3 overall considerations

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COURSEFACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING

OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS

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FACILITIES LAYOUT TRAINING COURSE

AGENDA

• Overall layout

• What is the overall Objective

• What is important to know/establish

• Fire and Explosion – Key parameters

• Hazard Gradient

• API 14 J key requirements

• Inherently Safer Design

• Examples of Design

• Future expansions

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OVERALL LAYOUT

What are we trying to achieve ?

Sa f e a n d O p e r a b l e D e s i g n

General Sound Principle in Facility Layout:

The principle of inherent safety shall be applied to both the field

and facility layout to minimise the likelihood of major initiating

events and the escalation of any subsequent consequences

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OVERALL LAYOUT

ISO 13702 – Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions

on Offshore Production Installations

OBJECTIVES

Principal Objective of Standard, in order of priority:

• Safety of personnel

• Protection of Environment

• Protection of Assets;

• Minimization of financial consequences of fires and explosions

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WHAT DO WE NEED TO KNOW

What are the hazards and risk

levels

• Complexity

• Amount and type of equipment

What is the exposure to

personnel

Future requirements

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WHAT DO WE NEED TO KNOW

1. Purpose andrequired equipment

2. Offloading / Tie-in

3. Local conditions

Unmanned versusManned

Pressures andInventories

Number and types of

equipment

FSO / SAL / SPM orPipeline

Wind & Current

Accommodation

Helideck

Wellheads

Risers

Minimize risk of gas towardsignition sources(accommodation etc)

Optimize natural ventilation

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INHERENTLY SAFER – RISK ASSESSMENT

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Hazards Causes Event Consequence

Wells Poor

design,

corrosion,

errosion,

fail

to

maintain

reservoir

barriers

Blowout Major

fire

or

environmental

damage

Construction Contractor

commitment

to

safety

at

site

Site

accident delays,

reputation

damage

Hydrocarbon

Processing

Corrosion,

erosion,

long

term

deterioration

Hydrocarbon

release Fire,

explosion,

gas

cloud

or

major

environmental

damage

Pipeline Corrosion, erosion, long term

deterioration,

sabotage

Pipeline failure Major fire, gas cloud or major

environmental

damage

High Technology

structures

Weather, geological activity,

miscalculation

due

to

novelty

Dropped objects Possible escallation to multiple casualties

or

major

environmental

damage

Heavy lifts Design of cranage or slinging Collapse, loss of

stability

Multiple casualties with fire, explosion or

environmental

damageTransport

of

goods Human

error Ship

collision Possible

escallation

to

multiple

casualties

or major environmental damage

Transport

of

people Human

error

or

machanical

failure Helicopter

accident Multiple

casualties

Human

error,

sabotage

Mal

operation,

bad

maintenance,

fail

to

control

change,

wilful

damage

Hydrocarbon

release Fire,

explosion,

gas

cloud

or

environmental

damage

Decommisioning Not thought through at original design Collapse Multiple casualties

EVENT


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JET FIRE

Rule of thumb

Flame size: Fl=18.5∙Q0.41

Fl: flame length (m)Q: release rate (kg/s)

Ignited gasblowout in Algeria

Z P AC Q D 001

1

0 12

RT M Z where

Pressure and release area are the driving force

Flame length in m

Pressure Hole size mm

barg 1 8 37.5

1 0.3 1.8 7.1

15 0.7 4.7 18.3

45 1.2 7.6 29.3

60 1.4 8.7 33.4

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EXPLOSION

In order for a vapour cloud explosion to occur in a hydrocarbon facility, four

conditions have to be present:

1. A significant release of flammable material2. Flammable material shall be sufficiently mixed with the

surrounding air

3. Ignition source

4. Some confinement, congestion or turbulence in the

released area

Congestion: Pipework, cable trays, etc.

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EXPLOSION - BUNCEFIELDDecember 11, 2005 a number of explosions occurred at BuncefieldOil Storage Depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire.

At least one of the initial explosions was of massive proportions andthere was a large fire, which engulfed a high proportion of the site.

The fire burned for several days, destroying most of the site and

emitting large clouds of black smoke into the atmosphere.

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EXPLOSION - BUNCEFIELD

Significant damage occurred to both commercial andresidential properties in the vicinity and a large area around

the site was evacuated on emergency service advice.

