2016 model assembly supreme court documents

2016 MINNESOTA YMCAYOUTH IN GOVERNMENT

Model Assembly Session

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________

SUPREME COURT DOCUMENTS

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Andrew Docherty, RidgedaleAUTHOR #2: Molly Carroll, Ridgedale

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cases & Statutes Used)

Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436)Safford United School Dist. #1 v. Redding (557 U.S. 364)J.D.B. v. North Carolina (564 U.S. ___) (Docket 09-11121)In re Gault (387 U.S. 1)US Constitution, Fourth AmendmentUS Constitution, Fifth Amendment

LEGAL ISSUES (How the trial court answered the question and Analysis)

The defendant was formally charged and wrote a handwritten confession.The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Students at Scrava School of Health Sciences formed a Facebook group composed of approximately 30 members.Students made posts offering to either buy or sell illicit substances, which were.The group was created and maintained as a secret group, meaning that the existence of the group, its membership, and its contents were private to its members, and the only way to gain access to the group was by invitation from an existing member.On October 22nd, 2014, Principal Lyons received an anonymous tip that Peter Cruman, a current junior at Scrava, had posted in the Facebook group that he would be conducting a few sales on campus after school that day.The school resource officer (SRO) pulled Cruman out of class and escorted him to the administrative office to be questioned by the principal regarding his planned drug deals.Prior to receiving the anonymous tip, the existence of the group was not known to school administrators, and aside from Principal Lyons, none of the other school administrators maintained active Facebook accounts.Initially, Cruman denied both involvement with the Facebook group and plans to conduct drug deals on that day.When the principal requested that he log onto his Facebook account on the principal’s computer, Cruman refused to do so. However, after two and a half hours of questioning, Cruman finally acquiesced to the principal’s persistent requests and logged in using a nearby computer, thus allowing the principal to see the contents of his profile and his posts.Once logged in, Principal Lyons found the Facebook group, where he saw the incriminating posts indicated by the anonymous tip.Cruman then admitted to dealing drugs, and hand-wrote and signed a confession which was turned over to the school.Cruman also led both the Principal and the SRO to a location on school grounds outside the building where he had hidden marijuana.The school later referred the case to law enforcement, and Cruman was formally charged.The SRO did not assist Principal Lyons in questioning Cruman, nor did the Vice Principal or any other school official. At no point did Cruman attempt to leave the principal’s office. In addition, Cruman’s parents were not called until after his questioning and subsequent confession.During his trial, Cruman moved to have both his confession and the evidence acquired from the Facebook group suppressed.Cruman argued that his statements under questioning and subsequent confession were inadmissible as a violation of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment because he was not read his Miranda rights by the principal.Additionally, Cruman argued that his online posts were found as the result of an unlawful search, and were thus invalid under the excluionary principle.Nonetheless, the court allowed the admission of all of the above as evidence, and Cruman was convicted and sentenced.Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld this ruling. Cruman appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

ARGUMENTS RELATED TO ISSUE 1

Issue #1 – Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure Does the Fourth Amendment protect Cruman against actions by school officials? Is any information stored on Facebook protected by the Fourth Amendment?Is information on Facebook that is private or secret entitled to greater protection? He is a minor and doesn't fully understand his rightsParents should be notifiedUnlawful search, there was no probable causeThe School Resource Officer has jurisdiction and needs to follow legal procedures

ARGUEMNTS RELATED TO ISSUE 2

Issue #2 – Right Against Self-Incrimination Was Cruman voluntarily speaking with Principal Lyons?Should someone's age be taken in account to determine if a Miranda Warning is necessary?Was Cruman in custody? Parents not notifiedAmount of time held in principals office would justify as “custody”There would be further punishment if Cruman had left questioningMinors are more more applicable to authority and not as willing to challenge themThe Facebook group was private because the school did not know about itExclusionary Rule

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. If the judgement is not reversed, it will set the precedent that online messaging that is intended to be private, specifically in social media sites, is not truly private. Regardless of the content that is being communicated, exposing private online messaging to search without warrant or consent creates larger flaws in internet security as a whole.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Kate Cox, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Ellie Lauderdale, Lakeville


Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436): Evidence is not admissable unless the defendant was informed that they have the right to consult with an attorney. Safford United School Dist. #1 v. Redding (557 U.S. 364) 8th grader was strip-searched because of another tip that she had advilviolated her Fourth Amendment.J.D.B. v. North Carolina 9564 U.S. __) (Docket 09-11121) Boy argued he was in police custody when he admitted what he did, says heshould have been read his miranda rights.In re Gault (387 U.S. 1) 15 year old accused of making an obscene telephone call. Was arrested with no notice given to his parents.4th amendment5th amendment


Issue one16 1) No, Cruman is not protected by the fourth amendment by school officals.17 2) No, it is a public social media network.18 3) No, it is still on the public internet.19 Issue 220 1) Yes, he was not being forced21 2) No, the situation should determine whether or not Miranda Warning is necessary.22 3) No, the SRO or police were not present.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 2014 Scrava HS began more regular drug checks/sweeps due to prior drug problems in the school. Drug use on campus declined,27 but off campus, kids were still invloved in drugs. The princlipal received an anonymous tip about a private facebook group involving drug28 dealing on campus, specifically Peter Cruman. Cruman was pulled out of class and questioned by only principal Lyons, after two and a29 half hours of questioning, Cruman finally showed the principal his facebook, admitted to dealing drugs, hand wrote a confesstion to the30 school, and showed them where he hid the marijuana. Later on Cruman was formally charged by law enforcement, in his trial Cruman31 argued his statements and confession under questioning were inadmissible because they violated the fourth and fifth amendment. Court32 allowed the admission and he was convicted and sentenced. He appealed his case, and the ruling was upheld, he then appealed to the33 supreme court which granted certiorari.


1) no school are not Law enforcment officers, there is a big difference.2) No Facebook is a public social media network accessible by anyone.3) No it is still a public social network

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647


1) yes, he was nit being firced to stay or cooperate with the school officials2) A miranda warning was not necessary because we does under custody or being detained. He was voluntarily sitting in the principals office.3) no he was not. The student in the principals officee is not under custody.

CONCLUSION

Cruman was never under custoday and all his actions, statements, and confessions were voluntarily. Making all evidence admissible and Cruman Guilty.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC vs The State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Charlie Maccallum, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Taylor Bauman


May it please the court, my name is Charlie MacCallum and my partner’s name is Taylor Bauman. We represent the respondent, the state of Minnesota in the case of PC vs State of Minnesota.This is a case about a school official who was merely doing his job during an unusual circumstance and of a student who was fairly given his rights but refuses to accept the consequences to his actions.These are the facts that matter to this court today. On October 22nd, 2014, Principle Lyons of Scrava High School had received an anonymous tip that Peter Cruman had posted in a facebook group that he would be making a number of sales of illicit materials, that included marijuana, on school grounds later that day. Principle Lyons called Cruman into his office and questioned him about the facebook group and the sales that he had supposedly planned for later that day. Initially Cruman said that there was no facebook group and that the information that Lyons had received was falsified. He remained persistent of this for the next two hours and thirty minutes while the principle continued to question him. Finally, after that period of time, Cruman willingly logged into a nearby computer to log into his facebook account that showed the incriminating messages. He then confessed to selling drugs, wrote a signed confession, and led the principle and the school resource officer to the place where he planned to make the deal. He was then turned over to the police department and he was charged.Now why are we here? The first issue I would like to address is if Cruman’s fourth amendment rights were violated at any time during this ordeal. Plainly, the answer is no. The fourth amendment protects Americans from unlawful searches or seizures of their “persons, houses, papers, or effects”, but according to the case of Romano vs Steelcase his facebook posts did not count as any of these items. In Romano vs Steelcase a woman sued a chair company for a faulty chair that she claimed caused her extensive injuries and a loss for enjoyment of life. But, when they looked into her facebook posts using a friend’s profile that allowed them to look, they were inconsistent with her claims. When Romano asked them to remove those posts as evidence as they were posted privately, the judge responded that “any post, private or public, that you share with another person can not hold a reasonable expectation of privacy.” In this case though, the information was willingly given by the guilty party. Principle Lyons did not force or threaten Cruman during his questioning so there is no debate on if he received the information legally.The second issue that I would like to address is the question on if Cruman’s right against self incrimination was stripped. The answer to this question, again, is definitely not. At no point during Lyon’s questioning did he make it seem like Cruman was being held against his will. He did not state that he was in custody and if Cruman would have gotten up to leave he would have been allowed to do so. Also the only person in the room besides Cruman was Principal Lyons so there was no reason to think that he was being detained.Therefore, Cruman did not need to be read his Miranda rights. In the original cases of Miranda vs. Arizona, the individuals were held in a room cut off from the outside world by police, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney.Secondly, Lyon’s did not force Cruman to log into his facebook account. There was no threat of consequences if Cruman did not log in. He would have been free to go but he chose not to.


STATEMENT OF FACTS



1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

CONCLUSION48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC v. STATE OF MINNESOTAAUTHOR #1: Julia Pearson, WoodburyAUTHOR #2: Margaret Schultz, Woodbury


Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436)Safford United School Dist. #1 v. Redding (557 U.S. 364)J.D.B. v. North Carolina (564 U.S. ___) (Docket 09-11121)In re Gault (387 U.S. 1)US Constitution, Fourth AmendmentUS Constitution, Fifth Amendment


The two main issues in this case concern the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states that citizens of the United States are afforded a right agianst unreasonable search and seziure. Both the trial and appeals court decided that the Fourth Amendment did not protect Cruman's actions by school officials, and that information on a Private Facebook Group is not private. The two main issues in this case concern the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states that citizens of the United States are afforded a right against unreasonable search and seizure. Both the trial and appeals court decided that the Fourth Amendment did not protect Cruman's actions by school officials, and that information on a Private Facebook Group is not private.Part of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states that citizens can not be forced to incriminate themselves in an interrogation. Both the trial court and the court of appeals determined that Cruman was voluntarily speaking to Principal Lyons, and that he did not require a miranda warning because the Principal was the only one who was interrogating him, and Principal Lyons was not a Police Officer.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Over the past few years, an increasingly alarming number of students at Scrava High School have been caught engaging in marijuana use and sale on campus. Students began seeing more and more sweeps by school administrators with trained drug sniffing dogs, as well as regular bookbag checks. As a result, drug use on campus sharply decreased on the whole. Unfortunately, there were several students who responded in the opposite manner, turning to more clever means to hide drugs on campus and conduct illicit transactions. To facilitate their efforts, these students formed a Facebook group, which in total accumulated about 30 members. The group was created and maintained as a secret group, meaning that the existence of the group, its membership, and its contents were private to its members, and the only way to gain access to the group was by invitation from an existing member. On October 22nd, 2014, Principal Lyons received an anonymous tip that Peter Cruman, a current junior at Scrava, had posted in the Facebook group that he would be conducting a few sales on campus after school that day. Prior to receiving the anonymous tip, the existence of the group was not known to school administrators, and aside from Principal Lyons, none of the other school administrators maintained active Facebook accounts. Initially, Cruman denied both involvement with the Facebook group and plans to conduct drug deals on that day. When the principal requested that he log onto his Facebook account on the principal’s computer, Cruman refused to do so. However, after two and a half hours of questioning, Cruman finally acquiesced to the principal’s persistent requests and logged in using a nearby computer, thus allowing the principal to see the contents of his profile and his posts. Cruman then admitted to dealing drugs, and handwrote and signed a confession which was turned over to the school. During his trial, Cruman moved to have both his confession and the evidence acquired from the Facebook group suppressed. Cruman argued that his statements under questioning and subsequent confession were inadmissible as a violation of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment because he was not read his Miranda rights by the principal. Additionally, Cruman argued that his online posts were found as the result of an unlawful search, and were thus invalid under the exclusionary principle.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647


The Fourth Amendment does apply to the actions taken by school officials. Because of the considerable authority that the principal has over the student, Cruman is protected. When the information on facebook is set to private, it is not available to the general public, and so is private information. As well, the information that was solely on Facebook would not have been accessed by the school administrators because they did not have active Facebook accounts.


Cruman was most likely not voluntarily speaking with Principal Lyons. Because of the amount of time he was confined in the room (2 ½ hours), he most likely believed that he could not leave. As well as not believing he could leave, the principal kept interrogating him even after he refused involvement and denied that there was a facebook group.Miranda warnings should be even more important in cases involving minors. Young people are even less likely to understand or know their rights, and everyone has a right to be notified of rights, especially in a criminal case. Because the police were only notified after the confession and the SRO officer was the one to pull him out of class, and because there would be consequences if he were to leave, Cruman was, for all intents and purposes, in custody.

CONCLUSION

Because both Cruman's right against unreasonable search and seziure, and his right against self incrimination were violated, the use of the evidence in previous cases was both unconstitutional, and unfairly swayed the judges opinion. Because of these reasons, we request that the decision be reversed.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Amanda Reed, WoodburyAUTHOR #2: Caleb Schwinghammer, Woodbury


Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436)Safford United School Dist. #1 v. Redding (557 U.S. 364)J.D.B v. North Carolina (564 U.S.) (Docket 09-11121)US Constitution, Fourth AmendmentUS Constitution, Fifth Amendment


Whether Cruman’s Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure were violated when the principal compelled him to relinquish access to his Facebook account.Whether Cruman’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated when the principal questioned him and procured his confession.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Over the past few years at Scrava School of Health Sciences and Engineering, there has been an increasingly alarming number of students engaging in marijuana use and sale on campus. In 2014, Principal Lyons went to many preventive measures to counteract this trend, including cracking down on drug possession on campus. There was also an increase in sweeps by school admins with trained drug-sniffing dogs as well as regular bookbag checks.Due to this, drug use on campus decreased sharply. However, some students simply turned to more secretive ways to hide drugs on campus and continue illicit transactions. One of the ways students did this was through a Facebook group which contained about 30 members.In this Facebook group, students posted with offers to either buy or sell illegal substances, especially marijuana. This group was secret, meaning that its members and its existence in general was private and the only way to view the content was to be invited from an existing member.On October 22nd of 2014, Principal Lyons recieved an anonymous tip that Peter Cruman, a current junior at the school, had posted in said Facebook group that he would be selling marijuana on campus after school that day. The school resource officer pulled Cruman out of class and escorted him to the administrative office to be questioned by the principal regarding this anonymous tip. Prior to Principal Lyons recieving the tip, the existence of the group was completely unknown to school administrators.Initially, Cruman denied involvement with the Facebook group and any plans to conduct drug deals that day. When the principal asked that he log onto his Facebook account on the principal's computer, Cruman refused. After two and half hours of questioning, Cruman finally gave in to the prinicpal's persistent requests and logged in; thus allowing the principal to see the contents of his profile and his posts.Prinicipal Lyons then found the Facebook group, and saw the incriminating posts indicated by the anonymous tip. Cruman then admitted to dealing drugs and signed a confession which was turned over to the school. He also lef both the Principal and the SRO to the location on school grounds outside where he had hidden marijuana. The school later referred the case to law enforcement and Cruman was formally charged. The SRO did not assist Principal Lyons in questioning Cruman, nor did any other school official. Cruman did not, at any point, attempt to leave the principal's office. Cruman's parents were not called until after his questioning and confession.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647


Cruman may have felt uncomfortable or unsettled by Principal Lyons going through his Facebook information. However, this was not a violation of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure. If the school resource officer had been the one going through Cruman's facebook, this would be a violation. However, the SRO was not involved besides escorting him to the principal's office. School officials do not need probable cause OR a warrant to search any student's property. Principal Lyons only needed reasonable suspicion, and the anonymous tip was more than enough to give him that. Cruman's parents may have not been called, but that's most likely because Principal Lyons felt that he should ensure that Cruman had or had not committed this act before contacting the parents.


