3:14-cv-00089 #63

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HAMBY ET AL. V. WALKER ET AL. CASE NO. 3:14-cv- 00089 TMB

MOTION FOR R ECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

1

Heather Gardner #0111079Caitlin Shortell #0405027

Counsel for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

MATTHEW HAMBY ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

WILLIAM WALKER, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:14-cv-00089 TMB

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONOF COURT’S ORDER ON MOTIONFOR ATTORNEY’S FEES (42 U.S.C.§ 1988) (FRCP § 59(e)

COME NOW Plaintiffs’ counsel Caitlin Shortell and Heather Gardner 1 and move

the court for reconsideration of its April 15, 2015 Order on their Attorney’s Fees pursuant

to FRCP §59(e). This motion is supported by attached Declarations of undersigned

counsel Caitlin Shortell, Heather Gardner, and the Declarations of attorneys Lee Holen

Ken Legacki, and Jessica Hedges.

I. BACKGROUND

1 Allison Mendel is not participating in this motion and undersigned counsel are notauthorized to speak for her or to represent her interests or those of her staff in this matter.All references to “counsel” or “undersigned counsel” in this motion refer exclusively toShortell and/or Gardner.

Case 3:14-cv-00089-TMB Document 63 Filed 05/13/15 of 29

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On April 15, 2015, this court partially granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s

Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988. The court reduced the award of undersigned counsels’

fees from the amounts requested by more than fifty percent. The court reduced the

hourly rates requested by all counsel and disallowed a significant number of hours set

forth in counsels’ declarations. The original motion for fees drafted by Allison Mende

or her associate did not include additional declarations from other counsel in the

community, and as a result, the court could not rely upon such declarations. Undersigned

counsel Shortell and Gardner apologize for this mistake, and seek to correct it by

providing such evidence herein. Even taking the lack of corroborating declarations into

account, the court relied upon a number of errors of fact, failed to apply binding Ninth

Circuit law on the matter of §1988 fees, and reached a conclusion that defies the purpose

of the fee-shifting statute in reducing the award. Accordingly, the court should reconsider

its decision to drastically reduce counsels’ award for the reasons set forth below.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The Ninth Circuit has set forth the grounds justifying reconsideration of a

judgment under Rule 59(e). There are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e)

motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law

or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to present newly


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discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent

manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an intervening change in

controlling law.2 For the reasons set forth below, reconsideration is warranted.

The factual basis for an award of attorneys’ fees is reviewed for clear error, and

the order’s underlying legal premises are reviewed de novo.3 If there are no clear errors,

an award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.4 In cases involving

federal fee-shifting statutes, the district court must calculate the lodestar by multiplying

number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate.5 The 9th Circuit

generally requires district courts to use the 12 factors outlined in Kerr v. Screen Extras

Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975) to make attorneys' fee determinations. The Kerr

factors are: 1) the time and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions

involved; 3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 4) the preclusion of

other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee; 6)

2 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9

th Cir. 2011).

3 Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)(citations omitted).

4 Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1148.

5 Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir

2009)(cit. omitted).


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whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances; 8) the amount involved and the results obtained; 9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of the attorneys; 10) the "undesirability" of the case; 11) the nature

and length of the professional relationship with the client; and 12) awards in similar

cases.6 In providing its analysis, the district court must provide more than just a general

statement that it considered the Kerr factors.

In Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008), the 9 th

Circuit ruled that the larger the disparity between the attorneys' fee request and the court's

award, the "more specific articulation of the court's reasoning is expected." A District

court must calculate awards for fees using the ‘lodestar method’ and the amount of that

fee must be determined on the facts of each case.7 “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by

multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.”8 In most cases, the lodestar figure should be

considered ‘presumptively reasonable’ by the District court.9 To fulfill the purpose of

6 Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 n.1. (9th Cir. 1988).

7 Ferland , 244 F.3d at 1149 n.4, Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).

8 Ferland , 244 F.3d at 1149 n.4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).9 Id.


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§1988, a "reasonable" fee award is one that will encourage competent attorneys to take on

meritorious civil rights claims "in order to ensure that federal rights are adequately

enforced"10 without yielding a windfall to either party.11

In order to assess the reasonableness of an hourly rate, the 9 th circuit court of

appeals has held that the district court must look to the prevailing rate of other attorneys

of similar skill, experience, and reputation in the relevant community,12 which is the

federal district in which the case was brought.13 The applicants for fees bear the burden of

producing affidavits to show that their requested hourly rate is within the range for

attorneys of similar experience, and reputation in the same district.14 This evidence can

include the applicants’ own affidavits, the affidavits of other attorneys in the same

district, and fee determinations in other cases.15 The party opposing the fee application

has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court

10 Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010).11

Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air , 478 U.S. 546 , 565 (1986). 12 Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 132 F.3d 496, 502 (9th Cir. 1997).

13 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008).

14

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984).15 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990).


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challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the facts asserted by the prevailing party

in its submitted affidavits.16

A district court errs when it fails to consider evidence as to the market rate for

attorneys of like experience, skill, and reputation in the same federal district, as in

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008). 17 The 9th Circuit

also instructs district courts to compare requested fees solely in comparison to cases

brought under the identical statute or on identical subject matter, but instead in

comparison to the fees commensurate to the fees the applicants could have obtained by

taking other cases of like difficulty.18

16 Camacho, at 4251, citing Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98.

17 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008).

18 The 9th Circuit court of Appeals remanded Camacho to the district court where thedistrict court limited its inquiry to FDCPA cases, directing the District court, “[i]n orderto encourage able counsel to undertake FDCPA cases, as congress intended, it isnecessary that counsel be awarded fees commensurate with those which they could obtain by taking other types of cases.” Camacho at Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 652 (7th

Cir. 1995); see also Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 706(9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that reasonable hourly rate must be based on “customary feesin cases of like difficulty”).


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A District court must give adequate explanation of how it reached its decision in

making a fee award. In Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC 19

, a three judge panel for the 9th

Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's order awarding reduced attorneys

fees to appellant. Carter reiterated and confirmed prior 9th Circuit holdings requiring a

sufficiently specific explanation in order to determine the reasonableness of a fee award

The greater the reduction, the more specificity required in the explanation. Appellant

Rick Carter appealed the district court's order awarding him $14,268.50 in attorneys' fees

and costs where his fee petition was sought $22,585. Carter appealed, arguing that the

district court's failure to sufficiently explain its rationale for the fee reduction constituted

error as a matter of law. The 9th Circuit agreed.

