Title: Guidelines for Planning Irrigation and Drainage Investment Projects...

FAO INVESTMENT CENTRETechnical Paper N. 11

Guidelines for Planning Irrigation and Drainage Investment Projects

1996

Table of Contents

FOREWORD

Objective of the Guidelines

INTRODUCTION

PART 1: RECENT LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING

1. Irrigation in the Context of Water Resources Management

2. Irrigation Types and the Issue of Scale

3. Irrigation, Food Supply and Drought

4. Effective Implementation

5. Fiscal Sustainability

6. Water User's Associations

7. Social and Environmental Aspects

8. Choice of Technology

9. The Drainage Dilemma

10. Implications for the Planning Process

Further reading

Footnotes

FOREWORD

Publicly financed irrigation and drainage investment projects have too often performed

poorly. Sometimes the reasons have been unforeseeable or unavoidable. But in somecases shortcomings were because planners gave inadequate consideration toinstitutional constraints or to the practical problems of subsequent implementation, orbecause there was insufficient commitment by governments or users to thedevelopments proposed. Delay, dilapidation, waste of scarce water and adversesocial and environmental impacts have been among the familiar consequences.Lessons have been learned from these setbacks, however. These Guidelines giveprominence to the planning approaches which have evolved, and are still evolving, toavoid future difficulties. The publication stresses sounder formulation of irrigation anddrainage investment strategies, improved conceptualization of project options, andbuilding stronger participation and commitment into the detailed planning process. Theintended users are FAO Investment Centre staff, trainees and consultants, as well aslocal planning groups set up by governments to prepare investment proposals. Someof the material may also be useful to consulting firms and financing institutionsinvolved in planning or appraising such projects. The following Investment CentreTechnical Papers complement and should be read in conjunction with theseGuidelines: Guidelines for the Design of Agricultural Investment Projects (No. 7,revised 1995); Financial Analysis in Agricultural Project Preparation (No. 8, 1991);and Guidelines on Sociological Analysis in Agricultural Project Design (No. 9, 1992).

Objective of the Guidelines

The objective of these Guidelines is to summarize present thinking and practice, andto assist practitioners to plan irrigation investment projects and programmes that willrealize and sustain their full potential. They cover the whole investment planningprocess, from formulation of subsectoral strategies, to conceptualization of projectoptions, and detailed planning of the preferred option(s).

INTRODUCTION

Why New Guidelines?

Irrigated agriculture has made a major contribution to food production and foodsecurity throughout the world: without irrigation much of the impressive growth inagricultural productivity over the last 50 years could not have been achieved.Nevertheless it is widely accepted that the overall performance of ‘irrigation anddrainage’ (also implying reclamation and water control) investments has too oftenfallen short of the expectations of planners, governments and financing institutionsalike (Ref: Report No. 13676, A Review of World Bank Experience in Irrigation,Operations Evaluation Department, World Bank, Washington DC, 1994).

In 1992, the World Bank's Portfolio Management Task Force reported that majorproblems that constrain the performance of World Bank financed investment projectsin various sectors, are:

inadequate consideration of institutional constraints and poor planning forimplementation; and

a lack of commitment to the success of the project by governments and users.

In the case of irrigation investments these problems are manifested in poorproject management, both at implementation and thereafter, and poor operationand maintenance resulting from inadequate budget allocations or from rentseeking by users and officials. These core problems usually give rise to, or areaccompanied by, a host of other technical, social and economic problems, suchas:

implementation delays and cost overruns;

premature degeneration of civil works and equipment;

unreliable water supplies, or over-irrigation, waterlogging and salinity;

social problems, including problems of organization, equity, land tenure andgender exclusion;

lower than expected output values, due to poor technical performance orreflecting over-optimistic price projections by planners.

The World Bank Task Force stressed that the ultimate success of a project is to asignificant degree determined by what happens in the "upstream" planning process,and that many implementation problems can clearly be traced to deficiencies here.These findings are now considered generally valid by other international financinginstitutions and donors. The lessons learned regarding these problems, and the newapproaches that have been developed to tackle them, therefore make new guidelinesessential and timely.

PART I: RECENT LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING

Since the ultimate success of an investment is largely determined by the quality of theupstream process of planning, it is pertinent to examine recent lessons learned fromexperience and their implications for future planning. The main lessons are that wateris an increasingly scarce resource for which there are many competing demands thatare more profitable, socially and economically, than irrigation; also that low worldprices for basic food and fibre crops, together with typically high development costs,have recently made new irrigation development increasingly difficult to justify. Evenso, world food supply will depend even more on irrigation in the next century than inthe present. Future irrigation investment must therefore focus on lower cost solutions,both for new development and for rehabilitation, on making better use of existingirrigation facilities and on increasing output value per unit of water used. Plannersshould seek to establish the conditions that will promote this focus.

1. IRRIGATION IN THE CONTEXT OF WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

In recent years, water issues have been the focus of increasing international concernand debate (1). More than two thirds of the water withdrawn from the earth's rivers isused for irrigated agriculture; in developing countries the proportion is even higher -more than 80 percent. But agriculture is a relatively low-value and often highlysubsidized water user. Competition for water with other sectors is already constrainingeconomic development in many countries; as populations expand and economiesgrow this competition will intensify, as will conflicts between water users, or betweencountries where such competition transcends international borders.

Cities and industries can afford to pay more for, and earn a higher economic rate ofreturn from, a unit of water than agriculture. Hence governments and financinginstitutions are being forced to reconsider the economic, social and environmentalimplications of investment in irrigation. As a result, it is likely that in future the watersector will be less dominated by irrigation, and in some countries water formerly usedfor agriculture is already being reallocated for higher-value uses.

The 1993 World Bank policy paper Water Resources Management crystallized muchof the thinking of governments and financing institutions with regard to the overallmanagement of water resources. It called for new approaches, including demandmanagement, - that is to say the use of economic, legal, institutional and other policyinterventions to influence the demand for water in order to improve the efficiency of itsuse. In countries with significant water management problems, the internationalfinancing institutions increasingly require the preparation of inter-sectoral waterresources management strategies to guide the lending programme in the watersector, as a precondition to lending for irrigation. The implication is that loans forirrigation development will not be made where this will prejudice other more profitable

or socially desirable uses of water.

These Guidelines, however, start from the assumption that water policy reviews haveindicated that irrigation is a justifiable option within the context of a country's overallwater resources management strategy, and that investment finance could be madeavailable for its development. The Guidelines therefore do not address the principlesand processes involved in water resources management strategy formulation, whichare well covered elsewhere(2). The need for project planning to be in strict conformitywith such strategies nevertheless cannot be overemphasized.

2. IRRIGATION TYPES AND THE ISSUE OF SCALE

Irrigation Typologies

With about 250 million hectares irrigated throughout the world in vastly differentclimatic and socio-political environments, some categorization of irrigation may bethought desirable. Numerous typologies are commonly used, such as system size, thenature of the water source, and whether schemes are operated publicly or privately.Definition by size presents difficulties on a global level, since, for example, what mightbe considered large-scale in some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would beconsidered as only small or medium-scale in South Asia. Furthermore, many of theproblems confronting publicly financed irrigation transcend scale, and some attemptsat categorization have confused "small-scale" with "traditional" or "informal" irrigation.Definition by the type or nature of the water source does not recognize the verydifferent characteristics of major public surface water schemes based on dams in theUSA, for example, and small community-managed tank irrigation schemes in SriLanka.

