24th ecpr phd summer school on ‘ political parties in new democracies ’ september 7-13, 2014
DESCRIPTION
THE SOCIAL GROUND FOR PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (2003-2011). Elena V. Sirotkina , National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. e-mail: [email protected]. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
THE SOCIAL GROUND FOR PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM
RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (2003-2011)
Elena V. Sirotkina, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. e-mail:
24th ECPR PhD Summer School on ‘Political Parties in New Democracies’September 7-13, 2014
Research Problem
• How can we measure party system institutionalization (in non-democratic states)?• Does limitation of competition promotes voters’ loyalty
to the continuous parties?• Is stability/volatility of voting preferences in Russia
rooted in the social cleavages (other stable determinants)?
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
The literatureInstitutionalisation•What to measure?• Four dimensions (Huntington 1968) • Value dimension (Alexis de Tocqueville 1969), value infusion
(Levitsky 1998; Selznick 1957)• The mentioned dimensions might not exist simultaneously at
one system (Ben-Dor 1975) • Party institutionalisation is more about a party’s reification in
the public mind (Janda 1970) • Institutionalization and democratic consolidation emerge with
the stability in rules for party competition (Mainwaring and Scully 1995)• ‘Systemness’, ‘value infusion’, ‘decisional autonomy’ and
‘reification’ (Randall & Sväsand 2002)
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Why stability (volatility) of electoral support?- a minimum satisfactory criterion for judging the level of
a party system institutionalization (within non-democracy)
- shows the level of voters’ persisting commitment to parties (voters’ status quo )
- catches the logic of parties in an non-democracy- implicitly takes into account other dimensions
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
What is specific about non-democratic states?The Russian caseRestrictions for participation
• 5-7% threshold• 200.000 signatures to collect or electoral deposit to pay• Obligatory regional party branches in the majority of the regions• Only parties not party associations or party blocs are to
participate• Not free and fair elections (reporting of falsifications, electoral
authoritarian practices)
The evolution of the competitors list (the ballot)• No ‘NOTA’ (against all) column
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
The Russian case
The evolution of the competitors list (ballot)
Parliamentary elections
Number of participants
Representation in the Duma
1993 13 8
1995 43 4
1999 26 6
2003 23 4
2007 15 4
2011 7 4
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Hypotheses
• H1: Limited competition in non-democratic Russia promotes stable support for the continuous parties• H2: Voting stability/volatility is determined by stable
regional characteristics (voting cleavages)
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Methods. Party system institutionalization measurementTwo-step party system institutionalisation measurement:
1) national-level stability: Average (Corr(p1(2003); p1(2007)); (Corr(p1(2007); p1(2011)); (Corr (p1(2003); p1(2011))….p4
2) regional-level stability (Average support changing): Sum ( mod(p1(2007) – p1(2003)); (p1(2011) – p1(2007))/av.p1*
Different from Volatility-Pedersen’s Index: takes into account the average result of a party in a region
* for every regionElena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Methods. ‘Social ground’ explanation Multiple linear regression (OLS)•Dependent: Changing of the average support•Independent:
• 1) Urban/rural population, • 2) Religion (Orthodoxy, Atheism, Islam)• 3) Personal wealth (Average per capita income (per month)• 4) Internet (share of internet users per 100 people)• 5) ‘Good governance’ • 6) Security level (Crime rate per 100,000 people)
•Case studies
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Data description
1) Electoral data: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation
Excluded regions: • those, who changed the boundaries• those, reported to have high falsifications rate
2) Social-economic data: Russian Federal State Statistics Service, Moscow Carnegie Centre report
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Results. Party system institutionalisation measurement. National level
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Party2003-2007
2007-2011
2003-2011
Average
UR .219 -.008 .181 .20KPRF .051 .247* -.213 -.08LDPR .063 -.109 .024 -.00JR -.107 .034 -.071 -.04
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Regional level
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
The overall level of parties’ support volatility
UR 74,40
KPRF 36,53
LDPR 41,19
SR 42,35
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
The effect of cleavages on volatility of electoral support
VARIABLES UR support volatility
KPRF support volatility
LDPR support volatility
JR support volatility
Personal wealth 1.664 (1.677) 2.201* (1,279) 20.217 (10.704)
20.693* (10.586)
Urban population -0.071 (0.206) -0.180 (0.157) 0.276 (0.209) 0.403** (0.194)
Religion: Orthodoxy -0.154 (0.192)
-0.178 (0.147)
-0.187 (0.195)
-0.126 (0.182)
Atheism -0.120 (0.137) -0.175* (0.104) 0.040 (0.139) -0.072 (0.129) Islam -0.054 (0.041) 0.064** (0.032) 0.056 (0.042) 0.004 (0.039)Internet 0.124 (0.168) 0.075 (0.128) -0.377**
(0.171)0.116 (0.159)
Democratic level 0.842** (0.288)
0.417* (0.220) -0.435 (0.292)
-0.008 (0.272)
Security level 0.302 (0.188) 0.027 (0.143) -0.007 (0.191)
-0.009 (0.178)
ConstantObservations
-9.560 (7.362)61
-8.964 (5.528)61
-7.639 (7.711)61
-13.534 (6.950)61
R-squared 0.319 0.227 0.189 0.172
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Interpretation
• National level: no stability in parties’ support within moderated elections and limited competition (the only medium-volatile is KPRF in 2007-2011)• Fluid party system within stable number of participants• Regional level: UR has the most volatile support
(volatile voting twice higher than its average), KPRF has the most stable support• Voting stability/volatility in the Russian case is not
determined by the voting cleavages or stable socioeconomic characteristics of the territories
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Case-studies
General trends: - UR electoral support decrease in the majority of the regions in
2011- Increase of absenteeism
Deviant cases (the most unstable):- ‘The personality factor’:
1) The ‘long-living’ governor factor (Kostroma Oblast, Tomsk Oblast)2) The opposition activity factor (Astrakhan Oblast)
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Concluding remarks• Voting stability measurement – minimal requirement for
party system institutionalization• Limitation of competition does not promote voters to stick
to their choice and does not serve for party system institutionalisation• Voting stability/volatility is not determined by voting
cleavages and stable characteristics of the territories• The more sufficient is personality factor (the governors’
and the opposition activity) + general trends which highlight the overall changing of voters attitude• Is there any ground?
Elena V. Sirotkina, HSE September 10, 2014
Thank you!