THEFUTUREOF20MILLIONPEOPLEINTHESIXWESTERNBALKANSTATES.AKEYQUESTIONFOREUROPE’SGEOPOLITICALFUTUREChristophZöpelSpecialAdvisertoPESPresidentonCentralandEasternEuropeTheEuropeanUnionhasanobviousinterestinthewealthand stability of the six Western Balkan states. Yet, thesituationinthesecountriesisgrowingintoathreatfortheEU. In this paper, the author proposes to replace thedenomination Western Balkan states with states of theEastern Adria, as the former has acquired a negativemeaning,whileEasternAdriawillunderlinetheEuropeandimension of the six states’ integration. The article willalso assess the reasons why the WB6 are crucial forEurope, the state of negotiations and obstacles toaccession,aswellasthereasonswhytheEU’straditionallybureaucratic-paternalistic approach to this region cannotbesuccessful.

FEPSMARCH 2018

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1.The“Balkandeadend”Theprevailingpoliticaland journalisticdebateabout thegeopolitical futureofAlbania,BosniaandHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia (FYR), Montenegro and Serbia has come to a dead end: thesituationinthosesixstatesisgrowingintoathreatfortheEuropeanUnion,however,becauseofthis same situation, they cannot become members of the European Union for the foreseeablefuture.Atthesametime,expertobserversaresettingthetoneofthisdramaticdebateandcanonlyhope “to publish their reports in the papers, be consulted as experts, receive support asrepresentatives of NGOs and not to be regarded as “abandoned” diplomats” – as Andreas Ernst,South Eastern Europe correspondent of the Neue Züricher Zeitung,1 puts it. It is also thisopportunisticdramatisationthatbarswaysoutofthedeadend.However,twofundamentalbarriersarethe“destructive”historical-politicalviewonthe“WesternBalkans”andtheEU’sbureaucratic-paternalisticenlargementpolicy.Bothare“scientifically”supported,thefirstbynationalhistoryandthe second by comparing facts about member and applicant states while ignoring spatial andtemporalconditions.

1.1The“destructive”historical-politicalviewonthe“WesternBalkans”

Theterm“BalkanPeninsula” is thestartingpointofquestionable“madeup”historical identitiesofthe Balkan states. It was coined in 1808 by the German geographer Johann August Zeune. HefollowedtheideaofancientgeographersaccordingtowhichtheBalkanMountainsstretchovertheentireSouthEasternEuropeanareafromtheSlovenianAlpsdowntotheBlackSeaandwerejustassignificant for the whole region as the Apennines for the Italian Peninsula. The term “BalkanPeninsula”ismetwithjustifiedcriticismsincethisassumptionhasbeenproventobeuntenable.Asearly as 1893, another geographer, Theobald Fischer, suggested calling the region “South EasternEuropean peninsula” which we abide by in this paper. Those states in the west of the peninsularemaining outside the EU, afterGreece joined in 1981, Slovenia in 2004, Romania andBulgaria in2007andCroatia in 2013,mayalsobe referred to as“Statesof theeasternAdria” togetherwithSloveniaandCroatia.

Thequestionableterm“BalkanPeninsula”isleadingtothe“Balkannarratives”–suchas“thepowderkeg of Europe”, “Balkans going to the bad”, “Balkans – the most dangerous of Europe’s troublespots”,“TheBalkansareahighlyexplosiveregion”,“Balkans:hotbedofbadnewsaboutcorruptionandorganizedcrime”,or“TheBalkans–inefficientstatehoodinafragmentedregion”.

Marie-JanineCalic2developedanextensivebasistoovercomethis“destructive”narrativebyputtingSouth-EasternEuropeinaworld-historicalcontext.Twoturningpointsinhistoryhavelefttheregionpermanentlydevalued:withthecentreoftheworldeconomyshiftingfromtheMediterraneantotheAtlantic area during the Age of Enlightenment, South-Eastern Europe was marginalised on the“WesternEuropeanmentalmap”andconsidered“peripheral,backwardandculturallyinferior”;the

1A.Ernst,Echoraum,NichtPulverfass,inJugoslawien=inPolitikundZeitgeschichte,40-41,2October2017.MichaelSchmunkoffersaveryrealisticanalysisofdiplomaticactivitiesinSouthEasternEurope:TheWesternBalkans´EU-perspectiveinanEraofNewChallengesandNewUncertainties–ExternalGameChangeofanAgonizingAccessionProcess,inSüdosteuropaMitteilungen,04-05/2017,p.27-39.2M-J.Calic,Südosteuropa.WeltgeschichteeinerRegion,Munich2016.

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breakup of the region’s empires since the end of the 19th century set off the fragmentation ofstatehood.

Calicshowshow“worldempires”arehistoricallyresponsibleforthe“badnews”aboutSouth-EasternEurope where they waged their conflicts and exploited the region’s people and resources. Herhistoricalviewgoesbeyondnarrownationalhistory.Trans-local,regionalandnationaltrade-offsareconsideredepisodesofglobalhistory.Thisway,regionalculturesandidentitiescanbeunderstoodas“constructs”oftheirtimeandmaybeusedina“destructive“mannertothepresentday.

The first sentence of the book “Am Anfang war Alexander der Große“ [“In the beginning wasAlexandertheGreat”-translator’snote]iscurrentlyleadingtoanamingdisputebetweenGreeceandpost-YugoslavianMacedonia. Historic documentation indicates that these countries have a Greco-Romanculturalheritage.AndcontemporaryhistoryshowshowlittlethesestatescanuseitfortheirEuropean integration. Those three prove the questionable condescendence of western EuropeanstatestowardsSouth-EasternEurope,despitepre-ChristianandChristianRomebeingaconstitutingelementoftheEU.TheChristianEU-narrativeespeciallyisbeingnarroweddowntoWesternEuropeandhistoricallydistortedasSouth-EasternEuropewasChristianisedcenturiesbeforeNorthWesternEurope.AfterthedivisionoftheRomanEmpirein395,SouthEasternEuropewasruledbyByzantiumevenduringthosecenturieswhenRomehadlostallpoliticalpower.Hence,aftertheyear800,SouthEastern Europe did not become part of the Carolingian Holy Roman Empire, the Franco-Germannarrative bracket of the EU. Following the schism of 1054 between the Catholic and EasternOrthodox churches, Byzantium used its religion for imperial rule too. Slavs had beenmigrating toSouth Eastern Europe since the 6th century where they were Christianised from Byzantium. Thus,theywereinvolvedinthecontinent’spower-politicalandreligiousdivision.HeinrichAugustWinkler3attributes a European “primordial difference“ since theMiddleAges to the schismbetweenRomeand Byzantium. According to him, the separation of powers between divine and human law –founded in the Concordat of Worms of 1122 for the “west” – did not happen in the sphere ofinfluence of the Byzantine Church, which forWinkler explains the “non-western” development ofeastern and South Eastern Europe to this day. This historical-political thesis is very influential inEuropean politics. However, it is fatal for Europe’s geopolitical perspectives. European integrationcanhardly accept thathistorical religiousdifferencesare turned into fundamentalismbut requirestheir abolition – just like the Peace ofWestphalia did for the political interaction of Catholic andProtestantstatesin1648.

Moreover,Winkler‘s“innerChristian”primordialdifferenceisignoringthecomplexandevenbeyond1999war-relevant difference between Christianity and Islam in south-eastern Europe that can beattributed to the Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine Empire, culminating in the conquest ofByzantiumin1453.Bothdifferencestogether,aspartofacorrespondingindoctrinationonthepartof the EU, make it easier for Turkey and wealthy Arabic states to influence those parts of thepopulationthatwereIslamisedbytheOttomans.

Sincethe14thcentury, IslamicdominancepushedtheChristianoneasideandtheOttomanEmpireusedthisforimperialpurposes.Bywayofcomparison,itsreignwas,despiteallcruelclaimstopowerandexploitations,multicultural.