From the technical viewpoint, a further distinction can be made between riceschemes, which comprise more than half of the world's irrigation, and non-riceschemes, because of their fundamentally different characteristics. Since the rice planttolerates waterlogging and needs much more water to thrive than almost all other ofthe major irrigated crops, it is dominant where water is cheap and plentiful, notably inthe humid eastern side of South Asia eastward through to Japan and Indonesia. Non-rice projects are generally found in the drier or cooler parts of the developing world.The design and operation of a rice-growing irrigation system is significantly differentfrom that for other crops: rice fields are waterlogged to reduce the weedingrequirements, whereas crops such as wheat, maize and especially cotton will dieunder these conditions(3). Once the crop is established rice schemes usually receive asmall but continuous flow to maintain flooded conditions; field-to-field irrigation isacceptable because a down-catchment farmer will often use what an up-catchmentfarmer wastes. Irrigation systems designed for other crops do not usually suit rice verywell, and vice-versa.

For the purpose of these Guidelines, irrigation could perhaps be categorized globallyas either public or private, ie by the degree of end-users' commitment of resources to,and control over the operation of, the system, rather than the usual categorization byscale. Even this is difficult to define precisely, since the share of public versus privateresources can vary widely between schemes. Nevertheless, public irrigation is definedhere as any irrigation in which government has the dominant financial interest ormanagement responsibility/control. Public irrigation may range in size from schemesof hundreds of thousands of hectares, down to very small schemes of 10 ha or less;but in each case these are initiated and developed under public authority and control,and operated and maintained in the same way. This definition includes for examplestate-owned large-scale estates (e.g. for sugar cane production), joint venturesbetween government and quasi-government financial institutions, and large-scalethrough to small-scale smallholder irrigation schemes set up under governmentauthority.

Conversely, private irrigation can be defined as any irrigation in which farmers (or a

private sector group) have the dominant financial interest or managementresponsibility/control. It includes:

Farmer-managed irrigation schemes of a few hundred square metres to aseveral thousand hectares, developed, operated and maintained by individuals,families, communities, or local rulers and landowners, independently ofgovernment, and generally for the production of basic food or fibre crops andvegetables for local markets. Examples may be found throughout the world,from small plots of paddy in Southeast Asia, shallow tubewells in the Indo-Gangetic Plain, tank irrigation systems elsewhere in South Asia, qanat systemsin Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the swamp and flood recession areas withpartial water control in Sub-Saharan Africa, to spate irrigation systems inSouthern Arabia. Some of these systems are hundreds of years old, in whichcase they are often referred to as traditional irrigation.

Commercial irrigation, with units ranging in size from a few hectares to severalthousand hectares, financed, operated and managed by individuals or privatelyowned companies. This category would include for example localized(4)

irrigation systems of 1-2 ha in extent, for the production of flowers, vegetablesor fruit, to larger overhead or surface irrigated schemes for the production highvalue field crops such as tobacco, and privately owned sugar estates.

The most important differences between public and private irrigation as defined aboveare that:

in public irrigation it is the government that plans, finances and implementsschemes, and in most cases farmers effectively receive a subsidized service;

in private irrigation, even though government may sometimes facilitatedevelopment or provide incentives, farmers take their own investment decisions,pay, implement, operate and maintain systems, and carry the risks.

Public irrigation therefore tends to be supply-driven and may incorporate political orsocial objectives, while private irrigation is demand-driven and reflects financialobjectives or, at times, the survival strategy of the poor. These characteristics impingeon many of the basic decisions for development planning and imply fundamentalinfluences on the investment approach. The features that make successful privateirrigation self-sustaining should if possible be emulated in planning public irrigationinvestments. Thus farmers must be involved in the planning decisions, contribute atleast a part of the capital costs, and accept full responsibility for operation andmaintenance (O&M). As will be seen, the planning and investment trend in publiclyfinanced irrigation is to emulate those characteristics of private irrigation that make itgenerally self-sustaining.

The Issue of Scale

According to a World Bank review of its experience in irrigation(5), there is noevidence to suggest that small-scale irrigation is more or less likely than large-scaleto achieve success, judged in terms of sustained economic internal rate of return.Nevertheless, it can be argued that where irrigation institutions - public or private - arestill relatively weak, where there is a lack of capacity to plan, implement, operate andmanage large schemes, attention should focus on smaller developments. Smallerschemes are more conducive to farmer management and control, and marketlimitations for the crops produced often make such schemes the only viable choice.On the other hand, there are many examples of the development of small publicirrigation systems, scattered over a wide area, that have overstretched the logisticaland staffing capabilities of irrigation agencies and have eventually failed. In theory,larger developments should encourage more Government support, attract bettermanagement, be easier to organize, and therefore enjoy better prospects forsustainability.

There are numerous other arguments for and against large or small irrigationschemes: for example, the obvious economies of scale and multiplier effects of largeschemes (see Box I-1). Many of the arguments are valid in some countries, for certainirrigation types, but not in others. Thus, generalization should be avoided and theissue of scale should be approached considering the individual circumstances of theproject and institutional capacities in the country concerned. As will be seen, there aremore important issues than scale: the overwhelming experience is that what isimportant in predisposing irrigation to success is the extent to which it enjoys thecommitment of stakeholders(6) to good engineering design, quality construction,efficient operation and adequate and timely maintenance.

Box I-1. Large versus Small Irrigation Schemes

Large Scale Small Scale

For:

Engineering economies of scale usually possible,hence, potentially lower unit costs.

Governments more disposed to take the actionsnecessary to ensure that project succeeds.

Economies of scale result in cost-effective provision ofextension services and social/economic infrastructure.

Greater regional impact of secondary benefits.

Easier physical planning of contiguous blocks thanscattered areas.

Against:

Demand for high level professional skills andinstitutional capacity in planning, implementing,operating and maintaining.

Relatively complex organization and managementrequirements; scope for farmer management limited totertiary system, hence greater recurrent cost burden togovernment or other central authority (which mayoffset potential economies of scale).

Longer period required to bring complete project intoproduction.

Greater potential for irreversible adverseenvironmental and social impacts, such asdisplacement of settlements or disruption of wildlifehabitats.

For:

Usually less exacting technical demands for high levelprofessional skills for planning, implementing, operating andmaintaining.

Greater opportunity for farmers to participate in planning,financing, implementing, operating and maintaining.

Better adapted to supplying local markets with (high value)horticultural products without depressing prices.

Relatively simple organization and management.

Often quick yielding.

Smaller risk of irreversible adverse environmental and socialimpacts

Against:

Diseconomies of scale sometimes result in relatively longerperiod required to plan and implement (per ha developed).

Fragmented distribution results in more difficult logistics forimplementation, extension coverage and provision of socialand economic infrastructure.

3. IRRIGATION, FOOD SUPPLY AND DROUGHT

Options and Alternatives for Food Supply

As populations in some developing countries continue to grow faster than increases infood production, the options for meeting the consequent incremental demand for food

need to be considered. These are discussed below.

Rainfed Production of Food as an Alternative to Irrigation

Although between 30 and 40 percent of the world's food at present comes from theirrigated 20 percent of total cultivated land, before contemplating further irrigationdevelopment the potential for increased food output from rainfed areas should beconsidered. There may be prospects for obtaining sustainable production increasesunder rainfed conditions through relatively simple low cost technologies: for exampleimproved in situ water conservation techniques(7), and the adoption of integrated pestmanagement and integrated plant nutrient management strategies. However whereland resources are scarce, further area expansion of rainfed food production couldincreasingly involve more marginal areas, with a risk of increased deforestation, soilerosion and general land degradation. In the less well-endowed areas particularly, thepotential for stabilization or intensification of existing rainfed production by increaseduse of agrochemical inputs is also technically limited: either the possible gains havealready been achieved, or they are unlikely to be achieved because of aversion byfarmers to the known risks of investing in improved inputs in marginal rainfall areas.

Hence, even though irrigation development cannot, and perhaps should not, be reliedupon to meet the entire future increase in demand for food, supply can be expected todepend to an even larger extent on irrigation in the next century than it has in this.

