EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 99289-90. January 13, 1992.]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO M.VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, SpecialProsecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OFMANILA, respondents.

Mariano P. Defensor for petitioner.

Nestor P. Ifurong for movant-intervenor.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents Vasquez and de la Llana.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR INJUNCTION; WHEN AVAILABLE.— It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie torestrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires thatcriminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection ofsociety, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strongarm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequateprotection to constitutional rights.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO COMPLAINTS FILED BY THESPECIAL PROSECUTOR DULY AUTHORIZED BY THE OMBUDSMAN AS IN THE CASEAT BAR. — The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman hadauthorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to file aninformation as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible official is vestedwith discretion and is endowed with the competence to determine whether thecomplaint filed is sufficient in form and substance to merit such referral. TheOmbudsman may himself dismiss the complaint in the first instance if in hisjudgment the acts or omissions complained of are not illegal, unjust, improper orsufficient. The Special Prosecutor, in case of referral of the complaint, may alsodismiss the same on proper grounds after the requisite investigative andadjudicatory proceedings.

3. ID.; ID.; ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE OMBUDSMAN NOT SUFFICIENTLYPROVED. — We have carefully gone over the records of the case and, contrary to thepretensions of petitioner, there is nothing to show that the informations in questionwere filed with the vindictive intention to oppress, harass and discriminate againsther or to violate her constitutional rights. It is significant that petitioner failed toimpute, much less prove, any ill-motive on the part of herein public respondents.Respondent Ombudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why,he "has no purpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's

aspirations for the highest position in the land." This is made no more apparent thanin the various memoranda approved by respondent Ombudsman establishing thatthe admitted facts of record are sufficient to engender a well founded belief thateach of the crimes charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is therequisite quantum of evidence at this posture of each of said case.

4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DEFENSES PUT UP BY PETITIONER SHOULD BERAISED AND SUBSTANTIATED DURING TRIAL IN THE COURT BELOW. — Petitionersubmits that she cannot be held liable as charged and raises the following defenses:that the donations received were not for personal use but were distributed to theCID employees in a raffle held during the CID Christmas party; that the legalizationof aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 was in accordancewith the authority vested in her by Executive Order No. 324 and was intended toassure family unity; and that the defamatory words were made against Maria Tatoyonly in self-defense. We are not persuaded that we should, in the present recourse,pass upon these asseverations of petitioner which we note have previously beenraised during the preliminary investigation. She will, of course, have all theopportunity to ventilate and substantiate the same in the proceedings before and/orduring the trial of these cases in the lower courts which would be the proper stagesand fora for the adjudication thereof.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; DISMISSAL OF INSTANT PETITION NOT REFLECTIVE OFCRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PETITIONER; ACTS CHARGED, A MATTER OFADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION. — The dismissal of this Petition in no wayreflects on the criminal liability of petitioner. Its immediate effect is only that thecases against her may now proceed but without prejudice to procedural remediesthat are open to her, like a Motion to Quash, and the defenses that she may raise,among them being, in at least two of the three cases, that the acts charged, as amatter of law, do not constitute an offense but are, as stated in Justice Feliciano'sdissent, a matter of administrative interpretation or policy for which a public officialshould not be subjected to civil or criminal liability.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALIEN LEGALIZATION ACT OF 1991; DECISION OFCOMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION; APPEALABLE TO THEPRESIDENT. — In a pending bill in Congress (H. No. 30878), or the "AlienLegalization Act of 1991," the stay in the country of aliens who entered thePhilippines prior to 2 February 1987 may be legalized upon their application (Sec.2), which could mean any time prior thereto or even after January 1, 1984. TheCommissioner is likewise given the authority to determine who among the alien-applicants may be qualified to be permanent residents, any adverse decision madebeing appealable only to the Office of the President (Sec. 7).

3. ID.; ID.; INHERENT FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION ANDDEPORTATION; INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY THE COMMISSIONER GENERALLYENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT. — Inherent in the Commissioner'sfunction is the exercise of judgment and discretion in the application of the laws

that said official has been authorized to administer and enforce. The interpretationgiven by that Office, as with all other administrative bodies, is, as a general rule,entitled to great weight and respect.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