The Ottoman Empire was one of the two adversaries in the global conflict between Europe’sdominatingempiressincetheendoftheMiddleAges,Habsburgtheotherone.WhiletheOttomanEmpirewasorientedtowardstheeast,HabsburgwasorientedtowardsthewestasfarasAmerica,3H.A.Winkler,ZerbrichtderWesten?ÜberdiegegenwärtigeKriseinEuropaundinAmerika,FrankfurtamMain2017.

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which marks the beginning of the modern age. There, England and France became new imperialadversaries.

The West, North America and France experienced democratic revolutions at the end of the 18thcenturyrelatedtotheEnlightenmentandthearticulationofhumanrights.TheyfreedSouthEasternEurope fromtheOttomanEmpireandbroughtaboutnationaleffortswhichwere thebeginningofconflictslastingtothisday;theyarelinkedtomade-upethnic-culturalhistorical-politicalperceptions.

It is of global political significance that the creation of small national states is competing withimperial or “nationalism of great powers” in the 19th and 21st centuries. The imperial interests ofHabsburg, the “nationalpowers”of EnglandandFranceaswell asRussia –on cultural groundsofSlavicunity–andtheDeutscheReichafter1871allstirredupthe“smallnations” inSouthEasternEuropeagainstoneanother.Theirantagonismsresulted intheBalkanWars in1912-13andledthe“greatnations”intotwoworldwars.Thosewarsweremarkedbydistressingatrocities–alsoagainstcivilians – committed by the warring South Eastern Europeans among themselves and by theinterveninggreatpowers,especiallyHabsburgduringWorldWar IandNaziGermanyduringWorldWarII.Thesufferinginflicteduponmillionsbecameareferenceforthecreationofethnicidentitiesthatconsiderbearersofotheridentitiesasenemies.4

Efforts to develop democratic statehood in South Eastern Europe between World War I and IIremainedunsuccessfulalsobecausetheGerman-Italianfascismpreventeditfromhappening.After1945, South Eastern Europe was politically divided following an agreement between Stalin andChurchill and the region became –with the exception of Greece – communist. Soon, this divisionbecameapartofthegloballyimperialisticandideologicaldualismbetweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates.

Earlyon,theSouthEasternEuropeanstatesattemptedtofreethemselvesfromtheirdependenceontheSovietworldpower,whichwasespecially true forYugoslavia,withTitoplayingamajor roleasleader of the non-alignedmovement; it was tragically-exotically true for Albania; and totalitarian-chauvinisticallytrueforRomaniaunderCeaușescu.Fromaculturalandlinguisticpointofview,theseattemptsweremadebySlavic-speakingpeoples,anAlbanianandaLatin speakingpeople.Currentdistinctions between a real or pretended “pro-western“ and “pro-Russian orientation“ of easternEuropeanstatescanhencenotgenerallybejustifiedwithcommonSlavicgrounds.

In the beginning, the building of communist statehood led to strong economic growth that wenthand in hand with a technological and economic transition from an agricultural to an industrialeconomyanda lastingurbanisation.Thecommunists’powerand integratedstatehooddeclinedasthe communist states in South Eastern Europe were no longer able to solve their crises mainlycausedbytheirfinancialintegrationintheworldeconomyandexternaldeficitssincetheearly1980s.ThewarsindecliningYugoslaviaturnedintoaglobalcrisisthatchangedtheworldorder:newglobalpolitical instruments were created such as the International Criminal Court or the UN’s“responsibility to protect”. The globality of the crisis in South Eastern Europe gives reason to fearthatunsolvedconflictsbetweenandwithinthesixstatesontheeasternshoresof theAdriaticSeacouldhaveglobalconsequenceswith“greatnational“statesasplayersanddisagreeingEUmemberstatesbeingaffected.

In Calic’s view, South Eastern Europe should develop from a scene of world history into a regionequally respected for human rights by building democratic states, overcoming nationalisticfragmentationandEuropean integration.Thiswouldhavetobeacceptedbycurrentworldpowers

4A.Micic,Derbosnisch-herzogowinischeNachkrieg,inJugoslawien=inPolitikundZeitgeschichte,40-41,2October2017.

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andEUmemberstatesalike.Still, theUSandRussia like to interfere insmall states,also insouth-easternEurope,Chinaentered thepicture in the21st centuryandsocould India, soon theworld’smostpopulousnation.

This is prompting thequestionof European geopolitical actions.Whether the sixWesternBalkansstates–ornowabbreviatedas“WB6“–belongtoEurope isanonsensicalquestion.Nobodywouldcontestthisfromageographicpointofviewandhistorically,theyalreadydidbelongtoEuropewhentheNorthofScandinaviaorGreatBritainhadnotevenenteredhistoryyet.However,thisquestionislinkedtotheEU’sself-image,articulatedtimeandagain, that itwassynonymouswithEurope.Butthis is“Eurocratic“hubrissometimesalliedwithwesternEuropean“national-provincial“arrogance.Naturally, Europe’s cultural and identity-related “self-image“ – also for the EU – has to apply theGreco-Roman and Christian historic narratives to all states in South Eastern Europe as well. Thisincludes overcoming inner-Christian conflicts progressively and thus being able to handle conflictswiththeothermonotheisticreligions–IslamandJudaism–accordingly.

International politically-integrated territory for operations is rarely determined on historical orculturalgroundsbutbytheefficiencyofpoliticalinstitutionsactingwithinitandtheirpower-politicaldimensions.This is also true for theEUand itsenlargementpolicywhichwasand still is aboveallguidedby its capacity for action and economic power forwhich historic referencesmay either bewelcomeorneglected.ThismakestheEU’srelationswiththeWB6power-politicallyrelevantontheircommon continent. By taking a deeper look into their common history, it is easier to assess theintegrationof20millionpeople inSouthEasternEuropewhilereflectingthepresent.Apermanenttopicforthepast20yearsandcomingwithsloganssuchasEuro-politicallethargyandenlargementfatigue,theEUisfailinginthisduty.

1.2 The bureaucratic-paternalistic enlargement strategy oftheEU

As is known, the EU has European legal relations with the South Eastern European states with aprospectof EUmembership.5 TheEUopenedaccessionnegotiationswithSerbiaandMontenegro,Albania andMacedonia (FYR) received candidate status, stabilisation and association agreementsexistwithBosnia andHerzegovinaandKosovo.On thisbasis, theEUhas the right to assess thesestates’“accessionmaturity”andhasbeendoingsoregularlyforyears.

These“maturityassessments”arelinkedtothe“regattaprinciple”.Bycompetingagainsteachother,these states are supposed to achieve maturity. The regatta principle can be considered as aEurocratic-arrogantapproach;“strictandpaternal”accordingtotheEUCommission:“Nowyoustartrunning, let’s seewhowinsandmaybe rewarded”.However, the regattaprinciple isabsurd since“immaturity“ isalsodue tomissingcooperationbetween theconcernedstatesand lies inbilateralproblems.TheEU isdoing itsbest tohelpsolvesuchproblems–prior toorbeforeconcludingtheaccession negotiations. By doing so, the EU is, however, partly responsible for this “immaturity”.Hencearisesthequestionwhethertheunderlyinglogicofpoliticalintegrationdoesn’trequiresolvingsuchbilateralproblemsinthecourseofaccessionnegotiations.

5 A possible membership is regulated by article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union of 9 May 2008; Associationagreementstandardisedarticle217oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)9May2008.

