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    Automated Data Analysis

    FEBRUARY 25, 2013

    Doing research lately I realized I was duplicating a lot of my efforts in terms of gathering and organizing data

    for analysis. I decided to invest some time creating databases and macros that could do this for me and

    make it easier to do analysis going forward.

    I started with commodity futures data from Quandl.com which is a great data website. It also has an API for

    calling specific date ranges and data.

    First I created a list of the commodities I needed and made a macro in Excel that would download this. The

    macro would go through the list of products I needed data for, and request them for the date ranges

    specified in cells C1 and D1. It would then save them by symbol name in a folder.

    So after running the macro the folder would contain the price data for the commodities requested. In this

    case there was a small range downloaded so I have a number of small CSV files.

    Next I used VBA in Access to import the CSV data into the

    database tables for the related commodities.

    As shown below there is now tables for each contract, and

    each tables has OHLC data as well as volume and open

    interest.

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    In order to avoid pulling unnecessary amounts of data back into Excel to analyze I made a union query

    which would return the data needed. In this case front and back month corn since 1/1/2013.

    Once in excel I used to a pivot table to organize the data which made it easier to graph.

    Lastly I created different charts. The following pages are the automated reports I had Excel generate for

    corn, soy and wheat.

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    RelationshipsbetweenUSDACropProgressReportsandCornYields.

    2012

    FromApriltoNovembertheUSDepartmentofAgriculturereleasesaweeklyreporttitledCropProgressand

    ConditionswhichprovidesinformationonthegrowthcycleandconditionsofmajorgraincropsintheUS.These

    reportsareanimportantsourceofinformationforcommoditymarketsandhavethepotentialtocauselargechanges

    inprice.

    Thereportisacompilationofsurveystakenfromapproximately4,000respondentswhoprovidesubjectiveratings

    andcategorizecropsasVeryPoor,Poor,Fair,GoodorExcellent.TheUSDAthenprovidestheaggregatepercentageof

    eachcrop,ineachstate,whichfallsintoeachcategory.

    Whilebreadthoftheweeklysurveysandthemethodologyprovidesvaluabledata,theUSDAspresentationofthe

    datamakesitdifficulttoanalyze.

    Forexample,whentryingtocomparetwoweekstherearefivedifferentchangesthathavetobechecked.Inthis

    hypotheticalscenariotheamountratedExcellenthasdropped5%,theamountratedPoorhasdropped10%and

    theamountratedFairhasincreased15%.

    Week1 Week2

    Excellent 10% 5%

    Good 20% 20%

    Fair 30% 45%

    Poor 30% 20%

    VeryPoor 10% 10%

    Althoughthisisvaluabledata,itishandicappedthroughpresentationandreporting,makingitdifficultrunstatistical

    analysisortocomparetohistoricaldata.

    Eveninthecurrentformvisualrepresentationdoesnotprovidemoreinsight.

    InordertocondensetheweeklyreportoffivedifferentcategoriesandcorrespondingpercentagesIhavecreateda

    numericalratingscalewithweightedcategoriestocomeupwithanaggregateratingwith1equalingVeryPoorand5

    equalingExcellent.

    Applyingthistotheprevioushypotheticalexampleweseethattheoverallchangesinthecategoriesleftthe

    conditionsunchanged

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    Week1 Week2

    Excellent 5 10% =0.50 5% =0.25

    Good 4 20% =0.80 20% =0.80

    Fair 3 30% =0.90 45% =1.35Poor 2 30% =0.60 20% =0.40

    VeryPoor 1 10% =0.10 10% =0.10

    2.9

    2.9

    Inthisexample,theaverageratingforWeek1and2was2.9,whichismarginallybelowFair(3).

    InordertoanalyzethisdataIranqueriesagainsttheUSDAsAgriculturalMarketingServicesdatabasewhichIthen

    importedintoMicrosoftAccess.Cornratingsforeverystategoingbackto1986producedover55,000entriesinthe

    database.

