3.5 - skibekk, gunnar - a brief aggiornamento for leftist intellectuals (en)

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A Brief Aggiornamento for Leftist Intellectuals

A Brief Aggiornamento for Leftist Intellectuals

by Gunnar Skirbekk

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1990, pages: 224-235, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=31132ed2-cee0-4ddb-9e51-11fc25f75341http://www.ceeol.com/


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THE WORLD RECONSIDERED

A BRIEF AGGIORNAMENTO FOR LEFTISTINTELLECTUALS

Gunnar Skirbekk

The political events in Eastern Europe during the year 1989 and the firstpart of 1990 do require some critical reexamination among leftistintellectuals.But these events should be seen in a broader setting of decisive changeswithin the modern world. In this paper I shall make a few sketchy remarks onsome of the notions and perspectives which in my view are to bereconsidered, first related mainly to Eastern Europe, then seen in a broaderscale.

1. Eastern EuropeI start with the simple observation that the political and ideological fall ofStalinist socialism in Eastern Europe was experienced with astonishment andeuphoria. Nobody had, to my knowledge, predicted that this system wouldfall apart so fast and so peacefully. And even though the future is filled withdifficulties and uncertainties, it seems plausible to think that this regime andits ideology are discredited beyond the point of possible restoration, at leastin this part of the world.The very unpredictedness of the events asks for serious considerationsamong scholars of different disciplines and political affiliations. For leftistintellectuals there are in addition at least two main points that require acritical reflection, the one being the strength of market economy, the other

the stength of nationalism in post-communist Eastern Europe. I shall brieflyelaborate these two points.Market economyIt has for a long time been quite clear that Soviet-type economy does notfunction well. It has also become clear that the traditional Yugoslav model,based on decentralization and self-rule on enterprise level, has severedifficulties. I thus assume that most leftist intellectuals now tend toward somekind of market economy with political frames which allow for a version of a

planned market. These are deep changes amongWestern leftist intellectuals:not only pure market economy, but also the Soviet as well as the Yugoslavmodel of economic life have lost their attraction, and what remains is somekind of mixed economy, mostly of a social democratic nature.In this perspective the apparent sympathy for market economy amongPraxis International 10: 3/4October 1990& January 1991 0260-8448$2.00


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Praxis International 225many East European reformers as well as among a large part of the electoratetherefore represents a challenge to leftist intellectuals.East European NationalismIt has also for a long time been well known that there are national andethnic tensions within what was called the Soviet bloc. But the strength ofthese nationalist forces has been a surprise for most Western observers; andfor leftist intellectuals, having international solidarity as an ideal and oftenarguing in favour of an historical "overcoming" of nationalism as a basicforce, this emergence of strong nationalism in Eastern Europe asks for aserious reexamination.There are certainly various explanations for the emergence of East

European nationalism. I shall here just mention three. The first one I wouldcall the "out of the ice" explanation: The East European nationalism in itsdifferent forms was suppressed by the Soviet system. Nationalist tensionsfrom the pre-Soviet period could not be properly discussed, nor properly"lived through", with the Soviet system. It became frozen, as it were. Andonce the "glacier" of the Soviet repression "melted" the old nationalisttensions reappeared, like de-frozen mammoths coming out of the ice.The strength of this explanation is its descriptive fit. (I t even seems to fit for

the case of suppressed national tensions within the federal republic ofYugoslavia.) As a sociological explanation, however, it is weaker. It does notreally give a sociological explanation of how nationalism could survive allthese (forty to seventy) years. Its explanatory power, I assume, is rather to befound in its tacit reference to psychological or pscyhoanalytic explanations ofrepressed psychic tensions, which tend to survive subconsciously just becausethey are not verbalized and openly worked out. But in a long-term societalperspective we would like to know why these attitudes and emotions did notchange in accordance with other changes in society; orwewould like to knowwhich manifest or latent functions they had within this society. If no suchfunction tan be demonstrated it seems unsatisfactory, as a sociologicalexplanations, simply to say that they prevailed "under the ice".Thereby we have already touched upon the second type of explanation for