1. STATUTES; ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS ARE GENERALLY ENTITLEDTO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT FROM COURTS; PUBLIC OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLEFOR INCORRECT INTERPRETATION, NOT HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE. — It is a ruletoo firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneousinterpretations of a statute or implementing regulation by the executive oradministrative officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a statuteor regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Courtitself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by suchadministrative officers. But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimatelyfound to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible forsuch interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally,whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as firmly settled that toimpose liability upon the public officer who has so acted, something far graver thanerror of law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personalintentions, personal malice or bad faith. As noted above, no such allegations weremade during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; ENTITLED TO AN EARLYRESOLUTION OF LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED BEFORE THE COURTS OF LAW;REASONS. — Whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal innature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks the Court to rule in thisPetition. There is nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on thislegal issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional essential facts apartfrom those already admitted by petitioner. A public officer is entitled to have legalquestions like that before this Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity,that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation,humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legalcharacterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake. The actscharged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts whichpetitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very seriousconsequences would follow for the administration of law and government rules andregulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal information here would appearto be that public officers interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions attheir own peril and at the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence ofany corrupt intent to profit personally by any such interpretation and application.

3. ID.; ID.; ACTS CHARGED DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF P.D. NO. 46. —The operative portion of P.D. No. 46, dated 10 November 1972, reads as follows:"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, byvirtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of allthe Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 datedSeptember 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do

hereby make it punishable for any public official or employee, whether of thenational or local governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for privatepersons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other valuable thing on anyoccasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing isgiven by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is forpast favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or bettertreatment in the future from the public official or employee concerned in thedischarge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing ofparties or entertainments in honor of the official or employee or his immediaterelatives. . . . A serious legal question exists: whether or not the acts of petitioner, asadmitted by her during the course of the preliminary investigation, fall within thescope of P.D. No. 46. It is not disputed that the solicitation had been made for thepurpose stated in the solicitation letter itself — the 1988 Christmas party of the CIDofficers and employees. It is also not disputed that all the donations in cash or inkind had been utilized for and in connection with such Christmas party, and that theonly personal benefit received by petitioner and her two (2) co-accused consisted ofone Christmas food basket each, along with more than 700 other officers andemployees of the CID. Petitioner hardly invented the employees' Christmas party, apractice widely observed in both the public and the private sectors. Petitioner'sspecial contribution consisted of making sure that the solicitation, receipt anddistribution of gifts were all done in an organized and public manner, in full view ofall the officers and employees of the CID and of the general public, doubtless toemphasize for whose benefit such solicitation had been conducted, to minimizeprivate or secret solicitation by individual CID officers or employees, and to precludeany charge of secret personal benefit on her part and of those who signed thesolicitation letters. What is at stake here, however, is the legal question of whetheror not the acts which petitioner has admitted constitute a criminal offense underP.D. No. 46 which, is ripe for determination by this Court. Those acts do not fallwithin the scope of P.D. No. 46 as it is presently written. It may well be that, as amatter of administrative policy, all solicitation including solicitation for the benefitof the officers and employees of a particular agency of government should beprohibited and perhaps criminalized. That, however, is something for the legislativeauthority to consider and act upon, not the courts and certainly not in a criminalcase.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 324; DISREGARD THEREOF DOES NOTGIVE RISE TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY; ACTS COMPLAINED OF CONSTITUTED OFFICIALACTS OF ACCUSED DONE IN THE COURSE OF INTERPRETING THE EXECUTIVEORDER; "UNDUE INJURY" TO GOVERNMENT NOT SHOWN. — Executive Order No.324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregardof Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. Thecriminal information in this case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 withSection 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act. Petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation,was expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply andadminister and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue

rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Theapplication and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerialor mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatoryand hence quasi-judicial in nature, and paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Orderprovide as follows: "11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, theCommissioner of Immigration and Deportation may waive exclusion grounds underthe Immigration Act in the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes toassure family unity or for the public interest. 12. The following grounds for exclusionmay not be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, namely,(a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become publiccharges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisionsas relates to a single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) thoserelating to national security and members of subversive organization. . . ."Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds forexclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "forhumanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest." Itwill be seen then that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to becriminal in nature, constituted official acts of petitioner done in the course ofapplying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. It is undisputed thatno one has pretended that petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in any ofthe cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had acted upon.No one has suggested, for instance, that the fees specified in paragraph 9 ofExecutive Order No. 324 either were not collected by the Government or weremisappropriated by petitioner and converted to her own use. The facts disclosed inthe preliminary investigation showed no "undue injury," to the Government and no"unwarranted benefit or advantage" to the alien wives and minor children ofqualified aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications forwaiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In otherwords, if the interpretation or construction given by petitioner to Executive OrderNo. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements byalien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified alienswho had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and whowere otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoringfamily unity — there would be no "injury," let alone an "undue injury," to theGovernment. Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in thecases of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be an"unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive OrderNo. 324 be held to be correct.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J p:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the

addendum thereto, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the RegionalTrial Courts of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 for violation ofRepublic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e); Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for violation ofPresidential Decree No. 46; and Criminal Case No. 91-94897 for libel.