    Icreatedqueriestopullspecificstatesandyears.IalsoutilizedcalculatedfieldsinAccesstoproducetheaggregate

    foreachweekforeachstate.

    RatingNumber:IIf([Corn]="Excellent",5,(IIf([Corn]="Good",4,(IIf([Corn]="Fair",3,(IIf([Corn]="Poor",2,(IIf([Corn]="Very

    Poor",1)))))))))

    Weighted:[RatingNumber]*[Rating]*0.01

    Creatingthisaggregateallowsforeasycomparisonsacrossyears.Accessqueriescanbemadeforspecifiedstatesand

    yearsandthenlinkedtoExcel.OnceinExcelitseasytoanalyzethedataorchartit.

    Belowisanexampleoftheweeklyaggregatefrom2007-2012,with2012bolded.ThisdatawasfromWeek#25which

    correspondedtotheJune11th

    reportin2012.Althoughthischartshowstheconditionsweremarkedlypoorerthan

    previousyears,themarketforSeptembercornfuturesclosedat$5.37onthedayofthereport.Thefollowingweek

    futuresbegantheirrallywhichtoppedoutwithSeptembercornhitting$8.43

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    TheJuly9th

    reportshowedexcessivedeteriorationinIowaquality,withSeptembercornfuturesclosingat$7.31.

    Theaggregatechartsmakeiteasytocomparestatesandalsovisualizetheconditionsrelativetopreviousyears.For

    example,Indianawasespeciallyhardhitduringthedroughtof2012andthismethodputsitintoperspectivewith

    otheryears.

    Indroughtyearssuchas2012marketsoftenlookforanalogyearswithsimilarconditionsinordertohavehistorical

    referencefortrading.For2012theoftencitedanalogyearswere1988and1993.IcreatedAccessqueriestopulland

    comparethisdata.Additionally,Ialsocreatedanotherindexwhichcomparedaveragecropratingsfrombetween

    2006-2011forcomparisonwithdroughtyears.

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    Anotheradvantageforaggregatingtheratingsisthatitallowsforyearlyaveragesofconditions.Duringthecourseof

    theyearfinalyieldestimatesfromtheUSDA,aswellasprivatecompanies,havemajorimpactsonmarketsas

    participantsreadjustsupply/demandmodels.Giventhatcropconditionsthroughouttheyeararecloselylinkedtothe

    finalofficialyieldIwantedtolookathowwelltheaverageyearlycropratingmatchedwiththefinalreportedyield.

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    Icreatedascatterplotfrom2000to2012witheachstatesaverageratingandfinalrealizedyield.

    Theseshowabroadcorrelationbetweenaverageyieldandaggregateannualcroprating.Oneinterestingoutlieris

    SouthDakotawhoseratingstendtobemoreoptimisticthantheothereightmajorproducingstates.

    Thiscanbethenanalyzedbyindividualstatesandlinearregressionlinescanbecreatedtoquantifythetrends.For

    Iowa,duringthisperiodthelinearregressionequationisy=0.0129x+1.5717.IftheaveragecropconditionwasFair(3)

    forayearthiswouldsuggestafinalendingyieldof110bushelsperacre,whileifitwereGood(4)thiswouldsuggesta

    yieldof188bpa.

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    Thiscanberunforotherstatesaswell.ForinstanceNebraskaslinearregressionisy=0.0199x+0.6353whichforaan

    averageyearlyratingofFair(3)suggestionsa118bpayieldandforGood(4)suggestions169bpsyield.Thisflatter

    relationshipimpliesthat,relativetoIowa,Nebraskacornyieldsfluctuatelessasreportedcropconditionschange.

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    UsingtheequationforeachstateslinearregressionIcalculatedthedifferencebetweentheimpliedtrendlineyield

    andthefinalrealizedyield.Thisshowstheaggregateyearlyaveragetobequiteaccuratewiththelargestpercentage

    beinglessthan5bpaawayfromthefinalyield.

