2:13-cv-00217 #86

Upload: equality-case-files

Post on 04-Jun-2018

233 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    1/25

    Kathryn D. Kendell (5398)

    National Center for Lesbian Rights

    870 Market Street, Suite 370

    San Francisco, CA 94102

    Telephone: (415) 392-6257Facsimile: (415) 392-8442

    [email protected]

    Attorney for Proposed Amicus Curiae the National Center for Lesbian Rights

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    DISTRICT OF UTAH

    CENTRAL DIVISION

    KITCHEN, et al.,

    Plaintiffs,

    v. Case No. 2:13-cv-00217-RJS

    HERBERT, et al., Honorable Robert J. Shelby

    Defendants.

    THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW AS AM ICUS CURIAEIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS

    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS

    MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86 Filed 12/02/13 Page 1 of 4

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    2/25

    1

    TheNational Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR) respectfully seeks leave of Court to

    file the accompanying memorandum of law as amicus curiae in support of Plaintiffs motion for

    summary judgment and in opposition to Defendants motion for summary judgment .

    Because an amicus curiaeparticipates only for the benefit of the court, and is not a party

    to the litigation, the court has the sole discretion to determine the fact, extent, and manner of

    participation by the amicus. Kane Cnty., Utah v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1347 (D.

    Utah 2013) (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted). Generally, courts have exercised great

    liberality in permitting an amicus curiaeto file a brief in a pending case and an amicusmust

    merely make a showing that his participation is useful to or otherwise desirable to the court.

    United States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 608, 620 (E.D. La. 1990);see also Hammond v. City of

    JunctionCity, Kansas, No. 00 2146JWL, 2001 WL 1665374 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2001) (granting

    leave to file as amicus curiaebecause it is in the interest of the court andall parties to ensure

    that all arguments concerning [an important] issue are presented fully at this juncture).

    NCLR is a national nonprofit legal organization dedicated to protecting and advancing

    the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and their families through

    litigation, public policy advocacy, and public education. Since its founding in 1977, NCLR has

    played a leading role in securing fair and equal treatment for LGBT people and their families in

    the areas of constitutional and civil rights. NCLR currently represents Plaintiffs in lawsuits

    across the country who seek the freedom to marry in their states, or the right to have their valid

    out-of-state marriages recognized, including cases in Tennessee, New Mexico, and Idaho.

    NCLR has a strong interest in protecting LGBT families across the country, including in Utah,

    and has extensive legal expertise with the issues pending before this Court.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86 Filed 12/02/13 Page 2 of 4

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    3/25

    2

    NCLRrespectfully suggests that the accompanying memorandum of law may assist the

    Court in resolving the issues presented in this case. NCLR supports all of the arguments made

    by the Plaintiffs in this case, including that Utahs laws prohibiting same-sex couples from

    marrying and prohibiting recognition of the lawful marriages of same-sex couples who married

    in other states unconstitutionally deprive those couples of their fundamental right to marry and

    impermissibly discriminate against same-sex couples based on their gender and sexual

    orientation. NCLR files this brief to address several additional and distinct reasons why Utahs

    refusal to respect the marriages of same-sex couples who married in other states violates the

    Constitutions guarantees of due process and equal protection. Specifically, as the Supreme

    Court recently recognized in United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013), the

    marriages of same-sex couples entered into in other states share equal dignity with other

    couples marriages and are entitled to the same protections that the federal Constitution ensures

    for all other marriages. In Windsor,the Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the federal

    Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7 (DOMA), interfere[d] with the equal dignity of the

    marriages same-sex couples by treating those marriages as if they did not exist for purposes of

    federal law. Id.

    NCLR has a particular interest in these issues because it represents four married same-sex

    couples in Tennessee who have filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the

    Middle District of Tennessee seeking to require Tennessee to recognize the legal marriages that

    plaintiffs entered into in other states. Tanco v. Haslam,No. 3:13-cv-01159 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 23,

    2013). On November 19, 2013, NCLR filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in that action a motion for

    preliminary injunction arguing that the couples are likely to prevail on their arguments that the

    federal Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize their valid marriages entered into in other

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86 Filed 12/02/13 Page 3 of 4

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    4/25

    3

    states. In light of the briefing that NCLR prepared in the Tennessee lawsuit, NCLR wishes to

    bring to this Courts attention certain arguments in support of the claim by Plaintiffs in this case

    that the federal Constitution requires Utah to recognize legal marriages that same-sex couples

    entered into in other states. As an organization with a long history of litigating these issues in

    courts across the country, NCLR therefore respectfully requests leave of court to file the

    accompanying memorandum of law in support of Plaintiffs motion for summary judgmentand

    in opposition to Defendants motion for summary judgment.