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This is especially true for the relationsbetweenKosovoandSerbiaand ingeneral for theSerbian-Albanian relationships.Kosovo’s independence is the resultofhow theSerbiangovernmentunderthewarcriminalMilosevic treatedAlbanians living there inadictatorialanddiscriminatorywayaswell as the successful intervention of NATO according to its idea of a “Responsibility to Protect”underinternationallaw.Subsequently,furtherintegrationoftheKosovarAlbaniansintotheSerbianstateprovedtobeimpossible.In1999,KosovowasputunderinterimadministrationoftheUN6untilbecomingasovereignstatein2008.Itwasthereforenon-autonomousandpartlystill isafter2008.Since June1999, authority in Kosovo is exercisedby theUnitedNationsAdministrationMission inKosovo(UNMIK),ledbyaspecialemissaryoftheUNGeneralSecretary;aswellas,sinceJuly1999,bytheOSCEMission in Kosovo, and, since 2008, the EuropeanUnion Rule of LawMission in Kosovo(EULEX). UNMIK is quarterly grading the development, last on 31st October 2017.7 In addition,embassies intervene almost daily, especially the US American embassy. This causes a dividedconsciousnessabout“international”politics.Albaniansarestrivingfornationalindependenceinthe19th century tradition,when EuropeanGreat Powerswith the involvement of Russia accepted thecreation of national states after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.8 The goal is stability; KosovarpoliticianswhotookresponsibilityfortheirstateduringthewarofindependenceagainstSerbiaaretryingtomeetthisgoalalsobecausetheyarehopingtoberewardedwithretentionofpowerandprotectedagainstprosecutionbyinternationaljustice–afterallitishardtoimaginewarwithoutwarcrimes.This is contradictory to theEuropeanpoliticalunderstandingofa younggenerationwho isembracingfreemobilityandawelfarestateguaranteedbydemocracy.

Thisdividedconsciousnessof“international”politicsinKosovoiscausingtheEUtohaveacredibilitycrisis between its documented claims of democracy and rule of law on the one hand and theconcreteactionsofambassadorsof its largermembersstateson theother.Thiscrisis is fuelledbylimitedsuccessofitsmissions;EULEXisnotfreefromallegationsofcorruption.AGermaninchargeof energy policy at UNMIK was arrested for illicit enrichment in the millions. Growing “national”claimsoftheKosovaroppositionbecomeunderstandableversus“national”claimsofSerbianpolitics.ForKosovoandSerbiatobecomemembersof theEU,bothstatesmusthaveequal rightswhich isnot thecase todayduetoSerbianclaimsof influenceandtonon-recognitionofKosovoby fiveEUmemberstates.

It isbecoming increasinglyclear that theproblemof thecohabitationofAlbaniansandSerbians inbothstatescanonlybesustainably solvedwithin theEU:with freedomofmovement,bordersarebecoming less important,minorityrightsturn intoEuropeanrightsandbothmakecurrentconflictsobsolete.

KosovoisalsoinconflictwithMontenegrooveraterritoryofamarginal–fromaEuropeanpointofview–8,000hectares.Generally,severalborderdisputesalsoexistintheregionwithSerbia.KosovoconsidersgivinginasaprejudiceagainstthemuchbiggerissuespersistingwithSerbia.Thefactthatthe EU is punishing people in Kosovowith visa requirements until this border dispute is resolvedshowsthatonlydiplomatsandmembersofparliamentforwhomdiplomaticpassportsareasimplerealityoflifecanhavecomeupwiththisidea.

6UNSecurityCouncilresolution1244(1999).7UnitedNationSecurityCouncil,Reportof theSecretary-GeneralontheUnited InterimAdministrationMission inKosovo(S/2017/911),31October2017.8Thosegreatpowersparticipatedinthemilitaryborderdisputes.PresidentWilsonencouragedthecreationofnewstatesaftertheendofWorldWarI,evidentlywithoutknowingthehistoricalcontext.Thisself-imageofbeingagreatpowerhasan effect on the behaviour of ambassadors – to the point of influencing the formation of governments, favouring orostracisingpoliticalparties.

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Kosovo’s dilemma has certain parallels with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Trilateral issues betweenBosnians, SerbsandCroats remainunsolved.WhileBosniansare resolutely fighting for their state,questions about the relationship with Serbia and Croatia are arising for Serbs and Croats. ThecommonstateistheresultofastructureestablishedunderinternationallawdesignedbytheUSandthe EU in Dayton. The UN and EU took over institutional roles, extensively curtailing thecompetenciesofdemocratically electedpoliticians. It comes thenasno surprise if their rhetoric isidentity-connected.Theinternationalcommunity’sfailuresarebynowagenerallydescribedprovenfact. Here, too, it is becoming increasingly clear that solutions can only be found in an EU thatincludes Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian statehood that respectsminorities. However, Croatia’s EUmembershiphasnotbroughtBosniaandHerzegovina‘sissuesanyclosertoasolutionandaborderdisputeispersistingbetweenEUmembersCroatiaandSloveniaoversovereignrightsatsea.

Comparedtothe“grading”ofindividualstates,generalproblemstheEUisclearlyinvolvedinareputasideduringthe“maturityassessments“.Nexttoitsannual“communicationoftheEU-Commissionon its enlargement strategy and most important challenges“9, the EU is also assessing criteriarephrased over the years. Currently and since 2015, these are rule of law, basic rights, economicdevelopmentaswellasfunctioningdemocraticinstitutionsand

thereformofpublicadministration.10

2.Ruleof law,basic rights, economicdevelopmentaswellas functioning of democratic institutions and reform ofpublicadministration

a)Forreasonsrootedindemocracy,theruleoflawisattheveryheartoftheconditionsformembership.Statesmust tackle justicereformsand fightorganisedcrimeandcorruption.Corruption is the most widely discussed issue with and within the WB6. There is nojournalistic article without a reference to it and, apparently, mutual accusations ofcorruption play a central part in election campaigns in these states. However, there arehardly any benchmarks applied equally to eastern and western Europe allowing for acomparableclassification.Since1995,TransparencyInternationaldrawsuptheCorruptionsPerceptionsIndex,whichindicatesperceivedlevelsofcorruptionofpoliticiansandofficials.It isdeterminedbyassessmentsby independent institutesandopinionsurveysofcountryanalysts,businesspeopleandexpertsathomeandabroad.

Ifcorrelatedwithstaterankingsofdomesticproductpercapitahowever,i.e.when“ruleoflaw“and“economicdevelopment“arecorrelated,thisrankingisthoughtprovoking.

BelowarankingofdomesticproductpercapitacalculatedinUSdollarsofthestill28EUstatesandtheWB6onthelowestranks:

9Latestcommunicationof9November2016,COM(2016)715final.10Basedonamedium-termstrategyfortheEUenlargementpolicy.

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EUmemberstatesandWB6 DomesticproductpercapitainUSdollars

1 Luxembourg 104,003

2 Ireland 69,231

3 Netherlands 51,049

4 Sweden 49,836

5 Germany 48,111

6 Austria 48,005

7 Denmark 47,985

8 Belgium 45,047

9 UK 42,481

10 France 42,314

11 Finland 42,165

12 Malta 39,834

13 Italy 36,833

14 Spain 36,416

15 Cyprus 34,970

16 CzechRepublic 33,232

17 Slovenia 32,085

18 SlovakRepublic 31,339

19 Lithuania 29,972

20 Estonia 29,313

21 Portugal 28,933

22 Poland 27,764

23 Hungary 27,482

24 Greece 26,669

25 Latvia 25,710

26 Croatia 22,795

27 Romania 22,348

28 Bulgaria 20,327

29 Montenegro 16,643

30 Macedonia,FYR 14,597

31 Serbia 14,493

32 Albania 11,840

33 BosniaandHerzegovina 10,958

34 Kosovo 9,332

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Thisrankingcanbecomparedwiththe“tabularranking”ofTransparencyInternational’s“corruptionindex”.Thelastfigureindicatesthedomesticproductpercapitarankwitharatingofthedifferencesinranksadded.