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    Thisaccuracydatacananalyzedbystate

    StateAvgdifference

    Max Min Range

    NE 0.35 13.89 -10.27 24.16

    KS 0.23 14.39 -16.71 31.09

    WI 0.1 14.39 -20.32 34.71

    MN 0.37 11.42 -23.89 35.32

    SD -0.12 17.67 -22.16 39.83

    IN -0.34 13.79 -32.65 46.45

    OH -0.1 22.46 -26.55 49.01

    IA -0.1 27.27 -26.8 54.07

    IL 0.01 33.72 -33.89 67.61

    Andbyyear

    StateAvg

    difference Max Min Range

    2000 -21.58 -2.33 -33.89 31.56

    2001 -9.6 2.13 -19.59 21.72

    2002 2.64 17.12 -6.67 23.79

    2003 -1 10.66 -10.18 20.84

    2004 1.01 8.85 -8.78 17.63

    2005 7.77 33.72 -4.37 38.09

    2006 0.31 17.63 -7.94 25.57

    2007 0.89 15.11 -10.27 25.38

    2008 3.96 13.39 -5.2 18.59

    2009 7.86 17.67 -5.46 23.14

    2010 -7.05 3.87 -23.14 27.01

    2011 3.29 15.95 -3.23 19.18

    2012 12.09 27.27 2.77 24.5

    Oneinterestingtakeawayfromthisdataishowmuch2012exceededexpectations.BetweenJanuaryandthe

    beginningofJune2012cornpricestradedbetween$5and$6.Duringmid-JunetoAugustpricesspikedto$8.43on

    August10.Sincethen,priceshavefallenwithDecembercornfuturesreachingaSeptember29lowof$7.05.

    The2012correlationdatashowsthatthefinalrealizedyieldwas12bpahigherthanthecropconditionsimpliedyield.

    Thisisbiggestoutperformanceinthesampleseriesandsuggestedthemarketoverpricedriskearliertheyearbefore

    readjustingafterharvest.Alsothataccuracyoftheimpliedyieldcalculationsdecreasesinextremeyearssuchas2012.

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    Corn Update 1/29/13

    JANUARY 30, 2013

    Lately RBOB/Ethanol spread has been widening. However this is mostly due to the strength in the RBOB

    market being greater than the strength in the ethanol market, rather than ethanol weakness.

    The correlation between ethanol and corn has been weakening, as ethanol prices have been strong relative

    to corn prices and thereby increasing margins for ethanol plants.

    Given the low carryout number in the January WASDE we need old crop higher to ration demand and prior

    to the report the prices werent high enough to do this. With margins increasing the demand reduction is

    unlikely to come from ethanol. Its possible that feed usage with decrease, but it remains to be seen if that

    will happen.

    Technically there can be a case to be made for

    the long side in March corn. Its broken through

    the descending trendline and has been

    consolidating after the last supply and demand

    report. Its also above the rising 20, 50 and 200

    day moving averages. And 710 has proved to

    be an important level that has held as well.

    However looking at linear regressions from the

    August peak March corn has been selling off

    and is now just back at the top of range.

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    To grind or not to grind

    JANUARY 29, 2013

    Recently POET made headlines for idling its Macon, Missouri plant due primarily to a lack of available local

    corn. Given that its a large operator and the announcement made many headlines, I felt it deserved a

    closer look.

    According to Ethanol Producer Magazine, Macon is one of the only plants POET runs that currently doesnt

    do corn oil extraction. POET runs 27 plants, has their own corn oil extraction technology, and Macon is one

    of the 2 plants that doesnt have this. Extracting co-product value has been especially important since the

    tax credits expired, even more so after the drought.

    POET is private company so for comparison I looked at the breakdown of operating profits for Green Plains

    Renewable Energy on their most recent 10-Q for the impact of corn oil.

    In this case GPRE has been losing money on ethanol production for the 9 months ending 9/31/2012 but co-

    products like corn oil are becoming an important source of income that can help to offset losses.