    Dated: November 29, 2013 Respectfully Submitted,

    ____________________________

    Kathryn D. Kendell (5398)

    National Center for Lesbian Rights870 Market Street, Suite 370

    San Francisco, CA 94102

    Telephone: (415) 392-6257

    Facsimile: (415) [email protected]

    Attorneys for ProposedAmicus CuriaetheNational Center for Lesbian Rights

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86 Filed 12/02/13 Page 4 of 4

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    5/25

    Kathryn D. Kendell (5398)

    National Center for Lesbian Rights

    870 Market Street, Suite 370San Francisco, CA 94102

    Telephone: (415) 392-6257

    Facsimile: (415) [email protected]

    Attorney for Proposed Amicus Curiae the National Center for Lesbian Rights

    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

    KITCHEN, et al.,

    Plaintiffs,

    v. Case No. 2:13-cv-00217-RJS

    HERBERT, et al., Honorable Robert J. Shelby

    Defendants.

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS AS

    AM ICUS CURIAEIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY

    JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY

    JUDGMENT

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 1 of 21

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    6/25

    i

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    STATEMENT OF INTEREST ...................................................................................................... 1

    INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1

    ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 3

    A. Utahs Anti-Recognition Laws Are An Unusual Deviation From ItsLongstanding Tradition And Practice Of Recognizing Valid Marriages

    From Other States .............................................................................................................. 4

    B. Utahs Anti-Recognition Laws Unjustifiably Infringe Upon Same-SexCouples Protected Liberty Interest In Their Marriages .................................................... 6

    1. Utahs anti-recognition laws inflict severe harms on marriedsame-sex couples and their children and disrupt their marital

    and family relationships ................................................................................... 9

    2. Like DOMA, Utahs anti-recognition laws were enacted for theimproper purpose of treating married same-sex couples

    unequally ........................................................................................................ 12

    C. Utahs Anti-Recognition Laws Violate Equal Protection ................................................ 13D. Utahs Refusal To Recognize Same-Sex Couples Valid Marriages

    Undermines Important Goals Of Federalism ................................................................... 13

    E. Section 2 Of DOMA Provides No Justification For Utahs DiscriminatoryMarriage Recognition Laws ............................................................................................. 15

    CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 17

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 2 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    7/25

    ii

    TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

    Cases

    Cahoon v. Pelton, 342 P.2d 94 (Utah 1959) ................................................................................... 4

    Dept of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) .................................................... 14

    Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479 (1965) ........................................................................... 7, 8

    Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) .............................................................................. 11

    Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)............................................................................................. 7

    M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) ............................................................................................. 8

    McConnell v. McConnell, 99 F. Supp. 493, 494 (D.D.C. 1951) ..................................................... 4

    Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) .................................................................. 8

    Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991) .............................................................................. 4

    Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) ....... 6

    Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120 (1875) ......................................................................................... 5

    Roberts v. Hartz, 113 Fed. Appx. 306, 312 (10th Cir. 2004) ......................................................... 8

    Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) .................................................................. 7

    Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) ....................................................................................... 16

    Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) .......................................................................... 16

    Tanco v. Haslam,No. 3:13-cv-01159 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 23, 2013) ................................................ 2

    Thomas v. ChildrensAid Soc. of Ogden, 364 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1961) .......................................... 5

    Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ..................................................................................... 7, 8

    United States v. Windsor,133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) ....................................................... passim

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 3 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    8/25

    iii

    Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ........................................................................... 7

    Wells v. Childrens Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (1984) ........................................................... 5

    Statutes

    Act of March 14, 1995, ch. 146, 1995 Utah Laws 146 (providing that a marriage recognized in

    any other state or country may not be recognized in Utah) (codified as amended Utah Code

    Ann. 30-1-4 (Supp. 1995) (effective May 1, 1995) ................................................................. 4

    Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7 ........................................................................................... 2

    Utah Code 30-1-2 ................................................................................................................. 12, 14

    Utah Code 30-1-4 ................................................................................................................... 4, 12

    Utah Code 40-1-2 (repealed 1963) .............................................................................................. 5

    Utah Code 30-1-2(5) ..................................................................................................................... 12

