217 p mx amend sac
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
1/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEEEugene D. Lee (SB#: 236812)555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100Los Angeles, CA 90013Phone: (213) 992-3299
Fax: (213) 596-0487email: [email protected]
Attorney for PlaintiffDAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FRESNO DIVISION
DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF KERN, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-00026 OWW TAG
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION ANDMOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECONDAMENDED COMPLAINT
Date: October 3, 2008Time: 10:00 a.m.Courtroom: U.S. District Court, Crtrm. 3
2500 Tulare St, Fresno, CAComplaint Filed: January 6, 2007Trial Date: December 2, 2008
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 1 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
2/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
Please take notice that on October 3, 2008, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the parties may
be heard, Plaintiff DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O. will and hereby does move this Court U.S. Dist. Ct.,
Bankr. Crtrm., 1300 18th St., Bakersfield, CA, for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint.
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and
Declaration of Eugene Lee, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant it leave to file the Second
Amended Complaint, and for such other relief as may be just.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on September 2, 2008.
/s/ Eugene D. LeeLAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100Los Angeles, CA 90013Phone: (213) 992-3299Fax: (213) 596-0487email: [email protected] for Plaintiff DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 2 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
3/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES
I. BACKGROUNDPlaintiff has attempted without success to obtain Defendants stipulation to file the Second
Amended Complaint (SAC) and the revised Second Amended Complaint ("RSAC").
On January 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed the Complaint initiating this action.
On April 24, 2007 and on June 13, 2007, Plaintiff supplemented the Complaint to reflect events
occurring after the date of the last-filed Complaint.
On January 4, 2008, Plaintiff sent the draft Third Supplemental Complaint (TSC) almost
identical to the SAC to Defendants for their review. Defendants never responded.
On January 22, 2008, Plaintiff noted Defendants had not responded. Defendants replied that they
were inclined not to so stipulate but would reconsider subject to certain conditions.
On April 17, 2008, after further discussion between the parties, Plaintiff again sent the draft TSC
to Defendants for their review. Defendants never responded.
On May 4, 2008, Plaintiff again requested Defendants stipulation to filing the TSC. On May 5,
Defendants refused and stated the pleadings are done.
On June 30, 2008, Plaintiff filed with this Court his notice of withdrawal of motion for leave to
file the TSC, stating:
Unless Defendants stipulate otherwise, Plaintiff intends to file a motion for leave to fileand serve the Second Amended Complaint, naming the County of Kern . . . asdefendants in their personal and official capacities under Count Ten [sic] of PlaintiffsComplaint (42 U.S.C. 1983 procedural due process).Doc. 159, 1:24 2:1.
On July 1, 2008, Plaintiff requested Defendants stipulation to filing the SAC. Later that day,
Defendants stated that they refused.
Discovery in this action closed on August 18, 2008, except for depositions per the stipulation and
order of the parties.
On August 29, during the deposition of Philip Dutt, the parties met and conferred regarding
withdrawal of Plaintiffs prior motion for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint so that Plaintiff
could further add additional claims arising out of facts which were newly discovered during the course
of Plaintiffs depositions. Defendants refused to stipulate to the filing of the revised Second Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff therefore had no choice but to bring this motion seeking leave to file the second
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 3 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
4/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
amended complaint.
II. ARGUMENTPlaintiff seeks to effect the following items with the filing of the SAC:
A. Item 1: Supplement the Complaint regarding events that occurred after the filing ofPlaintiffs second supplemental complaint.
1. Requested Change
Plaintiff filed the Second Supplemental Complaint on June 13, 2007. Plaintiff now seeks to
supplement the Complaint regarding events occurring subsequently, including: (a) Defendant Countys
lifting of Plaintiffs home restriction on April 30, 2007, (b) Defendant Countys non-renewal of
Plaintiffs employment contract on October 4, 2007 and (c) Plaintiffs exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to make additions to the Complaint including the following:
20. Just before Thanksgiving of 2006, Plaintiff confided to Gilbert Martinez, theLaboratory Manager at KMC, that he intended to blow the whistle on KMC toappropriate outside agencies. Days later, Defendant Harris met with Philip Dutt, M.D.,Interim Chair of the Pathology Department at KMC (Dutt), to discuss what steps thePathology Department should take in anticipation of Plantiffs whistleblowing to theseoutside agencies.
27. On April 30, 2007, Defendant County sent a letter to Plaintiff notifying him of itsdecision to lift the home restriction. To date, Plaintiff has received no formal explanationfor the involuntary leave or the restriction to his home.
28. On May 1, 2007, Defendant County sent an email to Plaintiff notifying him of itsdecision not to renew Plaintiffs employment contract, which was not due to expire untilOctober 4, 2007, and to let the contract run out. To date, Plaintiff has received noformal explanation for the decision not to renew his contract.
29. On October 4, 2007, Defendant County failed to renew Plaintiffs employmentcontract, which therefore expired.
30. On August 15, 2008, Ray Watson, Chair of the Board of Supervisors ofDefendant County, testified in deposition that Defendant County had decided during thecourse of several KMC Joint Conference Committee meetings not to renew Plaintiffsemployment contract because he had filed the instant lawsuit.
138. On October 4, 2007, Defendant County failed to renew Plaintiffs employmentcontract, which therefore expired.
142. During the time that Defendants placed Plaintiff on involuntary full-time leave,including the period from December 7, 2006 to October 4, 2007, Defendants effectivelydenied Plaintiff the opportunity to earn Professional Fees as set forth in Article II of theSecond Contract.
149. On October 10, 2007, Plaintiff again filed a supplemented Tort Claims Actcomplaint with the County of Kern, supplemented to reflect events occurring after filingof the supplemented Tort Claims Act complaint on April 23, 2007.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 4 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
5/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
153. On October 16, 2007, Plaintiff again filed a supplemented complaint with theDFEH, supplemented to reflect events occurring after filing of the supplementedcomplaint with the DFEH on April 23, 2006.
154. On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff again filed a supplemented complaint with the
DFEH, supplemented to reflect additional claims for retaliation for opposing practicesmade unlawful under CFRA and FEHA which arose after evidence was newlydiscovered subsequent to the filing of the supplemented complaint with the DFEH onOctober 16, 2007.
2. Why It Should be Permitted
Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms asare just, permit the party to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions oroccurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to besupplemented.
A supplemental pleading is used to allege relevant facts occurring after the original pleading was
filed. Keith v. Volpe (9th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 467, 468. A supplemental pleading is designed to bring the
action up to date and to set forth new facts affecting the controversy that have occurred since the
original pleading was filed.Manning v. City of Auburn (11th Cir. 1992) 953 F.2d 1355, 13591360. A
supplemental pleading may properly allege events occurring after the original complaint was filed and
identify any new parties involved therein. Rule 15(d) plainly permits supplemental amendments to
cover events happening after suit, and it follows, of course, that persons participating in these new
events may be added if necessary. Griffin v. County School Board(1964) 377 U.S. 218, 226227.
Supplemental pleadings can only be filed with leave of court and upon such terms as are just. Glatt v.
Chicago Park Dist. (7th Cir. 1996) 87 F.3d 190, 194. However, supplemental pleadings are favored
because they enable the court to award complete relief in the same action, avoiding the costs and delays
of separate suits. Therefore, absent a clear showing of prejudice to the opposing parties, they are
liberally allowed. See Keith v. Volpe (9th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 467, 473; Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co. (2nd
Cir. 1995) 71 F.3d 58, 66. The purpose of Rule 15(d) is to promote as complete an adjudication of the
dispute between the parties as is possible. LaSalvia v. United Dairymen of Arizona, 804 F.2d 1113,
1119 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987).
