27_impact_of_climate_change_on_nigerias_economy

Delivering sustainable solutions in a more competitive world

Impact of Climate Change on Nigeria’s Economy Final Report February 2009 www.erm.com

FINAL REPORT

Impact of Climate Change on Nigeria’s Economy February 2009

REVISION RECORD

Revision Date Comments 00 11.09.08 Draft for internal review 01 12.09.08 Issued to DFID 02 08.12.08 Final draft for internal review 03 09.12.08 Final submission to DFID 04 24.02.09 Final Final submission to DFID

Prepared by: James Spurgeon, Catherine Wasilewski, Professor Anthony Ikpi & Simon Foster

Reviewed by: Tim Geyer

This report has been prepared by Environmental Resources Management the trading name of Environmental Resources Management Limited, with all reasonable skill, care and diligence within the terms of the Contract with the client, incorporating our General Terms and Conditions of Business and taking account of the resources devoted to it by agreement with the client. We disclaim any responsibility to the client and others in respect of any matters outside the scope of the above. This report is confidential to the client and we accept no responsibility of whatsoever nature to third parties to whom this report, or any part thereof, is made known. Any such party relies on the report at their own risk.

For and on behalf of Environmental Resources Management Ltd Approved by: Tim Geyer Signed: Position: Partner Date: 24th February 2009

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0082608/DIFID/NIGERIA CLIMATE CHANGE FEB 2009

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nigeria is likely to be one of the most negatively impacted countries in the world as a result of climate change. Its risks are particularly high due to its low lying coastline that is highly populated with a heavy concentration of GDP generating industry and infrastructure. In addition, the north of the country forms part of the Sahel which is at risk of further desertification and droughts. Flooding, water shortages, increased diseases and associated social disruption could well give rise to a vicious cycle of economic degradation and social conflict. Based on IPCC climate change assumptions, latest research findings relating to sea level rise, and results of a consultation exercise in Nigeria, a preliminary Integrated Assessment Model adapted for this study predicts that climate change could result in a loss in GDP of between 6% and 30% by 2050, worth an estimated US$ 100 to 460 billion dollars. By 2020, if no adaptation is implemented, between 2-11% of GDP could potentially be lost. These numbers assume minimal adaptation. By undertaking appropriate adaptation actions and strategies, much of these impacts can potentially be mitigated. The above impacts are based on possible sea level rise from 1990 levels to 0.3 m by 2020 and 1m by 2050, and rise in temperature of up to 3.2°C by 2050 under a high climate change scenario. The low estimate predictions are for sea level rise of 0.1 m and 0.2 m by 2020 and 2050 respectively, and a temperature increase of 0.4 to 1°C over the same time periods. All the main sectors of Nigeria’s economy will be impacted by climate change, but in particular agriculture. Infrastructure such as water, transport and power are also extremely susceptible and will result in knock on effects to other parts of the economy, especially wholesale and retail. It is possible that some aspects of the economy may gain, such as the production and sales of renewable energy, flood protection, medicine, building cooling equipment etc. All regions will be impacted, particularly the southern coastal regions and the far North of Nigeria. The more central regions will be less affected but were grouped as part of the overall North region. The model predicts losses of 8-30% for the North, 5-25% for the SE and SS, and 7-34% for the SW and Lagos. Attaining the MDGs will also suffer as a result of climate change. In particular Goal 1 on hunger and poverty and Goal 7 on environmental sustainability will be affected in a major adverse way.


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Climate change impacts will be worse for the vulnerable such as the poor, old, women, children and for those that depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. This is because the vulnerable are less able to fend for themselves and are less able to adapt to changing circumstances. In terms of the spatial distribution of impacts, those in the far north and adjacent to the coastline are far more at risk. This study has identified a broad range of adaptation actions and strategies, highlighting those that may be relatively cost-effective. Many relate to strengthening the robustness and resilience to agriculture related impacts. Other key adaptation requirements include conducting a national coast defence strategy, protecting key infrastructure, and facilitating water collection at a local and household level etc. Extensive data gaps exist with respect to assessing impacts and adaptation strategies. However, it is also difficult to obtain relevant information that does exist. Key data gaps include: climatic data and trends, baseline natural resource and socio-economic conditions, location and importance of assets, data on extreme events such as drought, flooding and coastal flooding, socio-economic data at a local and regional level etc. Nigeria currently has institutions traditionally mandated to provide data relating to climate change and associated impacts, such as the Nigerian Meteorological agency (NIMET). However, such institutions appear to have problems generating and disseminating relevant information. There is some good academic capacity related to climate change expertise within the country, in various institutions. However, coordination of expertise and funding for research are lacking. Most critically, Nigeria does not yet have a national climate change policy. However, a national policy framework on climate change in Nigeria is being developed, which will be put forward in April 2009 at the forthcoming Nigerian National Climate Change Summit. There is also a plan to mainstream the new climate change policy into the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 2 (NEEDS 2) programme, which is presently ongoing. Furthermore, Nigeria has recently developed a draft National Adaptation Plan of Action, which may be available by the end of this year. Even with such policies and plans in place, there is a lack of a centralised institution that can champion and coordinate climate change activities in the country. Developing and implementing piecemeal solutions and projects will not solve the country’s climate change problems. It is mandatory that Nigeria move away from this model and embrace an integrated approach.


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The recommended engagement strategy for HMG via DFID and the High Commission, include the following seven actions: 1) Support a study to undertake a stock-take of existing and proposed

climate change data, studies and resources relevant to Nigeria.

2) Support the undertaking of a more detailed spatial analysis of key sectors and geographical locations at risk from climate change, linked to a feasibility study of adaptation options.

3) Facilitate raising the profile of climate change within Nigeria to the public via the media, and amongst key interested parties through workshops.

4) Promote and support the creation of a national Climate Change Commission (or similar).

5) Support an initiative to build capacity in climate change skills within the Ministry for Environment and other Government Ministries.

6) HMG should work closely on climate change issues with key industries and industry representatives.

7) Work with the Ministry of Environment and selected states, to develop projects that might be eligible for carbon credits, or would otherwise build up the adaptive capacity of Nigeria.

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 BACKGROUND 1 1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 1 1.3 APPROACH 2 1.4 REPORT STRUCTURE 3

2 NIGERIAN ECONOMY 4

2.1 CURRENT GDP & GROWTH RATES 4 2.2 CURRENT POVERTY & DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES 5 2.3 CURRENT MDG STATUS 7 2.4 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS 9

3 NIGERIAN CLIMATE 10

3.1 CURRENT & HISTORIC NATIONAL CLIMATE 10 3.1.1 Historic changes in climate 10 3.1.2 Current climate 10 3.2 PREDICTED FUTURE CLIMATIC CHANGES 12 3.2.1 Changes in average temperature and precipitation 12 3.2.2 Changes in sea level rise 13 3.2.3 Other predicted changes 13 3.2.4 Final caveat 14

4 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO NIGERIA 15

4.1 INTRODUCTION 15 4.2 SPECIFIC SECTOR IMPLICATIONS 18 4.3 REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 21

5 ECONOMIC IMPACT MODEL RESULTS 23

5.1 INTRODUCTION 23 5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE GDP 24 5.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR MDGS IN NIGERIA 26 5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS 28

6 ADAPTATION 30

6.1 OPTIONS FOR ADAPTATION 30 6.2 OBSTACLES TO ADAPTATION 34 6.3 NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLAN 34

7 DATA & INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 35

7.1 DATA REQUIREMENTS 35 7.2 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 37

8 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 41

8.1 CONCLUSIONS 41 8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND WHERE HMG CAN BEST ENGAGE 43

9 REFERENCES 46

ANNEX A SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION OUTPUT ANNEX B CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS AND LATEST RESEARCH FINDINGS ANNEX C SECTORAL AND REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ANNEX D COMMENTS ON A DISEASE PERSPECTIVE ANNEX E KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS ANNEX F NIGERIA’S PROPOSED CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTS

LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES AND BOXES

Figure 2.1 Trends of sectoral contribution to Nigerian GDP in real terms (%) 2001-2004 5

Figure 2.2 Relative poverty incidence map of Nigeria by state, 2004 6 Figure 3.1 Vegetation map of Nigeria 11 Figure.4.1 Climate change and Africa 15 Figure 4.2 Map of regional impacts of climate change in Nigeria 21 Figure 5.1 Potential climate change impact on Nigeria’s GDP under a medium

growth scenario 25

Table 2.1 Trends in relative poverty levels, 1980-2004, Nigeria 6 Table 2.2 Occupational groups by gender in Nigeria, 2004 7 Table 2.3 Nigeria’s progress towards the MDG goals 8 Table 2.4 Projections of GDP growth in %, draft needs-2, Nigeria 9 Table 3.1 Projected increase in average temperature of Nigeria (∆ degrees celsius) 12 Table 3.2 Projected increase in precipitation in Nigeria (∆ mm) 12 Table 3.3 Projected increase in sea level rise (∆ metres) 13 Table 4.1 Summary of key impacts of climate change in Nigeria 17 Table 4.2 Key climate change impacts on GDP sectors 19 Table 4.3 Key regional climate change impacts by GDP sector 22 Table 5.1 Percentage loss of national GDP from climate change (medium gap

growth) in different years 24 Table 5.2 Percentage loss of sectoral GDP from climate change (medium GDP

growth) in 2050 25 Table 5.3 Range of percentage loss of GDP through cc by 2050 (assuming medium

GDP growth) 26 Table 5.4 Affects of climate change on MDG goals in Nigeria 26 Table 6.1 Adaptation options for agricultural management 30 Table 6.2 Adaptation options for agricultural sub-sectors 31 Table 6.3 Adaptation options for infrastructure 32 Table 6.4 Other sector-based adaptation options in Nigeria 32 Box 4.1 The worst case scenario, D. Okali 16

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AR Assessment Report DFID Department for International Development ERM Environmental Resources Management FRN Federal Republic of Nigeria GCM Global Climate Model GCSI Global Change Strategies International GDP Gross Domestic Product HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus / Acquired immune deficiency

syndrome HMG Her Majesty’s Government IAM Integrated Assessment Model IMF International Monetary Fund IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change LSMS Living Standard Measurement Study MDGs Millennium Development Goals MOE Ministry of Environment (of FRN) NASRDA National Space Research and Development Agency NCCC National Climate Change Commission NEEDS National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy NEPA National Electric Power Authority NEST Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team NGO Non-governmental organization NIMET Nigerian Meteorological agency OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries PIRC UK’s Public Interest Research Centre PMU Programme management Unit SRES Special Report on Emissions Scenarios SU Steering/Advisory group(s) UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UK United Kingdom UKCIP UK Climate Impact Programme


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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Nigeria hopes to be in the world’s top 20 biggest economies by 2020. In order for Nigeria to reach this goal, the strengthening of non-oil growth is essential. However, global climate change is one of the largest threats to Nigeria’s development and economy. Particular threats are posed to Nigeria’s competitiveness in agriculture from changes to rainfall patterns in the Sahel resulting in increased desertification and flooding, and to economic activity in Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial hub, which has recently been identified among the 21 cities most likely to be affected by rising sea levels. Other threats include effects on power generation and distribution due to the effects of river levels on major dams, on transport infrastructure vital for trading, and possibly on oil and gas production and investment. Despite the recognition of the serious threats posed by climate change to the Nigerian economy, the need to address this issue is not incorporated into national policy or regulation. At present addressing climate change is the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of the Environment, and focuses largely on individual projects. Such an approach is unlikely to enable appropriate and cost-effective adaptation to climate change for the country as a whole. There is therefore a strong need for policy to address climate change at the Federal and State levels, and to ensure that the private sector adequately factors the risks posed by climate change into risk assessment, investment planning and project execution. Environmental Resources Management (ERM) has been commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID) to undertake an analysis of the economic impact of climate change on sectoral and regional growth in Nigeria in order to provide the information critical for raising the profile of Climate Change in Nigeria and to contribute to the argument for the mainstreaming of climate change within Nigeria’s development plans.

1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study is to provide ‘ballpark’ quantified estimates of the impact of climate change on Nigeria’s future Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and ability to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in order to facilitate the integration of climate change concerns within Nigeria’s development plans.


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Specific outputs requested were as follows: • An economic assessment of the impacts of climate change on Nigeria,

including GDP growth and attainment of the MDGs; • An analysis of the economic impact for Lagos state, and for different

regions (either geo-political zones or climatic zones), and, where appropriate, sectors, particularly those which employ a large number of people;

• An analysis of the cost of adaptation to climate change for Nigeria and for Lagos state and identification, if appropriate, of sectors where relatively more can be done in a cost-effective way;

• An analysis of the distributional impact on different demographic groups; • A statement on gaps in data and an outline of the institutional

arrangements that need to be put in place to provide this data; • A statement on the capacity of Nigerian organisations and institutions to

take forward climate change impact analysis and the design and implementation of adaptation measures, and a view on where capacity could most usefully be built;

• A statement on where Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) can best engage to address the economic impacts of climate change and support adaptation.

1.3 APPROACH

ERM undertook some initial consultation to identify some key experts within the Nigerian research community, civil society and donor organisations. Further consultation was then undertaken with these experts through face to face interviews in Nigeria and an email questionnaire to obtain expert opinion and data to inform the study. The key findings and details of the experts consulted are included in the stakeholder consultation write up in Annex A. Additional consultation was also undertaken with Dr Victor Fodeke, head of the Ministry of Environment’s Climate Change Unit, who responded on behalf of the Ministry of Environment. His input is incorporated within this report. In addition, ERM conducted a detailed review of relevant information on the Nigerian economy and climate change issues with respect to Nigeria and Africa (see references). Furthermore, a climate change impact model has been developed using Microsoft Excel based on the TORCH model that ERM created for assessing the economic impact of climate change to businesses. The model, and study in general, splits the economy into three different regions based on the six geo-political zones of Nigeria that also link to the different agro-ecological zones. The three regions are: i) North (North-West Zone (NW), North-East Zone (NE), North-Central

Zone (NC)); ii) South West (SW) (which includes Lagos); and iii) South-East (SE) and South-South Zones (SS).


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The model and study also focuses on the three largest sectors, together with a combined ‘other’ category, as follows: • agriculture (42% of the Nigerian economy in 2005) comprising crops,

livestock, forests and fisheries; • mining and quarrying (25%) comprising oil and gas (99% of it); • wholesale and retail trade (14%); and • the remaining nine main sectors combined as ‘other’ (giving a combined

total of the remaining 19%). Although the study is particularly focussed on GDP and MDGs, it is important to highlight that GDP is increasingly being questioned as an appropriate indicator, particularly from a ‘sustainable development’ perspective (Daly, 2008; Scott Cato and Kennett, 1999; and Stiglitz, 2006). Indeed, cutting down forests, cleaning up pollution damage and repairing extreme weather damage can all result in short term GDP growth.

1.4 REPORT STRUCTURE

The structure of the report is as follows: Section 1: Provides the background, objectives and approach adopted for the study. Section 2: Sets the scene by giving an overview of the current and future predicted Nigerian economy and MDGs. Section 3: Details the current and future predicted climatic conditions in Nigeria and West Africa. Section 4: Highlights the potential impacts of the change in climate detailed in Section 3, upon the main economic sectors and the three main regions in Nigeria identified above. Section 5: Details the results of the climate impact model on GDP at a sectoral and regional level, also providing an overview of the national impacts on the MDGs. Section 6: Outlines potential alternative adaptation strategies and actions, and indicates their relative cost-effectiveness. Section 7: Discusses key data requirements and institutional capacity within Nigeria in relation to climate change. Section 8: Provides some conclusions and recommendations for action.


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2 NIGERIAN ECONOMY

2.1 CURRENT GDP & GROWTH RATES

In contrast to the two previous decades, the Nigerian economy has expanded at a rapid pace since 2000. According to UK-DFID estimates (Nigeria Competitiveness and Growth, 2007), GDP per capita in current US dollars has more than doubled between 2000 and 2005. Although part of this can be explained by a rise in oil prices, real GDP rose by 39% in this period (IMF 2007 Country Economic Memorandum). Moreover, non-oil GDP growth has accelerated significantly, reaching 7.4% in 2004 and 8.2% in 2005. First estimates (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008) for 2008 expect that real GDP growth will reach 6.8% thanks to strong non-oil sector growth and increase in off-shore oil production. However, 2008 oil production will remain below potential due to recent upsurge of violence in the Niger Delta region. On the other hand, recent significant oil prices mean that oil related GDP figures this year will grow substantially, although these will be tempered by recent decline in oil prices. The overall global recession may also slow down Nigeria’s growth over the coming few years. Given the appalling conditions of the Nigerian economy in the 1990s, in 2004 the Government, launched The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS, 2004-2007) (National Planning Commission, 2004) to reduce poverty, recover growth and foster development. According to the IMF in 2007 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), the performance of NEEDS has been remarkable. For instance, the IMF reports that real GDP annual growth rate averaged 6.6% in 2004-2006 as against the NEEDS target of 6.0%; oil sector annual growth rate averaged – 0.23% as against 0.0% targeted for 2004 – 2006; and non-oil sector annual growth rate averaged 8.2% as against the NEEDS target of 8.0%. However, much progress is still needed in terms of poverty reduction, addressing inequalities, employment generation, and provision of infrastructure and power (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). According to the IMF, Nigeria’s GDP (in current prices) for 2005 was US$ 112 billion (compared to US$ 46 billion in 2000). The relative contribution of different sectors to GDP in Nigeria is shown in Figure 2.1 below. However, it is worth pointing out the difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent GDP estimates for Nigeria, particularly over extended time periods.


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Figure 2.1 Trends of Sectoral Contribution to Nigerian GDP in real terms (%) 2001-2004

Source: Poverty Profile for Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, 2005 Note: “Other” includes Solid mineral mining, Utilities, Hotels & Restaurants, Transportation, Communications, Finance & Insurance, Business Services and Government Services. Since 2003, there has been decline in the contributions of these sectors to real GDP.

The oil and gas sector plays a large role in the Nigerian economy, accounting for around 30% of the GDP between 2001 and 2004. Nigeria is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and possesses the tenth largest proven reserves of oil in the world (36.2 billion barrels). It ranks as the world’s eighth largest exporter of oil. However, on the other hand, the agricultural sector has failed to keep pace with Nigeria’s rapid population growth, so that the country, which once exported food, now relies on imports to sustain itself (Library of Congress- Federal Research Division, 2008). The considerable fluctuations in price of oil will also strongly influence the oil and gas related GDP over time.

2.2 CURRENT POVERTY & DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES

Poverty in Nigeria is multi-dimensional. Poor people are more likely to be living in rural areas; to depend on natural resources for their livelihoods and to be women, young or elderly. Most Nigerians still live in rural areas, yet urban centres like Lagos grow quickly and welcome a growing number of poor populations. Moreover, poverty rates in the northern regions are substantially higher than in the south (World Bank Group and UK-DFID, 2005). The map shown in Figure 2.2 illustrates relative poverty by state and clearly shows the northern states as having a higher incidence of poverty (ie in red) than the southern ones (with the exception of Lagos).


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Figure 2.2 Relative Poverty Incidence Map of Nigeria by State, 2004

KEY

20.0 to 42.9

43.0 to 63.4

63.6 to 95.1

Source: Poverty Profile for Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, 2005 Note: This map illustrates the distribution of “relative poverty”, which is based on a measure of mean per capita household expenditure. Refer to the report p19 for the detailed methodology. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of Nigeria, poverty levels declined from 46.3% in 1985 to 42.7% in 1992, before rising sharply to 65.6% of the population in 1996 (World Bank Group and UK-DFID, 2005). In terms of numbers of individuals, the population of poor Nigerians increased four-fold between 1980 and 1996, affecting 67.1 million people in 1996. In 2004, the Nigerian Government decided to conduct a Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS)(1) to collect more reliable information and provide basic welfare indicators for monitoring poverty alleviation programmes. The survey found that relative poverty in Nigeria had decreased to 54.4% in 2004. However, the population in poverty has maintained a steady increase between 1980 and 2004, as illustrated in Table 2.1. Note that it is thought that the estimates prior to the 2004 figure are both not reliable and not comparable with the 2004 figure (National Poverty Assessment, 2007). This tends to explain the otherwise rather surprising fluctuations.

Table 2.1 Trends in Relative Poverty Levels, 1980-2004, Nigeria

Year Poverty Incidence Estimated Total Population Population in Poverty 1980 28.1% 65 m 18.26 m 1985 46.3% 75 m 34.73 m 1992 42.7% 91.5 m 39.07 m 1996 65.6% 102.3 m 67.11 m 2004 54.4% 126.3 m 68.70 m

Source: Poverty Profile for Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, 2005

(1) LSMS is a methodology developed and recommended by the World Bank


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In spite of nearly 6% annual GDP growth rates between 2000 and 2005, and significant progress (see section below) it is unlikely that Nigeria will manage to reduce poverty level to about 28% and meet the MDG target (Nigeria Competitiveness and Growth, UK DFID, 2007). This is mainly due to low formal job creation rates, as well as to the fact that most of the workforce is employed in low productivity activities in agriculture and in the informal economy. The repartition of the population by occupational groups is illustrated in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Occupational Groups by Gender in Nigeria, 2004

Occupational Group Male Female Student/Retired/Unemployed/Inactive 32.52 46.16 Professional or Technical 5.84 2.79 Administration 0.25 0.07 Clerical 5.15 1.71 Sales and related activities 8.09 14.31 Services and related activities 3.48 11.39 Agriculture and forestry 36.06 20.09 Production and Transport 2.27 2.98 Manufacturing and Processing 2.05 0.04 Others 4.28 0.44 Total 100 100 Source: Poverty Profile for Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, 2005

2.3 CURRENT MDG STATUS

Nigeria’s current progress towards the MDG goals is summarised in Table 2.3, which shows mixed progress. Significant progress has been made in eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achievement of universal primary education, improving maternal health and developing a global partnership for development. However, there are critical challenges in the health sector where weak infrastructure, ineffective health services, low coverage of immunization, and lack of access to skilled health care continue to hamper progress(1). Progress reporting under the environmental sustainability goal is hampered by a lack of data. However, there are a number of initiatives of note taking place in Nigeria in this area, such as the agreement on Zero Tolerance on Gas Flares by 2008 (IMF, 2007), which should improve health in coastal areas.

(1) MDG Monitor, 2007. MDG factsheet: Nigeria. www.http://mdgmonitor.org/factsheets_00.cfm?c+NGA&cd+566


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Table 2.3 Nigeria’s progress towards the MDG goals

MDG goal Progress icon(1)

Explanation(2)

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Good progress towards goal. Poverty trend has continued to decline progressively from 70% in 1999 to 54% percent in 2005.

2. Achieve universal primary education

Steady progress towards goal. Net enrolment in primary education was 84.26 percent in 2005 compared to 81.1 percent in 2004.

3. Promote gender equality and empower of women

Mixed progress towards goal. The proportion of girls to boys in primary education (i.e. girls per 100 boys) has improved from 79% in 2004 to 81% in 2005. However, the proportion of women in non-agricultural wage employment did not show any remarkable improvement in 2006.

4. Reduce child mortality

Little progress towards goal. Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) deteriorated from 100 per 1000 births in 2003 to 110 per 1000 births in 2005.

5. Improve maternal health

Little progress towards goal. Mortality rate increase of 800 per 100,000 live births reported in 2004 compared to 704 in 1999.

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Mixed progress towards goal. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS fell from 5.8% in 2001 to 4.4% in 2005. Less progress reported for other diseases.

7. Ensure environmental sustainability

Progress towards goal not fully understood due to unavailability of data.

8. Develop a global partnership for development

Good progress made in attaining goal. Per capita official development assistance to Nigeria has increased from 2.3$US in 2004 to 4.0$US in 2005, but is still low. Cancellation of Nigeria’s international debt has freed up an additional $1 billion a year for poverty reduction.

Key to progress icons

Achieved

On track/very likely to be achieved

Possible to achieve if some changes are made

Off track

Insufficient information

The implications of climate change on reaching the MDGs in Nigeria are addressed in Section 5.

(1) Status icons adapted from www.mdgmonitor.org (2) Illustrative data adapted from: IMF, 2007. Nigeria Poverty reduction Strategy - Progress Report. IMF Country Report No. 07/270.