    Utah Rev. Stat. 1186 (1898) ........................................................................................................ 5

    Other Authorities

    James R. Browning, Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the U.S., 1 Duke B. J. 26 (1951) ..................... 5

    Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion ofObligation, 1 STAN.J.C.R.&C.L. 1, 40 (2005) ......................................................................... 5

    Lois A. Weithorn, Can a Subsequent Change in Law Void a Marriage that Was Valid at Its

    Inception? Considering the Legal Effect of Proposition 8 on California's Existing Same-SexMarriages,60 Hastings L.J. 1063, 1125 (2009) ......................................................................... 9

    Luther L. McDougal III et al.,American Conflicts Law713 (5th ed. 2001). ................................. 4

    William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws398 (3d ed. 2002)

    ................................................................................................................................................. 5, 9

    Constitutional Provisions

    Utah Const. art. I, 29 .............................................................................................................. 4, 12

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 4 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    9/25

    1

    STATEMENT OF INTEREST

    The National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR)is a national nonprofit legal

    organization dedicated to protecting and advancing the civil rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and

    transgender people and their families through litigation, public policy advocacy, and public

    education. Since its founding in 1977, NCLR has played a leading role in securing fair and equal

    treatment for LGBT people and their families in the areas of constitutional and civil rights.

    NCLR currently represents plaintiffs in lawsuits across the country who seek the freedom to

    marry, or the right to have their valid out-of-state marriages recognized, including in cases in

    Tennessee, New Mexico, and Idaho. NCLR has a strong interest in protecting LGBT families

    across the country, including in Utah, and has extensive legal expertise with the issues pending

    before this Court.

    INTRODUCTION

    Amicus curiaeNCLR respectfully submits this brief in support of Plaintiffs motion for

    summary judgment and in opposition to Defendants motion for summary judgment. NCLR

    supports all of the arguments made by the Plaintiffs in this case. In particular, Utahs laws

    prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and prohibiting recognition of the lawful marriages

    of same-sex couples who married in other states unconstitutionally deprive those couples of their

    fundamental right to marry and impermissibly discriminate against same-sex couples based on

    their gender and sexual orientation.

    NCLR files this brief to address several additional and distinct reasons why Utahs

    refusal to respect the marriages of same-sex couples who married in other states also violates the

    Constitutions guarantees of due process and equal protection. NCLR has a particular interest in

    these issues because it represents four married same-sex couples in Tennessee who have filed a

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 5 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    10/25

    2

    lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee seeking to require

    Tennessee to recognize their legal marriage entered into in other states. Tanco v. Haslam,No.

    3:13-cv-01159 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 21, 2013). On November 19, 2013, NCLR filed on behalf

    of the plaintiffs in that action a motion for preliminary arguing that the couples are likely to

    prevail on their arguments that the federal Constitution requires Tennessee to recognize their

    valid foreign marriages. In light of the briefing that NCLR prepared in the Tennessee lawsuit,

    NCLR wishes to bring to this Courts attention additional arguments in support of the claim by

    Plaintiffs in this case that the federal Constitution requires Utah to recognize legal marriages that

    same-sex couples entered into out-of-state.

    Specifically, as the Supreme Court recently recognized in United States v. Windsor,133

    S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013), the marriages of same-sex couples entered into in other states share

    equal dignity with other couples marriages and are entitledto the same protections that the

    United States Constitution ensures for all other marriages. In Windsor,the Supreme Court held

    that Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7 (DOMA), interfere[d]

    with the equal dignity of the marriagesof same-sex couples by treating those marriages as if

    they did not exist for purposes of federal law. Id.

    Utahs categorical refusal to respect the valid marriages of same-sex couples who married

    in other states violates due process and equal protection for the same reasons that the Supreme

    Court concluded in Windsorthat the federal governments categorical refusal to respect valid

    same-sex marriages violated those constitutional guarantees. Like Section 3 of DOMA, Utahs

    anti-recognition laws unjustifiably infringe upon married same-sex couples constitutionally

    protected liberty interest in their existing marriages and constitutes a deprivation of the liberty

    of the person protected by due process. Id. at 2695. Similarly, the anti-recognition laws

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 6 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    11/25

    3

    deprive married same-sex couples of equal protection of the laws by discriminating against the

    class of legally married same-sex couples, not to achieve any important or even legitimate

    government interest, but simply to express disapproval of that class and subject that class to

    unequal treatment. See id.at 2695-96. As with DOMA, the challenged Utah anti-recognition

    laws principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them

    unequal. Id.at 2694. Utahs refusal to respect the otherwise valid marriages of same-sex

    couples cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny because no legitimate purpose overcomes the

    purpose and effect to disparage and to injure married same-sex couples. Id.at 2696.