Over 40 people were injured; fortunately there were nofatalities.

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Significant damage occurred to both commercial andresidential properties in the vicinity and a large area around

the site was evacuated on emergency service advice.

Over 40 people were injured; fortunately there were nofatalities.

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HAZARD GRADIENT

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HAZARD GRADIENT

RiskPressure

Inventory

Leak freq.

Distance

Prevailing Wind Direction

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HAZARD GRADIENT

Risk

Pressure

Inventory

Distance

Accommodation

Utility

Risers

WellheadCompression

Separation

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HAZARD GRADIENT

Water injection

Accommodation

Power turbines

Oil Separation

Chemical injection

Gascompression

Fuel gasGlycol contactor

Utility

Turret

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HAZARD GRADIENT

Water injection

Accommodation

Power turbines

Oil Separation

Chemicalinjection

Gascompression

Fuel gasGlycol contactor

Utility Turret

A c c o m m o d a t i o n

Pipe rack

Turret

SeparationLP CompHP Comp

Benefits• Segregate Acc from HPsources.

• Avoid having to pass HPsources during escape.

• Reduce length of highpressure piping.

• Segregate Acc and highrelease freq. equip/system(Compression).

A c c o m m o d a t i o

n

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HAZARD GRADIENT

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HAZARD GRADIENT

More details will follow23


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Take account of prevailing wind; Gas &

Smoke, oil on sea

Isolated from fuel sources – greatest

extend possible - Considered an Ignition

Source (Cat.)

Fire wall or adequate spacing

Minimize windows facing production

HVAC with F&G

Provide quick and easy escape – at least

two independent routes

Accommodation

Protected from

External Fires,

Explosion and Noise


API 14 J KEY REQUIREMENTS

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Provide protection for personnel for anamount of time consistent with theplatform evacuation philosophy.

Offshore survival gear

Lifeboats, rafts or capsules for allpersonnel

At least two independent routes to the

sea

Muster Area

Commonly designated temporaryMustering areas are the living

quarters, control room, or lifeboatstation areas



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Lifeboats

Optimum location for escape

100% capacity incl. Visitors*

* Some operators: 100% plus oneadditional boat

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Source of fuel

Protected against ignition sources

Not to be placed directly above or belowignition sources

Liquid like to run downwardsGas likely to rise upwards

Can be located next to wellheads

To be protected against dropped objects

Unfired Process Area



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Source of ignition

Remote or protected from area that issource of fuel – including verticalseparation

Fired Process Area



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Source of ignition

Remotely located or otherwise protectedfrom:

WellheadsUnfired EquipmentRisers and pipelines

If no fuel is present it is similar to LQand be located in proximity

Combustion engine driven machineryhave both ignition source as well as fuel.To be separated from:

WellheadsRisersHydrocarbon storage

LQ

Machinery area



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Source of ignition

Emits radiation and permissible distanceshall be accessed

Potential for burning rainPlatformSupport Vessels

Source of fuel

Radiation as for flare if ignited

Flare & Vent



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API 521 Requirements will follow32


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Accessible for drill rig

Separated and protected from:

• Sources of ignition

• Large inventories of Hydrocarbon

• Large inventories of MeOH

• Dropped Objects

• Risers and Pipelines

• Maximum separation toAccommodation

Wellhead areas



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Separated from ignition sources

Protected from ship impact

Protected from dropped objects

Not be placed under living quarters*

Riser ESDV to be located as close aspossible to incoming point of platform

Protect Riser ESDV**

Prevent liquid accumulation under ornear riser ESDV

*) Unless special precautions have been**) Consider fire protection

Riser & Pipelines



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Separated from ignition sources

Oriented / Facing outbound

Separated from highly travelledpersonnel routes

Separated from material handling areasLauncher & Receivers



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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN

What do we mean by Inherently Safer Design

Inherently Safer Design can be translated into;

“What you do not have can not harm you”

as well as

“Personnel that are not exposed does not get harmed”

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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN PRINCIPLES

• Fewer hazards

• Fewer causes

• Reduced severity

• Fewer / reduced consequences

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IP & UKOOA – Guidance for safer design

• Simplify installations

• Reduce equipment levels, including safety equipment

• Improve material choices and strength levels

• Decrease maintenance, repair and inspection for the lifetime of

the installation

Projects should aim to minimise the exposure of personnel tohazards by adopting inherently safer designs.