District courts have discretion in determining the amount of a fee award, but they

must provide a clear explanation of their reasoning for an award.20 In Carter v. Caleb

Brett LLC , the district court based its award on a "blended" hourly rate (calculated using

a combination of the senior and junior attorney rates) combined with a 37% reduction in

compensable hours. The 9th Circuit panel opined that the district court 's focus on only

two of the twelve Kerr factors was insufficient and that the court must provide more

19 Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC , 757 F. 3d 866 (9th Cir. 2014).20 Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 437-439 (1983).


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specific reasons for making such a significant reduction. The panel cites the 9th Circuit's

opinion in Costa v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 690 F.3d 1132 (9th

Cir. 2012) where it held that the magistrate was required to provide relatively specific

reasons in support of ordering an hours reduction of one-third. Similarly, in Carter , the

panel vacated the award and remanded to the district court with instructions to reconsider

the amount awarded and to articulate the basis for the award with more specificity.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Kerr Factors

The court should reconsider its order to include a thorough application of the Kerr

factors to reinstate applicants’ requested fees, as follows:

1) Time and Labor Required

Shortell and Gardner were required to spend extensive time and labor to bring and

litigate the case, including client recruitment, investigation, legal research, drafting of all

the substantive pleadings, and meetings with each other and their co-counsel, Allison

Mendel, as detailed in their declarations and fee bills submitted to this court. Shortell

recruited six of the ten clients in the case and acted as the client liaison. Shortell

researched and drafted the motion for summary judgment. Gardner drafted the Complain

and the Reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment as well as the Reply to the


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Opposition to the Motion for Fees. Both attorneys had to research all the applicable case

law as it developed during the pendency of the case and discussed in the Motion and

Opposition, because they were lead drafters of the substantive pleadings. Undersigned

counsel remained in contact and met on a weekly basis throughout the case to check in

and review any new cases that had issued and any needs and questions posed by the

clients. Shortell spent time and labor listening to oral arguments and meeting with co-

counsel, preparing for oral argument, and in arguing the due process claim in the Motion

for Summary Judgment. Gardner helped prepare Shortell for oral argument and met with

the clients and co-counsel prior to the oral argument. Gardner also drafted the Reply to

the Motion for Fees. These are all both appropriate and necessary uses of lawyers’ time.

Finally, Shortell and Gardner have spent time and labor on this motion for

reconsideration, for which they have not billed, as well as the Reply to the opposition to

the original motion for fees.

2) The Novelty and Difficulty of the Issues Presented

Hamby et al. v. Walker et al . presented a matter of first impression in the District

of Alaska: whether the State of Alaska’s laws denying same sex couples the right to

marry and recognition of their marriages violated the guarantee of due process and equal

protection in the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. The case was brought


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less than one year after the Supreme Court’s landmark decision striking down the federal

Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor 21, and four

months after the Ninth Circuit decision in SmithKline Beecham v. Abbott 22

which

determined the applicable level of scrutiny in the circuit for review of a law that

discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, but did not resolve the question of

marriage. More than thirty decisions on same sex marriage bans issued from federal and

state courts during the pendency of this case. None of plaintiffs’ counsel in this matter,

nor any other attorney in the district of Alaska had litigated these issues before

applicants. Thus, applicants Shortell and Gardner were required to do substantial work to

litigate this case of first impression during the time when its underlying issues and claims

were and still remain, in legal flux.

The issue of same sex marriage is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme

Court. Until the Supreme Court rules on Obergefell v. Hodges so as to resolve conflicts

between the circuits, the right of same sex couples to marry is still not settled law. With

Defendants maintaining the appeal of the above-captioned matter before the Ninth Circuit

and joining with 14 other states in an anti-equality amicus brief to the United States

Supreme Court, the outcome of this matter is still not a foregone conclusion. In its fee

21 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. – (2013).22 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F. 3d 471 – (9th Cir. 2014).


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order, the court essentially states that counsel knew what the outcome of the case would

be, so counsel spent too much time working on it. This conflicts with the reality of

preparing a civil rights case on an issue of significant national importance, as new orders

were coming out of multiple states as the case was being researched, prepared, and

briefed, with unpredictable results. It also conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s position that

courts should generally defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how

much time was required to spend on the case; “after all, he won, and might not have, had

he been more of a slacker.”23

3) The Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly

This case required applicants to be skilled at recruitment and management of ten

clients, to strategize the pleading of a federal civil rights case under 28 U.S.C. §1983, to

be skilled at legal research and writing, to work on a project that included other attorneys

supportive staff, clients, journalists, activists, advocacy organizations, government

agencies, and opposing counsel.

4) Preclusion of Other Employment by the Attorneys Due to Acceptance of the

Case

23 Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).


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At the outset of this case, both Shortell and Gardner resided in Seattle

Washington and traveled periodically to Anchorage to represent Alaska clients. The time

required to adequately pursue this matter hindered both attorneys from accepting and

performing other work. Both attorneys traveled to Anchorage in 2014 to meet with clients

and co-counsel and Shortell moved back to Anchorage in July of 2014 in part because the

case demanded that she be present and available to clients and co-counsel. Both Shortell

and Gardner devoted focused sessions of time to the legal research, writing, editing, and

argument of this case. All the time devoted to the case represented an opportunity cost to

Plaintiffs’ lawyers as they did not earn and have not yet received any compensation for

the time they spent, whereas they would have been paid had they devoted the same time

to other cases.