    ARGUMENT

    In addition to unconstitutionally depriving same-sex couples of their fundamental right to

    marry and impermissibly discriminating on the basis of gender and sexual orientation, Utahs

    refusal to recognize same-sex couples valid out-of-state marriages also raises constitutional

    issues that are distinct from those raised by Utahs refusal to permit same-sex couples to marry.

    Utahs anti-recognition laws constitute a stark departure from Utahs longstanding practice, and

    that of other states, of recognizing valid marriages from other states in all but the rarest of

    circumstances. The resulting harms caused to married same-sex couples are severe, leaving

    those couples and their families in an untenable limbo and effectively stripping them of an

    existing marital status for all state law purposes. As the Supreme Court affirmed in Windsor,

    laws that depart from existing practice and tradition by withholding governmental recognition

    from valid state marriages warrant careful considerationunder both due process and equal

    protection review. Id.at 2693. Like DOMA, Utahs refusal to recognize legally married same-

    sex couples violates basic due process and equal protection principles by excluding married

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 7 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    12/25

    4

    same-sex couples from protection, not to further a legitimate purpose, but simply to identify a

    subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. Id. at 2693, 2694.

    A. Utahs Anti-Recognition Laws Are An Unusual Deviation From ItsLongstanding Tradition And Practice Of Recognizing Valid Marriages FromOther States.

    Before the enactment of House Bill 366 (HB 366) in 1995,1Utah law provided that

    [m]arriages solemnized in any other country, state or territory, if valid where solemnized, are

    valid here. Utah Code 30-1-4 (1994);see alsoCahoon v. Pelton, 342 P.2d 94, 96 (Utah 1959)

    (Generally, the laws of the state where a marriage is consummated determine its validity.)

    overruled in part on other grounds by Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991). This

    ruleknown as the place of celebration ruleis recognized in every state and is a defining

    element of our federal system and American family law. See, e.g.,McConnell v. McConnell, 99

    F. Supp. 493, 494 (D.D.C. 1951) (The general and apparently universally accepted rule is that

    the validity of a marriage is to be determined by the law of the place of the celebration of the

    marriage, or the lex loci contractus.). The rule recognizes that individuals order their lives

    based on their marital status and need to know reliably and certainly, and at once, whether they

    are married or not. Luther L. McDougal III et al.,American Conflicts Law713 (5th ed. 2001).

    This rule of marriage recognition also confirms the parties expectations, it provides stability in

    an area where stability (because of children and property) is very important, and it avoids the

    potentially hideous problems that would arise if the legality of a marriage varied from state to

    1 Act of March 14, 1995, ch. 146, 1995 Utah Laws 146 (providing that a marriage recognized inany other state or country may not be recognized in Utah) (codified as amended Utah Code Ann.

    30-1-4 (Supp. 1995) (effective May 1, 1995). HB 366 created an exception to the place ofcelebration rule for the marriages of same-sex couples, as well as for certain bigamous and

    underage marriages. In 2004, Utah voters enshrined a similar provision in the Utah Constitution.

    Utah Const. art. I, 29(2) (No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized

    as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.).

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 8 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    13/25

    5

    state. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws398 (3d

    ed. 2002).2

    Before the enactment of HB 366, this rule had been in place in Utah for nearly a century.

    See, e.g., Utah Rev. Stat. 1186 (1898). Even during the era in which Utah and many other

    states barred interracial marriages,seeformer Utah Code 40-1-2 (repealed 1963), Utah

    recognized interracial marriages from other states, including those entered into by Utah residents

    who traveled to other states to avoid Utahs prohibition of interracial marriage. SeeJames R.

    Browning,Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the U.S., 1 Duke B. J. 26, 29, 35 (1951) (describing

    Utahs practice of recognizing valid interracial marriages from other states).3

    Against this background, Utahs ban on recognizing the valid marriages of same-sex

    couples who marry in other states represents a stark departure from the general rule followed

    throughout the country and from Utahs own past and current treatment of out-of-state marriages.

    Utah enacted these laws in 1995 and 2004 as part of a national wave of statutes and state

    constitutional amendments aimed at barring same-sex couples from the protections of marriage.

