The politics-administration dichotomy : a reconstructionOvereem, P.

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4. HeterodoxCriticisms

“[W]hatwas‘rejected’mayhavebeenoversimplified,distorted.”(Waldo1968a:13)

4.1 A tenet of orthodoxy?

The politics-administration dichotomy formulated by Wilson, Goodnow,and Weber did not immediately raise many eyebrows in American PublicAdministration.Weber’swritingswerenot translateduntil 1946 and thereforeremained largely unknown, andWilson’s academic writings were not widelyread either (Van Riper 1984). Goodnow, now the least known of the three,initiallyhadthegreatestinfluence,butevenhisideasontherelationshipbetweenpolitics and administration received little attention.1 So, at first the politics-administrationdichotomyseemstohavebeenquiteuncontroversial;infact,theideawasreceivedwithasilencethatseemstoindicateuncriticalacceptanceorperhapsgeneraldisinterest.Slowlybutsurely,however,thedichotomybecamethesubjectofexplicitdiscussion.It isnoteasytosaywhenexactly thewindsofcriticismbegantoblow.Campbellcertainlypicksattoolateadatewhenhesaysthat“[n]otuntilthe1960sdidafloodofliteraturebegintoattackfrontallythepolicy/administrationdichotomy”(1988:245).Attheotherextreme,Vilehasfoundanoccasionalcriticalremarkarticulated“asearlyas1908”(1998:311),butthiscannotcountasanattackofanyseriousforce.Consideringthestrengthandthevolumeof theargumentsraisedagainst thedichotomy,Waldo’sestimationseemsthemostaccurate:“Asthe1930sadvanced,doubtanddissentincreased.Inthe1940srefutationandrepudiationcametothefore.Bythe1950sithadbecomecommontorefertothepoliticsadministrationdichotomyasanoutwornifnotludicrouscreed”(1987:93).Thecombinedthoughnotnecessarilycoordinatedandcoherentassaultonthedichotomymustbedatedshortlybeforethemiddleofthetwentiethcentury.

1 This is nicely illustrated by an early review ofPolitics and Administration (Ford 1900) thatincludesaperceptivediscussionofGoodnow’sconceptofstate,butnotevenamention,letalonecritique, of his views on the relation between politics and administration. Remarkably, a 1939reviewofWilson’sessayshowedthesameomission(cf.Lynn2001:148).

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Inthisconnectionitisnoticeablehowsoonthedichotomywasdepictedasanotionofanalreadyrespectableage.Inthe1950sthedichotomywasalmostcasuallycalled“old”(Gulick1955:76;Mansfield1959:187),“conventional”(Long1952:808),“now-familiar”(Kaufman1956:1060),and“traditional”(Kaufman1956:1067;Smithburg1951:59).ThesewidelysharedcharacterizationscastdoubtonSvara’sclaimthat thedichotomyneveractuallywasapartof thesharedbodyofknowledge inPublicAdministration (2001).At the same time they shouldnotbetakentooliterally.Thedichotomywassurelynotaparticularlyoldideain the 1950s, let alone a very familiar and long-debatedone.Whatmatters isthesometimesnearlyexplicitsuggestionbehindsuchcharacterizationsthatthedichotomy should be regarded as obsolete and out-of-date, a superseded ideabelongingtoabygoneera.

Manystudentsofpublicadministrationhavelearnedtoregardthepolitics-administrationdichotomyasonebuildingblockinawiderstructureofthoughtknown as PublicAdministration’s ‘orthodoxy’. Friend and foe agree that thisideaoforthodoxywasespeciallydevelopedinandpopularizedbyWaldo’sTheAdministrative State.Thisbookpresentedpre-SecondWorldWaradministrativethoughtasamoreorlesscoherentsetofideas,consisting,besidesthepolitics-administrationdichotomy,of“thepostulatethattruedemocracyandtrueefficiencyare synonymous, or at least reconcilable,” the ideal of a ‘scientific’ study ofadministrationandmanagement,andthebelief in theso-called“principles”ofadministration,laterassociatedwiththeinfamousPOSDCORBacronym(1948:206-207).Twopublicationsinparticular,bothpublishedin1937,havecometoberegardedasexpressionsof“thehighnoonoforthodoxy,”namelythePapers on the Science of AdministrationeditedbyGulickandUrwick,andthereportofthePresident’sCommitteeonAdministrativeManagement,betterknownastheBrownlowReport(Sayre1958:103).

Howstrongly thedichotomyhascome tobeassociatedwith theorthodoxtenets is illustrated byHerbertKaufman’s thesis that that in its earliest phaseAmerican Public Administration was particularly concerned with the valueof “neutral competence,” which he defines as the “ability to do the work ofgovernmentexpertly,andtodoitaccordingtoexplicit,objectivestandardsratherthan to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties” (1956: 1060).Asterminology already suggests, the concept of neutral competence is in fact anamalgam of two ideas, one referring to the absence of political involvement(neutrality) and the other to the presence of professionalism (competence).Herethedichotomybetweenpoliticsandadministrationisdirectlyrelatedtoaparticularidealofgoodadministration.

In recent years, it has become clear that the concept of orthodoxy,

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notwithstandingitsmerits,mustalsobequalified.Itsuggestsastrongunityofthought,whereasinfactpre-SecondWorldWaradministrativethoughtwasmuchlesscoherentandlessone-sidedthanhaslongbeenbelieved(Lynn2001;BertelliandLynn2006:ch.3;Marini1994:3).Thedistinctionbetweenorthodoxyandheterodoxy,moreover,appliesonlytoAmericanPublicAdministrationandnottoitsequivalentsinotherpartsoftheworld,notablyEurope.Specificallyimportantfor our purposes,finally, is that treating the politics-administrationdichotomyaspart of abroaderorthodoxy suggests that thedichotomy isnecessarily andintrinsicallyrelatedtotheorthodoxtenets.Thisfalsesuggestionhasdonegreatharmtotheacceptabilityofthedichotomyinpost-orthodoxPublicAdministration.Thosewhobelieveditnecessarytoabandonorthodoxyhaveusuallyalsorejectedthedichotomyasapartofthatbroaderpackage.

Apart from being linked to the typical ideas of the PublicAdministrationorthodoxy (administrative principles, Scientific Management), the politics-administrationdichotomyisalsooftenassociatedwithaparticularunderstandingofdemocracy,characterizedbytheideaofapopularwillorpopularsovereigntyand the principle of legislative supremacy (Long 1952: 808-809; 1954: 24-25).EmmetteRedfordhascapturedtheseelementsinwhathecalledthe“two-pyramid” or “overhead democracy”model (1969: 70). The basic idea of thismodelisaptlysummarizedbyWaldo:

“Politics-democracy proceeds upward to an apex at which the popular will isdetermined by law or otherwise, and then is bridged over to administration.Thereuponthewillisrealizeddownwardthroughanorganizationthatishierarchical,functionallyrational,professional,informedbyscience,andcommittedtoefficiency.Responsibility, responsiveness, and accountability are then brought about by thesamestructures,butthedirectionisreversed.Theygouptheadministrativepyramidtotheapex,bridgeover,andgodownthisstructuretothevoters”(1987:92-93;cf.1984a:xlviii).

Thismodelismostlypresentedasaproperdepictionofparliamentarydemocracysystems with ministerial responsibility and of council-manager systems inAmerican local government, but Redford himself applied the concept toAmericanfederalgovernmentaswell(1969:70-71).Manywritershaverelatedthedichotomytothisparticulartypeofdemocraticgovernment(e.g.,Self1977:150-151; Kirwan 1977: 349; 1981: 346; Golembiewski 1981: 24;Meier andBohte2007:135-136).

