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DOI: 10.1177/02654075060624762006; 23; 249Journal of Social and Personal Relationships

Alan D. Heisel and Michael J. Beattyneuroscience approach to theory of mind in relationships

the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices? A cognitiveAre cognitive representations of friends' request refusals implemented in

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Are cognitive representations offriends request refusals

implemented in the orbitofrontal

and dorsolateral prefrontal

cortices? A cognitive

neuroscience approach to theory

of mind in relationships

Alan D. Heisel & Michael J. Beatty

University of Missouri-St. Louis

ABSTRACT

Formulating cognitive representations of others mental stateswhen interpreting behavior (i.e., theory of mind) rather thanmerely focusing on the behavior is considered a distinctlyhuman trait which both interpersonal scholars and cognitiveneuroscientists agree plays a critical role in the developmentand maintenance of social relationships. Although brain-imaging studies have led to huge advances in the understand-ing of memory and language, theories of social relationshipsremain relatively uninformed by cognitive neuroscience. Inthe present study, hypotheses regarding the implementationof theory of mind in a relationship context are (a) derived

from extant theory and research, and (b) tested via brain-imaging technology. Specifically, spectrum analyses wereconducted using brain wave recordings collected by anelectroencephalograph (EEG) monitoring oscillations in thegamma range for the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontalcortices while participants attempted to construct cognitiverepresentations regarding a friends request refusal. Resultsindicated statistically greater electrical activity in both cortical

Journal of Social and Personal Relationships Copyright 2006 SAGE Publications(www.sagepublications.com),Vol. 23(2): 249265. DOI: 10.1177/0265407506062476

All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Alan D. Heisel, AssociateProfessor and Director of the Graduate Program, Department of Communication, University

of Missouri-St. Louis, One University Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 631214499, USA [e-mail:

[email protected]].

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regions for participants engaged in the task than for partici-pants in the control condition. The implications of the findingsfor building a fully elaborated sequential process model ofcognitive representations in interpersonal contexts, among

other theoretical endeavors, are discussed.

KEY WORDS: EEG electroencephalogram prefrontal cortex request refusals theory of mind

Several scholars exploring behavior from a cognitive neuroscience perspec-tive maintain that language (Levelt, 2000; Pinker, 1994, 1997; Preus, 2000;Tomasello & Call, 1997) and theory of mind (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990;Levelt, 2000; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Preus, 2000; Provinelli & Preus,

1995) are distinctly human cognitive functions. Theory of mind refers tothe attempt to differentiate what one knows, thinks, intends, or feels fromwhat others know, think, intend or feel (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Withinthe context of social interaction, theory of mind represents the propensityto interpret behavior by making inferences about mental states, rather thanmerely in terms of behavioral tendencies (Preus, 2000, p. 1221). Regard-less of whether the construct is conceptualized as perspective taking (Hale& Delia, 1976), empathy (Rogers, 1970), metathinking (Laing, 1969), mindreading (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000), or theory of mind (Premack &

Woodruff, 1978), it is essential to interpersonal communication. As Berger(2002) put it, those who are skilled at achieving their own goals duringsocial interaction have to know not only where they are in their goal hier-archies, but what higher-order goals others are pursuing (p. 192). Further-more, contemporary cognitive neuroscientists (e.g., Levelt, 2000; Tooby &Cosmides, 2000) as well as scholars approaching interpersonal relationshipsfrom a humanistic perspective (e.g., Laing, 1969; Rogers, 1970) consider theability to produce accurate cognitive representations of anothers state ofmind central to the development and maintenance of social relationships.

In this article, we take a cognitive neuroscience perspective on theory of

mind as it occurs in friendship contexts. While advances in cognitive neuro-science especially the volcanic eruption of imaging studies (Levelt, 2000,p. 844) have already transformed the study of language (Brown, Hagoort,& Kutas, 2000; Indefrey & Levelt, 2000; Pinker, 1994; Stromswold, 2000),few studies have focused on theory of mind. The present study was under-taken to address the paucity of research directed at cortical activity duringtheory of mind processes. Specifically, changes in electrical activity in tworegions of the cortex suggested by theory and research as cortical regionsassociated with theory of mind operations (i.e., orbitofrontal and dorso-lateral prefrontal cortices) were measured in response to participantsefforts to produce cognitive representations of the mental states associatedwith messages attributed to a friend.

