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Reserve Component Programs

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This is the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s report onReserve component programs and other matters required tobe presented to the President and Congress annually by 10U.S.C. 113 (c) (2). It includes the collective views of theBoard members and does not necessarily reflect the officialpolicy position of the Department of Defense, or any otherdepartment or agency of the United States Government.

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The Annual Report of theReserve Forces Policy Board

2003

Reserve Forces Policy BoardOffice of the Secretary of the Defense

Washington, DC 20301-7300

April 2004

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Reserve Forces Policy Board Members

Honorable Albert C. ZapantaChairman, Reserve Forces Policy BoardWashington, DC

MG Richard O. Wightman, Jr. USAMilitary Executive to the Reserve ForcesPolicy Board and Military Advisor to theChairman, RFPBWashington, DC

LTG John P. Abizaid, USA(Detached–Jan 03)Director, Joint StaffWashington, DC

LTG George W. Casey, Jr. USADirector, Joint StaffWashington, DC

Chairman

Military Executive

Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Department of the Army

Honorable Reginald J. BrownAssistant Secretary of the Army(Manpower & Reserve Affairs)Washington,DC

LTG Richard Cody, USADeputy Chief of Staff for Operations andPlans, G3Washington, DC

MG H. Steven Blum, ARNG(Detached–May 03)Chief of Staff, US Northern CommandPeterson AFB, CO

MG Fred Rees, ARNGChief of Staff, US Northern CommandPeterson AFB, CO


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MG Stanhope S. Spears, ARNG(Detached–Jul 03)The Adjuntant General, South Carolina

MG John F. Kane, ARNGThe Adjutant General, Idaho

MG Paul C. Bergson, USAR(Detached–Mar 03)Military Deputy (RC) for Security CooperationRosslyn, VA

MG Charles E. Wilson, USARDeputy Commanding General, US ArmyReserve CommandFort McPherson, GA


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Department of the Navy

Honorable William A. Navas, Jr.Assistant Secretary of the Navy(Manpower & Reserve Affairs)Washington, DC

RADM Eric Olson, USN(Detached–Aug 03)Director, Strategy & Policy Division (N51)Washington, DC

RADM John Stufflebeem, USNAssistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations(N3N5B)Washington, DC

RADM Martin E. Janczak, USNRDeputy Commander, Naval Surface ForcePacific FleetSan Diego, CA


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RADM John G. Cotton, USNR(Detached–Oct 03)Assistant Deputy CNO Warfare Requirements& Programs (N7R)Washington, DC

MajGen Frances Wilson, USMC(Detached–Sep 03)Director, Personnel Management Division(MM)Quantico, VA

MajGen Arnold L. Punaro, USMCR(Detached–Sep 03)Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower& Reserve AffairsQuantico, VA

MajGen Leo V. Williams, III, USMCRDeputy Commanding General, Marine CorpsCombat Development CenterQuantico, VA


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Department of theAir Force

BGen Timothy Ghormley, USMCDirector, Plans & Policy Divisiion, M&RAQuantico, VA

Honorable Michael DominguezAssistant Secretary of the Air Force(Manpower & Reserve Affairs)Washington, DC

Maj Gen John M. Speigel, USAFDirector Personnel Forces PolicyWashington, DC

Maj Gen Gordon Stump, ANG(Detached–Feb 03)The Adjutant General, Michigan


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Maj Gen Martha T. Rainville, ANGThe Adjutant General, Vermont

Maj Gen Edward Mechenbier, USAFRMobilization Assistant to the Commander,AFMCWright Patterson AFB, OH

Maj Gen John Bradley, USAFR(Detached–Jul 03)Deputy CommanderJTF Computer Network OperationsWashington, DC

RADM Robert Papp, Jr. USCGDirector of Reserve and Training USCGWashington, DC

United States Coast Guard


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EX OFFICIO

President, RFPB AlumniAssociation

President Elect, RFPBAlumni Association

RADM Mary P. O’Donnell, USCGRDep Area Cmdr Mobilization & Reserve AffairsPacific AreaAlameda, CA

MG Gerald A. Rudisill, Jr. USAAssistant to the Chairman, JCS for NationalGuard MattersWashington, DC

RADM Grant Hollett, USNR (Ret)

Mr. Bryan Sharratt


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Col Richard O. Roberts, Jr.Chief of StaffSenior Policy Advisor, USAFR

CAPT Wayne S. StuartSenior Policy Advisor, USNR

Col Rocky L. TemplonSenior Policy Advisor, ANG

COL Stewart GoeschSenior Policy Advisor, USAR

COL Jess Soto, Jr.Senior Policy Advisor, ARNG

LtCol Marianne WinzelerSenior Policy Advisor, USMCR

COL Samuel Nichols, Jr.Senior Policy Advisor, USAR

YNCM (SW/AW) Arthur M. RiversSenior Enlisted Advisor

SFC Michael E. Biere, USARPersonnel Operations NCOIC

Ms. Patricia A. ElkinsExecutive Assistant

RFPB Staff Members

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2002-Present Albert C. Zapanta

1994-2002 Terrence M. O’Connell

1989-1994 John O. Marsh, Jr.

1985-1989 Will Hill Tankersley

1977-1985 Louis J. Conti

1957-1977 John Slezak

1955-1957 Milton G. Baker

1953-1955 Arthur S. Adams

Inception - 1953 Charles H. Buford

Current and Former Chairmen of theReserve Forces Policy Board

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Reserve Forces Policy Board Membership Matrix

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The logo of the Reserve Forces Policy Board represents the Total Force as the shield for theNation. The United States is identified by its national symbol, the eagle. A blue field represents theMilitary Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps is a part of the Depart-ment of the Navy. The Coast Guard may become a part of the Navy Department in time of war orwhen the President so directs. Three stars depict the Active component, National Guard, and Re-serve. Seven vertical stripes of the shield stand for the seven Reserve components: Army NationalGuard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Re-serve, and Coast Guard Reserve.

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board reflects a consensus of the 24-memberBoard. Although most policy recommendations and Board positions have the unanimous support ofthe Board, this report does not purport that individual Board members, the Military Services, or theDepartment of Defense concur with every recommended action or position.

The Annual Report contains the Board’s independent review of Reserve component issues and aconsensus evaluation of Reserve component programs. The report includes the collective views ofthe Board and primarily focuses on the period from 1 October 2002 through 30 September 2003;however, also includes information and projections into 2004.

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I. Chairman’s Overview and Executive Summary..............................................1

II. Introduction......................................................................................................7

Mission and Vision Statement...............................................................................................7History of the Reserve Forces Policy Board..........................................................................7

III. Mobilization.............................................................................................9

DoD Mobilization Guidance.................................................................................................9Progress Toward Mobilization Reform................................................................................10Automated Systems.............................................................................................................11Employer.............................................................................................................................11Individual Medical Readiness..............................................................................................12Family Readiness and Healthcare........................................................................................12Doctrine, Policy and Law....................................................................................................13Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Access and Relevancy......................................................18Volunteerism.......................................................................................................................18Mobilization Process...........................................................................................................19Transforming the Reserve Components...............................................................................21

IV. Equity..............................................................................................................23

V. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations...............................................25

VI. Building Joint Reserve Components.............................................................27

Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).....................27Joint Reserve Intelligence Program.....................................................................................29Reserve Components in Homeland Security (HLS)/Homeland Defense (HLD)

VII. Legislative Update..........................................................................................33

General Officer/Flag Officer Management..........................................................................33Positive Legislative Changes Supporting the Reserve Component......................................34Future Areas of Concern.....................................................................................................34

VIII. Conclusion......................................................................................................37

Appendix I: 2003 Board Activities................................................................39Appendix II: RFPB Symposium — Strategic Challenges:

Transforming The Total Force Vision for the 21st Century.......43Appendix III: FY 2003 Data Summaries.........................................................55Glossary....................................................................................................................65

Contents

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Reserve component (RC) mobilizations,from Operations Enduring Freedom and NobleEagle to a new round of activations and de-ployments in support of Operation IraqiFreedom, witnessed an increase in 2003.These deployments began to stress somesegments of the Services, prompting bothaccurate and exaggerated news reports, as wellas interest from the President and the Secretaryof Defense. The deployments raised concernand presented the question: How do we relievethe pressure on the Guard and Reserve? Thewar in Iraq was fought and won, thentransitioned into a dangerously charged peaceenforcement operation and the dawning of anew age became abundantly clear. We nowknow, without a doubt, that the Global War onTerrorism will be long term. We must fight onmany fronts and use all available nationalelements of power.

We are fully committed, the course is set,and we must now adjust for a long-term com-mitment of resources, a commitment designedto pace the force and institute flexibility,predictability, and surge capabilities into ourresponsiveness to the fight, whether at home orabroad. These new imperatives became thedriving force behind the Reserve Forces PolicyBoard (RFPB) efforts in 2003.

Executive Summary

In 2003, the challenges we faced in 2002,posed by homeland defense and securitytogether with mobilization and demobilization,only intensified. These issues have given newurgency to RC transformation and rise to agreater intensity in the cries for reform in themobilization process, in how equity issues areperceived on the ground by our RC members,and ultimately, in long-term support to post-conflict stabilization. United States NorthernCommand, in the midst of Initial OperationalCapability, quickly realized that the competingrequirements between homeland defense andexpeditionary warfare would require extraordi-nary planning and result in a delicate balance

that could be achieved only through extremepersonal sacrifice by hundreds of thousands ofthose in uniform, their families, employers,and ultimately their communities. This Board,through a continuing series of field visits andextremely successful Citizen-Patriot Forums,quickly came to realize that we must fullyexplore the changing contract between theRC member, his or her family and employerand his or her Service, the Department ofDefense and America. The Board will focusefforts in 2004 on framing this contract.The necessity for maintaining first responsecapability, as well as the need to surge whenrequired, has, in part, driven the need for thisreport to address these matters.

The Business Cycle

The RFPB Symposium, “Strategic Chal-lenges: Transforming the Total Force Visionfor the 21st Century” was held at the NationalDefense University May 19-20, 2003, withover 220 participants in attendance. Fourmajor forums presented views related to theSymposium’s main topics on the first day, andon the second day, breakout sessions addressedthe questions raised by those forums. TheSymposium’s Executive Summary, AppendixII in this report, and recommendations werebriefed to the Secretary of Defense and fedinto the RFPB business cycle for the remainderof the year.

Some of the major recommendations fromthe symposium included:

• Mission: The Reserve component mustmaintain unique Title 10, Title 14, and Title 32capabilities while developing a portfolio ofmission capabilities to support both Homelanddefense and expeditionary warfare.

• Emerging Doctrine: The Reservecomponent must train and fight jointly and beon an equal footing with the Active componentin training, equipment, utilization and benefits.

Chairman’s Overview and Executive Summary

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• Employment: The Reserve componentmust reform, transform, and modernize tocreate a new availability and Service para-digm. This means streamlining mobilizationand deployment processes while maintainingthe American militia tradition.

• Citizen Connectivity: The Departmentshould explore national service options andincrease the Reserve component emphasis onCitizen Patriot links and contacts.

These recommendations have also sup-ported the issues addressed by the RFPB andgiven new urgency to this Board’s mission;they have renewed focus to our efforts onbehalf of the nearly 1.2 million men andwomen in uniform with the National Guardand Reserve. In many instances, our fieldvisits revealed recurring issues created bybureaucratic Cold War constructs that continueto slow down and frustrate our Armed Forces.The RFPB has examined these issues in oneform or another since its inception in 1952.The difference this year was that the samebarriers were highlighted - most publicly andpainfully - as they continued to obstruct andoften restrain the Services’ best efforts toachieve Total Force integration.

As one of the most significant outcomes ofthe May Symposium, the RFPB Chairmanasked members to volunteer to serve onspecific task groups to support the Board’sbusiness cycle and to ensure Service represen-tation in all undertakings. These partnershipswere established as task groups:

• Task Group Joint Forces Command(JFCOM) – engaged in mobilization, demobili-zation, doctrine, joint training and education;

• Task Group Northern Command(NORTHCOM) – engaged in strategic missionsupport of Guard and Reserve roles in Home-land Defense and Homeland Security;

• Task Group Special Operations Com-mand (SOCOM) – engaged in reviewing therole of RC special operations forces, particu-larly in post conflict stabilization and supportoperations;

• Task Group National Defense Univer-sity/Senior Service Colleges – engaged in andsupporting RC education, curriculum develop-ment and participation in joint wargames,simulations, and exercises; and,

• Task Group Public and Private Coopera-tion – engaged in reconnecting with public andprivate sector constituencies.

It is equally important that the RCs recon-nect with our stakeholders, the Americanpeople. Since the Revolutionary War and theestablishment of General George Washington’sCitizen Patriot militia, Citizen Patriots havetraditionally been the mainstay of our nationalsecurity. As community leaders, they providea reservoir of unique civilian skills and capa-bilities not normally resident within theDepartment of Defense (DoD). SecretaryRumsfeld’s reform and transformation initia-tives offer a unique opportunity to define anew Total Force Policy that ensures a strongbond with our country’s Citizen Patriots, andmeets the needs and requirements of a 21stCentury Armed Forces.

Recommendations

The Board’s recommendations concerningthe most significant issues covered in thisAnnual Report are summarized as follows:

• Mobilization

o Develop a joint tracking system totrack and manage Individual RC members,including interim measures to integrate exist-ing Service specific system data, to share thisdata across DoD at the appropriate levels, andto dedicate funding to accelerate systemdevelopment.


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o Establish partnerships with industryleaders to develop solutions on sharing thetalents of the individual RC members, improv-ing employer support and volunteerism, andstrengthening member rights and responsibili-ties.

o Continue the recent progress in fundingand providing medical and dental screening forRC members through resources such as FEDS-HEAL.

o Improve level of education andtraining for RC members and their familiesregarding TRICARE and Family SupportPrograms.

o Establish effective Mobilization CapManagement policies that improve predictabil-ity for RC members and responsiveness inmeeting mobilization requirements.

o Streamline the process within DoDfor the Military Departments to gain approvalof involuntary activations to achieve predict-ability and responsiveness.

o Establish formal procedures whennotifying RC members of pending activation toensure that irreversible employment or per-sonal financial decisions are not made prior tothe actual issuance of activation orders.

o Explore opportunities for developingforce structure that allows for a “just in time,”rather than a “just in case” approach, andoffering financial and other incentives thatattract and retain Reservists for stressed units.Evaluate industry options as ways to employ a“just in time” philosophy as it relates to per-sonnel requirements.

o Review “best practices”, policies, andstatutes governing the management of the IRRat the OSD annual Individual Ready Reserve(IRR) Mobilization ManagementConference,with a goal of improving theoverall deployability, resourcing, and relevancyof the IRR as a mobilization asset.

o Resource the background securityinvestigation infrastructure at a level thatwould give both Active component (AC) andRC members a much shorter timeline forapproval of a final clearance.

o Develop policies and revise statutesand regulations that better supportvolunteerism and reduce reliance on involun-tary activations that stress RC forces.

o Provide a policy exclusion to pre-clude RC volunteers on active duty in excessof 179 days (270 combatant command exclu-sion) from counting against a Service’s activeduty end strength and controlled grade limita-tions. Seek change to Title 10 Sections 115,517 and 523 to allow Services more flexibilityin managing and employing RC members byremoving or modifying the end strength andcontrol grade limitations in Title 10 thatrestrict the use of volunteers.

o Evaluate development of a JointMobilization Process.

o Seek one organization to guide RCtransformation to improve consistency, bal-ance, sharing of ideas, and best businesspractices, and to ensure the right policies andlegislative proposals are fully developed.

• Equity Issues

o Seek equity in pay and benefits, toinclude the entire compensation and benefitspackage for performing the same duty in thesame location regardless of component–Active, Guard, or Reserve.

o Simplify and clarify travel and perdiem entitlements to provide uniformity ofinterpretation and equal payment to all ourmembers.

o Continue all efforts to review andevaluate the many proposals and combinationsof proposed solutions to provide relief forincome protection.


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o Change DoD policy to remove theinequity suffered by RC members on active dutyfor less than 140 days and those RC memberswithout dependents, who receive less than theircounterparts.

• Stabilization and ReconstructionOperations

o Create a command structure andorganize units to reflect units of action thathave modularity, flexibility, and that takeadvantage of the special talents that RCmembers, because of their civilian skills, areable to contribute to Stabilization and Recon-struction operations.

o Explore new ways to bring additionalvolunteers into the RC who possess specialskills that are most useful during Stabilizationand Reconstruction operations. Give consider-ation to expanding the auxiliaries, usingTemporary Reserves, retirees, volunteers fromthe business community, or other creativemechanisms to meet the needs of the military.

• Building Joint Reserve components

o Support and manage the Joint OfficeManagement program to preclude the need fora joint duty waiver to be appointed as a RCChief.

o Include the RFPB in any future JointProfessional Military Education (JPME) taskforce in order to ensure that the needs of theRC are developed in parallel to their ACcounterparts.

o Make changes to JPME to includeprovisions for the training and building of jointduty qualified RC officers and Noncommis-sioned Officers.

• Legislative Issues

o Avoid any further delays in fillingvalidated senior military officer requirements

necessary to execute the National SecurityStrategy.

o Ensure all Reserve officers receivejoint duty experience as required byGoldwater-Nichols vice providing a permanentwaiver of joint duty experience for officers tobe appointed as Reserve Chief or NationalGuard Director.

o Maintain separate Active and ReservePersonnel Appropriations until RC equityconcerns have been addressed.

o Develop an equitable DoD policy thatproscribes assignment to combat zones of bothmilitary spouses when they have children,regardless of component–Active, Guard, orReserve.

o Pursue solutions that provide protec-tions for RC students who lose tuition and/orplacement at colleges and universities as a resultof a call to active duty.