the emergence of East European nationalism, i.e. an explanation whichclaims that nationalism did play a role within these societies during the yearsof Soviet domination, though unrecognized by most observers. Tosubstantiate this functional explanation one has to go empirically into eachcase, in order to see whether nationalism of some kind did have such a roleand importance within the society. I shall not try to follow this thread, butmerely indicate what I have in mind. One reasonable case is Poland, anotherYugoslavia. For one thing we could investigate the social function of theCatholic Church in Poland and its connection to Polish nationalism, and wewould investigate the interconnection between economic differences withinYugoslavia and the call for political and cultural separation in Slovenia andCroatia. In these cases, however, nationalism has for a long time beenrecognized and this kind of explanation has already been applied. The pointis now that similiar explanations could be tried out also on cases of

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226 Praxis Internationalnationalism which have hitherto been overlooked in one way or the other like DDR German nationalism or the strength of Baltic nationalism.There is still another kind of explanation worth mentioning, namely onewhich underlines the creative aspect within the emergence of nationalism:

The various forms of nationalism were not there, frozen under the ice orlatently functioning, but they are formed actively (but not necessarilyconsciously) in order to fill an ideological vacuum that occurred by thewithdrawal of Soviet political domination. (This is one of the competingtheoretical positions among historians trying to explain the emergence ofNorwegian nationalism around 1814. I can imagine the same controversyabout nationalism in the Third World, such as in the movement ofnegretude.)The dispute between these three attempts at explaining nationalism has tobe solved by empirical research, but the dispute also entails conceptualcontroversies concerning the proper nature of the agents and the determiningfactors (be it politically acting individuals, classes or social conditions).There is certainly a lot more to be said about nationalism and differentways of describing and explaining its emergence in East Europe. The point Iwould make so far, is simply this: nationalism, as a case of particularcollective identity, has to be taken seriously, also in modern societies. It hasto be taken seriously both as a functional factor within a society and as afactor in human collective identity limiting a We from a They. However, the

East European experience of nationalism does not occur as somethingunique in our times. It adds to other experiences of nationalism, even inmodern societies such as in Japan. The latter case is specially interesting sinceJapan undoubtedly is modern. It therefore contradicts the view thatmodernity by necessity leads toward universalism and away from particularcollective identities e.g. in the form of nationalism. It indicates that there aredifferent ways of modernization and different ways of being modern.The case of Japanmight even be made sharper: So far Japan seems to havehad less socio-cultural disintegration than Western societies, and thecohesion of its homogeneous culture might be an explanation for this.

Furthermore, Japanese economy is able to invest in long-term perspectivesto a higher degree than Western societies - a fact which might be analyzed inthe light of the long-term interest embedded in a national culture in contrastto the rather short-term interest of singular agents on the market. The latterpoint is also interesting in an ecological perspective, since economic andpolitical agents with a long-term concern are strongly required in thisecological perspective.These brief remarks on possible linkages between particular collectiveidentity and economy lead us back to the question of market economy in theform Soviet-dominated parts of Europe. Here I would allow myself to startwith a rough and speculative model. To the extent that Stalinist economywasbased on a top-down system of commands, connected with a threat towardthose who did not obey, this system of motivation is no more functioning.Maybe it did function at an earlier stage, when it was supplemented by a prideof working for the revolution, or for being a Soviet proletarian fighting or


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Praxis International 227having courageously fought Fascism. But this cultural motivation is severelyweakened. It hardly functions any more. And at the same time marketmechanisms, distributing reward and punishment according to marketbehaviour, have not yet taken over. Thus there is a strange interregnum inthis transition within the former State-socialist countries, the Soviet Unionincluded.It is a question whether this system of top-down command could ever haveovercome the threshold of control, which is easier concerning quantity thanquality and easier concerning reproduction of known products than creationof new ones - in this respect it is a question whether this system could evercompete with a market economy in decisive fields of modern economy likequality consumer-goods and in informatics.My point, however, is just the following. To the extent that the old Stalinisteconomy, based on command and threat, is definitely dismissed, there are