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2.4 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS

According to estimates by The Economist (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), annual economic growth in Nigeria should remain over 6% between 2009 and 2012, in spite of ongoing unrest in the Delta region. The National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) expired at the end of 2007 and is being replaced by the NEEDS-2 (2008-2011) document, currently subject to consultation. The major growth drivers are expected to remain agriculture and solid minerals. This is in accordance with the President’s policy known as “Vision 2020” adopted in May 2007 which aims at making Nigeria one of the 20 largest economies globally by 2020. Table 2.4 summarises the % GDP growth estimates recently estimated in the draft NEEDS-2 report for both optimistic and conservative growth scenarios (IMF, 2007).

Table 2.4 Projections of GDP Growth in %, Draft NEEDS-2, Nigeria

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Scenario 1 (optimistic) – 1990 prices GDP 8.84 9.13 9.35 9.53 9.62 Scenario 2 (conservative) – 1990 prices GDP 5.02 4.81 4.91 5.92 5.83 Data based on NPC-CEAR ECON-MOD MAC-I Simulations (IMF, 2007). The above estimates are used to inform the growth scenarios used in the model for this study (see Section 5). An average annual growth of 6% is assumed for the main model outputs.


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3 NIGERIAN CLIMATE

3.1 CURRENT & HISTORIC NATIONAL CLIMATE

3.1.1 Historic changes in climate

Observational records have shown that Africa has been warming throughout the 20th century at a rate of about 0.05°C per decade, amounting to an increase of approximately 0.5°C. The warming has been more significant in the period June-November each year. The most significant change to Africa’s climate has been a long-term reduction in rainfall in the semi-arid regions of West Africa. In the Nigerian Sahel region, there has been a 25% decrease in precipitation on average in the last 30 years (Nkomo et al., 2006). However, the reduction in precipitation has been more moderate in other parts of Africa. In the past 30 years, both droughts and floods have increased in frequency and severity on the continent. The regularity of drought periods has been a notable aspect of Nigerian climate in recent years, especially in the drier regions in the north. Well publicized droughts in the 1970s and 1980s significantly affected West Africa in the 20th century and they severely affected large areas of northern Nigeria and the Sahel region. These drought periods are indications of the large variability in climate across tropical Africa, the most serious effects of which are usually felt at the drier margins of agricultural zones or in the regions occupied primarily by pastoral groups. In recent years, Africa has seen more frequent flood and cyclone episodes. The Nigerian delta has in particular seen a marked increase in flooding in the last few decades (Nkomo et al., 2006). Dust storms (which are partly due to changes in land use such as grazing and deforestation) in the some parts of the Sahel have also increased, particularly between the 1950s and 1980s (Elasha et al., 2006). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report explains that during 1961 to 2003, the average sea level rose by 1.8 ± 0.5 mm per year. While sea level rise varies between regions, Nigeria’s entire coastline has been affected by this observed rise (IPCC, 2007a). Such a rise will have already led to an increase in coastal erosion and exacerbated flooding damages.

3.1.2 Current climate

Nigeria has a tropical climate with variable rainy and dry seasons, depending on the location. In the southeast of Nigeria it is hot and wet most of the year, but it is dry in the southwest and farther inland. In the north and west, a savannah climate with marked wet and dry seasons prevails, while a steppe climate with little precipitation is found in the far north.


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Generally speaking the length of the rainy season decreases from south to north. In the south the rainy season lasts from March to November, compared to the far north, where it lasts from mid-May to September. In the south and the southeast especially, precipitation is heavier with over 3,000 mm of rain a year (compared with about 1,800 mm in the southwest). Rainfall decreases progressively away from the coast and the far north receives no more than 500 mm a year. In the south of the country, temperature and humidity remain relatively constant throughout the year, while the seasons vary considerably in the north. On the coast the mean monthly maximum temperatures are steady throughout the year, remaining about 32 °C at Lagos and about 33 °C at Port Harcourt; the mean monthly minimum temperatures are approximately 22 °C for Lagos and 20 °C for Port Harcourt. When considering Nigeria by climatic region, three regions emerge: the far south, the far north, and the rest of the country. The far south is defined by its tropical rainforest climate, where annual rainfall is 2,300 to 3,200mm a year. The far north (i.e. Sahel region) is defined by its almost desert-like climate, where rain is less than 800 mm per year. The rest of the country, everything in between the far south and the far north, is savannah, and rainfall is between 800 mm and 2,300 mm per year. Figure 3.1shows the differences in vegetation that are characterised by these three climatic envelopes, with the ‘woodland and tall grass savanna’ representing the middle zone.

Figure 3.1 Vegetation map of Nigeria


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3.2 PREDICTED FUTURE CLIMATIC CHANGES

3.2.1 Changes in average temperature and precipitation

Available data from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, which is also used in the IPCC assessments, has been used to provide a best estimate scenario for temperature and precipitation changes in Nigeria. The best estimates for 2010 – 2050 were calculated from an average of the three different IPCC ‘Special Report on Emissions Scenarios’ (SRES) for the region (see Annex B for the full set of SRES scenario data and underlying assumptions). A low scenario has been calculated by using guidance from the Stern Report (multiplying the best estimate by a factor – in this case of 0.57). The high estimates are based on IPCC assessments for temperature and rainfall, but on latest research findings for seal level rise. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 summarise the predicted changes adopted for this study.

Table 3.1 Projected increase in average temperature of Nigeria (∆ degrees Celsius)

Scenario 2010 2020 2050 Low 0.4 0.5 1.0 Best estimate 0.7 0.8 1.8 High 0.9 1.3 3.2 Note: The high estimate is based on the latest IPCC Working Group 1 estimate of temperature rise of 6.4oC in 2100 interpolated back. However, note that Stainforth et al (2007) suggest a possible rise of up to 11oC by 2100..

Table 3.2 Projected increase in precipitation in Nigeria (∆ mm)

Scenario 2010 2020 2050 Low 3 4 8 Best estimate 5 6 14 High 7 9 19

It should be noted that although average precipitation is expected to increase in Nigeria, different zones will have varying effects, with some areas becoming increasingly desertified, while others will likely suffer increased precipitation. The values shown here are thus country-wide averages. It should also be noted that predictions are calculated based on observed historical data and different models will produce varied results, as can be seen in Annex 2. Climate models suggest that Africa’s climate will generally become more variable, but different authors have often stated conflicting views on the future of Africa’s climate. For example, a more humid regime is predicted in the Sahel by Brooks (2004), based on observations since the 1990s of an amelioration of the regional climate with more rainfall. Other studies indicate that these general trends may include hidden variations (Hulme et al., 2001).


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3.2.2 Changes in sea level rise

A global rise in sea level is expected to significantly affect Nigeria’s coastline. The current IPCC predictions are a rise in sea level of between 18 and 59 cm by 2100 relative to 1980-1999, depending on the scenario (IPCC, 2007a). As such, this study assumes there to be an increase of potentially 40cm by 2050 for the best estimate. However, the IPCC’s fourth assessment forecast is now widely viewed to be too conservative by the scientific community as it is based on multiple models that all exclude ice sheet flow due to a (then) lack of published literature. In the interim, several studies (e.g. Jevrejeva et al, 2006) using a range of different methodologies have been published which suggest that sea levels will rise much higher and faster than previously thought (between 80cm and 6m by 2100). The IPCC has been criticised for using the same model to predict future sea level rise as was used to calculate past increases (inaccurately). The IPCC models underestimated the sea level rise that we have already observed by 40% (Rahmstorf et al, 2007) therefore its accuracy in projecting future sea level rise is questionable. A recent paper by Pfeffer et al (2008) in Science argues that sea level is likely to rise by around 80 cm by 2100, but that a rise of 2m by 2100 cannot be ruled out. The recent report by the UK’s Public Interest Research Centre (Hawkins et al, 2008) suggests that despite some predictions of more than a few meters, a 2m rise would cause considerable global economic havoc, especially as 22 of the world’s top 50 cities, hundreds of million people and trillions of dollars of assets are at risk of inundation.

Table 3.3 Projected increase in sea level rise (∆ metres)

2020 2050 2100 Low 0.1 0.2 0.5 Best estimate 0.15 0.4 0.9 High 0.3 1 2.0

3.2.3 Other predicted changes

The general consensus in the scientific community is that extreme events will continue to increase and become more severe across the continent. However, the IPCC has stated that there is insufficient information on which to assess possible changes in the spatial distribution and frequency of tropical cyclones affecting Africa. However, it is thought that a further 1°C rise in surface sea temperature in the Atlantic will create the conditions required to create hurricanes off the coast of Nigeria. A general increase in high-rainfall events is expected, coupled with the expected increase in atmospheric water vapour. The probability of extremely warm seasons is 100% for West Africa, with a 22% probability of extremely wet seasons. The IPCC has further predicted that 1 in 5 seasons will be extremely wet in the 21st century in West Africa (IPCC, 2007b).


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In terms of more recent study predictions highlighting positive feedback warming and stronger climate change, signals from observations have not been focussed on Nigeria in particular. Thus a direct translation and downscaling of the recent findings on temperatures and sea level rise to Nigeria in terms of changes to precipitation, the frequency of extreme events etc on a local level, is not possible. For comparison, studies in Europe suggest that under global warming, the number and intensity of extreme cyclones over the British Isles and the North Sea are projected to increase, leading to increased wind speeds and storm-related losses over western and central Europe (Pinto et al 2007). Without the adoption of adaptation measures, storm-related losses are expected to increase by up to 37% between 2060 and 2100 for the UK and Germany (Leckebusch et al 2007).

3.2.4 Final caveat

ERM has used the findings of the IPCC as the basis for our projections for the low and best case scenario, as it is the best available peer reviewed evidence base. However, its conservative nature should be borne in mind at all times. The high scenario is based on more recent scientific findings, but again, that too is kept relatively conservative. This is still thus a risk that potential impacts could be significantly worse. Climate scientists have historically tended to be conservative when talking about climate change for fear of being accused of being irresponsible or alarmist. Scientists are increasingly stressing that when looking at the range of possibilities for climate change, it is important not to ignore the upper end of the range of uncertainty and the associated risks of disastrous impacts. Recently however, the evidence is increasingly indicating that once climate change exceeds certain “tipping points” or critical thresholds, the consequences will enter a largely uncontrollable and irreversible domain – so called dangerous / run-away / catastrophic or non-linear climate change. Associated with which are trends such as the intensification of El Niño and the risk that it could become a permanent feature, weakening of the Gulf Stream, melting of the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, disruption of the Indian monsoon, widespread acidification of the oceans, and hurricanes of increased intensity and geographical range (Schellnhuber, 2006). Considerable scientific research released since the publication of the IPCC Assessment Report 4 (AR4), suggests that the risks of amplified non-linear climate change are considerably greater than stated in the AR4 and that the severity and pace of climate change may be far graver than that stated by the IPCC. A summary of some of the latest science produced since AR4, and the key uncertainties regarding climate change projections is also presented in Annex B.


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4 POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO NIGERIA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The IPCC describe Africa as “one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability”, and within Africa, Nigeria is one of the countries expected to be worst affected (Boko, M. et al., 2007, p3). Figure.4.1 below indicates the key areas at risk from climate change in Africa, revealing that Nigeria faces potentially serious risks both on the south coast and in the north of the country. The remainder of this section identifies key reasons why Nigeria is vulnerable to climate change, and key impacts likely to occur. It then provides two summary tables that highlight how the three main economic sectors and the three main regions of Nigeria are likely to be affected.

Figure.4.1 Climate Change and Africa

Source: Grid-Arendal, Columbia University: The Economist

According to Nigeria’s First National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (MOEFRN, 2003), 15% of the country’s population is affected in some way by climatic variation and sea level rise. The Ministry of Environment’s 2003 report also states that this is set to rise to between 50% and 60% with further anticipated climate change and


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sea level rise, and that between 25%-40% of the national capital stock could be adversely affected. Nigeria’s high vulnerability to climate change is due to a number of factors, as highlighted below (based on Okali, 2004). • Its geographical characteristics: Nigeria lies between 4ºN and 14ºN, and

between 3ºE and 15ºE and spans 6 major vegetation zones, reflecting the highly variable climate throughout the country. Its sub-Saharan location is one of the ‘hot spots’ of climate change likely to experience the most severe impacts due to the delicate nature of the existing ecosystems.

• There is limited capacity to adapt due to low levels of awareness, financial

resources, and institutional and technological capability. • Much of the economy is dependent on climate-sensitive resources. For

example, the agriculture, forestry and fishing sectors employ up to 70% of the workforce (Library of Congress- Federal Research Division, 2008).

• A high population, general food insecurity issues and serious social

tensions (in some parts of the eastern states population density is over 1000ppl/km2 and rising).

• The heavy concentration of GDP generating industry in locations that are

highly vulnerable to climate change i.e. Lagos and the Niger Delta.

Box 4.1 The Worst Case Scenario, D. Okali

Source: David Okali, Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST)

“Ultimately, failure to act effectively against climate change, because of indifference, inadequate attention or a low level of adaptive capacity, exposes us to the risk of general systems collapse, marked by economic losses, disruption of development and especially poverty elimination programmes, displaced populations, ecological refugees, stresses on resources, heightened resource-sharing conflicts and political destabilization.”


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Table 4.1 Summary of Key Impacts of Climate Change in Nigeria

Key Impacts Main Climate Change Related Factors

Selection of Possible Consequences

1- Sahelization - Increased unpredictability of summer rains - Rapid contraction of Lake Chad due to drought, which has shrunk to almost 5% of its size in 40 years

- Decreased agricultural productivity in the north of Nigeria - Reduced food security - Reduced water availability for irrigation - Desertification of 50% of the Guinea Savannah region (threatening 60% of the population of this region) - Increased social tensions - Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists ‘climate refugees’ coming from the north seeking water and pasture for their herds

2- Loss of coastal zone infrastructure, settlements and agricultural land

- Sea level rise - Increased storm surge heights - More violent wave action - Saline inundation of freshwater aquifers

- A 1 metre increase in relative sea level would submerge 18,400 sq kms, which is much of the south’s arable land and 6% of Nigeria’s 300,000 sq km of arable land.

3- Reduced hydrocarbon extraction activities (Niger delta) and increased risk of oil spills

- Sea level rise - Increased severity and frequency of storms

- Land loss - Food insecurity - Increased social tensions - Increased internal migrations - Fishing industry badly affected by oil spills

4- Reduced food security and fuel wood supply

- Changes in the forest cover (following severe dry spells)

- Poor rural population depending on non-timber forest products (such as bush-meat) for food negatively affected - Hampered energy supply for most rural Nigerians depending on fuel wood for energy

5- Negative effects on human health

- Higher temperatures - Higher humidity - Increased flooding - Reduced freshwater availability

- Increased number of pests and breeding sites - Increased exposure to vector-borne (e.g. malaria) and water-borne (e.g. cholera) diseases - Increased heat stress mortality - Increase in malaria alone is expected to decrease the annual GDP growth rate by 1.3% - Worse sanitary and health facilities due to the diversion of resources to combat climate-linked natural disasters - Increased risk of malnutrition (due to food insecurity, shortages or famine)

6- Damaged transport routes

- Extreme weather events (floods, heat waves, etc)

- Negative impacts on trade and communications - Buckling of rail tracks, melting of road surfaces

7- Negative effects on electricity supply and distribution

- Reduced rainfall - Extreme weather events

- Reduced production of hydro-electricity - Damaged energy distribution network - Increased frequency of blackouts - Economic activity across Nigeria negatively affected

Source: Boko, M. et al. 2007. This represents the findings on Africa in the latest IPCC assessment.


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4.2 SPECIFIC SECTOR IMPLICATIONS

The table below summarises how seven key climate change impacts may affect the three largest economic sectors, together with the remaining other sectors. The shading indicates the relative significance of the impacts, which includes both direct and indirect impacts. A more detailed description of the impact can be found in Annex C. On balance, overall impacts are likely to be negative, although minor positive impacts could arise in some sectors (e.g. in renewable energy, flood prevention and cooling equipment for buildings).


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Table 4.2 Key climate change impacts on GDP sectors

Sector Drought Sea level rise Flooding Extreme weather Temperature

abnormalities Change in disease/pest patterns

Conflict / migration

Agriculture, fisheries and forestry

Direct: Will increase in occurrence and severity, having a huge impact, especially in the dry North (50% affected by desertification). The humid south may not be directly affected by precipitation but will be adversely affected by temperature increase. Forestry, especially in the central and northern regions, will be affected by increasing forest fires from drought. Large livestock holdings are predicted to lose 22% revenue but small holdings will see rises. Potential for irrigation will be reduced. Low soil moisture content, and reduced soil fertility.

Direct: Will cause up to 75% of agricultural land to be lost in the southern region with a 1m rise. Sea-level has already risen 0.25m threatening 15% of agricultural land and 0.9million people. Will also cause salinisation of many southern areas. May increase fishing catches due to an increase in off-shore fishing, although species rich areas, like reefs and mangroves, will be lost, potentially reducing fishing yields. Increased salinity will also lead to agric loss in short term.

Direct: Will increase in the humid, southern river basins and coastal regions due to increases in precipitation. This will increase crop loss from flooding in these areas

Direct: Will increase in frequency and severity causing crops to be flattened or soil being washed away. Will reduce availability of surface water resources for animals and possible increase in salinity at watering points

Direct: Will increase, affecting planting and growing seasons and threaten crops. Diurnal temperature increases of 0.6 degrees have already been seen which affect the plant’s growth cycle and increases extreme weather will kill crops.

Direct: Increases in pests and disease will affect crop production, livestock and the rural population potentially causing huge losses.

Direct: Will increase as climate refugees increase putting huge strain on agriculture.

Mining and quarrying

Indirect: Mainly affects energy, food supply and social sectors.

Direct: Up to $13bn is at risk of loss from sea level rise in the Niger delta region (MOEFRN, 2003). Many existing drilling operations in the delta will be lost.

Direct: Increases in precipitation in the south combined with irregular rainfall events will trigger flooding and adversely affect the mining operations located in that region.

Direct: Increases in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events around the coastal regions will threaten major infrastructure, off-shore drilling and on shore mining, representing huge potential losses to Nigeria’s economy.

Indirect: Will mainly affect support systems, some operations and agricultural sectors.

Indirect: Will mainly affect workers and social sectors.

Indirect: Will mainly affect workers and social dynamics.

Wholesale and retail trade

Indirect: Will be greatly affected by the direct affects that drought has on crop production and other agricultural products.

Direct: Infrastructure is at direct risk from land inundation and sea-level rise, especially in the Lagos and Niger delta region where up to 35% of the land would be lost with a 0.5m rise.

Direct: With most of the major cities located on or around rivers/deltas the impact of flooding is already being seen. As precipitation increases, damage will increase (e.g. transport infrastructure).

Direct: Increases in extreme weather events will directly affect infrastructure through damages. It will also cause increases in damages to crops which will affect trade.

Indirect: Will mainly affect the supply of the products thus affecting the wholesale and retail trade.

Indirect: Will have much the same affect as temperature abnormalities

Indirect: Climate related conflict/migration will have severe impacts upon the wholesale and retail trade in Nigeria through major social disruption.


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Sector Drought Sea level rise Flooding Extreme weather Temperature abnormalities

Change in disease/pest patterns

Conflict / migration

Others (nine sectors)

Direct/Indirect: The manufacturing sector will suffer losses from reduced potential to produce goods requiring agricultural inputs. Industries in the northern dry belt will suffer increased costs for water-reliant processes. The utilities/energy sector will be affected by decreases in the output of hydroelectric plants and losses from oil/gas. Water supply will be constrained through reduced precipitation and run-off. The tourism sector will also be affected from indirect losses such as ecological loss.

Direct: All sectors will be affected by sea level rise and land loss. The transport, tourism (especially beach-based tourism) and insurance industries will be among the worst hit as they are directly affected. It will also affect the boundaries of the ecosystems and the mix of the species that compose them. Most of the water resources along the coast would become polluted by intrusion of salt water. Depreciation of coastal properties would be profound.

Direct/ Indirect: As with sea-level change except focussed around rivers and the river basins as well as coastal areas. Utilities will be affected as sewers and other infrastructure are flooded. Land for housing will be claimed, increasing costs for building erection. Insurance will also be greatly affected by the increasing difficulty of predicting the floods. Resorts and tourism will be badly affected.

Direct: Extreme weather damages to all sectors will increase as the intensity and frequency of the events increase.

Direct/Indirect: The main affects will be caused by disruption to sectors such as the construction sector or tourism sector. Insurance industries will also be affected by varying temperature anomalies. Extreme heat may accelerate degradation of transport infrastructure.

Indirect: Increases in the occurrence of disease affecting humans, animals and crops will have indirect effects on most sectors and might disrupt the manufacturing and transport sectors.

Indirect: All sectors will be affected by increases in conflict and climate refugees.

Overall The worst affected sector from drought is by far agriculture. Increases in drought have secondary impacts on all sectors. High

Sea level rise will severely affect all sectors. The worst hit regions will be the coastal areas and the Niger delta where a substantial amount of investment is in place.

Flooding will increase in the southern regions, increasing the damage to infrastructure and most sectors in that region.

The southern coastal regions that are at risk from tropical storms will be the most at risk. A further one-degree rise in sea surface temperature in the Atlantic will create the conditions required to create typhoons off the coasts of Nigeria. Agriculture and mining will be the most affected sectors.

Temperature abnormalities are expected to increase causing disruption to most sectors and posing a severe threat to agriculture.

The change in disease and pests will inevitable affect the health sectors most but will have a significant general threat when combined with other factors, such as sea-level rise.

Climate refugees are already migrating and this problem is set to only get worse as climate change takes effect. If conflict breaks out this could be devastating for all sectors, both regionally and nationally.

Key: Red/dark shade = High impact; Orange/Light shade = Moderate impact; and No shade = Low impact


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4.3 REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The impacts of climate change in three main regions of Nigeria are summarised in Table 5.2 overleaf. Again, it establishes key direct and indirect impacts and the relative order of magnitude of impacts. The research conducted by ERM into the regional impacts are also highlighted in Figure 4.2 and further elaborated in Annex C.

Figure 4.2 Map of Regional Impacts of Climate Change in Nigeria

Source: ERM Research for this study


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Table 4.3 Key regional climate change impacts by GDP sector

Northern regions South East & South South

South West & Lagos

Agriculture Direct: Agricultural productivity decreases due to soil moisture reduction and desertification. Fishing yields in Lake Chad will potentially reduce. Groundnut (peanut) production may disappear. Forest will be affected by increasing forest fires from drought.

Direct: Will devastate farmland due to sea level rise and soil erosion. Food security will affected by reductions in the size and biodiversity of the southern rainforests.

Direct: Will inundate large areas of agricultural land through sea-level rise. Will also cause salinisation of many southern areas.

Mining and quarrying

Indirect: Mainly affects energy, food supply and social sectors.

Direct: Irregular rainfall events will trigger flooding and adversely affect mining operations. Sea level rise will also damage coastal operations and infrastructure.

Direct: Sea level rise and increases in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events around the coastal regions will threaten major infrastructure, off-shore drilling and on shore mining, representing huge potential losses to Nigeria’s economy.

Wholesale and retail trade

Direct: Will be greatly affected by the direct affects that drought has on crop production and other agricultural products.

Direct: Infrastructure is at direct risk from land inundation and sea-level rise.

Indirect: Climate related conflict/migration will have severe impacts upon the wholesale and retail trade. Sea level rise will reshape settlement and markets.

Others (ten sectors)

Direct/Indirect: Will cause new health risks, in particular cholera outbreaks. Will also cause water resource scarcity due to the decline of Lake Chad. The tourism sector will also be affected from indirect losses such as ecological loss. Could cause desert encroachment, drought, or wild fires; directly through diminished rainfall in the north and central parts and indirectly as people lose their livelihoods and turn to forests and other ecosystem services to expand their agricultural production.

Direct: Sea levels rise will cause major problems. Fuel wood supply will be affected by forest cover reduction. The transport, tourism (especially beach-based tourism) and insurance industries will be among the worst hit as they are directly affected.

Direct: As sea levels rise, Lagos will be uninhabitable. Will destroy beach properties and threaten low lying buildings and roads further inland. Most river deltas maritime wetlands and most socio-cultural features would also be endangered.

Overall

Drought is the main problem in this region, which can lead to severe ecosystem degradation. It suffers reduced agriculture outputs and severe water shortage. Over 50% of the population in this area is under threat from climate change.

Sea level rise and flooding will severely affect all sectors, in particular in the coastal areas and the Niger delta where a substantial amount of investment is in place.

All sectors will be affected in this vulnerable region due to large size population, poor infrastructure and building quality, flood and sea-level rise risk.

