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2/9

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY

AND

LAW

37/2-3

2007)

The

New Diplomacy

for Sustainable

Development and

the Negotiations

on Climate

Change

by Bo

Kjell6n*

It

is

a great pleasure and an honour for me

to

be present

at

this

Symposium in the company

of

so many distin-

guished colleagues.

I

also wish

to

take this opportunity

to

renew

my thanks

to Elizabeth

Haub

for the

Prize

so gen-

erously awarded

to me in 1998

together with

my

friend

and colleague, Ambassador

Razzali

Ismael

of

Malaysia.

I

also wish

to

express my appreciation

and

gratitude

to

Dr

Wolfgang Burhenne for

his

thinking

and

action over a great

number of years in favour of the global environment and

of

global cooperation.

In my acceptance speech when

I

received the Prize

in

New York,

I

already

touched on the main theme which I

will discuss with

you today.

Against the background of

my experience as a practitioner

of

environmental diplo-

macy, I have

come

to the

firm

conclusion

that

we are

now

witnessing the emergence

of

a new

type

of

international

relations,

the

New Diplomacy for Sustainable

Develop-

ment.

No doubt,

traditional diplomacy

with

its

roots

in the

Westphalian system

of

national sovereignty and its

em-

phasis on national security maintains its role and impor-

tance.

The

events

of

this

year

in

the Middle East and

else-

where

have certainly confirmed this.

Nevertheless,

it is

essential that traditional diplomatists begin

to

realise that

major

changes

are under way and that it is high time to

understand that

the

human impact

on the

global natural

system and

its

corresponding long-term risks are modify-

ing the environment in which international relations de-

velop. For the

first

time in history, humans have the ca-

pacity to influence

the

whole global system, and conse-

quently

the living

conditions

of all future generations. This

has led

the Nobel Prize

Laureate Paul

Crutzen

and

his

colleague Stoermer

to

speak

of

a new geological phase:

the

Anthropocene Era. Coupled with the human impact

on economic and social

systems

across the world through

the

effects of

what is

commonly

known

as globalisation,

this means that relations between states have

to

respond

to new imperatives and

face

new responsibilities. It is

of

course true that the methods and processes

are the

same

as those

of

traditional diplomacy,

but the

substance is radi-

cally different. In this lecture, I wish to develop a theoreti-

cal background and

then

to

elaborate

on

the

climate nego-

tiations as a practical example

of

the new diplomacy.

Before going further, it might be necessary to briefly

comment

on

the distinction between

environment

and

sustainable

development .

In

the early

stages of

global

concern for

the

environment, as exemplified

in the

Stock-

holm

Conference

in

1972

on

the Human

Environment,

the

problems

of

development were certainly

discussed

let me recall that the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

made

this

a

major issue in Stockholm -

but they did not

Ambassador,

Senior

Research

Fellow,

Stockholm

Environment

Institute.

occupy central stage. It

is

also true that in those days the

global aspects

of

environmental

threats

were less known

than today.

There were serious concerns

in the

South that envi-

ronmental arguments would weaken the support for

the

necessary combat

of

poverty; against that background the

Brundtland Commission, established

in

1987,

underlined

the need for a combined and balanced approach through

the use

of

the expression sustainable development .

Nevertheless,

as

preparations began for the 1992

Rio

Conference

the

Group

of 77 was not

ready

to

accept

the

concept, and the

agreed

title became the

UN

Conference

on

Environment

and

Development .

It was

not until

Jo-

hannesburg

in

2002 that this problem was finally solved

with the expression World Summit on Sustainable

De-

velopment .

Sustainable

development

encompasses

environmental,

social, and economic components. It

is

not a simple trian-

gular relationship

however; a large

number

of

different

parameters

are

involved,

ranging

from health,

through

social aspects such as human rights, equality and employ-

ment

to

various

economic

factors,

including

food

produc-

tion, raw

materials

and

energy.

It is fair

to

say that Governments for a

long

time have

aimed at achieving

economic

and social

sustainability. En-

vironment

is

the new

element,

and

therefore

it is

not sur-

prising that the concepts environment and sustainable

development are sometimes used

to

mean more or less

the

same

thing. I prefer to speak of the New Diplomacy

for Sustainable Development,

but it

is quite clear that its

main

significance lies in the

field

of

environment.

We know

that the

co-existence between traditional and

new diplomacy

is sometimes

uneasy. On the

one hand

we

have

the

power-based diplomacy, which is today spe-

cifically illustrated

by

the military discourse

of

the US

administration, underlining the

need

for full support

in the

war on terrorism; and a lack

of

confidence in the United

Nations. The tensions between Europe and the United

States,

or between

the

US

and

the UN

Secretary-General,

arising

out of

this state

of affairs,

need

to

be settled within

a framework

of

distributive bargaining, and the stakes

are

high.