New Irrigation Development

Increased production through new irrigation development is nevertheless increasinglydifficult to justify economically for the production of basic foods, because of thedecline in world market prices for these crops(8) and typically high per hectare capitalcosts (see Box I-2, also Annex 2 of Investment Centre Technical Paper 5(9)). Thesituation may change in the longer term if, as world population grows, the demand forfood begins to outstrip supply. In this case prices might reasonably be expected toapproach the marginal cost of irrigated production, and the use of current World Bankprice projections for project analyses may be inappropriate(10). Indeed, should worldmarket prices for basic food crops show signs of recovery, this could significantly alterthe profitability of production of such crops under irrigation. Nevertheless, for theforeseeable future any expansion of irrigation for the production of basic foods willonly be possible if substantial reductions in per hectare capital costs of newdevelopment can be achieved.

In many countries, however, the better irrigation sites are already developed, andhence new projects could be expected to cost even more per hectare than thosedeveloped in the past. New irrigation development in these countries may thereforeincreasingly be justified only for the production of relatively high value crops - forwhich markets and marketing are often constraints - rather than for basic foods. Inthis situation markets, as much as the availability of suitable sites, will determine thepace of investment in new irrigation, unless lower cost technologies can be devisedand introduced. This is today's challenge to irrigation engineers.

Box I-2. Asian Food Production in the 1990s

The introduction and rapid spread of high-yielding rice and wheat varieties combined with heavy investment in irrigationand rapid growth in fertilizer use in the late 1960s and the 1970s resulted in strong growth in output of these crops inAsia. For rice, the rate of growth of yields increased from 1.7% per annum during 1958-66 (before the spread ofmodern technology) to 2.9% during 1974-82. However, growth in rice yield, the primary contributor to rice outputgrowth throughout these periods, has slowed to 1.9% annually since the early 1980s.

Area expansion contributed about one-third of Asian rice output growth during 1966-74, but little after that. The annualgrowth rate in rice output therefore declined in the 1980s, from 3.1% in 1974-82, to 2.2% during the period beginningin 1982. Similar trends have occurred with wheat output.

Reductions in the amounts of new investments in irrigation have been dramatic. Aggregate lending and assistance forirrigation in Asia in the 1970s and 1980s by four major financial institutionsa/ reached its peak in real terms in 1977-79.By the mid-1980s it was less than 50% of the 1977-79 level. What has caused this decline in investment? Contributingfactors include the large public and foreign debt loads carried by most of the agriculturally based economies in theregion, the declining share of unexploited irrigation development potential in many countries in the region, inter-sectoralcompetition for water, and increasing stringent project evaluation in response to political resistance from environmentalinterests and those displaced or otherwise negatively affected by irrigation development.

However, the main reasons for declining investment are the increasing real costs per hectare of new irrigationdevelopment and decline in world rice and wheat prices. Rosegrant and Svendsen presented real capital costs forconstruction of new irrigation systems in five countries in South and Southeast Asia over the period 1966-88, theunweighted average for which increased by a factor of 2.5, from US$1,744 to US$4,385 per ha, over the period. Thereal price of rice and wheat over this period was halved, representing a swing of a factor of 5 in the ratio of costs tobenefits.

a/ World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and US Agency forInternational Development.

Source: Mark W. Rosegrant and Mark Svendsen (1993), Asian Food Production in the 1990s: Irrigation Investment andManagement Policy, "Food Policy", February 1993.

Intensification of Existing Irrigation Systems

Given that the cost of new irrigation development for food production is increasinglydifficult to justify, and that many existing irrigation systems perform below potential, itis logical to consider intensification and increased output from existing systems. Theinvestment emphasis in recent years has therefore shifted towards improving thelatter, taking advantage of sunk costs to achieve incremental production at lowincremental cost. It is important here to note the distinction that has been madebetween an endless cycle of rehabilitation, which is simply deferred maintenance, andupgrading, which involves making existing schemes work better. Upgrading usuallycalls for engineering, economic and sociological analysis to arrive at solutions.Sectoral loans aimed at such improvements have become an important part of theportfolios of the financing institutions, often linked to system management transfer tothe users (see Chapter 7).

Low Cost Irrigation

The above discussion focuses on irrigation development in formal systems and takesno account of the existence, in various parts of the world, of large areas of informal ortraditional irrigation.

These, by definition, have been developed on the initiative of farmers rather thangovernments, and have continued their existence in the same way. Traditionalirrigation systems are often characterized by poor water control, and consequent lowcropping intensities and yields. In many cases improved water control can beachieved at comparatively low cost, and is often easily justified by the incrementalproduction that can be achieved as a result. Thus, given that in some countries thearea under traditional irrigation far exceeds the area under formal irrigation, the scopefor obtaining increased food production from these systems could be significant. The

identification of opportunities for such improvements may therefore be a priority forplanners. However, it must also be noted that the most important feature of thesesystems is local initiative, responsibility and control; proposed improvements shouldavoid inadvertent transfer of responsibility to government.

Apart from traditional irrigation systems, other opportunities exist for low costirrigation, particularly for localized irrigation, including systems based on the use ofclay pots for the storage and gradual release of irrigation water. These, and othersimilar devices, often bring nutritional benefits to local communities because they aregenerally used for fruit and vegetable production. They make efficient use of scarcewater, but are in general unsuited to large-scale food production(11).

Irrigation and Protection from Drought

In many regions of the world the major river systems have their headwaters in highrainfall or snowmelt areas and flows are relatively insensitive to droughts inagricultural areas downstream. Here the value of irrigation in "drought-proofing", bycreating greater yield stability and out-of-season food production, is undoubted.

In other areas subject to repeated and prolonged droughts, such as the Sahel,northeast Brazil or southern and eastern Africa, although at first sight there wouldappear to be no apparent alternative for improving local food security, irrigation doesnot always provide full insurance against drought. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa forexample rivers and dams dry out and groundwater levels drop in years of recurrentdrought. It could therefore be argued that in these circumstances irrigated agricultureis more vulnerable to drought than some less intensive forms of agriculture. Moreover,even where irrigation potential remains unexploited in these areas, its developmentcost nowadays will often only be justified by high value crops. These have limitedmarkets and will bring primary benefits to only a few of the people normally at risk.Thus, despite its superficial appeal, irrigation development in these areas may not bea fully effective means to combat recurrent drought, rural poverty and food insecurity.There are unfortunately no easy, quick fixes for these problems. Further research isnecessary, aimed at developing viable technical recommendations that take accountof the recurrent drought cycle, including opportunities for non-farm rural employment.Policy assumptions that automatically equate irrigation development with theelimination of drought risks in such areas should be regarded with caution.

4. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

Experience to date, well summarized in the 1992 report of the World Bank's PortfolioManagement Task Force referred to earlier, makes it clear that a key condition forsustainable development impact from irrigation investments is implementability. Thisrequires:

that the implementation requirements of the project are matched to localinstitutional capacity;

commitment to the project, built on stakeholder participation and localownership.

Other factors, such as good technical design, sound construction and financialviability for the users are of course equally important. But experience indicates that inthe past irrigation professionals have often underestimated the attention which alsoneeds to be given to implementability.

Implementation Capacity and External Technical Assistance

The conventional project identification/preparation approach of the past has oftenresulted in arriving at detailed project design only to find a mismatch with localcapacity to implement it. Money and technical assistance has then been provided tobridge the gap. Technical assistance frequently then crowds out any local capacity,

and may in effect substitute for local management rather than strengthen it, bringingno sustainable improvement.