    Courts throughout the country, including this Court, are now considering whether the states have

    2 Reliance by courts on the public policy exception to deny recognition to out-of-state marriages

    historically has been extremely rare in Utah and elsewhere. Indeed, until the recent hysteriaassociated with same sex marriage, the public policy exception was fast becoming obsolete.

    Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Evasion of

    Obligation, 1 STAN.J.C.R.&C.L. 1, 40 (2005).

    3 See alsoThomas v. Childrens Aid Soc. of Ogden, 364 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1961) (assuming

    without deciding that Utah would recognize the marriage of an interracial couple who married inIdaho to avoid Utahs miscegenation statute if the marriage had not been void under both Idaho

    and Utah law on other grounds) overruled in part on other grounds by Wells v. Childrens Aid

    Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (1984). Conversely, states that banned interracial marriage generallyrecognized interracial marriages contracted in Utah before Utah began to prohibit such

    marriages. See, e.g.,Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120 (1875) (recognizing marriage contracted

    between Utah residents before moving to California, where interracial marriages were

    prohibited).

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 9 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    14/25

    6

    deprived married same-sex couples of constitutionally protected liberties through enactment and

    enforcement of state-level Defense of Marriage laws that departed from their longstanding

    practices of respecting valid marriages from other states. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Kasich, No.

    1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (enjoining state officials from

    refusing to recognize the valid out-of-state marriage of a same-sex couple). For the reasons

    explained below and in Plaintiffs briefs, Utahs refusal to recognize the marriages of an entire

    category of persons who validly married in other states, solely to exclude a disfavored group

    from the ordinary legal protections and responsibilities they would otherwise enjoy, and despite

    the severely harmful impact of that refusal, cannot survive any level of constitutional scrutiny.

    B. Utahs Anti-Recognition Laws Unjustifiably Infringe Upon Same-Sex CouplesProtected Liberty Interest In Their Marriages.

    Like the plaintiff in Windsor, Plaintiffs Karen Archer and Kate Call are already legally

    married. Windsorheld that the federal governments refusal to recognize legally married same-

    sex couples violated due process because it burdened many aspects of married and family life,

    from the mundane to the profound, 133 S. Ct. at 2694, and because its avowedpurpose and

    practical effectwere to treat those couples unequally, rather than to further a legitimate purpose.

    Id. at 2693. Utahs anti-recognition laws deprive married same-sex couples of due process for

    the same reasons.

    Windsors holding that married same-sex couples have a protected liberty interest in their

    marriages means that married same-sex couples, like other married couples, have liberty interests

    in their marriages that are protected against infringement by any level of governmentfederal,

    state, or local. The State of Utahs argument that Windsors holding applies only to the federal

    government has no merit. Def.s Mot. Summ. J. at 47. It seems doubtful that Utah would

    contend that it may disregard other liberty interests protected by the federal Constitution simply

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 10 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    15/25

    7

    because a case in which a federal court recognized that liberty interest involved the federal

    government as a defendant instead of a state. A protected liberty interest is safeguarded from

    unjustified intrusion by any government. For example, a persons protected interest in

    maintaining parent-child bonds exists regardless of whether those interests are threatened by the

    federal government or by a state. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (invalidating

    state law that impermissibly infringed upon parental rights).

    Windsors recognition that same-sex couples marriages are constitutionally protected is

    consistent with cases stretching back for decades in which the Court has held that spousal

    relationships, like parent-child relationships, are among those intimate family bonds whose

    preservation must be afforded a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified

    interference by the State. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984);see also

    Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (reversing married interracial couples convictions for

    violations of anti-miscegenation statutes4); Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, 485-86

    (1965) (holding that marriage is a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by

    several fundamental constitutional guarantees); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720

    (1997) (recognizing marital privacy as a fundamental liberty interest). The Supreme Courts

    cases protecting family relationships have explained that the Due Process Clause guarantees

    more than fair process; it also includes a substantive component that provides heightened

    protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.

    4 WhileLovingis usually cited as a case about the right to marry, it also involves a particularly

    severe type of interference with an existing marital relationship. The plaintiffs inLoving hadtraveled outside their home State of Virginia to get married, and it was Virginias refusal to

    recognize that marriage, and its criminal prosecution of the married couple when they returned to

    Virginia, that led to their successful challenge in the Supreme Court.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 11 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    16/25

    8

    Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);see also Roberts v. Hartz,

    113 Fed. Appx. 306, 312 (10th Cir. 2004).

    Under these and other cases, laws that significantly burden protected liberties must be

    subjected to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86, 503-504 (applying

    heightened constitutional scrutiny in striking down law barring use of contraceptives by married

    couples);Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (holding that where law

    burdened a protected family relationship, the court must examine carefully the importance of

    the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged

    regulation.);M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (holding that state action burdening a

    protected parent-child relationship requires close consideration); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692

    (holding that federal statute burdening marital relationships requires careful consideration)

    (internal citations omitted).