TIcorruptionindex EUmemberstatesandWB6

PercapitaGDPranking Comparison

1 Denmark 7 significantlybetter

2 Finland 11 significantlybetter

3 Sweden 4 minimallybetter

4 Netherlands 3 same

5 Germany 5 same

6 Luxembourg 1 significantlyworse

7 GreatBritain 9 marginallybetter

8 Belgium 8 same

9 Austria 6 slightlyworse

10 Ireland 2 significantlyworse

11 Estonia 20 significantlybetter

12 France 10 marginallyworse

13 Poland 22 significantlybetter

14 Portugal 21 significantlybetter

15 Slovenia 17 marginallybetter

16 Lithuania 19 marginallybetter

17 Spain 14 worse

18 Latvia 25 significantlybetter

19 Cyprus 15 worse

20 CzechRepublic 16 worse

21 Malta 12 significantlyworse

22 Slovakia 18 worse

23 Croatia 26 better

24 Hungary 23 minimallyworse

25 Romania 27 marginallybetter

26 Italy 13 significantlyworse

27 Montenegro 29 marginallybetter

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28 Greece 24 worse

29 Serbia 31 marginallybetter

30 Bulgaria 28 marginallyworse

31 Albania 32 minimallybetter

32 BosniaandH. 33 minimallybetter

33 Macedonia,FYR 30 slightlyworse

34 Kosovo 34 same

It becomes clear that corruption correlateswithpoverty, rich states areperceivedas less corrupt.Italy shows an evident negative discrepancy and yet, the well-knownmafiose structures were noobstacle for thecountry tobea foundingmemberof theEuropeanEconomicCommunity in1957.One of the questions around inner-European security is that of corruptive structures in WesternEurope linking up with those in South Eastern Europe. This concerns the fight against organisedcrime,whichshouldworkbetterwithintheEUthaninthesmall“WB6“states.

b)Anotherpartof the fightagainstcorruption in thecontextof the“ruleof law”and“functioningdemocratic institutions” as well as “economic development” is the issue of overcoming aninappropriate influence of the rich, called oligarchs in Eastern Europe. Economically meaningfulbenchmarks are missing here too. The “Bloomberg Billionaires Index”11 published by Bloomberg,ranking500billionaires,mayserveasareferencehere.ThethreerichestareallUSAmericanswitha“totalnetworth“ofover80billionUSdollarseach.ThefourthandhencerichestEU-EuropeanisaSpaniardwith78billionUSdollars.Amongthe500peoplelistedare26RussiansandoneUkrainian;however,withtwoCzechs,amongwhomANO-leaderAndrejBabis,onlytwocitizensfromallEasternEuropeanEUmemberstatesmadethelistandnoonefromtheWB6.Forthesakeofcomparison:Germanyhas36.

11BloombergBillionairesIndexasof10December2017,www.bloomberg/billonaires/.

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TheGermannewspaperWeltamSonntag12developedanoligarch indexbasedon the“BloombergBillionaires Index”definedas “wealthof the five richestpersons in a countrymatchedagainst thecountry’seconomicperformanceinpercentageterms”.Accordingtothisindex,EUmemberCyprusisleadingbyalongwaywitharesultof80.8%,thirdisSwedenwith18.7%,CzechRepublichas11.9%before Denmark with 10.7%, Russia is 10th with 6.7%, and Germany is 15th with only 3.7%. The“BloombergBillionairesIndex”providesnostatisticalbasisfortheWB6.Ofcourse,here,too,wefindrichpeopleinfluencingthepoliticaldevelopmentintheireconomicallyweakstatefortheireconomicinterests.IntheEUhowever,thiswouldbeirrelevantsincetheEuropeanmarketwouldmarginalisesuch influence, also because of these states’ low domestic product, just as EU membershiprelativisedthepeakvaluesofCyprusandtheScandinavianstatesonaEuropeanlevel.Thequestionmay be asked how differently wealth and hence political influence of individuals are assessedbetweenWesternandEasternEurope.

c) Some political and socioeconomic links must be known and weighed accordingly to assesscorruption.Oneofthoselinksstemsfromthecommunistpast.Inawell-foundedbookon“Corruptdemocratisation in the context of European integration”, Gergana Bulanova-Hristova,13 usingBulgariaasanexample, showsthatcorruption isalsoacommunist legacy.Heranalysis– thatmayalso be applied to theWB6 – is based on the observation that socialist societiesweremarked bystrongdeficitsingoods.This“impliedthedevelopmentofanalmostall-encompassingbartersystemwheregoodswerebarteredforstatusinthesenseofaccesstolimitedgoodsorservices”.Itwasnotabarterforobjectsofequalvaluebutaccesstosomethinglimitedforafavournoworinthefuture.Shecalls thisa“secondnetwork” that isdifferent fromthestructuresof thecommunistgoverningparty. This double network led to the idea that there was a second way for everything, thuscircumventingofficial rules. Strong familyorprofessional tiesofferedhelpful conditions for suchasystemof favours.With the implosionof communism, the formal centreof powerdisappearedaswellwhilethesocialstructuresremainedunchanged.“Theymaintainedtheirexistenceasanetworkofpeoplewhokneweachotherfromtheirprofessionalorsocialenvironmentandtrustedfromtheirexperience that the reciprocity of favours would inevitably be maintained. The elites of thetransformationwere recruited fromprecisely those networks, such as flexible parts of the formernomenklatura and intelligentsia who directed their political efforts at putting ‘their people’ in allareasofsociety todividethe leftoversof the formerstate’sassetsamongthemselves. ‘In thenewera’ someof theprofessionalnetworksof socialismpaved theway for theoriginsofpost-socialistorganisedcrime”.14

A crucial element of the socioeconomic transformation that is also relevant to functioningdemocraticinstitutionswasthatBulgaria’selitewasnotreplacedin1989–whichappliestotheWB6inasimilarway.Instead,theformerpoliticalleadershipsplitandonepartquicklytookovertheroleofanewelite. Itconsistedofmembersoftheformernomenklaturaandcirclesofscientists,artistsandwriters.Earlylegitimationofthenewpoliticalelites,determiningthebasiccharacteristicsofthedemocratictransformation,happenedatroundtablesorduringsimilargatherings.UnlikethePolish“roundtable”thatbroughttogethertheCommunistpartiesandanti-Communistswhohadfoughtinthe underground for years, in South Eastern Europe pro-reformers of the Communist party andalternative parties, that were created within a few weeks and whose protagonists had had a12D.Eckert,H.Zschäpitz,DiewahreListederSuperreichen,in“DieWeltamSonntag”,26November2017.13 G. Bulanova-Hristova, Von Sofia nach Brüssel. Korrupte Demokratisierung im Kontext der europäischen Integration,Baden-Baden2011,especiallyp.322ff.14Seeibidemp.323f.

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Communistpast (thougha lessprominentone), came together. Theyagreedon themainpoliticalreforms, amarket-based liberal democracy and a European orientation. Therewas no real publicdebateaboutthepathtothose“reforms“sothatnocompetitionintermsofcontentcouldcomeupbetween the parties. This meant a derogatorily perceived choice between “post-Communist“ or“anti-Communist“ governments in theWestern European view. Bothwayswere to blame for theinitially negative consequences of the socioeconomic reforms, in which their dependence oninternationalfinancialinstitutionsandtheEUdeprivedthemofanyalternatives.

The above-described barter system has a lot to do with economic informality, the secondsocioeconomic link to be looked at. Informal economic activitymust not be confusedwith a (taxevading)shadoweconomy. It isanon-monetarymarketsystem,withoutpublicsocialsecurity.Thisinformality is much simpler if the informal objects for barter, as described by Bulanova-Hristova,belong to the service sector than in the case of the agricultural sector, where large parts ofproductionareusedforownneeds,complementedbyanin-kindbarter.NorbertMappes-Niedieck15points out that large parts of the Balkan Peninsula were oriented towards livestock breeding.Herdsmen drove their sheep and goats through mountainous regions where farming was hardlypossible.Theywerenecessarilyarmed,andtheirbartercoulddegenerateintorobbery.