In the conventional planning process, detailed start-up and implementation plans havegenerally been considered as beyond the ambit of the identification/preparation teamswork. That this was inappropriate is now clear and a new approach has been foundnecessary: projects should be planned to match local capacity for implementation,which implies that planning teams should first acquire a thorough appreciation of thiscapacity. If necessary the project scope and content may be reduced to matchexisting implementation capacity. Technical assistance can then be appliedselectively, rather than indiscriminately as often in the past, for genuinely sustainablecapacity to be built. The planning process should therefore give specific attention toan analysis of institutional capacity, and to providing a detailed programme to enablethe implementers to prepare themselves for carrying out the tasks expected of them,once the project becomes effective.

Participation, Ownership and Commitment

Successful implementation requires participation in the planning and implementationprocess by all stakeholders, in order to create a sense of ownership of, andconsequent commitment to, the project. This requires that the project planningprocess should allow time for the borrower and users to participate in, or preferablydrive, the planning process, and for any potential losers to have a substantiveinfluence on decisions that affect their future. Ownership and commitment by theusers are unlikely to be achieved unless they consider that the project would meettheir felt needs(12) and they have a stake in the equity - that is, they share in or bearall of the investment costs.

Building ownership and commitment through participation has often been difficult toachieve in the past. The conventional sequence of identification/preparation, carriedout against tight deadlines by external planning teams, has seldom allowed time forgenuine participation (which should go beyond mere consultation), either bygovernment staff or farmers. On implementation, government irrigation engineers, fortheir part, have usually seen irrigation only from an engineering, rather than a farmingor social, perspective. They have been reluctant to adopt participatory approacheswith farmers, mainly because of a misplaced belief that farmers are unable tounderstand or make any contribution to technical matters, or because of concernsthat participation might delay implementation or result in design changes thatcompromise the quality of the final product.

Undue delays in project approval and implementation are undesirable, not least forthe farmers; but taking time over stakeholders' participation in planning does notnecessarily mean delay. It can often pay dividends, by preparing the implementers,ensuring smooth start-up, building farmers' commitment to change, and mayultimately lead to more rapid implementation and a more sustainable developmentimpact. Experience has shown that the ultimate scheme design almost alwaysbenefits from involving the users in the planning process. Farmers, or at least thosewith some experience or knowledge of irrigation, from the poorest illiterate smallholderto the richest well-educated commercial farmer, usually have practical ideas of whatworks and what does not, from their detailed local knowledge of weather patterns,hydrology, soils, markets, and so on. Communities often have strong preferencesregarding the nature and location of development that needs to influence planning,such as aligning a canal to avoid excavation in sacred ground.

Participatory or consultative planning is essential in rehabilitation projects or theupgrading of traditional farmer-managed irrigation systems, to take advantage of theinvaluable store of cross-disciplinary knowledge that farmers possess about theexisting systems. Projects that involve the displacement and resettlement of peoplecan only be planned and implemented effectively if those affected are involved in theplanning process and their suggestions and concerns taken fully into account.

As will be seen from Chapter 5, involving farmers in system design can also oftenresult in significant cost savings, particularly if the farmers themselves are expected totake a share in the equity by contributing to the investment costs. Sound engineeringis essential, but it can nonetheless take account of the farmers' experiences andpreferences. Yet farmers, as a possible source of system design input, are still toooften ignored by engineers, and as a result schemes are often inappropriatelyplanned (see Box I-4).

Box I-4. Second Approximations:Unplanned Farmer Contributions to Irrigation Design

Farmers interviewed on the Kosinggolan Scheme of the Dumoga Irrigation Project in North Sulawesi, Indonesiafrequently reported that during construction they had approached construction labourers or supervisors in the field tosuggest changes and were usually told that the design had been established by the government and could not bechanged. Often farmers relocated the construction markers when the crews had left. Others waited until constructionwas finished and the contractors had moved on before altering the structures. Altogether, 27 design alterations wereidentified in the sample blocks. Many cases involved multiple alterations that were interconnected.

The most common kinds of alterations observed were channels being relocated, streams being diverted or ponded,project channels being abolished or not used, and channel offtakes or division points being relocated. Other actionsincluded redirecting project channels into drains or streams, making new channels, adjusting division box gates toalter water divisions, making new flumes, destroying project flumes and lining channels. Several cases involvedrelocating channels to follow farm boundaries, to accommodate low water requirement crops or to continue to makeuse of pre-existing farmer-built structures such as small weirs, channels and ponds.

The most frequent reasons reported by farmers for making design changes related to questions of conveyance anddistribution efficiencies, farm boundaries and the conjunctive use of alternative water sources (in this case fromnatural waterways or from return flow).

Source: Vermillion D.L., in Design Issues in Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems, Proceedings of an InternationalWorkshop of the Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems Network held at Chiang Mai, Thailand, December 1989. IIMI,Colombo, Sri Lanka (1990).

A Possible Role for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)(13) in ParticipatoryDevelopment

Farmers may be as uninterested in participation as government irrigationbureaucracies, especially if in the past they have received free, though possiblyunreliable, irrigation services and are now expected to bear more of the costs. Theymay often be suspicious of government officials, especially if they have been thelosers as a result of incompetent or corrupt practices. Farmers may therefore requireconsiderable persuasion to commit themselves to participate.

Participation usually also requires behavioural change in irrigation bureaucracies, anduntil this is achieved they may not be in a position to implement participatorydevelopment. Some bureaucracies have successfully employed young graduates insocial science to work directly with farmers to assist the latter to mobilize andorganize themselves to participate in project planning and construction(13). However,for various reasons it is often difficult for irrigation bureaucracies to attract and retainsuch staff. Even if such staff can be recruited, farmers may still hesitate to cooperatefully with persons they regard as government agents. In this case what is oftenrequired is a non-governmental intermediary, to identify community needs andarticulate them on behalf of the otherwise voiceless. While non-governmentalorganizations vary in their ability to work with the poor and to cooperate withgovernment agencies, several of them have undertaken this role successfully.

However, caution is necessary to avoid any suggestion that NGOs should replace

more formal local institutions: in some cases, there would be advantages but in otherssuch a move could be counter-productive. Instead, suitably qualified and motivatedNGOs may be sub-contracted, either by local government(14) or through the farmers'own administrative structures(15), to provide technical assistance services to animateparticipation. They may also often assist in capacity building by training governmentstaff in this role.

5. FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY

The Need for Cost Recovery

Economic efficiency and fiscal sustainability demand that the capital costs of irrigationinfrastructure should eventually be recovered from the users, in order to permit longer-term replication of investments. On equity grounds, it can also be argued that costsshould be recovered, as farmers who are able to irrigate tend to be amongst the betteroff members of the rural population. In practice few countries have ever succeeded inrecovering much more than the O&M costs of public irrigation directly, althoughindirect recoveries in the form of agricultural taxes or generally negative terms of tradefor the subsector have in some cases been important (see Box I-5).

Box I-5. Cost Recovery: Setting the Appropriate Level

A 1986 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (OED) report described serious cost recovery problems on theMuda project in Malaysia, where at the time of audit, water charges and land taxes remained far short of meeting O&Mcosts. The prospects for raising direct cost recoveries were considered poor, partly because of the heavy burden onfarmers of zakat, a religious tithe, and a substantial sales tax collected from produce in the region. However, the auditreport concluded that if the zakat, estimated in an FAO study to be 5-7 percent of gross farm income, as well as theindirect return to the government resulting from controlled prices were taken into account, the Muda farmers' combinedpayment of water charges, taxes, and the production tithe covered all the O&M costs plus 20 percent of capital costs(at 10 percent annual interest).

Source: OED Report No 6233, World Bank Lending Conditionality: A Review of Cost Recovery in Irrigation Projects.World Bank, Washington DC, June 1986.