The supplements sought by Plaintiff promote a complete and efficient adjudication of the
disputes between the existing parties to this action. Item 1 Plaintiffs proposed supplements allege a
series of adverse employment actions taken by Defendants against Plaintiff that were first referenced in
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 5 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
6/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff's original and subsequent complaints. For instance, Plaintiffs Second Supplemental Complaint
had alleged in pertinent part:
102. On or about December 7, 2006, Culberson sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff
informing him that he was being placed on involuntary paid administrative leavepending resolution of a personnel matter.
104. On April 4, 2007, Plaintiff placed Defendant County on notice that (i) he still hadyet to be provided any explanation for his involuntary leave or any indication as towhether or when it would end so that he could return to work, (ii) the involuntary leaverequiring him to remain at home by his phone during working hours was threatening toerode his pathology skills, jeopardizing his employability and career as a pathologist,(iii) the involuntary leave was denying him the opportunity to earn income fromprofessional fee billing, and (iv) part-time work was deemed therapeutic for him by hisphysician and that the confinement to his house during working hours was having theopposite effect of severely exacerbating his depression.
105. To date, Plaintiff remains on involuntary leave, with no explanation therefore orany indication as to whether or when it will end.
Plaintiff alleges that these actions constituted a continuing violation and/or a pattern and practice of
discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation taken against Plaintiff because of his protected
characteristics and activities. If Plaintiff is denied leave to file the SAC, Plaintiff would be forced to file
a new law suit re-alleging most of the same claims contained in this action based on these new adverse
actions. Permitting the supplement would result in a more efficient use of scarce judicial resources.
More importantly, there is no risk of prejudice or surprise to Defendants. First, the supplements
comprise allegations of continuing injury or continuation of the wrongful conduct already alleged in
Plaintiffs original or supplemental complaints. Second, Plaintiff has repeatedly apprised Defendants of
his desire to make the foregoing supplements to his complaint since January 4, 2008, when Plaintiff first
sent Defendants the draft TSC. Defendants initially refused to respond at all, then ultimately refused to
stipulate.
Third, Plaintiff served on Defendants copies of the supplemented complaint he filed with the
Department of Fair Employment & Housing on October 16, 2007 and supplemented Tort Claims Act
claim he filed with the County of Kern on October 10, 2007, each detailing the same supplemental
allegations which Plaintiff now proposes in the SAC.
Fourth, Plaintiffs Initial Disclosure contained a Rule 26 report issued by Plaintiffs forensic
economist which fully disclosed the harm that Plaintiff suffered and expected to suffer because of the
events which Plaintiff now seeks to supplementally allege.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 6 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
7/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Defendants cannot in good faith claim to be surprised or prejudiced by Plaintiffs proposed
supplements.
B. Item 2: To include an element of Plaintiffs Count VI for disability discriminationadded to Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case by a decision of the California Supreme Courtissued after the filing of this lawsuit.
1. Requested Change
Plaintiff seeks to add Paragraph 125 to allege Plaintiffs ability to perform the essential functions
of his job, which the California Supreme Court found to be an element of Plaintiffs disability
discrimination claim in Green v. State of California, issued by the California Supreme Court on August
23, 2007. Paragraph 125 reads as follows:
125. At all times material here, excluding a portion of the time when he was out onvoluntary full-time medical leave, Plaintiff has been able to perform the essentialfunctions of the employment positions he held with Defendants and each of them, withreasonable accommodation.
2. Why It Should be Permitted
Rule 15 provides the parties with flexibility in presenting their claims and defenses. It assures
that cases will be heard on their merits and avoids injustices which sometimes resulted from strict
adherence to earlier technical pleading requirements. Foman v. Davis (1962) 371 U.S. 178, 182; Slayton
v. American Express Co. (2nd Cir. 2006) 460 F.3d 215, 228. Rule 15 reflects the limited role assigned to
federal pleadings: i.e., their purpose is simply to provide the parties with fair notice of the general nature
and type of the pleader's claim or defense. As long as such notice has been provided, the pleadings
should not limit the pleader's claims or defenses.Ibid.; see also Grier v. Brown (N.Dist. Cal. 2002) 230
F.Supp.2d 1108, 1111.
Plaintiffs proposed correction of an omission does not allege any new facts; it arises out of the
same exact nucleus of facts alleged in Plaintiffs original and supplemental complaints filed with the
Court. Simply put, it merely seeks to correct the omission of a legal pleading element required for
Plaintiffs Counts VI through VIII for violation of Californias disability discrimination laws.
Defendants cannot claim to have been denied fair notice of the general nature of Plaintiffs disability
discrimination claims or the alleged facts from which they arise. Permitting the correction would not
prejudice Defendants in any way. Conversely, denying the correction may prevent consideration of
Plaintiffs disability discrimination claims on their merits and result in injustice.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 7 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
8/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
C. Item 3: Add already-named and existing Defendants, the County of Kern and IrwinHarris, to Plaintiffs Count IX for 42 U.S.C. 1983 due process violation claim, basedupon events which were already alleged in the Complaint.
1. Requested Change
Plaintiff seeks to amend Count IX (See Paragraph 207 of the SAC) to add Defendants County of
Kern and Irwin Harris to that count. Both Defendants are already named and existing parties and no
joinder of new parties is required under Rule 19. Rather, joinder of a claim against an existing party is
required under Rule 18.
2. Why It Should be Permitted
Rule 15 requires that leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2); seeLone Star Ladies Invest. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc. (5th
Cir. 2001) 238 F.3d 363,
367 (policy favoring leave to amend a necessary companion to notice pleading and discovery.) This
policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003)
316 F.3d 1048, 1051;Moore v. Baker(11th Cir. 1993) 989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (justifying reasons must be
apparent for denial of a motion to amend). Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the other
reasons for denying leave to amend, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting
leave to amend.Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc. (9th
Cir. 2003) 316 F.3d 1048, 1052. While
leave to amend should not be granted automatically, the circumstances under which Rule 15(a)
permits denial of leave to amend are limited. Ynclan v. Department of Air Force (5th Cir. 1991) 943
F.2d 1388, 1391.
The opposing party may claim prejudice from any amendment, such as the expense of
responding to the amended pleading and possible delay in getting to trial; however, expense and delay
are probably not enough by themselves to deny leave to amend. There must be some showing of
inability to respond to the proposed amendment. Likewise, the need for additional discovery is
insufficient by itself to deny a proposed amended pleading. See U.S. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank &
Trust(2nd Cir. 1989) 889 F.2d 1248, 1255; Genentech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories (N.Dist. Cal. 1989)
127 F.R.D. 529, 531.
Rule 18(a) expresses a philosophy of great liberality toward entertaining the broadest possible
scope of action consistent with fairness to parties; joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly
encouraged.Lanier Business Products v Graymar Co. (1972, Dist. Md.) 342 F.Supp 1200. A party
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 8 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
9/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
should be able to join all claims he has against his opponent as matter of course to avoid a multiplicity of
litigation and possible claims ofres judicata at later date.Ibid.
Joinder of Plaintiffs Count IX for 42 U.S.C. 1983 due process violations against Defendants
County and Harris should be permitted. Both Defendants are already named in several of Plaintiffs
Counts and are existing parties in this action. Joinder of Defendant County in County IX is clearly
warranted underMonell v Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658 and would avoid multiplicity of
litigation and claims ofres judicata at a later date. Joinder of Harris became warranted in light of the
deposition testimony of David Culberson, former Interim CEO of KMC, on August 21, 2008 wherein
Plaintiff learned for the first time of the extent of Dr. Harriss participation in Defendant Countys
decision to place Plaintiff on administrative leave on December 7, 2006 and, subsequently, not to renew
Plaintiffs employment contract.