Some of the WB6 still have a large agricultural sector similar to Romania. While only 4.5% ofemployees in the EU are working in agriculture, it is 41.3% in Albania, 19.4% in Serbia, 17.9% inMacedonia (FYR) and Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively, and, to a less significant extent, inMontenegro with 7.7% and Kosovo with only 2.3%. Society defeats crime and corruption in thetransitionfromanagrariantoaservice-orientedsocietyinasocialstate.

Thelinksbetweenaweakdomesticproductandmissingruleoflawcangenerallybeexplainedwithacontradiction.Weakness is certainly a result of informality not least because it is not statisticallycapturedandhencemakes thedeclareddomesticproduct smaller than theactualone.Corruptionleads to reserve of the private sector, financial resources are misdirected however, real oligarchpowerismadeimpossiblebyeconomicweakness.Andyet,itislikelythatsufficientrecoverygrowthisonlypossibleintheEU.

ThisisconfirmedbycomparingthedomesticproductsofallEasternEuropeanstatesbetween2000and2016:

GDPgrowthinEasternEurope

2000 2016 Increasein%

Albania 9,386 11,840 +26.2%

BosniaandHerzegovina 9,017 10,958 +21.5%

Bulgaria 15,670 20,327 +29.7%!

Croatia 19,454 22,795 +17.2%

CzechRepublic 27,498 33,232 +20.9%

Estonia 21,724 29,313 +34.9%!

Hungary 21,906 27,482 +25.5%

15N.Mappes-Niediek,Balkan-Mafia.StaateninderHanddesVerbrechens–EineGefahrfürEuropa,Berlin2003,p.127f.

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Kosovo 7,76 9,332 +18.5%

Latvia 17,856 25,710 +44.0%!

Lithuania 20,551 29,972 +45.8%!

Macedonia,FYR 11,564 14,597 +26.2%

Montenegro 13,562 16,643 +22.7%

Poland 21,084 27,764 +31.7%

Romania 16,719 22,348 +33.7%!

Serbia 12,110 14,493 +19.7%

SlovakRepublic 24,555 31,339 +27.6%

Slovenia 28,055 32,085 +14.4%

In2000,thedomesticproductofall“WB6”stateswaslowerthanallstatesthatjoinedtheEUandthishasnotchangedsince2016.AccordingtoanassessmentoftheEuropeanCommissionhowever,increases in some of the recent member states are significantly higher than in the WB6 states,especiallyinBulgariaandRomania,whichsufferfromsimilardeficienciesastheWB6statesandalsointheBalticstates.InthecaseofCroatia,thehigherbaselinevaluewasinfavourofitsadmittance,nottheincrease.

e) It isremarkablethatthe lowdomesticproduct ishardlybeingexplainedintheEUCommission’scommunications. Structural reforms andmacroeconomic stabilitywith lowpublic debt are crucial,thoughitisnotverifiedwhetheracorrespondingeconomicpolicyisactuallynecessarilycontributingtohighergrowthratescomparedtoWesternEuropeanmemberstates.

Sectorialeconomicstructuresareadecisiveprerequisiteforsufficientgrowth.However,thisisbarelydiscussed in thecommunicationseventhoughcorresponding indicesare listed in theannexes.Thepercentageemployment shareof theagricultural sectorhasalreadybeen shown in the contextofinformaleconomicactivity,belowthesharesof industry,constructionandservices.Thoseare17.3%,6.8%and71.3%intheEU.WB6valuesforcomparisonare:16

Employmentsharebysector

Construction Industry Services

Albania 6.9% 11.6% 40.2%

BosniaandHerzegovina 7.5% 22.0% 52.4%

Kosovo 9.5% 18.7% 68.4%

Macedonia,FYR 7.1% 23.4% 51.6%

Montenegro 6.6% 10.8% 74.8%

Serbia 4.5% 19.9% 55.4%

162016CommunicationonEUEnlargementPolicy,COM(2016)715final.

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EUvaluesforservicesandindustrymustbestrivedfor,especiallyattheexpenseoftheagriculturalsector; highly developed economies are post-industrial service and knowledge economies.Coordinatingthe interaliascientific-technicaltrainingwithcorrespondingprofessionalperspectivesisdecisivetofightyouthunemploymentandemigrationofthequalifiedyoung.

e) Rule of law is a fundamental prerequisite for the democratic and economic development ofEurope, theEUand theWB6.Democracy is foundedon the ruleof law; this is thedifferencewithtotalitarianandauthoritarianpoliticalsystems.Theruleoflawisbasedinappropriatelawsandtheindependenceofthejusticesystem.Thisindependencemeansnottobesubjecttothegovernment’sinstructions, but it also means socioeconomic independence. Only if judges are sufficiently paidcorruptionwillnot spread; thismayhappen if theyarenotadequatelypaid for their social status.However, this was and remains insufficiently solved and is problematic because the varyingsocioeconomic situations in European states are transparent and comparable – in terms ofcommunication,infact,Europeisfullyintegrated.Forexample,Albanianjudges,whoreceived€500permonthforalongtime,knewthattheirGermancolleagueswerepaidabouttentimesasmuch.OneoftheEuropeanCommission’salmostabsurdpositionsconcernsitsopinionthatjudges’salarieswere a matter for member states, which coupled with the recommendation for budgetaryconsolidationand,ifpossible,notaxincreases.IntheconcretecaseofAlbania,thispositionseemedgrotesque. In 2006 EURALIUS, the European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice Systempublished the report “Creation ofmedium-term programme to increase judges salaries aiming toreducecorruptiondegree”.17 It recommended increasing thesalariesof judges in the first instancefromalmost€600to€1,000andupto€1,500,increasethatwastobepaidbytheAlbanianstate.HardlyanythingcouldhavecontributedmoretoimprovingtheruleoflawinAlbaniathanafinancialcontributionoftheEUtothisveryrecommendation.

Inthemeantime,theAlbanianjudicialsystemhasbeenimprovedfollowingstrongpressurefromtheEUandtheUnitedStatesambassador.However,itwillstilldependonthecomparisonofthejudges’salariesinEuropewhetherthoseregulationswillbeeffective.

Theruleoflawisapreconditionforeconomicinvestment:foreignersandlocalshaveinvestedonlyinshort-term projects in Albania for a long time due to legal uncertainty. Also the rule of law is aconditionsinequanontofightorganisedcrime.Asearlyas2003,NorbertMappes-Niediek,18whosejournalistic publications are not about creating scandals, described the South Eastern Europeanstatesas“inthehandsofcrime”,asa“dangerforEurope”.

Crime is theresultofwar,statefailureandthecreationofsmaller,economicallyweaknewstates.Thebordersbetweenthemencouragesmuggling.SuppliersandconsigneesinWesternEurope–andintheUSA–areoneofthereasonsfororganisedcrimetohaveenteredthosestates.JusticeineveryoneofthosesmallSouth-easternEuropeanstatesistooweakandunderpaidtotakeonthemafiosinetworks, and international and EUmissions are incapable to act for organisational reasons. It isobviousthattheresponsetoEuropeanmafiaintegrationmustbeanintegrationofthesestates.

f)Organisedcrimeisariskfordemocracyiftheruleoflawcannotfightitonthelongterm.Itisalsoundermining basic rights that the democratic state has a duty to protect. Basic rights had to be

17MauscriptbyEURALIUS,2006.18Mappes-Niediek,cit.