It has also been argued that the complexity of some irrigation and drainage schemesjustifies state intervention and subsidizing of part of the investment costs, withoutwhich some worthwhile projects may not have been constructed. In these casescapital costs not recovered may not really be subsidies if all the secondary benefits ofirrigation development are taken into account. In a case study of the Muda IrrigationProject in Malaysia, for example, it was found that for every dollar of value addedgenerated directly by the project, another 80 cents were generated downstream(16).Moreover, other researchers have argued that the multiplier effects of investment inagriculture in developing countries are generally greater than those associated withinvestment in other sectors(17). Nevertheless, the governments of many developingcountries faced fiscal crises during the 1980s that focused their attention on theshortcomings of existing policies for financing irrigation, particularly with regard to theO&M costs. The general consensus now, among governments and financinginstitutions, is that users should pay all of the O&M costs and as much as possible ofthe capital costs.

Cost Recovery, O&M and Water Charges

Problems with cost recovery and O&M form a vicious circle. Irrigators on publicschemes are commonly reluctant to pay any charges that they are not forced to: poorcollections lead to poor O&M, and an even greater reluctance to pay. It is alsogenerally accepted that the standard tactic for dealing with poor O&M in the past -

that of relying only on raising water charges - does not usually work, mainly becauserevenue from water charges (if they are collected) is often returned to the generaltreasury instead of being allocated to O&M. There are exceptions to this rule, forexample on public schemes in Morocco, but in these cases increased water chargeshave been accompanied by improved service, hence greater willingness to pay on thepart of the farmer.

Any suggestion that irrigators on a public irrigation scheme cannot afford to pay eventhe O&M costs needs to be examined very critically. If irrigators cannot pay it can onlybe assumed that the scheme is either unviable - in which case the question should beasked why it was built or what can be done to make it viable - or unreliable, in whichcase measures should be taken to correct the situation. Moreover, there is an issue ofequity involved in subsidizing some members of society by way of artificially cheapirrigation: in principle it may be a praiseworthy social objective, but with typically highunit costs for irrigation development, the social impact would in most cases be greaterif any subsidy was spread more thinly over a higher proportion of the rural poor.Fiscal constraints in many developing countries simply do not permit subsidies of thiskind anyway.

The application and collection of water charges can be further complicated by variousfactors, including for example local customary law, or a fundamental belief in somecountries that water should be free. There is also the difficulty of volumetricmeasurement. The first of these may be overcome to a certain extent by charging a"service" fee for irrigation. But this usually takes the form of an area or crop-based feethat provides no incentive for the efficient use of water and may thus contribute towasteful usage. Even if it were possible to charge individual farmers for water on avolumetric basis, which it seldom is for most surface irrigation systems involvingsmallholders, setting an appropriate charge may present some difficulty because oflocal economic distortions (see Box I-5 above). Nevertheless, without some form ofvolumetric charging, individual irrigators have little incentive to make more efficientuse of water.

One solution to the problem of water charges is to devolve financial autonomy forO&M to users' groups, or to irrigation agencies dependent upon the users for finance.Metering of water supplied to larger groups, even if only approximate, is usually moretechnically feasible, and the group as a whole can then be charged. It becomes thegroup's responsibility to allocate water amongst its members and to recover thecharges; the experience is that users' groups are more effective collectors of feesthan government agencies. However, this solution will depend for success entirely onthe cohesion of the group involved. Conditions for the sustainability of users' groupsare discussed later.

Users' Contributions to Capital Costs

Apart from the obvious fiscal advantage, a contribution by users towards the capitalcost of a new or rehabilitated scheme is an indication of demand and commitment. Ineffect, this is an investment in equity and hence the scheme becomes to some extentprivate, enhancing prospects for sustainability. For this to happen it requires that theusers will be in a position to make such a contribution, and that there are no economicdistortions in place that make it impossible for them to do so.

It also presupposes that government is committed to recovering costs. Yet there aremany examples around the developing world where governments and donors haveadopted the view that users are too poor to make any capital contribution. In thesecases the construction or rehabilitation of an irrigation scheme is often seen as awelfare project rather than as an investment project, and farmers are paid in cash orfood to contribute labour to the construction of the scheme. There are no signs thatsuch an approach engenders any sense of ownership or responsibility. Farmers aremore likely to view construction simply as a source of off-farm employment, to regardthe scheme as government infrastructure and ultimately to show little subsequent

commitment to it. Moreover, the injection of large amounts of food into an area underfood-for-work programmes can sometimes depress agricultural prices and affect otherfarmers' incomes.

Even among very poor populations, individuals and communities have been willingand able to invest substantial amounts in cash and kind for projects that they considerare worthwhile. If nothing else, irrigators or prospective irrigators can contributelabour, even if only for a few hours a day, and provide locally available materials forconstruction. Unwillingness to contribute implies a lack of demand for the irrigationdevelopment proposed, hence a lack of commitment, which invariably leads tounwillingness to accept O&M costs. Thus the International Fund for AgriculturalDevelopment’s (IFAD) irrigation and drainage investment strategy(18) requires thatusers should "contribute between 10-20 percent to the direct costs, preferably in kindor labour", and that they should "pay for the cost of irrigation equipment (cash/loans)".Experience suggests that this is not unreasonable, if the development proposed is anappropriate response to local demand for irrigation(19). On some public systems inMorocco, for example, up to 40 percent of the initial capital costs are recovered fromfarmers, and private irrigators throughout the world - including those on traditionalfarmer-managed irrigation schemes - are willing to pay up to 100 percent of the costof their schemes.

As mentioned, case studies have shown that requiring a capital cost contribution fromfarmers can result in significant overall savings if farmers themselves are involved insystem design. For example, in the IFAD/World Bank-funded Communal IrrigationDevelopment Project in the Philippines, actual costs were US$ 4,100 per hectarecompared with the originally estimated US$ 7,000, not only because of the farmers'contribution of labour and materials, but also because of farmer-led designchanges(20). Farmers will invariably seek the least cost solutions if they have to payeven a part of the costs.

Land tenure problems can, however, be a constraint to users' participation in capitalcosts. Where farmers are unable to gain legal or even customary title to their landthey are not normally willing to invest, unless they have confidence in long termusufructuary rights. Legislation may therefore be necessary in order that freeholdtenure or long leases can be granted - for which reason, among others, governmentcommitment to the proposed investment is essential.

6. WATER USERS' ASSOCIATIONS

Water Users' Associations and Transfer of O&M Responsibility

Fiscal crises have in many cases forced governments to devolve financial andmanagerial responsibility for existing irrigation systems to the users - in effect toprivatize them - and to ensure that users' groups on new schemes accept fullresponsibility for O&M from the outset.

The degree of responsibility which water users' associations (WUAs) can be given formanagement of a system depends on its scale. It is obviously unrealistic to expect aWUA to take over full responsibility for a system that serves hundreds of thousands ofhectares and which was previously operated (even if poorly) by a large irrigationagency. On the other hand there are other options available, such as users'representation, either directly or indirectly through apex WUA organizations, on theboard of a financially autonomous irrigation authority, or for WUAs or their apexorganizations to make a contract for the provision of irrigation services with the privatesector. Smaller schemes, including their main water supply infrastructure, might onthe other hand be managed entirely by a WUA. The objective in either case is greateruser commitment, which can lead to more efficient use of the resources by helping toovercome many of the problems that public irrigation systems face, such as

inequitable water distribution, corruption (see Box I-6), inefficiency and poor O&M.Attention is nowadays being focused on how to achieve this commitment, and to whatextent WUAs can be assisted to form and to manage their own affairs.