Cruman and his lawyer argued that his right against self incrimination was not made apparent (fifth amendment) and in this case, his rights were not read by the SRO before he was brought to the principal's office to give his confession. As an adult, one should not need their rights read aloud as they should be aware of all constitutional amendments. The rights of Cruman may not have been read aloud but at no point during the days was Cruman legally put in custody, he could have called a lawyer or simply left the premise. Not only could Cruman have left but he voluntarily started conversation with Lyons, yes there may have been a small educational penalty for not meeting with the principal but there was no legal charge placed on him. Cruman willingly talked with Lyons until he felt the need to give his verbal and written confession.

CONCLUSION

In this case of PC v. State of Minnesota a high school student was brought in for questioning by his principal after an anonymous tip pointed him (Peter Cruman) being student in a group of others on Facebook interested in selling or purchasing illicit drugs on the school campus. After Cruman was selected by Lyons for questioning, a SRO escorted Cruman out of class in an attempt for his confession to be siphoned out, after two hours of prying, Lyons finally convinced Cruman to log onto his account and show the proof of his crime, Cruman then wrote and signed a confession. Crumans fourth amendment rights were violated as a school official only needs reasonable suspicion for the questioning and or punishment of a student, but this does not give the individual power to make one relinquish personal data. On the other side, Crumans fifth amendment rights were not violated as he was never placed under proper custody, therefore he could have left the site of the principals questioning any second he wished.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME:AUTHOR #1: Abdulahi Abdalla, Higher GroundAUTHOR #2: Ramla Mohamud, Higher Ground


PC. V State of Minesota.4th and 5th amendment


The court allowed the admission of all of the above as evidence, and Cruman was convicted and sentenced. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld this ruling.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On October 22nd, 2014, Principal Lyons received an anonymous tip about Cruman's Facebook account regarding the drug sales that he would be doing the next day. Cruman was questioned in a room for two and a half hours. For those two hours, the principal and those questioning him were requesting Cruman to log onto his Facebook account so they can confirm. After that specific amount of time Cruman finally capitulated. Cruman confessed and admitted to his wrong doings and even decided to show the principal where he had stashed away the marijuana.


Those who are for Cruman believe that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the principal went through his Facebook account without a warrant. As the 4th Amendment states that government authorities cannot inspect one’s house, paper, and effect without a court appointed warrant, but his 4th amendment rights were not violated because the principal had every right to conduct an inspection if there is a probability of something harming his students’ well being and he has a plausible reason. We agree with the opposition of Cruman because in that two and a half hour time period, he was more than capable of walking out. Also, an anonymous tip from the student body is a probable reason to be suspicious of Cruman. Therefor, Principal Lyons conducted this inspection without suppressing Cruman’s 4th Amendment rights.


Even if Cruman was in a hostile environment, he had every right to leave at any moment. To say that he was held without a choice is ridiculous. Due to the fact that he was not being forced to stay, he was not in custody. If he was, his presence would have been an obligation. Also, his case was not forwarded to law enforcement until after he made a written confession. Thus, Cruman was not being questioned by a law enforcement authority also counters the claims made of the interview being labeled as custody.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Peter Cruman, the junior at Scrava, was caught during the preplanning of a marijuana sale. His Facebook account confirmed the sale. Though he claimed that this information was found in an unlawful search, the court used all of the evidence in the case to convict and sentence him. Though there were assertions made about how Cruman’s 4th Amendment right were violated and that the evidence found was under the exclusionary principle, the Court of Appeals supported his decision of his conviction

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Ellie Lauderdale, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Kate Cox, Lakeville


Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436): Evidence is not admissable unless the defendant was informed that they have the right to consult with an attorney. Safford United School Dist. #1 v. Redding (557 U.S. 364) 8th grader was strip-searched because of another tip that she had advil violated her Fourth Amendment.J.D.B. v. North Carolina 9564 U.S. __) (Docket 09-11121) Boy argued he was in police custody when he admitted what he did, says he should have been read his miranda rights.In re Gault (387 U.S. 1) 15 year old accused of making an obscene telephone call. Was arrested with no notice given to his parents.4th amendment5th amendment


Issue one1) No, Cruman is not protected by the fourth amendment by school officals.2) No, it is a public social media network.3) No, it is still on the public internet.Issue 21) Yes, he was not being forced2) No, the situation should determine whether or not Miranda Warning is necessary.3) No, the SRO or police were not present.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 2014 Scrava HS began more regular drug checks/sweeps due to prior drug problems in the school. Drug use on campus declined, but off campus, kids were still invloved in drugs. The princlipal received an anonymous tip about a private facebook group involving drug dealing on campus, specifically Peter Cruman. Cruman was pulled out of class and questioned by only principal Lyons, after two and a half hours of questioning, Cruman finally showed the principal his facebook, admitted to dealing drugs, hand wrote a confesstion to the school, and showed them where he hid the marijuana. Later on Cruman was formally charged by law enforcement, in his trial Cruman argued his statements and confession under questioning were inadmissible because they violated the fourth and fifth amendment. Court allowed the admission and he was convicted and sentenced. He appealed his case, and the ruling was upheld, he then appealed to the supreme court which granted certiorari.


The principal requested for Cruman to log into his facebook, Cruman refused, was questioned for two and a half hours before he finally logged in.It was an unlawful search, an anonymous tip is not enough evidence for someone to be forced to log on to their social media website.Yes, it is private for a reason, again an anonymous tip is not enough evidence for Cruman to be forced to log on to his facebook.


Cruman was pulled out class, and could have walked out which would have resulted in a more severe punishment most likley.No they should always recieve Miranda Warnings, so they understand they do not have to answer or give someone private information.Yes, all of the information is going to be reported to the police so they are technically involved.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

CONCLUSION

Cruman was not read his Miranda Warnings, meaning he did not know he had the right to remain silent, or to an attorny. This makes his evidence inadmissible

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC vs State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Jenna Spitzack, HastingsAUTHOR #2: Kailey Marek, Hastings


Cases: Miranda vs. ArizonaSafford United School District #1 vs. ReddingJDB vs North CarolinaIn re fault (387 US 1)Statutes: 1. Reviewed for judgment by Supreme Court of Arizona for this case along with three others. Used to determine the truth of statements obtained by the defendant. Three of the cases were reversed and one was affirmed. 2. Case was affirmed as to the stripping search was unjustified. 3. Court had reversed judgments made by North Carolina Supreme Court and questioned whether the student was in custody under analysis. 4. The Lower Court's judgment was reversed


Issue #1: Cruman had a volition of the 4th Amendment. Facebook information privacy depends on what you make public and what you make private. Private info on Facebook would be entitled to more protection. This question was not answered by the trial court.Issue #2: Cruman was never voluntarily speaking to Principal Lyons. No one's age should be taken into consideration when giving Miranda warnings. Cruman was never taken into custody. This question was not answered by the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS


-Violation of the 4th Amendment.-5th Amendment violation.-What you make private should be kept private; Public can be open to anyone.


-Not in custody.-No Miranda Rights given.-Intimidate/Interrogated by Principal- not a cop.-Age shouldn't matter for Miranda Rights.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoining reasons, the judgement fot the trial cour shoudlbe reversed.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: PC v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Caleb Schwinghammer, WoodburyAUTHOR #2: Amanda Reed, Woodbury


Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436)Safford United School Dist. #1 v. Redding (557 U.S. 364)J.D.B v. North Carolina (564 U.S.) (Docket 09-11121)US Constitution, Fourth AmendmentUS Constitution, Fifth Amendment


Whether Cruman’s Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure were violated when the principal compelled him to relinquish access to his Facebook account. Whether Cruman’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated when the principal questioned him and procured his confession.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Over the past few years at Scrava School of Health Sciences and Engineering, there has been an increasingly alarming number of students engaging in marijuana use and sale on campus. In 2014, Principal Lyons went to many preventive measures to counteract this trend, including cracking down on drug possession on campus. There was also an increase in sweeps by school admins with trained drug-sniffing dogs as well as regular bookbag checks.Due to this, drug use on campus decreased sharply. However, some students simply turned to more secretive ways to hide drugs on campus and continue illicit transactions. One of the ways students did this was through a Facebook group which contained about 30 members.In this Facebook group, students posted with offers to either buy or sell illegal substances, especially marijuana. This group was secret, meaning that its members and its existence in general was private and the only way to view the content was to be invited from an existing member.On October 22nd of 2014, Principal Lyons recieved an anonymous tip that Peter Cruman, a current junior at the school, had posted in said Facebook group that he would be selling marijuana on campus after school that day. The school resource officer pulled Cruman out of class and escorted him to the administrative office to be questioned by the principal regarding this anonymous tip. Prior to Principal Lyons recieving the tip, the existence of the group was completely unknown to school administrators.Initially, Cruman denied involvement with the Facebook group and any plans to conduct drug deals that day. When the principal asked that he log onto his Facebook account on the principal's computer, Cruman refused. After two and half hours of questioning, Cruman finally gave in to the prinicpal's persistent requests and logged in; thus allowing the principal to see the contents of his profile and his posts.Prinicipal Lyons then found the Facebook group, and saw the incriminating posts indicated by the anonymous tip. Cruman then admitted to dealing drugs and signed a confession which was turned over to the school. He also lef both the Principal and the SRO to the location on school grounds outside where he had hidden marijuana. The school later referred the case to law enforcement and Cruman was formally charged. The SRO did not assist Principal Lyons in questioning Cruman, nor did any other school official. Cruman did not, at any point, attempt to leave the principal's office. Cruman's parents were not called until after his questioning and confession.


Cruman may have felt uncomfortable or unsettled by Principal Lyons going through his Facebook information. However, this was not a

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

violation of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure. If the school resource officer had been the one going through Cruman's facebook, this would be a violation. However, the SRO was not involved besides escorting him to the principal's office. School officials do not need probable cause OR a warrant to search any student's property. Principal Lyons only needed reasonable suspicion, and the anonymous tip was more than enough to give him that. Cruman's parents may have not been called, but that's most likely because Principal Lyons felt that he should ensure that Cruman had or had not committed this act before contacting the parents.


Cruman and his lawyer argued that his right against self incrimination was not made apparent (fifth amendment) and in this case, his rights were not read by the SRO before he was brought to the principal's office to give his confession. As an adult, one should not need their rights read aloud as they should be aware of all constitutional amendments. The rights of Cruman may not have been read aloud but at no point during the days was Cruman legally put in custody, he could have called a lawyer or simply left the premise. Not only could Cruman have left but he voluntarily started conversation with Lyons, yes there may have been a small educational penalty for not meeting with the principal but there was no legal charge placed on him. Cruman willingly talked with the Lyons until he felt the need to give his verbal and written confession.

CONCLUSION

In this case of PC v. State of Minnesota a college student was brought in for questioning by his principal after an anonymous tip pointed him (Peter Cruman) being student in a group of others on Facebook interested in selling or purchasing illicit drugs on the school campus. After Cruman was selected by Lyons for questioning, a SRO escorted Cruman out of class in an attempt for his confession to be siphoned out, after two hours of prying, Lyons finally convinced Cruman to log onto his account and show the proof of his crime, Cruman then wrote and signed a confession. Crumans fourth amendment rights were violated as a school official only needs reasonable suspicion for the questioning and or punishment of a student, but this does not give the individual power to make one relinquish personal data. On the other side, Crumans fifth amendment rights were not violated as he was never placed under proper custody, therefore he could have left the site of the principals questioning any second he wished.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 1CASE NAME: 16-001AUTHOR #1: Courtney Zaharia, TrumanAUTHOR #2: Kashana Wigley


Cases: Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436)Safford United School Dist. #1 v. Redding (557 U.S. 364)J.D.B. v. North Carolina (564 U.S. ) (Docket 09-11121)Statutes: 4th amendment, 5th amendment


Issue #1: Whether Cruman's Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure were violated when the principal compelled him to relinquish access to his FacebookIssue #2: Whether Cruman's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated when the principal questioned him and procured his confessionTrial court allowed the admission of all of the above as evidence and Cruman was convicted and sentenced

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Scrava School of Health Sciences and Engineering is a public high school with a student body of approximately 2,500 studentsAn increasingly alarming number of students have been engaging in marijuana use and sale on campus.In 2014 preventative measures were instituted to counteract this trend.Students formed a Facebook group to facilitate their efforts in buying and selling marijuana.The group was created and maintained as a secret group.On October 22nd, 2014, Principal Lyons received an anonymous tip that Peter Cruman had posted in the group that he would be conducting a few sales on campus after school that day.Initially, Cruman denied involvment with both the Facebook group and plans to conduct drug deals that day.When the principal requested that he log onto his Facebook account, Cruman refused to do so.After two and a half hours of questioning he logged onto the Facebook account.There were incriminating posts on the Facebook page.Cruman admitted to dealing drugs, and hand-wrote and signed a confession which was turned over to the school.At no point did he attempt to leave the principals office.