Conclusion

This year’s report has been redesigned toreflect the RFPB’s 2003 transformation into abody that operates within a strategic 18-monthbusiness cycle. Our annual symposium, fieldvisits, trips to our Combatant Commanders,the establishment of our RFPB task groups,and all other efforts serve to support andreinforce matters and issues that we address inour Annual Report. The strategic recommen-dations contained within this report reflect theviews of the Chairman and the members of theBoard, not necessarily those of DoD.

Our efforts in 2004 will be shaped by theSecretary of Defense’s request to the Chair-man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to engage the Boardin force rebalancing. As provided in Title 10,United States Code, the RFPB is the principal


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policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense onmatters relating to the RC and shall provide anannual report on RC programs and otherappropriate matters for transmission by theSecretary of Defense to the President andCongress. As such, the Board is particularlywell suited to engage a great many issues at thestrategic level that impact the RCs.

Albert C. ZapantaChairmanReserve Forces Policy Board


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Mission

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), asprovided in Title 10 of the U. S. Code, is theprincipal policy advisor to the Secretary ofDefense on Reserve component (RC) matters.The RFPB acts independently in its advisory roleto evaluate proposals and actions or situationsimpacting RCs that would: create, change, ordiscontinue pertinent laws, directives, instruc-tions, or other guidance media; alter the missionsor the composition, operation, readiness, or otheressential elements of one or more RCs; or impactdirectly upon the RCs in such matters as culturaland environmental issues. The RFPB shallprovide an annual report to the Secretary ofDefense for transmission to the President andCongress.

The Chairman’s Vision

The RFPB provides independent, timelyadvice, and recommendations to the Secretary ofDefense on challenges facing the RCs. Ourdirect charter from the current Secretary ofDefense is to aid efforts to support transforma-tion, rebalance and strengthen the RCs, and assistthe RCs in reconnecting with America.

History of the Reserve Forces PolicyBoard

President Harry S. Truman, on October 15,1947, directed the Secretary of Defense to takeevery practicable step for the strengthening of allelements of the RCs of the Armed Services. Inresponse, Secretary of Defense James Forrestalappointed the Committee on Civilian Compo-nents to make a comprehensive, objective, andimpartial study of the RCs of the armed forces.The committee recommended that the Secretaryof Defense create a standing committee torecommend policies and procedures affecting theRCs. The then Secretary of Defense, Mr. LouisJohnson, adopted the committee’s recommenda-tion, and on June 14, 1949, created a CivilianComponents Policy Board.

In 1951, Secretary of Defense George C.Marshall changed the name of the Board to theReserve Forces Policy Board to more accuratelyreflect the Board’s focus. The Armed ForcesReserve Act of 1952 codified a Reserve ForcesPolicy Board within the Department of Defense.Although the RFPB had existed via regulationsfor a number of years, Congress envisioned asomewhat different purpose for the RFPB. Asoutlined in 10 USC 10301, the Board, actingthrough the Assistant Secretary of Defense forReserve Affairs, is the principal policy advisor tothe Secretary of Defense on matters relating tothe RC. Further, it was envisioned by Congressthat this Board would act independently tomonitor, review and evaluate proposals, actions,and situations impacting the National Guard andReserve forces–a goal the Board steadfastlymaintains.

In September 2002, the Board commemo-rated its 50th anniversary with the establishmentof an annual “Citizen Patriot Awards” program.The fiscal year 2002 Awards were presented tothe Honorable John O. Marsh Jr. and to theWWII Women’s Air Service Pilots, CitizenPatriots who made considerable contributions tothe national defense.

The Board has been able to keep pace withthe evolving role of the RCs over the years. Asthe Guard and Reserve mobilizations in supportof the Global War on Terrorism have illustrated,we are once again at the beginning of a new era,where the windows of opportunity are enormous,and the challenges equally daunting. The RFPBstands ready to continue its important role insupport of the RCs in successfully carrying outthe roles and missions specified in the President’sNational Security Strategy.

Introduction

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The Reserve components (RC) havecontributed significantly to military operationsduring the past decade. As stated in the“Review of Reserve Component Contributionsto National Defense” report of December 20,2002, “Reserve Component support hasincreased from 1.4 million duty days in FY1989 to nearly 13 million duty days in FY2001. Reservists have responded to the call ofduty when needed, well trained and ready.”The Total Force policies, Abrams Doctrine,downsizing, and increasing demands to sup-port peacetime missions and contingencieshave been major factors in the increasedreliance on the Reserve Forces. In a two-yearperiod following September 11, 2001, about300,000 of the 1.2 million RC personnel werecalled to active duty. RC members were quickto support operations centers, flight operations,and to provide security at the Pentagon, WorldTrade Center, airports, and military installa-tions around the Nation. They fought on thefront lines in Afghanistan and Iraq and trackedterrorists throughout Asia and Africa. Theyare maintaining the peace in the Sinai,Balkans, Afghanistan and now Iraq, andparticipated in a wide range of domesticmissions. There is no indication that thisincreased reliance on the RCs will change inthe foreseeable future, thus, transformation is anecessity.

Since September 11, 2001, numerousstudies, symposiums, conferences, and thedocumenting of lessons learned have beenperformed to closely evaluate how the Depart-ment of Defense (DoD) and the Servicesaccomplished the business of mobilization andto pursue organizational and process improve-ments. Considerable evidence exists that thecurrent mobilization process and organizationis not sufficiently responsive to 21st centuryoperational requirements and thus will notserve the nation well in the future. The goalhas been to mobilize RC forces based onoperational plans developed through a deliber-ate planning process; however, it is generally

recognized that the need exists to move towarda capabilities-based approach in order tobetter respond to the current threat environ-ment. The Services have used predictableoperating cycles and advance notification toprepare for mobilizations. The existingoperation plans were not sufficient to guidemobilizations; thus, a modified process thatrelied on additional management oversight andmultiple layers of coordination was utilized.This process was slower and less efficient. Itwas reported by the United States GeneralAccounting Office (GAO) that the Secretary ofDefense (SECDEF) signed 246 deploymentorders between September 11, 2001, and May21, 2003, to mobilize over 280,000 RC mem-bers in comparison to the less than 10 deploy-ment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000RC members during the 1991 Persian GulfWar.

The mobilization process begins with theidentification of a force requirement by theCombatant Commander and continues untilindividuals and units arrive at their gainingcommands. This process must be efficient,flexible, and responsive.

DoD Mobilization Guidance

The SECDEF has challenged his staff, theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),and the Military Departments to find short andlong-term solutions to lessons learned duringthe alert, activation, mobilization, and demobi-lization of forces in support of the Global Waron Terrorism (GWOT). Some of the mostsignificant areas that need to be addressedinclude:

• Improving the process of activatingGuard and Reserve personnel and seeking jointsolutions to provide the best flow of forces(active and reserve) promoting judicious andprudent use of the RCs;

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• Seeking “quick wins” or “best practices”that will result in immediate process improve-ments in the activation of RC personnel;

• Seeking the best Active component (AC)and RC mix to allow greater flexibility, im-prove strategic surprise, and reduce the strainon Guard and Reserve personnel through theefficient application of manpower and techno-logical solutions;

• Structuring AC and RC forces to reducethe need for involuntary mobilizations of theGuard and Reserve-in particular, seek toreduce the need for involuntary mobilizationduring the first 15 days of a rapid response;

• Limiting the frequency and length of involuntary activations;

• Developing a full spectrum of initiativesand programs to encourage RC member“Volunteerism” for extended periods of activeduty;

• Establishing a more rigorous process forreviewing joint requirements;

• Validating requests for forces in time toprovide timely notice of activation;

• Making the activation and demobiliza-tion processes more efficient;

• Ensuring that RC members, when used,are given meaningful work for which alterna-tive manpower is not readily available, but,retaining them on active duty only as long asabsolutely necessary; and,

• Improving the capability to track RCmembers from alert through the activa tion andmobilization process, in theater, and throughdemobilization.

Progress Toward MobilizationReform

The mobilization process owners, from theOffice of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)through the Military Departments and Combat-ant Commanders have been working to im-prove the process, rebalance the forces, anddevelop sustainability and predictability.Much remains to be accomplished and thischapter serves to focus attention on many ofthose issues and lessons learned.

The CJCS provided guidance to Com-mander, United States Joint Forces Command(USJFCOM), with regard to developing a moreagile, responsive process for mobilizing RCforces and individuals that requires changes inService and joint doctrine, policy, and law.USJFCOM has assembled subject matterexperts from the Office of the Secretary ofDefense/Reserve Forces Policy Board (OSD/RFPB), Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA), theJoint Staff, Combatant Commanders, Services,and all seven RCs to seek mobilization processreform. The Under Secretary of Defense forPersonnel and Readiness (USD/P&R), incoordination with JFCOM, the Joint Staff, theServices, OASD/RA, and other OSD staffformed a working group to identify “QuickWin” opportunities to improve policy andprocess changes that could be implemented toimprove the efficiency of the mobilizationprocess. The following areas, having signifi-cant impact on mobilization reform, have beenthe primary focus of these two efforts:

• Using RCs forces Judiciously andPrudently;

• Preparing RC Units for Activation;

• Using RC personnel to BackfillDeployed Active Forces;

• Activating Members of the IndividualReady Reserve (IRR);

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• Managing the Mobilization Cap;

• Involuntarily Activating Ready ReserveMembers;

• Maximizing Predictability to the RCs;

• Sustaining RC Capabilities;

• Seeking Joint Capabilities BasedSolutions;

• Maintaining Visibility of RC Forces;

• Obtaining Force Sustainability andCollective Training;

• Improving Military OccupationalSpecialty (MOS) Training;

• Issuing/Revalidating SecurityClearances;

• Improving Medical Readiness/Resourcing;

• Improving Initiatives to SupportVolunteerism;

• Improving IRR Access/Relevancy; and,

• Improving Individual AugmenteeManagement.

The mobilization process must be mademore relevant, efficient, and effective. To doso will require total support and cooperationfrom DoD, Congress, and collaboration amongthe Services, Joint Staff, RCs, CombatantCommanders, and various defense agencies.Throughout the many studies, symposiums,and conferences, it has been clear that DoD,the Services and RCs have worked extremelyhard to respond to the current challenges. TheBoard recognizes and applauds these positiveefforts toward continual mobilization processimprovement and transformation.

Automated Systems

The current process of mobilizing RCmembers is fragmented with “stove-piped” andincomplete tracking systems. These systemsare not standardized or interoperable across thejoint community and do not offer leaders andprocess users visibility of critical informationrequired to make timely and accurate deci-sions. The Services, Combatant Commandersand joint planners have indicated the need fora common system of tracking RC personnel inthe mobilization process from individualnotification through demobilization. Thus,there is an immediate need to develop a jointtracking system to track and manage indi-vidual RC members. Long-term focus shouldbe on developing a DoD common mobilizationsystem, integrated and compatible with currentand planned DoD and Service readiness,personnel management, and operationalplanning systems. This system should becapable of managing the mobilization processfor all Services using standardized data.Ideally, this automated system will include allpersonnel, regardless of status. Accessibilityto the data in these systems should be availablereal-time to the leadership within DoD and theServices to improve efficiency and effective-ness of the decision making process. TheServices have recognized this problem andalready have systems in place or under devel-opment to improve personnel tracking; how-ever, these systems are not integrated nor dothey contain consistent data elements. TheBoard recommends development of interimmeasures to integrate existing Service specificsystem data, to share this data across DoD atthe appropriate levels, and to dedicate fundingto accelerate further system development.Great effort needs to be taken to ensure lessonslearned are factored into the developmentcycle.

Employer

Increased utilization of the individual RCmembers has increased strain on families and

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employers. The Board is concerned that over aperiod of continuous mobilizations this factorwill likely have a negative impact on themanning of our RCs. Protective measuresmust be put in place to ensure employersupport does not become too great a burden,particularly for small companies, small busi-ness owners, and self-employed RC members.Much is being done today by OSD, EmployerSupport of the Guard and Reserve, and Con-gress, but the Board believes there is a need todevelop policy as a basis for solutions on howto best share the talents of the individual RCmember, improve employer support andvolunteerism, and strengthen member rightsand family support.

Individual Medical Readiness

The state of individual medical and dentalreadiness prior to activation has a tremendousimpact on individual RC members, on overallunit readiness, and on the effectiveness of themobilization process. Some RC membersarrive at the mobilization processing stationwithout prior/proper medical or dental screen-ing. Often, these members have medical ordental problems that delay or prevent deploy-ment. The so-called “early” benefit provided bythe FY 04 NDAA provides some much-neededrelief from these problems for Reserve compo-nent members ordered to duty in support of acontingency operation, but it will expire inDecember of 2004. The Board recommends thisbenefit be continued without lapse. The follow-ing approaches could significantly improvethis deficiency: Implement DoD IndividualMedical Readiness standards; improve thecategorization and tracking of individualmedical readiness of all RC members; andresource medical and dental readiness at alevel that will allow RC members to meet/maintain the statutory and regulatory require-ments for medical and dental screening andreadiness standards.

The Board recognizes that keeping all RCmembers fully ready, medically and dentally, is

very costly; however, with our continuedreliance on the RCs, the need exists to deter-mine the best alternatives to achieve this goal.The Board recommends DoD evaluate jointmedical solutions and ensure DoD policies andstatutes are sufficient to support cost effectivemedical and dental readiness of our RC mem-bers. One advance in this direction has beenthe policy for standardization of individualmedical readiness reporting issued by theOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Health Affairs which the Services areimplementing. Another advance is legislationto allow for medical and dental screening andcare of RC members who have been notifiedthey will be called to active duty for a periodof more than 30 days. DoD policy broadensthe applicability of that provision by statingthat a member of the Ready Reserve may atany time while in a military duty status beprovided any medical and dental screening orcare necessary to ensure the member meetsapplicable medical and dental standards fordeployment, as provided in accordance withpolicies and procedures of the Military Serviceand RC concerned. The effectiveness of thesepolicies throughout the Services and RCs willbe evaluated during fiscal year 2004. Everyeffort must be made to provide Commandersthe tools necessary to accomplish their respon-sibility of ensuring medical and dental readi-ness for their units.

Family Readiness and Healthcare

Since the Gulf War, much has been done toimprove all areas of family support, particu-larly healthcare; yet there is still a significantlack of understanding, access to, eligibility for,and rules governing TRICARE benefits, plus alack of understanding of the importance ofmaintaining current Defense EnrollmentEligibility Reporting System (DEERS) infor-mation. These programs are complex and notdesigned with our RC members in mind. It istherefore vitally important to educate the familiesof RC members, especially on the TriCare

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changes contained in the FY 04 NDAA. This isparticularly important due to fact that approxi-mately 50 percent of our RC members’ fami-lies do not live within reasonable proximity toMilitary Treatment Facilities. The goal needsto be family healthcare and family healthcareeducation at the right level for the right personat the right time at the right cost regardless ofdemographics and existing medical coverage.Continuity of health care has been the numberone issue of the RC Chiefs the last three years.

In addition, family members must beaware of and understand their military benefitsand how to access them. Family SupportPrograms change frequently and it is challeng-ing to keep RC members informed about thelatest changes due to their geographic disper-sion. These Programs are important to manyRC members and their dependents upon returnto active duty. There are some great initia-tives within the Services to improve familysupport; however, much can be done to im-prove standardization and accountabilityacross the Services. Family Support Pro-grams are being designed from a Joint ServiceTotal Force perspective and the Services andRCs are making every effort to ensure anymember or family, whether Active, Guard, orReserve, can use the family support programsavailable at any base or installation. Addition-ally, the National Guard has established over400 Family Assistance Centers in the Statesand Territories to provide local support andcoordination for services. All Services andRCs are also participating in Military OneSources, an employee assistance programaccessible by a toll-free telephone number andthrough the internet. The greatest challenge inproviding support for the families of Guardand Reserve members is their geographicdispersion. While the Internet is proving to bean effective tool in providing informationabout programs available to military families,many RC families do not reside close enoughto an installation and therefore, cannot takeadvantage of those services. The Boardsupports the ongoing efforts to improve

TRICARE and Family Support Programs forour RC members but stresses the importanceof timely education and assistance. This willbe particularly important as we seek to utilizevolunteers more frequently and for shorterperiods of time.

Doctrine, Policy, and Law

To ensure judicious and prudent use ofRCs and to reach a high level of efficiency andeffectiveness, significant improvements to themobilization process will require changes inpolicy, law, and doctrine. Proposed policypapers were developed as part of the “QuickWins” process and submitted as recommenda-tions to the SECDEF for consideration insupport of continued process improvements.Even though these proposed policy recommen-dations are still under review by teh Depart-ment, they are provided in order to highlightthe issues and show the level of effort to seekimprovement. In addition, JFCOM, undertheir effort to develop a more agile, responsiveprocess to mobilize RC forces and individuals,is working a number of issues that will havemajor impact on mobilization process reform.Presented in this section are some of the mostsignificant issues developed during theseforums along with recommendations forneeded improvement.