On the other hand, the Rio process has laid the basis

for

a framework

of

negotiation

which is

more

integrative,

where bargaining positions

and

the underlying interests

are

more

varied

and where

the bottom

line

is the

concern

for long-term human survival.

As

all negotiators

in the

Rio process know this does not mean that solutions are

easy

to

find: powerful economic and social interests

are

challenged, and progress

is

often

slow.

But the underly-

ing

purpose of negotiation

is

different.

What

are

then

the

central features

of

this new

diplo-

macy?

I

wish

to

distinguish between a set

of

fundamental

0378-777X/07/ 17.00 2007

lOS Press

207


3/9

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY AND LAW 37/2-3

2007)

parameters

and some

other aspects

which

are

of

a more

specific and organisational character. The structure can

be summarised as

follows:

Fundamentalparameters

-

The existence

of

absolute limits/threats

-

The

need

for a broad vision

-

The primacy of the long term

Specific elements

-

The emergence

of

new international actors

-

The role

of

civil society and non-governmental organi-

sations

-

The impact

of

research, in particular

in

the natural sci-

ences

I will briefly comment on these one

by

one.

The existence

of

absolute limits/threats

The dangers

of

a global disaster caused by a major

nuclear

war may

have

subsided,

but instead man's impact

on

the earth's natural system

can lead

to

consequences

with catastrophic global effects. For the individual

it

is

of

course

extremely

difficult

to

visualise

disasters

of

this

kind,

they fall outside our normal mindsets.

But responsible

Gov-

ernments

have to

calculate different courses

of

action

to

avoid these dangers ever becoming a reality. During the

cold war the super-powers

normally handled the nuclear

threat with great caution, within the boundaries

of

tradi-

tional diplomacy. Established patterns

of

thought were

applied; in the academic discourse on negotiations, game

theory

was highly relevant.

For the

New

Diplomacy,

the

threats are

of

a different

character.

They

are

long-term,

and

sometimes

diffuse.

The

American scientist Michael Glantz has coined

the

expres-

sion

creeping disasters . There

is no concrete

enemy,

the

threat is nowhere and everywhere. The threat

is

also within

the

very fabric

of

our

societies

and

lifestyles, often

linked

to material progress. In all countries,

it

is difficult

to

make

this

threat credible

and thus to

create

a

state

of

public opin-

ion

that

permits

funds

to

flow and action

to be

taken.

If we now consider the international arena, it becomes

clear that new dimensions

are

added

to

traditional diplo-

macy. The threat

is absolute:

there is no adversary on the

other

side

of the table who can be bullied

or subtly con-

vinced to postpone the execution

of

the threat or accept

the terms

of

a compromise: global change will happen

unless the negotiating partners can

agree among

them-

selves

to

modify certain practices,

such

as excessive

emis-

sions

of

carbon dioxide.

To

make

things

still worse,

we

are uncertain

about

the nature

of

the

threat: we

know that

we

are

facing absolute limits

of

a kind, but we do not know

where these limits are. Furthermore, we are dealing with

systemic effects

of

a tremendously complicated nature:

where and when

will

the

sensitive

fabric

of global resil-

ience tear apart?

The policy-makers in

capitals

and the negotiators

middlemen between

the

desirable

and the possible - are

caught in a dilemma: on the one hand they

are

operating

within the boundaries

of

traditional methods

of

multilat-

eral negotiation,

and on the other hand

they

are negotiat-

ing about problems

of

a totally new kind. The long-term

0378-777X/07/ 17.00 2007 lOS

Press

threats

are real though

diffuse, but

in the short

term very

important and concrete economic and other interests

are

challenged by the necessary

action

to be taken. My im-

pression

is that we

are

all

on

a learning curve, trying to

understand better how

the

international negotiating frame-

work

could

be adapted

to

the new

kinds

of

problems, while

at

the

same time facilitating actions

in

capitals: how

can

the many national interests and the state

of

public opinion

really enable Governments

to

take sufficiently advanced

negotiating positions

in

a situation when

the

negotiating

partners should

logically rather be on

the same side?

The

need

for a

broad

vision

These complexities

underline the

need for a broad

vi-

sion

of

the contents and the context

of

negotiations on

sustainable

development. Policies,

instructions

and

nego-

tiations

need

to recognise

an

extremely

complex

reality,

which involves a reasonable understanding

of the

forces

that influence global change as

well

as the many

social

and

economic consequences of action

to

promote sustain-

ability at

the

global level.

My experience

as a

negotiator has

given me a fair

amount of admiration

for

my colleagues, not least those

from developing countries, for their capacity

to

deal with

this broad range

of

problems

in

a constructive way. But as

I look back I

also sense that most

of

us

were

initially ill-

equipped

to grasp

the inter-linkages between the many

different

forces

that operate in the field. Most

of

us had

university

degrees in

law,

economics,

or political

science,

but very few had

a

background in sociology or, in particu-

lar, the natural

sciences.