two (ideal-type) options for East Europeans when it comes to economicmotivation, i.e. either market economy or a restoration of culturalmotivation. The latter option (some would say, temptat ion) is one whichwould be interested in nourishing any kind of a strengthening of the collectiveidentity, and then nationalism, too, is close at hand. Thus East Europeannationalism could also be investigated in a perspective of such a (possible)functional tie with this kind of economic revitalization - should we say,Japanese style! In this perspective Russian nationalism (such as Pamiat)could also be investigated as an attempt at a restoration of a functionaleconomy; it should not only be interpreted in terms of Russian traditionalismper se. But any nationalism of this sort within the Soviet Union would workcounterproductively, i.e. against the unity of the Union. Such a nationalist(cultural) motivation might perhaps have some importance to get Estoniansworking, or Armenians, or Lithuanians, or Russians - but hardly all of them,together. In that perspective market economy, and a strong presidency, is asafer way to keep the Empire afloat, and even hope for economic progress(which is Gorbachev against the nationalists of various kinds).At this point I would like to sum up my brief remarks on nationalism andeconomic motivation in East Europe: Intellectuals should take the notion of

particular collective identity seriously also in modern societies, both withregard to its function for social cohesion and with regard to its political andeconomic function. Diversity and particularity should not be overlooked inany of these spheres of modern life. It might even be evaluated as valuable,e.g. in an ecological perspective. On the other hand, intellectuals shoulddifferentiate between legitimate and illegitimate "particular collectiveidentities". In cases of rationally confirmed legitimacy, a rationally foundedtolerance is required, whereas in cases of rationally confirmed illegitimacy,criticism and possibly political strategies are required. Such attempts atdifferentiating between legitimacy and illegitimacy can only take the form ofopen and enlightened analyses and discussions, the basis of which is exactlythe equality of the participants and the universality of the arguments. To thiscrucial point I shall return in the second part of the paper.


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228 Praxis International2. The broader view

I would now like to delineate a few themes that in my view for a long timewere disregarded or inadequately treated among leftist intellectuals, thoughgradually most of them are back on the agenda. Since there has been aconsiderable improvement in reintroducing these themes, my first point isjust to give a brief reminder of some of the main issues. The second and mainpoint consists in my conclusion concerning the notion of politics in a modernworld.I shall approach the matter by positing three spheres - which for the sake ofbrevity could be called the sphere offree decision, the sphere of rights and thesphere of truth - and I shall briefly indicate their autonomy as well as theirmutual dependence. I shall also briefly indicate some of the levels ofautonomy and independence within each sphere. For pedagogical andphilosophical reasons I shall proceed in an Hegelian manner in the sense thatindicated shortcomings in one position lead over to the next - the power ofthe negative fueling a transcending movement, so to speak.(1) During the student movement direct democracy was an ideal, forsome, the ideal. Direct democracymeant participation, participation both ina process of free speech and open discussion and in a process of decisionconcerning one's own situation. It meant learning, not only scholarlylearning, but learning through participation, through discussion and decisionand through the personal experience of conceiving the world in differentperspectives dependent on the various contexts within which the variousdiscussions were located.These are all valuable insights. But all along there were equally clearshortcomings connected to any model of direct or participatory democracy.One set of problems is associated with the capacity question: Participationtakes time, and time is scarce. In an adult modern world, with professionaland family life duties, lengthy and frequent meetings and teach-ins soonbecome a problem - and more so if participatory democracy is introduced inall the different spheres of activity in which modern man takes part. Theseare the problems of overburdening.Another set of problems is connected to the decision procedure. Formallyunregulated group decisions aiming at unanimity can easily lead to repression

of unpopular opinions or neglect ofminorities. This point indicates a need fora differentiation between intellectual discussion and voting procedures and itindicates a need for legal protection of free speech and of minority views.And in large-scale modern societies with many levels, institutions andperspectives there is not only a capacity need but also a procedural need fortranscending participatory democracy in favour of some form of representative democracy. In accepting representative democracy one also has toaccept nomination procedures and elections, parties and interest groups,voting and compromises.This is the old and well-known discussion of direct democracy (of "theancient") and representative democracy (of "the modern" - as in BenjaminConstant's criticism of Rousseauean ideals). Our point is just to remind of