250 Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 23(2)



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Conceptual framework

A cognitive neuroscience perspectiveTheories of cognition have been advanced and refined by the wealth ofknowledge generated, especially in the past 10 years, under the rubric ofcognitive neuroscience (Gazzaniga, 2000; Pinker, 1997). The principal goalof neuroscience is to map the information-processing structure of thehuman mind and discover how this computational organ is implemented inthe physical organization of the brain (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000, p. 1167).One foundational premise of cognitive neuroscience is that the brain is anorganization of computation. As such, its physical structure embodies a setof programs that process information, and . . . that physical structure is therebecause it embodies these programs (p. 1167). Thus, our present attempt

to connect increased activity in the specific regions of the cortex to engage-ment in theory of mind processes constituted a cognitive neuroscienceapproach. This is precisely the type of research Beatty and McCroskey(1998) hoped to stimulate when they insisted that theoretical speculationabout thinking, feeling, and behaving during human interaction must beconsistent with knowledge about brain-functioning (p. 46).

Undertaking the present study holds the potential to advance under-standing about theory of mind in relational contexts in at least two ways.First, if consistent patterns of activation in targeted regions of the cortexcan be isolated during theory of mind inductions, then it would be possible

to determine whether or not participants were engaging in theory of mindwhen engaged in complex activities involving multiple operations such asplanning social influence messages, for instance, by inspecting cortical acti-vation patterns for the presence or absence of the empirically derived elec-trical signatures of theory of mind activity. Although activation in theorbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices is associated with manycognitive operations, it might be possible to differentiate theory of mindprocesses on the basis of degree of activation and the sequence of activa-tion among the regions engaged. A second potential yield from the presentstudy concerns determining whether the neurobiological processes associ-ated with theory of mind in response to characters in stories (e.g., Fletcheret al., 1995) generalize to interpersonal contexts. In particular, cognitiverepresentations of friends perspectives might involve different or, at least,additional cognitive processes, thereby suggesting the need for a differentmodel of cortical activity. On the other hand, the process of theory of mindmight be invariant across stimuli. The current study presented the oppor-tunity to examine cortical activity during theory of mind processes in afriendship context.

Theory of mind and cortex activityWe are certainly not the first to explore the association between communi-cation functions and brain characteristics. Over a decade ago,communicationresearchers examined nonverbal behavior and intrapersonal processes asfunctions of the left versus right cerebral hemispheres (Andersen, Garrison,

Heisel & Beatty:A neuroscience approach 251



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& Andersen, 1979; Sellers & Stacks, 1990; Stacks & Andersen, 1989; Stacks& Sellers, 1986, 1989). Although some communication scholars (Floyd &Mikkelson, 2003) and, in fact, some neuroscientists (Davidson & Hugdahl,1995), remain interested in hemispheric asymmetry, advances in brainmapping beginning in the mid 1990s have also made it possible to isolateprecise locations of the neurological origins of specific kinds of specificcognitive activity.

The physical structures of interest in the present study are located in theprefrontal regions of the cortex. In the present study, we focused on theorbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices. Studies show thatthoughts about mental states are implemented in the orbitofrontal cortex(Baron-Cohen et al., 1994). In fact, damage to the orbitofrontal cortexresults in insensitivity to the emotional states of others (Stuss & Benson,

1986). The orbitofrontal cortex integrates information from several corticesand subcortical regions, most notably the amygdala, and maintains a mentalrepresentation of others mental states online while other processes areundertaken (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). In addition, however, the information-processing functions performed in the dorsolateral prefrontal corteximplicate the structure for involvement during theory of mind activity. Asnoted, engaging in theory of mind involves forming a cognitive representa-tion of anothers mental state, which requires differentiating that state fromones own mental state. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex consolidatesmental representations and co-ordinates attention shifts from one mental

process to another when multiple cognitive tasks must be accomplished(DEsposito et al., 1995) and it scans working memory for data that mightbe useful in solving the problem at hand (Levy & Goldman-Rakic, 2000;Petrides, 2000; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000).