5) Customary Fee

The Alaska Bar Association has approximately 4000 members. A large percentage

of those lawyers work for governmental organizations, NGOs, or as in house counsel

The customary fee is difficult to assess due to the very small population of lawyers who

practice in the area of federal civil rights litigation against state actors. For example

Shortell is one of approximately three attorneys who focus on employment law


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representing plaintiffs in Anchorage.24 The mode of compensation for undersigned in

their private practices ranges depending on whether the fee agreement is contingency, flat

fee, or hourly basis. Shortell currently charges $375.00 as a basic hourly rate for routine

legal advice and representation in all matters including employment law and family law

The hourly rate of $375.00 is a rate charged where clients agree to pay Shortell for her

services in advance, as opposed to a complex case of first impression taken without any

assurance of getting paid. Gardner has been employed most recently as in house counsel

for an out of state firm. Both attorneys have agreed to charge clients less than the rate

requested in this matter where payment is made in advance and payment is not contingent

on recovery of damages. However, contingency fees are more difficult to quantify, and

lead to variable results when reduced to an hourly rate. Undersigned counsel submit that

an hourly rate of $395.00 was within the range of a reasonable customary rate for

attorneys with 10-20 years of experience who undertake and prevail in complex federal

litigation such as this case. Attorneys Holen, Legacki, and Hedges, all experienced civil

rights attorneys in private practice, submitted declarations that support the request for an

hourly rate of $395 as reasonable.

24 Attorneys Lee Holen and Kenneth Legacki, who have submitted declarations insupport of this motion, are the other two plaintiff-side employment lawyers known toapplicants.


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6) Whether the Fee is Fixed or Contingent

The fees sought by applicants are contingent upon their prevailing in the lawsuit

and the court’s award pursuant to §1988. This case was not accompanied by a demand for

damages against the Defendants, which would have permitted the court to include the

award of damages in its analysis.

7) Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or the Circumstances

Although Shortell and Gardner began to work together to develop the case in June

2013, the Complaint in this case was filed on May 12, 2014 and the Motion for Summary

Judgment, Opposition and Reply were briefed and decided by October 12, 2014. The

schedule of the case required applicants Shortell and Gardner to devote large amounts of

time during 2014 to the case that could have otherwise been spent earning fees in cases

where payment was certain. Both attorneys were working as sole practitioners during the

pendency of the case. Unlike firms where attorneys can devote time to pro bono cases

and this activity is subsidized by other paying clients, Shortell and Gardner sacrificed

much of 2014 to the Hamby case due to its social and legal significance, and did not work

within a firm framework where that lost time could be absorbed. Due to the court’s order

that the case proceed on a tight deadline and the fast-moving national legal landscape, the

case demanded that Shortell and Gardner devote much of their time in 2014 to the


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Hamby case. The court noted that it took the risk to the attorneys as sole practitioners

into account, but failed to explain how that reasoning is consistent with the court’s more

than 50% reduction of the fee award. Accordingly, applicants Shortell and Gardner ask

the court to reconsider its reasoning and decision in light of their sacrifice as sole

practitioners and the fees that they could have earned had they not been working on the

Hamby case during the tight deadlines necessary in 2014.

8) The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained

The Hamby Case was not a lawsuit for money damages and the fees requested

were reasonable in light of the historic result obtained. Since 1998, the state of Alaska

had expressly discriminated against same sex couples, denying them marriage and

recognition of marriage. Applicants won a permanent injunction and a declaration that

Alaska’s marriage laws violated due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th

amendment of the United States Constitution. As of January 2015, hundreds of same sex

couples had married in Alaska. Plaintiffs achieved reversal of an era of discrimination

that persisted from 1998-2014 that denied same-sex Alaskans fundamental rights and

equal protection of the law. The fees requested by Shortell and Gardner were necessary

and reasonable in relation to the historic result accomplished, but the court reduced those


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fees by over 50%25. Although this court recognized that Plaintiffs’ counsel benefitted

their clients and “others throughout society” and stated “[t]he Court has limited its

deductions from Plaintiffs' award due to this success and in order to fulfill the purpose of

§ 1988 to encourage experienced, uniquely-qualified attorneys to take on meritorious

constitutional claims of clients wronged by the government,” the court’s more than 50%

reduction of Shortell and Gardner’s fee request will have the effect of chilling, not

encouraging, future civil rights litigation against the government. Applicants urge the

court to reconsider its reasoning and decision to drastically reduce their requested fees

based on the remarkable result they achieved for civil rights in Alaska.

9) Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys

25 The court reduced Shortell and Gardner’s fees by 53% as follows: Caitlin Shortell

billed $395 per hour for 180.5 hours for a requested total of $71,297.50. This court

reduced Shortell’s hourly rate from $395 to $250 and reduced her hours by 25% to 135.4

hours for a reduced total award of $33,850.00. Heather Gardner billed an hourly rate of

$395 per hour and 230.2 hours for a requested total of $90,929.00. This court reduced

Gardner’s hourly rate to $250/hr and reduced her hours by 25% from 230.2 hours to

172.7 hours for a reduced award of $43,175.00.


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Applicants Shortell and Gardner both graduated from law school in 1999, Shortell

from Northeastern University School of Law and Gardner from Tulane Law School. Both

applicants had fourteen years of legal work experience following law school at the time

this case proceeded.

In 1999, Shortell was a judicial extern for District Court Judge Maxine Chesney of

the Northern District of California. She also worked for the private law firm of Gold

Bennett, Cera & Sidener in San Francisco on complex multidistrict class actions in

Securities Fraud and Antitrust. In 2000-2001, Shortell worked as a judicial law clerk for

Superior Court Judge Stephanie Joannides in Anchorage, Alaska. After returning to

Alaska permanently in 2003, Shortell worked as a lawyer at the Alaska Public Defender

Agency and as an Assistant Attorney General in Child Protection and Medicaid

Subrogation sections until January of 2008. In January of 2008, Shortell worked as

Attorney IV, Human Rights Advocate, at the Alaska State Commission for Human

Rights. From 2009 to the present, Shortell has been in private practice with Gardner and

in solo practice. In her private practice, Shortell focuses on plaintiff-side employment

discrimination and harassment, as well as civil litigation against government. Shortell

currently is sole counsel for Plaintiffs in a hybrid collective/class action brought under

the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Alaska Statutes and Human Rights Law before this


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court. Shortell has also done constitutional appellate advocacy for criminal defendants in

state and federal court. The focus of Shortell’s career as a lawyer since 1999 has been

constitutional and civil rights, the same subject matter of the Hamby case.

Heather Gardner graduated from Tulane Law School in 1999. Following law

school, she worked for private firms in Seattle and Juneau before becoming an assistant

attorney general representing the Divisions of Medical Assistance, Public Health, and

Public Assistance. From 2003 to 2005, she was in private practice in a firm specializing

in complex civil litigation in Juneau, Alaska. In 2005 she founded her own law firm,

where her practice included personal injury litigation, maritime litigation, business

litigation, administrative proceedings and appeals, federal criminal appeals, and family

law.