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enforced against the Communist past in all post-Communist states during the transformationprocess,butthiswasnotalwaysaprioritytopost-Communistelitesforwhomfreedomalsomeantfreedomofenrichment.ThankstotheirknowledgeabouttheeconomicstructuresduringCommunisttimes, these elites benefited from privatisations that were pushed by western consultants,internationalfinancialinstitutionsandtheEUonaninstitutionallevel.Thus,politicalinfluencejoinseconomicinterestsanditisashortwayfromheretoassertingthoseinterestsbycriminalmeanstoo.Overlapping interests andof course crime fight shyof transparency. It follows almost conclusivelythat thepowerful rich takeholdof themediaaswell.All thismakesguaranteeinghuman rights aconditionsinequanontoEUmembership.Theirobstructionliesintheirinterlockingwitheconomicdevelopment. The European Commission is doing too little in this area in the on-going accessionnegotiations,especiallywithSerbia.ItissymptomaticthatthecurrentSerbianpresident,AlexanderVučić,usedtobeinaministerinMilosevic’sgovernment.HiscriminalconnectionsculminatinginthelatecontractkillingofprimeministerZoranDjindjićarewellknown.Obstructionsofthemediaareobvious especially during Serbian elections: election observation missions have to focus on suchobstructionsandtheircontinuationmustleadtoaninterruptionofaccessionnegotiations.

g)Functioningdemocraticinstitutionsandreformofpublicadministration.TheproblematicnatureofthefreedomofthemediainSerbialeadstothatoffunctioningdemocraticinstitutions.Theruleoflawandbasicrightsareprerequisitesfordemocracy.Democracyisshapedbyelections,afterwhichtheelectedonesarelegitimisedtotakepoliticaldecisions.InEasternEuropecompetingpartieswerecreated with the support of West European parties and consultants after the implosion ofCommunist regimes.The ideawasthat theEasternEuropeanpartysystemswouldadopttheWestEuropean ones,with a democratic right-left alternative.Demands for inner-party democracywereexpressed, though itwas rarely verifiedwhich of those demandsweremet byWestern Europeanparties.Since1990,electionsamongpoliticalpartiestookplace.However,itemergedthatvictoriousparties in declining Yugoslav states were oriented towards national-separatist goals, thusacceleratingdeclineandwillinglyacceptingcivilwars.HolmSundhausen’sverdictisthat“thethesisaccording to which democratic elections are an important instrument to solve conflicts was notconfirmed in the case of Yugoslavia”.19 This was especially true for Croatia, Serbia includingMontenegro,andBosniaandHerzegovina,toalesserextentforSloveniaandMacedonia(FYR).OnlyAlbania was not concerned. Since then, the party systems in those states have turned towards aWestern European left-right juxtaposition under the strong influence of the European “families ofparties”, especially the PES and EPP, according to theirweight in the European Parliament and inwestern European states. The decline of early EPP members in some East European EUmemberstatesmayhaveaninfluenceonSouthEasternEurope.Partysystemanalysesfrequentlyleadtotworesults:alackofalternativestothegoalsofcompetingpartiesandalackofinner-partydemocracy.

Bothmay also be explainedwith the influence of corruption: election campaigns focus onmutualaccusationsofcorruptionfollowedbyaccusationsofelectoralfraudbytheloseraftertheelections.ItshouldbeaddedthattheeconomicpoliciesrecommendedorevenimposedbytheEUblurredthealternatives. Tony Blair’s strategy of a “third way“ has become a true justification for the lack ofalternatives.

Theaccusationsof lackingdemocracywithin thepartiesmaybecounteredwithoneexample.Thepartychairmanof theSocialistPartyofAlbania,EdiRama, is reproachedfornothavingbeengonethrougha re-electionprocessaschairmanof theparty for thepasteightyears,but thisprocedure

19H.Sundhausen,JugoslawienundseineNachfolgestaaten1943-2001,Vienna-Cologne-Weimar2012,p.292.

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has been replaced by his successful re-election as prime minister. However, he took over thisprocedurefromtheBritishLabourPartywhereitwaspractisedlongbeforethedaysofTonyBlair.

ThetwobigpartiesinAlbaniaaresomewhatincapableofcompromise,theinfluenceofS&DandEPPMEPs was hence useful and a necessary contribution to democratic European integration of theparties.Thisinfluenceontheonehandallowedtoconstitutionallychangethejusticesystem,andontheothershowsthatdemocraticdeficit innon-EUstatescanonlybesolvedatEuropean level,notautonomouslyasaconditionformembership.

Macedonia’sPrimeMinisterNicolaGruevski’srefusaltostepdownafterhispartyVMRO-DPMNElosttheelectionswasonlysurmountedfollowinginternationalpressure.DespiteeffortsoftheEuropeanfamilies of parties, the case was referred to the international criminal court. This shows thatsupranationallawisnecessaryinthecaseofsmall,historicallydamagedEuropeanstates.However,suchsupranationallawshouldbetterbeEuropeanlawappliedtomemberstatesthatareinvolvedinthelegislativeprocess,ratherthantheenforcementofinternationalstandardsbythreateningUnitedStatesambassadors.

h) Regional collaboration. TheWB6 are a result of the principally military decline of Yugoslavia,whichAlbaniagotdrawnintoevenifitwasnotconcernedbytheinternationalmilitaryconflict.Itisunderstandable that peaceful intergovernmental collaboration between those states is soproblematic.Notonlyistheimprovementespeciallyofeconomiccollaborationanecessity,alsothepartlytraumaticwarexperiencesmustbecopedwith.Sincethe1990s,theinternationalcommunityistryingtocontributelikeitdidwiththestabilitypactaftertheendoftheKosovoWar.Inthefaceofitslimitedsuccess,however,theBerlinProcesswaslaunchedin2014,whichcreatedthebasisforaregionalmarket.ThisisanaturalcooperationformembershipintheEU;yeta“substituteEU”with20millionpeopleinsteadofEUmembershipwiththen529millionpeopleseemsawhimsicalidea.

Cooperation between the heads of state and government is even more important in every dayintergovernmental life. The “Western Balkans Six Leaders Summit“was held in Sarajevo inMarch2017. In addition, frequent bilateral meetings between the heads of state and government areindispensable contributions; even Vučić and Rama aremeeting. The lastmeeting of the heads ofgovernment in 2017 was held in early December in Brussels upon invitation of the High EURepresentativeforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyFedericaMogherini.

Tocriticisesuchmeetingsbecausetheyaremotivatedbydomesticpoliticsisbizarre,aseveryforeignpolicy must be also legitimised by domestic policy. The fact that Rama talked to parties of theAlbanian minority in Macedonia (FYR) about their involvement in overcoming the local crisis ofdemocracywasratheranecessityforpoliticalintegration.Callingitaninterferenceinthecountry’sdomesticaffairsseemstobea lackofunderstandingoftheinstitutionalgoalsoftheEU.TheBrdo-BrioniProcess,initiatedbythepresidentsofCroatiaandSlovenia,isanotherimportantcontribution;thelastmeetingwasheldonthe3rdofJune2017.ThisprocessshowsthataccessiontotheEUisanecessityforallstatesofformerYugoslaviaorratherallstatesontheeasternshoresoftheAdriaticSee, even if EU membership does not solve all intergovernmental, historically-charged issues, asshown by the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia over the Bay of Piran. But here is astandardexampleofaEuropeandispute:evenbeingpartofasinglestatedoesnotsolvetheissuesbetweentheFlemishandWalloons inBelgium.Nevertheless,Brussels is the indisputablecentreofEUpolitics.

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3.NecessaryEUgoalsinsixEuropeanstateswith20millionpeopleinthe21stcentury

TheintegrationintheEUofsixstatesand20millionpeopleinthe21stcenturyshouldbebasedon:the interest of the Europeans in a geopolitical dimension combined with the comprehensiveEuropeanunderstandingofhumanrights.

