32humrtsq530

Citation: 32 Hum. Rts. Q. 530 2010

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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Legal Mobilization for Human RightsProtection in North Korea:Furthering Discourse or Discord?

Patricia Goedde*

ABSTRACT

International human rights networks have publicized the exigencies ofhuman rights violations in North Korea and have mobilized internationaland domestic laws as part of their respective movements to pressure NorthKorea on human rights. This article asks how effective these attempts atlegal mobilization have been. While leveraging law has found success inother parts of the world for human rights improvement, this article arguesthat legal mobilization has had very limited impact in North Korea due tolarger political impediments such as denuclearization priorities, ideologicalpolarization between human rights groups, and North Korea's own counter-discourse to human rights.

I. INTRODUCTION

In our socialist society which regards man as most precious, human rights are firmlyguaranteed by law; even the slightest practice infringing upon them is not tolerated.

In our country all people's rights ranging from the rights to employment, food, clothingand housing to the rights to free education and medical care are fully guaranteed.

-Kim Jong II, 5 May 19911

* Patricia Goedde is an Assistant Professor at Sungkyunkwan University Law School in Seoul,

South Korea. Dr. Goedde received her J.D. and Ph.D. in Asian and Comparative Law at theUniversity of Washington (UW) School of Law, and M.A. in Korean Studies at the UW JacksonSchool of International Studies. Dr. Goedde is a licensed attorney of the Washington StateBar and has also practiced in Seoul with the law firm of Kwangjang (also known as Lee &Ko).

1. KONcDAN OH & RALPH C. HAssic, NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 25 (2000).

Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2010) 530-574 2010 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

Legal Mobilization for Human Rights

This personal testimony attributed to North Korean leader Kim Jong II on thefirm legal protection of human rights in North Korea sits at odds with the restof the world. The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in2008 censuring the dire situation of human rights violations in North Korea(Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or "DPRK"). 2 International NGOssuch as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continue to pub-lish inventories of human rights abuse in North Korea. 3 Meanwhile, NorthKorean refugees steadily stream into South Korea with individual accountsabout their hardships back home.4

At first glance, international consensus seems clear on the status of hu-man rights in North Korea. Human rights advocacy groups, both state andnonstate, have mobilized campaigns calling for the improvement of humanrights in North Korea. Mobilization tactics include efforts such as buildingalliances, promoting dialogue, resorting to laws, and other grassroots ac-tivities. However, closer inspection shows that this consensus ruptures instrategic approach when dealing with human rights in North Korea. Factorsthat frustrate a unified approach to addressing human rights in North Koreainclude the sheer range of human rights abuses to tackle, denuclearizationpriorities, ideological differences among NGOs, and the lack of constructiveresponse from within North Korea. The different ways that NGOs mobilizeinternational and domestic laws also illustrate this dissonance. The theory oflegal mobilization is a useful framework to compare and analyze the humanrights campaigns in the United States and in South Korea with respect toNorth Korea, given the resort by various actors to enact domestic laws andrely on international laws. By analyzing the activities toward lawmaking andthe implementation of relevant laws, it is possible to gain a more accuratepicture of how these actors and networks push the human rights agendaand with what actual results. While transnational legal mobilization has had

2. Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Promotionand Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rap-porteurs and Representatives, U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 64 (c), U.N. Doc.A/C.3/63/L.26 (30 Oct. 2008) [hereinafter Promotion and Protection] available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N08/579/63/PDF/N0857963.pdf?OpenElement.Ninety-five countries voted in favor, while twenty-four voted against, with sixty-two ab-staining. See Press Release, U.N.G.A. GA/SHC/3940, Third Committee Draft ResolutionsAddress Human Rights Situations in Myanmar, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,Iran (Nov. 21, 2008) (available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/gashc3940.doc.htm).

3. See Amnesty Int'l, North Korea: Torture, Death Penalty and Abductions, Al IndexASA 24/003/2009, Aug. 2009, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA24/003/2009/en/544fbfdc-94 1 c-4bb4-89b8-92dd08c62d92/asa240032009en.pdfHuman Rights Watch [HRW], A Matter of Survival: The North Korean Government'sControl of Food and the Risk of Hunger, Vol. 18, No. 3 (C), May 2006.

4. See, e.g., Tom O'Neill, Escape from North Korea, NAT'L GEOGRAPHic, Feb. 2009, availableat http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2009/02/north-korea/onei Il-text.

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relative successes for human rights advancement in other countries,' thisarticle asks to what extent human rights advocacy groups have been able toleverage law to improve the human rights record of North Korea.

To understand the advances and limitations of transnational legal mobi-lization on human rights protection in North Korea, this article first reviewsthe state of human rights in North Korea, and next identifies which actorsare involved in human rights mobilization. The article then analyzes thelegal mobilization process of human rights actors, the implementation ofspecific international and domestic laws, and the broader issues that impedelegal remedy of human rights issues in North Korea. The article concludesthat transnational legal mobilization has had the most significant impact onstrengthening the international human rights community, but little effect inchanging the reality of human rights abuse within North Korea due to politi-cal impediments such as denuclearization priorities, ideological polarizationbetween human rights groups, and North Korea's own counter-discourse tohuman rights.

II. STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA

The state of human rights in North Korea appears dismal by most global ac-counts.6 In November 2008, the UN General Assembly passed a human rightsresolution against North Korea for rights abuses in various categories:

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1) Torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary detention, forced

labor, prison camps

2) Punishment of repatriated North Korean refugees and asylum-seekers

3) Restrictions on freedoms of thought, religion, expression, assembly andassociation, equal access to information

4) Restrictions on travel

5) Violations of economic, social and cultural rights, resulting in malnutrition,especially of highly vulnerable groups

6) Rights violations against women (e.g., trafficking and other gender-baseddiscrimination)

5. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS ININTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).

6. PAOLO CAMMAROTA ET AL., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & U.S. COMM. FOR HUMANRIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA, LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA (2007)Ihereinafter LEGAL STRATEGIES] available at http://www.hrnk.org/legalStrategies-1 107.pdf.One NGO-commissioned report claims that North Korea "has engaged in the systematic,flagrant abuse of nearly every human right recognized by international law." Id. at 5.

7. See Promotion and Protection, supra note 2 at 3.

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7) Rights violations against the disabled

8) Violations of workers' rights

Other governmental and NGO reports echo this sentiment. Amnesty In-ternational's most recent report reiterates concerns regarding the lack offreedom of expression, enforced disappearances, prison conditions and thedeath penalty, and the plight of North Koreans who leave their country.' Itespecially prioritizes the right to food and also criticizes the lack of accessby NGOs and the UN Special Rapporteur to assess human rights condi-tions for themselves in North Korea.9 Reports by Human Rights Watch andFreedom House are similar in their appraisals. 0 The US Department of State,likewise, provides examples of rights violations in the areas listed in theGeneral Assembly's resolution above." These include references to publicexecutions for North Koreans who had been repatriated from China, tortureof individuals in labor camps and prisons, detention and arrest (or worse) ofthose practicing the Christian faith underground, compulsory labor, mediaand internet censorship, and abductions of Japanese, South Korean, andother foreign citizens.2

One United States NGO, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea(HRNK), prefers to focus on what it views as the worst human rights offensesin North Korea: famine and the existence of political prisoner camps. 3 Justas Amnesty International prioritizes the issue of hunger, so too does HRNK.A report commissioned by the NGO argues that the existence of persistentfamine and the exodus of North Koreans are evidence of the North Koreangovernment's violation of its people's basic human rights.14 It claims thatsystematic starvation and gulag prison camps represent the "government'sfailure to protect its own citizens from crimes against humanity.""

8. Amnesty Int'l, Amnesty International Report 2009: North Korea (2009) [hereinafterAmnesty 2009], available at http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/asia-pacific/north-korea.

9. Id.10. HRW, World Report 2009 at 280-85 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/world-

report-2009; Freedom House, Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies(2009), available at http://www.freedomhouse.orguploads/WoW09/WOW%202009.pdf.

11. See U.S. Dep't of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Democratic People's Republic ofKorea, 25 Feb. 2009, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/1 19043.htm.

12. Id.13. See Committee for Human Rights in North Korea [HRNKI, Founding Declaration, avail-

able at http://www.hrnk.org/declaration.htm.14. HRNK & DLA PIPER, FAILURE TO PROTECT: A CALL FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACr IN NORTH

KOREA (2006) [hereinafter FAILURE TO PROTECT].15. Id. at 83. For similar assessments by other scholars, see also STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS

NOLAND, FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA 209 (2007); Grace M. Kang, A Case for the Prosecution ofKim Jong I/ for Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, and War Crimes, 38 COLUM. HUM.RTS. L. REv. 51 (2006).