Both attorneys each had over 14 years of legal work experience at the filing of this

case in 2014 and possessed the requisite skill and experience in constitutional advocacy

civil rights litigation, and the basic skills of legal research, writing, and client

management necessary to bring a case of first impression involving a constitutional

challenge to Alaska law with a team of multiple attorneys and ten clients.


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Applicants Shortell and Gardner request that the court reconsider their experience,

skill, and ability due to its factual errors in noting their respective work experience and

the relevancy of those experiences to the instant case.

10) The "undesirability" of the case

When Shortell and Gardner began investigating this case in 2013, no other known

attorney, law firm, or advocacy organization would agree to take it. In response to press

inquiries in December 2013, representatives of Lambda Legal, Identity Inc, and the

ACLU of Alaska all stated that they did not intend to bring an Alaska marriage case. The

lack of any other local organization bringing the case made it “undesirable.” In addition

the case required advocating for LGBT people, a group that courts have recognized has

been a despised minority group. Applicants respectfully request that the court reconsider

its order based on the undesirablility of the case that applicants brought when no other

attorneys or organizations would do so in the State of Alaska on behalf of an unpopular

minority that continues to experience discrimination in the state.

11) Nature and extent of the professional relationship with the client

Counsel has outlined the relationship and efforts with the clients as set forth

above.


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12) Awards in similar cases

The court considered similar or parallel marriage cases outside Alaska, but did not

apply rates from within the District of Alaska, and few parallels exist. Counsel notes that

the total award claimed by the Alaska attorneys was considerably less than the amount

claimed by and awarded to the Idaho plaintiffs. The court failed to adequately explore

this factor and applicants urge the court to reconsider the Motion for Fees in light of this

factor.

B. Errors in the Court’s April 15, 2015 Order Require the Court to

Reconsider and Vacate its Order as to Undersigned Counsel and Reinstate the Fees

Requested

Applicants Shortell and Gardner request that the court reconsider its order in light

of manifest factual and legal errors, each of which appear to have factored into the court’s

decision to reduce the fee award requested by counsel:

1. Undersigned counsel did not “assist with the case” [Doc. 62 at 8] but in

fact, brought 6 of 10 Plaintiffs into the case and drafted the preponderance of substantive

pleadings in this matter. As the timesheets of both counsel indicate, Gardner drafted the

Complaint, the Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and


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the Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Attorney’s Fees.26 Caitlin Shortel

drafted the Motion for Summary Judgment, organized the Plaintiffs, and performed the

preponderance of work involved in initially bringing the case, preparing the clients

meeting with clients before the complaint was filed, interacting with clients after the case

was underway, and dealing with public inquiries about the case. Mendel’s office brought

four of the Plaintiffs into the case, edited and made inclusions in documents, and drafted

the pre-trial conference notice, the opposition to the stay in mid-October 2014, and the

motion for fees. The delegation of substantive work between the attorneys in this matter

was divided between Mendel’s office on one hand and undersigned counsel on the other,

and is reflected in the time spent by undersigned counsel set forth in their timesheets.

Undersigned counsel began the legwork to bring this case in late June, 2013

immediately after the Windsor decision was issued. Because of the nature of the case

both attorneys performed work that is not reflected in time sheets because it is non-

compensable by this court under 42 U.S.C. §1988. This was also explained in the

Declarations of both attorneys, and is also evident in the Affidavit of Blakeley. The

court’s repeated assumption that Mendel “led” the case, its “legal team” [Doc. 62 at 14

17] and its other assumptions about the relative value and weight of the attorney’s

26 As Allison Mendel is not participating in this motion, Counsel cannot speak to her andher associate’s billing in this matter.


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contributions is not based upon any facts present or relevant in this matter, but appears to

have factored heavily into its decision to impose a substantially lower hourly rate (and

greater discount of both rate and hours) on undersigned counsel than upon Mendel,

whose compensable effort was more limited.27 It also appears to be the basis for the

court’s subjective evaluation of experience and reputation, without any reference as to

any specific basis for those conclusions.

Because undersigned counsel was largely responsible for the briefing and were in

reliable communication with each other, undersigned counsel met on a regular basis by

phone to discuss, among other matters: new cases as they were decided; lega

scholarship, theories, and news articles on the matters before the court; the postures of

pending cases; recorded oral arguments and the judges’ questions as they became

available; and questions presented by the Plaintiffs themselves to their counsel. There are

all reasonable uses of attorney time, and would in fact be reasonably billable to private

clients who were headed to federal court on a rapidly evolving issue. Not all of the time

the attorneys spent working on this case was actually reflected in their timesheets. If the

Plaintiffs were directly paying for the work performed by counsel, they would reasonably

27 Counsel does not suggest that Mendel is not entitled to her claimed fees. To thecontrary. But undersigned counsel does not represent Mendel or have any authority fromher to speak for her.


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expect Counsel to be fully informed and up to date on all developments on their issue,

regardless of how quickly they occurred, and they would expect their attorneys to direct

their case based upon the latest developments. Moreover, the hours claimed do not reflec

all of the time counsel spent reasonably working on, researching, discussing, or otherwise

occupied by the case. Counsel exercised discretion in billing as billing occurred.

2. The court also misstated undersigned counsel’s legal experience as set forth

in Declarations. For example, as an AAG, Gardner did not do “child protection

litigation”, nor does her practice focus on “domestic matters” as the court states. [Doc 62

at 9, FN 50.] These are relevant errors because they appear to have factored into the

court’s eventual determination of the artificial hourly rate it assigned to counsel. If the

court is relying upon date of admission to practice in Alaska, it has not explained why

that is the relevant basis for calculating an attorney’s experience, rather than the year the

attorney completed law school. Gardner was admitted to practice in 1999, and Shortell in

2004. Yet the court assigned both attorneys the same substantially reduced hourly rate.

3. It is also unclear why the court, finding that Gardner’s experience merited

an hourly rate of only $250 an hour, awarded Mendel a different rate for a longer career

that has actually been focused on family law, found no reason to reward Shortell’s

experience litigating discrimination claims, an area of practice directly relevant here, and