Given

the

existing divides be-

tween

disciplines

this has

created

a

sense

of

uncertainty,

as

problems became increasingly complex. How much

do

I really understand? Do I have the competence

and the

information

to

try to find new solutions in tricky negotiat-

ing

situations? Or is

it

safer to stick

to

a narrow

interpreta-

tion

of my

instructions? And do

I really

have

the back-

ground to discuss with my political masters in the capital

possible

new

ideas

or

new

avenues

of

compromise?

It

is true

that the cooperation in

a well

designed nego-

tiating team helps

to

reduce a

number of

these problems.

But it is only the biggest developed countries that can af-

ford to keep

sufficiently

large delegations

to provide

ex-

pert knowledge on a very broad range

of

issues. Very much

depends on the single negotiator. Therefore the training

of

negotiators and more generally capacity-building

has

to

be given

particular

attention.

I

also believe that our

in-

creasingly complex world

requires

particular efforts in the

educational

systems

to give

us

all

the tools

to

keep

an over-

view, and not be dependent on the scattered images

of

reality that are flashing on

our

TV screens.

The

German

word Bildung reflects very well what I mean. Maybe

global sustainability

will

also require

a

new

approach to

culture, a 21st Century Renaissance.

There

is

another

aspect

of

this broad vision that

needs

to

be explored, and that is

the border

zone

between

the

new diplomacy and traditional international relations. In

times

of

crisis, there are always the immediate burning

issues that need

to be

addressed. When there is a

war go-

ing on, who can bother about long-term environmental

2 8


4/9

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY

AND

LAW

37

/2-3

2007)

issues; as

illustrated by the conflict in the Middle

East?

But we also have

to

realise that there

are

numerous link-

ages between traditional conflicts and environmental is-

sues, as attention is focused

on preventive

diplomacy. It

becomes more

and

more obvious that

environmental

dis-

asters can lead

to

political and ultimately military con-

flicts

between countries

and

within countries. Dramatic

events take over the front pages

of

our newspapers; but

forces

that

drive

global

change

are

continuing

all

the

time,

and

have

to be addressed.

It is also

striking that recent

G-

8

meetings

have been increasingly preoccupied

with

en-

vironmental

or economic

sustainability:

climate

change,

and

Africa,

are

obvious

examples.

Therefore, even

if the

competence

of

negotiators and

other officials

is

an essential issue, Governments need

to

recognise

that the

broad vision will be

an

increasingly

important element

of

political action, nationally and in-

ternationally. The interdependence

of

nations has been

growing fast over the

last decades,

and globalisation has

political, economic, social

and

cultural consequences. But

the

global sustainability imperative

takes

us into yet an-

other

dimension. The

new diplomacy

is a

complicated

arena, and most Government departments will have to be

engaged

in

an effective

way.

The primacy of the long

term

The famous British economist John Maynard Keynes

coined the expression In the

long run

we are all dead .

Probably the purpose was

to

discourage speculation on

what could

happen in

the

distant future, and to

focus

in-

stead

on

practical policy

in the

short and medium term.

Many

people have also laughed at the quip

of

Groucho

Marx: Why

should

I

do

anything for the future? The

fu-

ture

hasn't done

anything for

me.

However, the Anthropocene era changes the perspec-

tive. If

humans

are

now influencing

the

entire

world sys-

tem, then

we

have an unavoidable

responsibility

for fu-

ture

generations, not just children and grandchildren, but

all future generations.

This is

a

daunting responsibility in

a

world

with

so

many,

and so difficult, short-term prob-

lems.

Politicians are

often

accused

of

lacking

interest

in long-

term

issues. A common

charge is that they don't

look

further

than the

next election.

In

my

view

this is

unfair,

since

in the day-to-day operation

of

Governments there

are too many

issues

that cannot simply be postponed and

where action has to be taken straight away. Visions

are

getting blurred by immediate

concerns.

As a former Brit-

ish

Foreign

Secretary,

Douglas-Home

once complained:

foreign policy is

just

one damned thing after another .

Given this constant tension between the urgent and

the long-term important, the requirements

of

the new

sus-

tainability paradigm have

to

be well understood by public

opinion. Natural disasters and such graphic illustrations

as the ozone hole have helped to increase

awareness.

I

will later comment more specifically

on

climate

change:

there the European Union and several member countries

have set long-term targets for emissions

of

greenhouse

gases,

stretching

to

2050-2060.

In

no other

policy

fields

are

this kind

of

long-term provisions in use. It is unavoid-

able

that

we

will see more

of

such long-term

objectives

as

the implications

of

global change become more generally

understood, and as the international community realises

still more clearly that time is

hort if humanity

is

to

avoid

disasters

of

different kinds, linked

to

anthropogenic

im-

pact on the global system.

One of

the

most salient features of

the

new diplomacy

is the primacy

of

the long term. Together with the abso-

lute character of the threat and the

need

for a broad vision

it

is a defining

element

for

the

very

concept. But I also wish

to

comment briefly

on

some other

aspects

of

a

more

con-

crete nature, which have emerged over the last decade.