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Praxis International 229the need in modern societies for supplementing participatory democracy(restricted to a reasonable extension within lower levels) with representativedemocracy (at higher levels). (In parenthesis we could add that intellectuals,and especially young intellectuals with fewer duties, do have an inherent biasfor teach-ins compared with committee work and party politics.)I shall not elaborate this point further. I shall just briefly recall theimportance of the corporative system including influential interest groupsand of the administrative apparatus and the mass media - institutionscharacteristic ofmodern representative democracy. Compared both with theimportance of the corporative sector and with the amount of empiricalresearch on its various aspects this sector seems to be insufficientlyelaborated intellectually, not least among leftist intellectuals.Through these intermediary and mixed systems, too, the politicalinstitutions are in mutual connectionwith the economic system as well as withthe sphere of socio-cultural reproduction (and creation).Finally I would emphasize the inherent tension between argumentationand voting, or between free and enlightened discussion and decision makingby legal procedures leading up to a vote. In politics both are needed, sincepolitics is dependent on legality and enlightenment - right and truth - at thesame time as politics is a domain of power and controversy. An enlightened,law-regulated representative democracy represents a civilized answer to this"fight of the goods" (as Max Weber has it).(2) In swallowing representative democracy with its various ingredients asobering step forward has been taken. Thereby one has also accepted theneed for legal regulations, namely of the procedures of election, ofnegotiation and ofvoting. Legality, law and order, are precious ideas. Misuseof these ideas is certainly to be expected. But these ideas should not merelybe seen in the light of authoritarian repression and as an ideologicalexpression of those in power (be they overclass, males or parents). Law andorder are necessary and basically desirable in any civilized modern society.The need for open criticism is certainly always there. But without theseframes of legality modern society shall most probably deteriorate intountamed power struggle and repression, nepotism and corruption.

Legal procedures are required for the process of decision-making leadingup to voting. This means that not everything is up for renewed decision all thetime. This imposes a self-restriction of the power game of politics. It makes itmore predictable and thus more civilized. Along these lines there is a wisdomin political systems that restrict their own freedom of constantly redoing theirown decisions. Like Ulysses one rather decides to tie oneself to the mast. Theaspect of stability and predictability which follows from this self-restriction isdefinitely one of high civilisatory value.Any civilized constitutional system should also pay due attention to humanrights - or should we rather say "natural rights" when communities and

traditions as well as animal rights and ecological rights are included. Formervulgar criticism ofthe notion of rights has mostly evaporated, and this issue istoday safely placed on the agenda for leftist intellectuals. The issue to bediscussed is no more the legitimacy of this notion but the question about the


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230 Praxis Internationalstatus of various rights or proposed rights and the relation between rights andpolitical decisions - the former question involving the discussion of thefoundation of rights and of their mutual interrelations, the lat ter questioninvolving the discussion ofthe relation between the domain ofwhat should bedecided by reason and remain more or less unchangeable and what should bedecided by voting and be more open for changes.