Thus, after the SecondWorldWar the dichotomy has become associatedwith two bodies of thought. The first is a ‘scientific’ view on the workingsand organization of public administration, which has to be business-like and

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value-neutral, and the other is a fairly radical understanding of majoritariandemocracy.Lawlerhas captured these twobodiesof thoughtunder the singleheadingof“scientificpopulism”(1988:50-51,53;cf.Storing1995:403).2Inaclimateofscientificpopulismneitherpoliticiansnoradministratorsneedtotakeresponsibility for public policies.They canpretend to derive their goals frompopularopinionandfrompolitics, respectively.Theschemeleaves littleornoroom for political leadership andmorally responsible administrative behavior.It is understandable, therefore, that the association of the dichotomy withscientificpopulismhasnegativelyaffecteditsreputation.Thequestionmustberaised,however,whether theassociationisanecessaryormerelyacontingentone.Afirsttentativeanswertothisquestionisthatitseemspossibletoendorsethedichotomywithoutendorsingscientificpopulism,too.Onewaytodosoisshown byWeber, who sharply analyzed and also strongly opposed scientificpopulism,andwhoadvocatedthedichotomyinordertocreateroomforthekindofcharismaticpoliticalleadershipthatwouldotherwisehavenoplaceinmoderngovernment. InChapterSix I suggest anotherway to understand and endorsethedichotomythatdiffersfromWeber’sbut is,Ibelieve,equallyuntaintedbyscientificpopulism.

ThischapterleavesasidethequestionwhetherearlyPublicAdministrationwasreallystronglyinfectedbyscientificpopulismandinsteadconcentratesonthecriticismsraisedagainst thepolitics-administrationdichotomyitself.Thesecriticismsareofdifferentkinds.InthepreviouschapterIhavealreadydiscussedwhatmightbecalledahistoricallineofcriticism:theargumentpropoundedbyrevisionist historiographers of administrative thought that the dichotomy hasactuallyneverbeensupported,atleastnotseriously,bytheauthorstraditionallycreditedwithitsinvention,particularlyWilsonandGoodnow.Ihaverejectedthisview,arguingthattheseclassicalauthorsdidadvocateadistinctionintheoryandaseparationinpracticebetweenadministrationandpoliticsthatisworthyofthenamedichotomy.Whateverthesupportoftheclassicalauthorsforthedichotomymay or may not have been, however, for the moment these historiographicdebatescanbeleftaside,becauseenoughobjectionshavebeenraisedagainstthedichotomyitself.

InWaldo’swritingswefindtheoften-repeatedobservationthatthepolitics-administrationdichotomywasrejectedforbothempiricalandnormativereasons(1948:128,207;1971:264;1980:68-69;1987:93;cf.Golembiewski1981:52-

2Theassociationofthepolitics-administrationdichotomywithscientificpopulismisnotsomethingofthepast,asHarmonillustrateswhenheassociatesthedichotomywithrationalism,moralism,andmanagerialism,ontheonehand,andnotionsof‘popularwill’andpopularsovereigntyontheother(2006:122-123,126-130).

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53).Althoughthiscapturesthetwomajorlinesofcriticism,Waldo’streatmenttendstoneglecthowexactlytheheterodoxauthorsconceptualizedthedichotomytheycriticizedandwhat theyrequired it toaccomplish.This inattention to thecontentandpurposeofthedichotomyistypicalofbutcertainlynotuniqueforWaldo. It has created the general but incorrect impression that the heterodoxauthors rejected the same, unaltered dichotomy they found in thewritings oftheir classical and orthodox predecessors. In fact, however, the dichotomyfundamentally changed meaning in their hands. Their reconceptualization ofthedichotomymustbeexaminedbeforetheempiricalandnormativeobjectionscan be discussed. A more complete and illuminating way of presenting thevarioustypesofcriticism,therefore,isofferedbySvara,whohasclassifiedthechallengestothedichotomyasthreedistinctyetinterrelatedtypes:conceptual,empirical,andnormative(1985:221).InthenextthreesectionsIfollowSvara’sclassification and examine these three types of criticism successively (4.2 to4.4).Next,specialattentionisgiventotheconceptofdiscretion,whichplaysacrucialroleineachofthesechallenges(4.5).Theconcludingsectiondiscussesand rejects the revisionist claim of Svara and others that heterodoxywas nota radicalbreakbut ratheracontinuationofearlier thinkingabout thepolitics-administrationdichotomy(4.6).

4.2 from ‘politics’ to ‘policy’

Svara describes the “conceptual” challenge to the politics-administrationdichotomy as “the redefinition of key terms accompanying the behavioralmovement”thatfloodedthesocialsciencesduringthemiddleof the twentiethcentury(1985:221).Inthebehavioralapproach,scholarlyattentionwasdirectedtowards the concrete level of individual actionby citizens (especiallyvoters),politicians,andcivilservants,andawayfromformalinstitutionsandnormativeprinciples.Themostimportant“redefinitionofkeyterms”inconnectionwiththepresentsubjectisundoubtedlythetransformationintheheterodoxliteratureofthedichotomybetweenpoliticsandadministrationintothe“parallel,alternative,and occasionally synonymous dichotomy” between policy and administration(Dunsire1973:91).ThisreconceptualizationcanbetracedbackwithremarkableexactnesstoLutherGulick’sessay‘Politics,Administration,andthe‘NewDeal’’(1933),which standsout asoneof thefirst critical reflectionson thepolitics-administrationdichotomyassuch.

Gulick opens his essaywith a distinction betweenwhat he calls ‘politics’andpolitics.‘Politics’(withquotationmarks)referspejorativelytothecorrupt

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politicsofthespoilssystem,whilepolitics(proper)referstoany“actionwhichhas todowithcontrolof the rulers” (1933:59).Gulickadds that“there isnoobjectivemethodofdistinguishingbetween‘politics’andpolitics”(1933:60).Inparticular,onecannotdeterminetowhichcategoryaparticulargovernmentalaction or decision belongs by looking at that action or decision only: “thedistinction between ‘politics’ and politics is not in the act itself” (1933: 60).Instead,onehastolookatthemotivesofthepoliticianswhoperformtheactionortakethedecision.Whentheyaredrivenbyself-interesttheyareinvolvedin‘politics’;whentheyactoutofaconcernforthepublicinterest,oratleastoutofamoregeneralinterestthantheirown,theyareinvolvedinpolitics.Inmostcases,Gulickasserts,therewillbeamixtureofbothmotivesandthereisnowaytodiscernandinstitutionallyseparatethetwokindsofpolitics(1933:59-60).

Thisreframingof‘politics’intoabroaderandlesspejorativeconceptofpoliticsinitselfneednotbeveryproblematicforthepolitics-administrationdichotomy.The aim to protect administration against illegitimate forms of politics mayhistoricallyhavebeenthemainjustificationforthedevelopmentofthedichotomyintheReformmovement,butitneednotbetheonlypossiblejustification.Onemaywellarguethatadministrationmustalsobeisolatedfromlegitimateformsofpolitics.ButGulickgoesfurtherinredefiningtheconceptofpolitics.Hearguesthatitisalwaysthegoalofpoliticsto“shiftthedirectionofpublicpolicy”(1933:60)–thatiswhat(legitimate)politicsisabout.Top-downpoliticaldirectionisnottheonlywayinwhichpublicpolicyisdetermined,however.Therearealsoinfluences from below: “If any government employee, anyone of our ‘rulers’[which forGulick includes civil servants], has discretion, henot onlyhas thepower,butisbycircumstancescompelledtodeterminepolicy”(1933:61).Thus,bothpoliticiansandadministratorsareinvolvedinpolicymaking,theformerintheirformalcapacityandthelatterintheirdiscretionaryaction.Gulickrealizedthatpointingoutthisoverlapofpoliticsandadministrationinthesphereofpolicyisacrucialstepandhequicklydrewtheconclusionthatitsignsthefateofthedichotomy:“Itfollowsfromthisthatgovernmentalinstitutionscannotbedevisedtocoincidedefinitelywithanyschemeofclear-cutdivisionbetweenpolicyandadministration”(1933:61).Herethepolitics-administrationdichotomyissubtlybutessentiallytransformedintoapolicy-administrationdichotomy.