New

international actors

The pattern

of

multilateral negotiation has changed only

gradually

over

the post World

War II period.

The role

of

the

superpowers,

the dominant role

of

the western

democ-

racies, and the emergence

of

the

group of

developing

coun-

tries (G-77)

has

characterised the structure

of

multilateral

cooperation for most of

this

period.

In recent economic and trade negotiations,

it

is obvi-

ous

that China, India

and

Brazil

have

merged as

major

players.

This

has

also been reflected in the negotiations

on

sustainable development, though with some nuances.

The cohesion

of

the G-77 has been considered essential:

this

reflects

concern

that

environmental policy

would

be

detrimental

to

growth and development objectives.

At the

same

time it has become clear that

China,

India and Bra-

zil are ready

to

go it alone

if

they feel that this is important

for

their

national

interests.

(China is formally not

a mem-

ber

of the

G-77, but

it

is normally associated

to

all posi-

tions

expressed by the

group).

However,

it is

worth mentioning that other groups of

countries, that

normally

do not

play

a

major role in the

United Nations, have held a high profile

in

the negotia-

tions

on sustainable development

since

1990.

One is the group

of OPEC countries, in

particular Saudi

Arabia. This is not the

first

time that Saudi Arabia

plays

a

leading

role in

a

south-north

context: during

the dialogue

on

a

new international economic order in the 1970's Saudi

Arabia's oil minister

Sheik Yamani

was at

the centre

of

attention.

The whole dialogue had in

fact

been initiated as

a

response

to the increase

in

oil prices

and the

risks

for

disruption

of

oil supplies that caused concern among the

industrialised

countries.

In a way this negotiation, which

however did not lead to any concrete results, was a

pre-

cursor

of

the new diplomacy.

Both in the Rio process and in the climate negotia-

tions,

Saudi

Arabia

and

some other

OPEC

countries

have

taken very strong positions, trying to block decisions that

might reduce the expected demand for oil. This has led to

tensions within the G-77,

in

particular since another group

of countries, the Association of Small Island States

(AOSIS), has constantly pushed for more action on emis-

sions

control.

Quite unexpectedly, this has

given some

small islands

in

the Pacific or the Caribbean, such as Sa-

moa or Antigua and Barbuda, pivotal roles in the negotia-

tions.

Finally, the Group of Least Developed

Countries

(LDC's)

has been able

to

defend

its

interests with skill

0378-777X/07/ 17.00 2007

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209


5/9

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 37/2-3

2007)

and perseverance, even

if the

results

have

not

always been

up to expectations. However, this group has been consti-

tuted

as part

of

G-77

for

a long time in the UN. What has

been striking

now

is that certain countries, or certain sub-

groups

of

countries, have been

able

to establish strong

platforms

of

action in

several

of

the negotiations on

sus-

tainable development. One example

is

the major role

played by West African francophone countries

in

the ne-

gotiations

for the

Convention

to Combat

Desertification,

or the

important contribution

of

a number

of

smaller Latin

American countries

in the Convention on Biological Di-

versity.

In this way, these negotiations

have

contributed to show

that there

are

areas

in

which small countries,

in particular

when strong national interests

are at

stake, have a real

possibility to

make

their

voices

heard in

the

UN. To

a

large

extent, this has also

been

due to the

negotiating

skills

of

their representatives.

The impact

of civil society

and

the role

of NGOs

The Rio process represented a break-through for the

participation

of

NGOs

in the work of the UN. Of

course

non-governmental organisations have had a long history

of participation in UN

activities, but

it

had been a limited

group

of

well-established, large organisations.

As

the Pre-

paratory Committee for

the

Rio Conference

assembled

in

August

1990,

there was a serious effort to widen the

par-

ticipation.

The Secretary-General

of

the Conference,

Mauric Strong

of

Canada, had many linkages

to

civil so-

ciety,

and many countries

felt

that action

to promote sus-

tainability would need NGOs

to be

more firmly anchored

in public opinion.

There

was

a

fair amount of suspicion,

as

many devel-

oping

countries

feared

that northern

environmental

NGOs

would have limited understanding and would not be very

sympathetic

to the developmental aspects

of

sustainabil-

ity. This led to

a difficult negotiation

at the

first meeting

of

the Preparatory Committee, but in my

view

the result

was very satisfactory. The

decision meant

that NGOs that

had been admitted to the Conference would have the

pos-

sibility to

participate in all

open meetings

if the

Chairman

of any body would so decide

with

the consent

of

the

meet-

ing.

On the

other hand it was

made very

clear

that NGOs

were not negotiating parties. This decision clearly shows

that the

full

responsibility for the results

of

negotiations

would stay

with

Governments; but it also

gave NGOs

a

very significant right to be

present.