Appellants: Facebook account was found under unreasonable search and seizure.Respondent: Information on Facebook-protected against search and seizure? School officials, not law enforcement


Appellants: Wasn't read miranda rights, therefore evidence is dismissed.Respondent: Was speaking voluntarily, was not in custody

CONCLUSION

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

Appellants: He should not be charged because it violated the 5th ammendment (no Miranda rights), and it violated the 4th ammendment because the principal did not have a search warrantRespondent: He should be charged because he wasn't in custody, was not held against his will, and the trial courts all allowed the evidence.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 2CASE NAME:AUTHOR #1: Calvin Roth, Red WingAUTHOR #2:


State v. Hanley, 363 N.W. 2d 735 (Minn. 1985)People v. Cosme, 397 N.E. 2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979)State v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)State v. Prudhomme, 287 N.W. 2d 386 (Minn. 1979)Tompkins v. Superior Court, 378 P.2d 113 (1963)Minnesota Statutes §629.34Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 10


Issue #1 Right of Consent or Refusal to SearchWho had the authority to authorize the search?Is one co-tenant’s authority superior to another co-tenant’s authority?In this situation, what difference would a search warrant have made?Issue #2 Requirement of Consent from Absent Third PartyDoes the consenting party to a search need to be present during the search to exercise his/her authority to conduct the warrantless search?Pursuant to an absent third party’s consent to search, are police officers required to knock and announce their authority and purpose before entering?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 30, 2011 Sean Mathews entered the Brainerd police station. He claimed he had information about a large amount of marijuana at 668 Madeline Avenue in Brainerd. Matthews stated 668 Madeline was his home along with Richard Mirer. Matthews in the early morning hours of August 30, 2011, Marshall Faulkner came to the house and asked Mirer if he could use Mirer’s vehicle to pick up a package at a rest stop near Nisswa. Matthews stated Faulkner was a “known drug dealer”. Mirer let Faulkner drive his car to the rest area. After Faulkner left, Mirer informed Matthews that Faulkner was going to pick up about 2 pounds of Marijuana.Faulkner returned to 668 Madeline Avenue at 4 AM on August 30. Mattews said Faulkner had a large amount of marijuana when he returned. Mattews, a former user, recognized it as marijuana.Mattews expressed to Faulkner and Mirer his extreme displeasure with Faulkner bringing drugs into the home. Mattews then left the house and when he returned 1 hour later, Mattews found Faulkner still present. Faulkner had wrapped the drugs in clear plastic bags and put the baggies his black motorcycle leather jacket.Based on his statements, the officers decided to obtain formal permission to search the residence at 668 Madeline Avenue. Matthews signed a standard “Permission to Search” form at 4:54 PM on August 30. THree Brainerd police officers and two Crow Wing County Sheriff’s deputies conducted a raid shortly after Matthews signed the consent form. Matthews did not accompany the officers on the raid. The officers did not have a search warrant because they believed Matthews consent was sufficient for a search. One officer testified that, based on the information Mattews provided, the police had probable cause to to search the house for drugs. The officers did not knock or announce their purpose when they entered the residence; rather they just walked in with guns drawn. Although Mirere was present when the officers entered, they did not ask Mirer for permission. In fact, Mirer told the officers they had no right to search his house with his permission.During the search, the officers found a leather jacket that matched the description Mattews gave. In it, they found several small bags of what turned out to be marijuana. Faulkner identified the jacket and contents as his. The police also found some marijuana in a canister in the kitchen. In total, about ½ pounds of marijuana was found.Finally, the officers recovered an illegal, sawed-off, 20 gauge shotgun, the evidence at issue in this case. The shotgun was in plain view in the living room of the residence. In a statement to the police after the raid, Mirer admitted that the gun belonged to him. On

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

September 21, 2004, Mirer was charged with violating Minnesota Statute §609.67 subdivision 2.The trial court suppressed the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable search and seizure. The State now appeals.


Either party has the right to authorize the search. Both People vs Cosme and State vs Hanley establish that co tenants have equal authority to grant consent to search the property. In application it follows as Mirer and Matthews were both co tenants each has a right to give consent to search. As Matthews and Meyers authority of the household is equal so is their authority to give consent. In State vs Hanley it is mentioned that by agreeing to live with someone you assume risk they consent to a search as is his or her right. Since the police had consent to enter the home they had the opportunity to develop probable cause there was drugs. The fact there is probable cause for a felony for the crime being committed establishes that the police can continue the search regardless of consent and with or without a warrant.


The consenting party in this case does need to be present. Matthews signed consent gives the police the right to enter the house. “we had not had occasion to consider whether the presence of protesting co-occupant at the scene of the search invalidates the authority of the other occupants to consent to a search of the shared premises. After an examination of the relevant precedents, we conclude that it does not” (People vs Cosme ). Because consent was already granted police do not need to knock and make their presence known because State vs Prudhomme establishes expectations can be granted on various conditions. First the police had special authorization, consent, to come in unannounced and it is fairly likely Mirer knew the police were coming due to how Matthews initially responded to the drugs being in the home and how long Matthews was gone. So the police did not have to make their presence known.

CONCLUSION

It is clear on further examination that the trial court erred in its judgement of the search being unlawful. It can clearly be seen that the police operated within their bounds and the evidence that convicted Mirer should not be suppressed.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 2CASE NAME: CASE NO. 16-002 STATE OF MINNESOTA v. MIRERAUTHOR #1: Samuel Kast, HudsonAUTHOR #2: Joey Oakman, Holy Family


State v. Hanley, 363 N.W. 2d 735 (Minn. 1985) People v. Cosme, 397 N.E. 2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979) State v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) **State v. Prudhomme, 287 N.W. 2d 386 (Minn. 1979) **Tompkins v. Superior Court, 378 P.2d 113 (1963) **Minnesota Statutes §629.34 **Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 10


(1) Whether a present, objecting cotenant's constitutional right to refuse consent to a warrantless search is superior to or otherwise controlling over an absent cotenant’s right to consent to that search.Is one cotenant'sauthority superior to another cotenant'sauthority? In this situation, what difference would a searchwarrant have made?(2) Whether police officers conducting a search pursuant to an absent third party’s consent are required to knock and announce their authority and purpose before entering. Does the consenting party to a search need to be present during the search to exercise his/her authority to conduct the warrantless search?Pursuant to an absent third party’s consent to search, are police officers required to knock and announce their authority and purpose before entering?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 30, 2011, Sean Matthews entered the Brainerd police station. He stated he had information about a large quantity of marijuana at 668 Madeline Avenue in Brainerd. He said that he had recently moved to 668 Madeline Avenue with RichardMirer. Marshall Faulkner came to the house and askedMirer if he could useMirer’s vehicle to pick up a package that was located at a rest area near Nisswa. Matthews stated that Faulkner was a “known drug dealer” After Faulkner had left, Mirer informed Matthews that Faulkner was going to pick up approximately two pounds of marijuana. When Faulkner returned Matthews stated that Faulkner had a large amount of marijuana when he returned to the house. Matthews knew it was marijuana because, as a former user, he recognized the drug by sight and smell. Matthews expressed to Faulkner andMirer his extreme displeasure with Faulkner’s having brought drugs into the house and left the residence When he returned Faulkner had wrapped the marijuana in clear plastic baggies. Based on Matthew’s statement as a co-tenant and the information that was known at the time, the officers decided to obtain formal permission to search the residence Matthews signed a standard “Permission to Search” form a raid was conducted after the form was signed. The officers did not obtain a search warrant because they believed Matthews’ consent was sufficient for a search of the residence. One of the officers testified that, based on the information Matthews had given the police, the police believed they had probable cause to search the house for drugs. The officers did not knock or announce their purpose when they entered the residence; rather, they “walked in” with their guns drawn. Mirer was present when the officers entered the house; they did not ask Mirer for permission to search the house. In fact, Mirer told the officers they had no right to search his house without his permission. During the search of the residence,

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

the officers found a black leather jacket like the one Matthews described to them before the search. In it, the officers found several small bags of what turned out to be marijuana. In total, the police found approximately one-half pound of marijuana. Finally, the officers recovered an illegal, sawed-off, 20-gauge shotgun, the evidence at issue in this case. The shotgun was in plain view in the living room of the residence. In a statement to the police after the raid, Mirer admitted that the gun belonged to him.


View from State: Cotenant's have equal authority over the property in the eyes of the law. from who is allow onto the property, to what can and cannot take place on the property. When 2 parties agree to live in a combined space, and agree that they both hold equal responsibility of the property, it is in the eyes of the state that both parties should also hold the rights to sign forms and other legal statements for the property. Also, due to the given information at the time from Matthews, a search warrant would only compound the right of the police to search, as they would have probable cause (As of drug smuggling occurring on the property), a search warrant, and the form signed by Matthews (allowing them onto the property).View from Mirer: In the eyes of Mirer, as the primary cotenant, he should have the ability to override the authority to some degree of the other cotenants. For instance, when another cotenant wants to sell the property without the consent of Mirer, they would have no legal grounds for them to do that, as it would strip him from his home, and other luxuries.


View from State: Authority was given to the police by Matthews, which was signed and stored. This is prior consent and one of the owners was aware of the impending search of the home. So in the eyes of the state, the police must not announce their presence, due to the fact that one they had prior approval, and that when they did enter and when Mirer said they were not allowed to search, hey may very well be an intruder and that because he is also a cotenant, he does not have overriding authority of the other cotenant.View from Mirer: The authroity of both cotenants must be upheld by police and when one gives authority and the other does not there is a conflict of interest and must be determined by legal means between the two parties, not one party against the police and the other party.

CONCLUSION

View from state: It should be view that authority was given, and that there was cause for the search that allows the police even without a warrant. Crimes were discovered and this has helped the community as a whole and the side of the state should triumph in this caseView from Mirer: There is a legal dispute between the cotenants and that should have been handled first before this trial to see if Matthew had the right to sign the form without the approval from Mirer, however, due to the current situation, Mirer should come out of the smoke victorious because of the improper conduct of the police's search and there many missing documents that should have been acquired for the search

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 2CASE NAME: State of Minnesota v. MirerAUTHOR #1: Emma Dennis, RidgedaleAUTHOR #2: Hannah Ogren, Ridgedale


State v HanleyPeople v CosmeState v MatlockState v PrudhommeTompikns v Supreme CourtMN Statues 629.34MN Constitution Constituion Artice 1, Section 10


The Trial Court suppressed the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable search and seizure. The State is now appealing the case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 30, 2011 Sean Matthews entered the Brainerd police station. He stated he had information about a large quantity of marijuana at 668 Madeline Avenue in Brainerd. Matthews talked with 2 police officer. He stated that he had recently moved into 668 Madeline Avenue with Richard Mirer. Mathews stated that on the morning of August 30 Marshall Faulkner came to the house and asked Matthew's roommate, Mirer, if he could use Mirer’s vehicle to pick up a package at a rest area near Nisswa. Matthews claimed that Faulkner was a “known drug dealer”. Mirer lent his car to Faulkner who used it to go to the rest area. After Faulkner left, Mirer told Matthews that the package that Faulkner went to get was approximately two pounds of marijuana. Faulkner returned to the house around 4:00 pm on the same day. Matthews claimed that Faulkner had a large amount of marijuana when he returned to the house. Matthews new it was marijuana due to the smell because he was a former drug user. Matthews expressed his displeasure to Mirer and Faulkner about having the drugs into the house and he left the residence. When he returned to the house later in the evening he found that Faulkner was still there, but Faulkner had wrapped the marijuana into clear plastic bags and put the bags into his jacket. The police officers decided to obtain a formal permission to search the house at 668 Madeline Avenue. Matthews signed a standard “Permission to Search” form. The raid was executed by three Brainerd police officers and two Crow Wing County Sheriff’s deputies shortly after Matthews signed the consent form. Matthews did not attend the raid. The officers did not have a search warrant because they thought that the form signed by Matthews was enough. The police believed that they had probable cause to search the residence for drugs based on the information that Matthews had given. The officers did not knock or announce their purpose when the entered the residence. Rather they walked in with their weapons drawn. They did not ask Mirer to search the residence, even though Mirer was present at the search. Mirer told the officers that they had to right to search the house. During the search the officers found a jacket with several small bags of marijuana. Faulkner identified the jacket as his. Marijuana was also found in a canister in the kitchen. In total 1.5 pounds of marijuana was found. An illegal sawed- off 20 gauge shotgun was also found, the gun was sitting in plain view in the living room of the residence. Mirere later admitted that the gun belonged to him.


The police had the correct authority because one of the home owner's authorized the searchNo co-tenant should have more authority than the other in order to authorize a search. A search warrant granted by a judge could have

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

helped clear the confusion of who could enter the home, and on what grounds the police could have entered. Yes, it would have helped to get an actual search warrant, but the officers did get a signed agreement from the tenant saying that they could search.


No, not all of the tenants need to be present during the search. Only one tenant should have to be there in order to approve a search, and in this case, one was.If the home does not seem safe, and if previous research says that this house is a potential threat. The officers should not be required to knock and announce their authority. They should be able to walk in if they think that evidence is hidden or altered.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the officers proceeded correctly in how they approached the situation. If the officers had announced themselves evidence would have been put in jeopardy. Also the officers had the permission of one of owners to enter and search the residence. Mirer and Matthews were equal owners of the residence and one did not have more ownership than the other. Matthews granted permission to enter the house, this gives the officers the right to enter without a search warrant.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 2CASE NAME: State of Minnesota v MirerAUTHOR #1: Hannah Ogren, RidgedaleAUTHOR #2: Emma Dennis, Ridgedale


State v HanleyPeople v CosmeState v MatlockState v PrudhommeTompikns v Supreme CourtMN Statues 629.34MN Constituion Artice 1, Section 10


The Trial Court suppressed the evidence on the basis of an unreasonable search and seizure. The State is now appealing the case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 30, 2011 Sean Matthews entered the Brainerd police station. He stated he had information about a large quantity of marijuana at 668 Madeline Avenue in Brainerd. Matthews talked with 2 police officer. He stated that he had recently moved into 668 Madeline Avenue with Richard Mirer. Mathews stated that on the morning of August 30 Marshall Faulkner came to the house and asked Matthew's roommate, Mirer, if he could use Mirer’s vehicle to pick up a package at a rest area near Nisswa. Matthews claimed that Faulkner was a “known drug dealer”. Mirer lent his car to Faulkner who used it to go to the rest area. After Faulkner left, Mirer told Matthews that the package that Faulkner went to get was approximately two pounds of marijuana. Faulkner returned to the house around 4:00 pm on the same day. Matthews claimed that Faulkner had a large amount of marijuana when he returned to the house. Matthews new it was marijuana due to the smell because he was a former drug user. Matthews expressed his displeasure to Mirer and Faulkner about having the drugs into the house and he left the residence. When he returned to the house later in the evening he found that Faulkner was still there, but Faulkner had wrapped the marijuana into clear plastic bags and put the bags into his jacket. The police officers decided to obtain a formal permission to search the house at 668 Madeline Avenue. Matthews signed a standard “Permission to Search” form. The raid was executed by three Brainerd police officers and two Crow Wing County Sheriff’s deputies shortly after Matthews signed the consent form. Matthews did not attend the raid. The officers did not have a search warrant because they thought that the form signed by Matthews was enough. The police believed that they had probable cause to search the residence for drugs based on the information that Matthews had given. The officers did not knock or announce their purpose when the entered the residence. Rather they walked in with their weapons drawn. They did not ask Mirer to search the residence, even though Mirer was present at the search. Mirer told the officers that they had to right to search the house. During the search the officers found a jacket with several small bags of marijuana. Faulkner identified the jacket as his. Marijuana was also found in a canister in the kitchen. In total 1.5 pounds of marijuana was found. An illegal sawed- off 20 gauge shotgun was also found, the gun was sitting in plain view in the living room of the residence. Mirere later admitted that the gun belonged to him.


The police had the correct authority because one of the home owner's authorized the searchNo co-tenant should have more authority than the other in order to authorize a search. A search warrant granted by a judge could have

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

helped clear the confusion of who could enter the home, and on what grounds the police could have entered. Yes, it would have helped to get an actual search warrant, but the officers did get a signed agreement from the tenant saying that they could search.