There is no risk of prejudice or surprise to Defendants. Defendants have had fair notice of the
nucleus of facts underlying Defendant Countys and Harriss liability under Count IX e.g., demotion
of Plaintiff and reduction of his base salary, placement of Plaintiff on involuntary administrative leave
with home restriction, and non-renewal of Plaintiffs contract since at least January 2008 when
Plaintiff sent the draft TSC to Defendants. On June 30, 2008, Plaintiff filed with this Court his notice of
withdrawal of motion to file the TSC, expressly stating therein Plaintiffs intention to seek joinder of
Count IX against Defendant County (Doc. 159). On July 1, 2008, Plaintiff again gave Defendants notice
providing them a copy of the SAC along with a proposed stipulation (which Defendants rejected). With
discovery in this action due to close on August 18, 2008, Defendants had more than a month to conduct
whatever additional discovery they deem necessary in light of the SAC although no additional
discovery should conceivably be necessary to parse out aMonell analysis.
More importantly, Plaintiff is not a percipient witness having knowledge of any facts regarding
Defendant Countys liability underMonell or Dr. Harriss liability for his participation in adverse
employment actions against him, other than what was revealed by Defendants former and current
employees themselves during their depositions. No further discovery needs to be conducted by
Defendants in order to defend against the new claims proposed to be brought against Defendants County
and Harris. Even if such were the case, Defendants have ready access to County witnesses and Harris
himself in contrast to Plaintiff who must engage in the formality of deposing them to access their
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 9 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
10/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
testimony.
Finally, under Cal. Govt. C. 995 et seq., Defendant County is required to indemnify its
employees against liability for violations alleged in Plaintiffs Count IX as set forth in Plaintiffs initial
complaint filed on January 6, 2008. The joinder of Count IX against Defendant County simply adds
direct liability where indirect liability for individually named employees under Count IX already exists.
D. Item 4: Joinder of new claims for CFRA retaliation (existing Count III), FEHAretaliation (Govt C. 12940(h), new Count XI) and FMLA retaliation (29 U.S.C. 2615(b), new Count X) against Defendant County and Does 1 through 10 basedupon newly-discovered evidence.
1. Requested Change
Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to add new Counts X and XI and a new claim for CFRA
retaliation under existing Count III against Defendant County and Does 1 through 10. Defendant County
is an already named and existing party and no joinder of new parties is required under Rule 19. Rather,
joinder of new claims against an existing party is required under Rule 18.
During the course of Plaintiffs deposition of Supervisor Ray Watson on August 25, 2008,
Plaintiff for the first time heard testimony that Defendant County had decided not to renew Plaintiffs
employment contract with the County due to the fact that Plaintiff had initiated this action. Based on this
newly-discovered evidence, Plaintiff requests leave to join new claims against Defendant County and
Does 1 through 10 for FEHA oppositional retaliation pursuant to Govt C. 12940(h) (new Count XI),
FMLA oppositional retaliation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 2615(b) (new Count X) and CFRA oppositional
retaliation (Count III). Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiffs filing of this action on December 7, 2006
opposing practices made unlawful under FEHA, CFRA and FMLA has subjected him to retaliation in
the form of non-renewal of his employment contract on October 4, 2007.
Moreover, based on newly-discovered evidence in the form of Supervisor Watsons foregoing
testimony as well as the testimony of former Interim CEO David Culberson in deposition conducted on
August 21, 2008, Plaintiff further alleges FEHA oppositional retaliation pursuant to Govt C. 12940(h)
(new Count XI) and CFRA oppositional retaliation (Count III) in that Defendants placed him on
administrative leave on October 7, 2006 subsequent to his filing of a FEHA/CFRA complaint with the
DFEH on July 31, 2006.
1. Why It Should be Permitted
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 10 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
11/77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
12/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
I, Eugene D. Lee, declare and say, as follows:
1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before the Federal and State Courts of
California and admitted to practice before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California. I am the attorney representing Plaintiff David F. Jadwin in this matter.
2. I am making this declaration in support of Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O.s motion for
leave to file the Second Amended Complaint (SAC). The facts stated herein are personally known to
me and if called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to the truth of the facts set forth in
this declaration.
3. A true and correct copy of the SAC which Plaintiff seeks to file is attached hereto as
Exhibit 1.
4. On January 4, 2008, my co-counsel, Joan Herrington, sent the draft Third Supplemental
Complaint, which contained the nucleus of facts underlying all of the changes proposed in the SAC, to
defense counsel, Mark Wasser, for his review. He never responded. I was carbon-copied on Ms.
Herringtons and Mr. Wassers emails. A true and correct copy of the emails is attached hereto as
Exhibit 2.
5. On January 22, 2008, I sent an email to Mr. Wasser noting Defendants had not responded
to Ms. Herringtons previous email. Mr. Wasser sent an email replying that he was inclined not to so
stipulate but would reconsider subject to certain conditions. A true and correct copy of the emails is
attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
6. On April 17, 2008, after further discussion between the parties, I again sent the draft TSC
to Mr. Wasser for his review. He never responded. A true and correct copy of the emails is attached
hereto as Exhibit 4.
7. On May 4, 2008, I again requested Mr. Wassers stipulation to filing the TSC. On May 5,
he sent an email stating his refusal and stated the pleadings are done. A true and correct copy of the
emails is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
8. On June 30, 2008, I filed with this Court Plaintiffs notice of withdrawal of motion for
leave to file the TSC, which stated:
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 12 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
13/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Unless Defendants stipulate otherwise, Plaintiff intends to file a motion for leave to fileand serve the Second Amended Complaint, naming the County of Kern . . . asdefendants in their personal and official capacities under Count Ten [sic] of PlaintiffsComplaint (42 U.S.C. 1983 procedural due process).Doc. 159, 1:24 2:1.
A true and correct copy of the notice of withdrawal is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
9. On July 1, 2008, I sent an email to Defendants requesting their stipulation to Plaintiffs
filing the SAC. Later that day, Defendants emailed me, stating that they refused. Defendants lack of
cooperation has been characteristic in this action. A true and correct copy of the notice of withdrawal is
attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
10. Discovery in this action closed on August 18, 2008, except for depositions per the
stipulation and order of the parties.
11. On August 29, during the deposition of Philip Dutt, the parties met and conferred
regarding withdrawal of Plaintiffs prior motion for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint so that
Plaintiff could add additional claims arising out of facts which were newly discovered during the course
of Plaintiffs depositions. Defendants refused to stipulate to the filing of the revised Second Amended
Complaint; however, Defendants agreed to stipulate to an expedited briefing and hearing schedule on
the motion for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint which Plaintiff intended to re-file in revised
form.
12. Plaintiffs ability to perform the essential functions of his job was found by the California
Supreme Court to be an element of Plaintiffs disability discrimination claim in Green v. State of
California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, issued by the California Supreme Court on August 23, 2007.
