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GDF SUEZ / Electrabel approach of

the Long Term Operation (LTO)project

in Belgium

Challenges & actual status

CONFIDENTIAL

L

Pierre DOUMONT

Group Senior Vice-prsident

Nuclear Safety & Radiation Protection

NTW

Exploratory Workshop

European Parliament

Brussels

March 19, 2014

Ageing of nuclear power plants

a threat for nuclear safety ?Control methods accross Europe and

recent developments for measuring the risk


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2

1. Positioning Tihange 1 & Doel 1-2

2. Regulatory context

3. Electrabel approach for the preparation of LTO files

4. Scope and organisation of LTO for Unit 1 of Tihange NPP

5. Planning and resources for its implementation

6. Conclusions

AGENDA

NTW Exploratory Workshop European Parliament Brussels March 19, 2014


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3

Nuclear Power in Belgium

Doel

Tihange

3

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Units Netcapacity

[MWe]

Date of 1stcriticality

Design Cumulativenet load

factor [%]

LTOrelevant

?

Doel 1 433 1974 Westinghouse 85.1 YES

Doel 2 433 1975 Westinghouse 82.1 YES

Doel 3 1006 1982 Framatome 84.0

Doel 4 985 1985 Westinghouse 83.6

Tihange 1 962 1975 Framatome 79.0 YES

Tihange 2 1008 1982 Framatome 85.8

Tihange 3 1015 1985 Westinghouse 86.64

The nuclear fleet of GDF SUEZ

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12

3

4

1. Doel 1 - 433 MW

2. Doel 2 - 433 MW

3. Doel 3 - 1006 MW

4. Doel 4 - 1008 MW



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1. Tihange 1 - 962 MW



1

2

3

6NTW Exploratory Workshop European Parliament Brussels March 19, 2014


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1. Positioning Tihange 1 and Doel 1&2





6. Conclusions

AGENDA



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Regulatory context to operate the Belgiannuclear units

The Belgian units are in constant evolutionthrough the mandatory process of decennialsafety reviews (Periodic Safety Reviews)and Electrabel policy of continuousimprovement.This PSR concerns as well the design as theoperational conditions of the plants.

The plant itself has no technical definedlifetime.Some components have a limited lifetime,but most are replaceable (e.g. steam

generators).

Regulatory context : Periodic Safety Reviews (P.S.R.)



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Regulatory context : Belgian Nuclear Phase Law

Nuclear phase out law

o Until 2003, the only regulatory limit on the lifetime was the

compulsory decennial review

o In July 2012, the government announced its intention to extentthe lifetime of the Tihange 1 NPP to 50 years, to assureelectricity supply, while the closure of Doel 1 and 2 after 40

years was confirmed.

o In March 2014, official autorisation to extent the lifetime of theTihange 1 NPP.



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In 2009 : Preparation of the LTO file based on one Strategic Note issuedby the Belgian Nuclear Safety Authorities :

Preconditions

Ageing

Design

Knowledge & Competence Management & Behavior

In 2011 : Submission of LTO-file: Re-evaluation of the design : proposal for design upgrades and related planning Ageing management : documentation compliant with 10 CFR 54

In 2012 : Final definition ofAgreed Design Upgrade (ADU)

In 2015 : a) Revision or supplement of the Safety Analysis report

(including ageing management, LTO-actions)

b) Full implementation of ageing management program

< 2020 : Realization of design modifications (Agreed Design Upgrade)

Regulatory context :Strategic Note from Nuclear Safety Authorities

Physical Ageing

Technological

Obsolescence



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6. Conclusions

AGENDA



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Electrabel approach : Preconditions

LTO-preconditions

Plant programmes Managementsystem

SafetyanalysisTLAA*

Licensingbasisdocuments

Maintenance

Equipmentqualification

Surveillanceand monitoring

Chemistryprograms

In serviceinspection

Configuration

management

(*) : TLAA : Time Limited Ageing AnalysisNTW Exploratory Workshop European Parliament Brussels March 19, 2014


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Electrabel approach : PreconditionsInterpretation of IAEA expectations