    Also, basis in northeastern Missouri has traded on the lower end of the range for Missouri according to data

    from USDA AMS and doesnt seem high when comparing to other bids for the Midwest.

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    Although the closure is attributed to lack of corn supply in the area it seems like adding corn oil extraction to

    the plant before new crop could also be a major factor.

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    National DDGS Price Comparisons

    FEBRUARY 3, 2012

    USDA AMS has a page for running custom reports from their data which is useful for DDGS data(http://marketnews.usda.gov/portal/)

    Pulling data from around the country I created a national average price and looked at how 100 day moving

    averages for different regions traded at premiums or discounts.

    Of course Chicago and Iowa are trading at a discount. But I found the variability and seasonality of the

    Kansas to be surprising. The Kansas prices usually bottom in the summer and then stay higher in the winter

    when there is more feed demand.

    With the amount of the DDGS that is still going to China, Kansas seems like a potential shipping point.

    There is a large intermodal facility in Kansas City and a few ethanol plants nearby. However no plants in thearea have container-loading capacity and most can easily truck out their capacity. Given the large premium

    Kansas is currently trading at it wouldnt make sense unless DDGS was sourced from Iowa, and by then any

    comparative advantage would be gone due to transportation cost. Also intermodal shipping costs to China

    are very similar if shipping from Kansas City or Chicago.

    Taking another look at Chicago and California prices in one of the longer data series. The California

    premium has really strengthened since 2008.

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    Last thing I found interesting was how closely Western Iowa and Chicago traded. Given how much capacity

    in Western Iowa I assumed it would be trading at a larger discount to Chicago. However for most of 2011

    they have traded in lockstep. Possibly due to the production in Illinois as well large marketing firms being

    able to transport huge quantities out of Western Iowa by rail.

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    Chinese DDGS Imports

    JANUARY 2, 2012

    For a while the Chinese Commerce Ministry has been doing an anti-dumping investigation into US DDGS

    exports to China. Recently they announced this investigation would continue until June 28th.

    Admittedly China doesnt have a lot of choice when it comes to US export to China that it can limit, but an

    investigation into DDGS is an obvious paper tiger. Reuters points out that last week China asked the US to

    lift duties on Chinese-made tires so China is likely trying to use DDGS restrictions as leverage. The problem

    is China would be hurting themselves more than the US if they imposed restrictions so this is an empty

    threat.

    1.Chinese ethanol producers requested the investigation but they are marginal players. Their total DDGS

    output is 3.5m tonnes. Total US productions for marketing year 09-10 is ~39m tonnes. Total US exports to

    China January to August 2011 is 805k tonnes. Chinese ethanol producers are also not going to be

    increasing output given that Premier Wen said on October 22 that China needs to strictly control ethanol

    production. Domestic demand is higher than their production can satisfy and they arent going to be able to

    increase production.

    2. Even if Chinese domestic production was enough to satisfy feed mill demand there would still be demand

    for US DDGS. Growing conditions in China results higher level of mycotoxins and Chinese DDGS trades at

    a discount to US DDGS. Containerized DDGS can be shipped closer to feedmills in southern China reducing

    the need for slow and expensive inland transit from the ethanol plants in the north.

    3. China doesnt have the luxury of limiting food imports. DDGS can only be used as animal feed so limiting

    its import directly leads to meat inflation. If you are fining companies like Unilever for even talking about aprice increase for shampoo, you are not in position to do anything that could lead to actual food inflation.

    4. Not exporting to China would hurt the US, but not that much. Even though China is the #2 export market

    there werent sizeable exports until 2008. Most US DDGS can be used domestically. Even now 60% more

    is being exported to Mexico than to China. Canada is the 3rd biggest market. Canada and Mexico also have

    the advantage of being serviced by rail, making it much cheaper than containerized shipments to China.

    Its hard to imagine China doing anything substantial given the it would lead to directly to food inflation, there

    isnt a viable domestic alternative and the damage to the US ethanol industry would be limited.