In Criminal Case No. 16698 1 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner standscharged as follows:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequentthereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner ofthe Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith andmanifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminallyapprove the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippinesafter January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causingundue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits andadvantage to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrativefunctions of said accused.

Contrary to law."

In Criminal Case No. 91-94555 2 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,petitioner, together with Daisy Montinola and Fermin Pacia, are accused of aviolation of Presidential Decree No. 46 allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequentthereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and FerminPacia, all public officers, being then the Commissioner, Chief of the Board ofSpecial Inquiry and employee of the Commission on Immigration andDeportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there,wilfully, unlawfully and criminally solicit and receive money, gifts and othervaluable things from several (F)ilipino and foreign businessmen the samebeing given by reason of their respective official positions for past favor andexpected favor and better treatment in the future from said accused, in thedischarge of their respective official functions.

Contrary to law."

The information filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Regional TrialCourt of Manila and docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94897 3 indicts petitioner forthe crime of libel, as follows:

"That on or about May 24, 1988, at the Office of the Commission onImmigration and Deportation, Port Area, Manila, Philippines, and within thejurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Miriam Defensor-Santiago,a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission onImmigration and Deportation, acting in such capacity and taking advantageof her official position, did then and there with malice aforethought, wilfully,unlawfully and feloniously call, utter, state, impute and make scurrilous and

defamatory statements against Maria S. Tatoy, by portraying the latter, thenChief of the Certificate Section, Commission on Immigration and Deportationto be 'a corrupt employee, a perennial trouble-maker who has filedadministrative cases against all the commissioners under whom she served'and the Certificate Section of which she was the head as 'not only uselessbut the most corrupt unit in the CID,' in the presence of newspaperreporters and media personalities, thereby finding print in the newspapers,which tend to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt of said Maria S. Tatoy,to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to law."

A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991 4 orderingthe Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, to respectively ceaseand desist from proceeding with Criminal Informations Nos. 11698 for violation ofRepublic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e) and 91-94555 for violation of PresidentialDecree No. 46. This Court, in issuing the said restraining order, took intoconsideration the fact that, according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally setfor June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisabilityof conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial rightto meet said contingency.

Petitioner avers that in filing the aforequoted criminal informations, respondentsOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner contends that the criminalcharges are meant and intended to harass her as a presidential candidate, inviolation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)onafide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment anddiscrimination."

Petitioner likewise asserts that the Ombudsman violated the very essence of fairplay by choosing to file the informations at a time when petitioner was clearlydisadvantaged by the injuries which she sustained in a vehicular accident, and onlyafter three (3) years from the time the sixteen (16) charges were initially filed in1988 by disgruntled employees of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation(CID); and that in filing the criminal informations just a year before the presidentialelections, respondent Ombudsman in effect wants to detain petitioner by reason ofher political aspirations. She further submits that the instant petition seeks toprevent respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from proceeding againsther in an oppressive and vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to herconstitutional rights. She consequently posits that, on the foregoing premises, herpresent recourse should be considered as an exception to the general prohibitionagainst petitions of this nature in criminal cases.

In their Comment, respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor refute theclaims of petitioner, explaining in the process the sequence of events which led tothe filing of the three (3) informations, in this wise:

"The charges involved in Criminal Case No. 16698 and Criminal Case No. 91-94555 were taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman upon thesame having been prominently published in the January 10, 1989 issue ofthe 'Manila Standard.' The investigation was originally handled by thenInvestigator Gualberto de la Llana but, on request of the petitioner, wasreassigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon sometime inMarch, 1989. The case was handled by an investigating panel whichsubmitted its draft resolution only on March 29, 1990. After the usualreviews by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, and of the Office of theDeputy Ombudsman for Luzon, the resolution was submitted for final actionof respondent Ombudsman in late March, 1991.

"A judicious appraisal of the record resulted in the issuance by theOmbudsman of the Memorandum for the Office of the Special Prosecutordirecting the filing of the two (2) informations which have been docketed asCriminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan, and Criminal Case No. 91-94555 of the Manila Regional Trial Court . . .