• Using RCs Judiciously and Prudently.As DoD continues its commitment to winningthe GWOT, the magnitude and duration of theconflict make the RC’s role essential. It isimportant to protect this vital resource andensure it remains available and ready torespond. The decision to activate RC forcesmust be made only after determining that it isboth judicious and prudent to do so. Thefollowing precepts should be consideredbefore sourcing a required capability to a RCunit or individual:

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o Activate RC forces with the consentwhen possible, of the individuals being calledto full time duty.

o Employ RC units and individuals in amanner that maximizes the utilization of theircore capabilities throughout the orderedduration of the validated requirement or thelength of the original orders to active duty,whichever is shorter.

o Give early consideration to thefeasibility of using alternate manpowersources–such as active duty forces, coalitionforces, host nation support, civilian contractedlabor, technological solutions, or other meansthat may be available.

o Apply innovative managementalternatives such as using retiree volunteersand civilian auxiliary members.

o Provide as much predictability as ispossible to the RC members, their families,and employers when sourcing requirements toRC forces.

• Preparing RC Units For Activation. Allof our forces need to be responsive, flexible,agile, and relevant. The readiness levelnecessary to achieve these goals may poseunique challenges to RCs. In advance of thelong-term efforts underway to transform theRC’s force structure, the Services must takeevery opportunity to ensure Reserve units andindividuals are ready to react quickly to a callto active duty or a change of mission status.In the near term, the Services must take thoseactions that are prudent and appropriate, andmust provide additional resources as neces-sary, to bring service members and units to anincreased state of readiness–first focusing onunits that possess the capabilities most likelyto be engaged in future operations. Someappropriate actions include: improving indi-vidual and collective training readiness,solving personnel shortages, cross-levelingequipment, and improving medical, dental, andfamily readiness.

• Using RC Forces to Backfill DeployedActive Forces. RC forces have historicallyprovided installations with manpower, on aone-for-one basis, to perform the functions andservices provided by Active component mem-bers who deploy forward. However, theduration and demands of global conflictsrequire a new approach that establishes mini-mum essential requirements and considersalternative manpower sources before activat-ing RC forces for this purpose. When consid-ering requirements, ensure that the functionthe RC member will perform is critical tosupporting mission needs, including familiesand the installation community, during theperiod the active member is deployed. Somealternate manpower sources to consider are:joint and/or regional solutions to provide theservice or function in lieu of activating aReserve individual or unit; existing civilian orauxiliary workforces to provide the service orfunction on a temporary basis while the activemember is deployed; and/or hiring of civiliancontractors from within the regional commu-nity to perform the service on the installation.If necessary to activate Reserve medicalmembers to backfill deployed Active medicalmembers, do so when: there are no adequateregional or joint solutions, including greaterreliance on the civilian sector to provide thepatient population responsive, quality medicalcare; diminished staffing could affect theaccreditation of the medical treatment facility,its outlying clinics, or its key programs; and/orthe backfill is essential to the theater medicalevacuation plan.

• Managing the Mobilization Cap(MOBCAP). The proposed “Quick Win”policy titled Mobilization Cap Managementstates, “The President, in consultation with theSecretary of Defense and with input from theUnder Secretary of Defense for Personnel andReadiness and the Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments, shall establish a mobilizationcap, when appropriate, for reserve forces. TheSecretaries of the Military Departments willprovide justification of Reserve force require-

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ments while applying policies and proceduresfor judicious and prudent use. To manage theflow of rotational forces, the Service may goabove the established MOBCAP to provideoverlap in support of long-term operations.The Under Secretary of Defense for Personneland Readiness, in coordination with theChairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, will establishauthorization levels for each Secretary of themilitary Departments within the approvedmobilization cap.” The Board concurs withthe proposed policy of MOBCAP Managementas a method of improving predictability andresponsiveness.

• Involuntarily Activating Ready ReserveMembers. The “Quick Win” policy titledProcedures for Involuntarily Activating ReadyReserve Members states, “ The Secretaries ofthe Military Departments may activate withoutadditional notification to the Secretary ofDefense (SECDEF) those Reserve members:

o Specified or implied as necessary toprovide the capabilities presented in alreadyapproved SECDEF Deployment Orders(DEPORDs) or already approved CJCS re-quests of the SECDEF to activate Reserveforces. This is allowable provided the require-ment is resourced within the allocatedMOBCAP and policy guidance on judiciousand prudent use of Reserve forces, backfill foractive duty forces, activating members of theIndividual Ready Reserve (IRR), joint capa-bilities based solutions, and preparing Reserveforce units for activation have been met.

o Required to provide scheduled relieffor approved ongoing operational missionswith rotational manning.

o Required to meet the internal Title 10responsibilities of the Military Departments.This is allowable provided the requirement isresourced within the allocated MOBCAP.

For all other requirements to order Reservemembers to active duty pursuant to ExecutiveOrder 13223 of September 14, 2001, the

Secretaries of the Military Departments mustobtain SECDEF approval through the CJCSand the Under Secretary of Defense for Per-sonnel and Readiness (USD/P&R). Theserequirements include those that are part ofDeployment Orders (DEPORDs) or ExecutiveOrders (EXORDs) being presented to theSECDEF for decision and those that a Serviceneeds to activate in advance of the DEPORDapproval process. “ The Board believes thatstreamlining the process within DoD for theMilitary Departments to gain approval ofinvoluntary activations is an essential part ofachieving predictability and responsiveness.

• Maximizing Predictability to the RCs.The July 19, 2002, addendum to the Mobiliza-tion, Demobilization, Personnel and Payguidance establishes a requirement to provideRC members with orders in a timely manner tofacilitate predictability for them, their families,and their employers. For all but the mosturgent operational requirements, the goal mustbe to provide the RC members a minimum of30 days notice to report for duty. Predictabil-ity can be extended to the maximum amountpossible by notifying RC members that theyare being considered for activation. Once RCmembers are notified of a probable or pendingactivation, it is necessary to be diligent inassisting them to certify their readiness toactivate and help their families and employersprepare to meet the challenges of the activa-tion period. Another important tenet of pre-dictability is transitioning to the alert periodby issuing activation orders as soon as it isoperationally feasible.

Many early deploying units have proce-dures in place to deploy in less than 30-dayswithout negatively impacting service mem-bers, their families or employers. For RCunits that do not have these procedures,Reserve force predictability can be achievedthrough additional mechanisms. Some ex-amples include: identification with Air andSpace Expeditionary Force rotations, employ-ment in continuing international peacekeeping

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missions such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo,early notification of members being consideredfor activation, and early consideration of StopLoss action. Notification of RC members oftheir pending call to active duty should bemanaged efficiently. It is necessary to beskillful in providing them the care and respectthey deserve, even when the conditions of theiractivation are uncertain and the environment ischanging. Predictability for RC members, theirfamilies, and employers is extremely impor-tant. The Board recognizes the importance ofpredictability and also notes that some RCunits have procedures in place to deploy in aslittle as 72 hours without negatively impactingRC members, families or employers. Thoughearly notification is extremely important theServices and RCs should exercise care andconsider establishing formal procedures whennotifying RC members of pending activation toensure that irreversible employment or per-sonal financial decisions are not made prior tothe actual issuance of activation orders.

• Sustaining RC Capabilities. Managingforce requirements in support of prolongedcontingency operations requires a significantRC contribution. Use of the RCs must bemanaged in a way that sustains their capabili-ties over the long run. To prevent overstress-ing capabilities, a process needs to be devel-oped that tracks augmentees and individualswithin units who have been previously acti-vated to support the GWOT. The need existsto look toward other solutions such as shiftingrecruiting and retention efforts to target thereplenishment of stressed capabilities andinnovative training technology to reclassifyRC members not previously activated so as tomeet the skill sets for predictable requirementsof future campaigns. The Services must beginnow to look for approaches to sustain ourReserve forces for future requirements, suchas, developing force structure that allows for a“just in time,” rather than a “just in case”approach, and offering financial and otherincentives that attract and retain Reservists for

stressed units. Several examples of forcestructure development include: constructionof modular units that can be tailored to supportrequired capabilities, and blending Active andRCs to support a common mission and takeadvantage of the inherent strengths and experi-ence found in our RC. The Board recognizesthat business may offer successful ways toemploy a “just in time” philosophy as it relatesto personnel requirements and recommendsthese options be evaluated.

• Seeking Joint Capabilities Based Solu-tions. To ease the pressure on stressed Reserveforce capabilities, Combatant Commandersshould request capabilities in as much detail aspossible without specifying the Service pro-vider. All Services that have forces availableto meet a valid requested capability should beused to meet requirements. Requirementsshould be sourced to the Service that, withinavailable forces, can best provide the capabil-ity. This should be done without a bias towardselecting the Service that, in the past, hastraditionally provided the requested capability.Joint solutions should be sought to sourceReserve capabilities and to ease the pressureon stressed skill sets within the RCs. Joint RCsourcing solutions should be sought that arejudicious and prudent to meet all requirementsexternally to the Services and support theirinternal Service requirements for additionalactivated forces.

• Maintaining Visibility of RC Forces.Efficient management of RC forces requiresfull spectrum, real time visibility of ouractivated RC members. In order to manageRC use judiciously and prudently, to sustainthe RC force capabilities, to ensure predictableuse, and to plan for future campaigns, theDepartment must have automated systems toprovide improved joint visibility in order toanswer the following questions:

o What Reserve forces are approved foractivation?

o What Reserve forces are requested

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pending approval for activation?o What Reserve forces are currently

activated?o Where are they serving, and how long

have they been activated?o When did they arrive in a theater of

operations?o When are they scheduled to rotate out

of theater?o When are they scheduled to be

released from active duty?o What Reserve forces have not been

activated?o What Reserve forces are supporting

operational requirements in a training status?

Without this level of detail, it is impossibleto efficiently provide flexible, agile, andresponsive RC force capabilities. Full spec-trum visibility is also essential to transformingthe Reserve force role and toward improvingthe activation process.

• Obtaining Force Sustainability andCollective Training. To get RC membersactivated and in theater quickly will requireinnovation in our funding, training, and alertprocesses. The collective training time spentat home and/or the mobilization station mustbe reduced. The right level of funding toimprove sustained training and equipmentreadiness must be sufficient to reduce the timefrom activation to arrival in theater. There is adirect correlation between the level of readi-ness funding and the ability to rapidly respondto the demands of the theater CombatantCommander. Reducing the deficit betweenmobilized mission readiness levels and peace-time standards, manning and resourcing levelswill enhance the responsiveness of these unitswhile decreasing the overall activation periodrequired to meet standards and to perform theoperational mission.

• Improving Individual OccupationalSpecialist Training. Each Service has occupa-tional specialist training for its personnel

though it may be identified by a different namein each Service. In the Army, it is known asMOS training. RCs consist of individuals thatare either prior service or non-prior service.Each Service component is challenged to adiffering degree in training these personnelquickly to both meet deployability and unitreadiness standards. The larger the unit thatrequires training, the greater the impact.While the unit may have willing servicemembers filling required positions, they maynot be deployable because they are not MOSqualified. Non-prior service members re-cruited under a split enlistment option (toaccommodate civilian education schedules)may have attended basic training but stillwaiting a school seat for MOS training. Priorservice members may have been recruited to aunit due to domicile proximity but may nothave retrained in the appropriate skill. When aunit is activated, cross-leveling may be re-quired to fill the skill vacancies created by thislack of qualified personnel. The Board recog-nizes and supports the Services’ efforts inseeking improvements in these areas andstresses the need to continue those efforts thatreduce the need for cross-leveling personnel.

• Issuing/Revalidating Security Clear-ances. The process for revalidating securityclearances for mobilized RC members islengthy and unresponsive to operationalrequirements. Additionally, Combatant Com-manders will not always grant interim clear-ances for mobilized RC members, throwingthe requirement back on the Services. Clear-ance requirements are often articulated at thehighest level of clearance, rather than at thelowest levels needed to perform the job. It isnecessary for Gaining Force Commanders togrant interim clearances for mobilized Reserv-ists at the lowest level necessary to meet therequirements. Responsibility for final process-ing of administrative requirements for clear-ances must be resolved to prevent delay in themobilization process. In the long term, DoDshould resource the background investigationinfrastructure at a level that would give both

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AC and RC members a much shorter timelinefor approval of a final clearance.

• Other significant recommendations thatfall in this category include updating opera-tional plans to reflect changes in mobilizationrequirements, updating mobilization directivesand plans, developing wartime Joint ManningDocuments for standing warfighting headquar-ters, seeking legislative changes to expand theoption to mobilize members for the purpose oftraining, and retaining the flexibility of mul-tiple involuntary activation authorities whileensuring predictability for members.

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)Access and Relevancy

The IRR provides a rich source of person-nel possessing a broad range of capabilities forthe support of future operations. A recentGAO report found, however, that the IRR wasnot being utilized to its full potential. Reserv-ists in the IRR are generally there to meet theirminimum military service obligations and havevarious levels of qualifications based on theirassigned skills when on active duty and thecurrent validity of those skills. There are otherReservists in the IRR, by choice (family,civilian career, education), that prevent themfrom participating in an Inactive Duty Training(IDT) status under the traditional IDT guide-lines. In either case, the IRR is a valuablepool of Reservists. A proposed “Quick Win”policy, developed to focus on this area, titledActivating Members of the Individual ReadyReserve (IRR) states, “ Members serving theremainder of their service obligation in theIRR can provide a depth of capabilities tosupport future conflicts. The decision to drawfrom this resource is a viable option andshould be done with the consent of the mem-ber being called to full time duty, if possible;or if involuntarily activated, preferably usingIRR not previously called. Activating IRRmembers involuntarily requires SECDEFapproval of a coordinated recommendationfrom the Secretaries of the Military Depart-

ments, through the Under Secretary of Defensefor Personnel and Readiness and the Chairmanof the Joints Chiefs of Staff. Services whosecurrent force structure sets conditions for IRRmembers to be called to active duty as casualtypersonnel replacements must ensure that theintent, scope, and timing for the involuntaryuse of IRR members is included in planspresented to the SECDEF for his approval. Inthe mid term, review how the IRR is used,confirm the viability of the IRR in today’smobilization environment, track trained andready IRR for utilization, and examine the useof Stop Loss and IRR.” The Board agrees thatthe Services still need the ability to involun-tarily activate IRR members to resolve deploy-ment shortfalls. Some examples of actionsthat can be taken include: separate non-deployable members through proactive man-agement of the IRR, improve education ofseparating AC members of their IRR responsi-bilities, improve annual mustering and moni-toring of IRR members, reclassify memberswhose skills do not match required capabili-ties, and target recruiting to increase thenumber of trained and available IRR members.The Board supports the concerns of the Ser-vices with regard to the utilization of the IRRand recommends OSD include the review“best practices” and the policies and statutesgoverning the management of the IRR at theirannual IRR Mobilization Management Confer-ence, with a goal toward improving the overalldeployability, relevancy, and resourcing of theIRR population as a mobilization asset.

Volunteerism

There exists a need to conduct involuntaryactivations to support contingencies. This, ineffect, means there must be a greater relianceon the use of volunteers to achieve this goal.Current policy, law, and regulations are notconducive to supporting RC members perform-ing extended active duty in a volunteer status.Within DoD, the present paradigm of thetraditional 39-day RC member must bechanged and a transformation construct, such

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as continuum of service, be instituted. Reli-ance on the RC is significant today and willcontinue into the foreseeable future; thus, it iscrucial that our governing laws and regulationssupport this environment. The capability mustexist to support both the traditional 39-day ayear RC member and the new non-traditionalRC member. The individual RC volunteermay suffer under the current system becausethe laws and regulations can negatively impactindividual compensation, benefits, entitle-ments, and even career progression. TheBoard applauds the fact that every RC hasdeveloped methods to support the non-tradi-tional RC member so the AC mission can beaccomplished with volunteers. However, theBoard realizes it will take DoD support andCongressional action to develop the policy,statutes, and regulations to support this trans-formation. To reduce the reliance on involun-tary activations and stress on our RC forces,these changes are critical.

Concurrent with the efforts of the indi-vidual Services, OSD has contracted to con-duct extensive research and data collection ondevelopment of viable initiatives in thevolunteerism arena for all Services. Thesestudies must answer the complicated, burningquestion of how to sustain the RCs withsufficient depth for a 5, 10, 20 or even 30-yearwar on terrorism. The answer must include anew “compact” with RC members, theiremployers and their families, which providesrealistic incentives for extended participationbeyond the confines of the original “Reservist”expectations for satisfactory participation ofone drill weekend per month, plus two weeksduring the summer. In addition, new initia-tives should be developed in the areas ofrecruiting, career development, promotion,separation, retirement, and how the IRR isutilized.

One area that significantly impactsvolunteerism is the fact RC members currentlycount against active duty end strength andcontrolled grade limitations (10 USC 115, 517,

and 523) if they serve in excess of 179 con-secutive days on voluntary active duty ordersor in excess of 270 consecutive days in sup-port of a combatant command. This impact iscurrently mitigated through delegation of endstrength waivers to the secretaries of themilitary departments at the end of the fiscalyear. However, all Services currently employvolunteer force management procedures basedon the potential impact on end strength andcontrolled grades. Removing these restrictionswill reduce the uncertainty associated with thecurrent waiver process and facilitate the use ofvolunteers in support of increased operationalcommitments. The Board recommends, in theshort term, SECDEF provide a policy exclu-sion to preclude RC volunteers on active dutyin excess of 179 days (270 combatant com-mand exclusion) from counting against aService’s active duty end strength and con-trolled grade limitations. More permanently,the Board recommends seeking a change toTitle 10 Sections 115, 517 and 523 to allowServices more flexibility in managing andemploying RC members by removing ormodifying the end strength and control gradelimitations in Title 10 that restrict the use ofvolunteers. In addition, the Board encouragesthe Services to “prime the pump” for increas-ing volunteerism by identifying and program-ming funding for day-to-day missions to beperformed by RC volunteers. This will pro-mote the changes in culture needed to increasethe rate of voluntary activation in war.

