4 3 c limatic a nomalies and c onflicts : t he r ole of t enure s ecurity on l and d isputes...
TRANSCRIPT
4 3
CLIMATIC ANOMALIES AND CONFLICTS: THE ROLE OF TENURE SECURITY
ON LAND DISPUTES
Marcella VeronesiUniversity of Verona and ETH Zurich
Salvatore Di FalcoUniversity of Geneva
March 24, 20152015 World Bank Land and Poverty Conference
Motivation/1
• Robust evidence that deviations from normal rainfall
and temperature increase human conflicts (Hsiang,
Burke, and Miguel, Science 2013)
• The positive relationship between climate and conflicts
frequently observed in Africa.
Motivation/2
• Climate models project weather variability to increase in
Africa (IPCC, 2013).
Lack of empirical evidence on possible factors or policies
that may mitigate the impact of climate and
so prevent disputes in Africa.
This Paper
Does land tenure (property rights) mitigate the
impact of climatic anomalies on land use conflicts?
Focus on land disputes in Ethiopia
Research question
Background:Climate and Land Certification Programme in Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Ethiopia has frequently experienced droughts and
floods (Lautze et al., 2003; NMS, 2007).
Most of climate models converge in forecasting
scenarios of increased temperatures for most of
Ethiopia (Dinar et al., 2008).
Background (cont.):Climate and Land Certification Programme in Ethiopia
Ethiopia
Ethiopia historically plagued by lack of tenure security
Until 1975 complex system of ownerships (communal, private,
church, state) Land owned by absentee landlords; arbitrary
evictions posed serious threats to tenant farmers.
1975 land reform rights to state and usufruct rights to farmers
1998 land certification program the program entry is random
and phased in over a period of time
Data
• Sustainable Land Management Survey
• Conducted by Addis Ababa University, Ethiopian
Development Research Institute, University of Gothenburg
• Years 2005 and 2007
• Large farm-household panel survey
• About 1700 households per year
• Amhara National Regional state of Ethiopia
Study Site
EthiopiaAmhara National Regional State
14 villages7 from East Gojjam zone 7 from South Wello zone
East Gojjam South Wello
Conflict Measure
• Conflict variable: disputes over land
“Have you ever faced any
conflicts or claims
regarding the land you own?”
“Yes/No”.
Conflict Measure (cont.)
Type of conflict(i) The claimant pushed the borders of my parcel;
(ii) It was claimed that the plot was unfairly given to me;
(iii) It was claimed that the plot belonged to the claimant sometime ago;
(iv) It was claimed that I pushed the claimant’s borders;
(v) The claimant did not want to leave the land I left for him to manage
while I was away;
(vi) The claimant did not want to leave my land I had given out to him on
sharecropping.
Climatic Data
• Ethiopian National Meteorological Services
• Annual mean rainfall from 1976 to 2006 at the
household level
• Spatial interpolation using latitude, longitude and
elevation of each household
• Rainfall anomalies = deviations from long-term mean
divided by its long-term standard deviation
Final Sample
• 12 villages 4 villages with land certification8 villages without land certification
• 1,487 farm-households1,027 with land certification 460 without land certification
• Total: 2,974 observations 2,054 with land certification 920 without land certification
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.YEAR 2005
conflict (1/0) 0.190 0.392male 0.814 0.389age 50.299 15.445literate (1/0) 0.466 0.499family size 6.227 2.342farm size (Ha) 1.810 2.934credit access (1/0) 0.178 0.383
YEAR 2007 conflict (1/0) 0.218 0.413male 0.807 0.395age 51.413 15.012literate (1/0) 0.427 0.495family size 6.619 2.391farm size (Ha) 2.081 1.839credit access (1/0) 0.246 0.431
Baseline
Follow-up
Descriptive Statistics
No Land Tenure With Land TenureMean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
YEAR 2005 conflict (1/0) 0.192 0.394 0.183 0.387male 0.824 0.381 0.810 0.392age 50.945 15.631 49.703 14.950literate (1/0) 0.452 0.498 0.534 0.499family size 6.316 2.358 6.431 2.353farm size (Ha) 1.755 3.173 1.945 2.899credit access (1/0) 0.195 0.396 0.148 0.355
YEAR 2007 conflict (1/0) 0.248 0.432 0.159 0.366male 0.823 0.382 0.804 0.397age 52.186 15.310 50.557 14.264literate (1/0) 0.396 0.489 0.514 0.500family size 6.580 2.409 6.805 2.512farm size (Ha) 1.878 1.636 2.463 2.260credit access (1/0) 0.220 0.414 0.270 0.444
Land Certification Introduced
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Households without
Land Tenure
Control Group Treatment Group
• Land tenure randomly assigned• Climatic anomalies exogenous
Identification Strategy
Households with
Land Tenure
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Empirical Model
• Fixed effect model with panel data:- account for potential omitted variable bias constant overtime- compare the same household overtime subject to different
rainfall anomalies.
• C*: propensity to experience land use conflicts• A: vector of rainfall anomalies• X: age, literacy, family size, land size, credit, livestock• μ: household fixed effects• η: error term
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Results: OLS Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4)Variables All Yes
Land TenureNo
Land TenureAll
+ interaction terms
Rainfall anomaly t-1 -0.031** 0.050 -0.043** -0.043*** (0.014) (0.027) (0.013) (0.013)Rainfall anomaly t-2 -0.123* 0.191 -0.199*** -0.199*** (0.067) (0.124) (0.054) (0.053)Land tenure -0.142*** -0.078*** (0.005) (0.021)Rainfall t-1 x land tenure 0.094***
(0.027)Rainfall t-2 x land tenure 0.390***
(0.124)Constant 0.227*** 0.158** 0.220*** 0.220*** (0.007) (0.030) (0.006) (0.006)Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 2,974 920 2,054 2,974
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the Kebele level in parenthesis. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** at 1% level.
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Results: Fixed Effect Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables All YesLand Tenure
NoLand Tenure
All + interaction terms
Rainfall anomaly t -0.094*** -0.043 -0.088** -0.088**
(0.032) (0.060) (0.038) (0.038)
Rainfall anomaly t-1 -0.212*** 0.044 -0.260*** -0.260***
(0.050) (0.109) (0.057) (0.057)
Rainfall t-1 x land tenure 0.045
(0.071)
Rainfall t-2 x land tenure 0.304**
(0.123)
Observations 2,974 920 2,054 2,974
Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Robustness Checks: Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)Variables All Yes
Land TenureNo
Land TenureAll
+ interaction termsRainfall anomaly t -0.086*** -0.035 -0.081** -0.084** (0.033) (0.062) (0.039) (0.039)Rainfall anomaly t-1 -0.194*** 0.082 -0.246*** -0.241*** (0.052) (0.110) (0.059) (0.059)Rainfall t-1 x land tenure 0.054
(0.073)Rainfall t-2 x land tenure 0.307**
(0.126)Age 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)Literate 0.048* 0.066* 0.046 0.052** (0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026)Family size 0.007 0.072*** -0.016 0.011 (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)Land area 0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.002 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)Livestock 0.005 -0.006 0.013** 0.005 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)Access to credit -0.021 -0.078*** 0.004 -0.017 (0.017) (0.029) (0.021) (0.017)Observations 2,864 876 1,988 2,864
Conclusions
We find robust evidence that farm-households with land tenure are more resilient to climatic anomalies than farm-households without tenure security.
Land certification: effective policy instrument to buffer
against climate anomalies