Figure 1 provides a visual referent for the location of the orbitofrontaland the dorsolateral prefrontal cortices. The illustration presents a pictureof the brain from overhead with the top of the illustration representing thefront of the brain. Like all other regions of the brain, the orbitofrontal anddorsolateral prefrontal cortices are defined by clusters of interactingneurons. A brief review of neuronal structure and function would demon-strate the significance of electrical impulses as an index of activation (for amore comprehensive discussion see Marieb & Mallatt, 1992, pp. 308310).

An example of the structure of a neuron is illustrated in Figure 2. Eachneuron consists of a cell body and extensions called dendrites and axons.Cell bodies contain genetic matter and material required to function as aconduit for nerve impulses. Dendrites are branch-like extensions thatprotrude from the cell body and function as receptor sites. The inner cyto-plasmic side of an unstimulated dendrite is negatively charged and theconcentration of potassium (K +) ions is greater inside the dendrite than

externally but the sodium (Na +) ion concentrations are lower inside thanoutside. When neurotransmitters released by a nearby neuron alter thepermeability of the outer membrane of the dendrite, positive Na + ionsenter the dendrite resulting in a less negative inner face. If the stimulussupplied by the neurotransmitter is strong enough, it results in a nerve




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impulse or graded potential charge that spreads to the axon. Axons areprotrusions from the cell body that transmit nerve impulses away from thecell body and result in the secretion of neurotransmitters into the synapticspace, which in turn stimulate the dendrites of other neurons.


FIGURE 1Location of orbitofrontal (A) and dorsolateral prefrontal (B) cortices in a

two-dimensional top-down perspective.

FIGURE 2Structure of a neuron.

Front

Back

(B)

(A)

Dendrites

Cell Body

Axon



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HypothesesWithin the context of the present study, the electrical activity indicatingneuronal activity within the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal areasof the cortex in response to a theory of mind task is, therefore, of majorinterest. Based on the conceptual framework for the present study, thefollowing two hypotheses were posited:

1. Electrical activity in the orbitofrontal cortex area will be significantlygreater for participants formulating cognitive representations aboutanothers state of mind than for control participants.

2. Electrical activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex area will besignificantly greater for participants formulating cognitive representa-tions about anothers state of mind than for control participants.

Method

Overview of the studyAll data were collected in the Department of Communications ResearchLaboratory, which is designed for the analysis of cortical activity. At the recep-tion counter of the lab, participants were greeted and briefed regarding theprocedures that were to be performed. After the briefing, participants were ledto the EEG station where they read and signed the informed consent agree-ment and responded to a demographic questionnaire. Electrical activity in the

cortex was recorded using an electroencephalograph (EEG) and an electrodesensor array for 20 participants (10 male, 10 female; Mage = 28.5). Ten partici-pants (5 male, 5 female) were randomly selected for the theory of mind taskand 10 participants (5 male, 5 female) were randomly assigned to the controlcondition. Data were collected one participant at a time. Each session, includ-ing equipment set-up, experimental procedure, and debriefing lasted over anhour. All sessions were audio taped. After the data were collected, participantswere debriefed regarding the specific hypotheses tested and were invited toreview their specific results.

Theory of mind inductionIn order to induce theory of mind processes, participants were asked to thinkof a same-sex friend. When the participant indicated that a friend was identi-fied, the experimenter presented a scenario verbally in which the participanthad asked to borrow a CD from the friend but the friend refused to lendthe CD without providing any explanation. The experimenter then asked theparticipant to think about, but not verbalize, why the friend might refusethe request. Upon indicating that they had formulated an impression of whatthe friend was thinking, in all cases, the participants were able to immediatelypresent their impression of their friends mental states. The most frequentresponses involved participants disclosures that they were notorious for losing

things and not being careful with items in general. As a follow-up, participantswere asked what strategies they might use to check their impressions and, inall cases,participants indicated that they would simply ask their friends directly.Participants cortical activity was recorded throughout the theory of mind task.The protocols for the control group were identical to those of the theory of




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mind group, except participants were asked only to think of a same-sex friend.After indicating that a friend was identified, the participants were asked todescribe how well they knew the target person. However, control participantswere not asked to describe the friends mental states.