"The said Memorandum, as may be noted on the face thereof, is dated April26, 1991, or two (2) days beforepetitioner met the vehicular accident onApril 28, 1991.

"Respondent Ombudsman received the informations prepared by the Officeof the Special Prosecutor only on May 13, 1991. Per office routine, afterrespondent Ombudsman approved the informations, they were forwardedto the Office of the Special Prosecutor which filed the same in theappropriate courts on May 13, 1991.

"The record thus attests to the fact that the filing of Criminal Cases Nos.16698 and 91-94555 was already a settled matter as early as two daysbefore petitioner's unfortunate mishap. Their filing in court was inaccordance with routine procedure, and impelled in some way by media'simpatient and irritating inquiries as to what respondent Ombudsman haddone in the petitioner's cases, induced no doubt by premature persistentfalse reports that the cases against petitioner had been dismissed by theOffice of the Ombudsman.

"With respect to the libel case which was filed with the Manila Regional TrialCourt on May 24, 1991, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 91-94897,the record will also show that the information in this case could have beenfiled as early as October 12, 1990 when the resolution recommending theprosecution of petitioner for libel was approved by respondent Ombudsman. . . However, on the day it was to be filed, some lawyers of the petitionercame and asked the respondent Ombudsman to defer the filing of theinformation inasmuch as they intend to file a motion for reinvestigation,which they did on October 29, 1990. The reinvestigation was denied in aMemorandum dated 25 March 1991 of Special Prosecution Officer ReynaldoL. Mendoza (approved by respondent Ombudsman on April 22, 1991) andan information was subsequently filed on May 24, 1991.

"Like in the previous two (2) cases, the filing of Criminal Case No. 91-94897

for libel had no relation at all to the accident which befell the petitioner onApril 28, 1991. Its filing after that accident was caused by a clearly delayingtactic on the part of the petitioner. It is rather unkind for petitioner to imputeill-motivation on the part of the respondents for something she herself is toblame." 5

The Court accordingly also takes note of the aforesaid disclosures of respondentOmbudsman that it was petitioner, personally or through counsel, who maderepresentations with said respondent which he granted and caused him to deferaction for some time on the complaints which were ultimately filed against her.

It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie torestrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires thatcriminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection ofsociety, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strongarm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequateprotection to constitutional rights. 6

The rule is equally applicable in cases where the Ombudsman had authorized theSpecial Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation or to file an information asin the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsible official is vested with discretionand is endowed with the competence to determine whether the complaint filed issufficient in form and substance to merit such referral. The Ombudsman mayhimself dismiss the complaint in the first instance if in his judgment the acts oromissions complained of are not illegal, unjust, improper or sufficient. The SpecialProsecutor, in case of referral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on propergrounds after the requisite investigative and adjudicatory proceedings. 7 But if, asemphasized by respondent Ombudsman, "the evidence presented during thepreliminary investigation constitute very valid grounds to charge petitionerSantiago and her co-accused before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional TrialCourts of Manila," no compelling reason would exist for us to rule otherwise.

Petitioner, claiming exception to the interdiction against a suit to enjoin criminalprosecution, avers that the instant petition seeks to prevent the strong arm of thelaw from being utilized in an oppressive and vindictive manner. 8 She thenpostulates that as one who has consistently topped all major presidential surveysfrom 1990 to 1991, the filing of the informations against her will prejudice herstanding in the presidential surveys. This is, contextually and for legal intents andpurposes herein, a mere verisimilitude.

At any rate, we definitely cannot subordinate the demands of public interest andpolicy to the political aspirations of herein petitioner. We have carefully gone overthe records of the case and, contrary to the pretensions of petitioner, there isnothing to show that the informations in question were filed with the vindictiveintention to oppress, harass and discriminate against her or to violate herconstitutional rights. It is significant that petitioner failed to impute, much lessprove, any ill-motive on the part of herein public respondents. RespondentOmbudsman categorically states that, and convincingly explains why, he "has nopurpose, motive nor desire to endanger or discredit petitioner's aspirations for the

highest position in the land." 9 This is made no more apparent than in the variousmemoranda 10 approved by respondent Ombudsman establishing that the admittedfacts of record are sufficient to engender a well founded belief that each of thecrimes charged has been committed, which parenthetically, is the requisitequantum of evidence at this posture of each of said cases.

Petitioner submits that she cannot be held liable as charged and raises the followingdefenses: that the donations received were not for personal use but weredistributed to the CID employees in a raffle held during the CID Christmas party;that the legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984was in accordance with the authority vested in her by Executive Order No. 324 andwas intended to assure family unity; and that the defamatory words were madeagainst Maria Tatoy only in self-defense.