Key: Red/dark shade = High impact; Orange/Light shade = Moderate impact; and No shade = Low impact


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5 ECONOMIC IMPACT MODEL RESULTS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

As part of this study, ERM has modified an MS Excel™ based climate change impact model it previously developed to assess climate change impacts on business operations around the world. As such, we have used an Integrated Assessment Model that combines scientific and socio-economic aspects, as was used in the Stern Report (albeit we adopt a less complex approach). Because the assessment was aiming to assess the overall impacts on the Nigerian economy, a Computable General Equilibrium model has not been used. It is important to note that the model used is ‘preliminary’ only and can readily be updated to generate more accurate outputs based on more complex and comprehensive data and assumptions(1). Another advantage of this approach is the transparent nature of the model, allowing any assumptions to be readily modified. The model is based upon up to date national economic data and forecasts, along with the most recent peer reviewed scientific studies of the potential impacts of climate change upon Nigeria, including IPCC’s 2007 4th assessment report, as detailed in Section 3. It is important to note that the high climate change impact scenario takes into account the most recent findings on sea level rise, but still remains relatively conservative (as explained in Section 3). It is thus possible that climate change impacts in Nigeria could be more extreme than is assumed under the ‘high’ climate change scenario. The model splits the economy into three different regions based on the six geo-political zones of Nigeria that also link to the different agro-ecological zones. The three regions are: iv) North (North-West Zone (NW), North-East Zone (NE), North-Central

Zone (NC)); v) South West (SW) (which includes Lagos); and vi) The South-East (SE) and South-South Zones (SS).

Three different impact timeframes were considered (2005-2010, to 2020 and to 2050).

(1) For example, the regions and sectors can be further broken down, and the assumptions as to the initial impacts and low and high climate change impacts can be modified based on further research and assessment.


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The sectors explored in the model were as follows (brackets showing 2005 percentage contribution to GDP): • agriculture (42%) comprising crops, livestock, forests and fisheries; • mining and quarrying (25%) comprising oil and gas (99% of it); • wholesale and retail trade (14%); and • the remaining nine main sectors combined as ‘other’ (combined total of

19%). Agriculture and wholesale and retail sectors are the largest employers of Nigerians, based on data from the Nigerian National Statistics Bureau. Key assumptions used in the model are provided in Annex E. As explained in that Annex, the key quantitative assumptions relating to significance of impacts for each sector and region in particular draw upon Table 4.2. The qualitative consultation responses detailed in Annex A also feed into the assessment of impacts, however, the quantitative results from the consultation are only indirectly considered in the model due to concerns over consistency or responses.

5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE GDP

The results of the model are provided in tabular form below. Of particular interest (especially at this stage of the preliminary model development) is the relative difference in sectoral and regional impacts. This highlights where the bigger risks lie. Table 5.1 highlights that by 2050; overall Nigerian GDP could be potentially 14-22% less with climate change if no adaptation is undertaken. Given the potentially significant agricultural, health and sea-level rise impacts, such figures are not surprising. Indeed, Nigeria is potentially one of the worst impacted countries in the world from climate change.

Table 5.1 Percentage loss of National GDP from Climate Change (medium GDP growth) in different years

Year Climate change scenario 2010 2020 2050 Low CC 0.7% 2.2% 6.4% High CC 3.9% 11.1% 29.5%

The predicted impact on overall GDP over time is shown in Figure 5.1. The table above highlights that there could be a material impact on GDP by 2020, which could hamper progress towards Vision 2020 goals.


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Figure 5.1 Potential climate change impact on Nigeria’s GDP under a medium growth scenario.

In terms of benchmarking these figures against other studies, in 2000, Mendelsohn et al estimated a potential loss of GDP of 11% by 2060 based on a 2ºC rise for Nigeria. Stern (2006) indicated that poorer countries could lose in excess of 10% of their GDP based on 5-6ºC warming by 2100. Currently, each wet year in the Sahel causes a loss of around 1.25% of GDP and 3.5% for a dry year (Ludwig and Kabat, 2007). Between 1997 and 2006, natural disasters have caused damage valued up to 22% of an exposed country’s GDP, although most impacts of 6% or more relate to island economies (Harmeling, 2008). Table 5.2 reveals how the impacts may affect different sectors by 2050. It shows that all sectors are at threat, but the worst affected is agriculture.

Table 5.2 Percentage loss of sectoral GDP from Climate Change (medium GDP growth) in 2050

Sector Low CC scenario High CC scenario Agriculture 8% 36% Mining and quarrying 4% 21% Wholesale & retail trade 5% 27% Others (nine sectors) 5% 27% Overall 6.4% 29.5%

Table 5.3 highlights how the sectors may be affected from a regional perspective.

0200400600800

1,0001,2001,4001,6001,800

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Time

GD

P U

S$ B

nNo Climate changeLow Climate changeHigh Climate change


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Table 5.3 Range of percentage loss of GDP through CC by 2050 (assuming medium GDP growth)

Regions Sectors (% reduction in sectoral GDP) Agric Mining Retail Other All

North 8 - 33 1 - 6 7 - 27 5 - 23 8 - 30 SE+SS 8 - 38 5 - 22 2 - 10 5 - 26 5 - 25 SW+Lagos 8 - 42 5 - 25 7 - 34 5 - 29 7 - 34

5.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR MDGS IN NIGERIA

Climate change will have a range of positive and negative impacts on progress towards the MDGs around the world. In most regions of sub-Saharan Africa, negative impacts are anticipated to far outweigh any positive impacts (IPCC, 2007b). The main ways in which climate change is anticipated to affect Nigeria’s attainment of the MDGs is summarised in Table 5.4. Because different MDGs will be affected negatively by climate change to different extents, a third column has been added that rates the potential severity of the impact as high, medium or low.

Table 5.4 Affects of climate change on MDG goals in Nigeria

MDG goal Affect of climate change on MDG goal* Degree of impact

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

• Increasing economic insecurity due to increase in weather extremes

• Diminishing bio-diversity and access to natural resources

• Diminished crop yields • Reduced fisheries due to coral bleaching and

increased calcification of coral • Increasing soil salinity

High

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education

• Lifestyle demands of increased time seeking food, water and cash income reduces time for education

• Increased environmental refugees and ill-health impacts as barriers to attending classes

Low

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

• Impacts on women as are already 2/3 of the world's poor

• Women's greater reliance on subsistence and natural resources for income

Low

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality

• Health impacts on children as are particularly vulnerable to flood-related, vector-borne and hunger related diseases

Medium

Goal 5: Improve maternal health

• Health impacts on mothers, particularly given maternal vulnerability to malaria

Medium

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

• Malaria and other vector-borne diseases predicted to dramatically increase with extreme weather events, increased flooding and temperature rises

• Malaria zone extended

Medium


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MDG goal Affect of climate change on MDG goal* Degree of impact

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

• Increased water shortages as a result of changes in rainfall patterns, greater periods of drought and salt water incursion into fresh water reserves

• Sea-level rise for urban dwelling poor, for the majority of the world's poor living in flood prone areas

• Loss of arable land, particularly in coastal areas

High

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development

• Dealing with the costs of weather related disasters could affect Gross Domestic Product, level of indebtedness, state of public finances, and investment in development in poor countries

Medium

*Source of impacts: http://www.cana.net.au/socialimpacts/global/millennium-development-goals.html Key: Red/dark shade = High impact; Orange/Light shade = Moderate impact; and No shade = Low impact Table 5.4 shows that all MDG goals in Nigeria will be potentially affected by climate change. The range of impacts listed is complex, and some are better understood than others. For example, changes in crop yields under a range of climate scenarios are relatively well known, whereas little research has been conducted to date on the impacts of climate change and weather extremes on women compared to men (IPCC, 2007). In Table 5.4 the MDGs of ‘eradication of extreme poverty and hunger’ and ‘ensuring environmental sustainability’ are rated as high because the impacts of climate change on these goals will be relatively direct. For example, climate change is anticipated to have a direct negative affect on agricultural production in Nigeria through an increase in weather extremes such as flood and drought. This is of particular concern because a large sector of the Nigerian population is engaged in, and dependent upon, agriculture and forestry (36% of men and 20%of women) as their primary occupation (see Table 2.2), and many such agricultural activities are subsistence in nature. Similarly, the goal of ensuring environmental sustainability is important because of the likely direct, negative impacts of climate change on water scarcity and loss of land due to sea-level rise. On the other hand, the MDGs rated ‘low’ in Table 5.4, whilst still important, are less directly affected by climate change. For example, the MDG aimed at empowering of women is affected by a complex range if economic and political factors; changing social conditions due to climate change is just one. In it current form, Table 5.4 assumes that climate change will impact in an even manner across the country. In reality, however, this is unlikely to be the case for two reasons. First, severe inequalities in wealth within Nigeria mean that there is far greater chance of some regions meeting the MDGs than others. For example, as described in Section 2.2, poverty rates in Nigeria’s northern regions are substantially higher than in the south (i.e. 60-90 percent compared


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to 20-40%resepctively). This means that, even in the absence of climate change, there is far less chance of Nigeria meeting the MDGs in the north of the country than in the south, particularly with regard to MDG 1 (eradication of extreme poverty and hunger). Secondly, climate change will have a number of regional-based impacts in Nigeria, meaning that different MDG goals will be affected to different extents across the country. For example, expansion of the Sahara and Sahel southwards in the north of the country can be expected to have a major impact on food security for the poorest sections of society (thus affecting MDG 1) in this area compared to the more built-up regions of the south. Similarly, changes to the disease regime in the southern areas of Nigeria (such as in and around Port Harcourt and the Niger Delta) are expected to be more pronounced compared to those in the north (thus affecting MDG 6, the combat of HIV/AIDs, malaria and other diseases).

5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR VULNERABLE GROUPS

Climate change can be expected to impact most severely on vulnerable societal groups, given that they are the most at risk from the elements, most reliant on natural resources for their living, and least able to adapt. In Nigeria, vulnerable groups mainly include poor people, especially those living in marginal environments and in areas of low agricultural productivity where they often depend directly on species and ecosystem diversity to support their livelihoods(1). As a result of this dependency, any impact that climate change has on natural systems threatens the livelihoods, food intake and health of poor people. In Nigeria, as in numerous countries around the world, the poorest sections of society are often disproportionately represented by women, young children and the elderly, and these groups will accordingly be most vulnerable to climate change (UNICEF, 2007). To illustrate, the women’s traditional role in the household, such as collecting water, is likely to be made more difficult through, for example, exacerbation of water shortages as a result of dryer weather (as anticipated in the north east of Nigeria as a result of the ongoing drying of Lake Chad). Similarly, an increase in the frequency and severity of weather extremes in Nigeria, such as flood and heat wave (as anticipated to occur, for example, in southern regions of the country), will disproportionately affect young people who are most vulnerable due to their small size and relative inability to care for themselves. In addition, Figure 2.2 reveals that two key areas in Nigeria with high poverty is the land in and around Lagos, and much of the region to the far North around the Sahel. Potential sea level rise is likely to cause significant problems to the poor in and around Lagos. Desertification and drought in the

(1) Source: http://www.developments.org.uk/articles/climate-change-threatens-africa2019s-poor/


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North of Nigeria is likely to severally affect the poor that live there, particularly those that depend on the land for their livelihoods. Due to constraints of the study it has not been possible to assess the distribution and vulnerabilities of different ethnic groups in any detail. This would require a more accurate assessment of the location of regional impacts and more detailed data on different ethnic groups throughout Nigeria.


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6 ADAPTATION

6.1 OPTIONS FOR ADAPTATION

There is a large amount of evidence demonstrating human adaptability to climate around the world. For example, in Africa, the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007) contains numerous examples of complex adaptations already observed in the continent in response to climate change and other stresses. These examples highlight, for example, the roles of social networks, diversification of livelihoods, and the contributions to adaptation made by infrastructure and technology. Lessons learned from these past experiences are highly valuable when considering future adaptation options. In Nigeria, examples of options for agricultural management, agricultural production (i.e. in specific sub-sectors) and infrastructure are presented in Table 6.1, Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 respectively. Table 6.4 presents adaptation options for a range of other sectors, including mining and quarrying, health and real estate. The adaptation options below represent a ‘preliminary’ list drawn from various documents, in particular: NEST & GCSI (2008); Elasha et al. (2006) and the Ministry of Environment of FRN (2003), as well as from the consultation exercise. In the Tables, most emphasis has been placed on the agricultural sector because of its relative cost-effectiveness of adaptation and its importance to the more vulnerable sections of Nigeria society affected (see Section 5.5). In addition, infrastructure is critical and thus likely to be relatively cost effective too due to the fact that it supports the general economy. The tables highlight relative costs and benefits (categorised according to high [H], medium [M] or low [L]). Those options where the relative benefits are likely to exceed the relative costs are shown in bold. Given the constraints of this study, these assessments are based on expert judgement and are only intended to provide a preliminary indication of relative costs and benefits.

Table 6.1 Adaptation options for agricultural management

Adaptation option Relative cost

Relative benefit

Government policy Providing greater support for agricultural research H H Improving transportation of agricultural goods M H Offering subsidies and other protective trade regulations devices H M Reforming land tenure and land management policies M H Establishing markets for products M M Implementing medium- to long-term development strategies for industries based on sustainable agricultural principles

H H

Farm management


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Relative benefit

Disseminating research findings to farmers L M Creating more efficient food storage/processing systems M M Improving pest management M H Creating water tanks/reservoirs in dry areas M H Reducing bush-burning M M Developing a more reliable system of seasonal predictions M M Engaging in labour migration M M Changing farm location M L Selling farm assets L L Soil erosion Initiating and stringently enforcing anti-erosion laws, including limiting access to eroded and erosion-prone areas

M L

Public education M M Erecting contour bunds around farmlands L M Prioritising soil and water conservation in government policy L M

Table 6.2 Adaptation options for agricultural sub-sectors


Relative benefit

Crops Using agro-forestry and organic farming techniques. For example, organic manure instead of chemical fertilizers

L M

Increasing crop area or crop intensity M M Using disease-resistant, quick-maturing crop and plant species (e.g. cassava sticks, fruits and nuts)

L H

Developing better heat- and drought-resistant crops H H Improving the production efficiencies in arid lands and marginal areas of early maturing crops

M H

Developing high-yield varieties H H Properly preserving seeds and plant seedlings to ensure healthy germination in the following farming season

M M

Introducing mixed farming practices (e.g. utilizing forest products as a buffer to crop failure in climatically marginal areas)

L H

Livestock

Reducing herd and farm sizes L L Diversifying animal stock – especially to smaller animals M H Transitioning to sedentary herds L M Culling animals L L Fisheries

Maintaining water levels so that fish can spawn M M Development of mariculture M H Forests

Establishing wood-lots with fast-maturing plant species that yield domestic fuel wood for nearby communities

L H

Establishing seed banks to maintain biological diversity and provide farmers with opportunities to diversify

M H

Decentralising resources to local governance arrangements i.e. adopting Community Based Natural Resource Management

L M

Improving all-round management of tree plantations, including prevention of soil erosion

M M


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Table 6.3 Adaptation options for infrastructure


Relative benefit

Electricity Relocating power generation and transmission facilities that are threatened by sea-level rise

H H

Providing physical protection for highly sensitive energy production facilities (e.g. oil rigs, oil refineries)

H H

Developing and enhancing utilisation of renewable energy resources such as solar energy

H H

Water Promoting water recycling and re-use M M Promoting greater efficiency in water use (e.g. making irrigation more efficient)

M M

Modifying existing infrastructure (e.g. changing location or height of water intakes; using closed conduits instead of open channels; using artificial recharge to reduce evaporation; raising dam height; adding more turbines; removing sediment from reservoirs for more storage)

M H

Introducing new management techniques for existing infrastructure (e.g. change in operating rules)

M H

Increasing water supply capacity through construction of new infrastructure (e.g. reservoirs, hydroplants, delivery systems for inter-basin transfer, development of groundwater supplies)

H H

Protecting watersheds and reservoir sites through establishment of intensive vegetation cover to minimize evaporation

L H

Better monitoring of ground-water resources M H Improving rain-harvesting techniques and construction of rain catchments back-up tanks

L M

Transport Using protective devices to shield sensitive equipment from excessive dust and humidity

M M

Installing drainage construction in and around ports H H Installing storm surge barriers in and around airports H H Better locating airports and motor parks (e.g. away from flood-prone areas)

M H

Designing highways and railway lines taking into account expected changes in climate

M M

Table 6.4 Other sector-based adaptation options in Nigeria


Relative benefit

Mining and quarrying Relocating to more favourable sites less exposed to weather extremes H H Developing appropriate mining techniques and industries for transiting climatic conditions

M M

Designing new industrial activities with increased resilience and flexibility with respect to climate change already built in

M H

Health

Implementing a consistent attack on the disease vector population M H


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Relative benefit

Strengthening the health care delivery system M M Developing public awareness on health issues M H Improving public sanitation and immunization coverage M H Gathering data and archiving diseases associated with climate change and their seasonal and inter-annual variations

M H

Developing technological or engineering strategies such as genetic or biological pest control

H H

Real estate & buildings

Undertaking a coast protection strategy to determine where and what form of coast protection schemes are required. Designing buildings to be more resilient to weather extremes (e.g. heat waves, storms)

M

M

H

M

Limiting property development in high-risk areas, such as flood plains, hillsides and shore lines, through appropriate planning

M H

Relocating infrastructure away from coasts prone to storm surges and sea-level rise

H H

Ecological

Diversifying and extending protected areas for the conservation of ecosystems that are most vulnerable to climate change and sea level rise

M M

Maintaining ecological structure and processes at all levels and reducing existing pressure on natural ecosystems

M M

Developing and implementing of programmes for restricted areas and buffer zones, resource harvesting on a sustainable basis, ecological restoration, sustainable management and agro ecosystems

M M

Monitoring to evaluate species and ecosystems stability from climate change perspective

M H

The ‘low/medium cost’ but ‘high benefit’ options presented in the above tables are potentially good value-for-money responses to the threat of climate change in Nigeria. These have been listed below, where each option can be implemented at a range of scales, from the individual farm up to the national level: • using disease-resistant, quick-maturing crop and plant species (e.g.

cassava sticks, fruits and nuts) (farm level); • introducing mixed farming practices (e.g. utilizing forest products as a

buffer to crop failure in climatically marginal areas) (farm level); • designing new industrial activities with increased resilience and

flexibility with respect to climate change already built in (site level); • establishing wood-lots with fast-maturing plant species that yield

domestic fuel wood for nearby communities (district level); • reforming land tenure and land management policies (national level) • Improving pest management (district level); • protecting watersheds and reservoir sites through establishment of

intensive vegetation cover to minimize evaporation (district level); • establishing seed banks to maintain biological diversity and provide

farmers with opportunities to diversify (national level); • better monitoring of ground-water resources (national level); and


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• undertaking a coast protection strategy to determine where and what form of coast protection schemes are required.

The costs of implementation of the above options range over a number of orders of magnitude, from the $10,000s when implemented at the farm-level to the $10,000,000s when implemented at the regional scale. For example, the switch from traditional varieties to disease-resistant, quick maturing crop and plant species on an individual farm will probably be in the order of $1,000s to $10,000s, whereas a comprehensive national programme to improve the monitoring of groundwater resources will most likely be in the order of $100,000s to $1,000,000s. Overall costs of adaptation are likely to be high. Niang-Diop (2005) estimates that for countries potentially affected, countering the costs of sea level rise could amount to 5-10% of GDP. Costs for Nigeria could be greater than this given the oil infrastructure and low lying situation of Lagos.

6.2 OBSTACLES TO ADAPTATION

The main obstacles to adaptation in Nigeria are listed below (NEST and GCSI, 2004): • Reluctance among some stakeholders to accept the reality of climate

change; • Inability and reluctance to adopt new farming strategies; • Lack of information (awareness) and knowledge (education) on the

phenomenon of climate change; • Lack of government preparedness and insensitivity to climate change • Lack of dedicated research institutions; • Inadequate public policies that target adaptation for relevant stakeholders; • Population growth; • Widespread poverty which induces heavy and total dependence on the

immediate environment for a livelihood; • Land scarcity, leading to adoption of unsustainable farming practices; and • The existence of land tenure and land management systems that do not

favour food security.

6.3 NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLAN

According to Dr Fodeke of the Special Climate Change Unit, (pers. comms., 2008), Nigeria currently has a draft National Adaptation Plan of Action, which may be available by the end of 2008. This was put together in a national review workshop in November through assistance of Heinrich-Boll Foundation.


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7 DATA & INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS

This section outlines key data and institutional requirements needed to help assess and deal with climate change impacts in Nigeria.

7.1 DATA REQUIREMENTS

As highlighted by the literature review and stakeholder consultation exercise, at present, Nigeria has limited information and data on what the climatic changes and associated impacts will be at a regional level within Nigeria. Key data that need to be put in place in order to make effective policies directed at tackling climate change impacts in Nigeria includes the following: • Climate forecasting and climate scenarios data (transformation of Global

Climate Model (GCM) data into local climate scenarios based on regional climate modelling).

• Information and good quality data for establishing baseline scenarios (e.g.

where assets are and their value, vulnerability etc) up to 50 year time slices or longer.

• Data linking past climates with vulnerabilities in each sector (from

national to local community level, etc). • Sectoral baseline and impact assessment data at a local and regional level. • Understanding the interlinkages between biological, physical and social

capital and economic outputs. • Local impacts (down to community level) and the social implications. • Sectoral approaches for adaptation to biophysical impacts. • Information on the least-cost approaches for adaptation. • The range of social impacts associated with each impact scenario. • Long-term data on sea level rise. • Data on the rate of subsidence in coastal areas. • Comprehensive analysis of droughts in the arid north, and data on the rate

of desert encroachment. • Data for prediction of storm surges and oceanic fetches from remote forces

in the Atlantic.


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• Regional climate models of various scenarios across different time slices. • Data on sectoral vulnerability and impacts across various scenarios,

socioeconomic models of Nigeria’s future growth path, integrated assessment models (as impacts or actions in one sector will affect other sectors).

• Nigeria does not have even a good baseline dataset to assess the progress

that is being made towards the achievement of the MDGs across the various sectors. For instance, it is difficult presently to assess the potential impacts of climate change on the achievement of these MDGs.

• There is need for developing clear quantifiable vulnerability indicators

across biophysical, socio-economic and health areas; that are also consistent and useful within a local context. At present, indicators are too broad-brush and do not take local conditions into account.

• At present the historical record of the impacts of climatic events is of poor

quality due to the paucity of disaster statistics compiled in the aftermath of events, and the generally low level of insurance coverage in the region.

The Ministry of Environment proposed a series of 14 projects back in 2003 to help fill some key data gaps, and other climate change study needs. The eight projects related to filling data gaps on climate change impacts and assessments are listed below, using the original numbering system. Further details of all 14 proposed studies can be found in Annex F. These projects have yet to be undertaken due to lack of funds (Fodeke, pers. comms. 2008). 1) Satellite Remote Sensing Determination of Vegetation Loading and Land

use Change between 1995 and 2005 as Influenced by Human Activities and Biomass Burning.

7) Baseline Data Analysis for Risk Assessment of Impacts of Flood and

Drought. 8) Modelling and Verification of Severe storms (cyclonic depressions) in the

Niger Delta, Nigeria. 9) GCM Climate Modelling of Temperature/ Precipitation and Crop Yield

relationship for Food Security. 10) Creation of Public Awareness on Climate Change. 11) Improving the Quality of Meteorological Data for Climate Change Impact

and Application Studies. 12) Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability Assessment in the Sudan-Sahel

Region. 14) Climate Change and Assessment of pollution – related health hazards in

Livestock.


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The Ministry of Environment also highlighted the need to consider the outcome of the UNFCCC report on Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries (2007), which also stresses the need for: adequate operational national systematic observing network and access to the data available from other global and regional networks; for countries to be able to understand their local climate better and thus be able to improve the understanding of the dynamics of the climate system and its natural variability; and provide input for climate models and plan adaptation options. Systematic observations of the climate system are usually carried out by national meteorological centres and other specialised centres. The report concludes that observations and data availability still need to be improved in all regions, systematic observation networks in Nigeria and Africa are inadequate because there is a lack of stations and lack of maintenance, and if data exist, there are difficulties in obtaining it. Equally as important, as mentioned above, is the need for accurate socio-economic data from across sectors, with a focus on the poor.