It shouldbe theEuropeans’ fundamental interest tomaintainan influenceon thedevelopmentofthe world to which globalisation, increasing states’ interdependencies in matters of security,economy, migration and environment add more and more reasons and no alternatives. Thus,Europeaninterestshaveageopoliticaldimension.AndthisrequiresterritorialintegrationwithoutanenclaveontheeasternshoresoftheAdriaticSeabetweenCroatiaandGreece.The2015migrationcrisismadeclearjusthowharmfulthisenclavereallyis.ThesixSouthEasternEuropeanstatescouldnot be involved in a common EU policy on refugees and hence, thousands of refugees passedthroughSerbiaandMacedonia(FYR)ontheBalkanrouteontheirwaytoAustriaandGermany.Thegovernment of Skopjewas forcedwith foreign pressure to shield the northern EUmember statesfromanuncontrolledfloodofrefugeesvia itsborderwithEUmemberstateGreece,atrulyabsurdsituationforEuropeanpolitics.ApromisetoaccelerateSerbia’saccessionprocesswassufficienttoobtain the desired action here, south of the Hungarian border safeguarded by barbed wire.Remarkably,AlbaniawascapablebyitselfnottobecomepartoftheBalkanroute.

Themigration crisis alsomade theEuropeanunderstandingof human rights a subjectof dramaticdebates.WhodeservesthesamecivilrightsofaEuropeanandwhoasamigrantonlytheasylumandrefugeeprotectionrightsdefinedbyinternationallaw?Ofcourse,adistinctionisnecessaryinsocialandpoliticalpractice,yetweshouldalsoconsiderwhatareEurope’scapabilitiesincomparisonwithstatesintheMiddleEastandAfrica.Today,GermanasylumlawconsiderstheWB6safecountriesoforiginwithoutgrosshumanrightsviolationsandthus,returnofmigrantstothesestatesispossible.In this way, however, forced return to theWB6 states turns into a violation of the rights of 2.9millions Albanian, 3.8 millions Bosnian-Herzegovinian, 1.8 millions Kosovars, 2.1 millionsMacedonian,0.6M.Montenegrinsand8.9millionsSerbiancitizens,atotalof20.1millionspeople.There is no justification for difference in their freedom of movement and that of508 millioninhabitantsofthe28memberstatesoftheEU.

Itcannotbeadifferentrecenthistory–that is,thattheyunlikemoststates inCentralandEasternEurope, were not struck by war after the implosion of communism – to make the difference. Adistinctionmust bemade here between Albania and the five states thatwere part of Yugoslavia.Whilethisfailedstatehadpractisedaliberalformofcommunismthatallowedforcooperationwiththe European Community, Albanians experienced a communism of total isolation and totalitarianrepression.ItisallthemoreremarkablethatAlbaniansmanagedtostayoutoftheYugoslavianwars,in spiteof the fact thatAlbanianminoritieswerehitparticularlyhardbySlavic repression, leadingeventuallytoKosovo’sindependence.IfEuropeanintegrationisaboutpeopleandnotaboutopenlychanging territorial statehood, it isappropriate toaskwho is responsible forwarandwhomaybepunished for it – millions of western Germans were not after World War II. 20 million in SouthEastern Europe however are punished with socioeconomic discrimination and are limited in theirfreedomtolivewherevertheywantinEurope–1.8millionpeopleinKosovoevenneedavisaiftheywanttotravelintotheEU.

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4.Thequestionofdemocracyandpoliticalmaturity

“Functioning democratic institutions” are considered as a criterion of “political” or “democraticmaturity“intheassessmentoftheWB6.TheassessmentsofthepoliticalmaturityisentrustedtoEUdiplomat, and this is indeed a sometimes questionable understanding of democracy. They involveinterventions by “mighty” ambassadors who, it should be mentioned, are not democraticallylegitimised, in spite of the democratic constitutions of their state. This is another reason why“political maturity” refers rather to the capability of managing state and external affairs than todemocracy itself. The Serbian government has been certified “politicallymature”; President Vučićreceived partly demonstrative support also from former social democratic chancellor Schroeder.Eventhoughmistakesofthepastmaybecorrected,itmustbenotedthatVučićwasministerunderMilosevicandhisnowministerofforeignaffairs,IvicaDačicć,washispressofficer.Theobstructionof themedia by the government or associatedmedia owners during election campaigns is hardlycontested.ThemajoritieswonbyVučićexcludeanyseriousconflictswithanopposition.Evidently,there are similar reasons for the support of President Hashim Thaçi in Kosovo. These politicalrepresentatives capable of acting on an international level have been named “stabilocrats of theBalkans”.20

Conflicts between the governing party and the opposition constitute the main criticism to thepoliticalsysteminAlbania.Withoutadoubt,thereisnofundamentaldemocraticconsensusoverthearguments about the recognition of election results between the two dominating parties, thecurrentlygoverningrather left-wingSocialistParty(SP) ledbyRama,supportedbythePESandtheratherright-wingDemocraticParty(DP)supportedbytheEPPandfoundedbyformerpresidentSaliBerisha,whowasamemberoftheCommunistPartypriorto1990.Changesinthegovernmentafterelectionshavetakenplacethough–abasicrequirementofdemocraticelections–andathirdpartycame into being after splitting off from the Socialist Party, the SocialistMovement for Integration(LSI),whichhavecontributedtothesechangesandfromwhoserankscomethecurrentPresidentofAlbania,IlirMeta.

Foritspart,Bosniaiscriticisedforhavingcartelpoliticalpartiesoftheethnically-orientedparties.Apartialexplanationmaybetheabove-mentionedrestrictionofcompetencyofintricatelyintertwinedinstitutionsbytheinternationalcommunity.Inaddition,theagreementconcludedinDaytontoelectaBosnian,CroatianandSerbianpresidentgivesfewreasonstomakeanethnically integratedpartylandscapeareality.

Montenegro,whichrecentlyjoinedNATO,hasbeengovernedbythesameman,MiloĐukanović,forovertwentyyears;apparentlythisisnotanobstacletotheprogressionoftheaccessionnegotiations,after admission into NATO, strongly encouraged by the United States. A coalition partner partingfromĐukanovićandaimingforachangeofgovernmentgainshardlyanyacknowledgement,nottosaytheriskofbeingaccusedofdestabilisation.Yet,theEUsuccessfullyintervenedinabuseofpowerinMacedonia(FYR).

20TitleofanarticlebyJensMartensinthe“FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung”,published4thApril2017.

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5.Risks for20millionpeople in six statesand thus for theEU

Circumstances in the WB6 that could turn into a risk for the European Union are populism andnationalismonadomestic level,theinfluenceof IslamonaEuropeanlevelandtheinterferenceofTurkey,RussiaandChinaonaninternationallevelandoverallthepossibilityofanotherwar.

PopulisminEuropecanbeastrategybothforgovernmentandopposition.Bothhavehigherchancesof success in smaller than inbigger states.Hence, the lesspopulous “WB6” states couldbemorestronglyaffected.Inconcreteterms,authoritariangovernmentswanttostopdemocraticchange,thepopulist argumentherebeing towardoff threats to stability.NikolaGruevski’s government in theFormerYugoslavianRepublicofMacedoniausedthisargumentcoupledwithaggressionsagainsttheAlbanian minority. The goal of this populist policy was to preserve power in order to safeguardeconomicinterestsandprivileges.

Generally speaking, populism can be linked to nationalism in Europe. However, the Macedoniangovernment’s populismwas not directed at the conservation of the nation-state but at its ethnicdivision.This leads to thequestionofwhether theWesternBalkanstatesaregenerallynationalist.NorbertMappes-Niediek21presentsvalidarguments toquestion this.Nationalism isnotaprincipalmatterinthosestatesthatwerenewlycreatedfollowinginternationalintervention.

Sincethe2015refugeecrisismigrantshavefedpopulistandnationalistarguments.Inthecontextofthecrisis,Macedonia(FYR)wasexploitedbytheEU.ItiscrucialtolookatthemigrationquotaoftheWB6.Theydiffer.The“Percentageofmigrantsoftotalpopulation”22islowinAlbania2%,BosniaandHerzegovina1%,Macedonia (FYR)6%,andhigher inCroatia14%,Montenegro13%,Slovenia11%,Serbiastands inthemiddlewith9%,andnodataavailable forKosovo.Tocompare: in theRussianFederationthepercentageofmigrantsis8%,andinGermanyis15%.