We are not persuaded that we should, in the present recourse, pass upon theseasseverations of petitioner which we note have previously been raised during thepreliminary investigation. She will, of course, have all the opportunity to ventilateand substantiate the same in the proceedings before and/or during the trial of thesecases in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and fora for theadjudication thereof. Accordingly, we quote with approval this portion of theComment of respondent Ombudsman:

"In her Petition and in the Addendum hereto, the petitioner had not madeany denial of the operative facts on the basis of which the charges havebeen filed. Instead, petitioner relies on her perceived defenses on herinterpretation of the said acts and the laws applicable thereto.

"Thus, in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 for a violation of P.D. 46, petitioneradmits the solicitation of donations and the giving of the same by thosefrom whom such donations were solicited. Petitioner justifies the said act byclaiming that the donations were not given for her 'personal use' but for thepurpose of the Christmas Party of the Commission on Immigration andDeportation. Whether this claim would negate the applicability of P.D. 46would involve an inquiry into certain facts which could only be ascertainedduring the trial of the case. Significantly, petitioner had not denied that thesolicitation of said gifts was at her instance, and that she even scolded acertain Renato Orlanda whom she requested to sign the solicitation letters,but who refused to do so for fear of committing a violation of the lawpunishing such act.

"With respect to Criminal Case No. 16698 for a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.No. 3019, petitioner has also not denied that she admitted and approved thelegalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984,which act is contrary to the express provision of Executive Order No. 324.She reasons out her doing so by putting forth certain alleged principles andprovisions of the same Executive Order which could be interpreted as givingher such authority to disregard the express prohibition in Executive OrderNo. 324. Again, these are matters of defense which the petitioner shouldprove during the trial.

"In the libel case (Criminal Case No. 91-94897), petitioner likewise admitshaving uttered the words constituting the bases thereof in a televisioninterview. She does not deny its libelous nature. She claims justification forhaving uttered the defamatory words against complainant Maria Tatoy onthe ground of self-defense. Allegedly, Tatoy in an earlier interview, hadmentioned about desiring to form a labor union among the employees ofCID, but that the petitioner was against such move. Respondents fail to seehow said statement of Tatoy could be considered as defamatory to justify alibelous response thereto on the ground of self-defense." 11

WHEREFORE, the petition and the addendum thereto are hereby DISMISSED, thewrits prayed for are DENIED, and the temporary restraining order issued in this caseis hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Nocon, J . , took no part.

Separate OpinionsMELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:

The long-standing doctrine is, indeed, that Writs of Injunction or Prohibition do notlie to restrain a criminal prosecution in view of the public interest involved. In fact,petitioner concedes this point but seeks an exception in her case.

I just wish to emphasize that the dismissal of this Petition in no way reflects on thecriminal liability of petitioner. Its immediate effect is only that the cases against hermay now proceed but without prejudice to procedural remedies that are open toher, like a Motion to Quash, and the defenses that she may raise, among thembeing, in at least two of the three cases, that the acts charged, as a matter of law,do not constitute an offense but are, as stated in Justice Feliciano's dissent, a matterof administrative interpretation or policy for which a public official should not besubjected to civil or criminal liability.

I would also like to point out that the Commissioner of Immigration andDeportation is charged with the administration of immigration laws. Section 3 ofthe Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (C.A. No. 613) provides that theCommissioner "shall issue from time to time such instructions, not inconsistentwith law, as he shall deem best calculated to carry out the provisions of theimmigration laws." Executive Order No. 324, likewise, explicitly authorizes theCommissioner to issue rules and regulations necessary to implement the saidExecutive Order (paragraph 16). The Commissioner may even waive exclusiongrounds under the Immigration Act, save in cases otherwise provided by law

(paragraph 11).

In a pending bill in Congress (H. No. 30878), or the "Alien Legalization Act of 1991,"the stay in the country of aliens who entered the Philippines prior to 2 February1987 may be legalized upon their application (Sec. 2), which could mean any timeprior thereto or even after January 1, 1984. The Commissioner is likewise given theauthority to determine who among the alien-applicants may be qualified to bepermanent residents, any adverse decision made being appealable only to the Officeof the President (Sec. 7).

Indeed, inherent in the Commissioner's function is the exercise of judgment anddiscretion in the application of the laws that said official has been authorized toadminister and enforce. The interpretation given by that Office, as with all otheradministrative bodies, is, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and respect.