Modification projects should aim to offset any increase in riskson existing installations by seeking reduction in other areas.

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BP Guidance on Practice for Concept Selection for inherently safer ..

Graham Dalzell

Historically, projects may have been driven by BUmanagement and economic

teams to minimised capital expenditures (Capex) regardless ofthe detrimental effects on operational expenditures (Opex),

personnel safety, and environmental consequences

Risk equal OPEX^2Nothing is Safety Critical

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Sound principles in Facility Layout:

• Provide space around individual items or groups of equipment to

enable safe operation, inspection and maintenance;

• Orientate equipment to minimise the potential for escalation in

case of a release e.g. Pig trap end enclosures orientated awayfrom process equipment.

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Test separatorGas Slug catcher

Wet Gas Receiver Crude Oil Receiver

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Sound Principles in Facility Layout

• Provide a means for removal of equipment and transportation to

laydown area/warehouse, and, if offshore, to/from facility tosupport vessel;

• Provide separation and segregation of hazards in the layoutdesign, thereby reducing the possibility of escalation during an

accidental event;

• Locate identified ignition sources with due consideration of theeffects of wind for all credible gas release scenarios, in order to

prevent immediate or delayed ignition;

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• Design plant layouts to provide natural ventilation to assist with

gas dispersion in the event of a release, or where found not to beadequate provide mechanical ventilation1;

• Design to avoid congestion and confinement so limiting explosiveoverpressure;

• Provide containment for liquid spills and releases;

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• Provide sufficient separation between areas containing

hydrocarbons and safe areas by separation distance for onshoreplants, Floating Production, Storage and Offloading System

(FPSOs) and bridge-linked platforms, and/or fire and blastbarriers for production platforms.

• Accommodations offshore shall be located on separate platformsat a safe distance from wells, hydrocarbon carrying risers andprocess equipment. Where this is not feasible (e.g. due to water

depth), mitigation measures shall be provided in the design such

as fire and blast walls and the proposed design shall be

demonstrated to have as a minimum a tolerable level of risk;

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• Provide escape routes with redundancy and protection (as

needed) to enable all personnel to escape to a safe locationduring an incident;

• Hydrocarbon containing risers shall be preferably located insidethe jacket structure or if not possible shall be provided with

suitable protection against boat impact.

• All jacket structures shall be provided with structural members toavoid the possibility for a vessel to pass beneath the jacket

structure

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C S O G CO S


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UKOOA

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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGNDominant release sites:• Pipe work

• Valves

•

Instruments≈ 72%

Dead legs

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Dual fuel turbines and recip.compressors highest ranking asindicated by system leaks.

Failure in equipment such as:

o Instruments

o Valves

o Flanges

o Piping

are not shown by figure (due tolow individual frequency) but areimportant due to the highnumbers of these.

Leak frequency for the 15 highest ranking equipment types (leaks/system year)

HSR 2002

Power from shore ?53



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Can we use fewer wells

Horizontal multizone wells

Less rotating equipment

Minimize number of pumps and compressors – Do we need spares ?

Less Processing

Export multiphase to shore

Export Wet gas

Export at lower pressure

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Fired heater

Hot work during production

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DA Wellhead

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HA Location59



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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGNA short bridge betweenGorm B and Gorm F wasinitially proposed in the

design of Gorm F toavoid the need for acrane on Gorm F.

Later in the design itwas decided to includethe crane anyway butthe bridge was notextended.Short bridge on Gorm in

the order of 5 - 10

meters. Placing Gorm E next toaccommodation isquestionable.

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INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGNLocation of turbine air intakes and exhaust piping shall beconsidered carefully. A gas cloud reaching a turbine has a veryhigh probability of ignition.

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PROVISION FOR FUTURE EXPANSION• Additional wells (extra row)

• Additional process or WI module

• Additional produced water handling / treatment facilities

• Other facilities, increased environmental requirements

• Additional risers / in- & outgoing pipelines

• Structure prepared for future bridge connection(s)

• Additional accommodation – accommodation module prepared for

extension

• Prepare at early stage in design an “Expansion Strategy” andinclude provisions

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THANK YOU


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3 overall considerations

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