ApparatusElectrical impulses in the cortex were gathered using a Compumedics/Neuroscan Electrocap system specifically designed for use with the EEG in ourresearch lab.1 The electrocaps in this study include a sensor array made up of34 Ag/AgCl (silver/silver chloride) sintered electrodes that are embedded in aspandex cap and six electrodes, connected to the electrocap, for referent andcontrol functions. Even though the spandex caps adapt to skull shape and helpto position the electrodes in accordance with the International 1020 elec-trode-placement system (Harner & Sannit, 1974), we verified electrode align-

ment with the nasion as a referent for each participant. In addition, weemployed different-sized sensor caps to accommodate various head sizes forincreased accuracy in the placement of electrodes.2 Control function electrodes,one on each earlobe, served as signal referents while those remaining wereplaced on standard facial locations to monitor blinking and eye movement.The signals from all electrodes were isolated and amplified using a DC-basedacquisition system. The system used in this study was a research gradeCompumedics/Neuroscan NuAmps 40-channel electroencephalograph. Finally,a high-speed desktop computer was used to run Neuroscans proprietarysoftware (SCAN version 4.3). This software interfaces with the EEG and elec-trocap system to collect, transform, and store data.

Check for obtrusiveness. After the theory of mind induction or control instruc-tions were completed, participants were asked to rate the degree to which theywere aware of the cap on a 1 to 10 scale (1 = completely unaware, 10 =completely aware). The mean rating for obtrusiveness (M= 4.10, SD = 3.37)


1. The lab is divided into two areas, separated by a modular wall: (1) The reception and moni-

toring station, and (2) the EEG collection cubical. In addition, the lab is centrally located inthe building and distant from major power sources. Because EEG data can be distorted by

major power sources, the location of the lab is important. Furthermore, all AC-based electri-

cal equipment in the lab is routed through a medical grade isolation transformer to eliminateRF interference. Calibration and testing indicated that the lab was free of mains line noise.

2. The localization of neurological events such as an epileptic spike would certainly warrantshaving a patients head and individually placing electrodes. Indeed, in such circumstances, the

surface of the scalp would be shaved and measured, each electrode attached individually, andthe data corroborated via MRI or CAT. Researchers in cognitive neuroscience who employ

EEG, however, often use sensor caps because of the accuracy and speed of electrode place-

ment. It is difficult to vary the placement of an individual electrode by much more than 3/8'and the application time is significantly reduced. Of course, when researchers are concerned

with an extremely small area of the cortex, for example, the size of a pinhead, more preciseplacement of each electrode might be required. However, as indicated in Figure 1, the dorso-

lateral prefrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex are relatively large (e.g., the orbitofrontalarea is approximately 3 1/2" 2 1/2" in the average adult). Furthermore, estimations ofgamma activity were based on data derived from several independent electrodes monitoring

the regions of interest. Therefore, the approximations that result from sensor caps providereasonably accurate approximations of the electrical activity in the regions of interest.



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indicated very little obtrusiveness for the procedure. Importantly, only three ofthe participants rated the obtrusiveness higher than the midpoint on the scale.Furthermore, in response to a follow-up question, those three participants indi-cated that although they were aware of being monitored, it had little or no

effect on their responses.

Impedance check. Establishing and maintaining low levels of impedance isessential to the quality of EEG data. Low impedance depends on the qualityof contact between the electrodes and the participants scalp. To achieve high-quality contact, each electrode was loaded with electrolyte gel. Impedancelevels were examined using software bundled with SCAN 4.3 which providesreadings that range from 0 to 1000 kOhms where 0 kOhms represents theabsence of impedance. In the present study, we achieved low levels of imped-ance for electrodes in the orbitofrontal (M = 9.29 kOhms) and dorsolateralprefrontal cortex (M= 10.00 kOhms).