FELICIANO, J ., dissenting:

It is with regret that I am unable to agree completely with the majority opinionwritten by my learned brother in the Court, Mr. Justice Regalado, with hiscustomary lucidity. That opinion expresses clearly the ordinary rule in the followingterms:

"It is a long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lieto restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requiresthat criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for theprotection of society, except in specified cases among which are to preventthe use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner,and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights." (Citation omitted)

Mr. Justice Regalado also points out that the above general rule is applicable inrespect of criminal prosecutions commenced by the Special Prosecutor and theOmbudsman:

"The rule is of equal application in cases where the Ombudsman hadauthorized the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation orto file an information as in the case at bar. Indubitably, such a responsibleofficial is vested with discretion and is endowed with the competence todetermine whether the complaint filed is sufficient in form and substance tomerit such referral. The Ombudsman may himself dismiss the complaint inthe first instance if in his judgment the acts or omissions complained of arenot illegal, unjust, improper or sufficient. The Special Prosecutor, in case ofreferral of the complaint, may also dismiss the same on proper groundsafter the requisite investigative and adjudicatory proceedings . . ." (Citationomitted)

It is clear, of course, that there are more than a few exceptions to the abovegeneral rule. In Brocka, et al. vs. Ponce-Enrile, et al., 1 the Court, speakingthrough Mr. Justice Medialdea, included the following in a list which wouldappear to be an open-ended one:

"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of theaccused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA95);

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or . . . [toprevent] multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304;Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27,1981,104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs.Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);

xxx xxx xxx

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation(Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385,389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People andAlvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. CityJudge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);

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j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and amotion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al.,L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438);

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It is my respectful submission that if the instant case, to the extent discussed below,does not already fall within one of the above exceptions, another and separateexception ought to be recognized.

The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 chargesthe petitioner as follows:

"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequentthereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner ofthe Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith andmanifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminallyapprove the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippinesafter January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causingundue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits andadvantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrativefunctions of said accused.

Contrary to law."

Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of theprovisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved applications for legalization ofthe stay of aliens who had arrived in the Philippines afterJanuary 1, 1984. Theinformation takes the position that Executive Order "does not allow thelegalization of the same."

Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrantsunder Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant toSection 47(A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of1940, which provides that.

"Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:

(a) when the public interest so warrants:

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(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under suchconditions as he may prescribe."

Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with theCommissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of passportrequirements during a 12-month period beginning on a date to be designated bythe Commissioner. The Order provides, among other things, that the alien "mustestablish that he entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he hasresided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date tothe filing of his application."

Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements ofcertain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of thiscase, especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of theSpecial Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens whohad arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses orminor children of qualified aliens — the latter being alien spouses or parents whohad entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were themselvesqualified for waiver of passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 — toapply for waiver of passport requirements and, after compliance with requirementsof Executive Order No. 324, approved such "legalization."

Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certainacts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise tocriminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links up ExecutiveOrder No. 324 with Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:

"SECTION 3. Corrupt Practices of such Officers. — In addition to acts oromissions of such officers already penalized by existing law, the followingconstitute corrupt practices of any public officer and hereby declared to beunlawful:

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(e) causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, orgiving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preferencein the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions throughmanifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Thisprovision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or governmentcorporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or otherconcessions." (Emphasis supplied)

It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigrationand Deportation, was expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324to apply and administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorizedto issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16).Secondly, the application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve,not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment anddiscretion, adjudicatory and hence quasijudicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps mostnotably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:

"11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner ofImmigration and Deportation may waive exclusion grounds under theImmigration Acts in the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposesto assure family unity or for the public interest.

12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by theCommissioner of Immigration and Deportation, namely, (a) those relating tocriminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become public charges; (c)those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions asrelates to a single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) thoserelating to national security and members of subversive organization.

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(Emphasis supplied)

Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds forexclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "forhumanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest."Under Section 29(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, theclasses of aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines include:

"(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may berequired under the provisions of this Act." 2

Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whosecases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be granted.