Gulicknot justbroadenedandneutralized theconceptofpolitics,butalsoundermined the conceptual distinction between political and administrativeissues. In his view, one cannot tell from amere act or decisionwhether it ispoliticaloradministrative(orexecutive,legislative,orjudicial,forthatmatter):“[T]he classification of an individual act (…) will depend upon the existinginstitutional set-up and upon the prevalent pattern of values and interests

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dominantatagiventimeandplace”(1933:62).Whatisahighlycontroversialpolitical issue in one settingmaybe amundane andunnoticed administrativeissueinanother.Aparticularactordecisionofgovernmentiseitherpoliticaloradministrativewhenthoseinvolvedinaparticularinstitutionalsettingregarditassuch.Noqualitativedifferencebetween‘administrativequestions’and‘politicalquestions’ (in Wilson’s terminology) can be found in the character of thosequestionsthemselves.Whetheraparticularquestionispoliticaloradministrativedependsonitscontext.

Howeverradicalthisviewwas,Gulickcouldstillsaythat,givenaparticularcontext,anissueiseitherpoliticaloradministrative.Indeed,heexplicitlyretainedthedichotomybetweenthetwo,albeitforspecificreasons:

“Thereasonforseparatingpoliticsfromadministrationisnotthattheircombinationisaviolationofaprincipleofgovernment.Thereasonforinsistingthattheelectedlegislativeandexecutiveofficershallnotinterferewiththedetailsofadministration,and that therankandfileof thepermanentadministrationshallbepermanentandskilledandshallnotmeddlewithpolitics,issimplythatthisdivisionofworkmakesuseofspecializationandappearstogivebetterresultsthanasystemwheresuchadifferentiationdoesnotexist”(1933:63).

Thisisahighlypragmaticargumentindeed.Thedichotomyisnolongerfoundedon any fundamental “principle of government,” but it is merely an efficientdivisionoflaborthathappenstoyield“betterresults”.

After Gulick, the equation of politics/administration with policy/administration was adopted surprisingly rapidly and widely. Herbert Simon,writing only one decade later, uses the new formulation consistently in hisAdministrative Behavior,forinstancewhenhespeaksof“thedistinction,sooftenmadeintheliteratureofadministration,betweenpolicyquestionsandquestionsofadministration”(1997:55;cf.pp.61-67).Thenewformulationwasusedmostconspicuously,however, in the titleandcontentofPaulAppleby’sPolicy and Administration (1949).Inthisbook,whichhasbeencalledthe“scholarlydeath-blowto thesimplistic formulationof theclassicdichotomy,andanewclassicstatement”(Dunsire1973:98),Applebystraightforwardlydefinedthedichotomyas“aseparationofpowerswhichexcludedfromadministrationany–oratleastanyimportant–policy-makingfunctions”(1949:3).Herepolicy/administrationfullyequatespolitics/administration.Whatismore,forApplebythedistinctionitself has become wholly relative. Any question government deals with, heargues,isbothapolicyquestionandanadministrativequestionatthesametime.Peopleonlyperceiveitdifferently,dependingontheirpositioninthegovernmenthierarchy:“Intheperspectiveofeachsuccessiveleveleverythingdecidedatthat

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levelandaboveis‘policy,’andeverythingthatmaybe left toa lower level is‘administration’ (1949:21).Thus, aparticular issue is regardedas ‘policy’bythosewhooperatehierarchicallybelow the level atwhich it is settled, andas‘administration’bythosewhooperateabovethatlevel.Whenanissuebecomesmorecontroversialitwillriseinthehierarchy,sothatthenumberofofficialswhoseeitas‘policy’rises,andthenumberofofficialswhoseeitas‘administration’decreases.Forthoseinsidegovernmentitiscompletelyrelativetotheirpositionwithinthehierarchywhetheranissueispolicyoradministration,butforthoseoutside the organization, including (significantly) the public administrationtheorist, it is always both at the same time: “In the perspective of an outsideobserver, policy andadministrationare treated together at every level” (1949:22;cf.pp.10-22).Andwhenanissuecanbecharacterizedasboth‘policy’and‘administration,’itisinfactneither.Theverydistinctionbetweenthosecategoriescollapses.

Appleby presented a really thorough reconceptualization and conceptualdissolution of the distinction between politics (or policy) and administration.LikeGulick,hecouldnoteasilygetridofthedichotomy,however.Hecontinuedtoacknowledgeadistinction,atthetopofthegovernmentalhierarchy,betweenpartisanpoliticsandotherformsofpolitics:“Everythinghavingtodowiththegovernmentandeverythingthegovernmentdoesispolitical,forpoliticsistheartandscienceofgovernment.Butintermsofmass,onlyasmallpartofpoliticsispartisan”(1949:153).Thissmallpartconcernsonlythosehighlycontroversialissues that capture “party attention” (1949: 153); other issues are resolved atlowerlegislativeandadministrativelevels.Whenacontroversialissue“emergesatthepartisan-politicallevel”(1949:53),majority-seekingpoliticianswillstarttheir turf-seekingfightsandnorolewillbe left foradministrators.Thus,evenaccordingtoApplebyarelevantdistinctioncanbemadebetweenpartisanpoliticsandadministration:“Thisisthesenseinwhichpoliticsandadministrationmaybemostsharplydifferentiated”(1949:53).3

Less than two decades after Gulick’s essay it seemed as if the contrasthad always been framed as ‘policy/administration’ rather than as ‘politics/administration’. Waldo, who in The Administrative State had mainly usedpolitics/administration,soonadoptedthenewinterpretationaswell,forinstancewhen he defined the dichotomy as “the tenet that administration is separate

3Fry has summarized Appleby’s position well: “Appleby contends that all administration ispolitical.However,onlyasmallpartofeitheradministrationorgovernmentispartisan,anditispartisanpoliticalactivitythatApplebywouldhavetheadministratoravoid.Appleby’sadviceisthatadministratorshandlepoliticalissuesuptothepointwheretheybecomepartisanmatters,notthattheystayoutofpoliticsentirely”(1989:1034).

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fromandshouldbeseparatedfrompolitics–withpoliticsconsideredbothastheactivitiesofpoliticalpartiesand as policy formulation”(1952:86;italicsadded).Today, the idea that the classical politics-administration dichotomy excludedadministrationnotonlyfrom(partisan)politics,butalsofrompolicymakinghasbecomegenerallyaccepted.Itisreflected,forinstance,inthedefinitionthePublic Administration Dictionary givesofthepolitics-administrationdichotomy:“Theviewthatpublicadministrationshouldbepremisedonascienceofmanagementandkeptseparatefromtraditionalpartisanpoliticsand general policy making”(ChandlerandPlano1988:98-99;italicsadded).4

In the Public Administration literature this replacement of ‘politics’ by‘policy’hasledtooftenveryextremeunderstandingsofthedichotomy.Themostgeneral tendencyis to treat thedichotomybetweenpoliticsandadministrationasonebetweenwillingandacting,decidingandexecuting.Simon,forinstance,charges Goodnow with coming “perilously close to identifying ‘policy’ with‘deciding,’ and ‘administration’ with ‘doing’” (1997 [1945]: 63). Deciding/executing is also the dominant conceptualization of politics/administration inWaldo’s early writings. In The Administrative State, he defines “the politics-administrationformula”as“thenotionthattheworkofgovernmentisdivisibleintotwoparts,decisionandexecution”(1948:206)andelsewhereinthebookhealsodirectlyequatesthetwodistinctions(e.g.,pp.14and114).InThe Study of Public Administration,ahighlyinfluentialintroductorytextbookfirstpublishedin1955,Waldoreferstothedichotomyasthedoctrinesaying“thattheprocessof government, analytically considered, consists of two parts only, namely,decisionandexecution.Itisnecessaryfirsttodecidewhatshouldbedone–thefunctionanddefinitionofpolitics–andthentocarryoutthedecision–theroleanddefinitionofadministration”(1968b:40).Longwasparticularlyextremeinhisuseofthewilling/actingdistinction:“Intheconventionaldichotomybetweenpolicyandadministration, administration is theAristotelian slave,properlyaninstrumentofactionforthewillofanother,capableofretrievingthecommands