13. There is no risk of prejudice or surprise to Defendants. Defendants have had fair notice of
the nucleus of facts underlying Defendant Countys and Harriss liability under Count IX e.g.,
demotion of Plaintiff and reduction of his base salary, placement of Plaintiff on involuntary
administrative leave with home restriction, and non-renewal of Plaintiffs contract since at least
January 2008 when Plaintiff sent the draft TSC to Defendants. On June 30, 2008, Plaintiff filed with this
Court his notice of withdrawal of motion to file the TSC, expressly stating therein Plaintiffs intention to
seek joinder of Count IX against Defendant County (Doc. 159). On July 1, 2008, Plaintiff again gave
Defendants notice, providing them a copy of the SAC along with a proposed stipulation (which
Defendants rejected). With discovery in this action due to close on August 18, 2008, Defendants had
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 13 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
14/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
more than a month to conduct whatever additional discovery they deem necessary in light of the SAC
although no additional discovery should conceivably be necessary to parse out aMonell analysis.
14. More importantly, Plaintiff is not a percipient witness having knowledge of any facts
regarding Defendant Countys liability underMonell or Dr. Harriss liability for his participation in
adverse employment actions against him, other than what was revealed by Defendants former and
current employees themselves during their depositions. No further discovery needs to be conducted by
Defendants in order to defend against the new claims proposed to be brought against Defendants County
and Harris. Even if such were the case, Defendants have ready access to County witnesses and Harris
himself in contrast to Plaintiff who must engage in the formality of deposing them to access their
testimony.
15. Finally, under Cal. Govt. C. 995 et seq., Defendant County is required to indemnify its
employees against liability for violations alleged in Plaintiffs Count IX as set forth in Plaintiffs initial
complaint filed on January 6, 2008. The joinder of Count IX against Defendant County simply adds
direct liability where indirect liability for individually named employees under Count IX already exists.
16. During the course of Plaintiffs deposition of Supervisor Ray Watson on August 25,
2008, Plaintiff for the first time heard testimony that Defendant County had decided not to renew
Plaintiffs employment contract with the County due to the fact that Plaintiff had initiated this action.
Based on this newly-discovered evidence, Plaintiff requests leave to join new claims against Defendant
County and Does 1 through 10 for FEHA oppositional retaliation pursuant to Govt C. 12940(h) (new
Count XI) and FMLA oppositional retaliation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 2615(b) (new Count X). Plaintiff
alleges that Plaintiffs filing of this action on December 7, 2006 opposing practices made unlawful under
FEHA and FMLA has subjected him to retaliation in the form of non-renewal of his employment
contract on October 4, 2007.
17. Moreover, based on newly-discovered evidence in the form of Supervisor Watsons
foregoing testimony as well as the testimony of former Interim CEO David Culberson in deposition
conducted on August 21, 2008, Plaintiff further alleges FEHA oppositional retaliation pursuant to Govt
C. 12940(h) (new Count XI) in that Defendants placed him on administrative leave on October 7, 2006
subsequent to his filing of a FEHA complaint with the DFEH on July 31, 2006.
18. Defendants will not be prejudiced by the joinder of the above new claims against existing
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 14 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
15/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Defendant County. Plaintiff is not a percipient witness having knowledge of any facts regarding
Defendant Countys liability for oppositional retaliation under FMLA or FEHA, other than what was
revealed by Supervisor Watson and Mr. Culberson themselves during their depositions. No further
discovery needs to be conducted by Defendants in order to defend against the new claims proposed to be
brought against Defendant County. Even if such were the case, Defendants have ready access to Mr.
Watson and Mr. Culberson in contrast to Plaintiff who must engage in the formality of deposing them
to access their testimony.
19. Defendant County's refusal to allow Plaintiff to return to work at Kern Medical Center;
failure to conduct an investigation into the "personnel matters" that purported necessitated Plaintiff's
administrative leave with home restriction; and its decision not to renew Plaintiff's employment contract
are part of a series of adverse employment actions taken by Defendants against Plaintiff, as alleged in
Plaintiff's original and subsequent complaints. Plaintiff alleges that this series of adverse actions
constitute a continuing violation and/or a pattern and practice of discrimination, harassment, and/or
retaliation taken against Plaintiff because of his protected characteristics and activities. An efficient
resolution of all issues raised by these subsequent events requires supplementation of the Complaint to
encompass all adverse employment actions taken by Defendant County against Plaintiff.
20. None of the Defendants can claim that they will suffer prejudice if leave is granted to file
the SAC.
21. If this Court denies Plaintiff leave to file the SAC, Plaintiff would be forced to file a new
law suit re-alleging most of the same claims contained in this action based on these new adverse actions.
22. Defendants have known since at least May 1, 2007, that Plaintiff would never be allowed
to return to work at Kern Medical Center.
23. Plaintiff notified Defendants that he would seek further leave to amend or supplement his
complaint if Defendant County carried out its threat to keep Plaintiff on administrative leave until his
employment contract expired.
24. Plaintiff provided further notice of his intent to seek relief for these adverse actions by
serving a copy of his supplemented Department of Fair Employment & Housing complaint and right to
sue letter and supplemented Tort Claims Act complaint on Defendant County.
25. Plaintiff has already disclosed documents reflecting the harm that Plaintiff suffered and
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 15 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
16/77
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 15
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
will continue to suffer because of these subsequent adverse employment actions, and Defendants have
conducted further discovery on these disclosures.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and of the United
States that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: September 2, 2008 LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE
By: ____________________________________Eugene D. Lee
Attorney for DefendantDAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 16 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
17/77
EXHIBITS TO DECLARATION OF EUGENE D. LEE
EXHIBIT 1. Draft Second Amended Complaint
EXHIBIT 2. Meet and confer emails between Plaintiffs attorney and Defendantsattorney, dated 1/4/08
EXHIBIT 3. Meet and confer emails between Plaintiffs attorney and Defendantsattorney, dated 1/22/08
EXHIBIT 4. Meet and confer emails between Plaintiffs attorney and Defendantsattorney, dated 4/17/08
EXHIBIT 5. Meet and confer emails between Plaintiffs attorney and Defendantsattorney, dated 5/4/08 to 5/5/08
EXHIBIT 6. Plaintiffs Notice of Withdrawal of Motion to File TSC (Doc. 159)
EXHIBIT 7. Meet and confer emails between Plaintiffs attorney and Defendantsattorney, dated 7/1/08
SAC000001
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 17 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
18/77
EXHIBIT 1:Draft Second Amended Complaint
SAC000002
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 18 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
19/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 1/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Eugene D. Lee SB# 236812LAW OFFICE OF EUGENE LEE555 West Fifth Street, Suite 3100Los Angeles, California 90013Telephone: (213) 992-3299
Facsimile: (213) 596-0487Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for PlaintiffDAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O.
Plaintiffvs.
COUNTY OF KERN; PETER BRYAN(both individually and in his former officialcapacity as Chief Executive Officer OfKern Medical Center); IRWIN HARRIS,M.D; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive.
Defendants.
Case No. 1:07-cv-26-OWW-TAG
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
I. Retaliation [Health & Safety Code 1278.5];
II. Retaliation [Lab. Code 1102.5];III. Retaliation [Govt Code 12945.1, et
seq; 12949(f); 2 C.C.R. 7297.7(a)];
IV. Interference with FMLA Rights [29U.S.C. 2601, et seq.];
V. Violation of CFRA Rights. [Govt Code 12945.1, et seq.];VI. Disability Discrimination [Govt. Code
12940(a)];
VII. Failure to Provide ReasonableAccommodation [Govt Code
12940(m)];
VIII. Failure to Engage in Good Faith In AnInteractive Process [Govt Code
12940(n)];
IX. Procedural Due Process Violation [14thAmendment of U.S. Constitution; 42U.S.C. 1983];
X. FMLA Retaliation [29 U.S.C. 2615];and
XI. FEHA Retaliation [Govt Code 12940(h)]
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 19 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
20/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 2/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
NATURE OF THE ACTION
This is an individual action brought by Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O., a whistleblowing
physician with disabilities, against his employer, (i) the County of Kern (Defendant County or
the County); ) (ii) individual Defendants Peter Bryan (Bryan), former Chief Executive
Officer of Kern Medical Center (KMC); Irwin Harris, M.D., former Chief Medical Officer of
KMC (Harris);; and DOES 1 through 10.