The debate around migration in several EU member states focuses on the influence of Muslimmigrants. This debate also refers to the memberships of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania andKosovo,allofwhichhavealargeMuslimpopulation.ThisaffectsdomesticpoliticaldevelopmentsinBosniaandHerzegovina;theBosnianpopulationisMuslimalsoinitsidentity,i.e.1.9millionpeopleor51%ofthepopulationofthisstatelivesidebysidewith31%mainlySerbianorthodoxChristiansand15%mainlyCroatRomanCatholicChristians.InAlbania,57%or1.6million,inKosovo96%or1.7million inhabitants are Muslim, together 5.3 million people. To compare: in Germany 4.7 millionpeople,or5.7%ofthepopulation,areMuslim,inFrancetheyarealittleover6million,i.e.9%.IftheEUwillenlargetotheWesternBalkans,thepercentageofMuslimpopulationwouldnotincreasebymuch.

To assess Muslim influence in Albania and Kosovo, it must be noticed that the former is aconstitutionally laicist state and the latter is a constitutionally secular one. The mythical hero ofAlbanians is LordGeorgCastriot SkanderbegwhodefendedChristianAlbania against theOttomanMuslims in the 15th century. His statues are found in Tirana and Pristina. Patron saint of streets,universities and airports in Albania is Mother Teresa, a Roman Catholic nun, whose memorial islocatedinSkopje.

21NorbertMappes-Niediek.cit.p.168f.22UnitedNations,InternationalMigrationReport2015.

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Fears of Islamic influence is coupledwith Turkey’s political influence on theWB6. First of all, thisinfluenceisofeconomicnature,which is inevitableconsideringTurkey’ssizeandis in linewiththeEU’sstrategyforafreetradepolicy.However,PresidentErdoganisconnectingforeigntradewiththefundingofpublic infrastructureprojectsandofmosques,andwiththesupport forTurkey-orientedgroups.ThismayleadtodependenciesinthosesmallstatesthatcouldbereducedoravoidediftheyweremembersoftheEU.

Muslim influence inBosniaandHerzegovina,Albania,KosovoandMacedonia (FYR) is amplifiedbythe construction of mosques funded by Saudi Arabia; this could be linked aWahhabi exercise ofreligion.ThisSaudiArabianinfluenceistobeunderstoodaspartofthemuchbroadercontextofEUrelationswithSaudiArabia,includingtheexportofweapons.Again,itiseasiertocounteractIslamicforcesviolatinghumanrightsintheEUthanindividuallyineachofthesmallWB6.

Russia’sinfluencehasgainedinimportance,aresultofincreasingtensionsbetweenthe“West”andPresident Putin. Those disputes find their antagonistic expression in the increasing influence ofUnitedStatesambassadors,whichprovidesthebasis for theNATO-membershipofat leastAlbaniaand Montenegro. Common Slavic grounds appear in the relation between Serbia and Russia;accordingly,RussiadoesnotrecogniseKosovo’sindependence.TheWB6statesarenotattheheartof the tensions between the EU and Russia, their membership however, after solving theirintergovernmentalconflicts,couldeasethosetensions,asopportunitiesforRussiatointerferewouldbereduced.

China’s influence is becoming more and more significant and is coupled with its “Belt and RoadInitiative”.23Thegreater context isChina’s16+1cooperationwithprecisely16CentralandEasternEuropean states. That China’s goal is to expand its trade and foreign investments is obvious,considering the international trade policies of the EU and USA, countries with significantly fewerinhabitants–510and330millionrespectively–thanChina(1,350million).CooperationwithBeijingcouldleadtodependencies,forsmallerstatesratherthanforlargerones.AspecialaspectofChineseinternationaleconomicpolicyisitsinterestinglobaltransportinfrastructures;spatialdevelopmentisregardedasafunctionalpolicy.Itaimsbothatconnectionsbysea,throughinvestmentsinharbours(alsoinEasternEurope),andbyland.TransportbytrainfromEastAsiatoEuropeisevidentlyfasterthan by sea, with more intermediate stops in locations, that could then improve their economicperspectives. South Eastern European states see funding opportunities for their infrastructureprojects through China’s policy as an addition or as an alternative to EU funding. This is certainlyusefulifeconomicrelationsbetweentheEUandChinaareclear.ButitbearsrisksifusedagainsttheEU.

TheinfluenceofTurkey,RussiaandChinaontheWB6mayleadtoproblemsfortheEUifitisusedtotriggercrisesaffectingEUmemberstates.Thecenturies-oldexperienceofworldhistory,accordingtowhichsmallerstatesareexploitedbybiggeronesfortheirconflicts,isstillvalid.Thisexploitationbygreatpowers– in theworst case throughwars –was theBalkan’s real tragedy. It is an illusion tobelieve that nomorewarsmayhappenon theBalkans twenty years after the Yugoslavwars. Thehistoricallymost successful strategy toavoidwar inEurope is theEuropeanUnionand,also in thecurrentEU-memberstates’owninterest,shouldnotbedeniedtotheWB6.

23 J.Bastian,China´sFootprint inSoutheastEurope:Constructingthe“BalkanSilkRoad”, in“SüdosteuropaMitteilungen”,04-05/2017,p.9-26.

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6. Strategy of European values also for the states on theEasternAdriaanditspeople

Only by admitting the WB6 into the EU can we go beyond the dead end in which these states’conditions constitute a threat to the EuropeanUnion and, at the same time, an obstacle to theirmembership.Thisisthebestpreventionagainstrisks.

TheproclamationofEuropeanvaluesbynumerousEuropeandiplomatsandmembersofparliamentin everyday politics is done on the false assumption that theworld iswaiting for these Europeanvalues. Consequently, it serves as a justification for the EU to punish governments and thosegoverned by them, should their institutions not adhere to these values. For states outside theEuropeanUnionthisisquitearidiculousillusion.WithintheEU,however,allEuropeanscouldfighttogetherfortheirvalues,andthepeopleoftheWB6areapparentlywillingtodoso.MostofthemwanttojointheEU.Itisobviousthatvalueswillbetotheiradvantage.OneofEurope’smoralissuesis that values are defended particularly where one’s own prosperity is being defended. Economicweaknesscanconsequentlybeunderstoodasaneglectofvalues.

During the June 2018 European Council summit, the EU should decide to launch talkswith all sixBalkanstatesanddropthe“regattaprinciple”.Intergovernmentalconflictsanddomesticrestrictionsof values must be on the agenda. Negotiations between the European Commission and theconcernedgovernmentsshouldcoverabroadspectrumoftopics.RepresentativesoftheEuropeanfamilies of parties should participate, especially their members in the European Parliament.DemocracyinEuropeisbasedoncompetitionbetweendemocraticparties,whichare,fortheirpart,integratedonaEuropeanlevel.

TheWesternBalkanstates’accession to theEUwouldalsomeanovercoming thedisintegrationofYugoslaviaandencouragearenewedintegrationof its inhabitants,thistimewithinEurope.Hence,theparticipationespeciallyofthepoliticalsystemsofCroatiaandSloveniaisappropriate.

ItshouldnotjustbeavisionthatthenextPresidentoftheEuropeanCommission,electedafterthenextelectionstotheEuropeanParliamentin2019,maybeabletodeclareatthebeginningofhisorhertermthatby itsend,allstatesontheeasternshoreoftheAdriaticSeawillbemembersoftheEuropeanUnion,i.e.by2024.Thiswillalreadybetenyearsafter2014,thecentennialofthegunshotfired in Sarajevo that triggeredwar in Europe.Actually, that yearwouldhavebeena goodone tosolvethe“Balkanissues”onaEuropeanlevel.