Practice has shown that

NGOs

increasingly have been

admitted

to practically

all meetings

,

with

the exception

of

sensitive final negotiations, and this has been applied

both in the normative Rio/Johannesburg process and in

the Convention negotiations. The formal approval ena-

bling NGOs

to

enter sessions

of

the various bodies has

normally been a low-key and routine business. In the case

of

the

Convention

to

Combat Desertification,

a large

number

of

grass-root

NGOs

participated actively; and their

presence was financed through a special fund with contri-

butions from developed countries.

The presence

of NGOs at the various meeting

has given

a considerable contribution

to

the negotiations. In all ses-

0378-777X/07/ 17.00 2007 lOS

Press

sions

they

have been invited to

make statements, some-

times strongly critical

of

Governments. In many

of

the

large Conferences, such as Rio or Johannesburg,

special

NGO villages have been centres for side events

of

differ-

ent kinds, meetings and manifestations. The development

of

side

events is generally an interesting feature

of

the

new diplomacy. These

are

organised with

the

help of

Sec-

retariats and cover a broad range

of

subjects and a number

of

different

activities,

from

academic

seminars to rallies

aimed at directly influencing negotiations. With

the

sup-

port

of some Governments, some NGOs also

produce regu-

lar reports on proceedings

in

the sessions, keeping an eye

on

how

delegations tackle the various

points

on the agenda.

More generally, the active

participation of

NGOs re-

flect an important feature

of

sustainability policies: the

need to keep

the general public informed

of

the

issues at

stake, so

that

everybody can have

a

considered judgement

of the

policies to be pursued. It is easy

to

say that life-

styles

need

to change

and

that paradigm

shifts are

needed,

but these

can

only come

about

if there

is

broad public

sup-

port for action. Therefore, the role

of

NGOs becomes par-

ticularly important in negotiations on sustainable

devel-

opment: they help

to provide bridges between the reality

of

negotiations

and

the reality

of

real life.

The role

of

science and research

One

important

characteristic

of the New

Diplomacy is

that it is driven by the natural sciences. The role of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will

be discussed

more

in

detail

in

the concluding

part of this

presentation, dealing more

specifically

with

climate

change.

But

climate

is

only one example

among

several.

One of the first examples

was

the intensive research car-

ried

out at

Stockholm University

that

led to the European

regional agreement on transboundary air pollution, already

in 1983.

And the

research

carried

out by

Paul Crutzen and

his colleagues

-

that

ultimately led to the

Nobel Prize

in

Chemistry in

1995 -

laid the basis for the Vienna

Con-

vention and

the

Montreal

Protocol on the

ozone

layer.

Chemicals in the atmosphere are central to the

prob-

lems

we

face

in

climate change

and in

the thinning

of

the

ozone layer.

But

chemicals are also responsible for pollu-

tion

of soils,

water and oceans; and there

are

now so many

chemicals in use that chemicals control has become a cen-

tral

issue

for

global sustainability. A

UN

Convention on

Persistent Organic Pollutants

(POPs)

was concluded in

Stockholm

in 2001; also in

this case research

was

instru-

mental in moving the processes

forward. And as

research

on

chemicals continues, there

is

no doubt that

the

input

will be transformed into new legal instruments.

A broad range

of

natural scientists are today involved

in research

of

high relevance

to

sustainability But as it

becomes

clear that we

are

dealing

with global

systemic

problems, it is necessary to broaden the scope

of

research.

In

this

context, the International Geosphere-Biosphere

Programme (IGBP) is

of particular

importance. The pro-

gramme is built on inter-disciplinarity, networking and

integration.'

In the same way, the International Institute

for Applied

Systems Analysis

(IIASA),

has become in-

creasingly relevant for international negotiations as they

21


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have

to take

into

account the fact that

we

live

in an

inte-

grated earth system. Similarly,

EU

research programmes

become geared to the

same

issues

of

high relevance for

the

New diplomacy.

Another salient feature

of

the

present

situation is that

the social

sciences need

to be given a more prominent

role. This

does not only refer

to

economics, which has

an

obvious contribution

to

give in modelling and calculation

of

cost-effectiveness,

but

also

other

social sciences,

mainly

political

science, sociology

and

social psychology. These

are essential components in preparing negotiations and

better understanding the societal conditions that will per-

mit a transition to sustainability over the long term. They

will also

be instrumental in better understanding

how

the

relationship between global, national,

and

local scales, will

evolve,

as

the approach to global

problems

will

have ef-

fects on

living conditions

and

lifestyles

all

over

the world.

How will

political

structures cope with these new

de-

mands? What are the consequences for legal systems?

What psychological mechanisms will permit acceptance

of

new kinds

of

constraints

in

order

to

respond

to the

new

requirements

of

intra-generational and inter-generational

equity?

These are

just

examples

of the new

claims that earth

science put on the research community; I have no doubts

that the linkages

between international negotiations and

all forms

of

scientific research will need

to

be strength-

ened

in the years to come.