Plaintiffs claims against his employer, Defendant County, allege violations of section
1278.5 of the Health & Safety Code1 which prohibits retaliation against a health care provider
who reports suspected unsafe care and conditions of patients in a health care facility; section
1102.5 of the Labor Code which prohibits retaliation against an employee for reporting orrefusing to participate in suspected violations of the law; the California Family Rights Act
(sections 12945.1, et seq., of the Government Code) (CFRA) and the Family and Medical
Leave Act (sections 2601, et seq. of the United States Code) (FMLA) which prohibit
interference with an employees right to medical leave and retaliation for an employees exercise
of the right to medical leave and for opposing any practice made unlawful by the CFRA/FMLA,
including filing any charge or instituting a proceeding under the CFRA/FMLA; and the Fair
Employment and Housing Act [subdivisions (a), (h), (m) & (n) of section 12940 of the
Government Code] (FEHA) which prohibits discrimination against an employee with a
disability, retaliation for opposing employment practices prohibited by the FEHA, failure to
provide reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in an interactive process; and recovery
of wrongfully deducted wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.)
(FLSA).
Plaintiff sues Defendants County and Harris, and Defendant Bryan both in his personal
capacity and in his official capacity as a member of the KMC Joint Conference Committee
(JCC) for violation of Plaintiffs 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution right to
procedural due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Due Process).
1 All statutory references are to California Codes unless otherwise specified.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 20 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
21/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 3/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff brings this action for general, compensatory, and punitive damages; prejudgment
interest, costs and attorneys fees; injunctive and declaratory relief; and other appropriate and
just relief resulting from Defendants unlawful conduct, and as grounds therefor alleges:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Court has federal question jurisdiction over the FMLA and Due Process
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
transactionally-related state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367.
2. Venue is proper in Fresno in the Eastern District of California, as a substantial
part of the events and omissions giving rise to this claim occurred in the County of Kern,
California.
INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
3. Assignment to Bakersfield is proper pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-120
(Appendix A) because the events giving rise to this civil action occurred in Bakersfield in the
County of Kern, California.
PARTIES
4. At all material times herein, Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. (Plaintiff) has
continuously been an employee of Defendant County, a citizen of the United States and
California; and a resident of Los Angeles County, California.
5. At all material times herein, Plaintiff was an individual with disabilities within the
meaning of Section 12926(i) & (k) of the Government Code.
6. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant County is a
local public entity within the meaning of sections 811.2 & 900.4 of the Government Code and is
operating in Kern County, California.
7. At all material times herein, the County has continuously been an employer
within the meaning of FMLA [29 C.F.R. 825.105(C)], CFRA [Government Code
12945.2(b)(2)], FEHA [Government Code 12926(d)], and FLSA [29 U.S.C. 203], engaged in
interstate commerce and regularly employing more than fifty employees within seventy-five
miles of Plaintiffs workplace.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 21 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
22/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 4/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8. On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Peter Bryan is a
citizen of Colorado, and a resident of Denver, Colorado, and was Chief Executive Officer of
KMC, and a member of the JCC.
9.
On information and belief, at all material times herein, Defendant Irwin Harris isa citizen of California, and a resident of Kern County, California, and Chief Medical Officer at
KMC, and a non-voting member of the JCC.
10. The true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, are
presently unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.
Plaintiff will amend this complaint to set forth the true names and capacities of said Defendants
when they are ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and
belief alleges, that at all times relevant, each of the fictitiously-named Defendants was an agent,
employee, or co-conspirator of one or more of the named Defendants, and was acting within the
course and scope of said agency or employment. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and
upon such information and belief alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants aided,
assisted, approved, acknowledged and/or ratified the wrongful acts committed by Defendants as
alleged herein, and that Plaintiffs damages, as alleged herein, were legally caused by such
Defendants.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE11. Plaintiff is a highly-qualified and capable pathologist with numerous professional
accomplishments that have included leadership roles in national, state and local pathology and
medical societies. Plaintiff received extensive education and training at reputable academic and
medical institutions. Plaintiff has managed several clinical laboratories and pathology
departments that have achieved accreditation by the College of American Pathologists,
frequently with distinction. Plaintiff has also been recognized by numerous pathologists and
physicians for his professional leadership and commitment to set and uphold rigorous and ethical
standards for patient care quality and safety.
12. In late 2000, Plaintiff was recruited to assume the position of Chair of the
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 22 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
23/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 5/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Pathology Department at KMC, a teaching hospital owned and operated by Defendant County.
Plaintiff was recruited in part to raise standards of patient care quality and safety at KMC.
Plaintiff immediately set about implementing, among other things, a best-practices peer review
system in the Pathology Department.13. In 2001, Plaintiff began to report concerns to key members of KMCs medical
staff and administration about the unacceptably high levels of unsatisfactory or non-diagnostic
fine needle aspirations (FNA) a method of using a needle and syringe to obtain deep internal
tissue samples of vital organs being taken by the Radiology Department at KMC for diagnosis
by the Pathology Department. In 2003, Plaintiff began to report concerns to key members of
KMCs medical staff and administration about ineffective and unnecessary blood transfusions
and an unacceptably high incidence of lost or incomplete product chart copy certifications
(PCC) required for accurate tracking of dangerous blood transfusions. In 2004, Plaintiff began
to report concerns to key members of KMCs medical staff and administration about the need for
instituting a policy of requiring KMC Pathology Department review prior to undertaking
significant surgical procedures based upon the reports of outside pathologists (Internal
Pathology Review). In 2005, Plaintiff reported a concern to key members of KMCs medical
staff and administration about an inappropriate radical hysterectomy (cancer surgical procedure
for removal of all female reproductive organs and regional lymph nodes) performed by Roy on a
patient with a benign endometriotic cyst (Roy Hysterectomy). Also in 2005, Plaintiff began to
report concerns to key members of KMCs medical staff and administration about the need to
review a series of serious diagnostic errors committed by a former KMC pathologist, including
the failure to identify invasive adenocarcinoma in several prostate needle biopsies (Prostate
Biopsy Errors). Also in 2005, Plaintiff reported concerns to KMC administration that KMC
physicians had performed surgery on a wrong patient due to an error which Plaintiff believed
would have been less likely had KMC implemented Internal Pathology Review per Plaintiffs
recommendation. Plaintiff reported several other concerns about inappropriate patient care and
noncompliance with quality control standards. In February of 2006, Plaintiff met with Bernard
Barmann, County Counsel for the County of Kern (Barmann), to report the foregoing
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 23 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
24/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 6/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
concerns.
14. In 2005, Roy began a campaign of making statements impugning Plaintiffs
professional competence. Events culminated in October of 2005, when Kercher, Harris, Ragland
and Abraham harshly reprimanded Plaintiff, based on false allegations, resulting from a 15- to20-minute presentation given by Plaintiff during a monthly KMC oncology conference that
allegedly exceeded conference time limits by approximately ten minutes. Plaintiffs presentation
had attempted to highlight several of Plaintiffs above-mentioned concerns regarding Internal
Pathology Review and their potential impact upon deciding the correct surgical procedure for the
patient under discussion. The presentation was stopped before Plaintiff could present the key
diagnostic conclusions of his presentation.