One decisive point is thus the one which leads from "positive right" to"natural right" (to talk in old tongues), i.e. from the actually existing legalsystem to a nomative evaluation of this system. Only if this latter possibility,that of a normative evaluation, is granted, can rights in principle be groundedbeyond the sphere of power. And this is a point where the discussion amongintellectuals, leftist or not, is still to a large extent underdeveloped. In sayingthis I expose a view that among quite a few is seen as questionable. I shalltherefore delineate my position on the possibility of a normative foundation.My position is that of so-called discourse ethics (found in K.-O. Apel,J. Habermas et al.) and I shall first concentrate on a few counter-argumentsagainst competing positions before focusing on the position itself.Scepticism against the possibility of a rational foundation of basis normsmight have positivistic roots. According to positivism only statements can betrue or false, norms not (i.e. basic norms, since so-called hypothetic normscertainly are empirically testable, like the claim "you ought to do yourhomework in order to pass your exam"). It is now-a-days well-known thatpositivism as a position is untenable. A main counterargument is that of itsself-referential inconsistency. It can alsobe shown that there are "institutionalfacts" inherent in various institutions (such as "corner" in football), meaningthat the very distinction between facts and norms is inadequate. Within asociety there are numerous "institutions" with their inherent norms andvalues, which can be analyzed and investigated in various ways.In formulating the criticism of positivism in these terms we are alreadyindicating a contextualist (or historicist) position concerning the status ofnorms: Norms are embedded in different contexts. Within each context thecontext-inherent norms are valid and in this sense mandatory. There is alsooverlap between many contexts, and in that sense there is a normativetransition. But there is no universal position above the various contexts, andthus there are no universally valid norms, i.e. norms that are obligatory foreverybody and that can serve as a basis for a rational criticism of givencontext, such as given religious or national traditions or legal systems withinstates. In other words, there is no impartiality. (Therefore the attempt atsuch a rational grounding is frequently interpreted as power in disguise, be itclass, race or sex.)This is a decisive point, and a difficult point.First of all we have the theoretical problem of describing contextualismwithout pragmatic inconsistency, i.e. without making universal validityclaims in describing a position that implicitly or explicitly denies such auniversality. Despite all arguing about differences between showing andstating (or claiming) and the like, I cannot really see that contextualism does


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Praxis International 231avoid this inconsistency (cf. my arguments in "Contextual and UniversalPragmatics", Thesis Eleven, September 1990).Then we have the practical problem of relativism inherent in this kind ofcontextualism: The rational foundation of basic rights becomesquestionable,

and the same goes for any criticism of traditions and states violating theserights.These critical remarks on contextualism lead me over to the pragmaticnotion of discursive rationalitywhich, I claim, gives the best available answerto the question of the foundation of basic norms.The first argument is one about self-reference: Not only are the otherpositions (positivism and contextualism) shown to be self-referentiallyinconsistent, but in reflecting on such dilemmas we realize that there is a coreof unavoidablewhile undeniable insights -like the principle of contradiction,which cannot be deductively demonstrated, but which can be shown to bepresupposed in any attempt at denying it. This is a peculiar kind ofexperience, a reflective experience, which requires a pragmatic attitude (incontrast to a semantic or third-person attitude).Through language this insight is intersubjectively accessible, also forcriticism. Through language we can argue with each other for and against thedifferent claims. In taking part in an argumentation we participate in anactivity with constitutive presuppositions on which we can reflect and whichwe can thematize and discuss. Within such an argumentative activity we dorecognize each other mutually as rational and as fallible - as rational enoughto follow the argumentation and as fallible in the sense that each of us needthe correction of the others. And in order to take part in an argumentation wehave to accept the force of the better argument over against less goodarguments, and we have to be interested in improving the given arguments.What is now said has the status of a claim concerning what is a correctdescription of a serious discussion, but also of what we undeniably have topresuppose while discussing. The latter claim is again one of self-reference. Ishall not here tire the reader by any further discussion of the more intricatequestions connected to this position. In this paper I shall merely recall a fewdecisive points (cf. my comment on these questions in "Pragmatism in Apeland Habermas" in Essays in Pragmatic Philosophy I, eds. I. Gullvag andH. H0ibraaten, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985).In my interpretation the notion of "rational consensus", in contrast to"best available real consensus", indicates an unavoidable regulative idea ofany argumentative discourse. The operative notion is rather that ofmeliorism, of improving the best available, real position. Here the emphasisis on the elimination ofwhat is not good enough, rather than on the notion ofseeking perfection. For this reason I prefer a reinterpreted version of theRawlsian motion of reflective equilibrium to that of consensus, viz to theextent that the term "discursive-reflective equilibrium" indicates that thebest available position at any time is, and should be, open to challenges andthus to improvement. New arguments can in principle always emerge, andtherefore we should seek them and take them into consideration, in order totryout and possibly improve our given equilibrium. In saying this I have to