The

institutional and structural

consequences

are

still unclear, but as I turn

to

a more spe-

cific

discussion of

the

climate

issue,

I believe

that some

lessons

can

be drawn.

The

New

diplomacy

at

work: the negotiations

on

climate change

Climate change is the most striking example

of

an-

thropogenic change in

a

global

perspective. The

way it

has been tackled

by

the international

community

is

also

the best example so far

of

practical implementation of the

New diplomacy.

I therefore

wish

to set

the

different pa-

rameters discussed in the previous section in the perspec-

tive

of

these negotiations.

This

will just be a

brief

presen-

tation

as

a background to our discussion.

Since

natural research has been

the

strongest

driving

force in this process, it

is

logical to begin with the impact

of

research, and in particular the instrumental role

of

the

IPCC.

As climate change began to appear on the radar

screens of

politicians

in

the

1970's the

obvious response

was to seek more information, and therefore the United

Nations

Environment Programme (UNEP)

and the

World

Meteorological Organisation (WMO)

jointly

created the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in

1987.

The

first assessment report

of

the IPCC was tabled

in

Septem-

ber 1990, and the

Panel would

from

then

on have

a

major

impact on the efforts

to

create a legally binding instru-

ment

to

tackle

climate

change.

Its fundamental

points,

made

on

the basis

of

combined efforts by more than 2000

scientists have been basically unchanged over the years:

there is a human impact on the climate; business as usual

would

risk

a

global

warming

of

the

earth's atmosphere

of

1.6

to 5.8

degrees Celsius

by

2100, sea level could then

rise

by

0.09

to 0.90

meters.

Wide

ranges

of uncertainty,

but an authoritative evaluation

of

tremendous risks for the

future.

When

the

then Chairman

of the IPCC, professor

Bert

Bolin

of

Sweden, addressed meetings

of the

negotiating

committee for the Convention, there was palpable

silence

in

the room. Here came

the facts,

the certainties

and the

uncertainties, and the negotiators got a clear sense

of

their

responsibilities. Tactical finesse and national interests for

once

became

secondary.

Of course

the

moment

passed,

but it

was a subtle

expression

of

the

impact

of

the natural

sciences on negotiations on global sustainability.

The three assessment reports

of

IPCC prepared to

far

- 1990, 1995 and

2001

- have

all had a

major

impact, and

no doubt the next report, to be published in 2007, will be

of

particular importance as

negotiators

will move further

in

the

preparations for the climate regime

after 2012.

Of

course

IPCC

findings

have

been challenged,

as have

other results

of

climate research, based on extensive data

modelling

and

evaluations of expected impacts. But over

the

last fifteen

years, the

scientific data have not ceased

to

strengthen the case

for

serious

concern

over the conse-

quences

of global warming. Even

such

an originally

very

outspoken critic as President Bush has had to mute his

criticism

of

the science behind climate change, even

if

he

continues

to keep the

US

outside the implementation

of

the

Kyoto Protocol.

The

strength

of

the IPCC reports might not have had

the same impact on the negotiations,

if

some

of

the other

characteristics

of

the New

diplomacy

had

not kicked in

and supported

the

process. In many countries, including

the United

States,

the late

eighties

was a time when the

presence of global environmental threats

was

recognised

at

high

political

levels.

Climate

change,

the

ozone

layer,

the state

of

the oceans, increasing water stress, desertifi-

cation

-

all these issues came to the

forefront as prepara-

tions came

under way

for the

Rio

Conference. This

was

also a period

when

the immediate threat

of

a nuclear war

became less

pronounced,

as

the Soviet Union no

longer

represented

a

credible political and military danger to the

west.

All this created a new atmosphere, which supported

the Rio

process

and

made

the Rio Conference

a

real

suc-

cess. The Conference

itself

adopted a set

of

principles and

a programme

of

action

for the 21st Century, Agenda 21;

furthermore the Convention on Biological Diversity and

the Framework Convention on Climate Change

were

signed in Rio. The existence

of

global

environmental

threats

was

acknowledged. And

among the

principles

adopted in Rio was the precautionary approach, indicat-

ing that major environmental

threats

had to be acted on

even

if

full scientific certainty was still lacking.

Since full

certainty is

almost

impossible

to achieve on

such a complex issue as climate change this element

of

precaution became an essential element in the thinking

of

many Governments with a clear impact on negotiations.

Admittedly, action on climate change goes deep into the

fabric

of

society, because

it

requires measures affecting

key

economic

sectors,

in particular

energy and

transport.

But the perception

of

a major global threat helped create a

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spirit

of

common purpose

which carried

the negotiations

forward. Even with all the caveats inherent in a negoti-

ated text, principle

of

Article 3

of

the Convention

pro-

vides

a good example:

The Parties should protect

the

climate system for the

benefit

of

present and future generations

of

human-

kind,

on the

basis of equity

and

in

accordance with

their common but differentiated responsibilities and

respective

capabilities. Accordingly the developed

country Parties should take

the lead in

combating

cli-

mate change

and the adverse effects

thereof'.