Results

Descriptive statisticsCortical responses consisted of electrical activity, reported in microvolts, in thegamma spectrum.3 As a reference point, baseline levels of electrical activitywere estimated by scanning the entire EEG record for each subject andlocating the lowest level of electrical activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (M=1.20, S = .39) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (M = 1.13, SD = .52) areas.

Activity levels in response to the theory of mind induction consisted ofmaximum electrical activity recorded during the interval between the experi-mental induction and the participants verbalizations. Activity levels for thecontrol group consisted of maximum electrical activity observed during theperiod participants thought about the target person. The mean duration ofthese intervals was 3 seconds. Means and standard deviations for electricalactivity in the orbitofrontal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex areas


3. One common way to treat EEG data is to calculate evoked response potentials (ERPs).

However, ERPs are only appropriate for phase-locked stimuli. The procedure typicallyinvolves presenting a stimulus (e.g., playing a tone in a persons left or right ear, inverting black

and white images, etc.) to a participant hundreds or thousands of times. Normalization algo-rithms are then used to calculate the ERP from repeated trials. However, social interactions,

theory of mind, thoughts and judgments about relational scenarios, and similar activities, are

too complex for this procedure. Although scenarios could be presented multiple times, thenumber of exposures are likely to produce changes in the participants responses. Because of

the nature of the phenomena we are studying, induced potentials are more appropriate oper-ational definitions of cortical responses. Responses that are not phase-locked and reflect more

of an integrated, global processing model can be examined using induced potentials. Induced

potentials are derived from an examination of electrical activity in oscillation spectrums ofinterest (e.g., alpha, theta, gamma). Treisman (1999) referred to this as a promising new tool.

The gamma range has been associated with higher order thinking and other cognitive activi-ties and thus was the focus of this study (for a review of induced potentials and the so-called

binding problem, see Treisman, 1999). Spectrum analysis of activation in the gamma range

was conducted for each subject. The acquired data was then aggregated and exported forstatistical analysis.



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are presented in Table 1. For illustrative purposes, the activation in theorbitofrontal cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during the theory ofmind task for one participant is displayed in Figure 3 as a two-dimensional top-down representation based on the spectrum analysis. Figure 3 depicts activa-

tion such that lighter shades indicate greater activity.

Test of hypothesesCalculation of t-tests for independent samples supported both hypotheses. Aspredicted in Hypothesis 1, the mean electrical activity in the orbitofrontalcortex for participants formulating cognitive representations of anothers stateof mind (M= 3.12, SD = 1.52) was significantly higher, t(19) = 2.55,p < .05(two-tailed) than for participants merely thinking about a target person (M=1.81, SD = .58). Likewise, the analysis for the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was


FIGURE 3Computer-generated representation of brain activity during theory of mind

tasks.

TABLE 1Means and standard deviations for control conditions and induced recordingsof electrical activity in the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices

Control group Theory of mind induction

Orbitofrontal cortex M= 1.81a M= 3.12aSD = .58 SD = 1.52

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex M= 1.30b M= 3.48bSD = .54 SD = 1.90

Note. Means represent microvolts of electrical activity in the gamma range. Common subscriptsindicate significant differences (p < .05).



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consistent with Hypothesis 2. Mean electrical activity in the dorsolateralprefrontal cortex for participants thinking about what they thought theirfriends were thinking (M= 3.48, SD = 1.90) was significantly higher, t(19) =3.49,p < .05 (two-tailed) than the mean for the control group (M= 1.30, SD =

.54). In terms of Cohens (1988) d, for example, the statistics for both hypothe-ses exceeded the benchmark for a large effect (i.e., d > .80) by a substantialmargin (d = 1.25 for the orbitofrontal hypothesis, and d = 1.79 for the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex hypothesis). Transformed to Pearson correlationcoefficients, the effects were r= .53 for the orbitofrontal cortex and r= .66 forthe dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

Supplemental analysisAlthough electrical activity at baseline was not significantly different for thetheory of mind and the control group for either the orbitofrontal (MTOM = 1.15,