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24

assigned an hourly rate of only $75 less to an associate with less than five years of

experience. The court does not explain why any of these characterizations, regardless of

accuracy, lead to the conclusion that the hourly rate claimed by counsel is inappropriate

The court’s reasoning is not adequately explained as required by the Ninth Circuit.28

4. The court also characterizes “experience working on LGBT issues” as

significant to counsel receiving a compensatory fee in this matter. This is an arbitrary

and circular basis for reducing counsels’ fee, given the fact that this case could certainly

not have been brought before Windsor (June 2013) and arguably not before SmithKline

Beecham (January 2014) and the Alaska Supreme Court was effectively denied

jurisdiction over this matter by the constitutional amendment this case overturned. Since

the courts either did not view same sex couples or LGBT people as meriting protection or

were prevented from doing so prior to 2013, very few Alaska attorneys have substantial

experience pursuing LGBT claims. For example, the Alaska State Commission for

Human Rights does not investigate or pursue claims of discrimination against LGBT

people. As a result, Shortell was barred from pursuing such claims when she was the

agency’s attorney, and the court has declined to recognize her experience as valuable

when the lack of any protections for LGBT people in Alaska resulted in a legal

28 Moreno at 1112.


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25

environment in which challenging any form of discrimination against them was virtually

impossible.

5. The court also did not explain why it refused to consider the evidence of the

hourly rates offered to private contract counsel by the State of Alaska in 2014 (c.

$380.00) as useful in determining the reasonableness of counsel’s requested hourly rate

but did consider the rate ($225.00) proposed by Defendants in their conclusory

opposition, which Defendants conceded was several years old, based upon “studies” no

provided to the court, was not intended to be a compensatory rate, and was unsupported

by any offered evidence other than Defendants’ counsel’s affidavit. As Defendants

acknowledged that the rate they proposed had been in effect for years, the Ninth Circuit

has specifically disallowed the evidence Defendants offered. “We also note that in

determining the prevailing market rate a district court abuses its discretion to the extent it

relies on cases decided years before the attorneys actually rendered their services.”29

6. Moreover, the court failed to consider that Defendants did not meet their

29 Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that it was an

abuse of discretion to apply market rates in effect more than two years before the work

was performed).


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26

burden of rebuttal. Defendants opposed the fee motion for the general reasons that they

believed that undersigned counsel took too much time and asked for a too-high hourly

rate. It is notable that Defendants admitted to about 670 hours spent defending the case

the court’s reduction of all of Plaintiffs’ counsels hours reduces the total hours allowed to

be billed to 542.2 hours [Doc. 62 at 20], more than 127 fewer total hours than Defendants

claimed to have spent defending it. Neither of Defendants’ vague bases of opposition

form anything approaching an adequate rebuttal. In Moreno, the Ninth Circuit warned

that

“the burden of producing a sufficiently cogent explanation can mostly be placed on the shoulders of the losing parties… If opposing counsel cannotcome up with specific reasons that the district court finds persuasive, itshould normally grant the award in full, or with no more than a haircut.”

30

6. The court should also reconsider the reasonablenesss of applicants

requested fees in comparison to cases of like difficulty and should not limit its inquiry to

equal marriage cases in other districts. The court did not base its analysis on cases of like

difficulty in the district, but considered rates in the context of equal marriage lawsuits

from other districts. The court appears to have relied primarily on a rate requested by an

attorney in the Western District of Kentucky, which is not comparable to the local

30 Moreno at 1116.


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27

market. The failure to consider the rates of attorneys in the district and restriction of

comparison to other FDCPA cases were a basis for remand in Camacho. The court

commented, “[i]n order to encourage able counsel to undertake FDCPA cases, as

Congress intended, it is necessary that counsel be awarded fees commensurate with those

which they could obtain by taking other types of cases.”31

7. The court should also reconsider its order’s impermissible double

discounts, as established in Moreno. By cutting both counsels’ hourly rate and the hours

reasonably spent, the court has imposed draconian reductions that are not justified by

either the circumstances of the case or the market rates in the district. As the Moreno

court warned:

“It is possible…for a district court to reduce both the hours and hourly rateawarded for some tasks. But the district court must exercise extreme carein making such reductions to avoid double counting… [t]he district court

may properly use the simplicity of a given task as justification for areduction in the rate for the hours spent performing that task or as justification for a reduction in the overall rate, but not both.” 32

31 Camacho, supra, citing Tolentino, 46 F.3d at 652; see also Semar v. Platte Valley Fed

Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1986).

32 Moreno at 1115-1116.


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28

The court’s order has imposed upon undersigned counsel draconian cuts where

Defendants offered no effective rebuttal, in a matter of monumental significance in the

development of civil rights, and on an issue where the final outcome is far from certain,

because it is currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. Plaintiffs achieved a

significant victory, and the court should not deter other attorneys from being willing to

bring similar claims before the court by arbitrarily cutting their fees to a noncompensable

level without justification.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the above, the court should reconsider its April 15, 2015 Order

reverse its reductions of counsel’s requested fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and

reinstate counsels’ fees as requested by undersigned counsel in the original motion for

fees.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of May, 2015 at Anchorage

Alaska.

By: ____________/s/_______________

Heather Gardner #0111079Caitlin Shortell #0405027


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29

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 13, 2015 I caused to be served by CM/ECF electronic service the

above document, attached declarations of Caitlin Shortell, Heather Gardner, Lee Holen,

Ken Legacki, and Jessica Hedges, and proposed Order on the counsel of record set forth

below:

Allison Mendel, Esq.

William Milks, Esq.

Kevin Wakeley, Esq.

/s/ Caitlin Shortell


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HAMBY ET AL. V. PARNELL ET AL. CASE NO. 3:14-cv- 00089 TMB

PROPOSED ORDER ON MOTION FOR R ECONSIDERATION (FRCP §59(E))

1

Heather Gardner #0111079Caitlin Shortell #0405027Counsel for Plaintiffs



MATTHEW HAMBY ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

WILLIAM WALKER, ET AL.,

Defendants.


PROPOSED ORDER ON

RECONSIDERATION OF COURT’SORDER ON MOTION FORATTORNEY’S FEES (42 U.S.C. §1988) (FRCP § 59(e)

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion is GRANTED. The court has reconsidered its Apri

15, 2015 Order, VACATES the order as to movants Caitlin Shortell and Heather

Gardner, and awards attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 to Shortell and Gardner

as follows:

1) the court awards Caitlin Shortell attorneys’ fees in the amount of $71,297.50.