Box I-6. Corruption in Public Irrigation Schemes

Social research and experience have shown that irrigation projects in some developing countries provide irrigationengineers and other operational personnel with opportunities to raise significant amounts of illicit revenue from thedistribution of water and contracts, some of which may be redistributed to superior officers and politicians. Thus, inreturn for financial inducements, irrigation engineers will award contracts to high-priced or unqualified, incompetentcontractors, and "turn a blind eye" to substandard work that saves costs for the contractor and increases his profit.The results of such corruption are not usually immediately apparent, but substandard work obviously has a detrimentalimpact on subsequent maintenance requirements and costs, contributes to the vicious circle of poor maintenance-poorcost recovery-poor maintenance, and hence has an obvious bearing on sustainability. Financial inducements may alsobe used to bribe ditch-riders and other operational personnel to enhance water supplies to one farmer, or a group offarmers, at the expense of others, usually the poorest and least powerful, which often means tail-enders.

Corruption of this kind is considered to be one of the most important supply-side factors in the poor performance ofpublic irrigation. It has been very difficult to control in the past because of lack of financial discipline and accountabilitywithin irrigation bureaucracies.

Source: Wade R, The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India. Journal ofDevelopment Studies 18(3): 287-328.

Conditions for Sustainability of Water Users' Associations

Experience to date in the formation of WUAs and the transfer of irrigation O&Mresponsibilities to them has been uneven. The 1994 World Bank review of itsexperience in irrigation, referred to earlier, concluded that some WUAs have beenstillborn, some have died in infancy, and some have lived on but performed no usefulfunction. Byrnes(21) concluded that most WUAs in World Bank-assisted projects inPakistan remain relatively weak. Meinzen-Dick et al.,(22) reached a number ofconclusions regarding what leads to strong WUAs, the policy factors that can assist inthe development of such organizations, and the implications for constructiveinteraction between irrigation agencies and WUAs, particularly for the transfer ofirrigation responsibilities.

These were summarized as follows:

WUAs are stronger if they can build upon existing "social capital", or patterns ofcooperation. It is therefore advantageous to work with existing successfulorganizations wherever possible. Whether existing or new organizations areinvolved in irrigation management, the organizations should be adaptable - totheir local conditions and to changes over time. WUAs are also likely to bestronger if they are relatively homogenous in terms of members' background,and assets. However, heterogeneity is manageable (or even, in some instances,desirable), and defining membership to include all stakeholders - includingtenants and women - improves equity.

There is no single "optimal size" for WUAs. As size increases, transaction costsincrease and it becomes more difficult for members to monitor each other.However, larger WUAs can achieve economies of scale, and take on moretasks in irrigation management. Federation allows WUAs to expand and operateon a larger scale, while still maintaining manageable interactions amongmembers of base-level groups.

The structure and role of WUAs depend on their degree of commercialization.

Greater commercialization allows WUAs to replace direct labour or in-kindparticipation of members by hiring specialists, and allows them to expand insize. However, it also creates a much greater need for accountability of leadersand employees to the membership.

The range of WUAs shows great variability, but two broad models can beidentified. The first (or "Asian model") typically relies on direct participation of allmembers, with smaller base units. These are often socially based, multipurposeorganizations and are likely to be most appropriate in socially cohesive societieswith smaller land holdings, low market penetration and simpler irrigationtechnology. The second (or "American model") is a more specializedorganization based on hydraulic boundaries, and the organizations are focusedon irrigation rather than multiple activities. Such organizations are appropriate tosituations of larger land holdings, greater market development, and morecomplex technology.

In any type of WUA, the benefits to farmers should outweigh the cost ofmembership. The benefits of improved water supply, increased farm income,and conflict resolution obtained through WUAs should offset the substantialtime, materials, cash, and interpersonal transaction costs of being involved inthe WUA. This implies that irrigated agriculture should be profitable enough tocreate a demand for water, and WUAs should have a demonstrable effect inimproving farmers' control over water.

Organized farmers in WUAs can manage more advanced technology, andhigher levels of irrigation systems. Their expanded role in main systemmanagement can provide a greater degree of control over water supplies,which, where water is scarce, is a major incentive for farmers to participate inWUAs.

Where public agencies retain operation and maintenance responsibilities athigher levels of the system, they need to carry out these roles effectively so thatfarmers will feel it is worthwhile for WUAs to carry out their functions at lowerlevels. Developing a service orientation among agency staff and a collaborativeattitude between agencies and WUAs is essential for successful jointmanagement of irrigation systems and for management transfer programs.Strengthening agency accountability to users through public information ofirrigation plans and programmes and providing financial autonomy for irrigationagencies to rely on user fees for their budgets are strong incentives for theagency to foster WUAs.

A supportive policy and legal environment is crucial to the sustainability ofWUAs. State policies of administrative and financial decentralization haveprovided the impetus for many management transfer programmes whichdiminish the role of the state and expand the role of WUAs. A facilitating legalframework is critical to give WUAs the ability to deal effectively with externalgroups, operate bank accounts and undertake other activities. However, thelegal framework should be flexible enough to allow members to adapt theirorganizations to local circumstances. It should also balance rights withresponsibilities for WUAs in order to ensure that members have sufficientincentive to participate. Clear assignment of property rights over water and overthe physical infrastructure of irrigation systems to WUAs can be a potent tool forstrengthening the organizations, and should be given greater attention,particularly in programs which aim to transfer responsibilities and costs ofirrigation system management from the state to users.

There is a changed but essential continuing role for the state in ensuring long-run sustainability of WUAs. Particularly important roles for the state areestablishing and adjudicating water rights, monitoring and regulatingexternalities and third party effects of irrigation, maintaining a supportive legal

framework, providing technical and organizational training and support toWUAs, and occasionally providing design, construction, or financial support formajor rehabilitation.

However, turning over management of public irrigation schemes is not merely amatter of consultation and forming WUAs, with government continuing to act as theprime mover. Power struggles, collusion and corruption may not always be eliminatedby user participation and the creation of WUAs. Not too much should be expectedfrom them, especially in the short term. Their creation requires a re-orientation ofirrigation bureaucracies towards providing a service and creating an environment thatfacilitates the formation, by the users themselves, of sustainable WUAs. Sound socialengineering is as necessary as good technical engineering. The ease with whichsustainable WUAs will form, and successful transfer of responsibilities will then takeplace, will vary according to different physical, social and financial circumstances.There is no magic solution, no one set of rules can be applied, and considerable timeand resources will have to be invested in learning how best to approach the processin each case. Investment project designs which provide flexibility and a progressive orpilot-led approach to transfer are more likely to lead to eventual success(23).

7. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS

Adverse social and environmental impacts of irrigation investments have been manyand varied. They include health impacts (malaria and schistosomiasis), andwaterlogging and induced salinization(24). Displacement of people from dam sites withinadequate consultation and compensation has also been a major source ofproblems. Land acquisition and resettlement requirements have often caused delaysto implementation or even cancellation of loan agreements. Although some wouldargue that on the whole the social and environmental disbenefits of irrigation are faroutweighed by the benefits, there are a number of irrigation projects around the worldthat possibly would not have been built had the full negative effects been foreseen,costed and entered into a cost benefit analysis.

Box I-7. Some Social and Environmental Issues in World Bank-Financed Irrigation Project Planning

The 1994 World Bank review of its irrigation experience commented as follows on the coverage of gender issues in itssector work:

"Irrigation affects men and women differently. Even if they have equal roles in agriculture, which theyusually do not, women almost always have primary responsibility for such household tasks as foodpreparation, washing and providing drinking water. However, except for the most recent studies onMexico and India, none of those (sector reports) analyzed was found to have addressed the subject."

and on organization and management:

"Coverage of management and organization was broad but generally superficial. It focused onmanagement and organization of government institutions, occasionally on their relations with irrigators'organizations, and never on the irrigators' organizations themselves."

and on broader environmental issues:

"Coverage of special areas of environmental impact has been poor and is still quite weak. This is thecase for drainage, an important source of environmental troubles in numerous countries, and especiallyso for aquifer management, and the various dimensions of catchment management: deforestation,overgrazing, inappropriate farming, soil degradation, erosion, and silting."