No, not all of the tenants need to be present during the search. Only one tenant should have to be there in order to approve a search, and in this case, one was.If the home does not seem safe, and if previous research says that this house is a potential threat. The officers should not be required to knock and announce their authority. They should be able to walk in if they think that evidence is hidden or altered.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the officers proceeded correctly in how they approached the situation. If the officers had announced themselves evidence would have been put in jeopardy. Also the officers had the permission of one of owners to enter and search the residence. Mirer and Matthews were equal owners of the residence and one did not have more ownership than the other. Matthews granted permission to enter the house, this gives the officers the right to enter without a search warrant.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 2CASE NAME: State vs. MirerAUTHOR #1: Mark Moses, RidgedaleAUTHOR #2: Sarah Uttormark, Ridgedale


State v. Hanley, 363 N.W. 2d 735 (Minn. 1985)People v. Cosme, 397 N.E. 2d 1319 (N.Y. 1979)State v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)State v. Prudhomme, 287 N.W. 2d 386 (Minn. 1979)Tompkins v. Superior Court, 378 P.2d 113 (1963)Minnesota Statutes §629.34aMinnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 10


Issues:(1) Whether a present, objecting co-tenant’s constitutional right to refuse consent to a warrantless search is superior to or otherwise controlling over an absent cotenant’s right to consent to that search.(2) Whether police officers conducting a search pursuant to an absent third party’s consent are required to knock and announce their authority and purpose before entering.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Facts15:00 August 30, 2011Sean Matthews enters Brainerd police stationMatthews states he as info about LOTS O' WEED at 668 Madeline AvenueMatthews met with 2 officersMatthews stated that he had recently moved to 668 Madeline Avenue with Richard MirerMatthews stated that Marshall Faulkner came to the house early on August 30, 2011 and asked Mirer to use his vehicle to pick up a package at a rest area near NisswaMatthews stated that Faulkner was a "known drug dealer"Matthews stated that Mirer lent car to Faulkner who drove to the rest areaMatthews stated that Mirer said that Faulkner was going to pick up about 2 LBS O' WEED16:00 August 30, 2011Faulkner returned to 668 Madeline AvenueMatthews stated that Faulkner had LOTS O' WEED upon returningMatthews, as a former user, recognized the WEEDMatthews told Mirer and Faulkner his displeasure in having WEED in the houseMatthews leftMatthews returned a few hours later and found that Faulkner was still thereFaulkner had wrapped the WEED in plastic baggies and stuffed the baggies in his "black, motorcycle-type leather jacket"16:54 August 30, 2011Matthews signed a standard "Permission to Search"Officers decided to get formal permission to search the residence based on Matthew's statement as a co-tenant and the foregoing information3 Brainard police officers and 2 Crow Wing County Sheriff's deputies conducted a raid shortly after Matthews signed the consent formMatthews was not with during the raid

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

Officers did not have a warrantPolice believed that they have probable cause to search for drugs based on Matthews's statementsOfficers did not knock or announce themselvesThey did not ask Mirer for permission to search the houseMirer told the officers that they had no right to search the house without permissionThe officers found a black leather jacket filled with BAGS O' WEEDFaulkner claimed that jacket as his ownCANISTER O' WEED found in kitchenPolice found 1/2 LB O' WEED totalpolice found an illegal, sawed-off, 20-gauge shotgunshotgun was in plain view in the livingroomMirer admitted the gun belonged to himSeptember 21, 2004Mirer charged with violating Minnesota Statute 609.67 subdivision 2 (possession of a short-barreled shotgun


Multiple case precedents have stated that when a space is shared a contenant has the right to consent to a search of the whole space. If the other cotenant is absent it is the present cotenant's consent or refusal that is superior. Thus depite the fact that Matthew's consented to the search since he was absent during the search and Mirer who was present refused the search, the ssearch should not have been conducted since it was warrantless.


According to the fourth amendment police officers must knock and announce their presence before conducting a search. However there are exceptions, if doing so would make the search dangerous or inhibit the search's effectivity. Thus since Mirer had a gun possession record knocking and announcing would have put the police officers in danger.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the evidence should be suppressed but the lack of knock and announce is not illegal. If the evidence is not supprressed it will set a precedent that a absent cotenant's consent is superior to a present cotenant. It will also put may police officers in danger by requiring a knock and announce.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 2CASE NAME: State of Minnesota v. MirerAUTHOR #1: Cynthia Terry, NorthfieldAUTHOR #2: Kajsa Johnson, Northfield


state v Hanleypeople v CosmeState v Matlock Tompkins v Superior Court Minnesota statutes 629.34Minnesota Constitution article 1 section 10


Trial court suppressed the found gun because of the believed basis of an unreasonable search and seizure by the cops. The officers came into the home with probable cause without announcing themse even though Mirer told the officers not to search his house without a warran.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Gun and marijuana were found at the scenepolice believed to have probable cause and came in unannounced with no warrant Mathews allowed the search whereas Mirer said no to the search


Mathews agreed to have the apartment searched which mrans that there was consent. A search warrant would have changed the situation because then they wouldn't have had to get consent. The co tenants are equal in superiority


police officer are not required to announce their authority and purpose before entering. A consenting person does not need to be present but can be during a search

CONCLUSION

There is evidence that supports the police and how they did a search legally but there is still some evidence that the police should have done more when doing the search.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I. v. JohnsonAUTHOR #1: Callahan Gergen, HastingsAUTHOR #2: Maryah Hernandez, Albert Lea


Keyishian v. Bd. of RegentsNorthwest Publications, Inc. v. St. PaulHubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. AftonGovernment in the Sunshine Act


Trial court ruled against P.A.T.I. holding that the dinner at Johnson's was not an official meeting, but also said that the definition of "meeting" is vague and could be worked around.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the 2006 mayoral election in Janesville, Johnson narrowly defeated Rogers. He then implemented town improvement plans without raising taxes. TrashMasters Inc. expressed interest in building an incinerator next to the high school in the marshland, which would pay for all of Johnson's town improvements. On February 28th, 2007 Johnson held a dinner at his house with several other government officials who were also close friends, along with Mr. Seale of TrashMasters. The next day Johnson announced his support of the TrashMasters plan, which incited Rogers to form P.A.T.I. in protest. The PATI found out about the dinner, and filed for a writ of mandamus preventing such meetings in the future. The trial court ruled against this, and PATI appealed.


Precedent clearly states that a "conversation between ... members of ... government bodies do not constitute a meeting for purposes of the open meeting law." Therefore this is not a real issue at all. The dinner at Johnson's house cannot be defined as a "public meeting" because it was really just a meeting between a couple of friends. Also, even if this could qualify as a "public meeting," the "public body" at hand clearly showed a need for confidentiality, which the Northwest Publications case ruled was an acceptable reason to have a private meeting. It was obvious that Rogers was still upset about her closely contested loss, and so she would immediately oppose any plans set forth by Johnson.


In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the court ruled that "precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely related to our freedoms," and that "because first amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in an area only with narrow specifity." Obviously the Sunshine Law violates this code. The Sunshine Law doesn't even define what a "meeting" is. In fact, the Sunshine Law actually only applies to meetings between Government agencies, which the dinner at Johnson's house was not, it was a meeting between several friends and a representative from a third party institution. Therefore the dinner cannot be ruled as a meeting. It would be a public meeting if perhaps another Government agency had been present. In Northwest Publications Inc. v. St. Paul the court ruled that "conversations between ... members of ... government bodies do not constitute a meeting for purposes of the open meeting law" or the Sunshine Law for that matter.

CONCLUSION

This case is altogether set back by precedent. Both Northwest Publications and Hubbard Broadcasting ruled in a way that neither the Open Meeting Law or the Sunshine Law would apply to this case. Rogers was just upset that she lost a closely contested race, and is seeking in any way possible to get back at Johnson during his term.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I v. JOHNSONAUTHOR #1: Sierra Armstrong, FridleyAUTHOR #2: Caitlin Fodstad, Fridley


Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Afton The Government in the Sunshine Law


Does Minnesota's Open Meeting Law apply to situations in which public officials are able to meet professionally and socially to discuss public buisness?Does the Sunshine Law, as applied, violate officials' First Amendment right to freedom of association?Trial Court ruled against P.A.T.I , stating the dinner at Johnson's was a social gathering so therefore it is exempt from the Open Meetings Law. They did note that the standard to detirmine if a gathering is a "meeting" is vague.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Alfred Johnson defeated Maureen Rogers for the position of Mayor of Janesville. His first thing he wanted to do as mayor was improve the town without raising taxes. Also the same week TrashMasters Inc. expressed intrest in building a trash incinerator behind the junior highschool, in the marshland. That land was owned by the town. The sale of the marshland would finance all of Mayor Johnson's plans and finance the towns budget for the next 2 years. On Feburary 28th, 2007 Johnson invited Oliver Bjerkness, Gordo Frank and Fredrick Hovland to his home for dinner. They were all members of the city council and friends of Johnson's. Also in attendence was Roger Seale of TrashMasters Inc. The day following the dinner, the mayor announced his endorsement of the TrashMasters plan, which was followed by tons of protest. Maureen Rogers started P.A.T.I (People Against Trash Incinerators). Letters from both sides of the debate started flooding the Janesville Courier. On March 15th,2007 people found out about the dinner at Johnson's home. P.A.T.I filed a suit under the MN Open Meetings Law. P.A.T.I sought a writ of mandamus which would prevent Johnson from doing this in the future and impose a civil penalty not less than 100$.


The Minnesota Open Meeting Law requires that meetings of governmental bodies be generally open to the public. The dinner that Mayor Johnson had at his home was just that, a dinner. All of the council members that were in attendence were personal friends of the mayor so this was not a meeting but a social event. A social gathering by definition is an interaction amoung a diverse group of individuals from small, medium, and large groups for social and community purposes. Seeing as the dinner here was between friends maybe they did discuss their views on the incinerator being built or maybe they didn´t. Roger Seale is a community member so maybe they did discuss some benefits or non benefits of the incinerator based on how it could effect the community which would still keep it under the soical gathering category. If council members and the mayor are personal friends of eachother so they probably discuss their opinions on certain issues frequently, outside of a public meeting. The setting and the circumstances of this situation are casual and nothing but a social event. The MN Open Meeting Law states that an exception to the law is a property transaction which is what this technically is so even if you do look at it as a professional governmental meeting, it is technically exempt from the law. I don´t think this law is applicable to when officials meet socially becuase no one knows what they are actually talking about besides the people involved. They could be discussing their private lives or they could be discussing how an incinerator effects a city.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647


In The Government in the Sunshine Law it states that meetings of government agencies shall be open to the pubic, and for other purpose.It is the federal version of the Open Meeting Law basically. It doesn´t violate the first ammendment right to freedom of association because it its a very broad law.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we affirm the trial courts decsion.The dinner was a social gathering and under the MN Open Meeting Law property transactions, which this was, is exepmt. So whoever thinks it was a meeting it would be exempt from the law.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I v. JOHNSONAUTHOR #1: Lauren Brooks, New PragueAUTHOR #2: Erin Skluzacek


- Keyishian v. Board of Regents- Moberg v. Independent School District 281- The Government in the Sunshine Act- Northwest Publications v. City of St. Paul


1) Open Meeting Law/Public Officials in Social SettingsRuling: The trial court determined the meeting was a social event and exempt from the Open Meetings Law 2) Public Officials/First Amendment RIghts of Freedom of AssociationRuling: The definition of a meeting is vague and a public official can easily get around the open meeting requirements.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 2006, Alfred Johnson won the election and became mayor of Janesville. In recent years, more people moved to Janesville in result of Waseca becoming more industrialized. In result of this change, Johnson enforced a plan to improve the town. Soon after, Trashmasters Inc. indicated they wanted to build a trash incinerator near the junior high school. Selling the land for the trash incinerator would provide finance all the improvements and the town’s budget for the next two years.On January 28, 2007, Johnson had Fredrik Hovland and members of Janesville’s City Council that were personal friends of Johnson. These included Oliver Bjerkness and Gordon Frank. Roger Seale of Trashmaster was also there.The next day, January 29, 2007, Johnson declared confirmation of the TrashMasters plan. Immediately, protests began across the town. The group People Against Trash Incinerators (P.A.T.I) was formed to protest the plan. The town sent letters from both sides to the Janesville Courier.On March 15, 2007 word got out that Johnson had a dinner and in response the P.A.T.I filed a claim under Minnesota Open Meetings Law. They wanted a writ mandamus and to create a civil penalty of a fine not less than $100.The ruling from the trial court was P.A.T.I., but they did mentioned that the definition of an open meeting was vague. Afterwards, the P.A.T.I. appeals.


Keyishian v. Board of RegentsIn this case they ruled that State cannot prohibit governmental employees from being a member of the Communist Party. States were arguing that being a member of the Communist party would violate the sedition laws that already existed. However, the court ruled that the sedition laws were “too vague and broad,” therefore could not be used to hold employees to this particular standard. Likewise, in the case PATI vs Johnson, the trial court stated that “the standard to determine whether a gathering is a “meeting” is vague” as well. Therefore, the Alfred Johnson and the city council cannot be responsible for adhering to an “open-meeting law” that is so vague and broad. Just as the states could not use their vague law to hold government employees to a certain standard, the courts cannot use a vague law to hold the city of Janesville government officials. Moberg v. Independent School District 281This case found members of the school board to be in violation of the Open Meeting Law. A few members of the school board had a few closed meeting in which only certain individuals were invited. Before the meeting, the school board was deadlocked in a decision to

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

close the school. After the meeting, the members’ votes were changed to an unanimous vote. In this case, the meeting could have influenced their vote; therefore, it was in violation of the Open Meeting Law. The Government in the Sunshine ActThis act states that “every portion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation.” It also defines a meeting as “the deliberations of at least the number of individual agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business.”Northwest Publications v. City of St. PaulIn this case the St. Paul city council had been considering already proposed changes in the city that are relative to on-sale liquor establishments and nude dancing. The city council had planned for a closed meeting but ran into some trouble with petition for a writ of mandamus and direction to open the meeting to the public. On appeal, the appellants said that the litigation was threatened, so the city council was entitled to have a closed meeting under the attorney-client privilege exception to the Minnesota Open Meeting Law.


CONCLUSION

- The definition of meeting is too vague- Members of city council attended the dinner party- The decision was made the day after the dinner party

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I. v. JOHNSONAUTHOR #1: Brook Huusko, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Alex Peterson


Minnesotas open meeting lawSunshine LawThe Government in the Sunshine LawHubbard Broadcasting v. City of St.Paul


Alfred Johnson had a social gathering in his own home with people of the company Trash Incinerators. The public saw this as a meeting and public matter that they should have a say in and be present at. Issues: Does Minnesotas open meeting law apply to situations in which public officials are able to meet professionally and socially to discuss public business?Does the sunshine law, as applied, violate public officials' first amendment right to freedom of association.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Alfred Johnson was having a social gathering in his own home with people he has worked with over a year. He has gained relationships with these people. With the deal of the of the land purchase/transfer happening between Alfred Johnson and the people of Trash Incinerators happening for over a year, the public had plenty of time to make their voices heard. Alfred Johnsonhas the first amendment right to freedom of assembly.


The Minnesota open meeting law does not apply to this case because the deal between Alfred Johnson and Trash Incinerators was out in the open for over a year before the social gathering has happened.


Yes, the Sunshine Law violates Alfred Johnson's first amendment right to freedom of association. Just because someone is a public official does not mean that they do not have the born rights of any other american citizen. He also had relationships with the people of Trash incinerators. No one knows what was talked about at this dinner.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the lower courts should be upheld because there is no proof that this social gathering had anything to do with the finalizing of the deal between the two parties. These people had worked together for a period of time and it is safe to say they gained a relationship through it. The deal was out announced to the public a year in advance of this dinner at Alfred Johnson's house.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I. v. JOHNSONAUTHOR #1: Abigail O'brien, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Sophie Demou


Moberg v. ISD 281- The school board members met privatly on 17 occasions and 14 were in violation of the open meeting law therefore the meetings held among the board memebers closly resemble Johnsons "dinner party".