Mobilization Process

The mobilization process typically beginswith the identification of requirements, whichare then consolidated and forwarded to theJoint Chiefs of Staff as “requests for forces.”The Joint Staff validates and prioritizes therequirements and coordinates with supportingcommanders and the SECDEF concerningtiming of mobilizations, units and individualsto be mobilized, approval of the deployment offorces, and the issuing of the deploymentorders. The Services review approved

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requirements and coordinate with Forceproviders and RC headquarters to verifyindividual and unit readiness. When units orindividuals are firmly identified, the AssistantSecretaries of the Military Departments forManpower and Reserve Affairs approve themobilization packages. Finally, the Servicesissue mobilization (activation) orders to RCunits and individuals. This entire process cantake anywhere from one day to several months,but normally takes several weeks. Most RCmembers complete the activation processwithin 24 to 96 hours though some RC mem-bers require lengthy post activation/mobiliza-tion training that delays movement into the-aters of operation. Factors that impact theefficiency of the mobilization process consistof identifying valid mobilization requirements,negotiating the approval process, identifyingand validating the appropriate fill, certifyingindividual readiness, notifying individuals in atimely manner, processing mobilization(activation) orders timely, completing theactivation process (medical and dental certifi-cation, benefits/legal and mission relatedbriefings, security clearance certification orprocessing, uniform and personal protectiveequipment issuance, establishing active dutypay accounts, etc), and validating missionspecific training, equipment processing, etc.This process offers many challenges that canresult in problems or delays that negativelyimpact individuals, families, employers, andmission readiness if not done efficiently andeffectively. This process is ready for reform tomeet today’s operational requirements. In-cluded below are some of the significantrecommendations to improve this process:

• Identifying one organization as thesingle source process owner for identifyingrequirements, generating “requests for forces,”and sourcing requirements based on capabili-ties;

• Developing a standard operating cycleconcept to help increase predictability;

• Reviewing and improving the effective-ness of the existing Joint Billet validationprocess;

• Ensuring “requests for forces” areprioritized and filled as they are generated;replacing sequential decision making with aparallel and collaborative process;

• Streamlining the activation/mobilizationprocess for RC members and equipment toremove duplicative processes and repetitivetraining;

• Increasing full time support manning toadequately support mobilization process;

• Developing policies and mobilizationguidance that makes the process more effi-cient;

• Automating the process as much aspossible and developing capability for allprocess owners to see the status of individualand/or unit processing;

• Improving supplemental personnelequipment issue process;

• Capturing readiness information on theresources within all the units that are availableto meet the tailored requirements of Combat-ant Commanders to improve visibility to keymobilization officials within DoD, the JointStaff, Combatant Commanders, and the Ser-vices;

• Investing resources early to enhanceindividual and unit readiness, with particularemphasis on pre-mobilization medical anddental screening and treatment, memberprocessing, security clearance processing,training for mobilization, and equipmentprocessing; and,

• Improving the tracking of medicalconditions of individuals in a non-deployablestatus to ensure deployability.

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The Board recognizes and applauds thefact that all Services, OSD, Joint Staff, Com-batant Commanders, and RCs have beendiligently working to improve the mobilizationprocess. The Board has supported and partici-pated with various agencies within and outsideof DoD in developing the best policy, as wellas legislative change recommendations, toreform the mobilization process. The Boardbelieves that JFCOM, through its initial effortsin working on mobilization process reform,has already had positive results on the devel-opment of process and policy changes amongthe Services. Much of this has been achievedthrough the coordination and cooperativeefforts of the Services, OSD staff, Joint Staff,and Combatant Commanders. This effortserved to highlight the positive aspects ofhaving one organization actively coordinateand facilitate mobilization reform.

Transforming the ReserveComponents

In the Fiscal Year 2002 Annual Report ofthe Reserve Forces Policy Board, the topic of“Transformation” was addressed. The primaryfocus of the chapter on Transformation con-cerned the relevancy of the Abrams Doctrinein the 21st century and the potential positiveand negative impacts of not retaining thedoctrine. Today’s increased reliance on theRCs is directly related to the Abrams Doctrine,total force policies, force downsizing, in-creased mission demands, and the fact that the“threat-based” approach of the past decade hasbeen replaced by a “capabilities-based ap-proach”. Even though the Services havealready been actively engaged in transforming,there has been a more concerned effort as aresult of the lessons learned from the currentcontingencies, emerging challenges, andadditional guidance from the SECDEF.

The Services recognize the importance ofachieving strategic surprise, reducing stress onhigh demand-low-density career specialties

(active and reserve), and streamlining ourreserve management practices in order toretain a strong, relevant Reserve Force. TheDecember 2002 Reserve Component Contribu-tions To National Defense report focused ontwo themes for transformation, which wererebalancing the force to enhance capabilitiesand creating flexibility in force management.The stage has been set and OSD and theServices are moving forward rapidly to iden-tify and execute force structure changes, toactively participate in mobilization processreform, and to develop policy and legislativechanges necessary to support innovativemanagement practices for more effective andefficient utilization of the RCs.

The Services have successfully imple-mented measures to improve the force mix andearly reliance on involuntary mobilizations.For example, between fiscal year 2005 and2009 the Army will rebalance over 100,000spaces of force structure in order to improveforce readiness and ease the stress on theGuard and Reserve. The Air Force is orga-nized and funded for the integration of RCsinto every aspect of the Air Force mission.Their Air and Space Expeditionary Forceconstruct allows for maximum use of volun-teers, thus, minimizing the need for involun-tary mobilization within the first 15 days of arapidly developing contingency. The NavalReserve contains a significant portion of theNavy Airlift capability and Maritime Patrolcapability, yet they are fully integrated to thepoint of seamless operations. Beginning infiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard begancommissioning the first of thirteen MaritimeSafety and Security Teams for domesticsecurity operations, reducing the need forReserve-staffed Port Security Units to respondto local contingencies. Port Security Units aredesigned to support the Combatant Command-ers overseas in strategic ports of debarkation.Every Service has already made structuralchanges in the ACs and/or RCs that reducestresses on critical skills and enhances capa-bilities. Many of these changes began before

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September 11, 2001, though now the need tocontinue is fully recognized. In some caseschanges in reserve management policies arebeing implemented to improve volunteerism.

The Board concurs with the current direc-tion and measures to rebalance the force anddevelop innovative management practices;however, it recommends that SECDEF con-sider one organization to guide this transfor-mational process. This will improve consis-tency, balance, the development and sharing ofideas and best business practices, and ensurethe right policies and legislative proposals arefully developed.

During the RFPB fiscal year 2003 fieldvisits to Combatant Commanders, the Boardmembers met with RC members individuallyand in groups to listen to their concerns. Theyexpressed concerns about an inefficient activa-tion/mobilization process but tended to acceptthis more often when they were fully utilizedand providing meaningful support; however,the Board repeatedly heard negative commentsabout fairness and equity issues. Thus, in spiteof the problems experienced by our RC mem-bers during the activation process, it is theBoard’s opinion that members are less likely toleave the Services because of these inefficien-cies; rather, they most likely will leave overfairness and equity issues; i.e., “second class”treatment.

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Equity

As the nation calls on our Reserve component(RC) members in increasing numbers and dura-tion to support our National Security require-ments, the level of attention focused on pay,incentives, benefits, entitlements and compensa-tion issues rises exponentially. The currentmilitary environment has forced the Services touse RCs in ways that are not fully supported bythe existing compensation programs. The Re-serve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) continues tohear recurring themes of equity and compensationissues between the Active components (ACs) andRCs. These comments are voiced most often asthe RFPB visits the Combatant Commanders anddeployed RC forces supporting the Global War onTerrorism. Equity in pay and benefits remains aconcern for many RC members and for themembers of the RFPB. Identifying the inequitiesand proposing solutions through DoD willcontinue to be a priority for the RFPB.

Regardless of which component a servicemember belongs to–Active, Guard, or Reserve,the pay and benefits for performing the same dutyin the same location should be the same. To theRFPB this means the entire compensation pack-age, not limited to just basic pay, but includingincentives, bonuses, special pays, and suchbenefits as Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH),medical and dental care, per diem, and familysupport programs. Recognizing the importance ofthese issues to the future of our Total Force,Congress and DoD have rightly focused theirattention and efforts to address and correct manyof the problems and concerns of our RC mem-bers. Most notable of these efforts are improvedhealth care benefits, full commissary privileges,hostile fire and imminent danger pay and new taxbreaks. However, there remain critical issues andareas where the Board feels that additional workand legislative change are required.

Current laws and regulations covering perdiem, special and incentive pay, housing allow-ances, death benefits and other benefits andentitlements do not cover the way we are usingour RCs. These compensation issues must be

addressed if we are to continue to attract andretain the numbers and caliber of personnelneeded in our RCs to meet military requirements.As these issues are examined we must be awareof both the statutory and budget implicationsassociated with the recommended changes.

A recurring issue voiced to RFPB membershas been the inconsistency in the method used bythe different Services to interpret and subse-quently pay travel claims. All the ACs and RCsare compensated using the Joint Travel Regula-tions (JTR) to compute eligibility and amounts ofpayments for travel related expenses. The issuearises from the interpretation of the JTR, whichseems to be different from one component toanother. The Board sees this difference amongthe components as a significant morale issue. Itis impossible to answer RC members who askswhy their per diem payment or travel allowancediffer from members assigned to a differentcomponent, especially when the members arestationed in the same location doing the sameduty. The RFPB has heard this complaint overmany years; however, the increasing use of ourRC members, particularly in a deployed status,has raised the intensity level and visibility on thisissue. On the surface this appears to be anadministrative issue that could be easily fixed.However, when the RFPB has dug deeper intospecifics, we always came away with the sameresponse: This is a legal interpretation of theJTR. The Board does not view this as a systemicproblem with the JTR, but rather a problem withthe many different interpretations applied to theseregulations. The Board unanimously supportsany effort aimed at simplifying and clarifyingtravel and per diem entitlements to provideuniformity of interpretation and equal payment toall our members. Our RC members are dailycarrying out hazardous missions and deserve fairequal treatment under the regulations.

As identified in the RFPB’s Fiscal Year 2002Annual Report, income protection upon mobili-zation is an important issue for many RC mem-bers. Many of these members can earn more intheir civilian jobs than they earn when mobilized

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Equity

for active duty. This loss of income can causemany problems for the members and theirfamilies. A previous attempt to remedy this issuewith a mobilization insurance system met withdisastrous results and was quickly terminated byDoD. The current level of dependence on RCforces to support military commitments at homeand abroad makes the insurance solution finan-cially unsupportable without a huge outlay offunds from DoD’s already taxed budget. Whilethere does not appear to be an easy answer to thisissue, the RFPB continues to support and encour-age all efforts to review the many proposals andcombinations of proposed solutions to providerelief. This is a significant recruiting and reten-tion issue that will not go away and must not beplaced in the too-hard-to-do box and forgotten.

BAH reform is another area of concern oftenvoiced by mobilized RC members. Undercurrent law, SECDEF has the authority toestablish a housing allowance rate for RCmembers who are on active duty for less than140 days, presently authorized as BAH II, whichis a flat rate based on grade and dependencystatus but not location. In comparison to regularBAH, the average BAH II rate is currently about$400 per month less. In high cost areas, theBAH-II rate is significantly less than the BAH-Irate. While this disparate payment system resultsin substantial cost savings to DoD, RC membersserving tours of duty for less than 140 daysreceive significantly less housing entitlementmoney per day than their active duty counter-parts. While there is an exception for thosemembers serving in support of contingencyoperations, the separate BAH rates still apply fornon-contingency duty. These distinctionsbetween AC and RC members based solely onmonetary considerations are no longer support-able. When the 140-day threshold was estab-lished 20 years ago, RC members were employedin a significantly different manner than they aretoday. RC members interested in serving tours ofduty for less than 140 days are faced with adisincentive to volunteer, as their amount ofBAH-II is less than that of their active dutycounterparts and other RC members servinglonger than 140 days. Because of our increased

reliance on RC members, need for improvedretention and to encourage volunteerism, theBoard recommends the Services, RCs, and DoDactively seek policy or other solutions to resolveBAH inequities for RC members on active dutyfor less than 140 days.

Family readiness is another area of greatconcern to the Board. As RC members are calledto active duty repeatedly over a short period oftime, or extended on active duty for long dura-tions, the strain on the families at home becomesa morale and retention issue. In the traditionalRC role of inactive duty and limited active dutyfor training, family readiness did not receivemuch attention. The Board is aware that thereare new programs within DoD, the Services andthe RCs addressing this issue and applauds theseefforts to alleviate this problem. However, wecontinue to hear from our deployed RC membersthat their ability to perform the missions we areasking them to do is directly affected by familyissues at home. Most of the complaints receivedby the RFPB are directly related to informationflow. Many families have been left in the darkregarding the duration of the mobilization and thedate the RC member will return home. Also,comments from RC members indicate a need forincrease emphasis on keeping RC member’sfamilies current on benefits and entitlements, andwhere to go to get questions answered or neededservices provided. Often RC family membersand even a significant number of RC members donot have Active duty experience nor live in thevicinity of military installations, resulting in alarge knowledge gap regarding benefits, entitle-ments, and support services. Thus, extendedActive duty becomes a whole new world to manyof these RC members and their families. TheBoard believes strongly that family preparationprior to deployment, proper education of themember and the family, and most of all, frequentand continuing communication between the RCsand the families are the keys to successfullymeeting this challenge. The Services do a greatjob of taking care of Active duty families; thus,we must figure out the way to translate that samelevel of care to our RC member families.

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Recent experiences in Afghanistan andIraq have presented an opportunity for theReserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) toexplore and contribute to providing recom-mendations to issues related to stabilizationand reconstruction operations. Stabilizationand reconstruction operations are sometimesreferred to as the post-conflict phase of opera-tions, although as we have seen in Iraq, theline between the conflict and stabilizationphases is very gray. Reserve Component (RC)units such as Civil Affairs, PsychologicalOperations, Military Police and Engineersalready play a key role in these operations.The RFPB is very interested in stabilizationand reconstruction operations and plans in2004 to actively focus on the development ofpolicy, organizational structure, and its impacton RC units and members, to include the useof civilian volunteers. Given the strongemphasis placed on force rebalancing andtransformation, the RFPB has a role to play inreviewing current proposals for reform. TheBoard will coordinate with various DoD andother Federal Agencies including NationalDefense University, the Office of ForceTransformation, Assistant Secretary of De-fense for Special Operations Low IntensityConflict, Assistant Secretary of Defense forReserve Affairs, and the Army War CollegePeacekeeping and Stability Operations Insti-tute, leading scholars, and “think tanks” thathave ongoing work in this area.

The demands of warfighting in the 21stcentury and insuring post-conflict stabilizationdemand new thinking and approaches for howthe RC can best contribute to this effort. TheRFPB is working with others and doingindependent research concerning the viabilityof expanded use of Auxiliaries and recalledretirees; utilizing authority that exists forcreating a Temporary Reserve; expanding useof State Defense Forces; and, examining othermechanisms that will meet the needs of themilitary and contribute to a new paradigm ofwhat Reserve service can mean. For example,the Board has an active program of engaging

senior business leaders regarding nationalsecurity issues that particularly impact themand their employees who are RC members.The RFPB has discovered they are interestedin supporting various new initiatives thatcontain real possibilities for developing activevolunteerism with the business community.Typically, these are senior level businesspersons who may or may not have had previ-ous military experience, but they have a skillthat is needed in the context of stability andreconstruction operations and they are willing,for a short time, to serve in the military whenthe Nation requires their skills–a true exampleof the Citizen Patriot.

The RFPB is positioned to provide valu-able insight in advising DoD on how to bestmeet our needs in the area of stabilization andreconstruction operations. While other agen-cies are doing outstanding work on the devel-opment of force structure and organizationalmanagement, the RFPB can and will explorehow to best tap into the almost limitless talentresiding in the civilian community among ourCitizen Patriots as a unique challenge.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

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Building Joint Reserve Components

Today, the Reserve Components (RCs) arebeing utilized to a degree to which they haven’texperienced since Desert Shield and DesertStorm. The RCs are intimately integrated intothe Homeland Defense mission, as well as theentire expeditionary mission, as the Global Waron Terrorism (GWOT) is executed. Joint Opera-tions and the RCs are now full partners, hand inhand, as they work to plan, organize, and equipthemselves to fight the wars that lie in front ofthem. Full integration of the RCs in JointOperations is no longer an idea, but a reality ofhow business is being accomplished. Given ourcurrent strategic situation, National Securitypolicy and future commitments, the futureutilization of the RCs will most likely resemblehow it is being used today - with the exception ofit being more ‘Jointly’ orientated and tasked. Theconcept of the “weekend warrior” is antiquated -an extinct concept and construct of the past.With the new steady and future state of increasedRC involvement, training, equipping, maintain-ing, and educating our members to a similar levelof our active duty counterparts is reality. Duringthe past year, the Reserve Forces Policy Board(RFPB) closely watched the progress being madein RC Joint Officer Management, Joint Profes-sional Military Education (JPME), the JointReserve Intelligence Program and the utilizationof the RC in Homeland Defense/Security.