Source: Report No 13676: A Review of World Bank Experience in Irrigation. Operations Evaluation Department, WorldBank, Washington DC (1994).

Despite the years of experience and the lessons learned - and despite the existenceof clear operational guidelines for dealing with social and environmental issues - governments, financing institutions, project planners and implementers have in thepast often paid only lip service to the need for systematic problem identification,assessment and mitigation. In the past one of the reasons for this was that promotersand implementers of irrigation projects found that addressing such issues was aninconvenience, as well as a likely source of project delays or cancellations. And eventhough environmental legislation existed, environmental agencies generally did nothave the teeth to implement regulations; if planners wished to strengthen theseagencies in parallel with the formulation of irrigation investment proposals, it wasalready too late.

The approaches and attitudes of governments and financial institutions have changedmore recently. The consensus now is that social and environmental impactassessment is essential and as important as economic analysis in influencing thedesign of projects.

8. CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY

Common sense dictates that the choice of technology for irrigation should be basedon its appropriateness for the cropping patterns intended and should also considercost-effectiveness. Irrigation engineers have in the past tended to overlook anadditional need: for the technology also to be matched to the level of sophistication oroperational capacity of the users. It has become increasingly obvious that the designprocess must start from a consideration of how the users will operate the system; thisshould then be designed to provide the optimum combination of efficiency in wateruse and cost effective operation and maintenance. Equally important, the designermust consider how the user will cultivate his land, and the implications that this mayhave for scheme layout. Thus it may be that the design which involves the lowestinvestment cost per hectare may not be the most cost effective solution if it alsoinvolves large numbers of staff for its operation, or if, because of operational difficulty,it cannot be utilized to capacity. On the other hand, a design to improve water useefficiency on a traditional irrigation system by the introduction of "modern" watercontrol structures may not result in overall efficiency gains if the users reject themodern controls in favour of their traditional proportional dividers.

The choice of technology, whether for new development or rehabilitation of existingschemes, has been the subject of much debate over the years. While most irrigationengineers would now agree that the starting point for design must be ease ofoperation, they still tend to polarize into two camps. One sees the problem largely asovercoming the hydraulic instability of extensively-gated manually operated systems;it sees the solution as the modernization of these systems, adding automaticdownstream control structures and other feedback mechanisms designed to achievehydraulic stability. The other accepts the reality of farmer damage in wet seasondrought and so favours designs based on cruder and more robust structures; thepossibility of just-on-time, demand-based, delivery of water to crops is foregone, inthe hope of preserving the civil works from interference(25).

Discussion of this issue is well covered elsewhere(26) and need not be continued hereexcept to note the conclusion of the World Bank in its 1994 review of its experience inirrigation, that there is inconclusive evidence to favour one camp or the other. Bothwould agree on the need to eliminate anarchy and on the importance of flexibility ofoperation.

9. THE DRAINAGE DILEMMA

The world is faced with a huge backlog in drainage requirements. Over the lastquarter of a century water usage for irrigation has more or less doubled without acomparable increase in drainage capacity. In the longer run poor drainage is one ofthe most significant causes of reduced yields and of irrigated land going out ofproduction, as shown, for instance, by the extent of saline and waterlogged areas inPakistan. The stage has now been reached when it is necessary to correct thedrainage omissions of the past. At the same time there is a need to improve wateruse efficiency to reduce the drainage demands of the future.

It is necessary however to consider why, even where provision for drainage has beenmade in the past, it has often survived for only the first few years of a project's life. Inmost cases of poor scheme maintenance it is the drains that are allowed todeteriorate first. One of the main reasons is that within a year or two of constructiontertiary drains are often cultivated over by the irrigators who are theoreticallyresponsible for them. Secondary drains, which are usually the responsibility of theirrigation agency, are often also partially filled in by farmers to provide crossings or topond water for other purposes. The main drains are therefore quickly renderedredundant.

To improve the sustainability of drainage systems, channels should be limited to thosewhich are essential; but these should be adequately maintained and defended againstencroachment. Provision of crossings, each with adequate culvert capacity, isessential or obstruction by informal cultivator-constructed crossings will inevitablyresult(27). The challenge is to persuade farmers to accept the importance of drainageand to take responsibility for its maintenance. This further reinforces the need topromote participation and ownership by the users.

10. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PLANNING PROCESS

To summarize, there is growing recognition that:

Water is a scarce and valuable finite resource with many competing demandsfor its use. Where such competing demands exist, charges for irrigation useshould at least reflect its scarcity value. International funding is unlikely to bemade available for irrigation if the use of water for this purpose prejudices othermore profitable uses.

There are more important issues in irrigation than that of scale - for example thedegree of users' demand and commitment to subsequent O&M. The issue ofscale should be approached with an open mind, in each case considering thecircumstances of the country and project opportunities concerned.

Although world food supply will depend even more on irrigation in the nextcentury than it has in the past, the per hectare capital costs of typical newirrigation development may be difficult to justify by the returns from basic foodcrops alone. Unless low cost solutions can be found, or demand forces the priceof basic food crops up, irrigation investment to achieve incremental foodproduction (other than rice) may be limited to upgrading existing formal andtraditional irrigation systems.

Apart from the obvious technical and financial conditions, the key condition forsustainable development impact from an irrigation investment project is itsimplementability. This requires that the institutional demands of the project arematched to local institutional capacity, and that stakeholders are genuinelycommitted to the project through participation and local ownership. Theconventional project identification/preparation approach of the past, which hasleft little room to participative approaches to project design, has militatedagainst these requirements being met.

Economic efficiency and fiscal sustainability demand that the O&M costs and atleast a part of the capital costs of irrigation should be recovered from the users.However, in practice this is rarely achieved. Fiscal crises in many developingcountries are now forcing governments to devolve responsibility for existingschemes to the users or private companies, and to ensure that users of newschemes accept responsibility for O&M from the outset. This often requiresinstitutional reorientation of irrigation bureaucracies, the formation of users'groups or WUAs, and an even greater need for participation and localownership.

Adverse social and environmental impacts are significant contributors to projectfailures. Despite past mistakes, governments, financing institutions, plannersand implementers all too often continue to pay only lip service to the need forimpact assessment and to internalizing the findings in project design. Theconsensus now is that social and environmental impact assessment is asessential and important a tool as economic analysis in planning successfulprojects and programmes.

Drainage should be given much more prominence than in the past, in bothstrategy formulation and the planning of individual projects.

The implications of these lessons for the planning process are that:

Project planning needs to center more on the users, and less on therequirements of the lender, and to emphasize participation and capacity-buildingfeatures. Whilst project planning has always been a government responsibility,there needs to be even greater insistence that international project planningteams, such as those provided by the Investment Centre, facilitate and assist inthe planning process by complementing and supporting local preparationgroups, rather than assume direct responsibility for the tasks involved.Increasingly, therefore, external technical support should involve providinginputs and support to a process that is driven nationally and involvescontributions from many, diverse local stakeholders.

Given this diversity of contributors, the planning process will continue to evolveaway from conventional identification and preparation to one that is lesscompartmentalized. Analysis and reporting are more likely to build up a dossierof reports, working papers and other documentation, that may not necessarilybe neatly a wrapped and packaged document that can be presented as an"identification" or "preparation" report.

Instead of producing comprehensive stand-alone preparation reports,international project planning teams will be required to produce working papersthat can be used to support a project proposal or appraisal, or they may simplybe required to review such papers produced by national preparation groups.