15. After the conference, Harris solicited letters of disapprobation from conference
participants, including Roy. Roy submitted a letter (Roy Letter) containing several false
statements of fact which impugned Plaintiff to other members of KMCs medical staff and
administration. On information and belief, Harris and DOES 1 through 10 republished the Roy
Letter to third parties. Several KMC medical and administration officers including Bryan and
Kercher were aware of Roys, Harriss and DOES 1 through 10s acts of unwarranted criticism,
but refused to intercede, and possibly approved or encouraged them.
16. In December of 2005, Plaintiff began medical leave initially in the form of
medically necessary reduced work schedule due to severe depression which was later extended
to June 16, 2006. It was not until on or about March 2, 2006, that Plaintiff was finally provided
with a Request for Leave of Absence form which he then submitted to KMCs HR Department.
Plaintiff also received a document entitled Designation of Leave (Serious Health Condition of
Employee-Intermittent) from the HR Department at KMC, which included a written guarantee
of Plaintiffs reinstatement to his same or equivalent position with same pay, benefits and terms
and conditions of employment upon his return from his leave.
17. During Plaintiffs sick leave, Bryan issued a series of verbal and written
ultimatums to Plaintiff which threatened him with termination or demotion upon return from his
leave, thereby giving notice that Plaintiff was not in fact guaranteed reinstatement to his same or
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 24 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
25/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 7/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
equivalent position. In a meeting in April of 2006, Bryan ordered Plaintiff to cease his reduced
work schedule and begin full-time leave, despite the fact that just days before, Plaintiff had
submitted a written request for extension of his reduced work schedule for an additional six
months to one year because of his serious medical condition. On June 14, 2006, two days beforePlaintiffs medical leave was allegedly due to end, Bryan informed Plaintiff that he was
demoting Plaintiff to a staff pathologist position, effective June 17, 2006, because Plaintiff had
taken excessive sick leaves; Plaintiffs base salary was also ultimately reduced over $100,000
(over 35%) as a result (such demotion and pay reduction are hereinafter referred to collectively
as demotion or demoted).
18. On July 10, 2006, the Joint Conference Committee (JCC) at KMC voted and
approved Bryans recommendation that Plaintiff be removed from chairmanship of the
Pathology department due to his physical absence from KMC.
19. Plaintiff resumed full-time work as a staff pathologist on October 4, 2006.
Plaintiff continued to suffer a hostile work environment and retaliation.
20. Just before Thanksgiving of 2006, Plaintiff confided to Gilbert Martinez, the
Laboratory Manager at KMC, that he intended to blow the whistle on KMC to appropriate
outside agencies. Days later, Defendant Harris met with Philip Dutt, M.D., Interim Chair of the
Pathology Department at KMC (Dutt), to discuss what steps the Pathology Department should
take in anticipation of Plantiffs whistleblowing to these outside agencies.
21. On or about November 28, 2006, after almost six years of trying to reform KMC
from within, Plaintiff finally blew the whistle on KMC, formally reporting his Concerns to the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospital Organizations, the College of American
Pathologists, and the California Department of Health Services (Authorities).
22. On or about December 4, 2006, Plaintiff submitted a written complaint to KMC
leadership about numerous additional concerns regarding the quality of patient care and the
deterioration of the pathology department.
23. On December 7, Plaintiff was placed on involuntary administrative leave
allegedly pending resolution of a personnel matter.
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 25 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
26/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 8/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
24. On December 13, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter to David Culberson (Culberson),
interim Chief Executive Officer of KMC, and carbon-copied to members of KMCs medical staff
leadership, informing him that he had reported his Concerns to the Authorities.
25.
On March 28, 2007, KMC authorized Plaintiff to access his office in order toretrieve his personal computer files. Upon his arrival, Defendant Dutt informed him that his
office was now locked and that Defendant Dutt now had custody of the key, that Plaintiffs file
cabinet and computer had been physically removed and retasked for other purposes at KMC, and
that Plaintiff would not be able to access his personal computer files after all.
26. On April 4, 2007, Plaintiff placed Defendant County on notice that (i) he still had
yet to be provided any explanation for his involuntary leave or any indication as to whether or
when it would end so that he could return to work, (ii) the involuntary leave requiring him to
remain at home by his phone during working hours was threatening to erode his pathology skills,
jeopardizing his employability and career as a pathologist, (iii) the involuntary leave was
denying him the opportunity to earn income from professional fee billing, and (iv) part-time
work was deemed therapeutic for him by his physician and that the confinement to his house
during working hours was having the opposite effect of severely exacerbating his depression.
27. On April 30, 2007, Defendant County sent a letter to Plaintiff notifying him of its
decision to lift the home restriction. To date, Plaintiff has received no formal explanation for the
involuntary leave or the restriction to his home.
28. On May 1, 2007, Defendant County sent an email to Plaintiff notifying him of its
decision not to renew Plaintiffs employment contract, which was not due to expire until October
4, 2007, and to let the contract run out. To date, Plaintiff has received no formal explanation
for the decision not to renew his contract.
29. On October 4, 2007, Defendant County failed to renew Plaintiffs employment
contract, which therefore expired.
30. On August 15, 2008, Ray Watson, Chair of the Board of Supervisors of
Defendant County, testified in deposition that Defendant County had decided during the course
of several KMC Joint Conference Committee meetings not to renew Plaintiffs employment
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 26 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
27/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 9/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
contract because he had filed the instant lawsuit.
B. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP31. On October 24, 2000, the County entered into an employment contract with
Plaintiff (Initial Contract), hiring him to a full-time position as Chair of the PathologyDepartment at KMC and as Medical Director of the KMC clinical laboratory (Lab Director)
for an employment term ending on November 30, 2006. As Lab Director, Plaintiffs job duties
included Medical Director of KMCs blood bank and transfusion service.
32. On or about November 12, 2002, the County modified Plaintiffs employment
contract to reflect an increase in his compensation and leave accrual rate, among other things.
This second employment contract dated as of October 5, 2002 (Second Contract) extended
Plaintiffs employment term to October 4, 2007. A true and correct copy of the Second Contract
is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, and incorporated by reference herein.
33. The Pathology Department and consequently the Chair of Pathology is
customarily referred to as the conscience of a hospital, and Plaintiffs job duties extended
beyond (his) own department and (he was) expected to be an effective contributor to the overall
improvement efforts of the hospital as a whole. Such duties included participation in many
hospital committees including KMCs Quality Management Committee.
34. According to Exhibit A of the Initial Contract, the County expected Plaintiff to
spend 80 to 90% of his time on clinical duties of a pathologist, and 10 to 20% of his time on
administrative duties as Chair of the Department of Pathology (Chair of Pathology) and Lab
Director.
35. Article V.10 of the Second Contract provides that Plaintiff will not be deemed a
classified employee, or have any rights or protections under the Countys Civil Service
Ordinance, rules or regulation.
36. Article II.3(B)(1) of the Second Contract guarantees that Plaintiffs base salary
will be based on a benchmark salary in proportion to his full-effort commitment. In turn, the
benchmark salary will be based on a national standard with four steps (A-D) with three criteria
for step placement: clinical experience, teaching and administrative duties as set forth in the
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 27 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
28/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 10/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
KMC Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual (KAPP Manual).
37. On information and belief, at the time of his hire, the County placed Plaintiffs
salary level at Step C .
38.