Joint Officer Management and JointProfessional Military Education(JPME)

Joint Officer Management and JPME areinextricably linked. Understanding servicecultures, practices, and procedures are fundamen-tal to successfully operating in the joint environ-ment - whether it be at a Headquarters or unitlevel. Service members coordinating jointoperations must know joint procedures, capabili-ties, and doctrine. RC members are now servingin increased numbers and frequency on jointstaffs and in joint billets. This trend will continueas the RC continues to be integrated into theTotal Force. Therefore, it is intuitive, RC mem-

bers must receive both JPME and joint dutyexperience to maximize the effectiveness of theDepartment’s initiative to adhere to theGoldwater-Nichols requirement on joint forceintegration. Without the RC member receivingthe education or the opportunity to serve in jointbillets, the RC member will never become fullyqualified as a Joint Service member; and with thecontinued use of the RC, the Department will notbe utilizing it’s best resource, the RC member, asefficiently and effectively as possible.

One of the first challenges to RC JointOfficer Management is in the area of education.Fortunately, there has been an improvement overthe past several years in this area. The ArmedForces Staff College has been successful in theirinnovative Advanced JPME pilot program byincorporating both distance learning and phasedresident options to the RC member. The firstiteration of the course received positive com-ments from the RC community. The next ‘pilot’class began in the first quarter of fiscal year 2004and received accolades from a larger targetaudience. Future plans are to have the courseavailable to all Active Component (AC) and RCmembers. As this and other related coursesimprove from lessons learned, the issue of JPMEfor the RC should be relegated to one of avail-ability of funds instead of systemic barriers toprogram integration.

The second challenge to becoming a fullyqualified Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) is to bebilleted in a Joint Duty Assignment. There areRC members, both officers and non-commis-sioned officers, serving at the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS), Unified Combatant Commands and JointTask Force headquarters who are not given creditfor “joint duty” experience because their billetsare not designated as Joint Duty Assignment. Inmany instances, the problem is further compli-cated by the fact that some of these RC personnelare assigned to billets considered liaison posi-tions within the organizations and thus, notincluded in the organization manning/authoriza-

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tion document. This situation is most commonwith RC “fulltime support” personnel in the ArmyNational Guard, Army Reserve, Marine CorpsReserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, andthe Air Force Reserve.

A report to the Subcommittee on MilitaryPersonnel, Committee on Armed Services, Houseof Representative by the General AccountingOffice (GAO) (03-238), regarding the educationpiece of this issue, stated the absence of a strate-gic plan for Joint officer development is a signifi-cant barrier to JPME integration and implementa-tion. Further studies by independent contractorsconcluded operational and organization changesare needed in order to implement the mandatedJPME program.

Importantly, regarding the Joint Duty Assign-ment issue, DoD Instruction, 1215.20, September12, 2002, (RC Joint Officer Management Pro-gram) provides policy and guidance for RC JointOfficer Management. This instruction providesguidance for identifying and validating RC jointpositions, tracking officers with joint experienceand education, and managing the program toensure an adequate pool of joint qualified officersare available to meet staff requirements.

Most recently, OSD has put forth a legislativeproposal for fiscal year 2005 to permanentlywaive the requirement for RC Chiefs to havesignificant joint duty experience. The currentwaiver expires in law on December 31, 2004.The Board has gone on record in opposition to apermanent waiver. Instead, the Board believesthat the Joint Officer Management programshould be appropriately supported and managedto preclude the need for a waiver to be appointedas an RC Chief.

To date, compliance with this DoD Instruc-tion has been limited. The Board believes thatDoD Instruction, 1215.20 can be a catalyst forchange to address the systemic problems that areseen as barriers to the full integration of the RC-Joint Officer Management program. Congress

has suggested creating a Task Force to furtherstudy JPME. The RFPB should be included inany future JPME task force in order to ensurethat the needs of the RC are developed in parallelto their AC counterparts. The Board will con-tinue to monitor all efforts concerning JointOfficer Management and JPME.

Joint Reserve Intelligence Program

The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program wasestablished in January 1995 by Deputy Secretaryof Defense memorandum “Peacetime Use ofReserve Component Intelligence Elements”,which approved the “Implementation Plan forImproving the Utilization of the Reserve MilitaryIntelligence Force.” The plan’s vision wasrevolutionary in that it directed the defenseintelligence community to train reservists formobilization by engaging them in “real-world”missions during peacetime.

The mission of the Joint Reserve IntelligenceProgram is to implement this vision via theintegration of the Reserve Component Intelli-gence Elements throughout the defense intelli-gence community. The Joint Reserve Intelli-gence Program also ensures that RC memberswho are not co-located with their respectivegaining commands have the necessary tools andcommunications to provide cogent, timely, anduseful all-source intelligence that supportsstrategic and tactical intelligence requirements ofthe unified combatant commands, combatsupport agencies, and service intelligence organi-zations.

The Joint Reserve Intelligence ProgramProgram Manager, Defense Intelligence Agency,Reserve Intelligence Integration Office estab-lished twenty-seven (27) Joint Reserve Intelli-gence Centers located throughout the continentalUnited States. Each Joint Reserve IntelligenceCenter shares the common mission of providingresources and Reserve support to assist thedefense intelligence community in meetingintelligence missions at all classification levels.

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Joint Reserve Intelligence Program RC membersutilize the equipment and infrastructure providedby the Joint Reserve Intelligence ConnectivityProgram to assure a collaborative intelligenceproduction between the Reserve ComponentIntelligence Elements and the defense intelli-gence community in a virtual environment. Thepresent ability of AC customers to quickly andreliably task RC personnel with contingency,crisis, or peacetime requirements illustrates thesuccess of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Programin meeting the needs of the larger defense intelli-gence community.

The Joint Reserve Intelligence Program alsoprovides the Joint Military Intelligence Programfunded reimbursable dollars to hire ReserveComponent Intelligence Elements personnel forintelligence operations, training, and support tomeet the unified combatant commands’ mostcritical defense intelligence needs. This fundingprovides flexible, tailored, and timely reservesupport for contingency, surge, and crisis opera-tional missions and essential DoD intelligenceproduction requirements.

For the past nine years, Congress has insertedlegislative language into the Defense appropria-tions bill granting funded reimbursable authorityfor the upcoming years. Funded reimbursibleauthority authorizes unified combatant com-mands to utilize Operations and Maintenance(O&M) funds for reimbursement of pay, allow-ances, and other expenses when members of theRCs provide intelligence support. This has beena very successful program, except that fiscal yearcross over and delays in the Defense Appropria-tions Bill result in periods when Fundedreimbursible authority is not authorized, whichnegatively impacts the combatant commands’ability to utilize valuable intelligence assets forreal world requirements. The most viable way toimprove the effectiveness of the Joint ReserveIntelligence Program would be for Congress toestablish a permanent Funded reimbursibleauthority a position also supported by the Board.

The second most important way to perfectthe intent of the Joint Reserve Intelligence

Program would be for DoD to establish andresource true “joint reserve intelligence units” tosupport the unified combatant commands andintelligence combat support agencies at the JointReserve Intelligence Centers. In their presentconfiguration, Joint Reserve Intelligence Centersare in actuality “consolidated work centers”because the billets are not Joint Duty Assignmentdesignated. The current system is unstable andprovides less than optimal war fighter supportbecause service-based RC units and individualmobilization augmentees tend to get tasked bytheir own service during times of high OperationsTempo (OPTEMPO). Establishing joint reserveintelligence units that provide dedicated supportto specific joint intelligence operation centerswould also enhance Joint Reserve IntelligenceCenters usage by bolstering war fighter confi-dence in the ability of the Reserve units toprovide effective, virtual, remote support fromthe Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers sites.

Finally, but not least in importance, is theissue of the growing need for long-term financialsupport for continual improvement in the techni-cal infrastructure managed by the subordinateJoint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity Program.The Joint Reserve Intelligence ConnectivityProgram is currently in the process of installing astate-of-the-art Joint Windows Enclave at allthree levels of classification throughout thetwenty-seven (27) sites of the Joint ReserveIntelligence Center system. Without budgetingfor continual capital replacement and infrastruc-ture improvement, however, the Joint ReserveIntelligence Connectivity Program infrastructurewould eventually lapse into irrelevance due tofailure to keep pace and compatibility with theintelligence automation systems used by the jointwar fighters.

Reserve Components in HomelandSecurity (HLS) / Homeland Defense(HLD)

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, hada major impact on the way we view emergency

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and disaster response. Today, the terms of‘homeland security’ and ‘homeland defense’ arenow part of our everyday language when discuss-ing emergency and disaster response issues.HLS is a concerted national effort to preventterrorist attacks within the United States, reduceAmerica’s vulnerability to terrorism, and mini-mize the damage and recover from attacks that dooccur. HLD is the military protection of theUnited States territory, domestic population andcritical defense infrastructure against externalthreats and aggression. It also includes routine,steady state activities designed to deter aggres-sors and to prepare U. S. military forces foraction if deterrence fails.

United States Northern Command(USNORTHCOM) was established in February2002 to provide command and control for DoDshomeland defense efforts and to coordinatesupport to civil authorities. NORTHCOM hasfew permanently assigned forces and is notconsidered to be a “first responder”.NORTHCOM will operate in support of anotherfederal agency, unless circumstances dictate thatDoD is the lead federal agency, in which caseNORTHCOM will be supported to ensuremission accomplishment. Whenever militarypersonnel of the DoD perform a domestic mis-sion, operation or other activity, it is important tounderstand the legal authority for that action.The core mission of the DoD is to provide themilitary forces needed to deter war and to protectthe national security interests of the UnitedStates. The core mission includes providing land,sea and aerospace defense of the homeland.

One legal implication of employing militarypersonnel of the DoD on U.S. territory is consid-eration of the Posse Comitatus Act, which iscodified at 18 USC section 1385. While theexpress term of the law places restrictions on useof the Army and Air Force to execute civilianlaws, DoD policy applies those same restrictionsto the Navy and Marine Corps as a matter ofpolicy. The Act does not apply to the NationalGuard when not in Federal status. The potentialapplicability of the Posse Comitatus Act isevaluated and resolved before military personnel

undertake any mission, operation or activity onU.S. territory, especially when providing supportto civil law enforcement authorities.NORTHCOM’s command and control relation-ship with the National Guard, when in Federalstatus, is the same as that of any other combatantcommander. There is no formal, direct linkagebetween NORTHCOM and individual StateNational Guard Headquarters or state and localofficials.

NORTHCOM has encountered severalchallenges since its formation less than two yearsago. For example, the organizational structurewas created, but assigning individuals to fillcritical positions from both the AC and RC is stillan ongoing challenge. A second issue that is leastunderstood but actually the most important is thatof organizational culture. NORTHCOM, as oneof the unified combatant commands, utilizes thetraditional warfighter construct to plan, coordi-nate and execute its operations, thus, requiringmore discussion to fully engage all mission areas.

When authorized under Title 32 USC,members of the National Guard may be orderedby the governor to perform certain duties in aTitle 32 status. Members in this status are paidwith federal funds but the members remain underthe authority, direction and control of theirrespective governors. Under constitutional andstatutory authority, the President may call ororder National Guard members into federalservice. When called to Federal service underthis authority (Title 10), members are subject tothe authority, direction and control of the Presi-dent and the DoD.

Summary

The most significant challenge to “BuildingJoint RCs” is that of transformation. Regardlessof policy, instructions, or directives, the Boardbelieves necessary change can not occur unlessthe most senior DoD leadership, both civilian andmilitary, provide the impetus for a real transfor-mation that includes both a change of culture andorganizational systems. Any effort short of this

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Reserve Component Programs 31

type of transformation will only provide short-term fixes while ignoring long-term systemicproblems. The fear of unintended consequencesshould not keep leaders from trying to makethose changes needed to make the Total Force areality. All interested parties must be willing tocome to the bargaining table with an attitude thatwill allow them to change something in order toachieve a greater good. The adage that “you caneither be part of the problem or part of thesolution,” seems appropriate as a challenge toovercome the present institutional inertia. TheBoard is committed to doing whatever is neces-sary to help facilitate the process of change andachieve the attainable goal of creating the TotalForce.



Legislatively, 2003 was a very busy andproductive year for the Reserve components(RCs). While not prioritized or all-inclusive,the below items were of concern or note to theReserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) this year.

General Officer/Flag Officer(GO/FO) Management

The RFPB is very interested in thefarreaching legislative proposals put forth bythe Department of Defense (DoD) with regardto the GO/FO Management. These proposalsare as a result of the recent GO/FO Manage-ment Study conducted by the Department, andalso as a part of the SECDEF’s Transformationproposals. The Board is concerened that itsindependent voice withregard to the potentialimpacts on RC senior officers is missing from

these proposals.

• Increasing in GO/FO Reserve authoriza-tions. The Board has not been aware forseveral years that the Services have validatedthe need for an increase in senior Reserveofficers based on the increased demandsplaced on RCs. The mose recent DoD GO/FOstudy determined once again that the numberof GO and FO requirements continues toexceed the number authorized in Title 10.DoD, however, will not propose a legislativeincrease in authorizations until it undertakes afurther study of the entire pool of seniorleaders to include DoD civilians. At the timeof writing, this further study has not begun.The Military Departments and CombatantCommanders are now faced with waiting untilthis tudy is completed before addressing theirReserve senior leadership shortage. The Boarddoes not concur with any further delays infilling validated senior military officer require-ments necessary to execute the NationalSecurity Strategy and supports increasedauthorizations.

• Permanent exemptions from gradeceilings for the ‘Chairman’s 12' and‘Chairman’s 10'. Twelve Regular and tenReserve GO and FOs serving in joint dutypositions are exempt from grade ceilings.These exemptions are due to expire 31 Dec2004. In its GO/FO Management Study, theDepartment stated its desire that these exemp-tions be made permanent. However, thelegislative change needed to support thatobjective was not submitted to Congress. TheBoard, in its review of the GO/FO Manage-ment study, agreed with this proposal andincluded the legislative language to make theseexemptions permanent in its comment. Thefiscal year 2004 National Defense Authoriza-tion Act includes these permanent exemptions.The Board is grateful for Congress’ support onthis important issue.

• Extension of “Good of the Service”waivers for significant joint duty experiencefor officers appointed as Reserve Chief orNational Guard Director. The Board is awareof DoD support for a permanent waiver topossessing significant joint duty experience forofficers to be appointed as Reserve Chief orNational Guard Director. The Board disagreeswith seeking permanent waiver authority forthe Secretary of Defense from Congress.Rather, the Department should make theneeded improvements to ensure that all Re-serve officers receive joint duty experience asrequired by Goldwater-Nichols.

• Increasing age, service and tour lengthsfor senior Reserve officers. The DoD supportsincreases in these areas as part of its transfor-mation proposals. The Board believes thatchanges to age or service limitations for themost senior officers, or increasing tour lengthsfor Reserve Chiefs or National Guard Directorshould be studied openly to assess the poten-tial impact on Reserve promotions and reten-tion. The Board has not been apprised of any

Legislative Update

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Legislative Update

34

studies in this area, nor does the Board findthat current statutes in these areas createobstacles to effective management of theReserve by its senior officers. The Boardrecommends caution before changing thecurrent statutes.

Positive Legislative ChangesSupporting the ReserveComponent

• Personnel Appropriations Merger. TheDoD proposed the merger of the ReservePersonnel appropriation with the active dutyaccount, for budgetary flexibility. ManyReserve proponents, to include the RFPB,were concerned that a result of this mergerwould be a shifting in the fourth quarter ofeach fiscal year of reserve training dollars intothe active duty pay account. Reserve equityconcerns should be addressed along with anymerger of appropriations.

• Alteration of Ready Reserve TrainingRequirement. The DoD proposed that thecurrent annual training requirement of 48 drillsand two weeks of annual training duty beconverted to 39 days of equivalent duty.Congress responded to the wide concern fromReserve proponents about the possible nega-tive impact of this proposal on Reserve payand retirement point accounting, and did notmake this legislative change. The Boarddesires to participate in any further study onthis issue by DoD.

• Pay and benefits equity issues. Anumber of advancements in equity in pay andbenefits have occurred this past year. TheBoard is extremely pleased with the progressmade, but is disheartened that it had to take aGlobal War on Terrorism, with its extremereliance on the RCs, to get these advance-ments. A partial list of these issues follow:

o Unlimited Commissary Visits. Un-limited commissary privileges have beenextended to Reservists and their families, andto gray-area Reserve retirees, in the samemanner as active duty service personnel.

o Above-the-Line Tax Deduction forOvernight Travel Expenses of Military Reserv-ists. Reservists who itemize their expensesmay now deduct for all overnight travelexpenses incurred for travel more than 100miles away from home.

o Hostile Fire and Imminent DangerPay for Reservists. Effective September 11,2001, Reservists performing inactive dutytraining at certain duty locations are autho-rized hostile fire and imminent danger specialpay at the same monthly rate paid to membersserving on active duty.

o Health Care Improvements. HealthCare improvements for Reservists include:earlier eligibility for TRICARE for Reservistsand their families to up to 90 days beforeeffective date of active duty orders and extend-ing to 180 days after separation; medical anddental screening for Guard and Reserve unitsalerted for mobilization.

o High Tempo Personnel Allowance.Just as their active duty counterpart is compen-sated monetarily for deployments that exceedthe norm, RC members will now receivemonetary compensation when their participa-tion in contingencies is repetitive.

o Federal Long-Term Care Insurance.This program is now open to gray-area Re-serve retirees.

Future Areas of Concern

Congress directed DoD to study two areaswhose outcome is of extreme interest to theRFPB.