This

text,

and

the other

subparagraphs

of

Article

3,

gives a fairly complete

picture of the

several issues flow-

ing out

of

the recognition

of

an overwhelming global threat

requiring common costly action

in

a world with enormous

inequalities.

The

South continues

to emphasise the spe-

cific needs

and circumstances

of

developing country Par-

ties

2

but in the background is a common perception

of

the

nature

and

dimensions of the

threat. This

is

a

charac-

teristic

of the

New Diplomacy that helps

to

better under-

stand

how

the

climate negotiations

have

been

able to

make

progress,

even

though enormous economic and social in-

terests

are

challenged,

and

even though many critical situ-

ations have appeared

in

the course

of

the negotiations. No

nation is

ready to

take the

enormous responsibility to

block

the

negotiations, even

if the

Bush administration came

close to it in 2001.

And

in the decision

of

the EU to take

on the fight over the survival

of

the Kyoto Protocol at that

same

time,

the

nature of

the global threat

was an essential

background rationale.

Because

of

the extreme complexity

of

the climate is-

sue and all

its

societal ramifications, negotiators typically

need

to try to

achieve a

broad

overview

of

the reality in-

fluencing the negotiations. In fact, the process

itself

has

been

a

continuing

learning

experience for

a great

number

of

officials and their

political

masters,

who

have had

to

try to manage not only the scientific background but also

the

need

to reconcile extreme long-term

objectives

with

the pressures

of

day-to-day politics and economics.

These effects

would not

have been achieved

if the proc-

ess had not benefited from the presence of a great number

of

engaged

and knowledgeable NGOs. This particular as-

pect

of

the New Diplomacy has had a major impact, as

delegates have had the opportunity to participate in

side

events

and be exposed to various kinds

of

lobbying. The

official

presence of

NGOs

in

many sessions and

the

state-

ments

made

by

representatives

of

civil

society,

not least

youth organisations, have had a clear

impact.

Some NGOs

have

also

run a much appreciated information service, par-

ticularly important for smaller delegations that always ex-

perience great difficulty in following the many parallel

negotiations

taking

place. A

special feature

of

the

climate

negotiations has been the traditional NGO party, which

assembles official delegates and NGO representatives in

a very relaxed atmosphere.

In reviewing the various features

of

the New Diplo-

macy against the background

of

the climate negotiations I

finally wish

to underline

the

importance

of

smaller

coun-

tries with special interests: I have already highlighted the

0378-777X/07/ 17.00 2007 lOS

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role of the OPEC

countries and the

Association

of

Small

Island States, and

mentioned

the specific

problems of

LDCs,

the least

developed

countries.

These

various groups

have had a

particular

impact

on

the negotiations,

on

some

occasions with unexpected results.

One example was one

of

the few occasions when G-

77

cohesion could not be maintained.

This

happened dur-

ing the first Conference

of

Parties, held

in

Berlin

in 1995.

The most important issue on this occasion was the nego-

tiation

of

a mandate for further strengthening

of

the Con-

vention, which ultimately led to

the

conclusion

of

the

Kyoto Protocol

in 1997.

The

AOSIS

took a very strong

position

in favour of a far-reaching mandate, which

clashed

with

the minimalist

attitude

of

the

OPEC

countries, and

finally led to the appearance

of

a new grouping, the Green

Group, directed

by

India,

China and

Brazil, that

became

the main

G-77 negotiators for the

Berlin

Mandate.

This

experience has not been repeated

since,

and

it

is

fair

to

say that this was the exception that confirmed the

rule of

G-77

solidarity, but

it

had

a

deep

impact

at

a

cru-

cial moment

of

the process.

As we look

towards

the

future, there

is no doubt

that

the LDC Group has had an increasing impact in

forcing

attention

on

the effects

of

climate change

and the need

for

support for adaptation measures. We realise better than

before

that

climate change is

already

happening and

that

even efficient action

to

reduce emissions (which is un-

likely in the short term) will be in sufficient to

avoid

ad-

aptation, because

of

the inertia

of

the global climate

sys-

tem. This

adaptation may

well be costly

and

difficult for

developed countries, but for

poor

countries

the

effort will

be

well

beyond their

means, with

dramatic consequences:

adaptation

to

climate change will have

to

be

an

integral

part of development cooperation policy over

a

long pe-

riod

if

the

UN

millennium goals

of

poverty eradication

are to

stand a

chance

of

being achieved.