SD = .46, Mc = 1.24, SD = .32, t= 0.50, n.s.) or the dorsolateral prefrontal (MTOM= 1.22, SD = .64, Mc = 1.03, SD = .40, t= 0.79, n.s.) areas, the baseline levels werenot identical. Given that the sample was not large and that the baseline levelswere not identical, the hypotheses were tested in a supplemental analysis withchange scores as the units of analysis. The results confirmed the hypotheses. At-test for independent samples indicated that the mean increase from baselinein the orbitofrontal cortex was significantly larger, t(19) = 2.38,p < .05 (two-tailed) for the theory of mind group (M= 1.97, SD = 1.63) than for the controlgroup (M= .57, SD = .50). Similarly, the results for the dorsolateral prefrontalcortex indicated that the average increase in electrical activity for theory of mindparticipants (M= 2.26, S = 1.42) was significantly larger, t(19) = 4.30,p < .05

(two-tailed) than for participants in the control group (M= .27, SD = .34).

Discussion

The present study was undertaken to link activation in the orbitofrontalcortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to efforts at producing acognitive representation of anothers mental state. Participants were askedto think about why a friend might refuse to lend them CDs while an EEGrecorded electrical activity in the cortex of the participants. The results indi-cated statistically large responses in both the orbitofrontal and dorsolateralprefrontal cortices as predicted. Specifically, the results pertaining to theorbitofrontal cortex were consistent with previous research (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1994) and those for the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex suggestthat the same neurological processes underlying the formation of cognitiverepresentations and co-ordination of attention shifts during complex infor-mation processing in general are present during a theory of mind exercisein a friendship context.

Implications for relationship researchThe results of the present study have two main implications for the empiri-cal study of relationships from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. First,the results regarding theory of mind provide initial data needed to beginbuilding a model of the neurological signature of efforts to produce cogni-tive representations of others mental states. The pattern of activity was




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produced as a function of isolating theory of mind cognitive activity. If amodel can be fully elaborated, it might be possible to examine corticalactivity during a variety of message-planning scenarios to determinewhether, or to what extent, an effort to envision others mental statesfactors into the process.

Certainly, many scholars have emphasized the role of considering theothers perspective in achieving goals (Berger, 2002; Hale & Delia, 1976),inducing therapeutic change (Rogers, 1970), and managing conflict(Selman, 1980). In fact, cognitive neuroscientist Willem Levelt (2000) wentso far as to argue that

it is reasonable to suppose that a major selective pressure derived from theneed to maintain coherence in ever-growing cooperative clans. Our closestrelatives in nature, the old world primates, achieve this bond largely by

grooming . . . Bonding-by-grooming, however, becomes impractical for themuch larger clan size that is typical of a hunter-gatherer society. Clearly,language can serve this function . . . It is a particularly well designed forcommunication in a society of individuals that have a theory of mind.(p. 843)

Theory of mind is essential to adapt messages to fit individual personal-ities if language is to serve a bonding as well as instrumental function inour society. However, to observe that a species has the ability to formulatecognitive representations of others mental states does not ensure that

members of that species engage in the process as an automatic reflex. Wewere able to induce theory of mind processes experimentally to somedegree in every participant. Importantly, however, the results showeddramatic increases in electrical activity for those engaged in theory of mindover that for participants merely thinking about a friend. Thus, it waspossible to differentiate theory of mind processes from mere reflection orrecall on the basis of degree of activation. This suggests that forming cogni-tive representations of anothers mental state is an effortful endeavor froma neurological standpoint. If we take seriously the observation that humanbeings tend to be cognitive misers as Taylor and Fiske (1978) put it, whoprefer to simplify input, then it is unlikely that theory of mind would consti-tute the dominate response in communicators, regardless of its apparentcentrality to social relationships. The model of theory of mind potentiallyderivable from the results of the present study provides an analytic toolpermitting relational researchers to observe the facilitating or inhibitingeffects of relational contingencies on theory of mind processes in real timeand in neurophysiological terms. This approach might advance our under-standing of interpersonal success and failure during social influenceattempts, conflict resolution scenarios, and in the trajectory of social

relationships in general.Second, the success of our attempt to demonstrate the biological basesof theory of mind indicates that a cognitive neuroscience approach torelationships holds promise beyond the focus on theory of mind in thepresent study. Consciousness in the sense of an integrated self-interactingwith the environment is known to be organized in an executive center set