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The issue of famine is salient because it compels North Koreans to leavetheir country in search of an adequate standard of living, thus explainingthe continuous emigration of North Korean people. The general population'sdifficulty in maintaining an adequate standard of living means that NorthKorea violates several international human rights instruments, including theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant onEconomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, to which it is a signatory.16 Whenasked why she left, one North Korean who eventually resettled in Seoul,explained, "It was either leave, or become a criminal to survive." 7 Thecompulsion to leave North Korea may frequently result in other rights abusesof North Koreans, including trafficking and forced repatriation. Meanwhile,according to the NGO reports listed above, forced repatriation often leadsto imprisonment, torture, or execution in some cases. 8

The overall consensus seems clear on the existing chain of humanrights abuses in North Korea. However, objections exist. For one, the NorthKorean government has rejected the UN General Assembly resolution.19 Itclaims that it has a legal system in place for human rights protection andhas submitted periodic reports to the UN treaty committees explainingits observance of international human rights treaties.2 0 Additionally, someSouth Korean NGOs and North Korea observers note troubling dimensionsas to how North Korean human rights violations are characterized. OneNGO report questions the sources for many of the human rights reportsabove, claiming that the same witnesses' testimonies are cross-referencedrepeatedly.2 A quick perusal of the major reports does show duplicationof the same information without adequate specificity in citations, if thereare citations at all. Recycling of testimonies highlights the most egregiousabuses in North Korea, but it does not help to quantify the abuses sufferedby the general North Korean population. This speaks to the other difficulty

16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (111),U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess, art. 25(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/21 7A (1948). See also InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S.3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976).

17. Interview with a former North Korean refugee held in author's classroom in Seoul, SouthKorea (15 Nov. 2008).

18. See Amnesty 2009, supra note 8.19. See UN resolution on N. Korean Human Rights Stirs up Inter-Korean Relations, THE

HANKYOREH, 24 Nov. 2008, available at http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english-edition/e_northkorea/323601 .html.

20. See Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties: Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea, at 7-9, U.N. Doc HRI/CORE/1/Add.108/Rev.1 (2002) [hereinafterCore Document].

21. Catholic Human Rights Committee, Peace Network, and Sarangbang Group for Hu-man Rights, The Statement of Peace and Human Rights NGOs' for United NationsUniversal Periodic Review of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at 5, 20 Apr.2009 [hereinafter Statement of Peace] available at http://sarangbang.or.kr/bbs/download.php?board=data&id=412&idx--2.

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of confirming the extent of human rights abuse in North Korea.22 Conditionsare recognizably desperate enough for North Koreans to migrate (essentiallyvoting with their feet) as a socioeconomic statement on the state of livingin North Korea, yet it remains a challenge to verify the scope of abusenationwide. Another problematic factor is that North Koreans who resettlein South Korea are motivated to tell their worst experiences to substantiatetheir leaving North Korea. More progressive South Korean NGOs point outthat South Korea's own National Security Law would prevent any pro-NorthKorean information from reaching the public, so the natural consequencewould be that the worst political and administrative aspects of the NorthKorean government are publicized over more objective reports.23

Nonetheless, at least one organization has made efforts to overcomethese deficiencies by tabulating refugee testimonies as statistics. The DatabaseCenter for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) published a white paper in2008, based on information collected from about 500 North Koreans dur-ing 2005 and 2006.24 It has nearly another 2000 individuals' informationto process from the years 2000-2007. Meanwhile, NKDB has categorized3,000 incidents of abuse either experienced or directly observed. 2 NKDBadmits many challenges and limitations in compiling its statistics, espe-cially in finding corroboration of interviewees' testimonies, but it expectsincreasing corroboration as additional testimonies are processed.26 Whenmore of these types of reports surface or improve, a clearer, more criticaland objective picture of the situation of human rights in North Korea canstart to emerge.

While international human rights NGOs stand united on the fact that theNorth Korean government perpetrates human rights violations, the approachon how to handle this is scattered. As political scientist Katharine Moonargues, the sheer scope of human rights abuses is so broad as to underminea focused and unified strategy on tackling the human rights issue in NorthKorea. 27 Moon explains that "the very diversity of human rights actors, political

22. Katharine H.S. Moon, Beyond Demonization: A New Strategy for Human Rights in NorthKorea, 107 CURRENT HISTORY 263, 264 (2008).

23. See Statement of Peace, supra note 21, at 5.24. Database Center for North Korean Human Rights [NKDB], White Paper on North Korean

Human Rights Statistics 2007, 53 (North Korean Human Rights Archives, 2008), availableat http://nkdb.org/bbs/data/publication/white-paperl .pdf.

25. Id. at 57. Various forms of abuse (e.g., beatings, sexual assault, torture, death) are pre-sented in the form of tables with little accompanying text. As presented, the informationis still difficult to contextualize. The 3,000 incidents involve about 2,900 individuals,either as victims or perpetrators (mainly the former), with about 800 individuals directlyexperiencing some form of abuse. 1,438 incidents of illegal detention or imprisonmentwere reported. Id. at 57-60, 226.

26. Id. at 54-55.27. See Moon, supra note 22, at 264.

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agendas, and stakes makes for dissonant and incoherent public discourse."28A closer look at the different human rights actors, but also their attempts atlegal mobilization, tests whether this is an accurate assessment.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY GROUPS AND THEIRMOBILIZATION METHODS

Human rights advocacy groups targeting North Korea mobilize their respec-tive campaigns in multiple ways, but a primary dynamic is their networkingwith each other. This phenomenon is consistent with international humanrights activism generally. In their renowned study, political scientists Mar-garet Keck and Kathryn Sikkink find that the discourse and tactics affordedby communicative channels among domestic and international NGOs,intergovernmental organizations, private foundations, and parts of stategovernmental bodies are what constitute advocacy networks and their abilityto mobilize rights campaigns on a more effective, global level. 29 Advocacygroups communicate with each other, build global and moral legitimacyfor their rights objectives, and thereby exert more pressure on the govern-ment of a state to amend its offensive practices.3 0 Their study, among oth-ers, illustrates how advocacy networks have been effective in prioritizinghuman rights in a number of countries, especially in Latin America duringthe 1 970s and 1980s.11 Whether the same can be said of the transnationalhuman rights network on North Korea needs to be explored. This particularnetwork similarly consists of international and domestic NGOs based in theUnited States and South Korea, UN agencies, and governmental bodies suchas congresses and commissions. In this section, we see what interconnectedrole these human rights actors play and what types of mobilization tacticsthey apply to promote human rights protection in North Korea.3 2

A. US Movement

International NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watchhave been active in raising awareness about the human rights situation in

28. Id. at 263.29. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 5.30. Id.31. Id. at 79-120. See also Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Constructing Law Out of Power,

in CAUSE LAWYERINC AND THE STATE IN A GLOBL ERA 354 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.2001) [hereinafter Constructing Law].

32. Many nonprofit humanitarian organizations, including UN agencies, constitute anothersphere of actors that play a significant role in advancing human rights in North Korea,in terms of food, agricultural and healthcare assistance, as opposed to calling explicitlyfor broad human rights principles.

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(and outside of) North Korea, especially through their media campaigns.However, lesser-known NGOs, based in both the United States and SouthKorea are more active than the larger international NGOs. In the United States,the types of NGOs vary and include policy think-tanks, Korean-Americanchurch groups, and refugee crisis organizations. This section focuses on twoUS NGOs that have been among the most active in mobilizing a movementtoward human rights protection in North Korea: HRNK and the DefenseForum Foundation.

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Human rights and foreign policy specialists formed HRNK in 2001 toresearch and raise awareness regarding human rights issues in North Korea,particularly regarding prison camps, famine, and North Korean refugees.

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Consisting of bipartisan membership, HRNK has published several exten-sive reports on the state of human rights in North Korea, and its membershave worked closely with global human rights leaders such as VaclavHavel and Elie Wiesel to highlight these issues before the United Nations.HRNK member David Hawk is also a former UN investigator and AmnestyInternational activist who published the seminal report The Hidden Gulag:Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps, which maps the prisons with satelliteimages corresponding to the testimonies of former North Korean inmateswho eventually made their way to South Korea."