7.2 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS

In terms of institutional arrangements necessary, according to the Ministry of Environment, Nigeria currently has institutions that are traditionally mandated to provide data relating to climate change and associated impacts. For example, the Nigerian Meteorological agency (NIMET) is charged with systematic observations and analyses for forecasting purposes around the country. In addition, other agencies and institutes have field experiment stations for their specific needs that are relevant to collating and analysing information about climate change. This includes, the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the National Institute for Freshwater Fisheries Research, The National Water Resources Institute - Kaduna, The National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA), National Centre for Remote Sensing, Jos and the National Centre for Arid Zone Studies, Maiduguri. What is needed now, however, is to establish exactly what they are meant to be doing in this area, and why they are all not fulfilling that task at present, and to seek to address the reasons identified. The country also needs to strengthen the research centres that are presently working in the area of climate change, such as the University Linkage Centre for Climate Change (FMEnv), so as to be able to add value to the sort of data that NIMET will be producing and make the data useful to the development community. The Ministry of Environment believes that Nigeria needs to establish and strengthen national climate committees and programmes throughout the country. Such programmes would promote activities related to gathering the data identified above, climate monitoring and observation networks, education and training, capacity building, climate research and the development of models, technology transfer and adaptation of technology,


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development and implementation of impact assessments, improved climate information services and public awareness of applications of climate information. In addition, the Ministry suggests that the government has to improve the capability of the meteorological satellite receiving facilities at the Airports in Lagos, Kano, Maiduguri, Enugu and Calabar, and to establish many more such facilities. The consultation process also highlighted the need to establish Programme management Unit(s) (PMU) and Steering/Advisory groups(s) (SU). The use of indigenous knowledge in the research to reduce uncertainty was also stressed. The impacts of climate change on poverty alleviation, food security and rural development should also be a research priority within the Nigerian context. Climate change course curricular is encouraged in Nigerian universities and other educational institutions. A database of African researchers who have considerable experience on climate change in general and adaptation in particular should be compiled and such researchers, where available should be used as mentors to other young African researchers. It is also recommended that a healthy funding stream should be diverted to this area to ensure that long term research projects are able to be sustained. Other consultees recommended developing and strengthening networks of trained scientists and associating them with on-going and new projects on climate change and adaptation research. Suggested research activities include:

i) Desk research and consultation to fully collate and synthesize all existing and previously conducted research and data on climate change in the region (Nigeria and West Africa), potential impacts, assets at risk and vulnerability etc. to climate change. This should build on the results of this study and the work undertaken by the Ministry of Environment and NEST.

ii) From the desk survey, identify important results, lessons learnt and

research gaps. Further research should be planned and conducted to fill those gaps.

iii) Large scale multi-region research should be encouraged and funded.

iv) Developing a more comprehensive and accurate Integrated Assessment

Model (IAM) for Nigeria (and Africa) is particularly important, to help focus on the sectors and locations most in need of support and adaptation.


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Beyond the academic community, Nigeria also needs to strengthen the capacity of key senior policy makers to ensure that they understand and support these institutional arrangements.

More critically, Nigeria does not yet have a national climate change policy. However, according to Dr Fodeke of the Special Climate Change Unit at the Ministry of Environment, a National Policy Framework on climate change in Nigeria is being developed. It is planned that this be put forward in April, 2009 at the forthcoming Nigerian National Climate Change Summit. It is recommended that climate change impacts and adaptation principles are embedded in existing planning systems (i.e. all relevant local, regional and national plans and strategies). According to Dr Fodeke of the Special Climate Change Unit, the plan is to mainstream the climate change policy into the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 2 (NEEDS 2) programme, which is presently ongoing. In addition, the importance of using the latest scientific evidence to inform and design policies should be reiterated. To have the maximum impact, a wide range of stakeholders should be included in cross-sectoral policy planning, and the media needs to be made more aware of the issues. An organisation should be created or selected, (such as a ‘Climate Change Commission’) that can champion and coordinate climate change activities in the country. Developing and implementing piecemeal solutions and projects will not solve the country’s climate change problems. It is critical that Nigeria moves away from this model and embraces an integrated approach. The current direction should be to establish a National Climate Change Commission (NCCC) to coordinate and provide new data for climate change assessment and management. This will be the best institutional arrangement foreseeable. The NCCC will link research institutions with other stakeholder institutions, and develop the scenarios for vulnerabilities and adaptation, as well as the likely policy framework for addressing the problem. The NCCC should be linked to the National Planning Commission of Nigeria which would use the key results in planning. The structure of the NCCC should evolve through professional input which can soon become available. Presently, there is some good academic capacity within the country, in various institutions. However, coordination of expertise and funding for research are lacking. Therefore, there should be networking of key institutions together with the national focal point, providing the policy and management lead, while the research institutions are provided the needed support to bring together informed positions of the state of climate system, the scenarios for vulnerability, and adaptation. Other institutions could then play their different roles in-between, including the media and the NGOs for outreach and public information.


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It is important for Nigeria to build strong knowledge networks that will promote understanding of how adaptation can be effectively integrated into development processes. The UK Climate Impact Programme (UKCIP) should be referenced as good practice in this arena and offers an exemplar of how to develop effective communication frameworks between and within the communities of scientists, resource managers, business, the general public, and the policy and government sectors. The encouragement of collaborative research between Nigerian, African and international (e.g. British researchers) is to be encouraged. Scientists can “learn by doing” and encourage cross learning from different cultural perspectives. In order to ensure effective planning of the suggested National Climate Change Commission, the following activities should be carefully implemented: • Identify resource persons in the various institutions. • Coordinate the effort in funded project implementation to ensure

networking. • Require a reporting function for funded activities/tasks in a well

articulated program. • Provide or source for essential equipment and transportation facilities

where necessary. • Ensure periodic exposure of project personnel to National/Global trends

in research by attendance at conferences/seminars/workshops within and outside Nigeria.

• Carry out assessments to identify policy determinants of adaptive

capacity. • Develop monitoring and evaluation criteria for adaptation projects and

test across various sectors and regions through case studies. • Factor climate change into new development investments and ensure the

effective development and implementation of National Communications, NAPAs, and promote cross-sectoral policy dialogue.


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8 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 CONCLUSIONS

Nigeria is likely to be one of the most negatively impacted countries in the world as a result of climate change. Its risks are particularly high as a result of its low lying coastline that is highly populated with a heavy concentration of GDP generating industry and infrastructure. In addition, the North of the country forms part of the Sahel which is at risk of further desertification and droughts. Flooding, water shortages, increased diseases and associated social disruption could well give rise to a vicious cycle of economic degradation and social conflict. Based on IPCC climate change assumptions and the latest research findings relating to sea level rise, the preliminary model adapted for this study predicts that climate change could result in a loss in GDP of between 6% and 30% by 2050, worth an estimated US$ 100 to 460 billion dollars. These numbers assume minimal adaptation. By undertaking appropriate adaptation actions and strategies, much of these impacts can potentially be mitigated. The above impacts are based on possible sea level rise from 1990 levels to 0.3 m by 2020 and 1m by 2050, and rise in temperature of up to 3.2oC by 2050 under a high climate change scenario. The low estimate predictions are for sea level rise of 0.1 m and 0.2 m by 2020 and 2050 respectively, and a temperature increase of 0.4 to 1oC over the same time periods. All the main sectors of Nigeria’s economy will be impacted by climate change, but in particular agriculture. Infrastructure such as water, transport and power are also extremely susceptible and will result in knock on effects to other parts of the economy, especially wholesale and retail. It is possible that some aspects of the economy may gain, such as the production and sales of renewable energy, flood protection, medicine, building cooling equipment etc. All regions will be impacted, particularly the southern coastal regions and the far North of Nigeria. The more central regions will be less affected but were grouped as part of the overall North region. The model predicts losses of 8-30% for the North, 5-25% for the SE and SS, and 7-34% for the SW and Lagos. Attaining the MDGs will also suffer as a result of climate change. In particular Goal 1 on hunger and poverty and Goal 7 on environmental sustainability will be affected in a major adverse way. Goals 4 (reduce child mortality), Goal 5 (Improve maternal health), Goal 6 (Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) and Goal 8 (Develop a global partnership for development) are all likely to be moderately adversely affected. Climate change impacts will be worse for the vulnerable such as the poor, old, women, children and for those that depend on agriculture for their


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livelihoods. This is because the vulnerable are less able to fend for themselves and are less able to adapt to changing circumstances. In terms of the spatial distribution of impacts, those in the far north and adjacent to the coastline are far more at risk. Assessing Nigeria’s physical vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is hindered by the paucity of data concerning historic incidences of climatic disruption, insurance losses and natural disasters in the country. Impact projections for the region also suffer from a lack of local detail, covering as they do large geographic areas. This lack of data means that it is difficult to estimate the impacts of climate change on Nigeria in the detailed manner needed to develop robust adaptation strategies. Adaptation principles need to be embedded in existing planning systems and reiterate the importance of using the latest scientific evidence to inform and design policies. This study has identified broad range of adaptation actions and strategies, highlighting those that may be relatively cost-effective. Many relate to strengthening the robustness and resilience to agriculture related impacts. Other key adaptation requirements include conducting a national coast defence strategy, protecting key infrastructure, and facilitating water collection at a local and household level etc. There is currently little political will to do anything serious about climate change and adaptation. This issue is compounded by the media’s general lack of interest and understanding of the issue as well. There are extensive data gaps with respect to assessing impacts and adaptation strategies. However, it is also difficult to obtain relevant information that does exist. Key data gaps include: climatic data and trends, baseline natural resource and socio-economic conditions, location and importance of assets, data on extreme events such as drought, flooding and coastal flooding, socio-economic data at a local and regional level etc. Nigeria currently has institutions that are traditionally mandated to provide data relating to climate change and associated impacts, such as the Nigerian Meteorological agency (NIMET), as well as numerous other institutions. However, such institutions appear to have problems generating and disseminating relevant information. There is some good academic capacity related to climate change expertise within the country, in various institutions. However, coordination of expertise and funding for research are lacking. Nigerian politics has barely begun addressing climate change due to the perception that more urgent worries exist and the fact that long term strategic thinking is not fully embedded within national politics.


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Most critically, Nigeria does not yet have a national climate change policy. However, a national policy framework on climate change in Nigeria is being developed, which will be put forward in April 2009 at the forthcoming Nigerian National Climate Change Summit. There is also a plan to mainstream the new climate change policy into the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 2 (NEEDS 2) programme, which is presently ongoing. Furthermore, Nigeria has recently developed a draft National Adaptation Plan of Action, which may be available by the end of this year. Even with such policies and plans in place, there is a lack of a centralised institution, (such as a Climate Change Commission) that can champion and coordinate climate change activities in the country. Developing and implementing piecemeal solutions and projects will not solve the country’s climate change problems. It is mandatory that Nigeria move away from this model and embrace an integrated approach. Perhaps the Ministry of Environment’s Special Climate Change Unit can play or help coordinate this role.

8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND WHERE HMG CAN BEST ENGAGE

The key to achieving greater resilience for Nigeria in the face of climate change lies in changing the mindsets and political will of decision makers. Key organisations are likely to include the Ministry of Power and Energy, and the Ministry of Finance. The oil companies are also extremely influential in Nigeria. Only by achieving this will enable the severity of the issue to be fully comprehended and integrated into development plans. The UK’s leadership in establishing institutional solutions to address climate change, particularly the UKCIP (UK Climate Impact Programme), puts it in a good position to engage with Nigeria’s decision makers to achieve this transformation. What is clear from the consultation is that reports and written communications are not the most effective route to take to achieve this engagement. Face to face time with decision makers is essential, in workshops, stressing win-win solutions and opportunities (e.g. for coastal defences and renewable energy development). It is also apparent that a considerable number of ongoing data collection and studies related to climate change are underway in Nigeria. Considerable benefit could be gained by coordinating and linking these up.


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The recommended engagement strategy for HMG via DFID and the High Commission, include the following seven actions: 1) Support a study to undertake a stock-take of existing and proposed climate change data, studies and resources relevant to Nigeria. This should include identifying key ongoing climate change projects, and key individuals within government, institutions, academia and the private sector with an interest in climate change who have the authority to influence outcomes. The challenge associated with engaging and gaining co-operation from the relevant individuals and organisations, and documenting such a considerable dataset should not be underestimated. Lack of progress on achieving this comprehensively should not be allowed to prevent subsequent actions from going ahead.

2) Support the undertaking of a more detailed spatial analysis of key sectors and geographical locations at risk from climate change, linked to a feasibility study of adaptation options. This should draw upon the outcomes of this initial study, and the proposed stock take, and link the outcomes to key political planning approaches in Nigeria (eg the Country Economic Memorandum, NEEDS2/SEEDS, Vision 2020 etc. The analysis should be a far more spatially detailed assessment, in particular focussing on sea level rise risks and desertification/drought vulnerable areas in the north. The latter should be achieved through use of remote sensing and GIS mapping tools to identify key assets, infrastructure and settlements at risk and links to poverty mapping and other socio-economic data.

3) Facilitate raising the profile of climate change within Nigeria to the public via the media, and amongst key interested parties through workshops. This can be achieved through supporting (as appropriate) a media campaign in the country’s prominent newspapers, radio stations and television, to raise the issue of climate change and what it means specifically for Nigeria, in the public consciousness. In addition, holding focussed workshops with relevant committees within the House of Representatives and the Senate (i.e. committees related to the environment, infrastructure development, the Niger Delta, oil / gas industries, power generation and distribution) – as these committees are influential. Workshops should focus on the science of climate change, what it means for Nigeria, and how best Nigeria should respond to the challenges posed.

4) Promote and support the creation of a national Climate Change Commission (or similar). Some central organisation that can coordinate the data collation and outputs from the various institutions and academic organisations involved in climate change.

5) Support an initiative to build capacity in climate change skills within the Ministry for Environment and other Government Ministries. The Ministry of Environment would benefit from additional capacity and influence to lobby


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other Ministries, whilst other such Ministries would benefit from have more informed staff with respect to the implications of climate change.

6) HMG should work closely on climate change issues with key industries and industry representatives. This should include working with the oil and gas industry (e.g. Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, BG Group etc) in Nigeria to develop a consistent, robust cross-industry approach to climate change in Nigeria. Both in-house actions as well as activities to influence the Nigerian government are needed. The severity of the impacts of a potential 1 - 2m raise in sea-levels for an industry whose infrastructure is located in coastal regions lower than 1m above current sea levels, should be self-apparent and emphasised. It should also include working with the Chambers of Commerce and other industry bodies (especially in Lagos, where 60% of all industry is located), to raise climate change as an issue for business, and to develop an action plan amongst key private sector players e.g. cement industry, breweries etc.

7) Work with the Ministry of Environment and selected states, to develop projects that might be eligible for carbon credits, or would otherwise build up the adaptive capacity of Nigeria. Such projects may include for example, afforestation initiatives, re-establishing coastal mangroves, and potentially managing forests that may otherwise be degraded (i.e. eligible for REDD – Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation). The Government of Cross River State, Ogun State and Ondo State have already had meetings with a private company that wishes to invest in standing tropical forests in these states with a view to obtaining carbon credits / CDM funds.


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9 REFERENCES

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Nkomo, J. C., Nyong, A. O. and Kulindwa, K. (2006) The Impacts of Climate Change in Africa. Final Draft Submitted to The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Okali, D. (2004). Climate Change and Nigeria: A Guide for Policy Makers. Nigerian Environmental Study/Action Team (NEST), Available: www.nestinteractive.org/climate_change_docs/policymakersoct25.pdf Onofeghara, F. A. (1990). Nigerian Wetlands: An Overview. In: Akpata, T.V.I and Okali, D. U. U. (eds). Nigerian Wetlands pp 14-26. Man and the Biosphere (MAB) National Committee, Nigeria, UNESCO National Commission, Federal Ministry of Education. Rahmstorf, S., Cazenave, A., Church, J. A., Hansen, J. E., Keeling, R. F., Parker, D. E. and Somerville, R. C. J. (2007) Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections. Science DOI: 10.1126/Science.1136843. February 1, 2007. Scoones, I. et al. (2005) Introduction: New Directions for African Agriculture. IDS Bulletin, Volume 36, Number 2, June 2005, pp. 1-12(12). Institute of Development Studies. Scott Cato, M and Kennett, M (1999) Green Economics: Beyond supply and demand to meeting people’s needs. Green Audit Books, Aberystwyth. pp243. Stern, N. (2006) Report on the Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. Stiglitz, J. (2006) Making globalization work. Penguin Books. London. pp358. Tanser F. C., Sharp, B. and Sueur, D. (2003) Potential effect of climate change on malaria transmission in Africa. Lancet, 362:1792–1798 Thomas, C. D., Cameron, A., Green, R. E., Bakkenes, M., Beaumont, L. J., Collingham, Y.C., Erasmus, B. F. N., Siqueira M.F. and Co-authors (2004) Extinction from climate change. Nature, 427, 145-148. UNFCCC (2007) Report on Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries. UNIDO Regional Centre for Small Hydro Power (2005) The Nigerian capacity to host the Regional Centre for SHP. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2008) Environment for Development. Atlas of Our Changing Environment, Available: http://na.unep.net/digital_atlas2/google.php UK DFID (2007) Nigeria Competitiveness and Growth, Country Economic Memorandum. Volume 1: Executive Summary.


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Watson, R.T., Zinyowera, M. C., Moss, R.H. (1998) The Regional Impacts of Climate Change. An Assessment of Vulnerability. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Working Group II. World Bank Group and UK-DFID (2005) Country Partnership Strategy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2005-2009) WHO/UNICEF (2005) World malaria report. Geneva, World Health Organization/ UNICEF World Health Organisation (2008) International Travel and Health

Annex A

Summary of Consultation Output


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A1 SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION OUTPUT

Prof Anthony Ikpi [email protected]

Dept of Agricultural Economics University of Ibadan

Ibadan, Nigeria (+234-805)5066828

1. Introduction

This portion of the Nigeria Climate Change Impact Study reports the fieldwork in Nigeria and addresses those issues embodied in the terms of reference covering the fieldwork. It consists of four other sections besides the Introduction. Section 2 contains the terms of reference; while Section 3 describes the methodology adopted for the data collection in the field. Section 4 presents a summary of some of the results/findings derived from filled-in respondent questionnaires relating to assessing impacts. Other responses, in particular the data and institutional arrangements that need to be put in place to effectuate policies that are to be directed towards tackling climate change in Nigeria are incorporated in the main report.

2. Terms of Reference

i) To provide relevant information and references on climate change impacts in Nigeria; ii) To interview selected respondents that represent a cross section of Nigeria’s climate

change experts from research, government, business, donor agencies and other sections of stakeholders for data, and complete some model assumptions and questionnaire proformas; and

iii) To provide a brief write-up on gaps in data and institutional arrangements that need to be put in place

3. Methodology

The method applied in collecting data from the field for this study combined direct face-to-face interviewing with emailing and telephoning of selected knowledgeable professionals within and outside Nigeria in the area of climate change in Nigeria. A three-page questionnaire containing eight simple questions was sent/given to a total of 21 respondents to fill after appropriate introduction and explanation of the purpose of the study. The 21 respondents included Nigerian civil service officials, politicians, private sector/NGO practitioners, and employees of diplomatic missions/donor agencies in the country. Altogether, 15 questionnaires were completed by respondents: eight by email and seven in hand-filled hard copies. The full list is detailed below, with their complete contact coordinates. Respondents with an asterisk (*) against their names, completed and sent/gave back their questionnaires; while the remaining non-asterisked seven did not complete theirs. Subsequent to this consultation exercise, ERM contacted Dr Victor Fodeke of the Special Climate Change Unit at the Ministry of Environment to obtain the Ministry of Environment’s opinions. The outcome of this is included in the main report.


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4. Summary of Findings from the Field Responses on Impacts

The key findings from the field concern the guesstimated impact of climate change on the different sectors of the Nigerian economy. Using scores given by the 14 respondents, the average scores for the sectors are summarized in Table 1. The Table shows that, out of a maximum impact index of 5.00, the four sectors that will be most critically impacted are: Crops (4.50), Livestock (4.07), Forestry (3.50), Utilities (3.50). Telecommunications (1.36), and Financial Services (1.36) are least affected. The reasons for the range of scores for each sector by the respondents are numerous and varied, and they are summarized below. Table 1.1 Respondent's Estimated Impact Scores of Climate Change on Various Sectors

of the Nigerian Economy

Sector No. of Responses

Range of Scores indicating magnitude of adverse impacts (0-5)

Average Score

Crops 14 3 to 5 4.50 Livestock 14 2 to 5 4.07 Fisheries 14 1 to 5 3.07 Forestry 14 1 to 5 3.50 Oil/gas 14 0 to 5 2.71 Wholesale and Retail Trade 14 0 to 4 2.07 Manufacturing 14 1 to 4 2.36 Utilities(water/electricity) 14 1 to 5 3.50 Construction 14 0 to 4 2.00 Transport 14 1 to 5 2.86 Telecommunications 14 0 to 3 1.36 Hotels/Ecotourism 14 1 to 4 2.71 Financial services 14 -5* to 4 1.36 Real estate & business services 14 -5* to 4 2.00 General Environment 14 2 to 5 2.50 * Two scores of plus five were suggested, whereby respondents believed a positive impact would be gained. For the Crop Sector: • Rain-fed agriculture is highly vulnerable to the vagaries of climate/weather, heat-wave

and drought inclusive;

• Climate change will adversely affect the ecosystem, length and volume of rainfall and alter the balance of available micro-nutrients available to crops among other reasons. High temperature and drought consequence of climate changes destroys crops;

• Biological component are sensitive and good indicators of change in ecological systems. Since green plants and crops are also primary producers and food sources, they are keys to the survival of all other living things that depend on them. Hence, these sources have the potential to experience most severe impact;

• Reduced rainfall will lead to crop failure in the northern region, while flooding in the coastal regions will lead to loss of crops, low soil moisture content, and reduced soil fertility;

• Climate change will directly affect crops through high temperatures, decreasing water use efficiency, soil desiccation, floods and droughts;

• It would get drier in most of the northern States that have surplus land for agriculture, while the southern coastal States would also loose agricultural lands in the face of sea


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level rise, induced flooding, and possibly increased rainfall caused by climate change. If, however, the North gets wetter, a net positive effect on crops would be expected. In this case, the impact may not be extensive taking other issues into consideration, like land degradation arising from population growth that may likely reach 500 million by 2050.

For the livestock sector: • Under-developed animal husbandry or one dependent on pasture/open land grazing,

watering holes and nomadic is highly vulnerable;

• Livestock animals/birds which depend mainly on plants for food will expectedly suffer greatly under climate change, plus flooding which arises from climate change will kill livestock;

• Livestock are biological materials sensitive to changes in ecosystems. Domesticated animals are also sources of food and income to humans. Any negative impacts on this sector will affect man and livelihood;

• Extreme heat affecting livestock and unavailability of water leading to increase in diseases affecting livestock;

• Large livestock would be affected through droughts more than small ruminants;

• In the drier North, there will be a net decline in feed productivity. Extreme loss of forest cover is expected from the interplay between population growth, urbanization and climate change. Even in the wetter climate scenario, it is unlikely that forests would recover from the current rates of deforestation and biodiversity loss;

• Grazing patterns might be affected as land becomes lost at low lying coasts.