The trial court ruled agaisnt P.A.T.I. claiming Johnson's dinner party as a social gathering thus presents no correlation to the Open Meeting Laws. However the trail court stated that it is hard to determine the difference between a social gathering and a meeting, thus easy to pose a meeting as a social gathering.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Shortly after Johnson was elected mayor of Janesville, TrashMasters expressed interest in the construction of a trash incinerator near the junior highschool. According to Johnsons budget statement, selling the land owned by Janevilles would not only finance his improvements but also finance the town's budget for the next two years. Shortly after interest was expressed Johnson invited three council memebers and a TrashMasters represenitive over for dinner. The next day Johnson endorsed the TrashMasters plan for the incinerator, soon after the local newspaper was bombared with letters for, and letters opposing the TrashMasters plan; some saying that the incinerator could potentially damage the enviroment. Less then a month later, Johnson's dinner party was made public which resulted in P.A.T.I. filing a suit under Minnesotas Open Meeting Laws.


Minnesota's Open Meeting Law requires that meetings of governmental bodies be open to the public, so being that there were three council memebers and the Mayor present at the dinner logically there is no way to avoid discussion about work. So therefore the dinner would be classified as a meeting among governmental bodies. Also the fact that a meeting is classified as an assembly of people, especially the members of a society or committee, would also support the argument that the dinner was a meeting.


The sunshine law is a law requiring certain proceedings of government agencies to be open or available to the public so if there was any discussion about the TrashMasters plan at the dinner party the public should have been included.

CONCLUSION

Johnson disguised his meeting as a social gathering therefore violating many aspects of The Open Meeting Law. Also the Sunshine Law does not violate the First Admendments right to association. This being said the ruling in the Trial Courts should be repelled.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I v. JohnsonAUTHOR #1: Brittany Heizler, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Danielle Slotness, Duluth


Hubbard Boradcasting Inc. v. AftonNorthwest Publications, Inc v. St. PaulNAACP v. Alabama


Trial court deemed the dinner a social gathering and therefore not applicable to the Open Meeting Law. They noted however, that the quidelines for what constitutes a meeting are vague.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 2006 Alfred Johnson was elected mayor in a tight race. Eager to have a successful term he looked for ways to finance his endeavours. The trash incinerator pushed for by Trash masters was just the way to do that. Johnson had expressed no endorsement of the trash incinerator plan until after the night of February 28th 2007. Johnson invited three city council members and the CEO of Trash masters Robert Seale over for “dinner”. The very next day Johnson announced his endorsement of selling the marshland owned by the town to Trash masters.


A private gathering involving a public official is considered as a business session when other public officials are present according to Hubbard Broadcasting Inc v. Afton This was also a public meeting according to Northwest Publications, Inc v. St. Paul. This meeting should have been public because it being a private gathering prohibited the interested public from becoming fully informed, violating the Open Meeting Law which applies because the matters being discussed were public and not private


The sunshine law does not infringe upon the rights of political officials.It is the right of the people to petition and express their grievances to the governing body. Alfred Johnson as mayor has the power to decide and therefore as noted by Hubbard Broadcasting Inc v. Afton determines that he and the other attendants of this “dinner” were acting as a governing body. The attendants of Johnson's dinner were not pursuing private interests, that would ensure they receive freedom of association under the 14th amendment that further defined in NAACP v. Alabama. So a meeting of a governing body should be open to the public according the Sunshine law, as noted in Hubbard Inc v. Afton, in order to ensure the people receive their 1st amendment right of petition as ensured by the 14th amendment. Allowing public officials to utilise their freedom of association to meet and discuss matters affecting the people, infringes upon the people's freedom to petition.

CONCLUSION

I urge you to overturn the decision of the past courts and appeal their decision. It is necessary that the precedents set forth in Hubbard Inc. v. Afton is upheld to ensure protection of the 4th amendment and to help exemplify the definition of a public meeting so conflicts such as these can be avoided in the future.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I. v. JohnsonAUTHOR #1: Cooper Cuene, RidgedaleAUTHOR #2:


P.A.T.I. Files suit under the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, Minn. Stat. §471.705, subd. 2. They want Johson to pay a fine of $100 and to not hold meetings such as the one at his house again.


The court decided that the meeting at Johnson's house was a social gathering, not a meeting, and as a result did not have to follow the Open Meetings Law. However, the court also thought that defining a social gathering compared to a Meeting was a blurry line and it would be possible to have a meeting under the cover of it simply being a social gathering. Johson argues that it would be a violation of 1st amendment rights to freedom of assembly to forbid these meetings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Alfred Johnson was narrowly elected mayor of Janesville, Minn before the events of the caseTrashMasters, inc. wanted to build a trash incinerator near JanesvilleAlfred Johnson invited Oliver Bjerkness, Gordon Frank and Fredrick Hovland to dinnerBjerkness, Frank, Hovland were personal friends of Johnson, and the dinner was at Johnson’s houseRodger Seale of TrashMasters was at the gatheringThe next day, the city agreed to the deal with TrashMastersThe sale of the land to the company financed the city budget for the next two years, in addition to financing improvments supported by mayor JohnsonMany residents of the city became opposed, and formed the group People Against Trash Incinerators (PATI)Others supported the plan, saying that the incinerator was well within enviornmental sciencesWhen PATI was informed of the meeting at Mayor Johnson’s house, they sued Johnson using Minnesota’s Open Meeting Law.


In Hubbard Broadcasting, inc. v. Afton, the court found that a mealtime discussion between two city council members was not a violation of open meeting laws. In PATI v Johnson, the question is over a similar mealtime gathering between city council members, and the precedent set in Hubbard Broadcasting v Afton should hold.


In Northwest Publications, inc. v St. Paul, the court found that a closed meeting between city council members to discuss what course of action should be taken in suing a liqour establishment must be opened to the public. While dealing with the same Open Meetings Law, this case is different than PATI v. Johnson because this case concerns a business meeting while PATI v Johnson concerns a social gathering. As a result, the precedent set in Northwest Publications v St. Paul does not hold for PATI v Johnson.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should uphold the ruling of the Lower Courts due to the fact that prior rulings have shown that social meetings for things such as meals do not count as business meetings, and should be exempt from Open Meeting Laws as a result.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I v. JohnsonAUTHOR #1: Shayla Cook, MankatoAUTHOR #2: Eliza Stougaard, Mankato


United mine workers v. State Bar association.Hubbard Broadcasting, inc. v. City of AftonKeyishian v. Board of RegentsMoberg v. Independent School District no. 281


(1) Does Minnesota's Open Meeting Law apply to situations in which public officials are able to meet professionally and socially to discuss public business?(2) Does the Sunshine Law, as applied, violate public officials' First Ammendment right to freedom of association?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Janesville is predominantly a farming community. In 1998, the Lamplite Corporation opened a cabinet manufacturing factory in nearby Waseca. As Waseca became more industrialized, more people began to move into Janesville and commuted to work in Waseca. This influx in population soon overtaxed local government resources, requiring the addition of several new city employees. With the projected population growth, the Janesville City Council debated the impact of additional expenditures on the city budget. These issues were highly contested in the 2006 mayoral election in Janesville. Alfred Johnson narrowly defeated Maureen Rogers, by less than one percent of the vote. As his first major initiative, Johnson implemented a plan to begin town improvements without raising taxes. Within the same week, TrashMasters Inc. expressed interest in building a trash incinerator on marshland behind the junior high school. The land was owned by the town. The sale of the land would finance all the improvements Mayor Johnson suggested, plus completely finance the town’s budget for the next two years, according to figures from the Mayor’s office. On February 28, 2007, Johnson invited Oliver Bjerkness, Gordon Frank and Fredrick Hovland to his home for dinner. Bjerkness, Frank and Hovland were members of Janesville’s City Council and were personal friends of Johnson. Also present was Roger Seale of TrashMasters. The next day, Johnson announced his endorsement of the TrashMasters plan, prompting a widespread protest. Under the guidance of Rogers, “People Against Trash Incinerators” (P.A.T.I.) was formed to oppose the TrashMasters plan. The Janesville Courier was soon filled with letters on both sides of the debate, some warning of the environmental damage from the incinerator, others posting scientific evidence showing that the TrashMasters plan fell within environmental safety limits and was economically necessary. On March 15, 2007, word leaked of the dinner at Johnson’s home. P.A.T.I filed suit under the Minnesota Open Meetings Law. P.A.T.I. sought a writ of mandamus which would prevent Johnson from holding such meetings in the future and impose a civil penalty not less than $100, pursuant to Minn. Stat. §471.705, subd. 2. The trial court ruled against P.A.T.I., holding that the dinner at Johnson’s home was a social gathering and thus exempt from the Open Meetings Law. However, the trial court noted that the standard to determine whether a gathering is a “meeting” is vague, suggesting that a council member might easily avoid the open meeting requirements under the guise of a social gathering. P.A.T.I. now appeals.


Private gatherings with public officials should not be considered as a business session. The main distinction between a private gathering and a public meeting is the location, just because public officials are meeting gives the public no right to listen to their private converstations.


The sunshine laws are harming public officials first ammendment right to freedom of association by not letting them associate with who they want to without having the public listen to all their conversations. One right doesnt have to "lose" or "win" but some rights do have

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

presidense over others.

CONCLUSION

The lower courts desicion should be upheld.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: PATI vs JohnsonAUTHOR #1: Alyssa Patil, RidgedaleAUTHOR #2:


Minnesota Statute 471.705Keyishian vs Board of RegentsNorthwest Pub., Inc. v. City of St. Paul


The trial court ruled against P.A.T.I., holding that the dinner at Johnson’s home was a social gathering and thus exempt from the Open Meetings Law. However, the trial court noted that the standard to determine whether a gathering is a “meeting” is vague, suggesting that a council member might easily avoid the open meeting requirements under the guise of a social gathering. The trial court did not answer the question of what makes the difference between a social gathering and a business meeting. The court also did not answer the question of whether or not the sunshine law fully protects the rights of citizens.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

TrashMasters Inc. expressed interest in building a trash incinerator on marshland behind the junior high school. Johnson invited Oliver Bjerkness, Gordon Frank and Fredrick Hovland to his home for dinner. Bjerkness, Frank and Hovland were members of Janesville’s City Council and were personal friends of Johnson. Also present was Roger Seale of TrashMasters. the next day Johnson announced his endorsement of the TrashMasters plan, prompting a widespread protest. “People Against Trash Incinerators” (P.A.T.I.) was formed to oppose the TrashMasters plan. Many warned of the environmental damage from the incinerator, others posting scientific evidence showing that the TrashMasters plan fell within environmental safety limits and was economically necessary. P.A.T.I filed suit under the Minnesota Open Meetings Law. P.A.T.I. sought a writ of mandamus which would prevent Johnson from holding such meetings in the future and impose a civil penalty not less than $100.


Issue #1: Is a private gathering involving a public official considered as a business session when other public officials are present? What is the distinction between a private gathering and a public meeting?In Keyishian vs Board of Regents, the court overturned the original ruling based on the broadness of the law in question. Likewise, it is hard to see where the line is between a social event and a meeting when the majority of the guests are town officials.


Issue #2: If the Sunshine Law is intended to protect citizens’ rights, is it harming the rights of public officials? In Northwest Pub., Inc. v. City of St. Paul it was ruled that a meeting cannot be closed, and the exception of the need for confidentiality was inapplicable. Similarly, in this situation there is no need for a meeting behind closed doors, especially since the issues under discussion require public participation in the decision-making process. The Sunshine law in put in place To protect the right of the people to be involved in city decisions,and the trial court disregarded this factor in the ruling.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. Johnson easily used the guise of a social event to discuss matters that should have taken place publicly. The sunshine law is intended to protect the rights of citizens, to keep them informed of government affairs. Dinner parties are not public, therefore not an appropriate place to make official decisions. The discussion taking place was also one that did not need confidentiality. People have a right to have access to public affairs.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I.v.JOHNSONAUTHOR #1: Sabrina Ali, Higher GroundAUTHOR #2: Hudaa Abdullahi


P.A.T.I.v.JOHNSONThe Government in the Sunshine LawUnited States Constitution, Amendment IUnited States Constitution, Amendment XIV


The legal issues in this court case is that the trial basically ruled against P.A.T.I stating that the meeting at the Johnson's house was a social gathering which made them exempt the law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Febuary 28, 2007, Johnson Invited Oliver Bjerkness, Gordin Frank and Fredrick Hovland to his home for dinner, Roger Seale of TrashMasters was also present. They were all members of Janesville's City council, and personal friends. On March 15, 2007, word leaked of the dinner at Johnson's home. P.AT.I filed a suiit under the Minnesota Open meetings., They imposed a civil penalty not less than $100.


Yes, a private gathering involving a public official is considered business session when other public officials are present at the time of the gathering.According to Google definitions, private is defined as belonging to or for the use of one particular person or group of people only. public is defined as; of or concerning the people as a whole. and gathering is defined as; an assembly or meeting, especially a social or festive one or one held for a specific purpose. Due to the fact that this particular event was assembled for a ceartain group, therefore it is a private event.


No, The Sunshine Law is intended to assure citizens to access government agencies. Public officials are not being harmed in this process. The law includes certain exemptions and does not harm public officials.Freedom of association is the right to join or leave groups of a person's own choosing, and for the group to take collective action to pursue the interests of members. Therefore no harm is done by the right to free association by the right to petition. Both of these rights are supplying frredom and are not meant to harm citizens.The rights have been established so that things could be fair.In some cases one right may over rule another, depending on the circumstances. The main point is not sothat they over-rule one another. In the case that one right is deemed more important than the other, the "more important" right shall be ratified over the other right.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the incidents that led to this case are undeniably upsetting.The meeting at Johnson's house was just a social gathering and not a private gathering where it was a business session because other officials are present. Because their actions did not constitute deliberate indifference professional judgment, they did not violate a clearly established legal right so it was ruled against P.A.T.I.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I vs. JohnsonAUTHOR #1: Haley Sampson, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Trevor Thompson


Sushine LawOpen-Meeting LawFirst Amendment- Right to Freedom of AssociationHubbard Broadcasting vs. City of Afton


The Trial Court ruled that the dinner at Johnson’s home was social and therefore exempt from the Open-Meeting Law. This upholds public officials Right to Associate because it was a private gathering unrelated to a meeting’

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lamplite Corporation already industrialized the area in 1998Selling the land would finance all improvements the Mayor was planning to makeThe TrashMasters plan was within the environmental safety limits and was economically necessary


A private gathering involving a public official is not in this case considered a business session when other public officials were present because not enough officials were present to make an executive decision for the council. If there were enough officials present to make a decision then the gathering would have to be open to the public and considered a "meeting". However, they met on private property and the meeting was only social.


The Sunshine Law does not affect the right of public officials as long as their right to associate freely is upheld and there are boundaries to what the citizens have a right to know. The citizens have a right to petition the government as long as they respect that the public officials have privacy too when they are not discussing legal issues. The citizens right to petition and the officials right to associate are equal as long as there isn’t a formal meeting without the public being informed and the Open-Meeting Law has boundaries.