• Mobilization Report. DoD must prepare


Legislative Update

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a report that outlines the numbers and dura-tions of mobilizations of Reservists for thepast two years. Additionally, the Departmentis to address the effects on RC recruiting andretention of these mobilizations, the lessonslearned from these experiences, a descriptionof changes in the armed forces envisioned bythe Secretary, and an assessment of the processused for calling RC members to active duty.The RFPB, under its mandate of providingpolicy advice on matters concerning the RCsto the SECDEF, must be intimately involved inthe preparation and outcomes presented in thisreport.

• Concurrent Deployment of MilitarySpouses with Children. The DoD currentlylacks an overarching policy that proscribesassignment to combat zones of both militaryspouses when children are involved. Currentpolicy in this regard addresses Active compo-nent members only. But, many times mar-riages involve an active member married to aRC member, or two married RC members.The Board wants to ensure that there is noinequity in treating any of these situations, nomatter which component or mix of compo-nents.

In addition, the following two areas are ofgreat concern to the Board, not only becauseof the resulting inequities to RC members, butalso due to their potential negative affect onretention and volunteerism:

• Equity in Pay and Benefits. Undercurrent law, significant inequities exists inBasic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for RCmembers serving on periods of active duty lessthan 140 days, and for RC members withoutdependents who must maintain a primaryresidence while serving temporary periods ofactive duty. Because of our increased relianceon RC members, the need for improved reten-tion and the need to encourage volunteerism,the Board recommends the Services, RCs, andDoD actively seek solutions to resolve theseinequities.

• Equity for Student RC members. TheDepartment has had great success working withthe Servicemembers Opportunity Collegesorganization to protect student RC members whoare involuntarily called to active duty. However,the Board believes a permanent, consistent long-term solution that provides protections to ourstudent Reservists who may lose tuition andplacement at colleges and universities as a resultof a call to active duty is important.


Conclusion

In the first days of the mobilizations, thearrivals of the first volunteers, and the initialdeployments following September 11, 2001, wethought we were facing a surge. The emergencyresponse to the attack would last for as long aswe needed to swiftly defeat the enemy, as wehave many times in the past.

Throughout 2002 and 2003, we came toaccept that we were not just facing a single bowwave, but that surging national need that woulddrive the Guard and Reserve to active duty formonths had indeed reached a plateau to supportthe Global War on Terrorism. The need is nowongoing; indeed we need the Guard and Reservein ways not envisioned during the last 50 years–not when the Abrams doctrine was enacted andcertainly not after the fall of the Berlin Wall in1989.

Even in the spring and summer of 2001 oursenior service colleges and national defensestrategy reflected the notion of “Strategic Pause”.We anticipated at least a 15-year hiatus beforethis nation would face a peer competitor.

Yet we now face an asymmetrical enemy, onewho targets civilians, adapts to our response andclandestinely communicates and plans world-wide. The levels of mobilization that must besustained to fight this enemy of loose collabora-tors under the umbrella of terrorism must like-wise be paced to support the fight. Our legacymobilization systems, equipment and policiesmust change. This report reflects just the tip ofthe iceberg – systems and policies entangled inover a myriad half century of laws, policies andregulations across the Services. They impede ourcurrent and urgent need for simple, seamless, andjoint response. Ultimately they compromisecommand and control and our operationalcapabilities. They impact morale.

What we learned this past year as mobiliza-tions continued, some back to back, and newrequirements initiated, was that our pay andentitlements systemsare significantly outdated;

that we were creating new problems that couldtake years to resolve; that our mobilizationprocesses are in need of major reform; and thestress on the force must be reduced.

Yet our people perform admirably as theyalways do when asked. We must do better forthem. They serve in a force that is the singlemost technologically advanced in the world. Wehave to pay them better, equip them right, andsupport them fully in this fight, and we have todo it now. In effect we have to “change the tireon the car while it is traveling down the road at60 miles an hour.” There is simply no time topull over.

Fixing the Guard and Reserve may requiremore than a transformation; it may very wellrequire a revolution and one that we must under-take immediately. We must find solutions thatsupport our soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, andcoastguardsmen now, and we need to fullyinvolve their employers in this process. Theemployers are the other factor in this equationthat have been on the sidelines too long. Em-ployers must be part of the solution.

This report includes a number of proposedchanges to Title 10 that must be pursued tosupport this long-term conflict. Likewise wemust move now to develop only two categoriesof service, active or reserve. We need one paysystem for all members of the Armed Forces andwe need it now. Defense Integrated MilitaryHuman Resources System (DIMHRS) is morethan 4-6 years away but we need it today.

We need to work with Congress to determinea better measurement of the effectiveness of ourArmed Forces than the false and arbitrary mea-surement of active duty end strength, a “roll call”taken every September 30th at midnight. Thatdoes nothing to measure our strength or oureffectiveness.

We need to fully integrate equipping plans

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Conclusion

with those of the Active components. SinceGuard and Reserve personnel are integral playersin today’s Total Force, participating side by sidewith their Active counterparts, their equipmentmust be compatible and interoperable with theActive components in order to fully leveragetheir capabilities. Equipment and prioritizationsneed to be reassessed to truly become a TotalForce.

This year the SECDEF has required theServices to undertake the task of force rebalanc-ing. This Board aggressively agrees with theconcept of placing more frequently used andneeded forces in the AC. However, this is stillonly a partial response to the issue of rebalanc-ing. We must find a way to allow forvolunteerism and capture that spirit as a virtue ofAmerican citizenship; and volunteerism must notbe a detriment to RC members, their families, oremployers.

Finally, the process of realigning the AC andRC must focus on developing a new mix, notmerely developing a band-aid for the old one.This should be built on the notion of achievingthe mission first while prosecuting the long-termwar on terrorism with the full spectrum of forcesavailable. We have to use this considerabletechnology at our fingertips to build modular,tailored force capabilities, using all individualsand their talents, including the Individual ReadyReserve.

Like smart engineers who design buildingsand wait to see the patterns that pedestrians takebetween the buildings before building the side-walks, we need to suspend our bureaucraticdisbelief in the next year and actually see wherethese magnificent young people take us.

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Appendix I: FY 2003 Board Activities

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB)maintained a very busy schedule during fiscalyear 2003 with four Quarterly Board Meetings,visits to three Combatant Commanders, coordina-tion of a symposium focused on Reserve compo-nent (RC) missions, doctrine, employment andcitizen connectivity, and held a Citizen PatriotForum in Sacramento, CA. In addition, theBoard made trips to Army Reserve PersonnelCommand, United States Joint Forces Command(USJFCOM), Forces Command (FORSCOM),and U.S. Army Reserve Command Headquartersto review and discuss issues that impacted thetimely and effective mobilization of RC mem-bers. Many of these issues have been addressedin detail throughout this report.

Quarterly Board Meetings

The first quarter fiscal year 2003 Boardmeeting convened December 3, 2002. Theprimary purpose of this meeting was to completeprevious business, receive current briefings, andreview new business. Topics of discussion andbriefings included updates from OSD PublicAffairs, ASD Legislative Affairs, Reserve Com-ponent Comprehensive Review presented byDeputy Assistant Secretary of Defense forManpower and Personnel, Northern CommandTotal Force Homeland Defense/Civil SupportRelationships Study, and a Joint Staff RC StudiesBriefing. The Honorable Thomas Hall, ASDReserve Affairs participated in the meeting. Theexecutive session reviewed upcoming visits toCombatant Commands, upcoming meetings andsymposiums, plus reviewed and provided com-ments on the Annual Report.

The second Board meeting, hosted by theCalifornia National Guard, was held at the StateHeadquarters, Sacramento, California on January15, 2003. The Chairman, RFPB welcomedBoard members and guests, explaining that themeeting would be conducted in three parts; anopen session, a closed executive session, and a

Citizen Patriot Forum. Topics of discussion andbriefings included California National GuardHeadquarters command briefing, presentation ofCalifornia Army and Air National Guard issues,FORSCOM Command Readiness Program,update on the Joint Officer Management andJoint Professional Military Education study,National Naval Reserve Policy Board’s proposalsand recommended Board positions, and theBoards fiscal year 2002 Annual Report.

The third Board meeting was held in thePentagon, on April 2, 2003. Topics for discus-sion and briefings included updates on HomelandDefense and Base Realignment and ClosureProcess, General/Flag Officer (GO/FO) Study,outstanding National Naval Reserve PolicyBoard issues, the fiscal year 2002 RFPB AnnualReport, and AC/RC Mix and Strategic Surprisebriefing from OASD/RA. A panel comprised ofrepresentatives from 12 military associationsprovided a briefing on their legislative initiativesfor 2003. RADM Richard Carmona, the SurgeonGeneral, served as luncheon speaker. The dayconcluded with an evening reception at theLibrary of Congress for members of Congress.On April 3, 2003, the Board participated in aStrategic Policy Forum at the National DefenseUniversity.

The fourth quarter Board meeting was held inthe Pentagon on July 9, 2003. Topics for discus-sion and briefings included updates on the AirForce Guardians of Freedom Program and theNational Guard’s new initiatives to transform theNational Guard, AC/RC mix, GO/FO Study,Legislative issues, and the Citizen Patriot Awardnominations for this year. The Honorable Dr.David S. Chu, USD Personnel and Readiness,was the luncheon speaker. Dr. Chu’s remarkswere both timely and relevant, dovetailing with anumber of topics addressed by the Board in itsexecutive session. His remarks focused ontransformation, important elements of the DoDlegislative package sent to Congress in April,senior officer tour lengths, joint training, civil

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service reform, the stationing of troops in Eu-rope, outsourcing of military jobs, and the AC/RC mix.

Pacific Command (PACOM)

Seven members of the RFPB, the AlumniPresident, three staff members and one specialguest traveled to the U.S. Pacific Command Areaof Responsibility (AOR) to discuss RC issueswith the Combatant Commander, subordinatecommanders, and RC members in Hawaii fromJanuary 8 to January 11, 2003. The party nexttraveled to U. S. Forces Korea (USFK), meetingwith the Combatant Commander and staff,subordinate commanders and RC members fromJanuary 11 to January 14, 2003. The Board thenvisited the California National Guard and con-ducted a Board meeting followed by a CitizenPatriot Forum in Sacramento California onJanuary 15.

The Board received briefings from U. S.Pacific Command; Marine Forces Pacific;Special Operations Command Pacific; Com-mander U. S. Pacific Fleet; U. S. Air ForcePacific; U. S. Army Reserve Pacific; 624th AirForce Reserve Unit, 154th ANG Wing, 9thReserve Support Group; and the 14th CoastGuard District. While in Korea, the Boardreceived briefings from Commander, USFK;Reserve Forces Support Theater Orientation Briefwith participation and follow-on briefings byrepresentatives from all major RC organizationsin country. The Board also visited the Demilita-rized Zone (DMZ), the Joint Security Area, andthe Korean Combined Operations IntelligenceCenter.

Key Issues in PACOM included: Impact ofHomeland Security (HLS) missions on the RCmissions, the need for funding, training, anddevelopment of a Mission Essential Task List forthe National Guard, concerns with problemscaused by separate pay system for mobilizedReservists, timely processing of security clear-ances, lengthy mobilization process, equipmentmodernization and replacement, increased need

for full time support personnel, increased concernregarding the impact that continued mobilizationsmay have on future recruiting, and retention.

A key issues in USFK was the necessity forRC members to be able to mobilize and deployimmediately while remaining in theater. In everylocation the Board visited, the need for immedi-ate flow of forces into theater was stressed, whilethe effects of the “tyranny of distance and thetyranny of time” were likewise cited as factorsaffecting all aspects of mission planning. Therewere also concerns regarding a perceived ineq-uity of tax breaks and other benefits betweensoldiers assigned to Korea and Bosnia. TheBoard fully supports development of an interac-tive, transparent process that meets the Combat-ant Commanders’ requirements by providingtimely access to RC forces.

On a positive note, the Board learned thatone unit, the 412th Engineer Command,Vicksburg, MS, did have the authority andprocess in place to directly mobilize in Korea. Inaddition, it was shared that multi-componentunits and Individual Mobilization Augmentees(IMAs) are an asset and working well in theater.RC members, many with years of service historyin Korea, often find themselves the “continuity”and repository of operational knowledge for theirunits and activities.

Northern Command(NORTHCOM)

Ten members of the RFPB, the AlumniPresident, three staff members, and one specialguest met at NORTHCOM Headquarters, Colo-rado Springs, Colorado on January 16-17, 2003.The Board received a command brief as well asbriefings on Global War on Terrorism, Inter-Agency development, operations, manpower,exercises, and Reserve intelligence. The Boardalso visited with Employer Support of the Guardand Reserve (ESGR) representatives and many ofthe RC members mobilized for duty atNORTHCOM.

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The effort underway at NORTHCOM tomake the headquarters a fully integrated, missionflexible, tailorable AC/RC component organiza-tion, was very positive. NORTHCOM was in theprocess of defining staff relationships, IMArequirements, and developing its Ready ReactionForce requirements. NORTHCOM is seekingfull integration in its development.

The NORTHCOM mission of securing ourborders highlights the need for a comprehensivepolitical/military strategy that is clearly differentfor Canada and for Mexico. It should be devel-oped with an awareness of differences in lan-guage and culture. The development ofNORTHCOM with the continental U. S. in itsAOR represents both challenge and opportunityto build this organization from the ground up as afully integrated, seamless, total force headquar-ters. The Board strongly endorses any and allefforts to leverage RC capabilities and test newconcepts for RC utilization by this organization,with the view to adaptation and adoption acrossthe total force.

European Command (EUCOM)

Two members and one staff advisor from theRFPB attended the 11th International Air ReserveSymposium (IARS) in Naples, Italy, September5-7, 2003. Three members and one staff policyadvisor visited senior leaders and major com-mands in Western Europe and the Balkan Statesfrom September 7-13, 2003. The purpose of thetrip was to provide Board members with insightinto the deployment of Reserve forces throughoutthe European theater and to gather information onRC issues faced by both theater commanders andRC personnel. The last time the board visitedEUCOM was in February 2002.

At the 11th IARS, the Board received brief-ings from senior leaders from Air Reservecomponent members from the Netherlands,Australia, Scotland, Israel, Great Britain, SouthAfrica, and Germany. Each country presentedtheir respective issues that dealt with RCs and

composition, funding, military policies, trainingand equipping. The Board received briefingsfrom EUCOM; Special Operations Command,Europe; Marine Forces Europe; U.S. ArmyEurope; 7th Army Reserve Command; LandstuhlRegional Medical Center (94th General Hospital)and held a Town Hall meeting; U.S. Air ForcesEurope; 28th ID- Camp Bondsteel (KFOR) and35th ID-Eagle Base-Tuzla (SFOR) and held aTown Hall meeting. A consistent theme focusedon the critical role of Reserve forces in enablingtheater commanders to meet mission require-ments. The importance of the RCs has increasedsince Operation Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.Commanders emphasized they would not be ableto keep up with the increased operations tempowithout RC support.

Key and reoccurring issues included: com-pensation, health care, equity issues comparingand contrasting RC and AC performing the samefunctions, heavy use of IMAs and mobilizedtraditional RC members from home station, anduncertainties about length of deployment. Inaddition, there were concerns regarding the needto coordinate and streamline Reserve require-ments common across Services, the need toimprove the mobilization process, the need todesignate IMA personnel that can deploy on 24-48 hours notice and the need for additional full-time support for theater Combatant Commanders.

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This was the Reserve Forces PolicyBoard’s (RFPB) first annual symposium,focusing fully on Reserve component (RC)missions, doctrine, employment, and citizenconnectivity. This year’s topic – “StrategicChallenges: Transforming the Total ForceVision for the 21st Century” was particularlyrelevant because it occurred during OperationIraqi Freedom (OIF). Over 200 senior leadersfrom academe, government, industry, publicorganizations and private policy relatedinstitutions, Department of Defense (DoD) andmilitary leaders – active and reserve, includingover 50 flag ranking officers – participated.With the unfolding war and campaign as abackdrop, speakers and forum discussants usedclear topical examples to make their points.

The symposium concentrated on fourstrategic objectives for the RCs; primarymission, emerging doctrine, employment, andthe RC link to their public constituency. Onthe first day, speakers from academia, govern-ment and military presented views related tothe symposium’s strategic objectives while thesecond day sessions concentrated on address-ing the four strategic objectives. The Sympo-sium attracted high level presenters from theDoD and the Congress. All seven RC chiefsparticipated, as did all RFPB members,alumni, congressional staffers, academics,private sector and community leaders, firstresponders, members of the news media, stateand local government representatives, theGuardian Angels and National Defense Uni-versity staff and faculty.

On the second day, summary briefingswere prepared from the breakout sessions toinclude key action recommendations. TheChairman of the Board presented these keyinsights and recommendations to the Secretaryof Defense following the Symposium.

KEY INSIGHTS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

Mission

• Maintain Title 10 and Title 32 uniquecapabilities and responsibilities and serviceunique capabilities.

• Develop portfolio of RC capabilities forboth expeditionary warfare and homelanddefense.

• Plan for flexibility and reliability in RCmissions and “on call” for deployment timeperiods.

• Design doctrine to support transforma-tion that supports operational availability butis still tailorable and flexible.

Doctrine

• The RC must train and fight jointly,integrate and be on an equal footing with theAC in training, equipping, benefits, andutilization.

• Force structure must support theGlobalWar on Terrorism (GWOT) steady state.

• Develop correct mission balancebetween the RC and AC first, and then workon force mix.

• Support development of auxiliary forces.