It will be seen then that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to becriminal in nature, constituted official acts of petitioner done in the course of

applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no questionthat the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minorchildren of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by petitioner "forhumanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the saidalien spouses and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable)excluded classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarlyundisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner had any personal or corruptinterest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliensshe had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance, that the fees specified inparagraph 9 of Executive Order No. 342 either were not collected by theGovernment or were misappropriated by petitioner and converted to her own use. Itmay be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the Commissioner"in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouses and minor children below21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included anallegation of "evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, thatthe facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered absolutely no basis forsuch an allegation which is actually a conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor,much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally" which are recitedredundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in thepreliminary investigation showed no undue injury, to the Government and no"unwarranted benefit or advantage" to the alien wives and minor children ofqualified aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications forwaiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In otherwords, if the interpretation or construction given by petitioner to Executive OrderNo. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements byalien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified alienswho had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and whowere otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoringfamily unity — there would be no "injury," let alone an "undue injury," to theGovernment. Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in thecases of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be an"unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive OrderNo. 324 be held to be correct.

It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneousinterpretations of a statute or implementing regulation by the executive oradministrative officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a statuteor regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Courtitself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by suchadministrative officers. 3 But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimatelyfound to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible forsuch interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally,whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as firmly settled that toimpose liability upon the public officer who has so acted, something far graver thanerror of law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personalintentions, personal malice or bad faith. 4 As noted above, no such allegations weremade during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.

My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitionerwere criminal in nature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks us torule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to prevent this Courtfrom addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of anyadditional essential facts apart from those already admitted by petitioner. It seemsto me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before thisCourt resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should notbe compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of: the wholeprocess of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminalis the very issue at stake.

I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law,constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having doneconstitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for theadministration of law and government rules and regulations in general. For thethrust of the criminal information here would appear to be that public officersinterpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at therisk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to profitpersonally by any such interpretation and application.

The second information was filed in Criminal Case No. 91-94555 before theRegional Trial Court of Manila, charging petitioner with Daisy Montinola and FerminPacia with violation of P.D. No. 46 allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about November 28, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequentthereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Daisy Montinola and FerminPacia, all public officers, being then the Commissioner, Chief of the Board ofSpecial Inquiry and employee of the Commission on Immigration andDeportation, respectively, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there,willfully, unlawfully and criminally solicit and receive money, gifts and othervaluable things from several (F)ilipino end foreign businessmen the samebeing given by reason of their respective official positions for past favor andexpected favor and better treatment in the future from said accused, in thedischarge of their respective official functions.

Contrary to law."

The facts brought out during the preliminary investigation of the above chargeshowed that, in connection with a Christmas party held on 20 December 1988 at3:30 p.m. in front of the CID building, held by the Commission on Immigration andDeportation for the benefit of its employees, letters of solicitation were sent out to agreat many people and companies, under the signature of Daisy Montinola andFermin Pacia who were Chairman of the Christmas Committee and President of theCID Employees Association, respectively. The identical letters of solicitation read asfollows:

"Dear . . .:

The CID Christmas Party for employees will be held on Tuesday, 20December 1988 at 3:30 p.m., in front of the CID building on MagallanesDrive, Intramuros.

We shall be happy to receive your donations for the CID, to be distributed tothe employees during the party. Further, we wish to invite you to the party,so that you can witness the distribution of proposed Christmas bags.

Under P.D. Nos. 46 and 807, the Commissioner strictly prohibits anyemployee from receiving any Christmas gift. Hence, Christmas gifts may begiven, only to the CID as an agency.

Thank you very much for your generosity, and please accept our bestChristmas wishes . . ."

Three hundred twenty-six (326) letters were sent out; one hundred one (101)addressees responded with donations. Petitioner submitted a list of the donorsand of the items and cash donated to the CID. The cash donations were used topurchase food and grocery items which, together with donations consisting offood, were then divided and packaged as individual Christmas baskets anddistributed to 700 officers and employees of the CID, plus 34 members of the CIDsecurity force. Donations in kind, including five (5) electric appliances, plus smallconsolation prizes, were raffled off to the employees during the Christmas party.Petitioner also furnished a list of these prizes and of the CID employees who wonthem, as well as an accounting of the purchases of food and grocery items. Theaccounting showed that a balance of P8,588.75 remained, which balance wasearmarked to assist in the funding of the CID summer excursion for CIDemployees and their families. 5

The operative portion of P.D. No. 46, dated 10 November 1972, reads as follows:

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant toProclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1dated September 22, 1972, do hereby make it punishable for any publicofficial or employee, whether of the national or local governments, toreceive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer togive, any gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion, includingChristmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given byreason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is forpast favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor orbetter treatment in the future from the public official or employee concernedin the discharge of his official functions Included within the prohibition is thethrowing of parties or entertainments in honor of the official or employee orhis immediate relatives.