Due to the importance now attached to social and environmental impacts theevaluation of these must be given as much prominence as economic evaluationin influencing project design.

In some cases the planning process may become as important an end as theultimate project plan, since it will be the main means of building localcommitment and capacity. When successfully executed, this approach shouldbe exploited to reduce the time spent in bringing about readiness forimplementation, and to ensure smooth start-up, rapid implementation andultimately sustainable development impact from investments.

Given the importance now paid to increasing implementation capacity,multilateral lending for irrigation and drainage is likely to continue to favoursectoral loans for this purpose, most often linked to upgrading of schemes and

facilitating greater involvement of irrigators themselves, NGOs and the privatesector in project implementation. Long-term technical assistance will be financedonly as a last resort, with specialized short-term inputs that will focus particularlyon institutional, environmental, social or organizational issues.

Further Reading

[Editor’s Note: This publication is planned for revision in the near future. For anupdate on the World Bank’s current perspective on some of the issues raised above,the Investment Centre suggests readers look at these recent references:

Ashok Subramanian, N. Vijay Jagannathan and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, "UserOrganizations for Sustainable Water Services", World Bank Technical PaperNo. 354, April 1997.

Salman M. A. Salman, "The Legal Framework for Water Users’ Associations, AComparative Study", World Bank Technical Paper No. 360, March 1997(English and Russian versions).

Ariel Dinar and Ashok Subramanian (Editors), "Water Pricing Experiences, AnInternational Perspective", World Bank Technical Paper No. 386, October 1997.

Salman M. A. Salman and Lawrence Boisson de Chazournes (Editors),"International Watercourses, Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict,Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar", World Bank Technical Paper No. 414,July 1998.]

Footnotes

1. The background to this is described, for example, in the World Bank Policy Paper WaterResources Management, World Bank, Washington DC (1993) and in Land and WaterBulletin 3 Water Sector Policy Review and Strategy Formulation: A General Framework(prepared jointly by the World Bank, UNDP and FAO), FAO, Rome (1995).

2. See for example: Land and Water Bulletin 3, Water Sector Policy Review and StrategyFormulation: A General Framework (prepared jointly by the World Bank, UNDP and FAO),FAO, Rome (1995); Water Report 6 Methodology for Water Policy Review and Reform(Proceedings of the Expert Consultation on Water Policy and Reform - Rome, January1995), FAO, Rome (1995); Irrigation and Drainage Paper 52 Reforming Water ResourcesPolicy: A Guide to Methods, Processes and Practices, FAO, Rome (1995).

3. Rice schemes nevertheless require adequate surface drainage, as total inundation of thecrop leads to significant yield losses.

4. e.g. drip or micro-jet.

5. Report No 13676: A Review of World Bank Experience in Irrigation. Operations andEvaluation Department, World Bank, Washington DC (1994).

6. The term stakeholders includes all individuals who may be positively or adversely affectedby the project: government planning agencies (planning units, senior decision-makers,Ministers); government implementing and operating agencies (senior and middle levelmanagement of line ministries) who may be subsequently responsible for projectimplementation, operation and management; community-based organisations, includingwater users' associations (WUAs) or other farmers' organisations; individual farmers; publicinterest groups; non-governmental organisations; (NGOs) and private sector companies;financing institutions; and international project planning teams such as those provided bythe Investment Centre.

7. See Soils Bulletin 57: Soil and Water Conservation in Semi Arid Areas, Land and Water

Division, FAO, Rome (1987); Investment Centre Technical Paper 10: AgriculturalInvestment to Promote Improved Capture and Use of Rainfall in Dryland Farming, FAO,Rome (1995); also Technical Paper 221: Conserving Soil Moisture and Fertility in theWarm Seasonally Dry Tropics, World Bank, Washington DC (1993).

8. Paradoxically perhaps, the expansion of irrigation over the last 50 years has been a majorfactor in the decline in prices, since it has caused relatively strong growth in supply of riceand wheat compared with growth in demand.

9. Investment Centre Technical Paper 5, Irrigation in Africa South of the Sahara, FAO, Rome(1986).

10. Doubts over the use of World Bank price forecasts for food and fibre crops have oftenbeen expressed. However, in the absence of any better alternatives, the analyst can do nomore than attempt best guesses based on the Bank's forecasts, or explore possible futuredifferences between forecast and actual prices through sensitivity analysis.

11. There are exceptions to this rule: one such system has been satisfactorily demonstrated forthe irrigation of cassava in some Sahelian countries.

12. This is the basis of genuine demand-driven development. Soliciting or orchestratingrequests from farmers for government investments in irrigation is not - even if theprospective users promise or agree to make a contribution at some later date. Oftenfarmers are driven by other motives in these circumstances, such as temporary wageemployment on scheme construction, and they later lose interest in the irrigation scheme.

13. For example, the National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines. See An Evaluation ofNIA's Participatory Communal Programme, Public Intervention in Farmer-ManagedIrrigation Systems, IIMI, Colombo (1987).

14. e.g. village or district councils.

15. e.g. water users' associations.

16. Bell, Clive, Peter Hazell and Roger Slade, Project Evaluation in Regional Perspective.Johns Hopkins University Press (1982).

17. See Vollrath T.L., The Role of Agriculture and its Prerequisites in Economic Development:A Vision for Foreign Development Assistance. In: Food Policy 1994 19 (5) 469-478.

18. Drawn from Irrigation and Drainage Cluster - Module: The Role of Water User’sAssociations, IFAD, Rome (Draft 20/10/94).

19. Evaluation of the Special Programme for African Countries Affected by Drought andDesertification: Thematic Study on Small-Scale Irrigation and Water Control Activities (MainReport No. 98/073 IFAD-SSA), IFAD 1998

20. From An Evaluation of NIA’s Participatory Communal Programme : Public Intervention inFarmer-Managed Irrigation Irrigation Systems, IIMI, Colombo (1987). Other experiencesfrom different countries are summarised in Robert Yoder and Juanita Thurston (eds),Design Issues in Farmer-Managed Irrigation Systems, IIMI, Colombo (1990).

21. Kerry J Byrnes, World Bank Technical Paper Number 173, Water Users’Associations inWorld Bank-Assisted Irrigation Projects in Pakistan, World Bank, Washington DC, 1992.

22. Meinzen-Dick R. et al., Sustainable Water User Associations: Lessons from a LiteratureReview. Paper prepared for World Bank Water Resources Seminar, 1994.

23. Practitioners are referred to Orstrom, E., Crafting Institutions - Self-Governing IrrigationSystems, ICS Press, San Francisco, California (1992) which covers some practicalplanning principles which can be applied in most cases. Also Yoder, R., Locally ManagedIrrigation Systems - Essential Tasks for Assistance, Management Transfer and TurnoverProgrammes, IIMI, Colombo, Sri Lanka (1994).

24. According to the 1990 FAO report An International Action Programme for Water andSustainable Agricultural Development: A Strategy for the Implementation of the Mar delPlata Action Plan of the 1990s, 20 to 30 million hectares (or about 10 percent of theworld's irrigation) is severely affected by salinity and an additional 60-80 million hectares

are affected to some extent.

25. Burns R., Irrigated Rice Culture in Monsoon Asia: The Search for an Effective WaterControl Technology, World Development XXI, (May 1993), pp771-789.

26. e.g. in World Bank Technical Paper 246, Modern Water Control in Irrigation(1994) byPlusqullec et al., World Bank Technical Paper 256, Design and Operation of SmallholderIrrigation in South Asia (1995) by Donald Campbell, and numerous IIMI publications.

27. Campbell D., Design and Operation of Smallholder Irrigation in South Asia, World BankTechnical Paper 256, World Bank, Washington DC (1995).