LTO report LTO action plans LTO period

Ageing managementaction plans

Preconditionsaction plans

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Ready for LTO

2016

LevelofLTO-readiness

Continuous

improvement

AS-IS situation

TO-BE

LTO effort

Evaluation of

currentpreconditions

AS-IS



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Electrabel approach :Ageing

Scoping Screening

Ageing

ManagementReview (AMR)

Condition

Assessment(CA)

Defining AgeingManagement Programs (AMPs)

Standard AME

EstablishingTime Limited Ageing Analysis (TLAA)

Ageing

ManagementProgram Review

(AMP Review)



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Electrabel approach : Design

LTO-DESIGN: Sources for design upgrade

(a) Regulation watch

(b) WENRA reference levels

(c) Benchmarks

(d) PSR look-back

(e) Operational experience feedback

(f) Design basis documentation

Other information sources

for design re-evaluation



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Process for design upgrade :From Safety Concerns up to Agreed Design Upgrade (ADU)

Weighing safetyconcernclusters

Identifying &clustering

safety concerns

Screeningsafety concern

clusters

Identifying &weighing

risk factors

FOR EACH SOURCE

START

Investigatingpotential

improvements

to safetyconcerns

Globalassessment

of potentialimprovements

ADU

EVALUATION MATRIX

1 2 3 4




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Benchmark

Periodic SafetyReviews

OperationalExperienceFeedback

Design BasisDocumentation

WENRA

RegulationWatch

Fukushima

Safetyconcerns

Potentialimprovements

Globalassessment

Fukushima

ADU

Fukushima




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Electrabel approach :Knowledge, Competence and Behaviour

Approach alignedwith LTO

preconditionapproach

Nuclear safety culture

OSART

Knowledge management

Self assessments

Work groups

Competencemanagement

OSART

Self assessments

Work groups

Specifying scopeof assessment

Identifyingand listingapplicableprocedures

Listing andevaluating

tools

Definingevaluationcriteria andframework

Assessing

1 2 3 4 5

Reporting

7

Definingactionplans

6



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Conclusions on LTO files

A utility point of view on the justification for safe long term operation :

- The LTO file is an opportunity for a complete and systematic

approach of the physical ageing, based on internationalreferences

- The LTO file is also an opportunity for reflections and fordeveloping a clear strategy to tackle the technological

obsolescence



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6. Conclusions

AGENDA



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Scope of LTO for Tihange 1

837 commitments bundled in 103 projects

Knowledge, Competences

and Behaviour : 2

Design : 12 Preconditions: 9

Mechanicalsystems : 22

Mechanicalstructures : 3

Civil works : 5

E I & C: 50

The scope of LTO concerns 103 projects



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6. Conclusions

AGENDA



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LTO-Planning

P

l

a

n

n

in

g

NuclearSafety

ALARA

RadiationProtection

Assuringsafetyduringworks

Risk ofcommon

modefailure

Time forstudies

anddelivery

Time forequipmentqualification

MilestonesStrategic

Note

Availabiltyof skilledpersonnel

Technicalrisks and

complexities



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LTO-Planning: outage planningSound and reasonable proposal for planning

Planning supports global safety. Planning is no goal by itself !

Planning based on unavailability of electric power supplies(NB : two redundant systems at Tihange 1).

Ageing mainly spread over outages of 2014 and 2016,both extended by 3 weeks (one complete system per outage)

Realize design upgrade gradually, not all at once, but do notpostpone actions with large impact on safety

Improvements gradually from now on until outage of 2019,extended by 4 weeks (Ultimate Extended Backup System)

Avoid common mode failure at any priceDont do everything during only one outage



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6. Conclusions

AGENDA



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LTO PROJECT: CONCLUSIONS

Official GO has been given recently by the Belgian government

Main challenge : Huge organisation requesting large resources

(internal as well as external) during a limited period, without

impairing further safe operation of all units of the concerned plant

External assessment requested through AIEA SALTO missions

(Preliminary mission, at the licensee request, occurred end of 2012 ;

Official mission, at Safety Authorities request, is planned for begin 2015)

Final approval for LTO over next 10 years will be part of the fourth

Periodical Safety Review of Unit 1 of Tihange.



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Thank you for your attention !

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