14 Mar$14 Apr$14Trigger UNICEF9L3

IASC9L3Deployments CAST

CAR

RRT

CAR

RRT9$9IM

RATRECAOther9Augmentation

CAR

Monitoring JMM94

CAR


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2.5 Coherence/Connectedness Broadly speaking, the FST surge support demonstrated clear strength in both inter-‐cluster and intra-‐cluster coordination which was the focal question related to this criteria. In particular, the diversity and depth of the previous experience brought by RRT members was noted as contributing to this strength and speeding their connection with other clusters.

The RAT and IM members were occasionally noted as weaker in coordination, some of which was related to their TOR and need for more structures. The inclusiveness of NGO participation and leadership was also noted as a clear strength supporting connectedness, which is certainly appropriate given the NGO leadership within the GWC SAG. Similarly, there was broad perception that the FST activities effectively understood and supported the unique role of cluster coordinators, including addressing role ambiguity and double-‐hatting issues. The primary concerns noted within this criteria related to communication and collaboration between the WASH cluster and other clusters, though part of this weakness was mitigated by stating that in some situations other clusters were not functioning as quickly or as strongly to be able to adequately engage.

General weaknesses in inter-‐cluster coordination systems were cited as one reason for these challenges, with many stakeholders noting that the processes for such cross-‐sectoral coordination seem primarily oriented to up-‐stream information demands. Similarly, several participants expressed the inherent difficulties of engaging with the cluster system itself, the mandate and “turf” struggles within the UN System and the dynamic tension between maintaining optimal coordination and accomplishing tangible relief objectives -‐ all of which underscored the complex dynamics related to connectedness that must be balanced in relief operations. FST members mostly demonstrated a strong appreciation and respect for their roles in supporting pre-‐existing coordination structures where they exist. In emergency and non-‐emergency support, FST members understood the importance of working with national governments where appropriate and possible and strengthening rather national coordination rather than building parallel systems. Coordination with national platforms and the credibility of the FST appears to be enhanced by the origin of FST members, who come from a diverse range of WASH agencies outside the UN system. Linkages between the GWC and UNICEF as CLA are strong at the global level, with clear participation of UNICEF in GWC initiatives and increasing collaboration on efforts to strengthen sectoral coordination. At the country level some weaknesses were identified in the connectedness of the GWC to UNICEF country offices in places where the FST has not recently deployed. Lack of understanding about the value added of the FST, or country office preference to

“One RRT was very keen on inter-‐cluster coordination, and went to each cluster meeting to get oriented in first days.”

“They were trying, but there is an underlying coordination problem between [clusters]; OCHA coordination was very poor, especially for level 3 emergencies. Things were thrown on the table and discussed a little but no real decisions.”


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handle CLA responsibilities without outside support can sometimes complicate and delay deployment of the FST where its assistance is needed. 2.6 Coverage

The expanded coverage of coordination needs was widely considered strong, including filling staffing gaps, helping establish sub-‐national systems, and starting new coordination efforts from scratch. To support these points, many participants noted the strength of experience and overall dedication of the FST staff, particularly the RRT’s responsible for coordination related efforts. Expanding the coverage of technical advisory needs was highly variable and largely related to the experience levels of individual FST members and key informant perspectives. Views were split between those that value coordination competencies most vs. those that believe coordinators need to have paramount technical expertise to “lead” coordination.

A key theme from the analysis underscored a mitigating factor for coverage with complex strategic implications; the tension between a reactive or demand-‐responsive posture of the FST and a more proactive or promotional stance. This theme was especially apparent in analyzing the divergence of response between participants.

On the one hand, some explicitly said that the FST needs to do more to ‘promote their services’ or ‘build awareness’ within the broad WASH community and with key national coordination structures and the CLA more specifically. At the same time, other participants referenced the need to be responsive to expressed local needs. While both goals can be pursued simultaneously, the strategic tension between a proactive and reactive stance is a mitigating factor related to coverage. In so much as the FST is reactive, the identification and extent of the gaps covered is limited by the requests of national organizations, and in so much as the FST is proactive, they risk disempowering the very national structures they ultimately seek to serve. 2.7 Sustainability There was broad evidence in the documents reviewed and from the key informants that the FST surge deployments included strategies and plans for transition and sustainability that were either pre-‐existing or developed during the deployment. In particular it was noted that the RRT mandate is to start planning the transition from ‘day one’ and many deployments are explicitly gap filling where transition is at least implicit, if not formally structured.