For the Fishery Sector: • Capture fisheries and fishing will be vulnerable due to fisheries species fluctuations etc,

and loss of wetlands will severely impact the fisheries;

• Increased salinity, shrinking rivers and lakes will result from climate change;

• Fisheries resources are more prone to environmental changes as they live in and depend on water for survival. Studies have shown that factors that contribute to climate change such as global warming are initially felt in natural water bodies and estuaries. For instance, undue increase in ocean temperatures can cause sea levels to rise hence fishes may be displaced. Thus, fishes are disturbed when their immediate environment and home are perturbed;

• Water shortage due to climate change leads to a reduction in fish stock or a decline in fish catches;

• Warm temperatures in the coast could affect fisheries production. Drying up of rivers could also affect artesinal fishing;

• Moderate sea level rise (SLR) would moderately boost increase in river basin (especially the Niger Basin) volumes. It is not known how other issues, such as increased water pollution and increased human population leading to higher demands, would play on fisheries; on the other hand, no easy positive impacts can be discerned as enhanced SLR would even further increase the adverse impacts;

• Distributions of El Ninios will affect storms, storminess patterns, and the aquatic habitat;

For the Forestry Sector: • Agro-forestry is climate dependent and vulnerable to drought and desertification;


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• Most direct and swift negative effect on forestry comes from logging and development activities. It is this felling of trees however that contributes to climate change. Fire across tinder-dry parts of any Nigerian forest could force some thousands of individuals to flee their homes;

• Forests are rich sources of biodiversity (genetic, species and ecosystem). Moreover, they serve as habitats to a host of fauna resources. Any adverse impact on this sector will affect biological materials significantly. Wildlife resources live in perfect harmony with their flora counterpart. In addition, flora resources serve as food, shelter and sustenance for wildlife and vice versa in some ecosystems. When flora are affected, the fauna resources are directly or indirectly affected as well;

• Climate change could cause serious desert encroachment, drought, or wild fires;

• Directly through diminished rainfall in the north and central parts of Nigeria and indirectly as people lose their livelihoods and turn to forests to expand their agricultural production and for other ecosystem services;

• Deforestation is huge in Nigeria, and if continued at the present pace will likely heighten the negative effects of climate change on Nigeria’s forests;

For the Oil & Gas Sector: • Contributes more to climate change, by facilitating ozone layer depletion, rather than

being clearly affected by it directly;

• Being mostly non-biological resources and sectors, these are not as adversely affected as biological components. On the other hand, the burning of fossil fuel (especially oil and gas from petroleum thereby spewing large amounts of pollutant gases and elements into the atmosphere, water, and land), has caused untold havoc in our environment in the past 30 years and this has contributed greatly to climate change in Nigeria;

• A sea level rise (SLR) of 1meter in the worst case could submerge all of Nigeria’s oil infrastructure in the Delta region;

• Nigeria depends nearly exclusively on exports of oil and gas resources for foreign exchange. With the combined response of most developed countries to the current energy crises which combine energy efficiency improvements with alternative sources based on renewables, the price and demand for oil may decline on the world market in the medium term (20 years) to long term (over 50 years) time slice. There are no indications of any preparedness plan by Nigeria to join in the search for low-carbon or carbon-free renewable energy technologies to off-set the potential loss of revenue. There is also no clear idea of what would be the likely products of international trade aside from oil. Nigeria could easily transform from an energy-exporting country to one that now imports both energy technologies and new fuels from the developed countries. The challenge for searching for alternatives to oil as product of international trade could make the nation re-think investments in science and technology as basis for future development;

• Oil and gas might be affected minutely as a result of changes in sea level, etc.

For Wholesale and Retail Trade: • Wholesale and retail trade in plant-based products like modern and traditional

medicines, trade in foodstuffs, etc will be adversely affected;

• Trade in agricultural produce could decline through a fall in production; decline in production could lead to high commodity prices out of the reach of many people. Climate change could impact also through the destruction of transportation infrastructure through floods and SLR;


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• Distribution and diversity might be somewhat affected, and other sectors might inadvertently affect it as well, but a balancing effect will be expected as adaptation occurs.


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For the Manufacturing Sector: • Most of the capacity are located in urban low-lying coastal areas vulnerable to accelerated

sea level rise and consequent disruption by increased flooding/inundations and marine erosion;

• Agro-allied manufacturing will be affected; but manufacture of metals and solid minerals-based products may not be so affected;

• Agricultural and agro-processed produce will be badly affected, and this will lower the return on investment in the agriculture sector;

• This can be through limited water availability and also destruction of economic infrastructure along the coastal region by floods;

• Increased demands for industrial efficiency could, if not well managed, lead to increased production costs, which translates to higher living costs for consumers. On the other hand, attainment of cleaner production at competitive costs could lead to improved capacity to export although due to low technology base, the likelihood of this happening is rather low;

• Materials to be manufactured might change as a result of change in trade due to change in environment but then another balancing effect might be expected.

For the Utilities (water/electricity) Sector: • Surface and groundwater are likely to suffer from salinization and sedimentation, while

low water levels will decrease electricity generation in dams and reservoirs;

• Shrinking rivers will affect hydro-electricity generation and reduce the water table and quantity of drinkable water available from unpredictable rainfall. Water available for other uses will also decrease;

• Utilities such as water supplies may be altered if changes are effected in this sector;

• Reduction in seawater level will lead to a drop in the electricity wattage, shortage of water, and reduced water quality;

• Water supply will be constrained through reduced precipitation and run-off. Water quality will also be affected through salt water intrusion particularly along the coasts. Already we are seeing how changes in levels in Lake Kainji are affecting electricity supply and climate change will further reduce run-off in the Niger River. In the worst case scenario where countries upstream decide to dam the river, then the impact will be exacerbated;

• Being located at the equator and within the tropics means that any increase in mean air temperatures would translate into higher demands for electricity for space cooling as well as increased demand for water for residential and agricultural uses. If such additional electricity generation would arise from fossil fuel, it would exacerbate climate change. If it is to come from renewable sources, additional costs would be involved. There appears to be no win-win situation;

• Water will suffer a higher impact than electricity as it is expected that less freshwater will be available as a result of submersion of some coasts by the sea, and as Nigeria already suffers a huge scarcity of potable water, it will be quite adverse on the nation.

• Hydroelectricity generation will be reduced due to low water levels;

• Power and energy is derived from some climatic components/factors such and water, wind and sun. Indeed, changes in these translates into alterations in sources of power and energy. Proper and well-directed utilization of these may help in curbing negative effects of climate change in our environment. This sector is highly essential to man’s survival and progress;


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• Hydroelectric generation is affected due to drop in seawater level;

• Ability to develop clean energy at competitive costs would lead to improved capacity, supporting energy export, and the development of auxiliary technologies to support infrastructure development. Due to low technology base, the likelihood of this happening is rather low;

• If oil and gas are not expected to be affected much, then the power and energy industry might also not suffer much.

For the Construction sector: • Construction and development activities are hinged on climatic conditions. The type and

mode of construction depends on the climate of the region. Changes in climate therefore have significant effect on this sector of human economy. It is noteworthy too that the reverse is also the case. Much construction and huge development activities affect many facets of the environment, which in turn affect the climate. Many have asserted that these anthropogenic activities (which involves deforestation and removal of large quantities of vegetation and soil covers; pollution of air; and contamination surface and ground water) are one of the primary causes of climate change;

• Unavailability of water and decreased human capacity to do work;

• Water availability and drop in GDP will all affect construction;

• Flooding of coastal areas used for resettlement schemes;

• There might be increased monitoring on urban planning, etc but it is not likely that the construction sector might suffer at all.

For the Transport Sector: • Accelerated rise in sea level would cripple ports, coastal roads, air fields, rail lines, etc

thereby reducing economic activities in the country;

• Changes in climatic conditions affect transportation, travel and travel time and schedule;

• Ocean/sea navigation is impaired due to reduced seawater level;

• Road and economic infrastructure, particularly along the coasts will be washed away. Most of the infrastructure from Port Harcourt to Lagos will be at risk;

• The efficiency of the transport sector is very low, resulting from nearly sole-dependence on road transportation. Response to climate change by other developed countries could change the transportation technology towards cleaner fuels and more integrated transport planning. Without a good long-term plan in place, the country may suddenly find its transportation system unable and not ready to tap into these new technologies. This could imply a sudden need for structural changes in the transportation system, with high implications to consumers, leading to enormous economic and social impacts. On the other hand, Ability to evolve a plan for new transportation system and transport technologies would add to national capacity for technology development and innovation management. Due to the low technology base, the likelihood of this happening is rather low;

• Transportation might be affected a bit as a result of changing means to adapt to new environments e.g. looking for more ways to navigate wet land, but it will not suffer much.


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For the Telecommunication Sector: • Probably will enjoy a boom!;

• The principles applied in telecommunications are hinged on climatic factors. Communication may likely to be impossible if the climate is not right, and communication is critical to a growing and healthy economy. Hence changes in climate will affect this sector of the economy in the long term;

• Destruction of infrastructure during flooding in the coastal region;

• Destruction of masts through storms. A further 1 degree rise in sea surface temperature in the Atlantic will create the conditions required to create typhoons off the coasts of Nigeria;

For the Hotel/Ecotourism Sector: • Resorts will be badly affected by frequent flooding/inundation and destruction of flora

and fauna, including risk of frequent malaria etc;

• Tourism suffers when weather-related disasters occur;

• Long term changes in climatic conditions also affect landscapes and the way places looks. This may lower the value of these components and thus reduce livelihood and income for man;

• Extreme heat leading to loss of life, increase in diseases affecting animals crops, and humans;

• Many of Nigeria’s good hotels are in Lagos, within proximity to the coasts and can be impacted by SLR and coastal erosion;

• Tourism could reduce based on the need for tourists from cold countries to come to the tropics;

• Ecotourism will suffer as a result of the change of habitats of animals and so such places of interest as game reserves and life parks might suffer a great deal as animals abandon them.

For the Financial Services Sector:

• When this sector is adversely affected, many things could be affected, as this sector helps to provide necessary funds/resources for amelioration/mitigation;

• Nigeria’s financial services are sustained by oil and agric and if these two sectors are affected, then the effect will spiral into the financial services sector;

• Lagos and the Niger Delta areas currently harbor a significant fraction of the national development infrastructure, and the oil and gas facilities. In any scenario of sea level rise (whether low, moderate or high) threats to infrastructure from potential flooding/submergence are high. This is already noticeable in the Lagos coasts. Insurance costs for existing and future investments, as well as assets management could lead to higher costs, leading to significant economic and social impacts;

• They are subject to changes everyday and such a change might mean more expenses in the community but will not change financial services too much.

For the Real Estate & Business Services Sector: • Depreciation of coastal properties would be profound due to increased scourge of

flooding, marine erosion and subsidence of low-lying coastal areas;

• Flooding from climate change destroys homes. Fire across tinder-dry parts of Southern California forced some 500,000 to flee their homes n 2007;


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• Real estate and business services are affected through diminished estate development when the climate is not right;

• Land for housing is claimed by water–flooding, thereby Increasing cost on foundation for building erection;

• They might suffer as a result of restructuring and urban planning;

• Design and construction will refocus for environmental impact and energy use.

For the General Environment Sector: • Coastal settlements will be dislocated, internally displaced persons and/or refugees from

arid areas will increase in number;

• Rising temperature foster the spread of diseases by allowing mosquitoes and disease-carrying organism like fungi to spread;

• Human health and safety is regarded as one of the most important biological resources. When negative changes occur in our climate, leading to disease outbreak, they hit human health severely. This reduces man-hours and work efficiency and increases death rate. Changes and alteration in one affects the other in like manner. This huge sector makes up the basic component of our environment wherein man is able to survive. Negative impact on these may prove to be detrimental and threat to plants, animals and man;

• Global warming and its associated effects – desert encroachment, flooding, drought, etc could occur;

• We will see severe ecosystem degradation, from droughts up north to flooding in the south with attendant consequences;

• Air pollution, waste management, and other environmental management issues are to be increased resulting from both local emissions and long-term transport. These require more efficient management systems, with costs likely to increase. On the other hand, ability to mainstream climate change adaptation into planning could reduce some of the costs, and provide improved technology planning and management capacity. The likelihood of this happening cannot be rated high;

• The total effect on the environment might be drastic to areas in low lying coasts but more stable environments might not suffer too much.

Experts contacted/interviewed on Climate-Change-in-Nigeria

(a) In Calabar, South-south Agroecological Zone:

1. Dr. Imo Jackson Ekpoh*, Environmentalist & Geographer Department of Geography University of Calabar Calabar, Cross River State (CRS) 2. Prof. Sam O. Abang* Agricultural Environmentalist Department of Agricultural Economics University of Calabar Calabar, Cross River State (CRS)


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3. Dr. Chris Odu Agbor* Environmentalist & Permanent Secretary CRS Forestry Commission 69 Target Road Calabar, Cross River State (CRS) (b) In Lagos, South-west Agroecological Zone 4. Mr. Adeniyi Arimoro* Environmental Ecologist & MD/CEO Afruit Enterprises 12 Festival Road, Victoria Island, Lagos 5. Dr. E. A. Ajao* Environmental Ecologist & Deputy Director Nigerian Institute for Oceanography & Marine Research Wilmot Point Road, Bar Beach PMB 12729 Victoria Island, Lagos 6. Mr. Nubi Olubunmi Ayoola* Environmentalist Nigerian Institute for Oceanography & Marine Research Wilmot Point Road, Bar Beach PMB 12729 Victoria Island, Lagos (c) In Ibadan and Ile-Ife, South-west Agro-ecological Zone 7. Prof. David U. U. Okali Retired Professor of Forestry Environment & Chairman The Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST) No. 1, Oluokun Street (Off Awolowo Avenue) Bodija, Ibadan 8. Dr. N. Kai GIS Expert International Institute for Tropical Agriculture Oyo Road, Ibadan 9. Dr. Imoh B. Obioh* Coordinator Atmospheric Research and Information Analysis Laboratory (ARIAL) Centre for Energy Research and Development (CERD) Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria


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(d) In Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT) 10. Prof. Collins Olisa-Emeka Gardner Environmentalist & Executive Chairman/CEO Presidential Implementation Committee on Clean Development Mechanism Room 1.49, Wing B (1st Floor) Federal Secretariat Complex, Phase 1 Shehu Shagari Way, Abuja 11. Dr. Ewah Out Eleri Executive Director International Center for Energy, Environment & Development (ICEED) Chatti Plaza, 6 Sapele Street P. O. Box 5421 Garki II, Abuja 12. Dr. Ishaku Huzi Mshelia Director Clean Energy & Environment Initiative HUZI & ASSOCIATES Legal Practitioners No. 8 Lobito Crescent Wuse II, Abuja 13. Ms Kate Airey* Head of Political Section British High Commission Shehu Shagari Way (North) Maitama, Abuja 14. Dr. Graham M. Gass* Social Policy Adviser DFID Abuja 15. Mr. Dada Iweka Geological Engineer Western Goldfields Limited 12 Abeokuta Street Garki, Area 8 Abuja 16. Mr. Guy Okechukwu Environmentalist & Estate Developer Guy & Co Properties Limited 33 Ekukinam Street Utako District, Abuja 17. Mr. Paul O. Iweka Construction Engineer Isajon Engineering & Construction Company 33 Ekukinam Street Utako District, Abuja


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18. Dr. B. A. Ajakaiye Director-General/CEO National Oil Spill Detection & Response Agency (NOSDRA) 5thFloor, NAIC Building Plot 590 Zone AO PMB 145, Central Area Garki, Abuja 19. Mr. Femi Ajibabi* Environmentalist Budget Office, National Assembly Abuja (e) In Enugu 20. Chidi Onuoha* Research Fellow African Institute for Applied Economics Enugu Nigeria (f) In other places outside Nigeria 21. Prof. Anthony Nyong* Director IDRC Nairobi, Kenya 22. Ms. Nura Oyekan* MSc. Student Intern/Environmentalist Imperial College London (Presently interning on Climate Change issues with Mr. Arimoro, Afruit Enterprises)

Annex B

Climate Change Scenarios and Latest Research Findings


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B1 CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS

B1.1 PREDICTED FUTURE CLIMATIC CHANGES

Table B1.1 and Table B1.2 show the predicted changes in temperature (degrees Celcius) and precipitation (mm) respectively, for four different IPCC models from the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. These models, CGCM2, CSIRO2, HadCM3 and PCM are also known as IPCC model numbers 7, 10, 30 and 23, respectively. The data are shown for the years 2010, 2020 and 2050 for three different scenarios – A1F1, A2 and B1, which correspond approximately to a high, medium and low climate change scenario, respectively. However, each scenario has various characteristics that should not be boiled down to ‘high, medium and low’ categories. The average results from the four models are shown.

Table B1.1 Predicted changes in average temperature of Nigeria (∆ degrees Celsius)

Model Scenario 2010 2020 2050 CGCM2 A1F1 1.00 1.22 2.56 A2 0.62 0.84 2.08 B1 0.62 0.82 1.41 CSIRO2 A1F1 0.67 0.83 1.70 A2 0.58 0.77 1.85 B1 0.80 1.05 1.83 HadCM3 A1F1 0.94 1.14 2.41 A2 0.60 0.82 2.04 B1 0.71 0.94 1.63 PCM A1F1 0.55 0.66 1.40 A2 0.35 0.47 1.17 B1 0.42 0.56 0.94 Average A1F1 0.79 0.96 2.02 A2 0.54 0.73 1.79 B1 0.64 0.84 1.45

Table B1.2 Predicted changes in precipitation in Nigeria (∆ mm)

Model Scenario 2010 2020 2050 CGCM2 A1F1 -9.23 -11.28 -23.76 A2 -5.83 -7.89 -19.49 B1 -3.60 -4.77 -8.26 CSIRO2 A1F1 -16.30 -19.98 -41.15 A2 -14.80 -19.80 -47.55 B1 -14.74 -19.32 -33.49 HadCM3 A1F1 25.83 31.41 66.46 A2 20.75 28.12 69.90 B1 20.79 27.54 47.72 PCM A1F1 24.15 29.01 61.33 A2 15.31 20.70 51.42 B1 17.63 23.23 39.49 Average A1F1 6.11 7.29 15.72 A2 3.86 5.28 13.57 B1 5.02 6.67 11.37


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B1.2 SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS

B1.2.1 A1F1

The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system. The A1F1 group is distinguished by its technological emphasis: fossil-intensive.

B1.2.2 A2

The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in continuously increasing population. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological change more fragmented and slower than other storylines.

B1.2.3 B1

The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the same global population, that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid change in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives.


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B2 LATEST CLIMATE CHANGE FINDINGS

Climate change science is a relatively ‘young’ research field and the academic literature is rapidly changing. There are considerable scientific uncertainties associated with lack of information and disagreement about what is known or even knowable. For many years, interest in climate change centred on whether or not global warming was really happening. In scientific circles, all but a minority of skeptics now agree that the climate is changing and most climate experts have moved on from this debate and begun serious consideration of the severity, likely impacts and the prospects for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However despite this apparent consensus there continue to be a broad range of views as to what the likely impacts of climate change will be. One recent emergent view that is increasingly making the headlines is the concept of ‘dangerous climate change’ i.e. a view held by an increasing number of climate scientists who argue that climate change will be compounded by positive feedback mechanisms that accelerate warming, and risk pushing global systems toward dangerous thresholds or ‘tipping points’ beyond which we lose any prospect of management. The evidence for ‘dangerous’ climate change will be presented in this annex. The difference in academic opinions is compounded by the wide range of uncertainties present in climate change science. For example, the following uncertainties mean that it is not possible to predict the exact impacts of climate change on the state of Nigeria:

• Future greenhouse gas emissions from human activities, • Availability of fossil fuels, • Future population trends, • Future consumption trends, • How to accurately express the exact role of water vapour and the

water cycle in global climate models, • Sensitivity of natural greenhouse gas emissions sinks to warming

temperatures and the likelihood of positive feedback, • Temporal atmospheric inertia – i.e. how long do past greenhouse gas

emissions ‘stay’ in the atmosphere and impact on the climate? • Climatic sensitivity to greenhouse gas emissions.

Further information on these uncertainties and the latest scientific developments in these areas will also be presented in this annex.

B2.1.1 The IPCC

To help decision-makers deal with the rapidly changing body of evidence for climate change, the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced regular comprehensive summaries of peer reviewed science on the topic – the IPCC Assessment Reports. The latest – the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) was released in 2007. It is important to stress that the AR4 is not


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new science; rather it is a collation of existing peer reviewed science, with the IPCC in essence being a reviewing and a collating body. The AR4 set out an overwhelming body of scientific evidence which put the reality of human-induced climate change beyond any real doubt. However despite being viewed by many governments as undisputed authority of climate change science, considerable uncertainties and knowledge gaps exist in the academic literature of climate change, despite and in some cases as a result of the AR4 and the IPCC Assessment Report process itself.

B2.1.2 Limitations of the IPCC Review Process

The IPCC has garnered criticism that its Assessment Reports are too conservative in their projections of climate change. This is partly unavoidable due to several key features of the IPCC Review Process most notably; the long timescales involved, the fact that governments not scientists have the final ‘cut’ in the editing process, and by the very nature of the Assessment Reports as consensus documents. Certainly, in making its projections, the IPCC faces pressure from numerous stakeholders, many of which may from short-term commercial and national interests wish to dilute its findings. The IPCC’s final reports have to reach consensus and unanimous approval from the scientific community, and then from each of the 113 signatory governments to the UNFCCC. Representatives of each signatory government review each summary document line-by-line, with the result that government staff, often without scientific backgrounds have the final ‘edit’ on the science presented in the reporti at times against the advice of the scientific panel. Because of the protracted nature of the IPCC’s review process for the Assessment Reports the IPCC’s schedule for producing reports requires a deadline for submissions up to two years prior to the report’s final release. This means that any new evidence that has been published in the intervening period is not able to be included, regardless of its significance. In an area of science where our scientific understanding is rapidly changing, this has been raised as a serious shortcoming in a body which is widely regarded as the ultimate authority on the science. So AR4, for example was limited to assessing science published up until the end of 2006 at the latest (with the bulk of the science assessed adhering to a cut off date of 2005), despite being published in November 2007 and criticsii have argued that it is already out of date and omits recent observations and factors contributing to global warming, such as the release of greenhouse gases from thawing tundra, and because it provides no upper bound on its projections of sea level rise. Some critics have contended that the IPCC reports tend to underestimate dangers, understate risks, and report only the ‘lowest common denominator’ findings. Professor James Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Studies, perhaps the most eminent climate change scientist in the world today, links this conservatism to a phenomenon that he describes as ‘scientific reticence’ which he believes


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“Hinders communication with the public about dangers of global warming… Scientific reticence may be a consequence of the scientific method. Success in science depends on objective skepticism. Caution, if not reticence, has its merits. However, in a case such as ice sheet instability and sea level rise, there is a danger in excessive caution. We may rue reticence, if it serves to lock in future disasters… I believe there is a pressure on scientists to be conservative. Papers are accepted for publication more readily if they do not push too far and are larded with caveats. Caveats are essential to science, being born in skepticism, which is essential to the process of investigation and verification. But there is a question of degree. A tendency for ‘gradualism’ as new evidence comes to light may be ill-suited for communication, when an issue with a short time fuse is concerned.iii”

B2.2 SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES SINCE THE AR4

Involving over 3,800 scientists from over 150 countries and six years of work, the IPCC AR4 was a substantial body of work which reviewed and analysed peer reviewed scientific studies published up to the end of 2006, and in a very few cases, to early 2007iv. Since the publication of the AR4, scientific research on climate change suggests that global warming is accelerating, considerably beyond that projected by the IPCC in AR4. New numerical modelling studies have also provided more detailed indications of the impacts to come, including in areas where there were significant data gaps in the AR4. Indeed important aspects of climate change seem to have been underestimated or downplayed due to the politics of the IPCC editing process, and the impacts of climate change appear to be being felt sooner and with more severity than predicted. Areas where significant science has been published since the AR4 submission deadline closed include: sea level rise, Arctic sea ice dynamics, ocean acidification and dangerous climate change as a result of feedback warming. The latest evidence suggests that feedback warming is already beginning to occur and will potentially amplify the warming trend initially triggered by anthropogenic emissions and, as a result, we may face climatic disruption considerably beyond the grave situation predicted by climate change scientists and the IPCC AR4 today. Rajendra Pachauri, the IPCC chair, admitted at the launch of the AR4 synthesis report that since the IPCC began work on it, scientists have recorded "much stronger trends in climate change"v which were unable to be included in the final document. The table below highlights some of the most important recent research including significant impacts, and their proposed thresholds (i.e. a certain increase in average global temperatures, or global CO2 levels) which was not available in time for inclusion in the IPCC’s AR4:


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Table 2.1 Latest Research Omitted from the IPCC AR4

Climate Change Hazard Estimated Thresholds Shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (the Gulf Stream) Various: 3°C, in 100

years, 700ppm CO2 Disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet (causing sea level rise of 5 metres)

2-4°C, 450 – 550 ppm CO2

Disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet (causing sea level rise of 7 metres)

1°C

Widespread bleaching of coral reefs >1°C Broad ecosystem impacts with limited adaptive capacity (including loss of the Fynbos in South Africa, and the Atlantic Forest ecosystem in Brazil)

1-2°C

Large increase of people at risk of water shortage in vulnerable regions 450 - 650 CO2 Source: adapted from Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005vi

B2.3 UNCERTAINTIES

Some of the most significant knowledge gaps / areas of uncertainty affecting the academic literature of climate change science, and the latest science to have emerged since the production of the Fourth Assessment Report are discussed in more detail below.