CONCLUSION

We ask you to uphold the Trial Court’s decision because there were not enough officials present to make an executive decision and the dinner was at a private location.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I. v. JohnsonAUTHOR #1: Hudaa Abdullahi, Higher GroundAUTHOR #2: Sabrina Ali


P.A.T.I.v.JOHNSONThe Government in the Sunshine LawUnited States Constitution, Amendment IUnited States Constitution, Amendment XIV


The legal issues in this court case is that the trial basically ruled against P.A.T.I stating that the meeting at the Johnson's house was a social gathering which made them expemt the law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Febuary 28, 2007, Johnson Invited Oliver Bjerkness, Gordin Frank and Fredrick Hovland to his home for dinner, Roger Seale of TrashMasters was also present. They were all members of Janesville's City council, and personal friends. On March 15, 2007, word leaked of the dinner at Johnson's home. P.AT.I filed a suiit under the Minnesota Open meetings., They imposed a civil penalty not less than $100.


Yes, a private gathering involving a public official is considered business session when other public officials are present at the time of the gathering.According to Google definitions, private is defined as belonging to or for the use of one particular person or group of people only. public is defined as; of or concerning the people as a whole. and gathering is defined as; an assembly or meeting, especially a social or festive one or one held for a specific purpose. Due to the fact that this particular event was assembled for a ceartain group, therefore it is a private event.


No, The Sunshine Law is intended to assure citizens to access government agencies. Public officials are not being harmed in this process. The law includes certain exemptions and does not harm public officials.Freedom of association is the right to join or leave groups of a person's own choosing, and for the group to take collective action to pursue the interests of members. Therefore no harm is done by the right to free association by the right to petition. Both of these rights are supplying frredom and are not meant to harm citizens.The rights have been established so that things could be fair.In some cases one right may over rule another, depending on the circumstances. The main point is not sothat they over-rule one another. In the case that one right is deemed more important than the other, the "more important" right shall be ratified over the other right.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the incidents that led to this case are undeniably upsetting.The meeting at Johnson's house was just a social gathering and not a private gathering where it was a busIness session because other officials are present. Because their actions did not constitute deliberate indifference professional judgment, they did not violate a clearly established legal right so it was ruled against P.A.T.I.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- District CourtDISTRICT COURT CASE: S - 3CASE NAME: P.A.T.I. v. Johnson (16-003)ATTORNEY #1: Kendra Nelson, LakevilleATTORNEY #2: Mackenzie Bongard, Lakeville

OPENING STATEMENT - Prosecution

1) With the provided case taken into consideration, it is beyond government officials rights to discuss public matters in a closed setting. Wth no one there to legally document decisions made, and no public representatives present to give ther input, no decisions should ever be made outside of a public setting available to anyone. Although the meeting was deemed a social gathering, there was discussion on topics that by law are supposed to be available to the public. The term for "meeting" is used too loosely in terms of the government and that needs to be changed! 2) The Sunshine law, as it states, clearly determines that all government gatherings must be open and available to the public. With freedom of association in mind, it clearly does violate rights given by birth to Americans. Americans have the rights to gather and hold a meeting whenever they please and discuss whatever topic they feel inclined to cover. The sunshine law does in fact restrict topics allowed to discuss and who can gather at these meetings.

OPENING STATEMENT - Defense

1) With the given case in mind, public officials truly do have the right, under American laws, to meet socially and discuss whatever topic comes to mind. The court, in fact, did deem the gathering as primarily social with harmless government talk thrown into the friendly discussion. They as Americans have the right to discuss what they want while in a social setting. They were merely discussion their occupation and opinions about the current problems in their city. Every other American has this right, so why are these officials any different?2) Based on the rights of freedom of association, the Sunshine Law does not violate ones rights given in the First Ammendment. The rights of association loosley define what a gathering intails, while the Sunshine Law goes more into depth. One has the right to gather, but not talk about important government topics without a professional setting. One can be easily biased in a personal setting like said dinner party.

QUESTIONS TO ASK YOUR WITNESSES (3 Witnesses = 3 Questions for Each)

What do you feel are your basic rights?Do you feel as if your rights are stripped due to the Sunshine Law?Should Government officials be allowed to discuss your towns public problems in a personal, secluded setting? Would you want to be present?Do you feel that you have the right and access to said meetings where laws are personally discussed? Why or Why not?

QUESTIONS TO ASK YOUR OPPONENT'S WITNESSES (3 Witnesses = 5 Questions for Each)

Do you feel as if these laws protect your rights? Why or Why not?Why do you feel that the public should or should not be present for such decision making?How do you feel that being present is beneficial for ecision making?Do you feel personal opinions could bias the ruling while in said personal and social gatherings?

CLOSING STATEMENT - Prosecution

All gatherings related to public issues need to be held in public setings, under the Sunshine Law, to ensure biases and unrelated topics dont intervene with the real issue at hand. Also, all Amerians, under the First Ammendment with freedom of association, have the rights to attend any meetings, including government ones, as they see fit.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

CLOSING STATEMENT - Defense

Americans have the rights under the Ammendments to freedom of speech and association to have a meeting and discuss any topic. All Americans have the rights to privacy and personal opinions that can be exprssed where ever and whenever. No person should be limited to gathering spaces and discussion topics. What even characterizs an official meeting space and problematic issues of the public?

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 3CASE NAME: P.a.t.i. Vs johnsonAUTHOR #1: Carter Hemstock, MankatoAUTHOR #2: Kieran townsend


The government in the Sunshine Law pp.1079-1085Minnesota statutes 471.705Open meetings law Moberg v isd 281


Issue #1: trial court ruled that the dinner at Johnson's home was a social gathering, thus exempt from the Open Meetings Law.Issue #2: are people's rights being harmed by the confines of the sunshine law and the public official's right to free association.Not discussed/ documented by trial courts

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Johnson has a dinner at his house. Meeting consisted of city council members and roger seale in representation of TrashMasters.The next day johnson announced his endorsement of TrashMaster's plan, sparking protest.


Johnson dinner is concidered a social gathering and is exempt from the Open meetings law. The event did not need to be documented.


The different laws and public official's right to free association conflict and harm the rights defined by other political justifications.

CONCLUSION

Johnson had every right to have a social dinner at his house without documentation and is not under any fault as congested by members of P.A.T.I.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Gabriel Stanley, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Cullen White, Duluth


State v. McKenzieState v. Bowles


1.) Whether the use of an anonymous jury violated Vang’s fundamental right to a trial by impartial jury2.) Whether the prosecutor’s closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Timothy Vang was arrested and charged with the murder of a convenience store clerk. He already had an extensive criminal record that included a charge for attempting to interfere with a jury member on a murder trial. Do to this as well as the media attention that this case attracted and Vang’s gang affiliations the trial court elected to empanel an anonymous jury. This is where the names of the member of the jury are not released in order to protect the impartiality of the jury. Both sides of the trial were given voir dire in order to ensure the impartiality of the jury. Vang also admitted to having no evidence of any jury member having a bias because of the jury’s anonymity.


The use of an anonymous jury didn’t violate Vang’s right to a trial by jury as stated in both the United States and the Minnesota state Constitutions. When deciding on the use of an anonymous jury the court must conclude that a strong reason exists for its use and the court must take steps to maintain the impartiality of the jury, as stated in State v. McKenzie. As in this case the defendant had gang affiliations, which are cited as one of the reasons for an anonymous jury. In McKenzie the court upheld the lower court's decision for the use on an anonymous jury because of this could affect the impartiality of the jury. Vang’s charge for attempting to interfere with the impartiality of a previous jury points towards the use of an anonymous jury to prevent further tampering. Furthermore the amount of media attention on this case is a factor that could affect the impartiality of the jury. Having then decided that a the use of an anonymous jury was necessary the court then has to take steps to see that the use of anonymity doesn’t interfere with the impartiality of the jury. The court in Vang’s case, like the court in McKenzie, accomplished this by allowing both side to participate in voir dire with the jury pool as well as instructing the jury to focus upon the evidence and the laws in the case. The case of State v Bowles states that when dealing with infringements on impartiality “the first question is whether ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play”’ and because even the defendant himself said that there was no evidence that the jury was impartial due to their anonymity there are no impermissible factors that would require a new trial. Due to the similarities in these cases, the precedent would stand, that an anonymous jury doesn’t violate the defendant's rights to an impartial jury as stated the Constitution.


The closing remarks of the prosecutor were not so improper as to require new trial. The remarks made would have no affect on the outcome of the trial based on the evidence that was provided in the trial, which strongly suggests that Vang was indeed guilty. The court has in place already a system of preventing improper behavior in the objection system. Had these remarks been so improper to require a new trial the defense counsel had the ability to object to such remarks and could have objected to them if it was deemed to be improperly influencing the jury.

CONCLUSION

In the case of Timothy Vang there was the use of an anonymous jury that didn’t in anyway affect the impartiality of the jury as Vang claimed. This is based off of the precedents of State v. McKenzie and State v. Bowles in which their use of an anonymous jury was

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

upheld. This was based on two factors a reason of its use and the proper steps needed to be taken in order to prevent the jury from not becoming biased due to their anonymity. In Vang’s case there was gang involvement, a previous threat to a jury, and a large amount of media attention that lead to the empaneling of an anonymous jury. The lower court also took the proper steps to keep impartiality through voir dire. The closing remarks were not so improper as to warrant a new trial because of the already in place system of objects that are prevent such actions from occurring. Vang;s right to impartial trial was not infringed upon by the use of an anonymous jury and the remarks of the prosecutor were not so improper as to require a new trial.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Daniel Urke, RidgedaleAUTHOR #2:


Cases:State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995)State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1995)State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1993)State v. Bohlsen, 526 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1994)State v. VanWagner, 504 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 1993)Constitutional Amendments and Articles:United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI, and XIVMinnesota Constitution, Article I, § 6


Issue 1:Whether the use of an anonymous jury violated Vang’s fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury?The trial court answered this question no an anonymous jury did not violate Vang’s fundamental right to an impartial jury.Issue 2:Whether the prosecutor’s closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial?The trial court answered this question no they were not so improper to require a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Timothy Vang was tried for the murder of a convenience store clerk. His arrest was assisted by the identification of Vang out of a police line-up by three witnesses who were at the convenience store and saw the murderer run out of the store. Vang has a long criminal record including being charged with attempting to tamper with a witness during a murder trial against his brother. He also was in a gang several years ago. Also while Vang was awaiting trial in jail, one of the witnesses who identified Vang in the police line-up was seriously injured in a hit and run which has not been solved. As a result of the unsolved hit and run and Vang’s previous criminal record, specifically the charge of tampering with a witness and being in a gang, the trial court decided to empanel an anonymous jury in order to protect them from potential harm. The jury members were instructed not to infer anything from their anonymity in regards to their decision in the case. Vang had the opportunity to examine these jurors and determine any biases and concluded himself that the jurors did not infer that were in danger or Vang was guilty. Vang did not testify at trial and the only witness that the defense called was Vang’s girlfriend who testified that Vang was at home the whole night arguing with her. In the closing arguments the prosecutor made several comments including that the defendant was “responsible” for his conduct and the need for the jury to convict the defendant in order to clean up the streets. Also the prosecutor went on to ask the jurors to put themselves in the minds of the victim and the victim’s family. Lastly, the prosecutor argued that the state’s evidence was not even disputed by the defense, the defense witnesses are not credible, and that constitutional rights were only designed to protect the innocent not the guilty. In the end Vang was convicted of the murder and appealed, arguing that the anonymous jury violated his right to an impartial jury trial and that the prosecutor’s closing arguments were so improper that they required a new trial.


Both the Minnesota and United States Constitution's grant a defendant the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. In this case Vang has tried to argue that this right of his was violated when the trial court decided to empanel an anonymous jury. The issue of an anonymous jury has been written on by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the cases State v. Bowles and State v. McKenzie. In State v. Bowles the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that an anonymous jury is not an inherently prejudicial practice as the jurors can believe that they are being protected from media influence instead of the danger of being tampered with. Also in State v. Bowles the Minnesota Supreme

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

Court ruled that in order for an anonymous jury to be used by a trial court it must satisfy two conditions. First, that there is a strong reason the believe that the jury needs protection from outside threats or influence. Secondly, the trial court must take precautions to minimize possible biasing of the opinion of the jurors through extensive voir dire and also instructions to the jurors to not take their anonymity into account when deciding the case. In the Minnesota Supreme Court case State v. McKenzie the court ruled also that the evidence of danger need not be written but simply be outlined clearly by the trial court. These two requirements set out in State v. Bowles were met in Vang’s case. In the case at hand there was clear evidence of potential jury tampering or danger considering his charge for tampering with the jury in his brother’s murder trial, the unsolved hit and run performed on a key witness for the prosecution, his gang history, the violent nature of the crime and the large amount of press coverage, hence the first requirement has been met. Secondly, the trial court both allowed for extensive voir dire by the defendant and instructed the jurors to not infer anything from their anonymity and decide the case solely on the facts presented. These requirements, based on the Minnesota Supreme Court case State v. Bowles, being met the use of an anonymous jury by the trial court was justified in protecting the jurors from potential influence and danger and did not violate Vang’s fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury.


As set out in Minnesota Supreme Court case State v. VanWagner, in order for the arguments of the prosecution to violate Vang’s rights they must first be improper and then they must have played a significant or substantial role in influencing the jury. If Vang’s rights were violated then this warrant a new trial however this is not the case. In this case the arguments the prosecution presented in closing may have been somewhat biased, however this is the point of closing, to provide each side time to present and summarize the case from their point of view. Even if they prosecution’s arguments were to be considered improper then they did not have an effect on the jury. The jury is instructed in trial court that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty so the argument from the prosecution that the constitutional rights were not intended to protect the guilty should and did not have an effect on the jurors. Lastly, the arguments of the prosecution did not affect the outcome of the case because the jurors were not instructed to take the prosecution's arguments as evidence simply as a summary and hence should and did not have any influence on the minds of the jurors as the potentially influential comments were presented as facts that the jurors did not have to consider.

CONCLUSION

Your honors for all of the foregoing reasons the judgement of the trial court should be affirmed.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Ryan Swanson, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Joel Atella, Duluth


State v. McKenzie 1995State v. Salitros 1993State v. Bohlson 1994United States Constitution Articles V and VIABA Standards of Criminal Justice


The trial court empanelled an anonymous jury in Mr. Vang's case. The prosecutor made statements discussing the defendants repsponsibility for his conduct, the juror's responsibility in the case, and the feelings of the victim's family.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Around 2AM on Jan. 9th 2006 a convenience store clerk was killed during a robbery. A man with a description matching the defendant Timothy Vang was then seen fleeing the scene of the crime by three individuals. Timothy Vang was then arrested three day later for illegal possession of a firearm which could not be directly traced to the murder. Vang’s previous criminal record included theft, check forgery, possession and dealing of drugs, assault on an off-duty police officer, and a charge for attempting to tamper with a witness in a trial against his brother. After being identified by witnesses, and failing to produce an alibi for his whereabouts at the time of the murder, Vang was charged with murder. One of the individuals that identified Vang was injured in a hit-and-run incident while Vang was in custody. After a series of testimonies from witnesses, including a prisoner who described Vang on the night of the murder, the trial chose to empanel an anonymous jury. The decision was based on concerns over public interest and the defendant's past gang involvement. The trial court was instructed not to release the names of the jury members, and Vang was given extensive opportunity to examine potential jurors before the session began. Vang exercised his right to not testify at his trial and after a series of weak testimonies by the defense, the prosecutor made numerous statements during the closing arguments that asked the jury to consider their responsibility, the feelings of the victim’s family, and that the evidence provided by the state was essentially indisputable.