2) the court awards Heather Gardner attorneys’ fees in the amount of $90,929.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY: _____________________________________U.S. District Court Judge Timothy Burgess

Case 3:14-cv-00089-TMB Document 63-1 Filed 05/13/15 Page 1 of 2

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HAMBY ET AL. V. PARNELL ET AL. CASE NO. 3:14-cv- 00089 TMB

PROPOSED ORDER ON MOTION FOR R ECONSIDERATION (FRCP §59(E))

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on May 13, 2015 I caused to be served by CM/ECF electronic service the above

document on the counsel of record set forth below:

Allison Mendel, Esq.William Milks, Esq.Kevin Wakeley, Esq.

/s/ Caitlin Shortell


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DECLARATION OF HEATHER L. GARDNER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

Heather Gardner AK Bar #0111079Caitlin Shortell AK Bar #0405027




MATTHEW HAMBY and CHRISTOPHERSHELDEN, a married couple, CHRISTINALABORDE and SUSAN TOW, a marriedcouple, SEAN EGAN and DAVIDROBINSON, a married couple, TRACEYWIESE and KATRINA CORTEZ, a marriedcouple, and COURTNEY LAMB andSTEPHANIE PEARSON, unmarried persons,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

SEAN C. PARNELL, in his official capacityas Governor of Alaska, MICHAELGERAGHTY, in his official capacity asAttorney General of the State of Alaska,WILLIAM J. STREUR, in his officialcapacity as Commissioner of the State ofAlaska, Department of Health and SocialServices, and PHILLIP MITCHELL, in hisofficial capacity as State Registrar andLicensing Officer, Alaska Bureau of VitalStatistics,

Defendants.

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OFMOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONRE: ORDER FOR ATTORNEYS’FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO28 U.S.C. §1988


I, Heather L. Gardner, hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am a member in good standing of the state bars of Alaska and Washington. I am

inactive in Washington. I am also licensed to practice in the United States District Court for the

District of Alaska, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the United

States Supreme Court. I am submitting this declaration in support of counsel Shortell and

Gardner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the April 15, 2015 Order on Attorneys’ Fees [Doc 62.]


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I have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this declaration and could competently testify

to these facts.

2. I previously set forth my experience, education, and qualifications in my earlier

Declaration in Support of Attorney’s Fees [Doc. 50] and incorporate that declaration herein.

3. The fee award entered by the court at Docket 62 is not fully compensatory to me.

I have not charged $250.00 per hour as a normal rate for any type of civil litigation for several

years. My rate varies, but is dependent upon having a deposit of fees in advance of performing

work. I often charge flat fees on complex matters when clients request it. I am rarely in a

financial position to undertake contingency fee litigation, and this matter was a rare exception

due to the importance of the issue.

4. In the above referenced case, I took primary responsibility for drafting the

Complaint [Doc. 1], the Reply to the Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

[Doc. 33] and the Reply to the Defendants’ Opposition to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. 58.]

I did not spend more time than necessary on any of these tasks, especially since I did not know

if, or when, I would be paid for them. I have not billed for drafting the reply to the opposition to

attorney’s fees.

5. In addition to the tasks for which I was primarily responsible, I spent time that I

did not bill for because I did not believe it was reasonably billable on this case. Caitlin Shortell

and I planned to bring this matter for almost a year before it was filed. I did bill for any

preparation time and I avoided billing when I was simply answering questions, interacting with

press, and other nonbillable activities.

6. The time demands of this case reduced my capacity to work on other cases. Due

to short deadlines and the rapidly evolving legal landscape of the issues presented in this matter,

I had to devote substantial focus to this case to the exclusion of other work.


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7. The court’s April 15, 2015 order drastically reducing both my hourly rate and my

total hours spent on this matter will absolutely deter me from accepting any future civil rights

cases or other types of cases subject to fee shifting statutes within the District of Alaska. I

cannot take such a risk in the future if, even if I prevail and achieve a high degree of success, and

even where the opposing party fails to rebut my request for fees, I stand to be under compensated

for my time and efforts.

8. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully request the court award me the fees I

requested, and fully compensate me for the work I performed in this matter.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Seattle, Washington on this 13th day of May, 2015.

/s Heather GardnerBy: ____________________________

Heather Gardner ABA #0111079


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DECLARATION OF LEE HOLEN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR REASONABLE

ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES - 1




Plaintiffs,

vs.


Defendants.

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OFMOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28U.S.C. §1988


I, Lee Holen, hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am a member in good standing of the state bar of Alaska. I am licensed to

practice in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska and the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I am submitting this declaration in support of Plaintiffs’

Motion for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. I have personal knowledge of the matters

stated in this declaration and can competently testify to these facts.

2. I am a 1977 graduate of William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota.


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3. Following graduation from law school, I relocated to Alaska and became a

member of the Alaska Bar in 1978 to the present.

4. Since the early 1980s, I have practiced employment law almost exclusively, in my

own firm since approximately 1990. I have litigated cases in Alaska State and Federal Courts, as

well as before administrative agencies, with appellate work before the Alaska Supreme Court,

the Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. I have served as co-

counsel with the EEOC in discrimination cases in Federal District Court in Anchorage, Alaska.

5. In my current practice, which includes mainly plaintiff-side employment

litigation, I have litigated federal civil rights lawsuits, including Breland v. Fred Meyer Stores,

Inc., Case No. A05-169 CI (TMB); Jacobsen v. Ketchikan Police Dept., et al., Case No. K03-

0003-CV (RRB); Walker v. NANA WorleyParsons, LLC , Case No. 3:11-cv-00089 (SLG); Sutton

v. Jewell , Case No. 3:13-cv-00096 (TMB); as well as a large number of cases in State Court

which also include federal civil rights claims.

6. As a lawyer who practices in the District of Alaska, I believe the hourly rate of

$395.00 requested by Ms. Shortell and Ms. Gardner is a reasonable hourly rate of compensation

for private attorneys with ten to twenty years of experience in a complex §1983 civil rights

lawsuit like Hamby v. Walker .