B2.3.1 Positive Feedbacks, Non Linear Change and the Risk of ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change:

Climate change is often thought of, and indeed in the AR4 is typified as - a gradual, linear process that involves a smooth relationship between increasing levels of greenhouse gases and rising temperatures — with the inherent assumption that, if we are slowly increasing GHGs we will produce a predictable linear warming. But the climatic system just is not as simple as this. In the Earth’s history, periods of relatively stable climate have often been interrupted by sharp transitions to a contrasting state: for instance, past glaciation periods typically ended suddenly. Prehistory suggests that it would be wrong to characterise our climate as one where change is gradual; rather the paleoclimatic record details numerous instances of dramatic changes that tipped regional climates from one state to another setting off chains of events that echoed around the globe. Scientists are increasingly coming to understand that our climate is one of chaotic, non-linear transitions, where a small increase in the level of greenhouse gases, or in the energy imbalance of the climate system, beyond certain critical thresholds can flip the whole climatic system from one state to another quickly and unpredictably. Rates of warming since the mid-19th century are higher than those of the last ice age by more than a factor of ten, increasing to a factor of twenty from the mid-1970s. The atmosphere is now heating up more quickly than modern humans have ever experienced suggesting that any ‘flip’ to another climatic state may also occur more quickly.


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Climate scientists are increasingly concerned that continued warming may instigate a number of positive feedback mechanisms, whereby natural tipping points are exceeded and self reinforcing, run-away warming is initiatedvii. Most climate models look at the direct effect of carbon emissions on global temperatures. What they do not include is the effect any warming might have on promoting further warming—what are called positive feedback loops. Scientists have long suspected that such sharp transitions might be related to tipping points where positive feedback mechanisms lead to self-propelling changeviii. The demonstration of tipping points has implications for our thinking about current climate change. The well known projections by the IPCC are based on the assumption of linear change. The latest science contradicts this and implies that we should also consider the possibility that the climate will cross a tipping point after which changes will be amplified. In recent years a broad consensus emerged amongst climate scientists that a rise above 2°C (and perhaps even less) of warming above pre-industrial global average temperature levels is ‘dangerous’ because it is likely to lead the planet’s climate to cross a number of these critical thresholds and stimulate further feedback warming as a result, i.e. the warming we cause will encourage the world's natural systems (i.e. permafrost, oceans, soils, and forests) to start releasing the GHGs they store – leading to so-called dangerous or run-away climate change. If feedback mechanisms kick in on a large scale human society would be unable to stop the planet from undergoing a rapid rise in temperatures of 11°C over a period perhaps as short as a few decades - this would be an unprecedented rise and one not seen since the end of Permian period some 250 million years ago – a time also known as the great extinction. Humans would then be powerless to prevent the collapse of numerous ecosystems (including the Amazon, global fisheries, and coral reefs), huge loss of human life from famine and drought, mass extinctions and sea level rises of up to 25 metres over the coming centuries. Examples of such feedback mechanisms, which could all trigger further warming, are illustrated in the following table:

Table 2.2 Climate Change Positive Feedback Mechanisms

Feedback Mechanism Status c.2008 Source Release of methane from previously frozen deposits i.e. permafrost, methane hydrates.

Already occurring in Northern Siberia and North America

International Siberian Shelf Study 2008 ix

The die-back of tropical forests and the release of their embodied carbon through forest fires.

Already occurring in the Amazon.

Lancaster University, University of East Anglia, 2008 x

Change to the albedo balance of the polar regions, as sea ice is reduced, and allowing oceans to absorb more warmth.

Already occurring in the Arctic and Antarctic

Scientific American, 2004 xi

Higher CO2 levels in the atmosphere reduce the ocean’s ability to store CO2 by increasing the acidity of the ocean and harming plankton and crustaceans.

Already occurring (particularly in the Southern Ocean).

Science 2007xii


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Recent observations suggest that feedback warming is already beginning to occur at temperatures far below the 2°C previously believed to lead to dangerous climate change. All of these feedbacks are occurring some 20-100 yearsxiii before they were predicted to by the IPCC, suggesting that we may be approaching the tipping point of catastrophic climate change sooner, and at a lower atmospheric concentration of GHGs than was previously thought. Indeed the latest science suggests that even a small perturbation can cause large climate change. Today, the Arctic sea-ice, the West Antarctic ice sheet, the Amazon rainforest and the Greenland ice sheet could provide such feedbacks. Little additional forcing is needed to trigger these feedbacks, because of the warming that is already in the pipeline from past emissions and the time lags in the atmospheric system. One such a shift is now occurring at the North Pole, where it appears that a tipping point, or critical threshold, has been passed, and an area of summer sea-ice once as large as Australia is disintegrating a century ‘ahead of schedule’. Two new summaries of the sciencexiv published since last year’s Intergovernmental Panel report, produced independently of each other, and the United Nations’ own Environment Programme’s latest yearbookxv suggest that - almost a century ahead of schedule - the critical climate processes that may lead to dangerous climate change have begun. In the AR4 the IPCC warned that the Arctic’s “late-summer sea ice is projected to disappear almost completely towards the end of the 21st century … in some models.xvi” But, as the new report by the Public Interest Research Centre (PIRC) shows, climate scientists are now predicting the end of late-summer sea ice within three to seven years. It appears that the less than 1°C of global warming that the world has experienced to date may have already triggered the first tipping point of the Earth’s climate system – the disappearance of summer Arctic sea ice1. This process has implications far beyond the Arctic and the iconic survival of the polar bear but rather, has implications for wider society and the global economy and could potentially open the gates to rapid and abrupt climate change, rather than the gradual changes that have been forecast so far. As the ice disappears from the Arctic, areas that were once white snow and sea ice are transformed into dark earth and ocean which absorb more heat from sunlight (much of which would previously have reflected off white ice and snow – due to the albedo affect) and warming is accelerated as a result. The most dangerous feedback loop involves methane release. Methane is another greenhouse gas, and one that is 21-times more potent than CO2. Billions of tons of methane lie frozen in the permafrost of the Arctic tundra. Evidence published since the AR4 shows that the extra warming caused by disappearing sea ice penetrates 1500km inland, covering almost the entire region of continuous permafrostxvii. Arctic permafrost contains twice as much carbon as the entire global atmosphere (ibid). This vast source of greenhouse gases remains safe for as long as the ground stays frozen. But this issue is compounded by the fact that the Arctic regions are warming three times faster than the rest of the planet, and are already 2°C warmer than they were in the


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1980s. Consequently, large areas of the Siberian tundra are now beginning to thaw. In 2005 it was discovered that a million square kilometers—an area the size of France and Germany combined—in western Siberia had already turned from permanently frozen peat bog into shallow lakes. Methane ‘geysers’ are now appearing in some locations with such force that they keep the water open in Arctic lakes, through the winter13. Worryingly, since mid-2006 the first significant spike in global atmospheric concentrations of methane in over a decadexviii has been observed, although whether this is linked to melting permafrost is not yet proven. Further south, if the changing climate were to produce four or five consecutive years of drought in the Amazon, it might become sufficiently dry for wildfires to destroy much of the rainforest and for the carbon stored in the biomass to pour into the atmosphere. The frequency and severity of Amazonian droughts have been increasing in recent years, partly as a result of climate change induced warming of the tropical Atlantic (which reached record levels in 2005 and produced record levels of forest fires in the Amazonxix), and also partly linked to changes in interdecadal variations and the ENSO cycle. This change in the regional climate pattern would further reduce rainfall, and the drying and dead forest would release very large amounts of GHGs. These impacts, like many others, would cause further threshold events. If this kind of momentum builds sufficiently, and enough tipping points are crossed, it seems likely that we will pass a point of no return. Whether climate as a whole is now approaching a tipping point is difficult to judge because human influence is simply too fast to generate data records long enough for accurate detectionxx.

B2.3.2 Uncertainties Regarding Sea Level Rise (SLR) Sea levels could rise by substantially more than the levels predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), according to the latest scientific research published since the IPCC’s AR4 was released last year. The IPCC’s forecast of an average rise in global sea levels of 28-43cm (and up to 59cm under the highest emissions scenario) by 2100 is now widely viewed to greatly underestimate the risk posed by SLR, by many in the scientific community as it is based on multiple models that only consider SLR due to thermal expansion of seawater, and from mountain glacier melt and notably exclude any SLR resulting from melting in the Antarctic and Greenland. The IPCC’s depiction of SLR as a gradual linear event has been questioned by more recent science and by actual observed rises. Sea level rose at an average rate of about 1.8 mm/year during the years 1961-2003, but the rise in sea level during 1993-2003 was at an increasing average rate of some 3.1 mm/year. The IPCC was unable to explain this acceleration in sea level rise, and unable to include the contribution to sea level rise from accelerated melting of the Greenland and Antarctic polar ice sheets in the AR4 (which are likely to contribute the vast majority of SLR over this century), because the processes involved were not understood at the time it went to press. In the interim several studies using a range of different methodologies, have been published which suggest that sea levels will rise much higher and faster than the figures stated by the IPCC in AR4. According to NASA:


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“The critical factor in predicting how fast sea levels rise, is how fast the major ice sheets respond to the warming of the ocean… Ice sheet disintegration could happen very rapidly, as rising sea level itself tends to lift marine ice shelves and detach them from land ice. As ice shelves break up, this accelerates movement of land ice to the ocean. The process could be further accelerated by increased absorption of sunlight by ice sheets darkened by pollution or meltwaterxxi. These reinforcing effects mean that the rate of change would be moderate until real collapse begins, after which changes could be extremely rapid. Recent observations of the Arctic ice cap lead some scientists to argue that a tipping point has already been passed after which ice loss can only acceleratexxii.” In 2007, German researcher Stefan Rahmstorf and his team published an influential paper in Sciencexxiii, showing that the observed sea level rise has been close to double the mean predicted by IPCC models over the past decade, and that the IPCC’s assumption that SLR is a linear process, is erroneous and that rises of up to 1.4m (and possibly even higher) by 2100 are possible. This raises concerns that the climate system, in particular sea level, may be responding more quickly to climate change than the current generation of models indicates. Another notable studyxxiv published too late to be included in the AR4 which involved the construction of a computer model linking temperatures to sea level rise for the last two millennia projects that by 2100, sea levels will rise by between 0.8m and 1.5m, with a rapid rise associated with melting of ice sheets. Anders Levermann, of Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, is one of the many scientists (and himself an IPCC contributing author) who, while supportive of the IPCC's overall findings, have criticised the panel for using the same model to predict future sea level rise as was used to inaccurately calculate past increases. The models in the IPCC report underestimated the sea level rise that we have already observed by 40% therefore their accuracy in projecting future sea level rise is questionable.

B2.3.3 Atmospheric Sensitivity to GHG and Saturation Thresholds

Another key uncertainty with regard to climate change science is the sensitivity of the planet to increased GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and the rate with which the climate could change and specifically the correlation between atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and climate change temperature rises. Recent consensus views argue that the most serious consequences of climate change might be avoided if global average temperatures rise by no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (1.4 °C above present levels). Until recently it had been assumed that this would occur if GHG concentrations rose above 550 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent by volume. This concentration was used, for example, in informing government policy in certain countries including the European Union. However a recent conference on avoiding dangerous climate change concluded that stabilizing emissions at the level of 550 ppm, is likely to lead to the 2 °C safe limit being exceeded, based on the projections of more recent climate models. Stabilizing GHG concentrations at 450 ppm


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would only result in a 50% likelihood of limiting global warming to 2 °C, and that it would be necessary to achieve stabilization below 400 ppm to give a relatively high certainty of not exceeding 2 °C. In the past five years and particularly in the last two years, improved climate change measurement techniques, and observation of the speed of glaciers melting in the Arctic and Antarctic, research has yielded compelling evidence that the world’s climate is warming at an unpredicted pace, it may well be that this is because the capacity of the Earth’s natural carbon sinks to absorb emissions may be reaching saturation point. The annual mean growth rate for atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide in 2007 was 2.14ppm – the fourth year in the past six to see an annual rise greater than 2ppm. From 1970 to 2000, the concentration rose by about 1.5ppm each year, but since 2000 the annual rise has leapt to an average 2.1ppmxxv. Scientists say the shift could indicate that the Earth is losing its natural ability to soak up billions of tons of carbon each year. Climate models assume that about half our future emissions will be re-absorbed by forests and oceans, but the new figures confirm this may be too optimistic. If more of our carbon pollution stays in the atmosphere, it means emissions will have to be cut by more than currently projected to prevent dangerous levels of global warming, and if emissions are not cut appropriately, that the impacts of climate change will be considerably worse than that predicted by the IPCC in the AR4 – i.e. dangerous. To ensure that climate change does not warm average global temperatures above 2°C, current mainstream thinking is that we will need to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere between 400-550 ppm. However the latest observations which suggest natural sinks are reaching saturation is leading an increasing number of researchers to conclude that the only way to avoid dangerous climate change is to limit concentrations to <350xxvippm thus, considering that current concentrations already stand at 387ppmxxvii, it can be seen that dangerous climate change is a real possibility

B2.3.4 Data gaps relating to climate modelling:

Despite an ever improving understanding of the science of climate change, our understanding of many of the components of the highly complex climate system and their role in climate change are still evolving, and as a result it has not yet been possible to incorporate their influence into Global Climate Models (GCMs). Some of the aspects of the climate system yet to be fully understood and quantified in GCMs include the roles played by clouds, the oceans, longer term climatic trends such as ENSO and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, land-use changes, the cryosphere (i.e. all snow, ice and frozen ground on and beneath the Earth and ocean surface) and the interactions between some natural feedback mechanisms and physical processes. Worryingly, the effects of melting permafrost and other positive feedback mechanisms are not incorporated into any global climate models.

B2.3.5 Knowledge Gaps in Historic Climate Records:

Long term observations and accurate recording of historic climatic conditions does not exist for many regions of the planet, particularly in the developing


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world. Thus it is not possible to use historical frequencies of climatic events to project a future trend line, or to detect changes from the long term average. Similarly it is not possible to use historical insurance loss data to look at past frequencies of extreme weather events, as assets in many parts of the world were underinsured or uninsured until the 1980s and underwriting data is not available: again, this is largely an issue for developing world countries.

B2.3.6 Future Emissions

Perhaps the most significant uncertainty is that future climate change will be shaped by emissions of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) which we have yet to emit - the evolution of which is highly uncertain (thus the success of current and future mitigation strategies will impact on the level of adaptation needed in the future). To reflect this uncertainty the IPCC developed different emission scenarios to express different emissions trajectories associated with different potential ‘futures’ expressing a range of climate change mitigation policies, rates of population growth, economic growth strategies – and the likely climate change impacts associated with each emissions scenario. The different emissions scenarios and the projected temperature rises associated with them circa 2100, is illustrated in the graph below, taken from the IPCC AR4:

Figure 2.1 Projected Temperature Rises Associated with the Different SRES Scenarios

IPCC, 2007 There are also uncertainties related to some of the assumptions implicit within the SRES emissions scenarios. Recent growth in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions has increased faster than projected in even the most fossil fuel intensive of the IPCC’s emissions scenarios (A1F1) – i.e. that is to say that ‘our business as usual’ activities – even with the Kyoto protocol, are already emitting more greenhouse gas emissions than the IPCC previously projected for its ‘high’ emissions scenario. Furthermore two-thirds of the ‘decarbonization’ of energy supply believed to be required to stabilize greenhouse gases is already built into the IPCC reference scenarios which


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implicitly assume that the bulk of the challenge of reducing future emissions will occur due to spontaneous technological changexxviii - in the absence of climate policies, something that recent observations would suggest may be over optimistic. Indeed the IPCC’s assumptions for increasing decarbonization in the near term (2000-2010) are already inconsistent with the actual recent evolution of the global economy, as in recent years global energy intensity and carbon intensity have both increased, contrary to IPCC projections. Increasing energy use and rates of GHGs mean only one thing: it will get hotter, quicker. The IPCC’s conservative estimate is a rise of 4°C by 2100 for the most pessimistic ‘business as usual’ scenario – A1F1, yet our emissions are currently rising faster than this scenario envisages, and one recent study predicts a 0.3°C increase for the period from 2004–2014 alone.

B2.3.7 Fossil Fuel Reserves

The SRES scenarios make no assumptions about future fossil fuel supplies, but assume that the supply of conventional fossil fuels will be able to keep up with demand which contradicts expert opinion from the energy modelling sector. Bodies such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Energy Watch believe that it is increasingly likely that geological constraints on oil global conventional oil production (peak oil) will occur before 2015 (assuming the continuation of economic growth, a recession will reduce oil consumption and delay the date of peak), if this has not already occurred, meaning that global production will go into decline. Whilst this may limit future emissions from burning conventional oil, should synthetic fuels, first generation biofuels or non-conventional oil supplies (tar sands, oil shales) be used to fill the gap in the supply of conventional oil it is likely that emissions could be significantly higher than those predicted by the IPCC’s emissions scenarios.

B2.3.8 Atmospheric Inertia

The currently observed impacts of climate change represent the reaction of the climate system to the greenhouse gas emissions of the past two centuries. “Even if all greenhouse gas emissions could be stopped today, the immense inertia in the Earth’s climate systems means that changes to our climate for the rest of the century are unavoidablexxix ”.Because of this inertia the impacts of today’s significantly higher GHG emissions will not become noticeable until the coming decades and consequently the climate of the Earth will presumably continue to heat up for many centuries to come. Average global temperatures have already risen 0.7°C since 1900. Climate models predict that we are committed to another 0.6°C temperature rise and changing weather patterns for the next 40 years, from emissions that we have already emitted. International efforts to reduce global emissions are not so far making the drastic reductions required, so we may be heading for further and potentially more profound changes to our climate.


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B2.3.9 Natural Variability

Climate is the term used to describe the average weather conditions and their variability over a long period of time (at least 30 years). Within the historic record there will be years when summers are hotter, winters are wetter than the predicted climate change trends, this does not mean that climate change is not happening, or that impact projections are wrong, or that efforts to reduce emissions have worked, rather it underlies the natural variability of the climate. Significant uncertainties are posed in relation to the interplay between long term climatic variables i.e. ENSO, interdecadal processes such as the Pacific Interdecadal Oscillation and climate change. More research is needed in these areas before their contribution and any interrelationships with climate change can be understood - let alone quantified in GCM modelling and climate change projections.

B2.4 CONCLUSION

All climate change projections have four sources of uncertaintyxxx associated with them:

1. Natural variability: the climate is influenced by natural factors as well as anthropogenic GHGs i.e. seasonal cycles, the ENSO (El Niño Southern Oscillation), it is also influenced by more complex climatic system feedback mechanisms (i.e. albedo, methane hydrates), and random external factors such as volcanic eruptions and sunspot activity;

2. Limitations of our knowledge, modelling methodologies and computing: our knowledge of how GHGs effect the Earth’s natural systems such as the atmosphere, biosphere etc is imperfect, and therefore our ability to represent these systems in a model contains large uncertainties and assumptions;

3. Future emissions scenarios: are not predictions but separate storylines on how the world may develop, the IPCC is keen that no probabilities are assigned to any of its SRES scenarios even though some appear now to be more likely than others considering recent history and development paths;

4. Scaling: it is a very complex process to represent local conditions that determine weather into the GCMs, and similarly extracting local conditions from some models can also lead to uncertainties.

Science cannot and will not be able to prove any statement with 100% confidence, to expect it to is to misunderstand the scientific method. Science’s role is to provide the best available theory to explain and understand observations. Therefore, any adaptation strategies that are produced in response to climate change should be flexible enough to be effective in the face of variability, in the face of the reasonable worst case scenario, and also in the face of new evidence as it arises. It will not be feasible or cost-effective to wait


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for 100% consensus to emerge on any aspect in the academic record of climate change, as this may have the effect of pushing decision making opportunities beyond the point in time where there is sufficient time to adapt to climate change in an anticipatory manner, and may result in the construction of considerable maladaptation in infrastructure constructed in the intervening period. As highlighted in the Stern Reviewxxxi, an early proactive approach against climate change will be less expensive and more effective than a reactionary, retrospective or emergency response. The implication of the latest climate change evidence published since the IPCC AR4 is that our mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change may need to be even more rapid and ambitious and that reliance upon some of the older science published in the AR4 could potentially lead to maladaptation and development which constrains society’s ability to cope with climate change in the future. i Summary from Der Spiegel 4th June 2007: “The release of the report was delayed for hours as heated discussions continued as countries like China, Russia and the US continued to lobby for the removal of parts of the report. US delegates opposed a passage warning of the prospects of "severe economic damage" to parts of North America. But the main tension in Brussels between some authors of the report and some political representatives was not over the scientific findings, but over a 21-page summary that would be shown to policymakers. Earlier this week, the summary said scientists had "very high confidence" that natural systems around the world "are being affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases." "Very high confidence," in the language used by the report, translates to a 90 percent certainty. Delegates from China and Saudi Arabia lobbied for "high confidence" instead, or 80 percent certainty -- and after a dramatic hours-long protest by three scientists on Thursday night, the milder language went in. "The authors lost," said one of the scientists. "A lot of authors are not going to engage in the IPCC (International Panel on Climate Change) process anymore. I have had it with them," he told the Associated Press on condition of anonymity. Though Washington and Beijing ultimately succeeded in changing very little of the text, the political tug o' war drew sharp criticism in Germany. "We are happy that we were able to prevent this kind of scientific vandalism in the end," Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel told Reuters TV. "The people have a right to find out about the consequences that threaten them if we are unable to stop climate change." Still, the final version is the clearest and most comprehensive scientific statement to date on the impact of global warming. "Certain passages were lost for time or for lack of agreement," Parry said, "But I don't think in any respect that the message was lost." http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,476074,00.html ii Joseph Romm, Fox News, February 1st 2007, available from http://climateprogress.org/2007/02/01/climate-progress-on-fox-news/ iii Hansen, James, E., 2007, Scientific reticence and sea level rise, Environmental Research Letters, 2 (2007) 024002 (6pp) doi:10.1088/1748-9326/2/2/024002, May 24th 2007. iv Tin, Tina; (2008). Climate Change; Faster, Stronger, Sooner – A European Update of Climate Change Science. WWF, Brussels. http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_science_paper_october_2008.pdf Retrieved on 25/11/08 v Rajendra Pachauri, quoted in The International Herald and Tribune, November 18th 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/18/europe/climate.php


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vi Oppenheimer, Michael, and Annie Petsonk, 2005 presentation to Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change Scientific Symposium on Stabilisation of Greenhouse Gases, February 1st to 3rd, 2005 Met Office, Exeter, United Kingdom http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/research/dangerous-cc/index.htm vii Greater London Authority, The London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, 2008, pp1 http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/publications/2008/docs/climate-change-adapt-strat.pdf pp9 viii Vasilis Dakos, Marten Scheffer, Egbert H. van Nes, Victor Brovkin, Vladimir Petoukhov, and Hermann Held, 2008, Slowing down as an early warning signal for abrupt climate change. PNAS early online publication, September 2008 ix Semiletov, Igor, Örjan Gustafsson et al, 2008, International Siberian Shelf Study 2008, ISSS-08 http://www.polar.se/expeditioner/swedarctic2008/pdf/ISSS_web.pdf x Barlow, J. and Peres, C.A., 2008, Fire-mediated dieback and compositional cascade in an Amazonian forest, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.0013 xi Hansen, James, 2004, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb. Scientific American, 290, No 3, March 2004: pp68-77, xii Le Quéré, C., C. Rödenbeck, E.T. Buitenhuis, T. J. Conway, R. Langenfelds, A. Gomez, C. Labuschagne, M. Ramonet, T. Nakazawa, N. Metzl, and N. Gillett, M. Heimann, 2007, Saturation of the Southern ocean CO2 sink due to recent climate change, Science, 316, DOI:10.1126/science.1136188, 1735-1738. xiii Brahic, Catherine, 2007, Southern Ocean already losing ability to absorb CO2, New Scientist Online, 17th May 2007 http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn11876-southern-ocean-already-losing-ability-to-absorb-cosub2sub.html xiv Hawkins, Richard, et al (2008). Climate Safety. Public Interest Research Centre, London, www.pirc.info Retrieved on 25/11/08. xv United Nations Environment Project, (2007). Melting Ice - a Hot Topic? Press Release on 4 June 2007. http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=512&ArticleID=5599&l=en Retrieved on 25/11/08 xvi Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I (2007). Technical Summary. IPCC, Cambridge, p73. http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-ts.pdf Retrieved on 24/11/08 xvii Lawrence, David M., et al., (2008). Accelerated Arctic land warming and permafrost degradation during rapid sea ice loss. Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 35, 11506. doi:10.1029/2008GL033985. http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/ccr/dlawren/publications/lawrence.grl.submit.2008.pdf Retrieved on 23/11/08 xviii Rigby, M., R. Prinn, P. Fraser, P. Simmonds, R. Langenfelds, J. Huang1, D. Cunnold, P. Steele, P. Krummel, R. Weiss, S. O’Doherty, P. Salameh, H. Wang, C. Harth, J. Mühle, and L. Porter (2008). Renewed growth of atmospheric methane, Journal of Geophysical Research. AGU 30/10/2008, 08/201, xix http://news.mongabay.com/2007/1021-amazon.html retrieved on 27/11/08 xx Vasilis Dakos, Marten Scheffer, Egbert H. van Nes, Victor Brovkin, Vladimir Petoukhov, and Hermann Held, 2008, Slowing down as an early warning signal for abrupt climate change. PNAS early online publication, September 2008 xxi Hansen, James, 2004, Defusing the Global Warming Time Bomb. Scientific American, 290, No 3, March 2004: pp68-77, pp74 http//:pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2004/2004_Hansen1.pdf,