However, despite the clarity of intent and planning, there was high variability in the actual implementation of the transition plans due to difficulties in recruitment, emergency context, and funding. Similarly, the lack of cluster system clarity related to deactivation and milestones for signaling the transition from emergency to

[The FST was a] “Big help with filling staffing gaps, helping get new state focal points up and running”

“Yes, with focus countries and intentional relationship development at country levels there are clear strategies to provide continuity of impact…but there are many variables and struggles.”

“One (FST member) was excellent, one was good, and the third didn't have any technical ideas...so uneven, and this should be considered in forming TOR.”


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development was noted as a reason for this weakness, as previous evaluations of the cluster system have also found. While the Transformative Agenda has initiated a process to reassess cluster activation on an annual basis, key informants did not mention significant changes in clarity regarding deactivation. However, in the Philippines, the IASC formally deactivated the L3 designation after 3 months. The lasting impact of FST deployments and overall quality of transitions was highly variable based on the partners involved, emergency context and funding. Similar to the effectiveness findings, sustaining FST efforts is depends on partners that remain in the local context.

There are no formal commitments beyond specific deployments and projects related to FST’s ongoing activities, and the path toward sustained impact is unclear. Sustainability of the FST structure was identified as a potential concern across many global key informants, despite the clear value added by the FST, due to concerns about funding and burnout. Donor support for the RAT and RECA projects has been strong for the past few years and key donors have given positive, if vague, indications that they continue to support the direction of the GWC. However, funding delays have complicated implementation of the RECA project in 2013 and further delays or reductions could significantly affect FST capacity, and thus the predictability and quality of GWC surge capacity. Although the GWC SAG, CAST and members all acknowledge these risks, alternative financing

models do not appear to have been strongly considered. In meetings observed during the evaluation most focus on funding appears oriented towards showing value for money to current donors and expanding the donor base by reaching out to other potential donor agencies. These risks may increase with the integration of FST components under the CAST if GWC members do not continue to actively participate in mobilizing resources and staff and UNICEF as the CLA is expected to ensure all funding and recruitment. As UNICEF is the CLA or co-‐CLA for 3 clusters and two areas of responsibility, the potential for seeking a common funding level across its clusters could negatively affect the capacity built within the GWC thanks to its strong partnership model. One possibility raised by a few key informants is the introduction of a partial cost-‐recovery system to reimburse the GWC for FST deployments using funds raised for emergencies. While this possibility does not seem to have been thoroughly analyzed due to potential complications with the CLA’s finance systems, such a system has successfully been established in other international humanitarian agencies for their surge capacity. For example, within the IFRC, the cost of Emergency Response Unit (ERU) deployments and the costs of the Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) are regularly reimbursed to the organizational unit that regularly employs deployed staff from the funds globally raised for an operation. While potentially complicated for the GWC with its diversity of members that provide FST staff, such a model could significantly increase the sustainability of the FST funding model.

“The key to sustainability is reinforcing the partners…but there is a massive rotation of the people in those contexts, so difficult to sustain anything.”


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3. Conclusions The FST is broadly relevant and appropriate within IASC standards and vis a vis the needs of national coordination structures. GWC efforts have been broadly effective and efficient and show overall value for money. However variance in effectiveness is linked to the experience and soft skills of FST members, and variance in cost-‐efficiency is driven by the fragmented evolution of FST components and their budget models. The support provided shows coherence through inter-‐cluster coordination within the limits of larger structures beyond the GWC’s control, and intra-‐cluster coordination is strong. Connectedness between the GWC and the CLA at national levels is not as strong in places where the FST has not been active. The surge capacity and support functions of the FST have had a positive effect on coverage of coordination needs, though perspectives on coverage of technical needs varies. FST support has demonstrated an effort to plan for transition and sustainability, but realizing these plans depends on effective recruitment and resource mobilization. Sustainability of the FST funding and structure is merited by the value it adds but may be at risk without addressing burnout and further consideration of alternative funding models.

The lack of a clear theory of change tied to the GWC strategy, and related monitoring and evaluation mechanisms makes it more difficult to assess total performance and show value for money. Agreed metrics and new methods for monitoring collective performance are merited to ensure a common understanding of success. The findings of this evaluation support the ongoing and proposed integration of the three components of the FST under a unified CAST management to improve flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency. This includes proceeding with some form of the decentralized operational hubs to build on the learned benefits of the RECA system and refocusing of roles within the FST on the seven functions outlined in the discussion paper for the GWC SAG. The operational hubs or greater regional focus would address several needs highlighted in this evaluation: the need to expand the base of local relationships and knowledge of specific country contexts, broaden teams involved with regions to allow more realistic deployments (reducing turnover/burnout) and be able to provide better response through coordination and assessment/IM members working together.