In a similar vein, the Defense Forum Foundation works to publicizeand educate US Congress about human rights issues worldwide, with oneof its particular focuses being North Korea. The Defense Forum also helpedto create the North Korea Freedom Coalition in 2003, an umbrella groupcomprising 60 member organizations worldwide. Its membership illustratesthe vast array of human rights groups devoted to improving the rights situ-ation of North Korean citizens. It includes religious groups (with many pas-tors as representative members), focus groups (e.g., women, refugee issues),and organizations that operate as underground trains getting North Koreanrefugees out of China. The Defense Forum and the North Korea FreedomCoalition frequently work together to organize media events in the UnitedStates involving various NGOs and North Korean refugees.

3 6

One individual, Suzanne Scholte, has been particularly instrumental inlinking these groups and mobilizing efforts for human rights in North Korea.

33. Many American NGOs work toward human rights advancement in North Korea. Due totheir vast number, this article focuses on two representative examples without meaningto discount the significance of many other important NGOs.

34. HRNK, About the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, available at http://www.hrnk.org/about.htm.

35. DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG: EXPOSING NORTH KOREA'S PRISON CAMPS (2003).36. Defense Forum Foundation [DFF], DFF Chairs North Korea freedom Week to Promote

Freedom and Human Rights for the North Korean People, available at http://www.defenseforum.org/promotefreedom/articleol .html.

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Dr. Scholte has been president of the Defense Forum since 1989, is a vice-chair and one of the founding board members of HRNK, and is also thechair of the North Korea Freedom Coalition. Dr. Scholte was awarded the2008 Seoul Peace Prize for her active leadership within these organizations,such as inviting North Korean refugees on speaker circuits, promoting NorthKorea Freedom Week, organizing congressional testimonies, and lobbying forthe US North Korean Human Rights Act.37 Meanwhile, her leadership acrossNGOs gives her an important networking role, not just within the UnitedStates between activists and congressional representatives, but also withhuman rights activists and North Korean refugees in South Korea. Scholte'sown Christian background adds further appeal to both Korean-American andSouth Korean church groups involved with North Korean refugee work.

B. South Korean Movement

While the US movement for human rights in North Korea demonstratesbipartisan support, the same cannot be said of NGO activism in SouthKorea. The North Korea Freedom Coalition claims to have ties to "all themajor NGOs in ... South Korea,"38 but this is misleading in that it conveysa unified position of all major South Korean NGOs on the issue of humanrights in North Korea. In reality, South Korean NGOs are polarized on theapproach toward human rights improvement in North Korea, mainly alongideological lines. Broadly, more conservative forces and Christian-basedchurches dominate the discussion and activities regarding human rightsin North Korea, whereas more progressive NGOs have supported the en-gagement policies of the two past South Korean presidents (Kim Dae Jung(1998-2003) and Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008)) and prefer to prioritizenormalization of relations with North Korea with the view that bringing uphuman rights earlier jeopardizes this relationship.

The reason for this divide in ideology and approach has a historicalrationale. Activists who rose up against the authoritarianism of South Koreanpresidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan were concerned aboutthe human rights of South Korean citizens, whose rights were suppressed,including workers and students painted as socialist, leftists, and pro-NorthKorea. After the democratic transition in 1987, and the later presidencies of

37. Jung Sung-ki, US Human Rights Activist Wins Seoul Peace Prize, KoRE TIMES, 3Sept. 2008, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/include/print.asp?newsldx=3051 8.

38. North Korea Freedom Coalition [NKFC], NKFC and History, available at http://www.nkfreedom.org/index.php?id=l 1.

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Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, both of whom had been active againstthe authoritarianism of the 1970s and 1980s, a certain standard baselineof human rights observance seems to have been reached in South Korea,including the establishment of the National Human Rights Commissionin 2001. However, the polarization between conservative and progressivegroups evidences a new phenomenon in South Korea. Conservative groupscriticize progressive NGOs for being silent about human rights abuses in theNorth when they have traditionally been the vanguards of human rights inSouth Korea, thus implying their adherence to socialist principles and theirultimate support of the North Korean government. Meanwhile, progressiveNGOs criticize conservative groups for their historical ties to authoritarianismtheir willingness to overlook human rights issues in South Korea, then andnow, and for using human rights as a means to the end goal of supportingregime collapse in North Korea.

This political division explains why South Korean NGOs are varied intheir approach towards human rights advancement in North Korea. The mostorganized and vocal NGOs, however, are those more aligned with the con-servative political party. Probably the most representative of these NGOs isthe Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (Citizens' Alliance).Though Citizens' Alliance aims to be nonpartisan, it has many members ofSouth Korea's New Right Movement and often receives funding from theconservative Chosun Ilbo news company. Citizens' Alliance hosts regulardomestic and international conferences to publicize rights issues and to givevoice to North Korean refugees. Citizens' Alliance also interacts often withmedia organizations such as Free North Korea Radio, a broadcasting groupled by North Koreans who have resettled in South Korea, and Daily NK, anonline nonprofit news service, which work respectively to gets news intoNorth Korea and to the general public. Many other NGOs, including refu-gee crisis groups and churches, turn to grassroots activities, such as runningunderground railroads in China and third countries for the safe passage ofNorth Korean refugees or helping North Koreans with resettlement in SouthKorea.39 Christian groups are especially motivated by the desire to rescueNorth Koreans in a spiritual sense, converting them to the Christian faithgiven the lack of religious freedom in North Korea.4"

On the other end of the political spectrum are progressive NGOs suchas Sarangbang Group for Human Rights and the Peace Network, which wereformed in the 1 990s in response to correcting human rights abuses in SouthKorea and promoting peaceful reunification, respectively. These two groupshave ardently criticized the dominant human rights movement in South

39. These include organizations such as Helping Hands, LINK, and Crossing Borders.40. See information about Durihana, for example, in O'Neill Escape From North Korea,

supra note 4.

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Korea. In response to the initial bill of the US North Korean Human RightsAct of 2004, Sarangbang issued a statement on behalf of progressive civicgroups, claiming that the bill risked the peaceful normalization of relationsbetween the two Koreas, thereby obstructing, rather than promoting, the pathtoward addressing humanitarian concerns in the North.41 In this statementand more recent ones by the Peace Network, the NGOs find it particularlydisturbing that the American National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is amajor source of funding for the major conservative NGOs working on humanrights in North Korea. 42 In the meantime, Sarangbang, the Peace Network,and the Catholic Human Rights Committee have submitted a statement tothe United Nations for the 2009 Universal Periodic Review of the humanrights situation in North Korea.43 The statement precedes its list of humanrights concerns with an appeal that the human rights situation in NorthKorea be taken in the context of human rights on the Korean Peninsula asa whole. It argues that human rights issues cannot be separated betweenNorth and South Korea given ongoing ideological conflict,44 particularly inSouth Korea where the National Security Law has historically been used tosuppress anti-government dissent in the name of quelling communist revolt.A parallel claim is that statements provided by South Korean NGOs that arecritical of rights abuse in North Korea are subject to the National SecurityLaw, which privileges negative assessments whereas more neutral or favor-able comments are restricted as a matter of law.

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NGOs like Sarangbang are unappealing to the global human rights move-ment because they downplay the severity of human rights abuse in NorthKorea, provide justifications for North Korea's humanitarian predicaments(e.g., natural disasters, international sanctions), and prefer to deal with thecurrent North Korean government than to propel its demise, which wouldcause even greater humanitarian catastrophes.46 International human rightsactivists are instead drawn to the existing, dominant network of conserva-tive South Korean NGOs that are fixed on eliminating rights abuse in NorthKorea. The ties between these NGOs and the United States are strong in thisregard. For example, the NED channels congressional money authorized bythe US North Korean Human Rights Act to several groups including, Citizens'

41. The Korean Civil Society Statement in Response to The May 4 2004 Report of the Com-mittee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives on H.R. 4011,the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (19 May 2004) [hereinafter Korean CivilSociety Statementl available at http://www.sarangbang.or.kr/eng/statement/20040606.html.

42. Id. For a full list of NED grantees, see http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/asia/north-korea.

43. Statement of Peace, supra note 21, at 1.44. Id. at 3.45. Id. at 12.46. Moon, supra note 22, at 264.

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Alliance, Free North Korea Radio, and Daily NK.47 This funding assists theNGOs in their activities and institutional survival. The Citizens' Alliance andDefense Forum are also partners. The two NGOs have hosted conferencesand coordinated awareness campaigns together. The most publicized andcontroversial occasion was when their representatives, including Dr. Scholteand North Korean refugees (e.g., Fighters for Free North Korea, DemocracyNetwork against NK Gulag), sailed into the West Sea to launch balloonsattached with leaflets about Kim Jong II and currency notes to send intoNorth Korea.