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xxii Tracy, Alexandra., Trumbull, Kate., and Loh, Christine, The Impacts of Climate Change in Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta, November 2006, Civic Exchange, pp11-12 xxiii Stefan Rahmstorf , Anny Cazenave, John A. Church, James E. Hansen , Ralph F. Keeling , David E. Parker , Richard C. J. Somerville. Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections. Science DOI: 10.1126/science.1136843. February 1, 2007. xxiv Jevrejeva, S., A. Grinsted, J. C. Moore and S. Holgate. 2006. Nonlinear trends and multi-year cycle in sea level records. Journal of Geophysical Research, 111, 2005JC003229. xxv NOAA, Mauna Loa Observatory carbon dioxide dataset. Dr. Pieter Tans, NOAA/ESRL (www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/) xxvi J. Hansen, M. Sato, P. Kharecha, D. Beerling, R. Berner, V. Masson-Delmotte, M. Pagani, M. Raymo, D. L. Royer, and J. C. Zachos, 2008, Target atmospheric CO2: Where should humanity aim? Atmospheric and Oceanic Physics, arXiv:0804.1126v3 [physics.ao-ph] xxvii NOAA, Mauna Loa Observatory carbon dioxide dataset. Dr. Pieter Tans, NOAA/ESRL (www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/) xxviii Pielke, R. Jr, T. Wigley, and C. Green (2008). Dangerous Assumptions, Commentary, Nature 452, 3rd April 2008, pp 531 http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/resource-2593-2008.08.pdf xxix Greater London Authority (2008). The London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, pp1 http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/publications/2008/docs/climate-change-adapt-strat.pdf Retrieved on 24/11/08 xxx Greater London Authority, The London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, 2008, pp1 http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor/publications/2008/docs/climate-change-adapt-strat.pdf pp8 xxxi Nicholas Stern et al, 2007, The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change, HM Treasury, UK, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_climate_change.htm

Annex C

Sectoral and Regional Climate Change Impacts


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C1 SPECIFIC SECTOR IMPLICATIONS

Many sectors of the Nigerian economy are directly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change such as construction, insurance, communications, transportation, offshore oil and gas exploitation, and thermal and hydro power generation and transmission (Nokomo, J.C., 2006). Other vulnerable sectors are those dependent on climate-sensitive resources like agriculture, fishing, forestry, renewable energy and eco-tourism (Adejuwon, J., 2006). Industries that aren't affected directly by climate change will be affected indirectly, with impacts depending on many factors like geographic location.

C1.1.1 Agriculture and Fishing

Climate change has the potential to affect African agriculture in a range of ways leading to an overall reduction of between 2 and 7% of GDP by 2100 in the Sahara and 2 to 4% in Western Africa (Mendelsohn 2000 in Boko, M. et al., 2007). First, as described in Section 4.2.2., desertification and the decline of Lake Chad as a major source of irrigation water is likely to decrease food production in the northern Sahel region, which today accounts for 26.6% of Nigeria’s land area (Boko, M. et al., 2007). Agriculture in southern Nigeria will also be affected by climate change. Indeed, Southern Nigeria’s low elevation means that it is prone to salt-water intrusion as sea levels rise. Even upland water is already showing evidence of increased salinization (Ministry of Environment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2003), which will ultimately make agriculture no longer viable and will force populations to relocate. Crops

Crops occupy nearly 94% of the agricultural sector in Nigeria and some areas are already experiencing a loss in length of growing days by 20%. Growth rates of maize, guinea corn, millet and rice are depressed by rises in temperature. Warming trends also make the storage of root crops and vegetables more difficult for those without access to refrigeration. Agriculture in Nigeria will be adversely impacted by increased variability in the timing and amount of rainfall. Water deficits may also depress crop and livestock production and hence, food supply, necessitating imports (Scoones, I. et al., 2005). During the worst of the drought in the 1970's and 1980's, harvest failure was significant which had significant repercussions for animal husbandry (see the next section) (Nkomo, J.C. et al., 2006). Food security is dependant on the age-long ability of farmers to predict when to plant their crops. Increasing unpredictability in the onset of rains in the last 30 years (NEST, 2008b) have led to crops planted with the arrival of early rains being damaged by an unexpected dry spell. This combined with the late arrival of rains results in harvest failures, forcing farmers to plant afresh with seeds taken from their reserves or else borrow money. It is also possible that groundnut (peanut) production will disappear in the north of Nigeria due to drought, as has been seen in Niger and Senegal where groundnuts were a major foreign exchange


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earner. Furthermore, extreme weather events like storms, heavy winds and floods may devastate farmlands and lead to crop failure. Pests and crop diseases are also migrating in response to climate variations. The changing distribution of pests may also hamper food storage. Livestock

The current warming trend hinders livestock production by reducing animal weight gain and dairy yield as livestock are subjected to long treks to find water and grass. During the worst of the drought in the 1970’s and 1980’s, close to one million livestock were lost, affecting meat and dairy supply throughout the country (Nkomo, J.C. et al., 2006). Large livestock species (cattle) are likely to be more vulnerable than small ruminants i.e. goats. Additionally, extreme storm surges may endanger livestock in the coastal region. In Nigeria, nomadic pastoralism is felt to be most vulnerable due to the insecurities of reliance on open land grazing and natural watering holes and the relative poverty of those currently practising this livelihood. The range of the tsetse fly has already extended its range northward and will pose a threat to livestock in the drier north. Fisheries

Coastal regions will be hit as climate change upsets ocean currents and fisheries (Okali, D., 2004). Major changes to fish spawning patterns have already been observed. In the coastal zone, the loss of mangroves as sea level rises will have serious repercussions for fishing as mangroves act as a sanctuary for young fish to mature (NEST, 2008c). Increases in the severity of storms, will threaten fishing vessels and crew. The viability of inland fisheries is threatened by increased salinity, and shrinking rivers and lakes. Forests

Climate change will potentially increase the incidence of pests and diseases that decimate forest trees. This in turn can lead to species extinction in the various ecosystems of Nigeria, as it has already been the case for the Iroko and oil bean in the southeast; various mahogany species in southwest; the baobab and the locust bean in the northwest and gum arabic in the northeast (NEST, 2008b). Serious deforestation is expected from the interplay between population growth, urbanisation and climate change. Even in wetter climate scenarios, it is unlikely that tropical forests will recover from the current rates of deforestation and biodiversity loss. In the drier scenarios, forest fires and desert encroachment would pose significant risk to local populations.

C1.1.2 Mining and Quarrying

Heavy winds, waves and precipitation, and shoreline erosion - from fierce storms – will make fossil fuel extraction more difficult and threaten sea-going vessels and crew, entailing production and transportation delays and temporary suspensions due to poor weather (NEST, 2008a; Okali, D., 2004). Oil and gas extraction infrastructures could even be lost as was seen in the


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Gulf of Mexico in 2005 in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This is an increasing risk as Nigeria has many US$ billions invested in oil mining in the Niger delta alone and seeks to move more of its production to offshore fields to avoid local unrest in that region. Increases in the severity of storms in the region combined with sea level rise, may lead to increasing wave damage to offshore buried oil pipelines, with the worst-case scenario being rupture and spillage. Oil spills already seriously affect fishing and upset the balance of marine ecosystems in Nigeria. Industrial pollution is damaging large areas of the Nigerian coast, further decreasing food security as valuable fisheries are destroyed. This will worsen food insecurity, exacerbate already existing social tensions in the Niger delta and create a greater risk of malnutrition. Sea level rise of 1 metre would submerge the entire oil infrastructure in the Delta region which would have a devastating knock on impact to the whole economy due to Nigeria’s overreliance on hydrocarbons for foreign exchange and government revenues.

C1.1.3 Wholesale and Retail Trade

Firstly, industries dependent on climate-sensitive natural resources will suffer with a lack of yield translating into fewer products to sell and reductions in consumer spend. Consumer behaviour is also linked to the climate, and as it changes, seasonal products risk a mismatch between supply and demand. In addition, trade will be threatened by the fact that electricity supply interruptions will probably increase and that whole regions of the country (particularly the Delta) risk massive relocations of population and impoverishment. However, the most significant risk for the wholesale and retail trade sector is probably related to the impacts of climate change on Nigeria’s transportation infrastructure. As a result, many industries will not get their goods to market, out of the country for export, or get access to raw materials in a timely fashion.

C1.1.4 Other sectors

Finance & Insurance

Financial services, which comprise private and public institutions that offer insurance, banking and asset management services, will be severely affected by climate change related impacts. In particular, the property insurance industry is likely to be the most affected since it is already vulnerable to extreme weather events. Moreover, climate induced events are likely to place undue stress on insurance markets. As it is, weather-related losses stress insurance companies to the point of bankruptcy by raising consumer prices, causing insurance coverage withdrawals for settlement claims and increasing the demand for publicly-funded compensation and relief. More uncertainty in the frequency, intensity and regional distribution of weather-related losses will increase the vulnerability of the insurance sector (NEST, 2008a). Nigeria’s financial services industry is very heavily reliant on the oil and gas, and


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agriculture sectors, negative impacts on these industries, will impact on financial services organisations. Manufacturing

Variations in the availability and production costs of crops, domestic animals, fish, wood, water and mineral resources due to climate change and sea level rise will directly affect industries processing these products (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Harvest failure, for example, would affect the fruit juice manufacturing and food-processing industries, while increased floods and storms will disrupt transportation of goods within the country (NEST, 2008a). Most of Nigeria’s manufacturing capacity is located in urban low lying coastal regions of the south, many of which could be obliged to relocate as the sea level rises. Those located in the northern dry belt will be exposed to extreme weather events that can destroy industrial infrastructure, as well as to the effects of warmer climate on water supplies that make process cooling and environmental processes more difficult and unduly expensive (NEST, 2008a). Eventually, a reduction of flow in rivers due to climate change may put increased pressure on wastewater treatment processes, leading to increased water recycling and a decline in industrial water use (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Energy Sector

Climate change could have significant impacts on the energy sector in Nigeria, affecting production, transmission and distribution but also consumption patterns. First, expected reduced rainfall, increased droughts and rising temperatures, particularly in the northern part of the country, would adversely affect the supply of hydroelectric power, upon which most Nigerians rely. Indeed, according to UNIDO estimates, hydropower generation currently accounts for about 40% of the total installed generation capacity in Nigeria (UNIDO Regional Centre for Small Hydro Power, 2005). Climate change could also have significant impacts on solar and wind energy; the two significant sources of energy that still remain untapped in Nigeria (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003), which could result in a positive impact on GDP growth. Furthermore, all types of energy facilities, including electric transmission lines, thermal power plants, wind and oil and gas production facilities, located along the coast could be subject to damage related to sea level rise (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Extreme weather events such as windstorms, severe and excessive rainstorms, floods and tornadoes could damage virtually all energy production facilities in the country and increase the failure rate of electric utility transmission systems (NEST, 2008a). Temperature fluctuations could affect the operations of switches, transformers and other equipment. In warmer weather, power transmission lines tend to expand and sag, and become susceptible to more damage from strong winds. If climate change results in population shifts, some existing production facilities may be impacted by changes to the grid, causing a reduction in production or closure, resulting in turn in financial losses and increased costs to remaining customers


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(Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Finally, hampered energy production in Nigeria would have impacts on other countries, since for example Nigeria supplies Niger with electricity to stop them from building a dam upstream of the Niger (Nkomo, J.C. et al., 2006); if Nigeria is unable to supply these consumers, then it is feasible that her upstream neighbours may decide to dam the river themselves. Meanwhile, it is expected that energy demand would increase significantly as increased temperatures would result in increased demand for air conditioning, refrigeration and other household uses (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Water Supply

There are currently three main categories of sources for water supply in Nigeria: direct rainfall harvesting, surface (rivers and lakes including human-made reservoirs, e.g. Kainji lake behind Kainji dam on river Niger) and underground water. Rainfall harvesting is used mainly in rural areas and covers more than 50% of water consumption in these localities. The estimated national annual water demand in 1996 was 6,502 million litres per day (mld) which far outstripped the supply of 2,957 mld (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Water supply demand projections for Nigeria show that the situation is expected to get worse by 2030, as shown in Table C1.1.

Table C1.1 Water Supply and Demand Projections in Nigeria till 2030

Population (million) Water Supply (mld) Water Demand (mld) Year Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 1996 50.7 39.6 90.5 2593.5 363 2956.7 4905.6 1596 6501.6 2000 62.8 44.7 107.5 3212.2 407.7 3619.9 6074.1 1792.5 7866.6 2005 82.1 51.6 133.7 4199.4 470.6 4670 7947.3 2069.2 10016.5 2010 107.3 59.5 166.8 5488.4 542.6 6031.1 10386.6 2386 12772.6 2015 140.3 68.5 208.6 7166.1 624.7 7730.8 13561.7 2746.9 16308.6 2020 183.5 78.9 262.4 9386 719.6 10105 17762.8 3163.9 20926.7 2025 240 90.9 330.9 12776 829 13605 23232 3645.1 26877.1 2030 313.6 104.9 418.5 16040.6 956.7 16997 30356.5 4206.5 34563

Source: Nigerian Ministry of Environment, 2003 Climate change, particularly if it is reflected in reduced rainfall in many parts of Nigeria, would further compound the inability of the country to meet people’s demand for water. The country may be tempted to increase its dependence on underground water sources, but decreased rainfall would lead to lower water tables and this could further worsen the water stress. In addition, higher temperatures will increase the rate of evaporation from land and water surfaces and evapotranspiration from plants, and will result in greater salinization and sedimentation of watercourses. The Sudan-Sahel region is very sensitive to small changes in temperatures and rainfall, meaning that the impacts on water resources may be greater there because temperature changes will affect the amount of runoff that becomes groundwater - the main source of water supply in many parts of the region (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Trends for Africa in the last decade already show a 17% decrease in rain runoff (TAR, 2001), to which water reservoir storage is markedly sensitive (Okali, D., 2004). In addition, most of the water resources


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along the coast would become polluted by intrusion of salt water, and water resources management would need to place greater emphasis on desalinization. For industries, reduction of flow in rivers may also put increased pressure on wastewater treatment processes, leading to increased water recycling and a decline in industrial water use (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Transportation & Communications

Climate change would affect transportation in various ways. First, sea level rise may require costly changes to ports, coastal roads and railways as the current means of communications along the coast may be covered by intruding sea water or washed away by erosion. Most of the transportation infrastructure from Lagos to Port Harcourt is at risk. Drainage for instance would be needed at the international airports of Lagos and Port Harcourt and other coastal airports. Changes in lake and river levels would affect inland navigation. More frequent storms would hamper shipping and other forms of transport. Increased rainfall will damage roads, entailing increased maintenance costs and more traffic accidents. Prolonged heat waves will cause serious problems to roads by softening asphalt and buckling concrete, warping railroad rails, forcing airport closures due to lack of “lift” in extremely hot air conditions, and increasing mechanical failures in automobiles and trucks. Adverse weather conditions may cause flight delays, cancellations and re-routing; with attendant financial losses to an industry already suffering from high fuel costs. Increasing floods and storms are also likely to hamper trucks and trains transporting merchandise. Any change in prevailing winds and increased dust haze would affect the safety and efficiency of take-off of flights (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003). Communications infrastructure is at risk from rising sea levels and the increased likelihood of storm damage to transmitters. Additionally telecommunications, dependant as the sector is, on electricity, is likely to be negatively impacted as Nigeria suffers from increased energy insecurity. Real Estate & Business Services

In the real estate and business services sectors, the most serious impacts from climate change come from depreciation of coastal asset values, increased likelihood of damage to buildings from extreme weather events (particularly at risk are uninsured assets) and risks to the national electricity supply, on which these sectors are heavily dependent. Changes in construction styles, and mechanical services requirements (cooling etc), may result from changes in the climate. However a decrease in national GDP as a result of other climate change impacts, will likely constrain construction and renovation activities significantly. Tourism

Tourism numbers in Nigeria have remained static for 15 years according to 2006 Nigeria Tourism Master Plan. The World Travel and Tourism Council


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forecasts that the tourism share of GDP will fall from 5.5% of GD in 2008 to 3.4% of GDP in 2018. However, tourism will certainly be adversely affected by climate change. It is based on wildlife, nature reserves, coastal resorts and abundant water supply for recreation. Changes to wildlife distribution and declining biodiversity are likely to negatively impact ecotourism. Changes to the malaria regime, as a result of increased flood events and warmer temperatures, are also likely to reduce visitor numbers. Tourism also suffers in the aftermath of weather related disasters. In Nigeria, many tourist attractions are located along the coast. Thus, any significant sea level rise would impact on these tourist attractions that range from modern hotels through traditional relics to recreational grounds like beaches and wildlife sanctuaries. Many beaches (e.g. the Victoria Island beach) in Nigeria will be lost, most river deltas and maritime wetlands would also be endangered, as well as most socio-cultural features (e.g., the first Christian Church in Nigeria, located in Badagry, near Lagos). Tourist attracting traditional festivals, such as the Argungu festival on river Argungu in Kebbi State, would decline to the extent that climate change induces shrinkage of such rivers. Climate change overseas will also impact Nigeria’s tourism industry, as with Europe warming, visitor numbers seeking respite from cold climates can be expected to reduce. Overall, tourism contribution to GDP could be seriously threatened by climate change-related impacts (Ministry of Environment of FRN, 2003).


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C2 REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS

C2.1.1 The North & Central Regions

The Sahel

The north and centre of Nigeria fall within the Sahel region. More than two-thirds of Nigeria is already prone to desertification and this will be exacerbated by climate change. The 30-year-long drought in the Sahel, described as "the biggest climatic anomaly observed to date" (Lebel, T., 2005), is the root of conflicts across the Sahel (e.g. Darfur) and is triggering major social changes across the region. The Sahel is facing a “lethal mix” of threats including climate change, rising food prices and the trafficking of arms and drugs according to Jan Egeland, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on conflict (Egeland, J., 2008). The Sahel zone’s vulnerability to conflict is heightened by unregulated border crossings between Nigeria and its dry neighbour to the north, Niger. Pastoralists from Niger, whose welfare depends on their livestock, let their animals encroach on Nigerian farmland, further decreasing food security for Nigeria. The Sahel is expected to experience higher temperatures and extreme peaks and troughs in rainfall, resulting in reduced agricultural outputs and disruptive migration as people move around the region searching for water, fertile land and jobs (Boko, M. et al., 2007). Changes to the Sahel are already being witnessed and over 50% of the population in this area is under threat from climate change. There have been an increasing number of extreme events across the Sahel, with periods of extreme drought interspersed with dramatic downpours. According to experts, the timing of rainfall is as vital as the quantity (Boko, M. et al., 2007). Wind and strong rains damage the region’s soils, leading to erosion and flash flooding. One predicted impact of climate change is a reduction in soil moisture, which will have serious impacts on agricultural output (Boko, M. et al., 2007). The longer dry periods between rain storms are also affecting water quality and creating new health risks, in particular cholera outbreaks. There are also links between desertification and meningitis, which is endemic across the Sahel and is spreading south. Lake Chad and environs

Related to the increasing sahelization of the north of Nigeria, is the decline of Lake Chad, located at the junction of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. It was once the sixth largest lake in the world and the second largest wetland in Africa. Persistent droughts and continuous extraction have shrunk it to about a tenth of its former size (UNEP) and its contraction has been increasing in rate in recent years. According to a recent study, the lake is now only 1/20th of the size it was 35 years ago (Coe, M.T. and Foley, J.A., 2001). The lakebed is shallow; even before the drought the lake was no more than 5-8 m deep. Lake Chad used to support diverse wildlife which historically provided a substantial proportion of local diets. Many different communities, including


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fishermen, farmers and herdsmen are dependant upon the lake. This food source is increasingly under threat from climate change, further compounding food insecurity in the region. Lake Chad's primary source of water comes from the monsoon rains that typically fall in June, July and August. Over the last three decades, these rains have become increasingly unreliable. Meanwhile, the use of water for irrigation has increased in response to the drier climate. It is estimated that rural water demand will be increasing from nearly 10,000mld in 2005 to 21,000mld by 2020, increasing the pressure put on the strained water sources. Therefore, climate refugees are being created, as climate change makes land no longer viable for farming without irrigation, and simultaneously reduces the water available for irrigation (Okali, D., 2004).

C2.1.2 Southern Nigeria

For the purposes of this study ERM has subdivided southern Nigeria into two distinct regions: ‘Lagos and the southwest’, and ‘the southeast and far south’ but it is worth stressing that many of the climate change issues facing these two regions will be the same. Shared impacts will be considered together in this section, before issues specific to the sub-regions are discussed separately. Nigeria's 800 km coastline is low lying and prone to erosion and flooding. Whilst the coastal zone only covers about 3% of Nigeria's entire land surface most of the economic activities that form the backbone of the national economy are located in the coastal zone. A large percentage of Nigeria’s population (more than 6 million) lives in coastal cities. Its shores and swamps, particularly in the Niger Delta contain valuable fishing grounds and hydrocarbon deposits. Coastal erosion, flooding, pollution (air, water, and land), deforestation, saltwater intrusion and subsidence are already degrading the region, and these issues look set to be worsened by climate change. Hydrological modelling (Onofeghara, 1990) shows that a 0.2 m rise in sea-level will inundate 3,400km2 of Nigerian coast-land; a 1.0 m rise will cover 18,400 km2 and submerge the Delta’s entire oil and gas infrastructure. The whole of the Niger Delta is under 6,000 km2 and contains the oil and gas producing region, and important cities, ports, and other infrastructure. The Ministry of Environment estimate that Nigeria will lose close to $20 billion as a result of the sea-level rise of 0.5m and US$ 43 billion from a 1m sea level rise assuming development and economic growth of 5% over 30 years (MOEFRN, 2003). Cities including Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt, Eket, and Calabar could become uninhabitable; whole communities will be forced to relocate, generating a serious refugee problem and dire socioeconomic consequences as violence, theft and disease are likely to become more prevalent. As sea levels rise, beach properties will be destroyed; low lying buildings and roads further inland will be threatened. This eventuality is already happening at Bar Beach, Lagos (NEST, 2008c). It is estimated that about 40% of the mangroves in Nigeria had been lost by 1980 (WRI, 1990). Mangrove ecosystems offer valuable protection to inland areas from storms and erosion, their loss will worsen the consequences of climate change (NEST, 2008c).


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Lagos and the Southwest

Lagos, Nigeria's largest city and one of the largest in sub-Saharan Africa is located on the high rainfall West African coast. The business district is centred on Victoria Island although the conurbation has rapidly extended to the once swampy, mainland. The city is situated just above sea level and is susceptible to flooding. Much of the city comprises of slums characterized by poor housing and overcrowding. Abuja was developed to replace Lagos as Nigeria’s capital city, because of Lagos’ chronic slums, environmental pollution and traffic congestion. However, Lagos remains Nigeria's most prosperous city and much of the nation's wealth and economic activity are still concentrated there. The sheer density and size of the population in Lagos combined with poor infrastructure and building quality, poverty and flood risk means that Lagos is very vulnerable to climate change. Southeast and the South (Niger Delta)

The integrity of coastal engineering infrastructures and industrial facilities in this key oil producing region are already being undermined by wave scouring and run-up and are vulnerable to possible closure of operations and resulting job losses (NEST, 2008c). Impacts on hydrocarbon extraction itself are discussed further below. Sheet erosion – which results in the complete removal of arable land – is the biggest threat to agriculture in the sandy soil regions of inland south-eastern Nigeria (NEST, 2008b). Farmland in this region has already been devastated by heavy rainfall-induced soil erosion, which is likely to accelerate as a result of climate change. Food security in the southern interior will also be affected by reductions in the size and biodiversity of the southern rainforests because many Nigerians, particularly the poor rural majority, depend on forest products for food. The severe dry spells that are likely to reduce Nigeria's forest cover will also pose problems for fuel wood supply.