4FredRiggshassuggestedthattheconflationofpolitics/administrationwithpolicy/administrationmaybe less common inBritish than inAmerican thought: “InEngland, ‘public administration’and‘publicpolicy’arevirtuallythesamebecausetopcareeradministrators,asadvisorstocabinetministers,areabletomanipulatetoppoliticaldecisionmakers.Bycontrast,theircounterpartsintheUnitedStatesaretransientappointeesandtheirroleaspolicyadvisersisviewedas‘political,’whereastheroleofcareerofficials,workingatalowerlevel,isviewedasessentiallymanagerial,giving‘administration’anonpoliticalcharacter.ThisenablessomespecialistsinAmericatoclaimpublicpolicyasa‘political’processwhereasinEuropeitismoreeasilyviewedasan‘administrative’function”(1997:105).OnewouldperhapsexpectContinentalEuropeanstobetemptedmorethanAnglophonestoreadpolitics/administrationaspolicy/administration,giventhefactthatlanguagessuchasFrenchandGermanrefertopoliticsandpolicybyonesingleword(politiqueandPolitik),butremarkablythisseemsnottobethecase.

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of reasonbut incapableof reasoning”(1952:808). Inhisview, thedichotomyrendersadministrationtoapassiveandunthinkingtoolinthehandsofitspoliticalsuperiors, “an instrument rather than a brain” (1954: 22). Basically the sameideawasexpressedbySayrewhenhesaidthatforadherentstothedichotomyadministration “was concerned exclusivelywith the execution of assignmentshandeddownfromtherealmofpolitics”(1958:103).

Thisisnottheplacetopointoutagainthatthisinterpretationdeviatesgrosslyfromtheclassicalunderstandingsofthedichotomy.Whatismostrelevanthereisthatbecauseoftheconflationofpolitics/administrationandpolicy/administrationthe heterodox reconceptualization interprets the dichotomy as posing a verystrict and instrumentalist relation between politics and administration: politicsdecides and administration executes. This reconceptualization is of coursecloselyrelatedtothatotherimportantdevelopmentinthemiddledecadesofthetwentiethcenturynotedintheprevioussection:theassociationofthedichotomywith ‘scientific populism’. Given these reconceptualizations and associations,it is not surprising that the dichotomy soon fell under heavy attacks andwasrejected“asaseriouslyerroneousdescriptionofreality”ontheonehand,and“asadeficient,evenpernicious,prescriptionforaction”ontheother(Waldo1971:264).Inthetwofollowingsectionstheseempiricalandnormativeobjectionswillbeconsideredinturn.

4.3 ‘A seriously erroneous description of reAlity’

Formany,themostimportantproblemofthepolitics-administrationdichotomyisthatitoffersaninadequatedescriptionofgovernmentalreality.InthewordsofLong, the dichotomy “has one fatal flaw. It does not accordwith the factsof administrative life.Nor is it likely to” (1954: 22). Because the dichotomyseemsnottobesupportedbyempiricalevidence,itisrejectedas“false”(Waldo1948:123;1968d:42,61).Lawlersaysthat“thedistinctionbetweenpoliticsandadministration exists only as an intellectual abstraction” andmust be rejectedas “unrealistic and unreasonable” (1988: 51). Of all the weaknesses of thedichotomy,itsempiricalinadequacyisusuallyregardedasthemostfatal.

In general, empirical objections seem directed much more against theseparation of administration from politics than against its subordination topolitics.AsApplebynoted,politics (orpolicy)andadministrationarenot twoworldsapart:“Executivesdonotsitattwodifferentdeskstreatingpolicyatoneandadministrationat theother”(1949:19).Ofcourse thisdoesnotmeanthatthosewhodenyseparationaffirmsubordinationinstead.Subordinationisnotthe

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onlypossiblerelationshipbetweenadministrationandpolitics,andmostcriticsofthedichotomythinkthereareother,moreequalandnon-hierarchicalrelationsbetweenthem.Whattheymostadamantlyreject,however,istheideathatsomeseparationcanbeperceivedbetweenpoliticsandadministrationinpractice.

SincetheSecondWorldWar,thePublicAdministrationliteraturehasactuallyshowntwowavesofempiricalcriticismofthedichotomy.Thefirstwaveemergedwiththeriseofheterodoxyinthe1930sand1940s,whenitwas‘discovered’thatadministrators do not simply execute political orders as automatons, but haveroomtointerpretandinfluencepolicyandtoact,atleastwithincertainlimits,accordingtotheirownjudgment.Thenotionsofadministrativedecision-makingand discretion became the main bridgeheads in the attack on the dichotomy.HerbertSimon,inhisAdministrative Behavior,emphasizedthatdecision-makingcouldnotberestrictedtopolitics,becauseadministratorsalsomakedecisions.Hence he proposed the value/fact distinction instead of deciding/executing asan alternative conceptual foundation for the politics-administration dichotomy(see section 5.2). Likewise, from “the fact of administrative discretion andeven administrative legislation”Long inferred that “anything approaching theconditions necessary to achieve a separation of policy from administration ishighlydoubtful”(1952:810).(Theargumentfromdiscretionisdiscussedmoreextensivelyinsection4.5.)

This firstwave of empirical criticism of the dichotomywas not based onsystematic empirical research. Of course, the idea that administrators havediscretionisplausibleenoughandhaslaterbeenconfirmedbymanyempiricalstudies,mostfamouslybyLipsky’sstudyofstreet-levelbureaucracy(1983),butwhentheargumentfromdiscretionwasfirstpresenteditwasmostlybasedonanecdotalevidenceandpracticalexperience.Thishaschangedsincethe1970s,however,whensystematicempiricalresearchofpolitical-administrativerelationsappearedandinitiatedasecondwaveofempiricalcriticism.ThemainclassicalstudyinthisgenreisundoubtedlyBureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies byAberbach, Putnam, andRockman (1981), but after them the literature hasexpanded rapidly.5Most empirical studies of political-administrative relationsconcernindividualcountries,butoftenacross-nationalcomparativeperspectiveisalsoadopted.Mostofthesestudiesfurtherconcentrateonthenationallevelofgovernment,inparticularontheinteractionbetweenministersandtheirtopcivilservants,andonlyasmallergroupdealswithpolitical-administrativerelationsinlocalgovernment(particularlytheAmericancouncil-managersystems,butothercountriesarealsostudied).Studiesaimedatpolitical-administrativerelationsat

5Lee andRaadschelders (2008) offer a detailed reviewof thework ofAberbach, Putnam, andRockmananditsreception.

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thesupra-nationallevelhavelongbeenrareandareonlynowemerging.6Mostofthesestudiesarebasedonsurveysorinterviewswithpoliticiansandsenior-levelbureaucrats.Thisimpliesthattheyconcentrateparticularlyonrespondents’roleperceptions.Theadvantageof thismethod is that thedataareoftenextensiveandrich,butthedisadvantageisthatsociallydesirableandsubjectiveanswersmaybegiven.Totheextentthatthisisindeedthecase,suchempiricalstudiesshowustheattitudesandespousednormsthatregulatepolitical-administrativerelationsratherthantheactualbehaviorofpoliticiansandadministratorsintheirmutualrelations(cf.’tHartetal.2003:47-48).Althoughitisdifficulttodrawgeneralconclusionsfromthiswealthofstudies,ingeneralithasbecomeclearthatcloseinteractionsexistbetweenmembersof thepoliticalandbureaucraticelitesinWesterndemocracies.Theyoftencomefromthesamesocialclass,havecloseworking relations, and sometimes they switch positions (a phenomenonknownbytheFrenchnameofpantouflage).