Employment

• Cafeteria style Employment Model witha variety of options and combinations.

• Full RC participation in equipmentmodernization and access to simulations andgaming.

Appendix II: Strategic Challenges: Transforming the TotalForce Vision for the 21st Century

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• Capitalize on critical civilian skillsespecially in the Information Technology (IT)arena.

• Determine rotating and standing forcesto conduct experimentation.

Citizen Connectivity

• Continue with efforts/programs tofacilitate connectivity with the public.

• Explore national service optionsandother outreach programs.

• Continue with transformation initiativesfocusing on the needs of the future.

• Increase emphasis on Citizen Patriotlinks and contacts.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

K E Y N O T E A D D R E S S - NationalMilitary Strategy - Reserve ComponentImplications General Peter Pace, USMC,Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gen Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the JointStaff, spoke on Operation Iraqi Freedom usingthe theme “Jointness Comes of Age.” GeneralPace assessed the effectiveness of our militarycampaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, highlight-ing the application of precision weaponry,flexible planning, agile execution, and speedas force multipliers. He observed that fire-power application historically required largetonnage of bombs and artillery to achievetarget destruction. In contrast OIF demon-strated the effectiveness of precision weaponsfire to destroy numerous targets. Precisionfires are seen as an integral component ofmaneuver warfare and are truly joint.

Speed of movement and precision fireshave transformed war fighting, literally be-

coming a “new way of war.” Planning andexecution at all levels, tactical, operational andstrategic, enhanced by real time situationalawareness can dramatically shift timelines.

Speed of mobilization and logistics werelikewise important, particularly in utilizationof prepositioned equipment. The use of theRC in these campaigns is essential. Yet themobilization process demands dramaticprocess change. Units need a process, whichmaximizes timely alert and notification.General Pace observed that headquarters usetoo much notification time, leaving too littletime for units to react and be mobilized. Keyrecommended changes include the force mix,and the organizational construct of the RC inHomeland defense.

K E Y N O T E S P E A K E R -Dr. Stephen J. Trachtenberg, President,George Washington University, and Professorof Public Administration

Dr. Steven Trachtenberg, gave a stirringspeech on the need for mandatory nationalservice to infuse a shared national vision. Hepresented the theme of service and educationby asking: “What ever happened to the conceptof national service?” He stated that publicschools need to be involved in this process toinsure both fluency in English and establish-ment of a common American identity. Thecommon cohesive vision through a concept ofnational service will become the school of thenation. This school will lead to better under-standing of military and public service. Theconcept of the citizen soldier serving thenation will lead to a fairer mix of classes.

At present the upper classes have noshared burden and the burden of service hasshifted to the lower classes. At present there isno maximum synergy between energy andbrains - national service would reinvigoratethis relationship. Recent history teaches us –Vietnam particularly – where the “Left”opposed the draft and national service, now,perhaps is the time this can be changed.

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Appendix II: Strategic Challenges: Transforming the Total Force Vision for the 21st Century

There is now an opportunity for a commonvision. There is also in education today “adisconnect between academe and student.”Training and education of the RC will de-mystify the relationship between the militaryand academe. Universities today are “gatedcommunities” that hold elitist notions. Na-tional service would help demystify thesenotions.

S P E C I A L G U E S T S P E A K E R -Honorable Newt Gingrich, Former Speakerof the U.S. House of Representatives, and CEOof the Gingrich Group

From the political perspective, the Honor-able Mr. Newt Gingrich gave a forceful dinnerkeynote address on homeland security, theimpact of domestic terror, and the need for ashorter response time for RC mobilization. Mr.Gingrich began with a warning: “We are in aperiod of crisis. What we do here in regard tothe utilization of the RC during this crisis andbeyond is critical to our country. We couldlose this country unless we act.” We are in anew era where real time weapons of massdestruction particularly the biological threatcan effect 35% to 90% of our population. Thisis not hype. The threat is real. We are waitingfor the “other shoe to drop.” This will make9/11 look pale by comparison. This cannot bepre-empted by military strikes. We must getready for this threatened strike.

Mr. Gingrich reminded participants thatmilitarily we are structured for the industrialage and now need to enter the informationage. Change is ongoing – hence accept it.Stories need to be told – tell them. Thinkabout coalition partners – for example in theanthrax case. Think about time: Six internetyears are like 100 years in regular time.Previous thinking was that jointness appliedabove the level of tactics; today’s applicationof jointness is at every level. OIF and Afghani-stan particularly show the links at the tacticallevel. There is now a need for a central systemto disseminate knowledge that distributes rapid

dissemination of unclassified lessons learnedand an on going analysis of the learned meth-odology.

K E Y N O T E S P E A K E R - Trans-forming Reserve Component Readiness,General Larry R. Ellis, Commander U.S.Army Forces Command

General Ellis addressed the state of RCreadiness and how readiness can be trans-formed. He focused on the continuum ofservice and the need for improved readiness ofthe RC. He proposed a series of specificapproaches to address these readiness issues,including the need for a seamless personneland pay system for active and reserve forces.He reviewed the need for equitable trainingand education opportunities for reservists,particularly for leader development.

General Ellis noted that the question of“who funds activities during alert for mobiliza-tion” remains unanswered. In the legislativearena, he recommended a single tri-componentfunding line with no restrictions on AC/RCequipment use and medical and dental careequitability. Central to his presentation wasthe need for a balance between active andreserve forces, and the mix of those forces.

K E Y N O T E S P E A K E R - TheCombatant Commander: Your UltimateCustomer, Admiral Edmund P.Giambastiani, Jr., Commander, Joint ForcesCommand

ADM Edmund Giambastiani likewisespoke on the critical theme of military trans-formation. He presented a thumbnail sketch ofhis top ten list which emphasized the strength-ened role of joint war fighting at every level.He plans to use joint exercises to emplacetransformational requirements. Key transfor-mational tenets include lighter joint force,utilization of all available forces and experi-mentation and demonstrations through the useof live, virtual and constructive simulation

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methodologies. He opined that we must takerisks and allow for the ability to fail. Withinthis approach, simulations can help in theconduct of the experiment. Simulation andmodeling use can precede the experiment andbe thereby useful in guiding the experimentthrough operational concepts and designs thathave been virtually proved successful.

He advocated the need for mission re-hearsal – going from embedded training tomission rehearsal. He plans to change theexisting RC sequence of alert, mobilize,deploy to a simple alert – deploy. In summary,Admiral Giambastiani presented the case forjointness in every facet of training throughdemonstrations and exercises and the deploy-ment of forces.

K E Y N O T E S P E A K E R -Congressman Steve Buyer (R, Indiana), Co-Chairman, House National Guard and ReserveComponents Caucus

Congressman Buyer, himself a Reservist,presented a challenge to the participants duringhis keynote presentation: transform the Re-serves, now! Use of the RC in the War onTerror and in the current series of campaignsin Iraq and Afghanistan is at an historic high.He observed that we are using Reserves toomuch. This utilization cannot be sustainedunless comprehensive approaches are under-taken. He reminded the audience that Guards-men and Reservists want to serve but they donot want to serve full time. Mr. Buyer was notsatisfied with the continual incremental ap-proach to change. He strongly suggested theneed for force rebalancing.

Representative Buyer examined the needfor better strength management. He felt therewere too many proposals before Congress onmilitary pay and entitlements. This incremen-talism on benefits needs to be changed topresent the entire benefits issue at one time.He recommended changes to the force struc-

ture and mix, because the “as is” mix of RCunder present commitments is unacceptable.Further the balance and force structure miximbalance needs to be resolved. He advisedthat the RC and AC should become fullyintegrated yet remain separate.

F O R U M I K E Y N O T E S P E A K E R -Honorable Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secre-tary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Mr. Hall was the keynote speaker for apanel discussion on the primary missions ofthe RCs in support of the national securityobjectives. Secretary Hall’s keynote accentedthe challenges the RC face. Innovation andtransformation must proceed in ways that areright for America. The American public mustbe educated about the Guard and Reserve. Thefirst challenge is to educate employers and thepublic constituency. The Reserves onlyaccount for 8.2% of the DOD budget, yet arenow providing GWOT support to the activeforces with over 240,000 Reservists. This is ahistoric high. The major issue facing gover-nors and employers is the forecastability ofdeployment. The major concern of Reservistsis health care coverage for the entire family.Payment for differential health care is a mustoption.

Secretary Hall asked rhetorically: Is theTotal Force concept dead? Is this policy stillworking? Can it work? Certainly the mobili-zation concept of operations is center stageduring war, but what is the policy in thefuture? Mobilization as a concept and as aprocess has dominated our thinking. We knowthat on any given day we now have approxi-mately 50,000 Reservists on active duty. Sothe question is, “What is the steady state ofReserves being called upon to perform certainduties?” If this number is about 50,000 then letus recognize this and codify it. There is a needto recognize what mix of Active and Reserveforces are required under a steady state ofpresent and future conditions. What is the

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nature of this mix? Inherent in the AC/RC mixis the protection of the homeland within thecontext of the conduct of a global campaign.We need to have the right structure for theconduct of this global campaign. SecretaryHall opined that the personnel system support-ing both campaigns and the global war is aninadequate relic of the Cold War. Our person-nel policies have to recognize the nature of theaway game – expeditionary warfare – and thehome game – homeland defense. There is aneed for a seamless flow between the person-nel policies of both active and reserves. Werecognize a force in being. There is now atime in our history to shape the policies for thefuture.

With Dr. Michael Krause moderating thepanel, Secretary Hall, Dr. Michael Doubler,Dr. Lewis “Bob” Sorley, and Ms. Lynda Davisexamined the various past influences that haveshaped the primary missions of the RC. Oneimportant influence is the militia concept.There are three fundamentals that should beconsidered: volunteers, a mix of state andfederal missions, and overseas deployments.As we look at the AC/RC future, we shouldremember these three fundamentals. Anotherfact, which shaped the mission of the Re-serves, was the utilization of Active and onlylimited Reserves during the Vietnam War.American will waned during the Vietnam War.This lack of public support for the fightingforces lead to the formulation of a forcestructure placing heavy reliance of combatunits in the National Guard and combat sup-port and combat service support units in theReserves.

Hence the mission of the Reserves was toreinforce the Active force upon declaration ofwar. The essentials of the Total Force Planwere to mobilize Reserve units in the event ofwar. In this plan, the Active forces could noteasily go to war without mobilizing the Re-serves. Reserve connectivity to the Americanpublic community – so it was thought – would

assure full public support of the militaryengaged in the conflict. General Abrams, theArmy Chief of Staff, developed the TotalForce structure concept to assure that the willof the nation would be fully committed, whenand if military forces were used in war. How-ever, even though the force structure changed,the mission of the Reserves did not: TheReserves continue to reinforce the Activeforces when mobilized and committed to war.This Total Force structure concept needs to beconsidered when additional missions areadded.

With the sense of new mission is not aneither or proposition for the Reserve Forces.Inherent in the Departmental name – Depart-ment of HLS and DoD are two missions.There may now be recognition of a new astabilization mission inherent in nation build-ing – as in Iraq and Afghanistan – and PeaceKeeping in nations around the world. There isa need for building the infrastructure fordemocracy. Inherently there is a dual missionwith multi-jurisdictions – but is must be a jointsetting. There is now a definitive need forcivil support operations. Embedded in theGuard is the sense of community, at home orabroad. The Guard and Reserves bring thissupport of the community with them. And inthis future commitment the mission of theReserves is changing.

F O R U M I I K E Y N O T ES P E A K E R - Honorable StephenCambone, Under Secretary of Defense forIntelligence

Dr. Cambone was the lead speaker for apanel discussion on how emerging doctrine isredefining the Total Force with a focus onmission balance, rapid and early deployments,and long-term joint operations. He recountedthe steps toward military transformationbeginning with President Bush’s redefinitionof the nature of war to a preventive and pre-emptive doctrine. Thus military transforma-tion is not only embedded in doctrine, organi-

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zation and equipment, but perhaps mostimportantly the cultural transformation. Weare now in a period of cultural change. Ourmilitary is a sound instrument; we have all ofthe necessary new guidance – the NationalSecurity Policy, the national military strategyand others that give us focus and direction.There are changes we need to make, particu-larly in the fields of acquisition, procurementand logistics. Organizational changes, such asthe creation of NORTHCOM, Strategic Com-mand (STRATCOM)/Space Command(SPACECOM) and the Department of HLSdemonstrate the transformational fact that“jointness has come of age.”

There is an on-going momentum fortransformational change. These matters are ofsome urgency since we are at war, a war that isunlikely to be short. There is a definite needto transform the RC. A constituency fromGovernors, Service Chiefs, and Reserve Chiefsis particularly interested in homeland defense,but the RC will continue to play in bothforeign and domestic missions. One of theissues discussed is how to distribute capabili-ties so as to manage the increased OPTEMPOparticularly for the Reserve components.While the CJCS is working the force balanceissue, the answers are not obvious, but forcemanagement is a problem as well as forcemixture. These issues must be addressed. Oneof the key tenets of change will be joint train-ing versus what we used to do in training bythe Services. We will also need to look at ourabilities to stabilize a given nation afteroperations are concluded. This may be an RCrole in the future.

F O R U M I I K E Y N O T ES P E A K E R - VADM (USN, Ret.) ArthurK. Cebrowski, Director, Office of ForceTransformation, OSD

VADM Cebrowski discussed that transfor-mation of our military forces requires a broad-ening of the RC capability base. Transforma-tion reflects a shift of the military focus from

fighting great power wars to fighting as a greatpower force. There is a “new American wayof war” emerging based in part on the substitu-tion of information technology for mass.There is a misalignment of roles and missionsfrom the industrial age, which need to betransposed to the informational age. Themobilization of logistics must be transformed.One example is that the Air Force once used1,000 bombs on a target that can now bedestroyed with just one bomb. Targetingtechnology made the difference. High-speedforces cannot drag around a giant supply depotif you have that kind of speed. That meansyou have to be looking at very good battlefieldtransparency. One of the things that we seebroadly is that information technology isrunning well ahead of the physical domain.

Previously our forces were structured to bereactive and punitive, in the new way ofwarfare our forces must be structured to beproactive and pre-emptive. This places apremium on small, fast, light, agile – “highspeed” units that have all of the attributes ofdepths of effects, mobile targeting, persistentsurveillance mentioned by the previousspeaker. Labor-intensive units are in chemicalbiological, military police, staffing, andintelligence guard units as examples. Logis-tics units are presently labor intensive. But thepotential is not uniform. The RC needs to betransformed the same way, from labor inten-sive to information technology intensive.

Dr. James Carafano moderated this panelcomprising Secretary Cambone, AdmiralCebrowski, Dr. Daniel Goure, and Mr. JackSpencer. They discussed how emergingdoctrine for the Total Force can be built withfocus on mission balance, rapid and earlydeployments, and long-term joint operations.

There are no long-term, large-scale mobili-zations forecasted, short of a World War IVscenario. Rather the problem is short/mediumterm mobilizations for combat followed by

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longer occupations or stability operations.What force structure is needed for support orstabilization operations? It is likely that thenew Homeland Security Department will beoverwhelmed and will require support fromDoD to accomplish the mission. Most likelythis support will come from RCs. It is equallylikely that the RC may become “fractioned,”pulled to separate commitments, betweenhomeland defense and expeditionary warfare –the home and away game analogy. We need tobalance in both domains; and the answers hereare not obvious or simple. Perhaps we mustconsider outsourcing work using the examplesof military training in Bosnia, Kosovo etc.

Certainly the terrorist attacks on 9/11changed the nature of war and thereby changedthe nature of transformational requirements.Now, how do we update and transform the RCsin this global war on terrorism? We do nothave a single front in this war, but rather a warthat is fought at home and abroad. At homewe need to become more capable of respond-ing better, with enlarged and more robustcapabilities to a multiplicity of threats.

The RC is best suited for this. There willneed to be a change in the law on equipping,training, and structure to better serve the RC.Organizationally, we need to look at the lawsthat constrain the personnel system and theprocesses of the RCs and adjust them accord-ing to the changed defense of the homelandmission. There are cultural, funding, andconnectivity issues associated with each ofthese changes, but essential is the need toenhance RC capabilities so that they canrespond quickly and decisively.

The Title 10 and Title 32 authorities mustchange over the next ten years to allow themost effective and continual war of homelandand global defense. There will need to bespecialization of the RCs. One aspect of thisspecialization could be in stability operationsand in the conduct of nation rebuilding. The

“new vision required” must change the culture,which places the RC “as a force in reserve.”Since the world has changed, RCs must besized, structured, and equipped so that acontinual defense can be conducted. Thestatutory laws come from a two-century need;these laws have served well. As we change thestatutory authority we must be sure to continueto build trust in the institutions that haveserved so well. Right now we know that over200,000 RC members on duty will not besustainable.

The question of keeping the RC as astrategic reserve is one of profound impor-tance. The current level of mobilization isprobably not sustainable. For continuingoperations like we’re seeing now, we need tomake some space between the AC and RC.This will require analyzing where the biggestrisks will be in 5-10-15 years, and design theAC/RC mixture to meet that threat, becausethat’s how long it will take to make thechanges happen. But the decisions need to bemade in the next 6 to 8 months.

F O R U M I I I K E Y N O T ES P E A K E R - Honorable Paul F. McHale,Assistant Secretary of Defense for HomelandDefense

The implications of transformation and the9/11 attacks were considered in SecretaryMcHale’s speech. He presented seven issues,which confront NORTHCOM, including itsrelationship with the National Guard, PosseComitatus, and Title 10/Title 32 mix.