Annex D

Comments on a Disease Perspective


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D1 COMMENTS ON A DISEASE PERSPECTIVE

Climate plays a significant role in the distribution of infectious diseases. According to the IPCC report on Human Health – Climate Change 2007 “projected trends in climate change related exposures of importance to human health will continue to change the range of some infectious disease vectors (high confidence)” (Boko, M. et al., 2007). Climate Change could influence the seasonal patterns as well as temporal distribution of diseases such as malaria, dengue and cholera due to changes in temperatures and expected alterations in rainfall patterns (Kuhn, K. et al., 2005; Thomas, C.D. et al., 2004). According to the World Health Organization, Malaria is the most important vector-borne disease in the world (WHO/UNICEF, 2005). The disease is endemic in Nigeria. It presents a major health problem for Nigeria; stable transmission occurs throughout much of the country. The distribution of Malaria as well as the abundance of the disease could be shifted in the future. These shifts in the distribution and abundance of malaria will depend on the location and the climate associated with the area (Tanser F.C. et al., 2003; Thomas, C.D. et al., 2004). Dengue is the most common mosquito-borne viral disease of humans; Dengue is transmitted by Aedes aegypti (Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007). A risk of dengue transmission (World Health Organisation, 2008) exists for the region. Outbreaks of dengue have been linked in the past directly or indirectly to high rainfall, increased temperature and humidity (Gubler D.J. et al., 2001). However scientific reports are not consistent in reflecting the complex effect that climate has on the transmission (Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007). Changes in temperature as well as changes in rainfall are expected to change the geographical distribution of the disease vector and therefore alter the spread of the disease (Chan, M., 2008). Cholera is a bacterial infection that causes both local outbreaks and worldwide pandemics. Regional epidemics occur seasonally and are associated with periods of excessive rainfall, warm temperatures and increases in plankton populations (Kuhn, K. et al., 2005). In the past, cases of cholera have been reported for Nigeria (World Health Organisation, 2008). Although the disease (according to the World Health Organization) no longer poses a threat to countries with minimum standards of hygiene, climate change could cause conditions where access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation cannot be guaranteed which may cause cholera outbreaks or the threat of a cholera epidemic. The seasonal pattern and temporal distribution of above listed diseases is strongly influenced by the climate. Impact of climate change such as alterations in temperature and rainfall will have serious impact on diseases (Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007; Campbell-Lendrum D. et al., 2007). A Public Health system needs to be in place; access to primary health care need to be


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accessible in order to reduce the vulnerability and increase the adaptive capacity (Boko, M., I. Niang et al., 2007). Effective surveillance, reporting procedures as well as implementation and monitor adaptation options are essential requirements (Campbell-Lendrum D. et al., 2007). Current national health programmes may need to be revised in order to include climate-sensitive disease issues.

Annex E

Key Model Assumptions


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E1 KEY MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

The starting point is an annual GDP for 2005 of US$ 112 billion based on current prices (IMF, 2007). Data from the Nigerian National Statistics Bureau was used to break total GDP down to a sector level based on percentages of local currency. The proportion of each sector’s output for the three regions is shown below, and is based on the team’s professional judgement (1).

E1.1 PROPORTION OF SECTOR OUTPUT PER REGION

North SE+SS SW+Lagos Total % % % %

Agriculture 50% 25% 25% 100% Mining and quarrying 5% 80% 15% 100% Wholesale & retail trade 10% 30% 60% 100% Others (nine sectors) 20% 30% 50% 100%

An underlying average annual compounded GDP growth rate of 6% was assumed (best estimate growth), with a high and low of +/- 25%, based on information in Section 3. However, the model outcomes below are generally based on the medium growth scenario. The low climate change scenario is simply 33% of the best estimate climate change impact. The High climate change scenario varies for the three regions as shown in Annex E (ranging from 150% for the North, to 175% for the SSS and SE and 200% for SW and Lagos). Larger impacts were used for the latter based on potential sea level rise implications.

E1.2 PROPORTION OF MEDIUM ESTIMATE IMPACTS USED AS HIGH AND LOW CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS

North % of Med impacts

SE + SS% of Med impacts

SW + Lagos% of Med impacts

High Climate Change impacts 150% 175% 200% Medium Climate Change Impacts 100% 100% 100% Low Climate Change impacts 33% 33% 33%

(1) Contact was made with the Ministry of Finance, but it appears that a regional breakdown of GDP is currently being undertaken, so no such data could be made available


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Agricultural impacts in the North was taken as the initial starting point with an assumed reduction in GDP growth rate of -1.5% (of 6% assumed medium growth) over a 5 year period from 2005 – 2010. This is loosely based on data from Ludwig and Kabat (2007) that shows a decrease of 1.5% on overall GDP growth for a single dry year assuming a 10% decrease in rainfall in the Sahel, and just over 1% decrease in rainfall for Coastal West Africa. Over time, a factor of 1.5 is used each decade until 2050. So, each decade an additional loss of growth of 2.25% is assumed. So, in 2020, agricultural growth for the North is assumed to be 3.75% less than the growth in the no climate change scenario which assumes 6% annual compounded growth, and by 2050 the reduction is 10.5%. The 2005-2010 reduction in growth rate for all other sectors and regions is a function of the -1.5% multiplied by a factor which takes into account the relative impacts (H/M/L) in the summary impact tables in Section 4 for both the sectoral and regional impacts respectively. A score 10 was used for the High impacts, 5 for the Medium impacts and 1 for Low impacts. The combined scores for the seven sectoral impacts are added and multiplied by the regional impacts to give a regional impact score for each sector.

E1.3 RELATIVE SCORES FROM ADDING SECTORAL IMPACTSAND MULTIPLYING BY REGIONAL IMPACTS

North SE+SS SW+Lagos Agriculture 630 630 630 Mining and quarrying 99 330 330 Wholesale & retail trade 490 147 490 Others (nine sectors) 400 400 400

These relative scores are then used to adjust the base impact of -1.5% for agriculture in the North. For example, as shown below, agriculture in the other two regions also scored 630 points, so they too have a starting impact of -1.5%, whilst the wholesale and retail trade in the North has a score of 490, thereby resulting in a factor of 1 x (490/630) = 0.8, and an impact of -1.2%.

E1.4 PROPORTION OF MEDIUM ESTIMATE IMPACTS USED AS HIGH AND LOW CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS

North SE+SS SW+Lagos Agriculture 1.0 1.0 1.0 Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.5 0.5 Wholesale & retail trade 0.8 0.2 0.8 Others (nine sectors) 0.6 0.6 0.6

Annex F

Nigeria’s proposed climate change projects


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F1 NIGERIA’S PROPOSED CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTS (2003)

The following 14 projects are those recommended in the Ministry of Environment’s First National Communication (2003). The text has been slightly abbreviated. The current status of each project is not known. 1) Satellite Remote Sensing Determination of Vegetation Loading and Land use Change between 1995 and 2005 as Influenced by Human Activities and Biomass Burning. It is generally known that Nigeria’s forest estate has decreased from about 60million hectares (mha) to approximately 9.6 mha during the 20th century. However not much data exist on annual evolution of landuse types in the different geographical zones of Nigeria, the biomass stocks in them, including above and below ground biomass, annual biomass growth rates, biomass harvests and biomass burning in different parts of the country Objectives: Satellite remote sensing remains the most viable tool to improve the current poor data in the land use change and agriculture sectors. The main aim of the project is to use the satellite remote sensing tool to provide new data and update existing ones so that the uncertainties in future GHG inventories could be reduced. Project Duration: 3 years (2004 to 2006). 2) Audit of Downstream Energy Sector Technologies, Fuel Consumption and Projected Demand Side Analysis for the Downstream Sector Substantial gaps exist in the database of both the emission inventories and mitigation analyses. For instance, in the downstream energy sector, data are obtained from NNPC Annual Reports, FOS Annual Abstracts of Statistics, among others reports. These reports are lacking in respect sectoral energy consumption, which is necessary for emission inventories. Objectives: The objective of this project is to undertake field surveys to provide data for energy consumption in the downstream energy sector. The surveys will involve development and administration of questionnaires as well as actual field estimate (vehicle counts, survey of vehicle fuel consumption, survey of fuel consumption in public sector and institutions, among others). This information will be used to develop demand-side energy consumption data. The study will cover all major downstream energy sectors: road, rail, internal navigation, domestic and military aviation, industrial heat generation, industrial and, private electricity generation, public and business sector energy consumption, etc. Project Duration: 2 Years: 2004 to 2005


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3) Development of National Emissions Data Systems (NEDS) There is currently no formal institution mandated with the task of developing and reporting of GHG emissions and mitigation options for Nigeria. The development of and implementation of a National Emissions Data Systems (NEDS) is part of the framework to ensure the availability of an institutional framework for data collection and archiving to support emissions inventories and mitigation assessment options. Objectives: The objective of this project is to develop and implement an institutional framework which would support the sustainable evolution and implementation of NEDS under the Federal Ministry of Environment. A suitable R&D institution with capability in GHG inventories and mitigation options is to be identified and tasked with the following: (a) Development of linkages with major database networks within the country for purposes of providing inputs to emission inventories and mitigation assessment routinely. (b) Periodic review of GHG emissions and mitigation options for all IPCC recognized sectors. (c) Development and implementation of an institutional framework to support the operation of NEDS could operate with mandate to provide data needed for research and national planning. (d) Development and implementation of a emissions data systems, which would be available either on the internet or LAN, to link various users of GHG inventory and available mitigation options. (e) Nation-wide capacity development on various aspects of emissions inventories: emission measurements, process modeling, database development, inventory spreadsheets development, etc. Project Duration: 2 Years (2004 to 2005) to support establishment and preliminary implementation of NEDS. 4) Technology Characterization Inventory to Support the Development of Technology Baselines and Options GHG Emission Reduction in Nigeria Technology plays and will continue to play a major role in development. The current efforts at providing mitigation to GHG emissions in various sectors require substantial knowledge of the technology base from which these sectors are currently operation. Such a technology characterization inventory (TCI) has never been carried out in Nigeria, even though mitigation options assessment are being carried out. Objectives: The objective of this project is to undertake a TCI for all relevant sectors and for small, medium and large scale sectors. Project Duration: 2 Years (2004 to 2005)


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5) Audit of Source Strengths for Solvents and Other Chemicals Use in Nigeria The solvents are other chemicals use is one of the sectors recognized by IPCC as contributing to GHG emissions. For Nigeria, there is hardly any data on solvents use. These include data on various paints applications, use of various organic and inorganic chemicals are volatile, especially the consumption of dry cleaning chemicals. Extensive field data collection is needed to support these. Objectives: The objective of this project is to develop a programme for field surveys of the various subcomponents of solvents and other products use in Nigeria and to be able to quantify their contribution to GHG emissions. Project Duration: 1 Year (2004 or 2005) 6) The Assessment of CH4 Emissions from Leak Facilities in the Upstream Oil and Gas Sector and Options for Reduction The oil and gas industry has in the last 30 years served as the main support for the Nigerian economy. This has been because, crude oil export during the period contributed more than 90% of the country’s gross export earnings. Despite the enormous positive impact on the economy, national and world attention has become recently focused on the high degree of perceived environmental degradation of the Niger Delta. Such assessment has principally been driven by sharp practices such as gas flaring, oil spillage, land use change induced by oil and gas exploitation activities, and other agents of global change. In 1990, the gross national emissions of CH4, NMVOC and CO2 from fugitive processes in the energy sector were summarised to be 55.81 Tg CO2 (mainly from gas flaring), 964 Gg CH4 and 210 Gg NMVOC. Oil and gas systems are responsible for more than 99% of the fugitive CH4 emissions. The current estimates of CH4 and NMVOC from oil and gas pipeline fugitive sources are expected to have high level of uncertainties which arise from the high uncertainties in the estimates of the population and emission factors of leak inducing modules. Objectives: In this regard, the main objectives of this study are as follows: (a) The determination of the components leading to fugitive emissions in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria, and the contribution of each generic components to the overall methane emission in the sector. (b) The assessment of the maintenance requirement needed to reduce future methane emissions to minimal levels. (c) The assessment of the adequacy of trained technical and managerial manpower capable of managing the maintenance of these systems in order that leak emissions are minimised. (d) Based on the fore-going, the determination of leakage emissions associated with oil and gas production and utilisation in Nigeria. The project is expected to provide data needed for accurate estimates of fugitive emissions from pipelines and other modules in the oil and gas sector.


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7) Baseline Data Analysis for Risk Assessment of Impacts of Flood and Drought given climate change scenario in Nigeria. Flood and drought are considered the greatest challenge facing Nigeria as a result of climate change in the 21st Century. Although studies on flood and Drought in Nigeria have confirmed their increasing intensity within the past three decades, Risk assessments have been speculative, falling short of IPCC required methodologies due to lack of baseline data on losses of life, properties and production base (agricultural land recourses and animal habitats). Objectives: The studies proposed will aim at: (a) Providing specific Baseline Data for Risk Assessment on Flood and Drought in Nigeria. (b) Delineating States (parts thereof), or geographical / Ecological zones prone to Flood and Drought with emphasis on flood /Drought types. (c) Quantifying the Risk levels of the different flood or Drought prone zones in order to assess the type (s) of intervention (local or international) required for adaptation. Expected outcomes include (i) Data Bank for GIS Products on Risk Assessment and Early Warning System on Flood, Erosion, (ii) Vulnerability Assessment of Specific disorders including Groups (and levels) of People at Risk, Capital values at Risk and Subsistence Values at Risk, (iii) Protection / Adaptation cost on Socio-Economic and Ecological values at loss / Risk, (iv) Cultural / Agricultural / Land Resources at loss / Risk for Adaptation measures. Expected Project Duration: 15 months. 8) Modeling and Verification of Severe storms (cyclonic depressions) in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) has mandate to carry out development projects identified to be a fallout from environmental degradation in the oil producing areas of Nigeria. This is to be carried out in close collaboration with multi-nationals. But it is important that activities include, in addition to man-induced disasters such as oil spillage, gas flaring resulting in general biodiversity degradation, natural disasters such as climate change effects: Sea Level Rise (SLR) and severe storms that will develop due to higher Sea Surface Temperatures (SST). The NDDC can only take the latter disasters ‘on-board’ at planning stage if it is in possession of scientifically sound ‘proof’ of imminent development of such severe weather events, that the present study aims at quantifying. Objectives and outcomes: With a lead time of no more than 2-5 years before the Tcritical of 27-28ºC is reached for these Tornado-type storms to start wrecking havoc in the Delta area, it is expedient to carry out this study so that advisories can be issued to Governments and their Agencies and adaptation measures put in place (a priori) of storm occurrence. Measures are in place ahead of seasonal severe storms. Specifically, the study shall aim at the following:


F5

(a) Design empirical and numerical models occurrence of tornado – type storms in the Niger Delta based on Tcritical Scenarios using SST values. (b) Predict (a head in time) the possible incidence of such tornado - type storms. (c) Provide advisories on the outcome of (a) and (b) above. (d) Suggest adaptation measures to curb or reduce losses including socio-economic values at loss / Risk (people, Capital value, Wetland / Land Resources, Biodiversity etc. (e) Empirical and numerical model results to determine level of susceptibility of the Niger Delta to storm surges of tornado origin. (f) Estimation of socio-economic disorders (people/capital; value/national resources at/risk) and adaptation measures to be recommended. Expected Project Duration: About 12months 9) GCM Climate Modeling of Temperature/ Precipitation and Crop Yield relationship for Food Security. Studies on Crop failure that may be climate, induced is on-going on the possibility of large scale food shortage, especially cereals and other grains in drought prone areas like Nigeria. GCM Models used on experimental (pilot) scale using data for two locations (Kano and Port Harcourt) are inconclusive with doubled Co2 adopted in GISS, UKMO and GFDL models. Objectives a) Simulate Temperature and Precipitation regimes under doubled CO2 (Extreme Warming above 1990 base-line level). b) Apply GCM models [GISS, UKMO, GFDL) tested in other tropical environments for simulation of crop- climate relationship under normal (1961 – 90) and climate change scenarios to predict crop yield especially cereals and tubers. c) Provide long – term Food Early Warning for the 21st Century (in decadal stages). The immediate outputs of the project will include: (i) Predictions of Crop yield under normal and doubled CO2 scenarios for formulation of FOOD SECURITY Policies through Early Warning. (ii) Identification of crops that are most vulnerable in terms of poor yield and low quality under extreme climate conditions. (iii)Determination of the most appropriate GCM models for operational use in Nigeria ‘quick-look’. (iv) Software, easy- to – use for algorithms simple applications in field operations where there is no direct access to mainframe systems. Expected Project Duration: 12 months. 10) Creation of Public Awareness on Climate Change. Climate Change as a result of human activities will have a devastating effect on land and life in Nigeria. With the variations being experienced in climatic conditions, there have been signs of adverse impacts of these changes. Temperatures are already rising with negative effects on health, agricultural production, water resources and other socio-economic sectors.


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It is therefore necessary to create awareness on (a) the need to reduce the emissions of GHGs, which are responsible for climate change and (b) the need to implement adaptation measures for reducing the adverse consequences of the impacts of climate change. Objectives The general objective of the awareness is to sensitize the general public to integrate measures in their programmes to reduce the emission of the GHGs and, where necessary, to co-operate on adaptation measures for the impacts of climate change. Specific objectives include (a) Making the public aware of the dangers of uncontrolled emission of GHGs (b) Assisting the public to identify the sources of emission of GHGs (c) Developing teaching and learning materials in the field of climate change for educational institutions (d) Promoting informal education stakeholders. 11) Improving the Quality of Meteorological Data for Climate Change Impact and Application Studies Data collection and archiving are faced with a lot of problems most of which the country has been unable to solve due to lack of, or inadequate, facilities including instrumentation, technological development, trained personnel and infrastructures. There is paucity of data on the commonly measured meteorological elements (e.g. rainfall, temperature, etc) and there are minimal data on such parameters such as radiation, humidity and wind. Since the mid-1990s, satellites have been used to monitor meteorological systems, but the data collected have not been stored because of lack of storage facilities. Objectives The main objective of the project is to improve the availability and quality of meteorological data in Nigeria. Specific objectives include (a) Increasing the number stations used for collecting the data to meet the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) standards. (b) Increase the quantity and quality weather measuring instruments. (c) Adopting modern state –of - earth technologies for data collection and management. (d) Improving the quality of personnel in NIMET and some other institutions that collect meteorological data. Expected outputs are (i) equipments acquired and installed, (ii) improved number of skilled personnel, (iii) enhanced quality and quantity of meteorological records, (iv) Improved meteorological database management systems (DBMS). Project Duration: 24 months. (Some details of this include) 12) Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability Assessment in the Sudan-Sahel Region All countries in the Sudan-Sahel regions have been adversely affected by climatic variability and changes as well as climatic events. Especially during the past three or four decades, the Sudan-Sahel region have been a centre of worry and disturbing concern especially because of the impacts of droughts


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and desertification. It has also been a region where greater focus and attention have been given on the need to find solutions to the problems of environmental crisis caused by climatic variability and climatic events, (especially droughts and desertification, soil erosion and other such consequences of climatic variations and variability). Objectives The main objectives of the project is to study the impacts of climate change on physical and socio-economic sectors of the Sudan – Sahel region, (with particular reference to agriculture and water resources) and put forward adaptation strategies for reducing the probable impacts of climate change. Specific objectives of the study include (a) To assess the potential impacts of climate change on agricultural production. (b) To assess the potential impacts of climate change on surface and groundwater resources. (c) To assess the impacts of climate change on water quality and how it can affect the water supply-demand systems. (d) To evaluate the impacts of climate change on domestic, industrial, agricultural and other avenues of water demands. (e) To evaluate water supply-demand systems and project the water balance (surplus or deficits) in the region based on implications of climate change on population and various socio-economic factors. Project Duration: 24 Months Expected outputs are (i) estimates of quantity and quantity of surface and groundwater resources in the Sudan – Sahel region of Nigeria (the estimates will also be carried out for the various states in the region), (ii) vulnerability analysis of the climate change impacts on the study region but specifically on agriculture and water resources sectors, (iii) projection of water resources supply and demand as well as water balance characteristics based on water supply and demand in the region, (iv) specific adaptation strategies for implementation in the region. 13) Improving Efficiency of Transport System in Nigeria The Transport System in Nigeria presents a major problem for environmental and socioeconomic development in the country. In particular, about 98% of the passenger travel in the country is by road, the other modes of transport forming only about 2 per cent. Unfortunately, the road transport system is very inefficient with the bulk of the transport consisting of small vehicles and private cars. In the urban centres, the situation is worsened by the centralization of commercial activities in the heart of the cities, especially the Central Business District (CBD). This situation causes heavy traffic congestion usually leading to “near impossible” movement in such cities as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano and Abuja. This has led to the urgent need to improve the efficiency of the transport system especially in the urban centres. Objectives: The main aim of the project is to improve the quality of the environment through the reduction of the number of the road transport vehicles in


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particular corridors, and decongest city centres of commercial activities. Specific objectives include: (a) To study the purpose of journeys and relate this to the density of road transport. (b) To study the level of gas emissions of the various classes of vehicles. (c) To examine the possibilities of reduction or change in the travel modes to modes that are more environmentally friendly (including (i) those modes with reduced exhaust emissions and (ii) those that would reduce transport congestion in the cities). (d) To assist in the formulation of policies towards the improvement of mass public transport system. (e) To examine the possibility of the use of other modes of transport for both inter and intra city travels. (f) To examine the possibility and ways of reducing the use of small private vehicles and their replacement by efficient traffic management measures Project Duration: 15 months. Expected outputs are (i) the reduction in the level of exhaust emissions, (ii) Use of alternative modes of transport such as rail for mass transit and freight, (iii) efficient transport system, (iv) evolution of various traffic management measures to encourage public transport use as against the use of small road transport vehicles, (v) reduction in the use of fuel which in turn will lead to reduction in emission of GHG, (vi) improvement in transport efficiency, which will transmit to efficient running of the economy, reduced costs and improvement in the economy through the distributive sector. 14) Climate Change and Assessment of pollution – related health hazards in Livestock Although changes in climate affect existing systems adversely, some systems for which adaptation is possible may benefit greatly from these changes. Climate change is also assessed in terms of economic development, which may make some countries more Vulnerable to climate change, for example, countries like Nigeria, which do not manage their natural resources properly and have high population growth rates, may be more vulnerable to potential changes in relation to environmental degradation, the basic cause of dust population. The dust in Nigeria may be ‘carcinogenic’ due to the presence of residues of chemical additives (in soils) to enhance or increase crop yield. Thus, livestock may be liable to epidemics which could be fatal under present trends of climate change when the Harmattan Season is synonymous with extremely cold nights and very hot dusty afternoon. These events indicate that, if advanced economies after doing all possible could not avert these catastrophes, it is expedient that in weaker, evolving economies like Nigeria assessment of impact of climate change in the poultry sub-sector of agriculture which tends to hold high promise in the country is expedient in order to provide benchmark data against which aberrations due to climate change can be ‘measured’. Objectives:


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(a) Establish Benchmarks for Risk assessment of Livestock (Poultry) against which Poultry losses during the 2000 / 2001 in the southwestern parts of Nigeria (prone to Harmattan Season epidemics) based on Pre – 1994 losses. (b) Identify ‘local’ and ‘Agric’ hybrids for stratification of possible specific worst affected by epidemics in each state and estimate Economics values at loss and capital value at loss and capital value at Risk. (c) Design protection / Adaptation measures to minimize or eliminate losses in future. Expected outcome is a vulnerability assessment in relation to economic values at loss and risk including determination of time trends in relation to cyclic recurrence patterns of epidemics which will not only be applicable in poultry development but can also be adapted for other livestock. Expected Project Duration: Nine (9) Months.

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