The court improperly applied precedents in using an anonymous jury. Proper analytical framework for determining when an anonymous jury can be applied only increases the burden on presumption of innocence. Adopting principles developed in federal case must begin with assessing the safety of the jurors and determining if they need protection (as stated in State V Mackenzie 1995). In Mr. Vang’s case, the lower courts failed to provide a clear and detailed explanation as to why an anonymous jury was selected, stating only that there were “concerns about public interest in the case,” and the defendant's previous criminal record. A complete and thorough set of reasons must be submitted before considering juror anonymity. Also, using an anonymous jury is not an inherently prejudicial practice. Anonymity of the jury represents a special circumstance of the defendant and is not frequently used. The trial court instructed the jury that their names were not released to avoid unwanted media coverage and people “bothering them.” This likely influenced the jury by making them concerned about potential contact from media or others associated with Mr. Vang. Because it is highly likely that the jury was influenced by the announcement of such anonymity , Mr. Vang was deprived of an impartial jury. It should also be mentioned (also stated in State V Mackenzie 1995) that in order for an anonymous jury to be used there must be a significant risk of jeopardizing the juror’s wellbeing. In Mr. Vang’s case, there was low media coverage before the trial and no threats to jurors, meaning that there were no legitimate safety concerns, thus nullifying the need for an anonymous jury. It can be said that for all these reasons Mr. Vang’s right to an impartial jury was violated.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647


As stated by the ABA Standards “The prosecutor should refrain from argument that would divert the jury from its duty to decide a case on the evidence by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury’s verdict.” Therefore, based on what was said by the prosecutor during the closing arguments such statements would be deemed improper by ABA standards. By influencing the emotions of the jury, asking them to consider their responsibility to “clean up the streets” and to consider the feelings of the victim, the prosecutor unfairly influenced the jury, and consequently led to Vang being deprived of an impartial jury. As seen in a similar case State v. Salitos 1993, such comments made by the prosecutor to influence the emotions of the jury were grounds for a new trial. A trial judge “has the responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests of the public in the administration of criminal justice,” as stated in ABA standards for criminal justice. It could therefore be said that the court has a responsibility the conduct of those it oversees.

CONCLUSION

Because there was no reasonable threat to the jurors, the anonymity of the jury in the case was not justified, and thus is unconstitutional. Regarding the closing statements of the prosecution, such statements would be deemed improper by the ABA standards for criminal justice, meaning that his statements influenced the jury, rendering them no longer impartial.For all these reasons we ask that the decision of the lower courts be reversed.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: TIMOTHY VANG v. STATE OF MINNESOTAAUTHOR #1: Maria Onnen, HastingsAUTHOR #2: Rachel Wester


State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995) State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1995) ** State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1993) ** State v. Bohlsen, 526 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1994) ** State v. VanWagner, 504 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 1993) ** United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI, and XIV ** Minnesota Constitution, Article I, § 6


Over Vang's objection, the trial court chose to empanel an anonymous jury, citing concerns over the public's interest in the trial, the defendant's past criminal record and gang involvement, and the unsolved hit and run accident involving a witness. Vang claimed an anonymous jury deprived him of the presumption of innocence and was not warranted given the lack of media attention or threats to jurors.In closing arguments, the prosecutor commented on the defendant being "responsible" for his conduct and bearing the consequences of his actions

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At approximately 2:00 a.m. early Saturday morning on January 9, 2006, a convenience store clerk in South St. Paul was shot and murdered during a robbery. The clerk was the son of a City Council member. Three individuals in two separate cars outside the store heard the shots and saw the murderer leave the store and drive off. Their descriptions of the murderer and the car that was driven were similar and generally matched that of the defendant, Timothy Vang. Vang was arrested six days after the murder. He had been stopped for speeding and expired license tabs. During the stop, a gun was discovered in plain view on the front seat. He was arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm. Ballistic tests could not match this gun to the murder weapon used. At the time he was stopped for speeding, he was on probation for a 1996 incident for unlawful possession of a firearm. Vang has a lengthy criminal record for theft and property crimes, including check forgery and drug dealing. He was an active member of a gang several years ago, but has had no known active involvement in the past eighteen months. Seven years ago he was convicted of assaulting an off-duty police officer. He was once charged, but not convicted, for attempting to tamper with a witness in a murder trial against his brother four years ago. Because both he and his car generally matched the description of the murderer, the three witnesses examined Vang in a police line-up. They all identified him as the man they saw leaving the store. When questioned, Vang originally said he had been in Chicago that day. He later was unsure whether he had been in Chicago that day or the next day and could not remember where he was at the time of the murder. Vang was charged with the murder. One of the individuals that identified Vang was seriously injured in a hit and run car accident two weeks after Vang's arrest but while Vang remained in jail pending trial. He did not testify at trial. The other two individuals testified at trial and identified Vang. At trial the prosecution also offered testimony from a prisoner that testified that Vang told him while the two were in jail that Vang had been out drinking in St. Paul the night of the murder with some friends after an argument with his girlfriend. This witness admitted he cooperated with the prosecution and arranged a favorable plea agreement.


The jury knew they were anonumus, so it is reasonalbe that they world suspect that there was a threat to their life, and therfore that the appelant was involved with dangerous people, and was, by extenion, guilty.


The judge is supposed to only pass a sentence based on the crime the jury found him guilty of, and control the court, not to help the prosecution with their case. If it was we wold not have prosecuting attorneys seperate from judges.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

CONCLUSION

Vang had an unfair trial

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang vs State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Alexandria O'mara, Elk RiverAUTHOR #2: Marisa Kranitz and Jinnae Koop, Elk River


Cases RelatedState v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995) State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1995) ** State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1993) ** State v. Bohlsen, 526 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1994) ** State v. VanWagner, 504 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 1993) ** United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI, and XIV ** Minnesota Constitution, Article I, § 6


1) The anoymous jury was helpful because it kept everyone safe and secure. This was instruced from the media so it wouldn't bother them. Vang wanted an anoymous jury because so he knew that gave him the innonce throughout the media and throughout the hit and run and because the jury was serious injured.2) The prosecutor was asking him so many questions. That he was " responible for his consequences of actions". The prosecutor was so concerned how Vangs family reacted and how Vang was that night of the crime. With all of these questions and concern this will lead to a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2:00 a.m. early Saturday morning on January 9, 2006, a convenience store clerk in South St. Paul was shot and murdered during a robbery.3 witnesses identified Vang as the murdererLater, he was pulled over for expired tabs and speeding and a gun was found in plain view on the front seat (Ballistic tests didnt match this with the gun he used for the murder).Vang has a long criminal recordOne of the individuals that identified Vang was seriously injured in a hit and run car accident two weeks after Vang's arrest When being questioned, he said he was in chicago but didnt know whyA prisoner testified that Vang told him while the two were in jail that Vang had been out drinking in St. Paul the night of the murder with some friends after an argument with his girlfriend.the trial court chose to empanel an anonymous jury Vang didnt testify on trialDefense counsel argued that any identification of the murderer was mistaken. The prosecutor argued that the evidence of mistaken identity was weak and that the defense's witnesses should not be believed


The lower court improperly applyed precedents in permitting the anonymous jury when they allowed the annoymus jurors to not be annoymus. This unfortunatlely let the hit and run against a memeber of the so-called "annoymus" jury to be killed. The jury was also used incorrectly when they picked people who had already read and had their opinions on the case, PRIOR to the trial.In what circumstances is an anonymous jury properly used? An anonymous jury is properly used when they keep it anonymous.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

The use of an anonymous jury can be “inherently prejudicial practice” because, as it is designed to keep the jury safe, that doesnt alwaysa happen, like we saw in Vang's first trial on this issue. The anonymous jury is intructed to not infer anything. However, people are people and they will think what they want. It's very possible that most if the jury ignored that, its just human nature.Vang’s right to a trial by an impartial jury was violated. Although, since the media was always showcasing Vang, there werent many people who didnt already have an opinion on what had happened. But still believe that its unfair that thre media had the oppurtunity to almost "brainwash" the jurors before they listened to the actual case.


The content of the prosecutor’s closing arguments improper the defendant because of how he reacted the trial. This brings him in a tough place because others think he is guilty. And the three witnesses saw him leaving the store.They were violated to the remarks because there could be other evidence and they still haven't found. Like the license tabs and Vang could have switched them out and could of taken a different car. Other it could have been the anoymous jury from the trial that we don't know. Yes they were so violated that they needed a new warrant because from all Vangs previous criminal records and all that he has done.The closing arugments helped influence the jury because of what the jury said about the evidence and how it was mistaken and was to weak. There could more information that can lead to different evidence from that night.Yes because Vang was exercising not to take the stand at the trial. Because of the evidence and all his previous criminal records. And how the defense witness was there when the whole thing happened so he knew what actually happened.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion Timothy Vang may be guilty or innocent. But the prosecutor and the jurys believe that he is guilty. With all of this information and evidence, three witnesses even saw Vang coming out of the Store that evening. Even though Vang had a alibi and that was with his girlfriend in Chicago that evening but that doesn't prove anything. Because of his licence tabs and that he was drunk that evening also. Lastly with all of his previous criminal records. When he decided not to testify there was a hit and run and someone was serious injured. It was possibly that was the anoymous jury because he wanted to keep everyone safe and secure due to the media.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Lily Willett, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Miranda Peterson, Lakeville


State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 19995)State v. McKenzieState v. SalitrosState v. BohlsenState v. VanWagnerUnited States Constitution, Amendments V, VI, and XIVMinnesota Constitution, Article I, & 6


Vang was charged with murder on the account that both he and his car were identifid by multiple witnesses.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Jan. 9th, 2006 a clerk at a convience store was shot and killed during a robbery.Three wittnesses in two cars heard the gun shots and saw someone who looked like Timothy Vang walk out and drive away.Timothy Vang was arrested when he was stopped for speeding and expired tabs. He was arrested for unlawful possession of a fire arm given that there was a gun in the front seat when he was pulled over.The gun did not match the murder weapon. He was already on probation for unlawful posession of a firearm.Vang already had a criminal record.Three wittness all identified him as the man who left after the robbery.Vang was charged with murder.


Anonymous joury was issued.Joury may be anonymous to protect the jourers.


Fact and law must be used.Joury may have been improperly influenced.

CONCLUSION

Vang was convicted of murder and the Trial Court charged him. The appeal is over whether or not Vangs right to an impartial joury was violated and if the prosecutors arguements were innapropriate in their closing summation.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Cullen White, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Gabriel Stanley


Table of Authorities: State v. McKenzie State v. Bowles


Legal Issues:1) Whether the use of an anonymous jury violated Vang’s fundamental right to a trial by impartial jury?2) Whether the prosecutor’s closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Timothy Vang was arrested and charged with the murder of a convenience store clerk. He already had an extensive criminal record that included a charge for attempting to interfere with a jury member on a murder trial. Do to this as well as the media attention that this case attracted and Vang’s gang affiliations the trial court elected to empanel an anonymous jury. This is where the names of the member of the jury are not released in order to protect the impartiality of the jury. Both sides of the trial were given voir dire in order to ensure the impartiality of the jury. Vang also admitted to having no evidence of any jury member having a bias because of the jury’s anonymity.


The use of an anonymous jury didn’t violate Vang’s right to a trial by jury as stated in both the United States and the Minnesota state Constitutions. When deciding on the use of an anonymous jury the court must conclude that a strong reason exists for its use and the court must take steps to maintain the impartiality of the jury, as stated in State v. McKenzie. As in this case the defendant had gang affiliations, which are cited as one of the reasons for an anonymous jury. In McKenzie the court upheld the lower court's decision for the use on an anonymous jury because of this could affect the impartiality of the jury. Vang’s charge for attempting to interfere with the impartiality of a previous jury points towards the use of an anonymous jury to prevent further tampering. Furthermore the amount of media attention on this case is a factor that could affect the impartiality of the jury. Having then decided that a the use of an anonymous jury was necessary the court then has to take steps to see that the use of anonymity doesn’t interfere with the impartiality of the jury. The court in Vang’s case, like the court in McKenzie, accomplished this by allowing both side to participate in voir dire with the jury pool as well as instructing the jury to focus upon the evidence and the laws in the case. The case of State v Bowles states that when dealing with infringements on impartiality “the first question is whether ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play”’ and because even the defendant himself said that there was no evidence that the jury was impartial due to their anonymity there are no impermissible factors that would require a new trial. Due to the similarities in these cases, the precedent would stand, that an anonymous jury doesn’t violate the defendant's rights to an impartial jury as stated the Constitution.


The closing remarks of the prosecutor were not so improper as to require new trial. The remarks made would have no affect on the outcome of the trial based on the evidence that was provided in the trial, which strongly suggests that Vang was indeed guilty. The court has in place already a system of preventing improper behavior in the objection system. Had these remarks been so improper to require a new trial the defense counsel had the ability to object to such remarks and could have objected to them if it was deemed to be

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

improperly influencing the jury.

CONCLUSION

In the case of Timothy Vang there was the use of an anonymous jury that didn’t in anyway affect the impartiality of the jury as Vang claimed. This is based off of the precedents of State v. McKenzie and State v. Bowles in which their use of an anonymous jury was upheld. This was based on two factors a reason of its use and the proper steps needed to be taken in order to prevent the jury from not becoming biased due to their anonymity. In Vang’s case there was gang involvement, a previous threat to a jury, and a large amount of media attention that lead to the empaneling of an anonymous jury. The lower court also took the proper steps to keep impartiality through voir dire. The closing remarks were not so improper as to warrant a new trial because of the already in place system of objects that are prevent such actions from occurring. Vang;s right to impartial trial was not infringed upon by the use of an anonymous jury and the remarks of the prosecutor were not so improper as to require a new trial.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang. v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Joel Atella, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Ryan Swanson, Duluth


State v. McKenzie 1995State v. Bowles 1995State v. Salitros 1993State v. Bohlson 1994State v. VanWagner 1993United States ConstitutionABA Standards for Criminal Justice


Issue #1: Anonymous Jury: Mr. Vang claimed that by empaneling an anonymous jury, the trial courts robbed him of his sixth amendement right to an impartial jury and that the decision also violated his right to presumption of innocence.Issue #2: Closing Arguments: There was also some speculation as to whether or not the prosecutor's closing arguments were proper; the questions he posed for the jurors may also have potentially taken away Mr. Vang's right to an impartial jury.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Around 2AM on Jan. 9th 2006 a convenience store clerk was killed during a robbery. A man with a description matching the defendant Timothy Vang was then seen fleeing the scene of the crime by three individuals. Timothy Vang was then arrested three days later for illegal possession of a firearm which could not be directly traced to the murder. Vang’s previous criminal record included theft, check forgery, possession and dealing, assault on an off-duty police officer, and a charge for attempting to tamper with a witness in a trial against his brother. After being identified by witnesses, and failing to produce an alibi for his whereabouts at the time of the incident, Vang was charged with murder . One of the individuals that identified Vang was injured in a hit-and-run incident while Vang was in custody. After a series of testimonies from witnesses, including a prisoner who described Vang on the night of the murder, the trial chose to empanel an anonymous jury. The decision was based on concerns over public interest and the defendant's past gang involvement. The trial court was instructed not to release the names of the jury members, and Vang was given extensive opportunity to examine potential jurors before the session began. Vang exercised his right to not testify at his trial and after a series of weak testimonies by the defense, the prosecutor made numerous statements during the closing arguments that asked the jury to consider their responsibility, the feelings of the victim’s family, and that the evidence provided by the state was essentially indisputable.