7. A federal civil rights lawsuit brings with it a risk that the lawyer never will be

paid. If the court declines to award the lawyers who have brought such a case their reasonable

hourly rates commensurate for their risk, their skill in concluding the case, and the result, it will

be a deterrent to civil rights lawyers bringing such cases in the future. I do not believe that a rate

of $250 per hour is near adequate compensation for taking on a case with the high degree of risk

involved in this vigorously contested civil rights case regarding equal marriage; the disparity

between the State resources and the Plaintiffs must be considered. Without attorneys who take


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these risks, the Plaintiffs would not be able to prosecute these legitimate and ultimately

successful claims.


Executed in Anchorage, Alaska on this 27th day of April, 2015.

/s/ Lee HolenAK Bar # 7810071


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IN THE UNITED ST TES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF L SK

Plaintiffs,

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY S FEES

AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. §1988

MATTHEW HAMBY and CHRISTOPHER

SHELDEN, a married couple, CHRISTINA

LABORDE and SUSAN TOW, a married

couple, SEAN EGAN and DAVID

ROBINSON, a married couple, TRACEY

WIESE and KATRINA CORTEZ, a married

couple, and COURTNEY LAMB and

STEPHANIE PEARSON, unmarried

persons,

vs.

SEAN C. PARNELL, in his official capacity

as Governor of Alaska, MICHAEL

GERAGHTY, in his official capacity as

Attorney General of the State of Alaska,

WILLIAM

J.

STREUR,in his official capacity

as Commissioner of the State of Alaska,

Department of Health and Social Services,

and PHILLIP MITCHELL, in his official

capacity as State Registrar and Licensing

Officer, Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics,

Defendants.


I, Kenneth Legacki, hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am a member in good standing of the Alaska Bar Association and the

Washington State Bar Association. I am licensed to practice in the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. I am

submitting this declaration in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reasonable Attorneys Fees and

Costs. I have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this declaration and could competently

testify to these facts.

DECLARATIONOFKENNETHLEGACKIINSUPPORTOFPLAINTIFFS MOTIONFORREASONABLE

ATTORNEYS FEESANDEXPENSES- I

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2. I graduated in 1982 from the University of Puget Sound School of Law, now

known as Seattle University School of Law.

3. Following graduation, I worked as a law clerk for The Honorable Thomas E.

Schulz, Judge of the Superior Court, and as a magistrate in Ketchikan, Alaska.

4. I was admitted to the Alaska Bar Association in November 1983 and to the

Washington State Bar Association in July 2003.

5. I have been practicing law in Anchorage, Alaska since 1983. I worked for

private law firms between 1984 and 1988, before opening my own practice in 1988.

6. In my current practice, which includes plaintiff-side employment litigation, I have

litigated race and gender discrimination cases.

7. As a lawyer who practices in the District of Alaska, I believe the hourly rate of

395.00 requested by Ms. Shortell and Ms. Gardner is a reasonable hourly rate of compensation

for private attorneys of similar experience in this district in a complex §1983 civil rights lawsuit

like

amby

v.

Walker

8. A federal civil rights lawsuit is by nature a contingency case that brings with it a

risk that the lawyer will never be paid. If the court declines to award the lawyers who have

brought such a case their requested hourly rates, it will be a deterrent to lawyers bringing such

cases in the future. I do not believe that a rate of 250 per hour is near adequate compensation

DECLARATION OF KENNETH LEGACKIIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR REASONABLE

ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES - 2

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for taking on a case with the risk involved in this highly contested civil rights case regarding

equal marriage, and I do not believe it represents a market rate for such work performed by

experienced attorneys.

declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Anchorage, Alaska on this 13

day of May 2015.

enneth W. Legacki

Alaska BarNo. 8310132

425 G Street, Suite 920

Anchorage, AK 99501

Phone: (907) 258-2422

Fax: (907) 278-4848

E-mail: [email protected]

DECLARA nON OF KENNETH LEGACKIIN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR REASONABLE

ATTORNEYS FEE S AND EXPENSES - 3

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DECLARATION OF JESSICA HEDGES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR REASONABLE





Plaintiffs,

vs.


Defendants.

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OFMOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEESAND COSTS PURSUANT TO 28U.S.C. §1988


I, Jessica D. Hedges, hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am a member in good standing of the state bar of Massachusetts. Since 2009, I

have been a partner in the law firm of Hedges & Tumposky, LLP, a small law firm that

specializes in civil rights (police misconduct) and criminal law. Currently, most of my cases

(both criminal and civil) are being litigated the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts, Boston. Before opening my own firm, I worked in another small law firm in

Boston for eight years (first as an associate and then as a partner) where I also specialized in civil

rights and criminal law.


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2. I am a 1999 graduate of Northeastern University School of Law. I am licensed to

practice in the States of Massachusetts and West Virginia, the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts and the United States Court of Appeals for the 1 st and 4th Circuit(s),

and the Supreme Court of the United States.

3. Throughout my career I have been asked to lecture, teach, and sit on various

panels concerning on civil rights law and criminal law. I have also been an Adjunct professor at

Northeastern University School of Law for the past five years.

4. I am submitting this declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reasonable

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. I have personal knowledge of the matters stated in this declaration

and could competently testify to these facts.

5. Throughout my career I have litigated numerous federal civil rights lawsuits.

Most of these suits have ultimately settled. However, I have tried several of these cases to

verdict, and supervised other in doing so, including, but not limited to the following:

Caldwell v. Delancy, US District Court, 06-11869 (J. Young) (civil Rights, prison) Losano v. Town of Swampscott , 02-11111 (J. Lasker) (civil rights, police misconduct)

Lacy v. Feeny 04-11492 (J. Young) (civil rights, police misconduct)

6. I have reviewed the fee bills of Caitlin Shortell and Heather Gardner in the above-

captioned matter. While I practice in the District of Massachusetts and Ms. Shortell and Ms.

Gardner practice in the District of Alaska, I have experience litigating §1983 civil rights cases

where the Plaintiff’s lawyer assumes the risk of never getting paid. Taking such cases has an

opportunity cost, because any time spent on a case where a client pays me for my services.