    Utahs anti-recognition laws also warrant heightened scrutiny because, as the Supreme

    Court recognized in Windsor, there is no basis to distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex

    married couples in defining their liberty interest in their existing marriages lawfully entered in

    other jurisdictions. See id. at 2693 (affirming the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity

    conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power). Marriage is a status of

    immense import. Id. at 2681. Once that status has been lawfully conferred by a state,

    Plaintiffs have the same protected liberty interest in their marital relationships as did the

    plaintiffs in Windsor, Loving, Griswold,and other cases involving attempts by the government to

    burden protected family relationships.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 12 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    17/25

    9

    1. Utahs anti-recognition laws inflict severe harms on married same-sexcouples and their children and disrupt their marital and family

    relationships.

    In a manner virtually unprecedented in this countrys history (outside the context of anti-

    miscegenation laws), Utahs anti-recognition laws, and similar laws that other states have

    recently enacted with respect to married same-sex couples, cause serious harms to families and

    society by disregarding the longstanding, deeply rooted, and otherwise near-universal rule that a

    marriage that is validly entered into by a couple living in one state will be recognized when the

    couple travels or relocates to another state. This uniform rule of marriage recognition confirms

    the parties expectations, it provides stability in an area where stability (because of children and

    property) is very important, and it avoids the potentially hideous problems that would arise if the

    legality of a marriage varied from state to state. Richman & Reynolds,supra,at 398. By

    excluding legally married same-sex couples from this uniform rule, Utah has created an

    untenable and chaotic situation whereby Plaintiffs Archer and Call are legally married in Iowa,

    where they wed, legally married in the many other states and countries that recognize the

    marriages of same-sex couples who marry in other jurisdictions, and legally married for purposes

    of most federal protections and responsibilities. But so long as they reside in Utah, these

    Plaintiffs legal marriage, and those of other legally married same-sex couples, are deemed void

    and unenforceable under the laws of this state. The instability and harms caused to these

    Plaintiffs and others by this extraordinary situation are significant, continuing, and cumulative.

    [N]ullification of a valid marriage when both partners wish to remain legally married

    constitutes the most extreme form of state interference imaginable in the marital relationship.

    Lois A. Weithorn, Can a Subsequent Change in Law Void a Marriage that Was Valid at Its

    Inception? Considering the Legal Effect of Proposition 8 on California's Existing Same-Sex

    Marriages,60 Hastings L.J. 1063, 1125 (2009).

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 13 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    18/25

    10

    By excluding legally married same-sex couples from recognition, the State of Utah

    disrupts their protected family relationships. Marriage provides the only means under Utah law

    whereby two adults can establish a family unit that must be legally respected by the state and by

    others. Through hundreds of statutes, regulations, and common law rules, Utahs laws provide

    married couples with comprehensive protections and responsibilities that enable them to make a

    legally binding commitment to one another and to any children they may have, and to be treated

    as a legal family. These state-law protections range from the mundane to the profound,

    Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694, but many are designed to assist families in their times of greatest

    need and to protect them when misfortune strikes unexpectedly. Virtually all other couples who

    legally marry in other states, including couples who could not have married under Utahs own

    laws, are treated as married in Utah, and automatically obtain all of the same protections and

    responsibilities as other married couples in Utah. Utahs anti-recognition laws strip legally

    married same-sex couples of all marital protections under state law and deprive them of the

    certainty, stability, permanence, and predictability that marriage is designed to provide.5

    By treating married couples as legal strangers, Utahs anti-recognition laws strip the

    5 Moreover, the federal government has not yet determined whether certain federal benefits and

    protections will accrue to married same-sex couples who live in states that do not recognize their

    marriages. For example, the Social Security Administration has announced that it will recognize

    the marriages of same-sex couples who reside in a state that recognizes their marriages. Program

    Operations Manual System, GN 00210.100, available at

    https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210100. But the Administration currently isholding spousal benefits claims filed by married same-sex couples living in states that do not

    respect their marriages and has not announced whether those benefits will be available to such

    couples. Program Operations Manual System, GN 00210.005, available at

    https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210005.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 14 of 21

    https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210100https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210100https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210005https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210005https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210005https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210100
  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    19/25

    11

    married Plaintiffs of privacy and autonomy and interfere with their freedom of intimate

    association. In effect, they have been divorced against their will, for state law purposes, by

    operation of law. By stripping Plaintiffs of the recognition, dignity, and protection they

    obtained by entering into lawful marriages, Utahs law demeans the couple, whose moral and

    sexual choices the Constitution protects[.] Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (citingLawrence v.

    Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). Marriage is a status of immense import. Id.at 2681. It

    conveys the depth and seriousness of a couples commitment to one another, and instructs others

    to respect the couples privacy, dignity, and autonomy and the integrity of their family

    relationship. Like DOMA, Utahs anti-recognition laws demean and stigmatize married same-

    sex couples by excluding them from these important protections and placing them in the

    untenable position of being legally married, but being treated by the State of Utah as unmarried.

    Id.at 269394. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a more direct or substantial burden on

    marital and family relationships than a law that legally nullifies Plaintiffs valid marriages.

    Utahs anti-recognition laws tell[] those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid

    marriages are unworthy of . . . recognition. Id.

    Utahs anti-recognition laws also harm the children of married same-sex couples by

    instructing them that the State of Utah regards their parents marriages and their families as less

    worthy of recognition than other marriages and familiesindeed, that they are worthy of no

    recognition at all. Id. at 2694 (differential treatment of same-sex married couples and opposite-

    sex couples under DOMA humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-

    sex couples and makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and

    closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their community and in their

    daily lives). Utahs anti-recognition laws instruct[]all [state] officials, and indeed all persons

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 15 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    20/25

    12

    with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their marriage is less

    worthy than the marriages of others by rendering their lawful marriages a legal nullity for all

    state law purposes the moment the couple crosses the state line. Id.at 2696.

    In sum, the harms inflicted on Plaintiffs and their families are as severe, damaging, and

    pervasive as those recognized in Windsor.

    2. Like DOMA, Utahs anti-recognition laws were enacted for the improperpurpose of treating married same-sex couples unequally.

    Utahs anti-recognition laws have the same avowed purpose and practical effect as

    Section 3 of DOMA: to deny married same-sex couples all of the benefits and responsibilities

    that otherwise would flow from Utahs recognition of the valid marriages of couples who marry

    in other states. That purpose is apparent on the face of the laws themselves, which render void

    any marriages between same-sex couples that are legally entered into in other states. See Utah

    Code 30-1-2(5) (prohibiting and declaring void marriages between persons of the same sex);

    Utah Code 30-1-4 (excluding married same-sex couples from Utahs general recognition of

    valid marriages from other states);see alsoUtah Const. art. I, 29 (marriages of same-sex

    couples may not be recognized or given legal effect). Like DOMA, Utahs anti-recognition

    laws were enacted to ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those

    unions will be treated as second-class marriages. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 269394. Their

    principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,

    and their principal purpose is to impose inequality. Id.at 2694. Like Section 3 of DOMA, the

    Anti-Recognition Laws therefore violate due process and equal protection because no legitimate

    purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure married same-sex couples

    in this extraordinary manner. Id. at 2696.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 16 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    21/25

    13

    C. Utahs Anti-Recognition Laws Violate Equal Protection.In addition to infringing upon the protected liberty interests of married same-sex couples,

    Utahs anti-recognition laws facially discriminate against the class of legally married same-sex

    couplesthe same class at issue in Windsor.6 Seeid. at 2695 (The class to which DOMA

    directs its restrictions and restraints are those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages).

    For the same reasons explained above, that classification violates basic equal protection

    principles by singling out a disfavored group for disadvantageous treatment, not to further a

    legitimate goal, but to impose inequality.

    D. Utahs Refusal To Recognize Same-Sex Couples Valid Marriages UnderminesImportant Goals Of Federalism.

    Defendants erroneously suggest that Windsor stands for the proposition that a states

    authority over marriage is absolute. Def.s Mot. Summ. J. at 51. In fact, the Windsorcourt

    unequivocally affirmed that state regulations of marriage must respect the constitutional rights

    of persons. 133 S. Ct. at 2691. That obligation applies not only to restrictions on marriage

    under state law, but also to state laws addressing the recognition of marriage from other states.