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C. Mobilization Strategies

Campaign repertoires of NGOs consist of a range of tactics. This is noexception for both South Korean and American NGOs. One important,overarching dynamic of the human rights movements with respect to NorthKorea, is the transnational alliance between groups in South Korea and theUnited States. Alliances serve as a networking function, helping to openchannels of communication and to combine resources for higher impactactivities. For instance, groups like Citizens' Alliance gain financial sup-port from NED, invite NED leaders and counterparts of the US Committeefor Human Rights in North Korea to speak at its international conferences,partner with Defense Forum Foundation, and help shuttle refugees to theUnited States for testimonials. In addition to conference work, dissemina-tion of news is helped by media groups like Free North Korea Radio andDaily NK. Mobilization tactics can also range from pursuing legal optionsto extralegal activities. In terms of legal mobilization, the Defense ForumFoundation was influential in lobbying for the passage of the US NorthKorean Human Rights Act, while South Korean NGOs have campaigned topass a similar law in South Korea. 49 At the same time, some NGOs involvedthemselves with work that verged on the extralegal, particularly with assist-ing North Korean refugees across borders of third countries without officialimmigration papers. While international refugee law may be invoked inthese cases, these acts violate the immigration and border control laws ofthe respective countries. Provocative protests such as the one involving the

47. See National Endowment for Democracy Website, North Korea: Grant Listings from 2008Annual Report, available at http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/asia/north-korea.

48. Suzanne Scholte, Why Balloon Launches to North Korea Must Continue, THECHOSUN ILBO, 2 Dec. 2008, available at http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html-dir/2008/12/02/2008120201594.html.

49. Defense Forum Foundation, Description of Suzanne Scholte's Efforts for the People ofNorth Koreas as President, Defense Forum Foundation and Chairman, North KoreaFreedom Coalition and Vice Chairman, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,available at http://www.defenseforum.org/latestnews/articlel 0.html.

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launching of balloons is a new manner of civil disobedience, continuingdespite warnings from the South Korean Ministry of Unification and Ministryof National Defense. The NGOs' instrumentalist use of the law often callsinto question their actions, but the NGOs defend their behavior in view ofthe more urgent goal of informing North Korean citizens about the repressiveactions of their government.5 0 The coordinated efforts of the NGO networkrelated to human rights in North Korea has gained momentum in the last fiveyears since many of these South Korean NGOs formed in the early 2000sand grew with financial support from the NED.

D. National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea

The National Human Rights Commission of South Korea (NHRCK) deservesmention for its distinctive role in the human rights advocacy related to NorthKorea. Established in 2001 under the Kim Dae Jung administration, theNHRCK argues that its jurisdiction is limited to human rights petitions withinSouth Korea as designated under Articles 4 and 30 of the Human RightsCommission Act."1 Nonetheless, the NHRCK provides a basic stance in itsrecommendation that the South Korean government should: (1) cooperatewith the international community for humanitarian aid to North Korea; (2)supply humanitarian aid without regard to political considerations; (3) helpto protect North Korean refugees' rights both diplomatically and institution-ally; (4) work to resolve cases concerning separated families, abductees andwar prisoners; and (5) strive to collect and analyze factual and objectiveinformation regarding the human rights situation in North Korea.52 In supportof these principles, the NHRCK has held fact-finding missions, organizedannual forums, and invited participants from all reaches of the human rightsactivist community, including US and Korean NGOs, Amnesty International,UN representatives (e.g., the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rightssituation in North Korea, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees), socialworkers who work with refugees, foreign embassy representatives, andscholars. Thus, the NHRCK facilitates further networking among the humanrights community, both domestic and international.

Despite these activities, the NHRCK has been in a delicate position.The NHRCK was created as an independent commission to serve a check-

50. See Scholte, supra note 48.51. Press Release, National Human Rights Commission of Korea [NHRCKI, Position on North

Korean Human Rights (11 Dec. 2006), available at http://humanrights.go.kr/english/north korea/introduction.jsp.

52. Id.

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and-balance function vis-A-vis the government. A closer look at its leader-ship shows chairs and commissioners with a history of activism againstauthoritarian administrations of years past, including lawyers who weremembers of Minbyun (Lawyers for a Democratic Society) or affiliated withprogressive civic groups.53 While NHRCK's position on human rights inNorth Korea was in quiet tandem with the past two administration's policyof engagement toward North Korea, this is no longer the case. The currentLee Myung Bak administration has challenged the overall independence ofthe NHRCK. The Board of Audit and Inspection deemed it "bloated" andmandated the downsizing of staff and payroll by twenty-one percent.5 4 TheNHRCK has petitioned the Constitutional Court with respect to this actionfor undermining its independence, and for lack of transparency in the auditreports without considering the increasing rise in processing human rightspetitions nationwide.5 After former chair Ahn Kyong-Whan resigned inprotest in July 2009, President Lee unilaterally appointed Hyun Byung-Chul,a law professor with little experience in the field of human rights.5 6 Thisevoked regional consternation. One result is that the Asian Human RightsCommission requested the UN Office of the High Commissioner for HumanRights to downgrade the NHRCK's status given President Lee's attempts tobring the NHRCK under executive control.

5 7

In many ways, the NHRCK embodies the ideological struggle over howto approach the human rights issue in both South Korea and North Korea.Under its past leadership, the NHRCK struggled with the balancing act ofbeing attentive to human rights in North Korea without outright condemnationof the North Korean government, whereas it had no such problem criticiz-ing administrative acts that infringed upon the rights of South Koreans. Itscurrent leadership will temper the actions of the NHRCK, which is anotherexample of how the issue of human rights in both Koreas must be constantlymediated in the South Korean political sphere.

53. NHRCK, About the Commission: Chairperson(s) Biography, available at http:llhumanrights.go.kr/english/about-nhrck/commissioners.jsp; Chairperson, http://humanrights.go.krenglish/about nhrck/presidentOl.jsp. (These include the Chair Byung-Chul Hyun, pastchairs Kyong-Whan Ahn, Young-Hwang Cho, Young-Do Choi, Chang-Guk Kim, Kyung-Suk Choi, Nam-Young Yoo, and Kyung Ran Moon.)

54. Park Si-soo, Human Rights Agency Will Take Forced Downsizing Plan to Court,KOREA TIMES, 27 Mar. 2009, available at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/na-tion/2009/06/113 42119.html.

55. Id.56. Letter from the Asian Human Rights Commission to the International Coordinating

Committee of National Institutions for Human Rights (31 July 2009), available at http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2009statements/2153/.

57. Id.

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E. United Nations

The United Nations also has an important function within the internationalhuman rights community, having started its focus on human rights in thelate 1970s.s8 As a composite of different agencies, the United Nations worksthrough its various institutional channels to deal with human rights throughoutthe world. In this regard, it has often worked closely with the global NGOcommunity to gain information on human rights violations and in the draftingof treaties and declarations.5 9 This relationship with NGOs also holds trueon the issue of human rights in North Korea throughout the UN.

1. General Assembly

The UN General Assembly has been the most visibly vocal body of theUnited Nations in issuing human rights resolutions and appointing a SpecialRapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea. The GeneralAssembly passed a human rights resolution on North Korea on 28 February2008, with the participation of South Korea under the current administrationof President Lee Myung Bak.

60

In the resolution, the General Assembly first acknowledges that mem-ber states are obligated to protect human rights as set forth in internationalinstruments, and that North Korea is a member of four international agree-ments and has cooperated with various UN agencies (e.g. UNICEF, WHO).

61

However, it then notes that North Korea has not allowed the Special Rap-porteur to visit the country to investigate human rights issues, before listingseveral pages of human rights concerns. 62 Additionally, the resolution calls

58. See KECK & SIKKNK, supra note 5, at 96.59. Id. This is consistent with the experience of UN agencies where they depend on NGOs

for information. One example is when Theo C. Van Boven became the director of theUN Center for Human Rights in 1976. He was criticized for working too closely withNGOs on human rights issues in Argentina, butVan Boven justified his position: "It wasthanks to them, in fact, that we could carry on our work, because I've always claimedthat 85 percent of our information came from NGOs. We did not have the resourcesor staff to collect information ourselves, so we were dependent. They did a lot of workwhich we should do at the UN." Id., citing Interview with Theo C. Van Boven, Maastricht,the Netherlands (8 Nov. 1993).

60. Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, ResolutionAdopted by the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR 62d Sess., Agenda Item 70(c), U.N.Doc. A/RES/62/167 (2008) [hereinafter Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly].