Thus,thetwowavesofempiricalstudyhaveyieldedtwoimportantfindings.Thefirst is that administrators do not simply execute political orders, but areheavilyinvolvedintheshapingofgovernmentpolicyinthepreparationaswellastheimplementationphase.Thesecondfindingisthatinmoderngovernmentthere ismuch interaction between politicians and administrators.They do notlive in separateworlds but share closeworking relationships and other socialconnections. These two findings are often interpreted as ‘falsifications’ ofclassical models of political-administrative relations, and particularly of thepolitics-administrationdichotomy.HansenandEjersbo,forinstance,claimthatthe politics-administration dichotomy “contradicts several empirical studies”(2002: 734). And in a recent study of council-manager local governmentsinAmerica, Demir and Nyhan (2008) conclude that their “analysis failed toproducesatisfactoryempiricalevidenceinsupportofthepolitics-administrationdichotomy”(2008:93).

Thequestionis,however,whethersuchempiricalfindingscanreallymanagetofalsifythe(classical)politics-administrationdichotomy.Astothefirstfinding,thefactthatadministratorsareheavilyinvolvedinpolicymakingisinitselfnotenoughtodisprovethepolitics-administrationdichotomy.Itisclearenoughthatadministrators have to interpret policy in order to implement it and that they

6Forstudiesofpolitical-administrativerelationsonthenationallevel,seeAberbach,Putnam,andRockman1981;DeBaecqueandQuermonne1982;Derlien2003;Dunn1997;’tHart et al.2003;’tHartandWille2006;LaPalombaraandBeck1967;Nieuwenkamp2001;Page1992;Peters1988;PetersandPierre2004;Putnam1973;Suleiman1984;Svara1985;Svara1999b;TimsitandWiener1980;andmanyothers.Forstudiesaboutthesub-nationallevel,seeMouritzenandSvara2002;Reussing 1996; Svara 1985; Svara 1999b;Thomas 1990;Watson 1997. For the supra-nationallevel,seePageandWouters1994;Wille2009.

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havethediscretiontomakecertaindecisions.Thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheyalsodeterminepolicy,however,butmerelythattheyhavetofillinwhathas(perhapsdeliberately)been leftopen.Astrongpolicy roleofadministrators isnotnecessarilyatoddswiththepolitics-administrationdichotomy.Totheextentthatpublicservantshavebecomeincreasinglyinvolvedinpolicypreparationandpolicyformulation,thismakesadichotomybetweenpolicyandadministrationseriouslyproblematic.7Again,however,thefactthatpublicadministratorshavean important, perhaps even dominant role in policy does not mean that theyare – without qualification – ‘doing politics’. The much-documented policyinvolvement of public administration does not brush away its exclusion fromother significant forms of politics. Politics and administration overlap in thesphereofpolicymaking,butthatdoesnotmakethetwoanymoreidenticalthantwilightmakes day and night. In one sentence that captures thewhole point:“‘Policydoesnothingwithout theaidofadministration’;butadministration isnotthereforepolitics”(Wilson1887:210-211).

Likewise,thehighlevelofinteractionbetweenpoliticiansandadministrators(the second finding) need not mean that politics and administration are alsobecoming more similar. The mosaic of government may become more fine-grained and less ordered, but still its stonesmay retain their different colors.As Vile has said: “The distinction between political leaders and bureaucratshassimultaneouslybecomesharperandmoreconfused”(1998:399).Lanehascaptured the same point: “It is true that ‘top executives,’meaning the higherechelonofthecivilservice,areinconstantinteractionwithpoliticiansandthattheir efforts in implementing policy have political implications. Establishingandaccepting this fundamental factaboutpublicmanagementdoesnotentail,however,thatoneneedstorejectthe‘politics-administrationdichotomy’”(2005:240).Overall,thereisnoconclusiveempiricalevidenceofagrowingsimilaritybetween politics and administration in the direction of either a politicizationof bureaucracy or a bureaucratization of politics. In fact, many studies findsustainableandstarklydifferent roleperceptionsbetween the twogroups,andoften also much explicit support for the classical role models. For example,MordechaiLee,aformermemberoftheWisconsinstatelegislature,concludesonthebasisofhisownexperienceswithpolitical-administrativerelationsinthatarenathatthereisinfactmuchsupportforthetraditionaldichotomyor‘separate

7Thereneedofcoursebenodoubtthatadministratorspartakeheavilyinpolicymaking:“Carefulanalysis shows,” saysWaldo (1984: 221), “that in fact politics, at least in the sense of policy,pervadesalllevelsofadministration(short,perhaps,ofthecompletelymechanicaloperations).”But,asWaldo’stwoprovisosinonesentencealreadysuggest,sometypesofpoliticsandadministrationarenot“pervaded”bypolicy.

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roles model’ (2001, 2006).8 In another example, Maynard-Moody and Kellyreport their systematic analysis of fifty-four stories of publicmanagers abouttheir interactionswith electedofficials.Their conclusion is interestingenoughtobequotedatsomelength,notleastbecauseitshowshowtheseauthorstrytoreconciletheirprejudiceagainstthedichotomywiththeirownempiricalfindings:

“Although the distinction between politics and administration is intellectuallyuntenable,asmostscholarsassert,thesestoriesbothrevealandconstructaconceptualbarrier between political and administrative agencies and actors. The politics-administrationdichotomyremainsimportanttothecultureofpublicorganizations.Itservesasaninterpretiveguidetopublicadministrators(and,wesuspect,toelectedofficials),eventhoughitdoesnotaccuratelydepicttheworkofpublicorganizations.Storiessuchasthosewehavediscussedsustainthisnormativefiction,afictionthatguideseverydayinteractionbetweenelectedofficialsandadministratorsandprovidesaglossoflegitimacytopublicorganizations”(Maynard-MoodyandKelly1993:89).

Third,Wittehasconcludedonthebasisofacase-studyanalysisoftaxpoliticsthat the classicaldichotomycanbe resurrected in its empirical andnormativeusage, albeit as a trichotomy between policy makers, policy managers, andadministrators(1993).AberbachandRockman,finally,whointheir1981classicthoughttheyperceivedatendencytowardsanincreasingmixtureofadministratorsandpoliticians, lateracknowledgedthat their“purehybrid”actuallyremainsaveryrarebird(1988;seesection5.3).

Although we cannot make broad generalizations on the basis of a smallnumberof studies, theydocastdoubton thecommonbelief that thepolitics-administrationdichotomysimplyfindsnoempiricalsupportwhatsoever.Besidesempiricalfindingsofentanglement,interaction,andoverlapbetweenpoliticiansand administrators, there is also evidence for persistent differences in roleperceptionsandactivitiesbetweenthetwogroups.Somehaveevenarguedthatdevelopmentsareinfactcontrarytowhatiscommonlybelieved.Inrecentyears,severalauthorshaveseenevidenceofamovementbacktowardsmoretraditionaland hierarchical relations between politics and administration (Aberbach andRockman2006;Peters andPierre2001). In country-specific studies this trendhasalsobeenobservedforBritainandtheNetherlands(BarkerandWilson1997

8Inthe2001versionofhisarticle,Leeexplicitlyinterpretedhisexperiencesintermsofthepolitics-administrationdichotomy.Hestatedthat“Legislators–unknowingly–endorsethetraditionalandnormativemeaningofthepolitics-administrationdichotomy”(2001:371;cf.368-369).In2006,however,Leepublished“anexpandedandsubstantiallyrevisedversion”ofhis2001articleinaspecialissueoftheInternational Journal of Public Administration,coordinatedbySvara.Inthisnew version he interprets his findings in terms of a typology offered by Svara, leaving out allreferencestothepolitics-administrationdichotomy,whichisrecastasthe‘separaterolesmodel’.