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232 Praxis Internationaladd that the reason for talking about consensus is equally decisive, namelythe very point that an argument is what can be agreed upon by every rationalbeing who argues under ideal (sufficiently ideal!) conditions. The notion of avalid argument is one that is intersubjectively valid, universally valid. Andfor this reason symmetric conditions among the discussants is essential,meaning that liberal virtues (or rights) of equality and free speech can rightlybe regarded as presuppositions for rationality - and thus as undeniablenorms.However, in using the term "discursive-reflective equilibrium" in additionto that of consensus (on a somewhat other level) I want to stress theintersubjective aspect of real discourse (in addition to the reflective aspect,which in principle can be taken care ofmonologically, at least for some time).This again implies that I regard real discourse, not only the idea of an idealdiscourse, as essential, both theoretically and practically. This, by the way, isalso a point where one of the basic and valuable ideas of participatorydemocracy reemerges.Real discourse, in this frame of argumentative rationality, also entails thatthe actual understanding of one's identity, interest and needs are questioned,opening up for a possible change and improvement. This is the deepermeaning of the learning process of discursive activity.In talking about real discourse and possible changes and improvementsone should bear in mind that the "explicit discourse" is just a part of a processwithin which we have all kinds of afterthoughts on previous discourses and

preparations for new ones, connected with various kinds of reading andwriting, and often also travelling to meet new challenges and perspectIves.The latter point indicates three important insights. (i) There is a gradualtransition from discourse to action. This is not merely an empirical claim;even though we have an unavoidable regulative idea of rational consensus,any actual consensus has the status of the until now best available equilibriumfor the discussants under optimal conditions. And to the extent that an idealspeech situation, or a final consensus, is not available in real discourse, thereis no hard core sharply delimited from a soft environment of mere action;

there is rather gradual transition (as there are empirical and transcendentalarguments; cf. my remarks in Truth and Preconditions, Bergen 1973).(ii) Understanding concepts and principles is immanently corrected to usethe practice - both are needed (practice and principles). (iii) Finally thisindicates that the problemof transferring the validity of norms from discourseto society at large is a problemwhich should not be stated too crudely. To theextent that normative answers are found within the process of discourse theirvalidity to relevant extra-discursive activities is rather like the one intheoretical discourse. (Normative answers within a discourse - thoughfallible like any discourse-immanent answer, be they theoretical or not - arepartly rooted in intersubjective consensus but partly in the adequacy of theconcepts involved. Norms never appear naked, as it were, but always withinsome language, the adequacy of which is also to be decided. Thus thedifference between theoretical and normative validity claims and answers


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Praxis International 233should not be conceived in clear-cut dichotomic terms.) To the extent thatthe normative answer is tied up with reflectively recognized preconditions fordiscursive rationality they have the status of norms constitutive forrationality, which is also relevant for everyday life outside the relatively strictactivity of argumentation. (Add to this the Habermasian arguments for auniversal pragmatic, or even those of developmental logics, with theirmixture of empirical and philosophical elements.)At this stage I shall end these brief remarks on the notion of discursiverationality. My point was just to recall how this position allows for a rationalgrounding of basic rights, thus giving a ground different from power,interests and partiality.(3) Non-distorted and enlightened people are required for rationaldiscourses as well as for representative or participatory democracy. The thirdangle is thus that of enlightenment.In negative terms it entails an attempt to do awaywith individual and socialdistortion. In positive terms it entails the whole system of learning, from theearly stages of socialization all through the educational system up to scientificand scholarly research. For one thing this means that education is a conditionfor democracy as well as for any rational discourse. But despite thisdependence the sphere of research and education (of enlightenment as I said)has its relative autonomy, just like truth should not be overrun by power (norby normative right).However, when it comes to scientific and scholarly research there is within