61. Id. 1 1-2.62. Id. 1 (b)(i-viii) (These include: (i) torture, excessive punishment, arbitrary detention,

forced labor, prison camps; (ii) punishment of repatriated North Korean refugees andasylum-seekers; (iii) restrictions on freedoms of thought, religion, expression, assemblyand association, access to information; (iv) restrictions on travel; (v) violations of eco-nomic, social and cultural rights, resulting in malnutrition, especially of highly vulnerablegroups; (vi) rights violations against women, such as trafficking and other gender-baseddiscrimination; (vii) rights violations against the disabled; and (viii) violation of workers'rights.) Id.

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upon the North Korean government to resolve issues related to the abduc-tion of foreigners and the misallocation of humanitarian resources.63 It then"[sItrongly urges" North Korea to "immediately put an end to the system-atic, widespread and grave violations of human rights mentioned above" byabiding by UN procedures and treaties, adding further that violators mustbe "brought to justice," that repatriated individuals not be punished, andto cooperate with UN bodies, such as the Special Rapporteur, UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights, the International Labour Organization,and UN humanitarian agencies.64 The resolution concludes by stating thatthe General Assembly will continue to monitor the human rights situationin North Korea.

65

The drafting of this resolution on human rights in the DPRK, along withthose on Myanmar and Iran, provoked heated debate within the Third Com-mittee of the General Assembly. 66 France's delegate, who had introducedthe draft resolution, said it was "aimed at drawing the attention of the in-ternational community to worrying human rights situations, in an effort tomobilize action on all sides," adding that "[t]he General Assembly shouldnot remain silent."67 Canada's delegate had drafted the resolution on Iran,arguing that not to do so would "undermine the Committee's credibility and,by extension, the credibility of the General Assembly at large." 68 Meanwhile,the delegates of the subject countries all objected on grounds of country-selectivity, hypocrisy, and politicization. Other representatives, includingCuba, Venezuela, and Singapore, pointed out that the new Universal Peri-odic Review process of the UN Human Rights Council, scheduled to beginin 2009 and every four years thereafter, adequately served the purpose ofhighlighting human rights concerns, and that singling out countries outsidethe process was a political move benefiting the agenda of a few MemberStates. 9 The North Korean delegate responded by pointing out the politicalpurposes and hypocrisy of the United States, Japan, and South Korea in sup-porting this resolution, adding that the DPRK was ready to participate in theUniversal Periodic Review.70 This view, shared by other country delegates,

63. Id. 2-3.64. Id. 4-5.65. Id. 5.66. Third Committee Draft Resolutions Address Human Rights Situations in Myanmar,

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, U.N.G.A., Third Comm., 63d Sess., U.N.Doc. GA/SHC/3940 at 1 (2008) [hereinafter Third Comm. Draft] available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/gashc3940.doc. The Third Committee is also known asthe Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee. See U.N. General Assembly, MainCommittees, available at http://www.un.org/ga/maincommittees.shtml.

67. Id.68. Id. at 2.69. Id. at 2, 7, 10.70. Id. at 10.

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helps to explain the twenty-four countries voting against the resolution, andthe sixty-two abstentions from the resolution.71

The country-specific resolution illustrates how the UN General Assemblyis moving outside its own processes to bear pressure on countries with gravehuman rights violations. The statement by France's delegate also shows howthis resolution is intended to "mobilize" action by many parties.72 Closeinspection of the resolution shows that it is more or less a position paperof the General Assembly, full of acknowledgements and entreaties to NorthKorea. 3 However, the voice of the resolution has worldwide impact whenreported by the media, and is then taken up by actors who are interested inresolving the human rights situation in North Korea, including NGOs.

2. Human Rights Council

The General Assembly also formed the Human Rights Council in 2006, abody of forty-seven country representatives who investigate human rightsviolations throughout the world. The Human Rights Council runs the Uni-versal Periodic Review, which has been set up to assess the human rightssituation in all 192 member states. 4 The Universal Periodic Review beganin 2009. With assessments currently underway, including for North Korea,it remains to be seen what the practical effects will be.

3. Special Rapporteur

In 2004, the Commission on Human Rights, of the Office of the High Commis-sioner for Human Rights, appointed a Special Rapporteur, Vitit Muntarbhorn,a law professor at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand, to assessthe situation of human rights in North Koreas.7 The Special Rapporteur hassubmitted reports to both the UN General Assembly and the Human RightsCouncil. 76 The role of Special Rapporteur is challenging, namely because theNorth Korean government opposed and rejected the mandate to establishthis position.7 7 North Korea has refused his repeated requests for access toNorth Korea.78 Consequently, the Special Rapporteur had to rely on outside

71. Id.72. Id. at 1.73. Id.74. See U.N. Human Rights Council, The Human Rights Council, available at http://www2.

ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/.75. Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Report of the

Special Rapporteur, Vitit Muntarbhorn, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., Agenda Item 67(c), at2, U.N. Doc. A/63/322 (2008) [hereinafter Situation of Human Rightsl.

76. Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Report of theSecretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., Agenda Item 67(c), at 7, U.N. Doc. A/63/332,(2008).

77. Id. at 7.78. Id. at 6-7.

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reports and visits to other countries, such as Japan, Mongolia, and SouthKorea to research the North Korean human rights situation.7 9 He relied onextensive interviews with various members of respective governments, civilsociety, and UN organs to compose his reports.80

While the Special Rapporteur could not obtain direct evidence from thesource country, the reports are comprehensive in listing areas of concern.For example, the August 2008 report covers five areas: human rights andthe development process, access to food and other necessities, rights andfreedoms, displacement and asylum, groups of special concern, and con-sequences of violence and violations. 81 The data found in the reports derivefrom outside country sources with the exception of some direct empiricalevidence provided by FAO/WFP on food and health statistics.8 2 This kindof reliance presents both advantages and challenges. On the one hand, UNbodies can gather more information from a variety of sources, triangulatingmore consistent data. UN bodies and representatives network with otherentities that may be more in tune with what is happening. NGOs maybe in constant communication with human rights victims, have firsthandknowledge of perpetrated abuses and their consequences, and possess bet-ter documentation of human rights violations. On the other hand, the riskis that information derived from outside sources reflects the same biases,supporting generalizations instead of hard statistics. The lack of direct evi-dence makes it difficult to gauge the frequency and severity of human rightsabuses. These deficiencies may be tempered by crosschecking and tallyingwitness testimonies. However, the depth of empirical analysis suffers whenUN reports recycle what NGOs communicate.

In the end, the UN process legitimizes the concerns of human rightsactivist groups and implicitly and explicitly calls for more mobilization byother actors, in some cases legal mobilization. For example, in the 2008 re-port, Professor Muntabhorn states: "There may also be avenues for mobilizingaction for individual criminal responsibility, inspired by the presence of theInternational Criminal Court, where the local system is unable or unwillingto act to make individuals accountable for serious crimes."83

4. UN Humanitarian Agencies

UN humanitarian agencies, on the whole, have had more success in coopera-tion with North Korea. Five UN bodies actively provide assistance to protect

79. Id. at 7.80. Id.81. Situation of Human Rights, supra note 75, at 3.82. Id. at 7-9.83. Id. at 16.

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human rights in North Korea: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), UnitedNations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Population Fund(UNFPA).84 The General Assembly and the Special Rapporteur make a pointof this constructive engagement early in their respective resolutions and re-ports. 8 North Korea has worked consistently with UN agencies to alleviateits food and health crises. For example, the Food and Agricultural Organiza-tion and the World Food Program monitor food security needs. They havereported increased cooperation from the North Korean government in termsof increased access to outlying counties (reaching 6.5 million people) andvisa approval for staff.8 6 Meanwhile, the World Health Organization keepstrack of medical issues and healthcare provisions, focusing on areas suchas maternal and child healthcare, control of communicable diseases, andoverall improvement of the healthcare system. The North Korean governmenthas proactively immunized against malaria and tuberculosis, and continuespolicy dialogue on how to improve medical training and provisions.,, UNICEFresponds to emergency cases of malnutrition, water sanitation, and educationfor children, while UNFPA works on spreading awareness of family plan-ning and HIV/AIDS prevention, and currently tracks the maternal mortalityrate in North Korea. 88 With both agencies, the government has cooperatedby providing access to homes and other survey needs. 89 Given the relativesuccess that humanitarian agencies have had in terms of access and coop-eration with North Korean authorities, these relationships can ideally serveas a benchmark for more cooperative and constructive projects to improvethe human rights situation in North Korea.

5. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has had less successin engaging North Korea. The High Commissioner for Human Rights hasoffered technical assistance to improve human rights observance in prepara-tion for the 2009 Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council.90

84. Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Report of theSecretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 63d Session, Agenda Item 67 (c) of the provisionalagenda, U.N. Doc. A/63/332 (26 Aug. 2008) at 10-15 [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General] available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO8/490/92/PDF/N0849092.pdf?OpenElement.

85. See Promotion and Protection, supra note 2; Situation of Human Rights, supra note 75,at 4.

86. Situation of Human Rights, supra note 75, at 8.87. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 84, at 13.88. Id. at 14-15.89. Id.90. Id. at 8.

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While the DPRK noted the offer, it has otherwise refused its assistance andnot yet resumed communication with OHCHR based upon its objectionsto the UN resolutions. 1

6. UN High Commissioner for Refugees

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) works perhaps the mostquietly on the issue of human rights by supporting the movement of NorthKorean refugees to safe haven countries.2 The UNHCR does not have apresence in North Korea. It has a more surreptitious role monitoring theflow and status of North Korean citizens across borders, and supporting thesafe transit of displaced North Koreans to destination countries, but therehas been no cooperation with the DPRK in this regard. 3

The role of the UN is multidimensional but instrumental in the way itsinstitutions are both aided by and further mobilize the advocacy networkof human rights NGOs. For example, this is evident in how the GeneralAssembly relies on NGO reports, but also explicitly uses the term "mobi-lize" to seek further action within the global NGO community. The SpecialRapporteur relies heavily on NGO sources, but also seeks ways to mobilizeinternational law for the same end goals that human rights NGOs have. TheUniversal Periodic Review process also depends on reports submitted byNGOs, with eventual published results having the effect of further bolster-ing NGO claims. Meanwhile, South Korean and American NGOs supporteach other in funding, exchange of information, access to refugees, hostingof conferences, media events, and protests, in order to add weight to theiroverlapping cause. The National Human Rights Commission of South Ko-rea, on the other hand, took a more cautious stance until recently, not onlyreflecting the ideological divide between conservative and progressive hu-man rights organizations, but also trying to maintain itself as a more neutralforum to engage the international human rights advocacy network regardingNorth Korea. While the mobilization efforts of this community are apparentin the manners discussed above, this article next asks how the human rightsadvocacy network has mobilized both international and domestic laws toimprove the human rights situation in North Korea.

IV. MOBILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAWS

The concept of legal mobilization, in simple terms, is when citizens har-ness the law, usually in cooperation with lawyers or the legal profession,

91. Id. at 8-9.92. Janice Lyn Marshall, International Attitudes in Acknowledging North Korean Defectors'

Refugee Status, International Symposium on North Korean Human Rights, NationalHuman Rights Commission of Korea, Seoul, Korea, 7 Nov. 2007, at 245-46.

93. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 84, at 16.

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for a specific movement or cause.14 This has traditionally been understoodin terms of impact litigation.9" Legal mobilization can be more than takingcases to court, however. Just as legal mobilization may be a tactic withinthe campaign repertoire of a movement, so too does the range of legalmobilization itself vary. This can include legal discourse, coalition buildingamong legal actors and activists, and a variety of legal methods beyond liti-gation, such as consulting, drafting laws, lobbying or petitioning legislators,alternative dispute resolution, and educating about the law. Political scientistMichael McCann finds that legal mobilization can be a very powerful toolin movement building.96 In his study on the pay equity reform movement inthe United States, McCann finds that in addition to litigation, "legal rightsdiscourse has provided reform activists a compelling normative language foridentifying, interpreting, and challenging the unjust logic of wage.""

The framework of legal mobilization can also be applied on an interna-tional level to human rights advocacy work.99 In dealing with the protectionof rights, human rights groups often mobilize the law both internationallyand domestically, by invoking the language of "human rights" as codifiedin treaties or constructed as international customary norms, by taking casesto international tribunals or domestic courts, and by their multilateral net-working and communicating about human rights cases via legal procedures.Scholars present accounts of relatively effective legal mobilization by NGCOsand intergovernmental organizations influencing government practice, butalso discuss the reasons for limitations, such as resistance or blockage fromthe target country.99 What is troubling is when transnational legal mobiliza-tion has little impact upon a government, as seen with the violent govern-ment practices in North Korea or when China repatriates North Koreansback to their home country. In this case, human rights activism has yet tocorrect the continuing human rights violations of North Korean citizens.Though at least one account asserts that international pressure helped toclose and reorganize some prisons in North Korea in the 1990s, this doesnot negate the continued existence of prison camps nor continuing humanrights violations.100 To test whether transnational legal mobilization has been

94. See, for example, MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994); CAUSE LAWYERING AND THESTATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2001).

95. See Donald J. Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125 (1973).96. See MCCANN, supra note 94, at 87.97. Id. at 48.98. See Cecilia MacDowell Santos, Transnational Legal Activism and the State: Reflections

on Cases against Brazil in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 7 SURINT'L J. HUM. RTs. 29 (2007). For more examples of transnational legal mobilization, seealso Constructing Law, supra note 31 and Scott Cummings & Louise Trubek, GlobalizingPublic Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2009).

99. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 5, at 79-120.100. Larry Diamond, Korea: Inside the Gulag, Hoover Digest No. 4 (1998), available at http://

www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3533466.html.

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effective with respect to North Korea, this section probes the internationaland domestic laws applicable to human rights in North Korea, how humanrights activist groups have mobilized them, and whether and to what extentthese laws and legal procedures have yielded results for the human rightscommunity and especially the North Koreans who have suffered at the handsof their government.

A. International Law

The United Nations and NGOs have resorted to international law in theirefforts to mobilize the law on human rights in North Korea. These includeUN treaty procedures, making a case for UN Security Council referral tothe International Criminal Court, and appeals to international refugee law.Closer analysis of these laws and procedures evidence their soft law nature,and thus the difficulty in implementing them for full effect. Nonetheless,the international legal framework sets an explicit standard for human rightsprotection and consequently helps to identify how human rights are violatedin North Korea.

1. International Human Rights Treaties

The United Nations has resorted to several actions to either monitor or cen-sure North Korea for human rights violations: UNGA resolutions, appoint-ment of a Special Rapporteur, initiation of the Universal Periodic Reviewfor human rights assessments of each UN member, and field involvementof UN humanitarian agencies. Treaty bodies constitute another institutionalmechanism to hold North Korea accountable to international human rightstreaties to which they have signed.

North Korea is a signatory to four human rights treaties: InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Eliminationof Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and Convention on the Rightsof the Child (CRC). 1m Under these treaty obligations, the North Korean gov-ernment must submit a periodic report on the implementation of the signedtreaties within a year of its implementation and on average every four years

101. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, available at http://treaties.un.org/ages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. The ICCPR and ICESCR were rati-fied 14 Sept. 1981; CRC on 21 Sept. 1990; and CEDAW on 27 Feb. 2001. Id. See alsoDemocratic People's Republic of Korea-Ratifications, available at http://www.bayefsky.com/html/dprkorea-tl ratifications.php.

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at the request of each treaty's reviewing committee. 0 2 Overall, North Korea'srecord in submitting periodic reports has been sporadic and tardy.103

More important than timing, however, are the contents of the periodicreports. The North Korean government claims to abide by the four treatiesand sets forth laws, policies, data, and examples as justification. Severalthemes consistent among the reports deserve mention for their significance.One is that there are many references to the domestic legal infrastructurein place to protect human rights, with frequent mention to specific lawsenacted or amended. For example, North Korea adopted or amended anumber of laws to be consistent with the ICCPR, which can be categorizedinto the areas of criminal law and criminal procedure, gender equality, andthe civil law, with corresponding constitutional provisions.104 While manylaws have indeed been newly enacted or revised, their implementation isopen to question and not corroborated by data from former North Koreancitizens. Nonetheless, the dominance of legal discussion in the reports il-lustrate that North Korean officials understand that a legal framework isnecessary to preserve human rights, at least in theory. Furthermore, theenactment or revision of laws demonstrates that North Korea has in factchanged its laws to comply with the treaties, though it would appear to bemore so on paper than in reality.

Also consistent in the reports are admissions of dire economic condi-tions in the country, including agricultural decline, malnutrition of childrenand vulnerable populations, and deficiencies in healthcare and educationfor rural areas, which are attributed to flood disasters, external sanctions,and market collapse.105 These admissions challenge the stereotype of the

102. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 40, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976).

103. Reporting History-Democratic People's Republic of Korea, available at http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/rephistory/state/47. For example, it signed the ICCPR in 1981,submitted its initial report in 1984 and its second report in 2000, despite attemptingto withdraw from the ICCPR in 1997. The third periodic report was due in 2004, buthas yet to be submitted. Similarly, North Korea has only submitted two periodic reportsunder the ICESCR, in 1987 and 2002. It has though submitted more recent reports forCEDAW (2002) and CRC (2008). Id.