If the jury had not been anonymous, the lower court did not properly apply precedents in permitting the anonymous jury because there were safety concerns about the juror’s wellbeing. In State V Mackenzie 1995, the court ruled that an anonymous jury did not violate the appellant's constitutional rights to an impartial jury because of the large media coverage of the case. Media attraction could have caused exposure of jury members personal information leaving details about them that could threaten their personal lives. It is a known fact that Vang had previous gang associations, whether or not he still did is irrelevant because gangs are notorious for seeking revenge on witnesses. Vang claimed an anonymous jury deprived him of the presumption of innocence, but extra measures were taken to assure the jury was impartial. During voir dire, Vang had an extensive opportunity to examine potential jurors. Also Vang admits on appeal that none of the jurors gained a sense of personal danger or any presumptions that Vang was guilty. Also the jury was explicitly instructed not to base any of their decisions on this procedure but to only base them on the presented evidence and applicable law.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

Because of these extra measures the trial court did not violate Vang’s right to an impartial jury.


The statements by the prosecutor did not jeopardize the presumption of innocence, and as seen in the case State v. Bohlson 1994 do not warrant a new trial. The prosecutors closing statements maintained the presumption of innocence while speaking that manages to assume the defendant's guilt. In this way Vang’s rights were not violated as the prosecutor did not influence the jury in a way that could make them impartial. The closing arguments made by the prosecutor did not influence the emotions of the jury, but merely advised them to uphold the law. Based on the procedures observed in the precedent cases, the court has supervisory powers over the attorneys and the conduct of both groups.

CONCLUSION

Because of the dangers involved with the media knowing the names of the jurors, and the fact that Vang was given an extensive period of time to examine potential jurors before the case, a jury that was anonymous to the public did not violate Vang’s sixth amendment rights. The statements made by the prosecutor did not jeopardize the defendant's presumption of innocence and simply advised the jury on their duty to uphold the law.For these reasons we ask that the decision of the lower courts be affirmed.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

12th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang vs. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Hans Arvidson-hicks, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Cris Larson


State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1993)State v. Bohlsen, 526 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 1994)State v. VanWagner, 504 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 1993)United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI, and XIVMinnesota Constitution, Article I, § 6


(1) Whether the use of an anonymous jury violated Vang’s fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury?(2) Whether the prosecutor's closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At two a.m. on January 9, 2006 as store clerk was shot during a robbery of a convenience store in Saint Paul. Three witnesses saw the events and the gunman leave the store.Timothy Vang was arrested a week later for speeding, expired license tabs, and an unlawful firearm. He matched the description of the gunman, and was identified by the witnesses. Vang claimed he was in Chicago and could not remember where he had been the time of the murder.At the trial, two of the three original witnesses testified against Vang along with Vang’s fellow inmate who claimed Vang admitted to being in the Twin Cities at the time of the murder. It was a plea bargain deal. The third original witness was injured by a car. The jury for the case was made anonymous in order to protect the jury from the perceived threat. Vang chose to forego testifying at trial but his girlfriend testified he had been arguing with her at the time of the murder. The prosecuting lawyer encouraged the jury to convict Vang on the premise of “cleaning up the streets.” He stated the importance of protecting the innocent are more important in the constitution than protecting the guilty.


A variety of things are wrong with the previous decision on this case. The incident involving one of the witness and a runaway automobile was not shown to have any relation to the case itself, what so ever. The jury had not received any threats and nothing showed them to be in harm's way, by making an anonymous jury it gave the jurors the preconceived prejudice that Vang was dangerous and therefore guilty. This destroyed integrity of the idea that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. This directly affected the outcome of the case in favor of the prosecution before a single word was uttered in that courtroom. The Jurors did make a different decision because they felt like they were in danger due to the jury being an anonymous jury. Our client knows that the anonymous jury deprived him of a fair trial, breaking the precedent innocent till proven guilty.


The prosecutor's arguments were way out of line in multiple respects. First the prosecutor put pressure up the jurors beyond the trial itself through his use of the phrase “it’s your responsibility.” This undoubtedly caused the jurors to take into account underly societal and social problems that afflict the US today. This puts upon the pressure of a nation's amount of murders and robberies upon Vang when the case is really only about if he is guilty or not. It caused the jurors to look at it as if Vang was responsible for all of society's problems and that is just not true and not fair to Vang. Secondly and most importantly he asked the jurors the disregard Vang’s constitutional right

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

when deciding their verdict in the trial. A verdict had not been handed down at the point the closing argument had been stated, so the prosecution was essentially asking the jurors to disregard the fundamental belief and cornerstone of our legal system that people are innocent until proven guilty. Asking the jury to convict with disregard to his constitutional rights would essentially be like saying that Adolf Hitler was a good guy because we can just disregard Jewish people's constitutional right of the freedom of religion.

CONCLUSION

Both the pretrial motion of an anonymous jury and the closing statement that asked the jurors to disregard constitution where in harm of Vang's constitutional rights, obviously. The idea that Vang should be committed for public good is beside the point. The focus of the case should be on proving Vang’s guilt, not painting him as the mascot of all of society's problems and having the jurors believe that their very lives are at risk by association with Vang. It was an unfair and unconstitutional.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Alanna Post, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Megan Hannasch, Lakeville


State v. Salitros 499 N.W.2d 815 (1993) United States Constitution, Amendments VI, VIXUnited States v Pacciona, 949, F2d 1183 (2d cir1991)State V. Bauer, 1989 Minn. 280, 284, 249 N.W. 40, 42. (1933 366.N.W. 2d at 109


1)The use of an anonymous jury with out merit denied Timothy Vang the right to a fair trial due to the loss of presumption of inocence. 2) The Prosecutors closing aurguements were so improper as to call for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On January 9th 2006 in the City of South St. Paul a convienence store was robbed. The store clerk was shot and killed in the robbery. Three individuals saw a male leave the store they later identified in a line up as Timothy Vang. Vang did not remember if he was in Chicago that day or the day after the robbery. A police officer stopped Vang for a traffic stop and saw a gun in plane site. Vang was arrested and balistacs were ran on the gun. The gun was not used in robbery. Vang was involved in gangs 18 months prior. He was on probation for a 1996 conviction of a fire arm. Defendant was arrested for the robbery and murder. The defendant had been charged but not convicted of witness tampering 4 years earlier. A witness in this case was hit by a vehicle that left the scene. The defendant was in jail at the time. Defendant was tried and convicted for the robbery and murder.


Proscecution did not provide clear and recent proof that Defendant was a danger to the jury. Client was not affiliated with organized crime and had no involvment in gangs for 18 months. Client was never convicted of witness tampering in a case 4 years prior. Client was in jail at the time of accident involving a witness. The prosecution must meet two part test to have an anonyomous jury impaneled 1) a strong reason to believe that the jury needs protection, and 2) taking reasonalbe precautions to minimize and prejudicial effects on the defndant. It is our argument before the court that the prosecution did not satisy part 1. United States v Pacciona, 949, F2d 1183 (2d cir1991)

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647


It is before the court that the closing arguments by the prosecution in State v. Vang were so improper as to warrant a new trial on the basis of a violation of defendants write to due process of the law, and equal protection, and right to a impartial jury. The state in its closing arguements concluded not only did the defendent have a "responsibilty" to pay for his actions but the jury had a "responsibility" to help the the prosecutor clean the streets of their city. It is not the jurys role to enforce the law, Prosecutors arguement was outside of the directions to the jury to focus on the evidence to determine innocence or guilt. The prosecutors statements inflame the jury unresonably. The State also misinterprets the Constitution of the United States as to protect only the innocent but not designed to protect the guilty. In State v Salitros the justice remind the court that the "trial courts and prosecutors not to site the constitutional rights such as the presumption of innocence are only for the benefit of the innocent and not to shield the guilty. State V. Bauer, 1989 Minn. 280, 284, 249 N.W. 40, 42. (1933) In Statev. Salitros The court ruled that the prosecution warned against making arguements such as in State. V. Vang that a case is weak, with out evidence to support.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion Defendant Vang was denied his Contsitutional Amendments to a fair trial and due process and therefore the Court should rule for a new trial.

48495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang vs. The State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Saleh Saleh, Higher GroundAUTHOR #2: Abdullahi,Abdikhaliq Mohamed


Timothy Vang vs. The State of MinnesotaMN Staute Supreme Court 480


The legal issues are: Whether the use of an anonymous jury violated Vang’s fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury? Whether the prosecutor's closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

- Vang has a lengthy criminal record for theft and property crimes, including check forgery and drug dealing he was an active member of a gang several years ago he and his car generally matched the description of the murderer was unsure where he was at the time of the murder


The anonymous jury was the best choice for someone with major criminal history. But legally the Appellant had to know or approve of that, but neither was done. The use of an anonymous jury is not an inherently prejudicial practice, because it was not justified.Vangs rights were somewhat violated.


The prosecutor's closing statement was proper it stated the faults of the Appellant. Vang's were not violated enough for a new trial, the man is a prime suspect for a murder and major previous criminal activities. The closing argument of the jury was mis-influenced it was taken in the wrong way.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the State of Minnesota violated minor rights of Timothy Vang. Vang is a prime suspect of a convenience store murder, and also has a horrific criminal record.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang vs. The State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Abdikhaliq Mohamed, Higher GroundAUTHOR #2: Saleh Saleh,Abdullahi Ali


Timothy Vang vs. The State of MinnesotaMN Staute Supreme Court 480


The legal issues are: Whether the use of an anonymous jury violated Vang’s fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury? Whether the prosecutor's closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

- Vang has a lengthy criminal record for theft and property crimes, including check forgery and drug dealing he was an active member of a gang several years ago he and his car generally matched the description of the murderer was unsure where he was at the time of the murder


The anonymous jury was the best choice for someone with major criminal history. But legally the Appellant had to know or approve of that, but neither was done. The use of an anonymous jury is not an inherently prejudicial practice, because it was not justified.Vangs rights were somewhat violated.


The prosecutor's closing statement was proper it stated the faults of the Appellant. Vang's were not violated enough for a new trial, the man is a prime suspect for a murder and major previous criminal activities. The closing argument of the jury was mis-influenced it was taken in the wrong way.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the State of Minnesota violated minor rights of Timothy Vang. Vang is a prime suspect of a convenience store murder, and also has a horrific criminal record.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Jess Peterson, DuluthAUTHOR #2: Ryley Graham, Duluth


State v. Bowles (MN 1995) State v. McKenzie (MN 1995) State v. Salitros (MN 1993) State v. Bohlsen (MN 1994) State v. VanWagner (MN 1993) The right to a trial by an impartial jury The right to a fair trial applies to everyone


Issue #1: Whether the use of an anonymous jury violated Vang's fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury. The trial court ruled that this did not violate Vang's fundamental rights. Issue #2: Whether the prosecutor's closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had a proper closing argument.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Timothy Vang was arrested for the murder of a convenience store clerk in January 2006. Vang has a lengthy criminal record for theft and property crimes, including check forgery and drug dealing. He was once charged for attempting to tamper with a witness in a murder trial against his brother four years ago. Three witnesses identified Vang as the man they saw leaving the store the night of the murder. One of the witnesses was seriously injured in a hit and run car accident two weeks after Vang's arrest. At the trial, one of Vang's jail-mates testified that Vang had told him that he was drinking in St. Paul the night of the murder. The trial court chose to empanel an anonymous jury, citing concerns over the public's interest in the trial.


The trial court instructed the jury that their names were not released so as to avoid any members of the media or anyone else bothering them. Vang had an extensive oppurtunity to examine potential jurors and admitted that there was no direct evidence that any jurors concluded from their anonymity that they were in danger or that Vang was guilty.


The prosecutor is permitted to argue about the evidence presented and to urge jurors to accept or reject the evidence and the inferences that might be drawn from it. It is also permitted for the prosecutor to argue that the jury should reject testimony of the defense witnesses. It is also permitted to point out problems with the theories of the defense. If the defense found that the prosecutor's comments were so inappropriate as to influence the decision of the jurors, they could have declared a mistrial.

CONCLUSION

Due to the evidence presented, it is clear that Vang should not be able to overturn his case. The anonymous jury does not imply that the defendant is guilty, it is merely a precautionary measure to protect the jurors from harm due to the attention created by the media. Also, if there was objectionable material stated in the prosecutor's closing argument, the duty is placed upon the defense attorney to rectify the matter and clear it up for the jurors.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

11th Grade -- Supreme CourtSUPREME COURT CASE BRIEF: S - 4CASE NAME: Timothy Vang v. State of MinnesotaAUTHOR #1: Monica Toussaint, LakevilleAUTHOR #2: Payton Camilli, Lakeville


State v. Bowles, State v. McKenzie, State v. Salitros, State v. Bohlsen, State v. VanWagner, United States Constition Amendments V, VI,


Weather the use of an anonymus jury violated Vang's fundamental right to a trial by an impartial jury?Weather the prosecutors closing arguments were so improper as to require a new trial?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Witnesses' discriptions of the murder and the car match Vang's vehicle. Vang was arrested for unlawful possesion of a gun. Vang was on probation from 1996 for unlawful possesion of a firearm, once again. Vang has a long criminal record. When he was asked where he was the day of the crime he first said he was in Chicago and then later contridicted himself and couldn't remember.


An anonymous jury is still impartial; they are just random people who are protected from the pressures of the media and potentially being harmed by the convicted.They were right in implementing an anonymous jury due to Vangs history in trying to tamper with people involved in hia brothers court case.An anonymous jury is in a way predisposed to the assumption that the convicted is violent that they could be harmed if the convicti knew who they were.


In the prosecuter's closing arguements, he generalized the occurances and facts of the case, which lead the jury to make wrong assumptions about the facts of the case. He also states his feels which are based off of opinions. This deems his closing statement improper and is a base for mistrial. The prosecuter's closing statement is nothing out of the ordinary and he uses the facts already proven to be true in the trial.To deem it improper would bring multiple other court cases into question.

CONCLUSION

Vang should recieve another trial on basis that he was withheld the right of an impartial jury and the defense's closing statement was improper due to the use of opinion.For Vang to recieve a new trial would be a waist considering an anonymous trial does not subject him to an impartial jury.

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647

2016 model assembly supreme court documents

Documents