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of information programs consisting mostly of prefrontal cortex regions(DEsposito et al., 1995; Fuster, 1997; Tanji & Hoshi, 2001). As Tanji andHoshi (2001) observed, generating purposeful action is the cardinal aspectof the cognitive functions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (p. 164). Forinstance, the cognitive function of error detection is associated withanterior cingulate activity (Carter et al., 1998). Conscious thoughts aboutconsequences of a course of action are associated with prefrontal orbitaland ventromedial prefrontal cortices (Bachara, Damasio, Damasio, &Anderson, 1994; Bachara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Damasio,Tranel, & Damasio, 1991). In fact, research indicates that damage to theventromedial prefrontal cortex interrupts higher-order mental functions,including comprehension of how a plan might eventually unfold (Damasio,1995).

Beatty (2003) argued that the validity of a wide range of constructsposited by cognitive approaches to social interaction (e.g., knowledge struc-tures) could be examined through a cognitive neuroscience perspective.The present study marks the first in a program of research designed tofollow this path. In our lab, for example, preliminary findings of a separatestudy indicate that routine messages can be differentiated from spon-taneously crafted messages on the basis of spectrum analysis of activity inthe prefrontal cortex. The degree to which messages represent variationsof MOPs rather than fully adaptive constructions can be parsed on the basisof differential cortical activity. In short, many hypothetical constructs

posited to explain information processing within the context of relation-ships can be operationally defined in terms of cortical activation. Clearly,evidence that the conceptualizations of social cognition are consistent withfacts regarding how the brain works would strengthen the literature.

Issues for future researchAt least five lines of research into theory of mind follow from the presentstudy. First, as more data are collected, it will be possible to specify thesequential order of localized cortical activity underlying theory of mind.Although the cognitive processes associated with each region of theprefrontal cortex are not completely documented, a great deal is alreadyknown about the cognitive operations implemented in the orbitofrontaland dorsolateral regions. Therefore, once all of the regions involved intheory of mind are identified, plotting the sequential order of activationwould provide insight into the order of cognitive operations that constitutetheory of mind. In this way, we could substantially advance our under-standing of theory of mind asprocess. With respect to our data, the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex activated prior to the orbitofrontal cortex in everyparticipant. Given the cognitive functions associated with each region, this

pattern suggests that when induced to form a cognitive representation ofothers mental states, the task is first consolidated as a goal state. Next, therepresentation is developed in the orbitofrontal cortex. Certainly, a fullyelaborated process model would include activation of memory-relatedregions of the cortex. The present study, however, focused exclusively on




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regions involved in the assembly of cognitive representations. Regions suchas the left parietal (Rugg & Allan, 2000) and the right anterior cortex(Buckner, 2000), which are involved in episodic memory downloading,provide asupportor resource function but are not directly involved in theassembly of cognitive representations.4 A fully elaborated model of thetheory of mind process would need to include memory functions as well asother auxiliary processes.

Second, neither the content nor accuracy of the cognitive representationswas examined in the present study. It might be that accuracy depends solelyon information already contained in memory about the target person orscenario. On the other hand, those who formulate accurate cognitive repre-sentations of the others states of mind might engage in auxiliary processesduring theory of mind efforts that could be described neurologically.

Third, the present study was focused on the development of cognitiverepresentations that can be classified as first-order theory of mind (e.g.,Baron-Cohen, 2000) because our interest was limited to what participantsthought their friends were thinking. Second-order theory of mind involvesforming a cognitive representation regarding what the participant thinksthe other thinks the participant thinks. Theoretically, theory of mind canproduce an infinite regression that is quite similar to the metalevelsproposed years ago by Laing (1969). It is possible that tasks requiringhigher-order theory of mind would produce higher levels of activation thanwere observed for first-order theory of mind.