Article III.4 of the Second Contract entitles Plaintiff to the same right to unpaidleave of absence as those provided to a regular County employee under the Countys policy,
including six months cumulative unpaid leave of absence for illness or disability pursuant to
Rule 1201.20 of the Rules of the Civil Service Commission for the County of Kern (CSC
Rules).
39. Article IV.1(B) of the Second Contract requires cause for termination of
Plaintiffs employment, which cause is defined as serious administrative violation and/or
unsatisfactory clinical performance.
40. Article IV.3 of the Second Contract entitles Plaintiff to administrative review of
any corrective action for unsatisfactory clinical performance pursuant to the Bylaws of the
Medical Staff of KMC (Bylaws); and for administrative review of any corrective action for
violation of administrative policies of the County or KMC pursuant to the KAPP Manual.
C. WHISTLEBLOWING41. Throughout the course of his employment by KMC, Plaintiff has advocated for
appropriate patient care and compliance with the quality accreditation standards of the Joint
Commission for the Accreditation of Hospital Organizations, the College of American
Pathologists, the American Association of Blood Banks and the American College of Surgeons
Commission on Cancer as well as applicable state and federal regulations designed to ensure safe
care and conditions of patients.
42. Plaintiff reported his various concerns (Concerns) about inappropriate and/or
suspected unsafe patient care and conditions and non-compliance with applicable laws and
regulations and accreditation standards to Bryan and key members of KMCs medical staff,
including but not limited to the following: (i) beginning in 2001, Plaintiff reported the
unacceptably high levels of unsatisfactory or non-diagnostic FNAs being taken by the Radiology
Department at KMC; (ii) beginning in 2003, Plaintiff reported the unacceptably high incidence
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 28 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
29/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 11/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
of lost or incomplete PCC; (iii) beginning in 2004, Plaintiff reported the need for Internal
Pathology Review; (iv) beginning in 2005, Plaintiff reported the Roy Hysterectomy; (v)
beginning in 2005, Plaintiff reported the need to review the Prostate Biopsy Errors; and (vi)
beginning in 2005, Plaintiff reported that KMC physicians had performed surgery on a wrongpatient due to an error which Plaintiff believed would have been less likely had KMC
implemented Internal Pathology Review. Unfortunately, Plaintiffs reports not only appeared to
fall on deaf ears, but also generated resentment and hostility among his peers at KMC.
43. On or about December 12, 2005, Plaintiffs former attorney, Michael Young
(Young), sent a letter to Barmann, requesting Barmann meet with Plaintiff to discuss his
Concerns.
44. On or about February 9, 2006, Barmann and Barnes met with Plaintiff. Plaintiff
reported his various Concerns, as well as the retaliation, unwarranted criticism, and hostile work
environment Plaintiff was experiencing at KMC.
45. Finally, on or about November 28, 2006, after almost six years of trying to reform
KMC from within in vain, Plaintiff formally reported his Concerns to the Authorities.
46. On December 13, 2006, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Culberson, and carbon-
copied to members of KMCs medical staff leadership, informing him that KMC leadership has
left me no choice but to report the above issues to the appropriate state and accrediting
agencies.
D. UNWARRANTED CRITICISMS47. In 2005, Plaintiff had reported the need for Internal Pathology Review to key
members of KMC medical staff and administration. Roy refused to submit outside pathology
reports for Internal Pathology Review prior to surgery, preferring instead to refer all of his
pathology cases to an acquaintance at the University of Southern California without intereference
from KMCs Pathology Department.
48. On or about April 15, 2005, Roy sent a letter which was addressed to Plaintiff and
carbon-copied to Dr. Leonard Perez (Perez), Chair of the OB-GYN Department at KMC. The
letter contained the following statements of fact:
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 29 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
30/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 12/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Additionally, I cannot institute adjuvant therapy in a timely manner when it takesweeks and sometimes months to get an accurate diagnosis from yourdepartment. Most importantly, delays in instituting appropriate adjuvanttherapy due to delays in obtaining an accurate diagnosis, or institutinginappropriate therapy based on an inaccurate diagnosis can negatively affectpatient survival.
49. Roys statements regarding delays of weeks and months were false. Perez
reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff. Perez reasonably understood the
statements to mean that Plaintiff was not managing the Pathology Department in a competent
manner. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of confidence of his peers at
KMC.
50. On or about April 20, 2005, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Roy and carbon-
copied to Perez, Dr. Maureen Martin, Chair of Surgery (Martin), Kercher and Bryan. The letter
stated: Please refrain from making statements such as it takes weeks and sometimes months to
get an accurate diagnosis from your department without citing specific instances. In my
experience, such statements are typically untrue and consequently are unethical if not supported
by facts. As officers of KMC, Kercher and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede
to protect Plaintiff from Roys unwarranted criticisms, and in so doing, ratified them.
51. In May of 2005, Harris informed Plaintiff that Roy had voiced concerns about the
Pathology Department and had submitted certain pathology reports for second-level peer review
and investigation. Plaintiff requested that Harris identify the pathology reports in question but
Harris refused. Later, Plaintiff determined that no second-level peer review ever occurred.
52. On or about June 30, 2005, Martin and Harris told Plaintiff that Roy was making
negative comments about the Pathology Department.
53. On or about June 30, 2005, Plaintiff sent a letter addressed to Roy and carbon-
copied to Perez, Martin, Harris, Kercher and Bryan. The letter stated:
It has come to my attention that you are making negative statements to numerouskey members of the medical staff regarding pathology reports issued by thisdepartment. You are reported by others to claim that several of KMC pathologydiagnoses do not agree with outside diagnoses rendered by other outsidepathologists and that these discrepancies have or would have changed patientmanagement. It would appear from these actions that you are claiming that ourdiagnoses are not correct. I do not recollect any true, substantial discrepanciesbetween diagnoses rendered by this department and outside pathologydepartments based upon retrospective review of our cases since my arrival in
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 30 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
31/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 13/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
December 2000. It is reported that you claim to have in your possession severalsuch reports detailing incorrect diagnoses rendered by our department. It is alsomy understanding that you have been asked on several occasions to produceexamples of these discrepancies, and as of yet have not produced any such reportsto individuals that have made these requests. To demonstrate and support theaccuracy of your claims, I request that you produce copies of these reports for my
review by July 15, 2005.54. Roys statements of fact regarding incorrect diagnoses by the Pathology
Department were false. The key members of the KMC medical staff who heard the statements
reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff and reasonably understood the
statements to mean that Plaintiff was not managing the Pathology Department in a competent
manner. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of confidence of his peers at
KMC. As officers of KMC, Harris, Kercher and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to
intercede against Roys unwarranted criticisms and in so doing, ratified them.
55. On or about July 15, 2005, Roy sent a letter addressed to Plaintiff and carbon-
copied to Harris, Bryan and Perez. The letter stated:
I was quite surprised to receive your letter of June 5th. The discrepanciesshould be well known to you as I have brought them to your attention many times,both in the presence of Dr. Perez, and in a letter to you a couple of months ago, aswell as multiple phone conversations. The inaccuracies, delays and refusals torefer specimens for outside review continue. The matter has been appropriatelyreported to the administration for a quality assurance review, as I have had nosuccess in my pleadings to you directly.
56. Roys statements of fact regarding the existence of discrepancies and the
bringing of them to Plaintiffs attention many times and in the presence of Dr. Perez were
false. Harris, Bryan and Perez reasonably understood that the statements were about Plaintiff and
reasonably understood the statements to mean that Plaintiff was neither managing the Pathology
Department in a competent manner nor being truthful about Roys disclosures of the facts and
circumstances underlying his unwarranted criticisms. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a
significant loss of confidence of his peers at KMC. As officers of KMC, Harris and Bryan
approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roys unwarranted criticisms and in so
doing, ratified them.