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and ’t Hart andWille 2006, respectively).AsThayer once put it: “Trends ingovernmentdemonstratethedichotomy’spersistence”(1984:264).

It is, however, not only the outcomes of empirical studies but also theirfocus that is important. Much empirical research deliberately focuses on thearea of overlap and (potential) conflict between politics and administration.In theirclassic studyAberbach,PutnamandRockman, for instance,explicitlysay that theyhaveconcentratedon the“contested territory”ofpolicymaking,although they acknowledge that politicians and bureaucrats also spend muchtimeandenergyonotherfunctionsbesidespolicymaking,suchas“managingthe administrativemachinery of government” and “routine implementation ofpastdecisions”inthecaseofbureaucrats,and“electoralandpartyaffairs”inthecaseofpoliticians(1981:20).Ofcourse,thisfocusonthenexusofpoliticsandadministrationandtheneglectofotherareascontributestotheunderestimationofthedifferenceanddistancebetweenthem,andstrengthenstheimpressionofoverlapandidentity.Italsostrengthensthetendencytopresent thedichotomyasastrawmanversionof theoriginal.Theclassicalconceptualizationsof thedichotomy ofWilson,Goodnow, andWeber did not suggest that politics andadministrationaretwoseparateworldsandthatadministratorsaremereexecutorsof political orders. Ironically,with their vehement objections to orthodoxy, orrathertoorthodoxyastheysawit,heterodoxauthorsonlyechoedtheclassics,whohadalready observedthatadministratorshaveawilloftheirown.

Sofarmydiscussionofempiricalcriticismshasassumedthatitissensibletosubjectthedichotomytoempiricaltestinginthefirstplace.Thisassumptionisactuallyhighlyproblematic,however.Aswesawinthepreviouschapterthedichotomy was not originally meant as a descriptive model of governmentalreality,but insteaditwashighlyprescriptive.Therefore, thedichotomycannotbe ‘falsified’ by empirical findings. Trying to do so amounts to an inversednaturalistic fallacy: the logically unwarranted attempt to dispel an ‘ought’ onthe basis of an ‘is’ (cf. Overeem 2006: 144).The very enterprise of ‘testing’thepolitics-administrationdichotomythroughempiricalresearchismisguided,becauselogicallyempiricalfindingscannothurtanormativeconstruct;atmosttheycanshowthatacertainnormisnotfollowed.Ofcourseonecouldquestionthevalueofnormsthatarecontinuouslyviolated;thereisnouseinnormsthatarenaïveandoutoftouchwithreality.Butthisisnotthesituationweface.Onthecontrary,asIwillargueinsection6.5,thedichotomydoesfunctionasanorminaparticularbutveryrealsense.Thedichotomystillhasgreaternormativeforceingovernmental reality thanmanypresent-dayPublicAdministration theoristswouldliketoadmit.Henceattacksonthedichotomyfromanormativeviewpointmaybeexpectedtobemorepertinentthanempiricalobjections.

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4.4 ‘A deficient, even pernicious, prescription for Action’

Heterodoxauthorshavearguednotonlythatthepolitics-administrationdichotomydoesnotcorrespondtoreality,butalsothatasituationinwhichitdidwouldbeundesirable. Some have suggested that normative objections carry evenmoreweightthanempiricalones.Schick,forinstance,hasclaimedthatthedichotomywasrejectednotsomuchas“afalseseparation”butratherasapoliticaltheory“that offended the pluralist norms of postwar political science” according towhichpublic administration cannot and shouldnot remainneutral in a highlypoliticized environment (1975: 152). In general, normative criticisms of thedichotomyhavecomeintwoforms.Sometimesthecriticismisdirectedagainsttheindependenceofpublicadministrationcreatedbythedichotomyandintendedasadefenseofpoliticsortheconstitutionalorder.Thislineofthinkingismainlyadoptedbyopponentsoftheadministrative(welfare)stateandoftenbackedupwithanoriginalistreadingoftheUnitedStatesConstitution(e.g.,Lawson1994;Pestritto2005,2007).ThislineofcriticismisaimedespeciallyatthedichotomyasitwasunderstoodbyWilsonandGoodnow,andmuchlessattheversionofthedichotomyproposedbyWeber.Indeed,Weber’sinterpretationseemstobeliethepresumptionof thesetheorists that thedichotomymustnecessarilybedirectedattheemancipationofthebureaucracyandtheexpansionoftheadministrativestate.Thisisnottodenytherelevanceoftheirconcernsabouttheconstitutionallegitimacy of administrative power in general and the administrative state inparticular.Arejectionof thedichotomyonconstitutionalgrounds is,however,notnecessary(asIarguemorefullyinChapterSix).

ThesecondtypeofnormativecriticismismuchmoreprominentinthePublicAdministrationliteratureanditisthistypethatwillbediscussedinthissection.Thislineofcriticismaimsnotsomuchattheseparationofadministrationfrompolitics,butratheratitssubordinationtopoliticsasitissupposedlyprescribedbythedichotomy.Itcomestothedefenseofadministrationandopposesthenotionofpoliticalprimacy.Often,authorsadoptingthisapproachaskforamoreimportantroleof the executive and the administration inmoderngovernment andarguethat administrators, with their expertise, should not be denied a considerablesay in themakingofpublicpolicy (Waldo1948:128;1980:68-69).Like theorthodox authors, these critics are oftenbiased in favor of administration andagainstpoliticsandconstitutionalism.Indeed,thisbiasisacontinuoustraitinthePublicAdministrationliterature.Sometimesthistypeofcriticismisalsoinspiredby an aversion tohierarchy as such.FrederickThayer, for instance, authorofabook titledEnd to Hierarchy! End to Competition! andaffectionatelycalleda“constructivecrazy”byWaldo(Harmon2007:457),regardedthedichotomy

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as thepossiblecauseofmajordisaster,so thatheevenstatedthat“policyandadministration must be merged if humanity is to survive” (1984: 267). Hebasicallyequatedpolitics/administrationwithsuperior/subordinate:“Thepolicy-administrationdichotomyrestatestheprincipleof‘delegationofauthority’byasuperior (policymaker) toa subordinate (administrator)” (1984:267).Becausehewanted todoawaywithhierarchy ingeneral,healsoopposed thepolitics-administration dichotomy.Thayer himselfwaswell aware that his ideaswerevery utopian, but however difficult, he regarded the abolition of hierarchy asabsolutelynecessary:“Theultimatetask(…)istodesignaworldinwhichthereisnohierarchy,hencenopolicy-administrationdichotomy”(1984:275).

In the mainstream literature the general concern of authors opposing adichotomy that makes administration subordinate to politics is that it wouldrelegateadministrationtotheroleofapassiveinstrument.Levitanhasarguedthatthedichotomyturnspublicadministrationintoameretoolandthatthishastwoundesirableeffects:first,itnegativelyaffectsthequalityofgovernmentofficialsandhencethequalityofpolicyandofadministrationitself,andsecond,itcreatesthetemptationtotransferadministrativetechniquestoothercountrieswheretheyprovetobeunworkable(1943).Whilethelatterpointwasalreadyrecognizedbytheclassics,theformerhasalsobeenbroughtforwardbyWaldo,whenheclaimedthatthedichotomyis“prescriptivelypernicious”because“administrators,moregenerallythoseinadministrativeoperations,haveknowledgedenied[to]citizensand politicians, and this knowledge should become part of the policy-makingprocess”(1980:69).