Mr. McHale pointed out that an importantconsideration is the assignment of land forcesto NORTHCOM, particularly for training.Forces that will be operationally assignedwhen the need arises need to be ready, trained,missioned, and known by the command. Inshort, those forces that are required for thedefense of the nation need to be “in a seriousrelationship” with NORTHCOM. He dis-cussed Title 32 versus Title 10 authorities for

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forces as well, noting that this is a seriousquestion that has yet to be resolved. Likewise,how should the relationship betweenNORTHCOM, the Department of HomelandSecurity and the National Guard be defined?How should there be interaction? Certainlythere should be “robust coordination”, butshould it be further defined?

MG Richard O. Wightman Jr., moderatedthis panel to focus on the employment of theReserve components. With Secretary McHaleand each of the Reserve Forces Chiefs partici-pating – LTG H Steven Blum, USA; LTGJames R. Helmly, USA; LtGen Dennis M.McCarthy, USMC; VADM John B. Totushek,USNR; Lt Gen James E. Sherrard, III, USAF;RADM Robert J. Papp, Jr. USCG; each consid-ered the need for a new employment andservice paradigm for the RCs – one thatreflects the changing patterns of use andenhances the capabilities of our militaryforces. Each of the service chiefs presentedtheir service views on the emerging employ-ment doctrine, organization and structure.Central consideration was the dichotomybetween Homeland defense – which theNational Guard and the Reserves can do well –and the continual support of Active forces inglobal expeditionary warfare. Further, newmissions such as stability operation and nationbuilding give an entirely new dimension to theforce structure, balance, mix and employmentconsideration.

The relationship of ground forces toNORTHCOM was discussed; particularly theNational Guard and Reserve element. Acentral perspective was the participants’recognition that if the military goes to war, itis planning on taking the National Guard andReserve with it. Hence a central planning andstructure questions is: How can the NationalGuard and Reserves be committed to homelanddefense, and who will do homeland security ifthe National Guard and Reserves leave?

LTG Blum began the panel by advocating a

new National Guard concept, which reflectsthe old “Minute Man”. The National Guardshould be able to defend the United Stateswhen we go to the away game. We certainlyhave the same concept for defense of theHomeland. We do need to work out theNORTHCOM – land component – Reserve andGuard relationship for all aspects of commit-ment of forces. Training jointly will be a key.All services are a part of NORTHCOM thatshould be used for a standing joint headquar-ters that has forces identified. In any case, weare ready to take part in the “unannouncedhome game” and are “ready to do what needsto be done.”

LTG Helmly articulated the need to realis-tically structure the Reserves so that all mis-sions – support of active forces in expedition-ary warfare, support of homeland defensesecurity needs and potentially stability opera-tions – can be satisfied. This realism must becapabilities based. What is required to supportall of these missions, balanced by recognitionof the time requirements? This time dimen-sion needs to be measured with the unit’scommitment. Reserve capabilities must be sostructured that trained units – not just indi-viduals – are committed over time. He pointedout that capability requirements must driveemployment. The time must consider unitdeployment and return, in short the commit-ment time. An example is to structure, one ofkind units, so that there are enough of them torotate into a forecasted contingency.

LtGen McCarthy, in commenting on thecontinuum of service, noted that OSD andOASD(RA) have the right approach. TheTotal Force approach for example does not fit,so that the one size approach does not fit all.Therefore the continuum of service as a policymust affect each service and must be consid-ered differently. By contrast, Marine mobiliza-tion during the period 1990 till 2002 was thesmallest, including Desert Shield and DesertStorm. However, now with OIF it is the

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highest. So we need to look at the continuumof service.

VADM Totushek pointed out that mobiliza-tion is in for change. The key element is thatmobilization as a process is in need of change.Dollar investments are needed. We have anopen mobilization system and it is networkcentric, but we have not invested any dollars inthe mobilization process. What is critical isthat 100% of some capabilities need to stay inthe Reserves. It is essential that we have theright mix. The nation cannot afford more thanrequired.

Lt Gen Sherrard indicated that each serviceRC is different and “the Reserves can be asgood as the AC service lets us be, with fundingand manpower being the key elements.” In theAir Force Reserves mobilizations don’t startfrom a full stop. For example fully 39% of AirForce Reservists are working every day, andmany crews were in the airlift system andsimply continued on when mobilized.

RADM Papp reminded the participants thatthe Coast Guard is a small organization ofapproximately 38,000 men and women. Hereviewed the employment of over 50% of the8,000 Reservists, which is small by absolutenumbers, but when measured as a percentageof utilization is large.

F O R U M I V K E Y N O T ES P E A K E R - Senator Lindsey Graham,(R, South Carolina)

Senator Graham was the keynote speakerfor a forum discussion regarding the need fornew commitment by Citizen Patriots. Heindicated that we must drive technology toprovide instant information sharing acrossgovernment. Senator Lindsay Graham de-scribed legislative initiatives to reduce RCretirement age, provide tax credits to RCemployers, and improve RC health care.

Mr. John Rendon, moderated this forum

which featured discussants - Mr. TonyBlankley, Mr. Robert Thomas, Ms. HelenaAshby, Dr. Thomas McGinn, III, Mr. JohnWinkler, and Mr. Arnaldo Salinas representingfirst responders, media, local governmentleaders, and private organizations. Onediscussant strongly supported the need forpublic involvement. What was significant wasthe Guard and Reserve grass root support,which shows in Congress. Strategic planningis key. A panelist with professional lifetimedetective experience indicated local Guardcommunity support is essential.

Final comments indicated that there aremany Americans potentially interested involunteering: Retirees, older reservists, andnew immigrants. There are several volunteerorganizations that can be expanded. Forexample, the Civil Air Patrol, the Coast GuardAuxiliary. There may be medical volunteers totreat mass casualties. There will also be amedical need for military assistance to civilauthorities - like the helicopter evacuations incivilian traffic accidents two decades ago; nowthere may be the same civil assistance tomilitary authorities.

F O R U M B R E A K O U TD I S C U S S I O N G R O U P S

The Symposium’s second day concernedthe construction of four groups to work on thequestions of (1) RC Roles and Missions - ledby Secretary Reginald Brown, ASA/M&RA;(2) Towards an Emerging Doctrine for the 21stCentury – led by Secretary MichaelDominguez, ASAF/M&RA; (3) New Avail-abilities and Service Employment Paradigmsled by Secretary William Navas, ASN/M&RA;and (4) The Citizen Patriot and BuildingPublic Constituency, led by MG Richard OWightman Jr., Military Executive to the RFPB.Each question was broken into four subtopicswith small groups working on each. Afterlunch, each group leader presented the conclu-sions of his group.

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SUMMARY OF THE BREAKOUTFINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

F O R U M I - Honorable Reginald Brown,Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpowerand Reserve Affairs; VADM Mark Feichtinger,USNR; Maj Gen John E. Spiegel, USAF; MajGen Frances Wilson, USMC; Dr. MichaelKrause; Mr. Charles Arce

This panel considered the question: Whatare the primary missions of the RC? Thepanel’s perspective was that the mission of theRC remains the historical mission – that is – tosupport and defend the nation. For the RC thismission must now be considered in two dimen-sions: Homeland Defense and the support ofexpeditionary campaigns. Within these twomissions there are several perspectives. Thefirst perspective considers the RC as a force instrategic reserve, secondly as an operationalforce multiplier, thirdly as a force for defense,and fourthly as a stabilization force in supportof expeditionary campaigns. This latterconsideration would help to create the condi-tions for success in “winning the peace”following a military campaign.

The panel evaluated the primary missionand its relationship to the Total Force Structureapproach – known as the Abrams Doctrine –and how it contributes to public and politicalwill. One perspective was that the Total Forcestructure is not as effective with the change innational security and military strategy to oneof preemption. Another perspective maintainedthe need to continue Service Title 10 capabili-ties and responsibilities for both wartime andhomeland defense. The panel wanted tomaintain and balance the unique RC capabili-ties throughout the transformation process.Key recommendations were to examine theright force structure between Active andReserve mix and balance and the adoption offuture roles and missions in homeland defenseand expeditionary warfare.

F O R U M I I - Honorable MichaelDominguez, Assistant Secretary of the AirForce for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; MGRaymond F. Rees, USA; RADM John Cotton,USNR; RADM Robert Papp, Jr., USCG; withDr. James Carafano and Dr. John Blair

The central question for the panel was:How to build the emerging doctrine for theTotal Force with a focus on mission balance,rapid deployment, and long-term joint opera-tions? The forum answered this question byvalidating the need for public and politicalsupport in the employment of forces. If the RCgoes to war they must have the support of thepeople. This centrality comes from the na-tional security strategy flows through the needfor part time and full time forces required bythe mission and structures the forces based onthese considerations. One consideration wasto streamline the decision-making process forrapid integration of the RC. The doctrine mustfocus on training the RC to fight in the jointarena.

The RC should be structured, organized,and trained to the Military Departmentsrequirements, but with an association withActive component units for training andoperational execution. The forum’s perspec-tive indicated that speed and effectiveness ofRC is critical. The RC must have the requiredfunding for implementation. In re-balancingthe Reserve Forces the present and futureoperational tempo must be considered. RCtraining must consider high demand and low-density units in order to meet the missionrequirements.

The forum indicated that balance is essen-tial in meeting the future mission needs of theTotal Force. The RC should receive equip-ment based on mission; it should have capa-bilities that allow it to execute the mission;equipment and manning must have technologythat allow communication with all services andthe Department of Homeland Security. Man-

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ning the RC must include personnel inter-changeability between the components and thesame pay and medical care systems. Aninnovative perspective of the forum was toinclude auxiliary and volunteer organizationsto assist with specific missions. Key forumrecommendations were: the RC must bebudgeted into the AC war plans; a streamlinedchain of command for RC integration into theactive forces; the RC must fit service compo-nent mission; there must be a correct missionbalance between AC and RC as well as equalbenefits.

F O R U M I I I - Honorable William A.Navas, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy forManpower and Reserve Affairs; MG CharlesE. Wilson, USAR; RADM Grant Hollett,USNR (Ret); Maj Gen John Bradley, USAF;Maj Gen Leo V. Williams III, USMCR; withCOL Mari K. Eder and Mr. Richard Odenthal

This panel considered the question ofemployment of the RC and focused on thequestion of a new availability and serviceparadigm for the RC, one that reflects thechanging patterns of use and enhances thecapability of our military forces?

The panel perspective reflected thechanged circumstance since we were attackedon 9/11. The panel’s insight included the needto formulate and formalize an employmentdoctrine for both Homeland Defense and warfighting capabilities. This insight includes useof a new rotational-based force with a predict-able forecast of reserve utilization. Insights onmodernization included full funding fortraining of Reserve component including useof simulation and distance learning capabili-ties. There are also certain critical civilianskills inherent in the RC, which are high pay-off in application.

These skills include the IT, medical, hardsciences, contract management, and linguistic

knowledge. Another panel insight addressedthe need for institutional and structuralchanges required to realize the employmentconcepts for the RC. NORTHCOM’s roleneeds to be defined in its operational relation-ship with the RC and the political state leader-ship. A key perspective pointed to the need forscheduled rotational employment of the RC.The forum’s approach was to recommendcongruent legislation and policy changes thatfacilitate full integration of all components.Cultural obstacles to experimentation includelimitations in the joint training and experimen-tation arena. The forum recommended that RCunits should be identified for joint demonstra-tion and experimentation. Key recommenda-tions included streamlining the mobilizationprocess and creation of a new service para-digm to reform, transform, and modernize.

F O R U M I V - MG Richard O.Wightman Jr., USA, Military Executive to theReserve Forces Policy Board; MG Tim Haake,USAR; RADM Mary P. O’Donnell, USCGR;MG Paul Bergson (USA Ret); Mr. BryanSharratt; with Mr. John Rendon, Ms. HelenaAshby and Mr. John Brinkerhoff

The panel considered how to best link thepublic constituency of the Reserve componentsto build a Citizen Patriot. The key panelinsight was that the basic constituency of RCwas the community. Their connection to thecommunity is in its every day commitment –through family, employers, neighbors andcommunity action. Forum members advocatedthe concept of mandatory national service –discussed by a leading educator. Anotherinsightful panel perspective was the use ofvoluntary organization to assist in executingsome of the missions of Homeland Defense.

One insight concerned the prototypeCitizen Patriot, building on citizen involve-ment for a national “neighborhood watch” aswell as for response and mitigation for lawenforcement, auxiliaries, Civil Air patrols,Guardian Angels and civilian specialties and

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Appendix II: Strategic Challenges: Transforming the Total Force Vision for the 21st Century

skills. The forum indicated that the RC shouldtake the lead in forming partnerships, definingthe missions and in conducting training andexercises. Key recommendations are: continuewith efforts and programs to facilitate connec-tivity with the public; explore the concept ofnational service and outreach programs;continue with transformation initiativesfocusing on the needs of the future; and,increase emphasis on Citizen Patriot links andcontacts.

THE WAY AHEADThe Honorable Albert Zapanta, Chairman,Reserve Force Policy Board.

The stated intent of the Chairman was tobrief the results of the symposium to theSecretary of Defense, providing him with thedirect inputs and feedback from participants,directly in line with the Board’s charter. Aformal report of the conference proceedingswill be published by the end of the summeralong with a Reserve component – focusedissue of the Joint Forces Quarterly. This issueis planned for publication in Winter 2003. Theresults of the conference will also drive theRFPB’s focus in preparation of it annual reportfor 2003 and will begin the cycle of prepara-tions for the 2004 Symposium.

The Symposium further served to focus theBoard’s efforts in determining that the Board’sway ahead will be one noted for its partner-ships and its products. These include:

• A working partnership with US JointForces Command. This Board task force willconcentrate on forming important relationshipsand connections with the force providers inboth constructing mobilization and demobili-zation lessons learned from OIF and in theimplementation of those lessons in jointoperations.

• A working partnership withNORTHCOM. This task force will work with

the Command on RC issues related to HLDand the relationship between the Guard andReserve, state and local leaders, and firstresponders at all levels.

• An educational partnership with theNational Defense University and other SeniorService Colleges concerning the developmentof articles, reports and other publications,simulations, and wargaming of issues involv-ing the Guard and Reserve for export to thestates.

• A public-private partnership driven bythe Board’s alumni with a focus on develop-ment of an Executive Leaders Forum with theprivate sector.

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Appendix III: FY 2003 Data Summaries

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Note: Data shows “Direct Support” only, not “Indirect Support” (e.g., Recruiting, SUSPFO, Most AGR Supoort).


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57



58



59



60



61



62



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AC Active ComponentAGR Active Guard ReserveAOR Area of ResponsibilityAR Active ReserveASD/RA Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve AffairsASD/SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense/Special Operations Low Intensity

Conflict

BAH Basic Allowance for HousingBRAC Base Realignment and Closure

CC Combatant CommanderCJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

DEERS Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting SystemDEPORD Deployment OrderDIMHRS Defense Integrated Manpower Human Resource SystemDMZ Demilitarized ZoneDoD Department of Defense

ESGR Employer Support of the Guard and ReserveEUCOM European CommandEXORD Executive Order

FO Flag OfficerFORSCOM Forces CommandFRA Funded Reimbursable AuthorityFTS Full Time Support

GAO General Accounting OfficeGO General OfficerGWOT Global War on Terrorism

HLD Homeland DefenseHLS Homeland Security

IDT Inactive Duty TrainingIMA Individual Mobilization AugmenteeIOC Initial Operational CapabilityIRR Individual Ready Reserve

JCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJFCOM Joint Forces Command

Glossary

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JDA Joint Duty AssignmentJMIP Joint Military Intelligence ProgramJOM Joint Officer ManagementJPME Joint Professional Military EducationJSO Joint Specialty OfficerJRIC Joint Reserve Intelligence CenterJRICP Joint Reserve Intelligence Connectivity ProgramJRIP Joint Reserve Intelligence ProgramJTR Joint Travel RegulationJWE Joint Windows Enclave

METL Mission Essential Task ListMOBCAP Mobilization CapMOS Military Occupational Specialty

NCO Noncommissioned OfficerNDU National Defense UniversityNORTHCOM Northern CommandNPS Non Prior Service

O&M Operations & MaintenanceOASD/RA Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Reserve AffairsOEF Operation Enduring FreedomOFT Office of Force TransformationOIF Operation Iraqi FreedomONE Operation Noble EagleOPTEMPO Operations TempoOSD Office of the Secretary of DefenseOSD/RFPB Office of the Secretary of Defense/Reserve Forces Policy Board

PACOM Pacific CommandPKSOI Peace Keeping and Stability Operations InstitutePS Prior ServicePSU Port Security Unit

RC Reserve ComponentRCIE Reserve Component Intelligence ElementsRFF Request for ForcesRFPB Reserve Forces Policy Board

SECDEF Secretary of DefenseSOCOM Special Operations Command

Glossary

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Glossary

SOUTHCOM Southern CommandSPACECOM Space CommandSTRATCOM Strategic Command

TAR Training and Administration of the Reserves

USC United States CodeUSEUCOM United States European CommandUSFK United States Forces KoreaUSD/P&R Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)USJFCOM United States Joint Forces CommandUSNORTHCOM United States Northern Command

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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This is the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s report onReserve component programs and other matters required tobe presented to the President and Congress annually by 10U.S.C. 113 (c) (2). It includes the collective views of theBoard members and does not necessarily reflect the officialpolicy position of the Department of Defense, or any otherdepartment or agency of the United States Government.

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