104. Second Periodic Report of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on its Implemen-tation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum.Rts. Comm., 5-6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2 (2000) [hereinafter Second PeriodicReport].

105. See generally Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 ofthe Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, InitialReport of States Parties: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.N. GAOR, Comm.on Elim. Of Discrim. Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRK/1 (2002) [hereinafterUnder Article 181; Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article44 of the Convention, The Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of States PartiesDue in 2007: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on Rts. ofthe Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/PRK/4 (2008) [hereinafter Under Article 441; Implementa-tion of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Second

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North Korean government as being ignorant, uncaring, or in denial aboutthe welfare of its general population. Yet the reports do not address howthese conditions more negatively impact those citizens at the lowest rungsof North Korea's social and political hierarchy, including those in laborcamps and prisons. This brings us to another recurrent theme, which isthat the reports credit and express gratitude for international humanitarianassistance from UN agencies, international NGOs, and other states. 10 6 Thissignifies that the North Korean government recognizes and appreciates thegoodwill of other organizations and states in alleviating hunger and sickness,though this too does not address whether the most vulnerable populationsactually receive this aid.

While the treaty process forces the North Korean government to justify itsprotection of rights, it is difficult to accept the reports at face value. On theone hand, the reports demonstrate legal changes, acknowledgments of areasneeding improvement (e.g., length of detention), growing policy coordination(e.g., establishment of a national committee on implementing CEDAW),

10 7

and also a developing sophistication in the writing of its reports. 08 On theother hand, the reports are rarely self-critical, lack empirical data, and, mosttellingly, do not admit to a single instance of human rights violation in thecountry. According to its periodic reports, North Korea fully abides by thetreaties. Based on refugee testimonies, the UN and NGOs do not entirelyagree with North Korea's periodic reports. Instead, NGOs partake in thetreaty reviewing process to challenge North Korea's rendition, by submit-ting counter-reports, or shadow reports, to provide different accounts. 09

Ultimately, the treaties are difficult to enforce by the review process alone.Therefore, the UN relies on other mechanisms to force North Korea to ad-dress its human rights situation more seriously, including the UNGA resolu-tion, appointment of a special rapporteur, and now the newly implementedUniversal Periodic Review process. One other avenue for UN action to push

Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant,Addendum: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/1 990/6/Add.35(2002); Second Periodic Report, supra note 103.

106. Id.107. See Under Article 18, supra note 104, at 12. It formed the National Coordination Com-

mittee for the Implementation of CEDAW in September 2001, comprised of members ofthe Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, the Cabinet, as well as the Ministriesof Labor, Education, Public Health, Foreign Affairs, and the Central Court and CentralPublic Prosecutor's Office. Id.

108. See Under Article 44, supra note 104. Among all of the periodic reports, this most recentone is perhaps the most sophisticated in terms of organization and style. It first explainsthe general measures of implementation: harmonization of laws, comprehensive strategyfor implementation, coordinating mechanism for implementation, resource mobiliza-tion, international cooperation, dissemination of the Convention, and availability of thereport. Id.

109. See LEGAL STRATEGIES, supra note 6.

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for human rights action is a UN Security Council resolution, the feasibilityof which is discussed below.

2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Scholars and lawyers have proposed that Kim Jong II and state officials maybe held criminally liable under the Rome Statute of the International Crimi-nal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.110

This legal resolution is not as simple as it appears, as it involves questionsof ICC jurisdiction and practical implementation.

On the basis of legal analysis alone, reported rights violations in NorthKorea fall within the scope of crimes listed in the Rome Statute. For example,the Rome Statute stipulates that a "crime against humanity" includes any ofthe following if it is a widespread or systematic attack against any civilianpopulation, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder, (b) extermination, (c)enslavement, (d) deportation or forcible transfer of population, (e) imprison-ment, (f) torture, (g) rape and other forms of sexual violence, (h) persecutionagainst any identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,religious or gender grounds, (i) enforced disappearance of persons, (j) apart-heid, (k) other inhumane acts causing great suffering mentally or physically."'With the exception of apartheid, all of the acts listed in Article 7 have beenreported as common incidents of violence committed by the state apparatus.Kim Jong II and higher officials may also be found guilty of war crimes andgenocide under the Rome Statute. The taking and continuous detention ofprisoners of war from the Korean War (1950-1953), estimated to be about500 personnel, constitute a breach of the Geneva Convention on the treat-ment of prisoners of war, and consequently a breach of Article 8 of the RomeStatute, which embodies the Geneva Convention principles. 2 Charges ofgenocide may also be brought under Article 6 of the Rome Statute. Genocideis defined under the statute as "acts committed with intent to destroy, inwhole or in part, a national ethnical racial or religious group." Accordingto North Korean refugees and NGOs, the North Korean security apparatushas targeted two groups for extermination: Korean-Chinese infants andChristians.' 13 While empirical data is missing, North Korean women refugeeshave reported that North Korean security guards have prevented births by

110. See Kang, supra note 15, at 51; See Legal Strategies, supra note 6, at 25-37.111. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, art. 7, U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) thereinafterRome Statute].

112. Id. art. 8; See Kang, supra note 15, at 106-07.113. See LEGAL STRATEGIES, supra note 6, at 27-28; See Kang, supra note 15, at 98-106.

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detainees, especially if the infant might be biracial (Korean-Chinese), forcingmiscarriages, abortion, or other forms of infanticide." 4

The case can be made that Kim Jong II and his state officials violate theRome Statute, but bringing them before the International Criminal Court isanother matter. The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over a state party if crimeshave been committed within the state party's territory or by its citizenry, or ifa non-ratifying state has lodged a declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction.'

15

The ICC may begin investigation of such crimes if: (1) a state party refers thecrimes to the ICC Prosecutor; (2) the UN Security Council refers the crimesto the ICC Prosecutor; or (3) the ICC Prosecutor directly initiates investiga-tion.1 6 North Korea is not a state party to the Rome Statute, and thus has notaccepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. In this case, the UN Security Councilwould have to refer the crimes under the UN Charter (Chapter VII) to theICC for the latter to investigate violations under the Rome Statute by NorthKorean leaders. Other requirements are that the crimes under investigationwere committed after 1 July 2002, when the Rome Statute was enacted, andthat the domestic courts cannot adequately remedy the crimes. 17 It maybe accepted prima facie that domestic courts do not have the independentauthority to try crimes of the executive leadership, but documentation willnonetheless be required to identify specific crimes committed after July2002, as well as to prove the requisite intent of the leadership in commit-ting these crimes.

The UN Charter permits the UN to take action to maintain internationalpeace and security. For referral to the ICC, the UN Security Council wouldneed to issue a resolution, which may be achieved by vote as long as noneof the five Permanent Members veto the resolution.' Despite calls for aUN Security Council resolution on human rights in North Korea, this pathhas yet to be taken. 9 While the Security Council has issued five resolu-tions with respect to nuclear and arms proliferation by North Korea, mostrecently Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) to sanction nuclear testingby North Korea, it appears that the Security Council is not willing to voteupon a resolution to address the human rights situation in North Korea.

120

114. See Kang, supra note 15, at 98-99.115. See Rome Statute, supra note 110, art. 12; See LEGAL STRATEGIES, supra note 6, at 25.116. See Rome Statute, supra note 110, art. 13.117. Id. arts. 1, 11, 17.118. See U.N. Security Council, Membership in 2010, available at http://www.un.org/sc/

members.asp. The five Permanent Members are the United States, United Kingdom,China, Russia, and France. Id.

119. Vaclav Havel, Kjell Magne Bondevick, Elie Wiesel, Turn North Korea into a HumanRights Issue, N.Y. TIMES, 30 Oct. 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/30/opinion/30havel.html?_r=.

120. U.N.S.C., Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 874 (12 June 2009); U.N.S.C. Res. 1718, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1 718 (14 Oct. 2006).

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The initiative is not likely to come from either the United States or Chinesegovernments. The US government has not accepted the jurisdiction of theICC itself. The US State Department under both administrations of Bush,and now Obama, prioritizes nuclear nonproliferation, not wanting to linkhuman rights as it might complicate negotiations. China, too, is unlikely toupset its neighbor in light of trying to maintain refugee outflows. Assumingeven that the Security Council succeeds in passing a resolution on humanrights in North Korea, ICC procedures depend on summoning the accusedand having the accused present before the court for charges to be brought.121

North Korean leaders are highly unlikely to submit themselves voluntarilybefore the court.