57. Moreover, Roys statement of fact that he had reported the matter to KMC
administration for quality assurance review was false. Harris, Bryan and Perez reasonably
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 31 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
32/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 14/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
understood that the statement was about Plaintiff and reasonably understood the statements to
mean that Plaintiff was not managing the Pathology Department in a competent manner. As a
consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of confidence of his peers at KMC. As
officers of KMC, Harris and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roysunwarranted criticisms and in so doing, ratified them.
58. On October 12, 2005, Plaintiff gave a presentation at the monthly KMC oncology
conference (Oncology Conference) highlighting concerns regarding a patient that might need a
hysterectomy, and the need for Internal Pathology Review.
59. Plaintiffs presentation lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes, which exceeded
alleged conference time limits by approximately ten minutes. Plaintiff was stopped before he
could present his final slides stating his patient care quality conclusions.
60. On information and belief, presenters at prior and subsequent Oncology
Conferences frequently exceeded time limits without interruption, incident, or reprimand.
61. Roy, Bill Taylor, Vice-Chair of Surgery, and Albert McBride, the Cancer
Committee Liaison, attended Plaintiffs presentation at the October 12 Oncology Conference and
were requested by Harris to give him letters criticizing Plaintiffs time infraction.
62. In response, Roy sent a letter (Roy Letter), dated October 13, 2005, addressed
to Harris. The Roy Letter stated in relevant part:
With respect, Dr. Jadwin is a small rural community hospital pathologist, withvery limited experience and no specialty training in regard to GynecologicOncologic Pathology. Dr. Jadwin is not a clinician, and has neither the fund ofknowledge nor the experience to make any recommendations regarding thetreatment of patients, much less criticize the care provided by those, such asmyself, whose training and experience were attained at some of the highest seatsof learning in the U.S and abroad. Additionally, as you are aware, it is notinfrequent that Dr. Jadwins diagnoses are in err when reviewed by outsidespecialists, as in this particular case. The management of the patient would havebeen inappropriate if we accepted Dr. Jadwins report, which as you know, was
different from two other pathologists in his own department (three differentopinions). I have no confidence in Dr. Jadwin and I am actively pursuing thepossibility of having all specimens from the Gynecologic Oncology serviceevaluated outside, as is currently done for the Neurosurgery service. I havediscussed these issues with Dr. Perez, Chairman of the Department of Obstectricsand Gynecology, and he assures me of his full support.
63. The Roy Letter contained the following false statements of fact: (i) Plaintiff is a
small rural community hospital pathologist, (ii) Plaintiff has very limited experience in
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 32 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
33/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 15/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Gynecologic Oncologic Pathology, (iii) Plaintiff is not a clinician, (iv) Plaintiff has neither the
fund of knowledge nor the experience to make any recommendations regarding the treatment of
patients, much less criticize the care given by doctors such as Roy, (v) it is not infrequent that
Plaintiffs diagnoses are in err when reviewed by outside specialists, as in this particular case,(vi) the management of the patient would have been inappropriate if Plaintiffs report had been
accepted, and (vii) Plaintiffs report was different from two other pathologists in his own
department, suggesting the deficiency of his report. Harris reasonably understood that the
statements were about Plaintiff and reasonably understood the statements to mean that Plaintiffs
credentials and abilities as a pathologist and physician were deficient. Roy impugned Plaintiff
despite Plaintiffs numerous prior requests to stop doing so. As a consequence, Plaintiff
experienced a significant loss of confidence of his peers at KMC. As an officer of KMC, Harris
approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roys unwarranted criticisms and in so
doing, ratified them.
64. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Harris subsequently
republished the Roy Letter to members of KMC staff, and that such staff further republished the
Roy Letter to other members of KMC staff. Such other members of KMC staff reasonably
understood that the statements contained in the Roy Letter were about Plaintiff and reasonably
understood such statements to mean that Plaintiffs credentials and abilities as a pathologist and
physician were deficient. As a consequence, Plaintiff experienced a significant loss of confidence
of his peers at KMC. As officers of KMC, Harris, and DOES 1 through 10 accepted, and/or
failed to intercede against Roys unwarranted criticisms or their subsequent republication, and in
so doing, ratified them.
65. On or about October 17, 2005, Plaintiff was ordered to attend a meeting with
Kercher, Harris and Ragland who subjected Plaintiff to humiliating ridicule, yelling and
inappropriate questioning regarding Plaintiffs alleged violation of Oncology Conference time
limits. Kercher, Harris and Ragland informed Plaintiff that they had received letters of
disapprobation (Disapprobation Letters) from three conference participants one of which was
the Roy Letter and would be issuing a letter of reprimand later that day which would be entered
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 33 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
34/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 16/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
into Plaintiffs medical staff file. When Plaintiff asked to see the Disapprobation Letters,
Kercher, Harris and Ragland refused to provide them. As officers of KMC, Harris, Kercher,
Ragland and Abraham approved, accepted, and/or failed to intercede against Roys unwarranted
criticisms or their subsequent republication by Harris and other members of KMC staff, and in sodoing, ratified such unwarranted criticisms.
66. Later that day, Harris, Kercher, Ragland and Abraham issued a formal letter of
reprimand addressed to Plaintiff (Reprimand Letter). The Reprimand Letter stated: Your
repeated misconduct at the Tumor Conference on October 12, 2005 was noted by numerous
attendants, three of which have written letters of their dissatisfaction, which will be entered into
your medical staff file. The three letters to be entered into Plaintiffs medical staff file included
the Roy Letter. As officers of KMC, Harris, Kercher, Ragland and Abraham approved, accepted,
and/or failed to intercede against Roys unwarranted criticisms or their subsequent republication
by Harris and members of KMC staff, and in so doing, ratified such unwarranted criticisms.
67. During the period from on or about October 17, 2005 to on or about January
2007, Plaintiff submitted numerous requests to Harris, Ms. Karen Barnes, Deputy County
Counsel for the County of Kern (Barnes), and Bryan to see the Disapprobation Letters. He was
continuously refused. As officers of KMC, Harris and Bryan approved, accepted, and/or failed to
intercede against Roys uwarranted criticisms or their subsequent republication by Harris and
members of KMC staff, and in so doing, ratified such unwarranted criticisms.
68. On or about December 12, 2005, Young sent a letter to Barmann stating:
Recently, Dr. Jadwin was advised that several of the staff physicians had writtenletters of dissatisfaction regarding Dr. Jadwins professionalism and was advisedthat these letters were placed into his personnel/medical staff file. When thedoctor asked to see these letters, he was refused access to them and wassubsequently told that the letters had not been placed into his file. Dr. Jadwin thensent an e-mail to Deputy County Counsel, Karen Barnes, copy attached, regarding
an opinion with respect to his right to inspect the file. At this juncture, there hasbeen no reply to his request. Needless to say, Dr. Jadwin is extremely upset andemotionally distraught over the present state of affairs.
69. On or about January 6, 2006, Barnes sent a letter on behalf of Barmann and
addressed to Young. The letter included as an attachment a copy of the Roy Letter, redacted to
conceal Roys identity. This letter afforded Plaintiff his first opportunity to see the Roy Letter
Case 1:07-cv-00026-OWW-TAG Document 217 Filed 09/02/2008 Page 34 of 77
-
8/14/2019 217 P Mx Amend SAC
35/77
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES & INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 17/43
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
and the unwarranted criticisms contained therei