For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment for not less thanone (1) year nor more than five (5) years and perpetual disqualification from

public office shall be imposed. The official or employee concerned shalllikewise be subject to administrative disciplinary action and, if found guilty,shall be meted out the penalty of suspension or removal, depending on theseriousness of the offense." (Emphasis supplied)

Here again, I respectfully submit, a serious legal question exists: whether or not theabove acts of petitioner, as admitted by her during the course of the preliminaryinvestigation, fall within the scope of P.D. No. 46. It is not disputed that thesolicitation had been made for the purpose stated in the solicitation letter itself —the 1988 Christmas party of the CID officers and employees. It is also not disputedthat all the donations in cash or in kind had been utilized for and in connection withsuch Christmas party, and that the only personal benefit received by petitioner andher two (2) co-accused consisted of one Christmas food basket each, along withmore than 700 other officers and employees of the CID.

One may, of course, debate the wisdom of the measures so adopted or tolerated bypetitioner in connection with that 1988 CID Christmas party. Petitioner hardlyinvented the employees' Christmas party, a practice widely observed in both thepublic and the private sectors. Petitioner's special contribution consisted of makingsure that the solicitation, receipt and distribution of gifts were all done in anorganized and public manner, in full view of all the officers and employees of theCID and of the general public, doubtless to emphasize for whose benefit suchsolicitation had been conducted, to minimize private or secret solicitation byindividual CID officers or employees, and to preclude any charge of secret personalbenefit on her part and of those who signed the solicitation letters. What is at stakehere, however, is the legal question of whether or not the acts which petitioner hasadmitted constitute a criminal offense under P.D. No. 46 which, I believe, is ripe fordetermination by this Court. I also submit that those acts do not fall within thescope of P.D. No. 46 as it is presently written. 6 It may well be that, as a matter ofadministrative policy, all solicitation including solicitation for the benefit of theofficers and employees of a particular agency or government should be prohibitedand perhaps criminalized. That, however, is something for the legislative authorityto consider and act upon, not the courts and certainly not in a criminal case.

For all the foregoing, and certainly in respect of two (2) out of the three (3) criminalinformations filed against petitioner, I believe that the Petition for Certiorari andProhibition should be granted and vote accordingly.

Gutierrez, Griño-Aquino, Romero, JJ ., dissent.

Footnotes

1. Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 19.

2. Annex B, id.; ibid., 22.

3. Annex E, Addendum to Petition; ibid., 310.

4. Rollo, 285.

5. Ibid., 416-418.

6. Ramos, et al. vs. Aquino, etc., et al., 39 SCRA 641 (1971); Arkoncel vs. Court ofFirst Instance of Basilan City, etc., et al., 66 SCRA 361 (1975), Asutilla vs. PhilippineNational Bank, etc., et al., 141 SCRA 40 (1986).

7. Tabujara vs. Office of the Special Prosecutor, et al. , G.R. No. 87912, Resolution EnBanc, January 18, 1990.

8. Rollo, 14.

9. Ibid., 420-421.

10. Annex C, Petition, Rollo, 23; Annex F, Addendum to Petition, Rollo, 312; andAnnex 4, Comment of Public Respondents, Rollo, 445.

11. Rollo, 424-425.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

1. 192 SCRA 183 (1990).

2. It is also pertinent to note the following classes of excluded aliens:

"(10) Persons who are members of a family accompanying an excludedalien, unless in the opinion of the Commissioner of Immigration no hardship wouldresult from their admission;

(11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who is helpless frommental or physical disability or infancy, when the protection or guardianship ofsuch accompanying person or persons is required by the excluded person, weshall be determined by the Commissioner of Immigration;

(12) Children under fifteen years of age, unaccompanied by or not comingto a parent, except that any such children may be admitted in the discretion of theCommissioner of Immigration, if otherwise admissible;

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(Section 29 [a], C.A. No. 613, as amended; emphasis supplied).

3. See, e.g., Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 (1967); Salavariavs. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 (1978); Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commissionerof Customs, 29 SCRA 617 (1969); University of the Philippines vs. Court ofAppeals, 37 SCRA 54 (1971); Lim Hao Ting vs. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 (1958).

4. See generally Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, 85 SCRA 346 (1990).

5. Rollo, p. 37.

6. It might be noted that Section 36 of the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807, asamended) specifies, among grounds for disciplinary action, the following:

"(9) Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in thecourse of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift, or othervaluable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving afavor or better treatment than that accorded other persons, or committing actspunishable under the anti-graft laws." (Emphasis supplied)