122

What practical effect, then, does the Rome Statute have over crimesperpetrated in North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong I1? As of yet,this is unclear. In 2009, South Korean NGOs formed the Crimes AgainstHumanity Investigations Committee that campaigned the ICC to prosecuteKim Jong II for crimes against humanity. 23 Though NGOs would like toinvoke this international legal remedy, the likelihood of charging Kim JongII and other individual officials would be low for the reasons stated above.Nonetheless, an important step has occurred, which is labeling the crimesof the state as violations of the Rome Statute (thus crimes against humanity,war crimes and genocide). Stating that North Korean leaders have violatedjus cogens principles embodied in the Rome Statute and that they are po-tentially subject to the ICC sends a powerful message. The Committe forHuman Rights in North Korea has worked with notable human rights andpeace activists to elevate the scale of abuses committed by the North Ko-rean government.1 24 While its practical implementation may be difficult, thesignificance lies in the naming of North Korea's violation of internationalhuman rights standards and the theoretical potential of Kim Jong II beingheld personally and criminally liable.

Besides the crimes enunciated in the Rome Statute, another emerginghuman rights doctrine is a state's "responsibility to protect" its own citizensfrom crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.2 s After arguing thatNorth Korea's food policy and resulting famine, as well as the existence andoperation of its political prison system, amount to crimes against humanityand North Korea's failure to protect its citizens from such crimes, the reportcommissioned by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea states:

121. See Rome Statute, supra note 110, art. 58; See LEGAL STRATEGIES, supra note 6, at 33.122. See LEGAL STRATEGIES, supra note 6, at 35.123. See, for example, Letter to the ICC Prosecutor Re: Request for Investigating 245 Persons

in the Yodok Political Prisoner Camp in North Korea (23 Feb. 2010) (on file with author),available at http://iccnk.kr/xedata/1 294.

124. See FAILURE TO PROFECT, supra note 14.125. Id. at 111-18.

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This report implores the United Nations, through the Security Council, to in-voke the responsibility to protect doctrine because all other efforts to engagewith North Korea through the UN system to address the sets of activities whichcomprise crimes against humanity (i.e., food policy and famine, and the gulagsystem) have failed to protect the civilian population of the country.

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On one level, the turn to this new doctrine signifies frustration with NGOsthat see little results via normal institutional channels of the UN. WhileNGOs may submit reports to UN bodies, whether as part of the treaty reviewprocess, the UPR, or in calling for higher impact actions from the SecurityCouncil, the resort to these processes have so far yielded little in the wayof human rights advancement in North Korea.

3. International Refugee Law

International refugee law also matters with respect to human rights protectionin North Korea given the steady flow of North Koreans crossing the borderillegally into China, often only to face trafficking, slavery, or repatriation backto North Korea (thus likely to be subjected to further rights violations suchas torture, imprisonment, or execution). The two main conventions are the1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol,the latter of which expanded the scope of the 1951 Convention to apply torefugees beyond the context of World War 11.127

Although China acceded to the 1951 Convention in 1982, the govern-ment signed a bilateral agreement with North Korea in 1986 to repatriateNorth Koreans who enter the country illegally.128 The Chinese governmentdoes not consider North Koreans residing illegally in their territory as fallingunder the strict definition of refugee under the 1951 Convention. Under theConvention, a refugee is defined as:

[A]ny person who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group orpolitical opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unableor, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protectionof that country.129

126. Id. at 118.127. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, U.N. Doc. A/

CONF.2/108 (1951), 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954) [hereinafterStatus of Refugees]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 31 Jan. 1967,G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (enteredinto force 4 Oct. 1967) (entered into force for U.S. 1 Nov. 1968).

128. Rhoda Margesson et al, North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues:International Response and U.S. Policy Options, CRS Report for Congress (26 Sept.2007).

129. See Status of Refugees, supra note 126, art. 1 A(2).

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Instead, the Chinese government prefers to classify North Koreans in theirterritory as "economic migrants," or those who have migrated to China insearch of food and better living standards (rather than leaving for reasonsof personal political persecution).130 The Chinese government has insteadcracked down harder on North Koreans within its territory and NGO net-works helping them, mainly due to negative global publicity (a familiar im-age being the dramatic runs on foreign embassies and consulates by NorthKoreans in the early 2000s).

Human rights activists have argued for a different interpretation ofthe Convention. For instance, the Special Rapporteur for human rights inNorth Korea has stated that North Koreans in China qualify as refugees surplace because they face the threat of persecution upon returning to NorthKorea.131 If the mere act of leaving North Korea would subject them to seri-ous harm amounting to persecution, this could be construed as "imputedpolitical opinion."'3 2 Furthermore, the Convention provides for the principleof non-refoulement "No Contracting State shall expel or return ["refouler"]a refugee in any manner whatsoever to ... territories where his [or her]life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, na-tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."'33

Accordingly, under this principle, North Koreans should not be repatriatedto North Korea.

Complicating the labeling of North Koreans as refugees is that theSouth Korean Constitution confers South Korean citizenship on all NorthKoreans. 13 4 The Convention provides that those with more than one nation-ality "shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country ofhis [or her] nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-foundedfear, he [or she] has not availed himself [or herself ]of the protection ofone of the countries of which he [or she] is a national." 35 Because NorthKoreans can avail themselves of South Korean citizenship, some states donot recognize them as refugees, for example Germany and Australia.

13 6

Meanwhile, countries like Thailand and Mongolia, which are part of theunderground corridors for North Koreans seeking their way out of China,

130. Janice Lyn Marshall, UNHCR Seoul Representative, International Attitudes toward theVulnerability and Need for Protection of North Koreans Outside the DPRK, Paper pre-sented at 2008 North Korean Human Rights Campaign: Compassion for North KoreanOrphans, at 149, Seoul, Korea, 26 Sept. 2008 (on file with author).

131. Situation of Human Rights, supra note 75, at 12.132. Marshall, supra note 129, at 243.133. See Status of Refugees, supra note 126, art. 33.134. HEONBEOP [Constitution) arts. 2, 3. (Republic of Korea).135. See Status of Refugees, supra note 126, art. 1 A(2).136. Marshall, supra note 129, at 4.

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have not recognized North Koreans as refugees either. Neither country is amember of the Convention, but they do not repatriate North Koreans andhave been able to provide safe facilities for their transit to South Korea oranother country of destination.

At issue is whether the process of refugee identification is a workableconcept for both the North Korean population in China, who fall betweenthe cracks of the 1951 Convention, and the countries faced with the continu-ing influx of North Koreans. North Koreans remain at risk of repatriation solong as they remain in China, whereas countries like China, Mongolia, andthose in Southeast Asia are adverse to accepting North Koreans formally asrefugees for risk of attracting even more North Koreans, thus amplifying ex-isting problems such as border transgressions, trafficking networks, crowdeddetention facilities, unwanted international scrutiny, and worsening relationswith North Korea.

Additional arguments have been made to support the principle of non-refoulement under the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which China is also aparty.137 This stipulates that member states shall not repatriate "a person to aState where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] wouldbe in danger of being subjected to torture."' 38 Because China is a signatoryto the 1984 Convention, the argument is that China should also abide bythe Torture Convention in addition to the Refugee Convention.139

Despite repatriation, many are willing to leave North Korea again forreasons of survival, and so the cycle of victimization and human rightsviolations begins all over again. So far, the international refugee laws havebeen of little assistance in convincing the Chinese government to reversetheir policy on repatriation. Practical considerations faced by the transitcountries in Asia allow for various interpretations and application of the1951 Convention. While international customary law standards may existfor reference and censure, these have minimal impact on the actions ofChina, not to mention North Korea. Relying on international law alone hasnot aided the plight of North Koreans in China and other third countriesrisking repatriation, thus NGOs have also turned to domestic legislation asanother avenue for legal mobilization.

137. Elim Chan and Andreas Schloenhardt, North Korean Refugees and International RefugeeLaw, 19 Int'l J. Refugee L. 215, 235 (2007).

138. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-ishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., art. 3, U.N.Doc. A/39/51 (1985), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).

139. Chan and Schloenhardt, supra note 136, at 235.

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B. Domestic Laws

Apart from the application of international laws, some states haveenacted, or are attempting to enact, domestic legislation on the issue ofhuman rights in North Korea. These include the United States and Japan,which have already passed laws on human rights in North Korea, and SouthKorea, which has a bill pending for passage. While human rights NGOs havehad little success with applying international law to North Korea, they havebeen able to mobilize in lobbying for legislators

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