Theseheterodoxconcernsaboutasituation inwhichadministratorswouldunthinkinglyandautomaticallyexecutethewilloftheirpoliticalsuperiorsshouldalsobeunderstoodagainstthebackgroundofthehorrorsoftheSecondWorldWar.Intheargumentforleavingadministratorsroomtomaketheirownvaluedecisions, topicalbutmostlynotveryelaborate references tend tobemade toNaziGermany, theNuremberg trials, andaboveall toAdolfEichmannas thearchetypeoftheobeying,unthinkingbureaucrathidingbetweenhisofficialstatustoevaderesponsibilityforhisactions(e.g.,Waldo1971:267;1984b:108;1987:93;Rabkin1998:158).LongwasagainveryexplicitwhenhesaidhewasgladtheAmericanbureaucracywas“noneutralinstrumentliketheGermanbureaucracy,availabletoNazianddemocratalike,pleadingitsordersfrom‘die höhe Tiere’as an excuse for criminal acts.Be it noted that this plea of duty to carry outordersneutrallymetshortshriftatNuremberg”(1952:817).ThusascribingthehorrorsoftheHolocausttoaninstitutionalarrangementlikethedichotomyhasthetendency,however,toobscuretheimportanceofthepersonal(im)moralityoftheofficials involved.Onecanwonder,moreover,whether theseallusionsand

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referencestoNaziGermanyareverypertinentatall.Insection6.4Iwillarguethat the idea thatNaziGermanywas characterized by an extreme dichotomybetweenpoliticsandadministrationisveryproblematic.Itratherseemsthatthedichotomywasseverelyviolatedthereordrasticallyreducedtoitssubordinationaspect.Butevenifthedichotomyhadbeenanimportantfeatureofthatregime,theabuseofanideainonecontextneedofcoursenotmakeituselessinothercontexts.

Whilemostempiricalcriticismsofthedichotomyareaimedattheseparationbetweenpolitics and administration,most normative criticisms are directed attheideaofadministrativesubordinationandinstrumentalization.Thus,itdrawsdirectly on the heterodox reconceptualization of the dichotomy noted earlier:theideathatthedichotomyturnsadministratorsintopassiveinstrumentsinthehandsofpoliticians.Wehavealreadyseenthatthisisamisrepresentationoftheclassical dichotomy:neitherWilsonnorGoodnow,nor evenWeberwanted todoaway(iftheycould)withthelegitimateroleanddecision-makingpowerofadministrators.Onthecontrary,theygrantedpublicadministratorsconsiderablediscretionaryscope.ParticularlyWilsonandGoodnowaimedtoprotectpublicadministrators against political interference. In my estimation the normativecriticismscarrymoreweightthantheempiricalcriticisms,becausetheypointtorealdangerscausedbyone-sidedunderstandingsof thepolitics-administrationdichotomy.Strictseparationwithoutsubordination,orstrictsubordinationwithoutappropriate independence, can ultimately have undesirable and perhaps evendisastrousconsequences.Thisshouldinduceus,nottoabandonthedichotomyassuch,buttoseekanunderstandingthatkeepstheseaspectsinbalance.

4.5 A note on discretion

Inallthreelinesofcriticismagainstthedichotomy–conceptual,empirical,andnormative – the concept of administrative discretion plays an important role.Thisnotionhasbeenthestartingpointformanyattacksonthedichotomy.Wehave already seen that, conceptually, administration was equated with policymaking.AsDimockwrote,“politics(inthesenseoflaworpolicy)runsalltheway through administration” (1937: 32).The notion of the “continuity of thepolicy-formulatingprocess”wascentraltotheearliestcritiquesofthedichotomy(Kaufman1956:1067). Itmeant that therewasnoriftbetweenmakingpolicyontheonehandandexecutingitontheother:“Theconcretepatternsofpublicpolicy formation and execution reveal that politics and administration are nottwomutually exclusive boxes, or absolute distinctions, but that they are two

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closelylinkedaspectsofthesameprocess”(Friedrich1981:198).9Butifpublicadministratorsare involvedinpolicymaking,howexactlydotheycontribute?Heterodox critics of the dichotomy have mostly not suggested that publicadministrators take the pen frompoliticians to draw the broad lines of publicpolicythemselves.Instead,theybelievedthatadministratorsshapepublicpolicy(bothinitspreparationandimplementation)moreindirectlythroughinnumeroussmalldecisionsintheireverydaywork.Gulicksaidtheworkofpublicemployeescouldbeseenas“aseamlesswebofdiscretionandaction,”andadministrationwasfoundtobe“acontinualprocessofdecision-action-decision-action”(1933:60).Whatmaybecalledtheargumentfromdiscretionrunsasfollows:becausepublicadministratorshave(orshouldhave)discretionaryfreedomtotakedecisions,theyare(orshouldbe)abletoshapeoratleastinfluencepublicpolicy,andthereforetheyare(orshouldbe)ultimatelyinvolvedinpolitics–whichmakesthepolitics-administrationdichotomyinadequate(initsdescriptiveandprescriptiveform).

ThisargumentfromdiscretionisverycommoninthePublicAdministrationliteratureanditiscurrentlyperhapsthemainargumentagainstthedichotomy.InhisEthics for Bureaucrats,forexample,JohnRohrusesadministrativediscretiontoexplainthe“demiseofthedichotomy,”arguingthat“[t]hroughadministrativediscretion,bureaucratsparticipateinthegoverningprocessofoursociety”andthat“toinfluencepublicpolicyasapublicofficialistogovern”(1989:23,48-49).Thereasoningisseriouslyflawed,however.Toseewhy,wemustfirstlookatthemeaningofdiscretionassuch.10InhisbookTaking Rights SeriouslythelegalphilosopherRonaldDworkinexaminesthediscretionofjudgesandexplainsthatitisnotmeaningfultousetheconceptofdiscretionwheneversomeoneisfreetomakechoices,butonlyundermuchmorespecificconditions:

“Theconceptofdiscretion isathome inonlyonesortofcontext;whensomeoneisingeneralchargedwithmakingdecisionssubjecttostandardssetbyaparticularauthority.(…)Discretion, likethehole inadoughnut,doesnotexistexceptasanarealeftopenbyasurroundingbeltofrestriction.Itisthereforearelativeconcept.Italwaysmakessensetoask,‘Discretionunderwhichstandards?’or‘Discretionastowhichauthority?’”(1977:31).

Sodiscretion,Dworkinargues,cannotexistwithoutrestrictionsandpresupposesarelationwithanauthority.Thisisnotonlytrueofjudiciarydiscretionbutof

9Onlyafewsentenceslater,Friedrichacknowledgedthat“thereisprobablymorepoliticsintheformationofpolicy,moreadministrationintheexecutionofit”(1981:198)–whichis,accordingtohisopponentFiner,“adeliciousunderstatement”(1981:210).10Forelaboratestudiesofdiscretion,bothofjudgesandadministrativeofficials,seeDavis1969andGalligan1990.

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discretioningeneralandhencealsoofadministrativediscretion.Infact,theideathatdiscretionisbydefinitionconstrainedwasalreadyacknowledgedbyGulick:“Discretion, the use of judgment, is the right to choosewithin a constrainingframeworkofnecessity”(1933:61).Aslongaswewanttogiveadministratorsdiscretion, not free rein or sovereignty (as no critic of the dichotomy hasproposed), we necessarily presuppose restrictions on their action. In modernformsofgovernmentsuchrestrictionsaretypicallydefinedbypolitics.Hence,the argument from discretion against the dichotomy cannot withstand closescrutiny. It runs too rashly fromadministrativediscretion topolicymaking topolitical involvement.Thefact thatadministratorshavediscretionaryfreedom,nomatterhowmuchorhowlittle,initselfdoesnotmeanthattheyareinvolvedinpolicymaking,letaloneinpolitics.Andevenwhenadministratorsareinvolvedinthedeterminationofpublicpolicy,theystillcannotbesaidtobeinvolvedinpolitics.11