So

the climate change negotiations

provide

concrete

examples

of

the way the New Diplomacy works. I also

believe

that the

experience

so far

gives

some reasons to

have hopes

for

the future, with the caveat that progress

might

always risk

being too

slow,

even

if

the direction is

correct. We have

seen

that a number

of

factors

have ena-

bled the

world

community

to take action

on

a

major

threat

to

the future: the Framework Convention was adopted

in

1992, and it was given concrete emission

targets

through

the Kyoto Protocol concluded in 1997. But it was

only

after

major

battles

and

tremendous efforts by,

in

particu-

lar, the European Union that the Protocol could enter into

force

in 2005;

and then without

the participation

of

the

United States. And as negotiators are now preparing for

the continued talks

about

the future climate regime after

2012, when the first period of the Kyoto Protocol comes

to

a close,

major uncertainties remain.

As

a former practitioner

of

the diplomacy for sustain-

able development, I can see that

some

of

its special

fea-

tures

will give reason for

hope

about the future climate

negotiations, and I remain optimistic about the prospects

for a deal that will permit the world community

to

move

towards a

long-term climate regime

that

will ultimately

lead to sufficient emission reductions to avoid disastrous

212


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effects

of

global warming. In turn,

this can

only be achieved

through action

to

promote new energy and transport tech-

nologies, and through a willingness to

accept

important

societal changes and modified life-styles. Is

it

naive

to

believe that this

can

happen?

I do

not

think so because I

believe that the realities

of

a globalised world system

are

beginning

to

be

better understood,

and

that

the

special

fea-

tures

of

the New Diplomacy represent a real paradigm

shift

in

international relations.

But

we also have to realise

that no international

nego-

tiations

of

this

kind can

succeed

if

enabling conditions at

the national level

are

not met,

if

a well informed public

opinion is not ready to back efficient global action.

And

that opens another kind

of

discussion, which might well

be a dominant factor as we look towards the future

of

the

climate issue,

and

other negotiations on sustainable

de-

velopment as well:

how will action

be consistent

with

per-

ceptions

of

fairness and

justice?

In the international

field,

we have

seen

how the notion

of common but differentiated responsibility has become

a

precondition for action. Weak

actors, such

as small is-

lands or least developed countries,

have

managed

to in-

fluence events by underlining the need for solidarity. But

as we move into areas,

such

as climate

change,

which will

require

the

participation of

all citizens

in

accepting life-

style changes, this notion

of

fairness and

justice

related

to

the

environment

will

permeate

national

situations

as

well,

and add

to

already existing social tensions.

So the analysis

of

diplomacy for sustainable develop-

ment moves into new landscapes. It is an ever-changing

reality, and

it is

still seen as subordinate to

the

traditional

forms

of

international

relations.

But I have no

doubts that

as this 21st Century moves on, people everywhere will have

to realise that all human

activities,

including

how

national

security is defined, will be dependent

on

the limits

im-

posed upon mankind

by

immense natural systems, and

act

accordingly.

Notes

1

In

2004,

the results

so

far

were

presented

in

a

major

work:

Global Change

and

the Earth System: A Planet under Pressure . (Springer Verlag).

2 Art. 3.2 F

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213

Climate Change - Key Elements of Key Documents

Framework Convention on

Climate Change -

Concluded 1992,

entered

into force 1994.

Vague

commitments on stabilisation

of emissions of

greenhouse gases

for

industrialised

countries at

1990

by 2000,

no rules

on

compliance.

Principle of

common

but differentiated

responsibility .

Financial and

technical support

for developing

countries

recognised.

Institutional

and

process rules established, including

an

annual Conference of Parties.

Most important

result: adoption of

an

ultimate

objective : stabilisation of

greenhouse

gas concen-

trations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference

with

the

climate system .

Kyoto Protocol - Concluded

1997

(COP-3),

entered into

force 2005.

Precise, differentiated,

quantitative commitments for

industrialised countries

covering

the period

1990-2008/12,

(EU -8%,

US -7%,

Japan

-6%,

Russia

0 etc.), on

average calculated

at

-5.2 .

Provisions

for accounting

for the

removal

of

carbon through sinks

(forests and

soils).

Establishment of

a

crediting system through mechanisms

such as emissions

trading,

joint

implemen-

tation and/or Clean Development Mechanism.

Establishment

of

a compliance

system.

A

separate

Meeting

of

the Parties

of

the Protocol.

Rules

on sinks,

mechanisms,

and

compliance were

not

complete

in

the Kyoto text.

Marrakesh Accords - Agreed in

2001

(COP-7).

Agreement

on

details

concerning

outstanding

issues

in

Kyoto Protocol

such

as

sinks,

mechanism,

and compliance.

Formalisation of

funding

offer from

a group

of

developed

countries

and agreement on

structure of

support funds,

concerning i a

adaptation

and

least

developed

countries.

Montreal

Decisions

(COP/MOP-1) (COP-11) - 2005.

Formal

adoption

of

Marrakesh

Accords.

Improvement

of

operation of

Clean Development

Mechanism,

and

establishment of 5

year programme

on adaptation.

Review

of

Annex

I commitments

after

2012.

Establishment of dialogue

on

post-2012 general climate regime (COP-Il decision).


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