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4. Recommendations 1. Proceed with the proposed further

integration of FST components under unified management of the CAST, organized into functional teams and assigned to decentralized hubs. Emergency deployments should typically include a minimum of two members each, including one focused on coordination efforts (i.e. FST -‐ coordination, continuity, capacity building and preparedness) and one focused on assessment/IM (i.e. FST – Assessment, Information Management and Quality Assurance.)1

2. Analyze the potential for implementing a partial cost recovery model and other mechanisms to increase the financial sustainability of the FST and develop agreements with GWC members to continue helping with resource mobilization and staff recruitment efforts.

3. Strengthen the minimum staff reporting structure building on the existing dashboard data collection to facilitate consistent reporting, contribute to value for money analysis and support integrated management of FST members.

4. Continue to closely collaborate with UNICEF’s global and regional WASH sections to facilitate coordination preparedness,

1 Note that the decentralized hubs do not necessarily require physical location in a regional office, as it is recognized that this would involve tradeoffs (i.e. increased costs vs. proximity). The office location of teams should be determined based on cost/need specifics, and could differ by region.

national capacity building and other tools and approaches to enhance continuity. Jointly develop country-‐specific preparation/preparedness initiatives in support of national coordination platform strategies for high risk/lower capacity contexts. This type of coordination should enhance the continuity from preparedness to response and development coordination efforts over time and increase awareness of the potential value added, when needed, of GWC FST support.

5. Develop a theory of change and monitoring

and reporting plan linked to the next GWC strategy based on a participatory dialogue among SAG members. The M&E plan should consider a pilot test of social network analysis. As more fully outlined in Appendix 8, the data needed for this analysis can be gathered through web-‐based surveys and analyzed with free software that provides several statistical metrics and visualizations. This established methodology could address the frequent references to the need for improved M&E of FST activities, and serve the GWC in two primary ways: a. Provide useful data related to the key

output of WASH cluster efforts: the quantity and quality of relationships between WASH participants. This data will help FST leaders and the SAG identify strengths/weaknesses within the FST and help FST members focus their efforts on key needs at country level.

b. Provide a basis for attributing FST activities to beneficiary impacts. The data and visualizations of this analysis links the relationships formed or


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strengthened during cluster activities to the resources or technical knowledge ultimately impacting beneficiaries.

6. Explore FST use of a standardized mobile electronic data collection tool (i.e. Magpi) for assessment and information management and pilot the training of national coordination platforms. Such tools would allow coordination platforms to develop a common living database regarding risks,

vulnerabilities and capacities to serve as a baseline for future emergencies, help focus readiness efforts, bring WASH agencies into more efficient synchronization and potentially provide data to eventually measure collective impact. Such data could also provide a platform of information to enhance continuity as members of national coordination platforms and the FST change over time.


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5. List of Annexes 1) Terms of reference 2) Evaluation methodology description 3) List of documentary data sources 4) List of stakeholders consulted 5) Interview Guide & Scales – Country Level 6) Interview Guide & Scales – FST Level 7) Evaluation Matrix 8) Social Network Analysis for the FST


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6. Acronyms Used ACAPS Assessment Capacities Project ACF Action Contre la Faim CAR Central African Republic CAST Cluster Advocacy and Support Team CLA Cluster Lead Agency DAC Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) DSA Daily Subsistence Allowance ERU Emergency Response Unit FACT Field Assessment and Coordination Team FST Field Support Team GB Great Britain GWC Global WASH Cluster IARRM Inter-‐Agency Rapid Response Mechanism IASC Inter-‐Agency Standing Committee IDP Internally Displaced People IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IM Information Management JMM Joint Monitoring Mission L3 Level 3 Emergency M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MIRA Multi-‐Cluster (Sector) Initial Rapid Assessment NCA Norwegian Church Aid NGO Non-‐Governmental Organization OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance OECD Organization for Economic Co-‐operation and Development PCA Programme Cooperation Agreement RAT Rapid Assessment Team RECA Regional Emergency Cluster (Coordination) Advisers RRT Rapid Response Team SAG Strategic Advisory Group TA IASC Transformative Agenda TOR Terms of Reference UK United Kingdom UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USA United States of America UN United Nations WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

2014.06.01 gwc evaluation final report d8€¦ · 8*...

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