large-scale political and economic projects a rational need to mediatebetween different disciplines, to bring the insight of the various disciplinesinto some intelligible whole, which can be discussed publicly and decidedpolitically. This requires for one thing an hermeneutic and reflectivecompetence among the researchers, and it requires legal and practical framesfor the public discussion (cf. my article "Technological expertise and globalethics in a time of scientization and ecological crisis", written for the journalChelaviek, Moscow, September 1990, in English in the lahrbuch for TheCentre for the Theory of the Sciences and the Humanities, University ofBergen, 1990).It is thus worth while noticing that discursive rationality is a commondenominator for the highest level at all three spheres of our triangle ofdemocracy, rights and enlightenment. A lack of understanding ofthe role andimportance of discursive rationality is therefore, in my view, a severe deficitin any notion of political culture. And at this point, it seems to me, there isstill some work to be done, in order to bring intellectuals, leftist or not, intoan adequate position.Then there is a second conclusion of main importance for my effort of anideological reconsideration: Even though my triangular model is fairlysimplistic - for one thing economy and culture (nationalism!) are left out - itdoes not only give some hints about dependencies and autonomies and aboutthe need for (and possibility of) a universalistic (though fallible) discursiverationality (embracing basic normative themes as well as theoretical ones),

but it indicates the importance of a balance between these spheres (and


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234 Praxis Internationallevels). Negatively stated we could say that political culture is essentiallymutli-dimensional. It is not one-dimensional in the sense that it makes senseto think of some maximizing along one dimension a l o n ~ - be it participatorydemocracy or moralistic virtue. Any attempt in that direction is doomed tofail, and to lead to disaster, since the very point is that of an interplay ofmanyfactors, not the perfection along one line - "radical, more radical, mostradical"! Politics is not the place for perfectionism, but of a pragmaticbalance, where the crucial point is not perfection but sufficiency. Politics isnot a realm for existential exercises or pseudo-religious emotions andaspirations. It is not the realm for utopia and perfection. It is the realm of asufficiently good balance and interplay of many factors and concerns. But,within it all, there is a demand for discursive rationality.The important political question is that ofwhat, at any time, is "enough",what is good enough - or ra.ther, to know, in concrete cases, when the balance

is not good enough. And this genuinely political insight cannot be learnt bybooks or by discussions alone. In addition a practical experience is required.Practical experience in this sense is only acquired through a multidimensional learning process, in first person (as itwere) - whereby one learnsto see the world from the different perspectives of different activities. This isnot the god's eye surveying it all from above, but a pragmatic learning processof seeing the world from different spheres and levels.The time for strong actions and severe interventions is the one when theinterplay has got out of balance. In between these moments of crisis politics is

and should be a realm of un-utopic cool pragmatism.3. Conclusion

Starting with recent events in Eastern Europe and following up withoriginally neglected themes among many leftist intellectuals I have tried todelineate some of the notions and perspectives that in my view have to bereconsidered. My main point is that of indicating a fruitful tension betweendiscursive rationality and pragmatic concern for the possible imbalance oftheinterplay that constitutes a modern world and a political culture.This might seem too much, in terms of rationality, and too little, in terms'ofutopian aspirations. But this, I think, is exactly the lesson to be learnt formodern man, for leftist intellectuals included.What, then, do we have? Life, I suppose, as long as it exists, and in all itswonder. Andwe have our common rationality and our common world, with apolitical culture which in a long-term perspective is out of balance, in crises

be it socio-cultural disintegration or ecological sustainability . So there is timefor deep and wise interventions, while still keeping the balance that there is.Politically, what does itmean? If I am not mistaken these reflections pointin a certain direction: Not state socialism, nor Yugoslav socialism, not freemarket economy North American style, hardly any national-capitalismJapanese style either (for its lack of universality). What remains is some sortof a reasonable social democracy - the term used not for specific politicalparties, but for a more general political approach - social democracy,


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Praxis International 235improved (for one thing) by a concern for socio-cultural reproduction and forurgent ecological questions.This, I assume, is not the answer desired by all leftist intellectuals. Butthen, what is the alternative - the political alternative?And finally, where does all this lead us, in geo-political terms? Probablynowhere. But if there should be somewhere to look, rather than somewhereelse, it seems reasonable to look at North Western Europe - not as an ideal,

but only as what is probably less miserable than most other places. But thebasic question is that of moving along, both with a reasonable balance andwith a rational and deep concern for a sustainable future.

3.5 - skibekk, gunnar - a brief aggiornamento for leftist intellectuals (en)

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