7. Having reviewed the billing of Ms. Shortell and Ms. Gardner and based on my

experience as a private lawyer who has practiced in the area of §1983 litigation, I believe that the

time spent by Ms. Shortell and Ms. Gardner on this case was reasonable for a case of this risk,

complexity and import. Plaintiffs’ counsel Shortell and Gardner found the appropriate clients,


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coordinated those ten clients throughout, kept abreast of decisions in the federal courts around

the nation that issued on a weekly basis during the pendency of the case. In addition, Shortell and

Gardner researched and authored the pleadings in the case. Gardner drafted the Complaint.

Shortell drafted the Motion for Summary Judgment. Gardner drafted the Reply to the

Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Shortell and Ms. Gardner met once a

week for one hour throughout the case to manage the progress of the case and nationwide

developments in equal marriage litigation. In addition, Plaintiffs’ counsel spent time throughout

the case meeting with their co-counsel, Ms. Mendel, to finalize the pleadings that Shortell and

Gardner authored, and in preparation for an oral argument.

8. The billing submitted by Shortell and Gardner was sufficiently specific with

regard to the tasks performed in each entry and was not “block billing” prohibited in the federal

courts. Entries by Shortell noted the particular topics researched and particular sections of the

Motion for Summary Judgment written on any given entry. Gardner’s entries were similarly

specific. Shortell and Gardner’s entries as to their meetings gave the court information as to the

topics discussed.

9. As an attorney in private practice, I handle different types of cases with different

rates of compensation, depending on whether the case is court appointed, billed to a client, on

contingency, or billed by the hour. The rate that I charge or receive for a court appointed

criminal defense case is different and typically much lower than the rate that I would charge and

receive to successfully bring a complex civil rights case. The reasons for the difference in my

rates include: 1) the rates of court appointed work are set by the court; 2) bringing a complex

federal civil rights case involves the very high risk that I will never be compensated for my time

unless I am a prevailing party.


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10. Because any time I spend on federal civil rights litigation is uncompensated as it

proceeds and consumes time I would otherwise be doing paying work, my billing in federal civil

rights litigation has to be efficient so that I can continue to do other paying work during the time

period that I am litigating the unpaid civil rights litigation.

11. I can afford to be paid a lower rate for court appointed criminal defense work that

I do because there is a certainty that I will be paid for the work I bill. I could not afford to receive

only $250/hour on billing as a prevailing party in a complex civil rights lawsuit. If the court

approved an hourly rate for me of $250/hour, I would be dissuaded from bringing such litigation

in the future.

12. While I do not practice in the District of Alaska, my experience with federal civil

rights litigation and my knowledge of the nationwide developments in the area of civil rights

litigation in the federal courts, the time reflected in the billing by Ms. Shortell and Ms. Gardner

was not excessive. The time spent appears to have been necessary to bring and develop the case,

coordinate ten clients, author the pleadings, prepare for and do oral argument. Based on the

diligent work performed to bring the case, the Plaintiffs prevailed and changed the law in the

State of Alaska. I conclude that the time spent by Ms. Shortell and Ms. Gardner was reasonable

and necessary to accomplish the result that they obtained.


Executed in Boston, Massachusetts on this 25th day of April 2015.

/s/Jessica D. HedgesMA Bar # 645847


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DECLARATION OF CAITLIN SHORTELL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR REASONABLE


Heather Gardner AK Bar #0111079Caitlin Shortell AK Bar #0405027Allison Mendel AK Bar #8310136




MATTHEW HAMBY et al, unmarried persons,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

WILLIAM WALKER et al,

Defendants.

DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OFMOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

RE: ORDER FOR ATTORNEY’SFEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO28 U.S.C. §1988


I, Caitlin Shortell, hereby declare and state as follows:

1. I am a member in good standing of the state bar of Alaska. I am licensed to

practice in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska and the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I am submitting this declaration in support of counsel Shortell

and Gardner’s Motion for Reconsideration of this court’s April 15, 2015 order partially granting

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. I have personal knowledge of the

matters stated in this declaration and could competently testify to these facts.

2. I previously set forth my experience, education, and qualification in my earlier

declaration in support of Attorney’s Fees [Doc. 49] and incorporate that declaration herein.


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DECLARATION OF CAITLIN SHORTELL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR REASONABLE


6. The fee award entered by the court at Doc. 62 is not adequately compensatory to me. I

have not charged an hourly rate of $250 for several years. Although I charge a variable hourly

rate depending on the complexity of the matter and other factors, I currently charge a rate of

$375.00 per hour in most cases, including routine family law and employment law matters.

7. Although I rarely undertake contingent fee representation due to my status as a sole

practitioner, I made an exception for this case because of the importance of the issue of the civil

rights issue of equal marriage involved.

8. In this case, I recruited six of the ten plaintiffs in the case. I was the client liaison by

agreement of counsel. I performed the majority of client communication and coordination

throughout the case.

9. During the pendency of the case, rather than take work where payment was certain, I

devoted a significant amount of time in 2014 to the Hamby case. I turned away other work

because this challenging and expedited litigation required a significant amount of my available

time and focus. This matter, while unquestionably worthwhile, has been a financial burden to my

practice. I was efficient and conservative in allocating my time to tasks in this case due to the

fact that I had no assurance that I would ever get paid and any time I spent took away from time

that I could earn fees in my other cases.

11. Despite these challenges, Plaintiffs’ team have produced excellent results for our

clients and others in society.

15. Accordingly, I requested to be compensated for 180.5 hours at $395 per hour

through October 27, 2014. In support of the Motion for Reconsideration, I submitted this

declaration, and the declarations of Heather Gardner, Lee Holen, and Kenneth Legacki, who all

aver that the requested rate and fees are reasonable within the district and for cases of like


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difficulty given my background, experience, and skill; the confluence of complexity, risk, and

time demands in this case; and the degree of success that we have achieved.

16. I requested 180.5 hours at $395.00 per hour for a total of $71,297.50. The court

reduced my fees by 53%. This drastic reduction of my fees will likely deter me from accepting

such cases where fee shifting applies in the future. Because my practice is focused on civil rights

litigation in the District of Alaska and there is much more work to be done to secure full equality

for LGBT Alaskans and other individuals, the court’s order of April 15, 2015 sets a chilling

precedent. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully request that the court reconsider its order and

reinstate my requested fees in this matter.


Executed in Anchorage, Alaska on this 13th day of May 2015.

/Caitlin Shortell___AK Bar # 0405027

3:14-cv-00089 #63

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