Fourth, while the effects of theory of mind inductions produced largeincreases in activation, there was variance in the degree of change in elec-trical activity for both the orbitofrontal (SD = 1.59) and the dorsolateralprefrontal (SD = 1.43) cortices, suggesting the possibility of individualdifferences in cognitive effort expended during theory of mind activity. Forinstance, variation in cortical activity might account for observed individ-ual differences in cortical activity which might account for observed indi-vidual differences in social perspective taking (Hale & Delia, 1976). Beattyand McCroskey (1998) argued that individual differences in interpersonalfunctioning were attributable to individual differences in inborn neurobio-logical systems. Some research indicates that electrical activity in the cortexis highly heritable (Boomsma, Anokhin, & de Geus, 1997). Furthermore,meta-analyses of twins research suggest that constructs such as theory of


4. Episodic memory is a subset of general memory and functions to mediate conscious accessto ones past experiences. In terms of theory of mind, episodic memory would be involved if

a person draws upon consciously accessed recollections of situations involving the target

person. However, semantic memory is involved to the extent that cognitive representationsare informed by a persons general knowledge about people. Because we presumably have

stored numerous episodes regarding people we know well, it is possible that episodic memoryplays a more significant role in forming cognitive representations of the mental states of

people we know well than in theory of mind efforts involving strangers. Importantly, episodic

memory retrieval processes can be differentiated from other memory processes on the basisof electrical activity in the cortex (Rugg & Allan, 2000).



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mind and empathy are highly heritable (Beatty, Heisel, Hall, Levine, & LaFrance, 2002). Certainly, research into the relationship between degree ofactivation and elaboration of others perspectives might provide insightsinto the process of understanding others mental states.

Fifth, we monitored orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortexactivity in response to hypothetical scenarios. In one sense, the use of ahypothetical scenario makes these findings relevant to the large portion ofinterpersonal literature that also relies on these types of stimulus materials.However, future studies of cortical activity in response to dyadic interactionshould be conducted, especially after the neurobiological processesinvolved in theory of mind are more clearly understood.

Limitations

In addition to the necessary research just discussed, two issues related tothe present study warrant attention. First, although the sample size in ourstudy is comparable to those typically employed in cognitive neurosciencestudies (see Gazzaniga, 2000), especially imaging (EEG, MRI, PET)research, it is markedly smaller than customary in communication research.Sample sizes tend to be smaller in imaging studies for two main reasons. Atthe practical level, data collection is extraordinarily time intensive. Onaverage, 40 minutes were required just to set the electrodes and achieveacceptable impedance levels. Removing the sensor array, cleaning eachindividual electrode, disinfecting the cap, and debriefing the participant

adds more time to the process. In light of the fact that only one participantcan be handled at a time, even an experiment consisting of a single, shortinduction is time consuming. Our time investment for each participant wasapproximately 2 hours. Perhaps sample sizes pose a troublesome issue inthe short run. However, the problem should diminish as studies demon-strating consistent patterns accumulate.

Second, when we designed the study, we were prepared to accept somedegree of artificiality due to the equipment in order to gather corticalactivity data. However, as the check we conducted indicated, participantsreported relatively little obtrusiveness of the equipment. In fact, themajority of participants commented that they had adapted to wearing thecap during the set-up and forgot about it completely once the experimentbegan. This response was not universal, however. In our lab, we havenoticed that about 1 in 10 participants report high levels of obtrusivenessand approximately half of those claimed that this awareness interfered withtheir performance in some way. Although we have not detected any indi-cation in the cortical or performance data that differentiate these partici-pants from other participants, data based on individuals who report highdegrees of awareness of the equipment should be inspected carefully as a

matter of routine.




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Conclusion

The present study is one of the first investigations into neurobiologicalfunctioning involved in interpersonal processes. As such, the findings mustbe viewed as preliminary. At the same time, however, this study demon-strates that biological inquiry by communication researchers is doable andhas the potential to greatly enhance our understanding of the cognitiveprocesses underlying social behavior. In light of the prevalence of theoriesin our discipline that rely on cognitive processes as explanatory mechan-isms, a cognitive neuroscience approach should be embraced by ourcolleagues, especially those working from a social cognition framework.

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