    As Windsorheld, when a same-sex couple enters into a valid marriage under the laws of a state,

    the spouses acquire a status of immense import. Id. at 2692. Once married, those couples

    have the same protected interest in their marital privacy, dignity, and autonomy as other married

    couples. Id. at 2693 (holding that married same-sex couples have equal dignity). As explained

    above, a state may not, consistent with the requirement of due process, infringe upon that

    6 Those laws, as well as Utahs laws barring marriage by same-sex couples within the state, also

    facially classify based on sexual orientation and gender. Amicusstrongly agrees with Plaintiffs

    that those laws must be subject to heightened scrutiny for that reason, as well as because they

    infringe upon a protected liberty interest.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 17 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    22/25

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    23/25

    15

    because they expect that other states will respect their marriages. Interstate transportability of

    marriages has becomeand has long beena defining feature of American law and one that is

    essential to stability, order, and the basic functioning of our highly mobile society. For one state

    to treat another states valid marriages as null and void without adequate justification is not only

    an affront to the rights of individuals, it is also an affront to the equal sovereignty of other states.

    For these reasons, the WindsorCourts emphasis on states sovereignty over marriage

    underscores why Utahs anti-recognition laws (like those of other states that categorically deny

    recognition to married same-sex couples) constitute an extraordinary departure from basic

    principles of federalism, as well as of due process and equal protection.

    E. Section 2 Of DOMA Provides No Justification For Utahs DiscriminatoryMarriage Recognition Laws.

    The State of Utah seeks refuge in DOMAs Section 2, arguing that it gives Utah and

    other states carte blanche to exclude the marriages of same-sex couples from recognition. Def.s

    Mot. Summ. J. at 48.8 As an initial matter, the basis of the Courts determination in Windsorthat

    Section 3 of DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applies equally to

    Section 2. Like Section 3, Section 2 targets the class of legally married same-sex couples for

    disfavored treatment. In Windsor, the Court emphasized that discriminations of an unusual

    character warrant careful consideration. 133 S. Ct. at 2692. The Court discussed the unusual

    character of Section 3, but Section 2 is just as unusual and unprecedented. Never before has

    8 The State of Utah seems to suggest that merely by describing Section 2 of DOMA, the Windsor

    Court affirmed its validity. Def.s Mot. Summ. J. at 48. But the constitutionality of Section 2

    was not before the Court in Windsor,and the WindsorCourts one line summary of what Section2 purports to do is no more affirming of that provisions validity than is the Courts subsequent

    description, immediately thereafter, of what Section 3 of DOMA purports to do. Windsor, 133 S.

    Ct. at 2682-83. Nothing in Windsorsuggests that Section 2, if challenged, would survive

    constitutional scrutiny.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 19 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    24/25

    16

    Congress passed a statute purporting to authorize the states to ignore a whole class of marriages.

    Moreover, in explaining why Section 3 was invalid, the Court in Windsorfound that DOMA had

    the improper purpose and effect of treating lawfully married same-sex couples unequally

    which is equally true of Section 2. In finding animus, the Court cited statements made in the

    House Report which apply equally to Section 2 as to Section 3. See id. at 2693. The Court also

    noted that the title of the statute itself evinced an improper purpose to discriminate, which

    applies equally to Section 2. In light of the Courts analysis, it would be utterly anomalous to

    conclude that section 2 of DOMA was not equally infected with the animus that the Court found

    with respect to section 3 of DOMA.

    In any event, this Court need not reach the issue of Section 2s validity here, because

    regardless of what Section 2 purports to authorize, this Court must decide whether Utahs anti-

    recognition laws satisfy the Fourteenth Amendments commands of dueprocess and equal

    protection of the laws. No statute passed by Congress can exempt Utah from those fundamental

    requirementsamong the most important provisions of our federal system since the Civil War.

    See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (Congress may not authorize the

    States to violate the Equal Protection Clause); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999)

    (Although we give deference to congressional decisions and classifications, neither Congress

    nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.)

    (internal citations omitted). Defendants argument is as baseless as the argument that Congress

    could have changed the result inLoving v. Virginiaby enacting a statute providing:

    No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall

    be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceedingof any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship

    between persons of different races that is treated as a marriage under the

    laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claimarising from such relationship.

    Case 2:13-cv-00217-RJS Document 86-1 Filed 12/02/13 Page 20 of 21

  • 8/13/2019 2:13-cv-00217 #86

    25/25