In his recent book Public Administration’s Final Exam (2006), MichaelHarmon employs the concept of administrative discretion to undermine thepolitics-administration dichotomy in another,more subtlemanner.He tries toshowthat it is impossible to legitimizeadministrativediscretionaryactionandthatthereforetheentireprojectof(rationally)legitimizingpublicadministrationisafailure.Thisseemsanoddwaytoproceed.Insteadofconcentratingonthekindofadministrativeactionthathepresumes(plausiblyenough)tobethemostdifficulttolegitimize,heshouldratherhavetakenthekindthatismosteasytolegitimize:ifthatcannotbelegitimized,noonecan.Nevertheless,hisdiscussionof discretion deserves our attention. He argues that, as long as we assume adichotomy between politics and administration, discretionary administrativeaction bydefinition cannotbejustifiedbyanappealtoanexternalruleorauthority,becauseifitcould,itwouldnotbediscretionary(2006:22).And,hecontinues,becausediscretionaryadministrativeactioncannotbejustifiedbysuchanexternalruleorauthority,itcannotbejustifiedatall:“Ajustifiablediscretionaryactisaredundantterm”(2006:22;cf.pp.131,138).Thus,discretionaryadministrativeactioninherentlyinvolves,hesayswithreferencetoSartre,gettingone’shandsdirty.Ultimately,thepolitics-administrationdichotomyrendersalldiscretionaryadministrativeunavoidablyillegitimate.

This is a sophisticated argument, but it overlooks the fact that within itsrestrictions discretionary administrative action may well be legitimated onother grounds than an explicit political commandor regulation.Typically, the

11Anotherproblemisthattheprecisenatureandextentofadministrativediscretionareoftenleftunconsideredinmostcriticismsofthedichotomy.Itissimplyassumedthatpublicadministratorshave(agreatdealof)discretion,butthisissuedeservescloseempiricalscrutinyaswell.

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restrictionsonadministrativediscretionaryactionarelawsandotherregulations.This leaves open the possibility (indeed the probability and desirability) thatadministrative discretionary action itself is subject to other norms, such asprofessionalormoralnorms. In theirwork,andespecially in theirexerciseofdiscretion,administratorsshouldbeguidednotonlybyexternalincentivesbutalsobyan‘innercheck’(cf.Finer1981;Friedrich1981).Andwhen,finally,withinthelimitsofallthesenormsstillsomediscretionaryroomisleft,choicesmadearenotnecessarilyunjustifiedanddirty,asHarmonsuggests,butinsteadtheyareallfullyjustified.Discretion,afterall,meansthatoneisallowedtodowhateveronechooseswithincertainrestrictions,andoftentherewillbeseveralwaystodoajobthatmayallbe,thoughperhapsnotequally,acceptable.Intheexerciseofdiscretion,therefore,itbecomesparticularlyclearthatpublicadministrationcanberegardedasaformofpracticalreasoning inwhichthevirtueofpracticalwisdom (phronesis, prudentia) is of special importance (Morgan1990;Dobel2001:361-363;Nieuwenburg2003).

Wecanevengoonestepfurther.Notonlydoestheargumentfromdiscretionnot seriously affect the politics-administration dichotomy, but it can even beturned in its favor.The concept of discretion implies the notion of separationaswell as subordination at the same time.Thus, it can serve as an importantconceptualtooltocombinepoliticalprimacyontheonehandandsomemeasureofadministrativeindependenceontheother.Bygrantingpublicadministrationasubordinateyetlegitimatescopeforaction,thenotionofdiscretionnicelysuitsmyconstitutionalunderstandingofthedichotomy(seeChapterSix).

4.6 A rAdicAl rupture

ThepreviouschaptershowedhowrevisionisthistoriographerssuchasVanRiperand Svara have cast doubt on the endorsement of the politics-administrationdichotomybyclassicalauthors, inparticularWilsonandGoodnow.Theyhaveargued that these classics never seriously intended to separate politics andadministration but rather favored a “complementary” relationship betweenthem.Moregenerally,theyhavearguedthatthedichotomywasnotthefoundingtheory of (American) Public Administration. Although such readings of theclassicsproved tobeproblematic, theyhavebecomewidelyacceptedandarelikelytohavecontributedtothefurthererosionofthedichotomy’srespectabilityand acceptability. Somewhat ironically, however, these same revisionisthistoriographers have also qualified the abandonment of the dichotomy byheterodoxauthors.Svarainparticularhasclaimedthatwhatheterodoxyopposed

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wasnottheideaofthedichotomyassuch,butonlyitsstrictestmanifestationsin practice. As a result of this double move of qualifying first the classicalendorsement and then the heterodox abandonment of the dichotomy, he hasbeenabletoclaimastrongcontinuitybetweenthetwoperiods.Onlyduringashortintervaloforthodoxthinkinginthe1920sand1930s,heargued,thestrictdichotomywasreallyendorsed,butthiswasnothingmorethanan“aberration”(1998).12

Now it must be admitted that the heterodox authors sometimes do givereasons to think that their opposition to the dichotomywas not very solid. Inhis own contribution to the heterodox assault on the dichotomy, Waldo, forinstance,assertedthat“disagreementisnotgenerallywithpolitics-administrationitself;onlywiththespiritofrigidseparatism”(1948:121).Moreover,heoftenaddedqualifiers tohisdeclarationsof thedeathof thedichotomy,writing thata “simple” and “sharp” dichotomybetween politics and administration has tobe rejected as untenable (1948: 128 and 207, respectively) and that “politics-administration, at least in the you-go-your-way-and-I’ll-go-mine form, is fastbecoming an outworn credo” (1948: 122; italics added). Thus, he suggestedthat other, more subtle versions of the dichotomy could perhaps be viable.Suchnuancesnotwithstanding,however, theview thatheterodoxywas justanextensionofanongoingtraditionof‘complementarity’isuntenable.Thethrustoftheheterodoxargumentsaboutthedichotomyisclearlydismissive.Whereastheclassicauthorsintendedtodisjoinpoliticsandadministrationtheheterodoxauthorsattemptedtojointhem.Thisisacrucialdifferenceofintentthatcannotbeblottedoutwithoutforcingtheexplicitarguments in thesources.Whenwefurther examine what exactly it was that heterodoxy rejected, we see that itwasnotonlythepracticalseparationofpoliticsandadministration,butalsotheconceptualdistinctionbetweenthem.Thus,theheterodoxauthorsdownplayedorrejectedWilson’sbasicpropositionthat“administrativequestionsarenotpoliticalquestions”(1887:210).Ingeneral,theheterodoxauthorswereconvincedofthreepoints:first,thatadichotomybetweenpoliticsandadministrationwasgenerallyendorsedinPublicAdministrationbeforetheSecondWorldWar;second,thatthis

12 Svara blames a 1958 essay byWallace Sayre for “derailing the evolving discussion of theinteraction of politics and administration” after the Second World War (2001: 178) and forintroducingtheviewthatthedichotomywasthefoundationofPublicAdministration.Byputtingforwardthis‘creationmyth,’Svaraargues,Sayre’sessayforcefullydistortedbothhistoriographyand theorydevelopment:“Fromthispoint forward, theviewthatpublicadministration isbasedonthesimpledichotomytakeshold”(1999a:684;cf.2001:178;2007:37).Itseemsexaggerated,however,topresentSayre’sfour-pageessayasa“watershed”;itdidnothavethatmuchimpact.StudiessuchasWaldo’sThe Administrative State havebeenmuchmoreimportanttoestablishthehistoriographyofPublicAdministrationSvaraopposes.

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dichotomywasconceptualizedmainlyasaninstrumentalistdistinctionbetweendecidingandexecuting;andthird, thatthedichotomy,thusunderstood,shouldberejectedasbothempiricallyandnormativelyindefensible.Thefactthatonlythefirstoftheseclaimsbearssometruthdoesnotmaketheiroppositiontothedichotomyanyless.

Thus, the idea that there is a strong continuity between heterodoxy andearlier thinking about the dichotomymust be rejected. The heterodox break-awayfromthedichotomywasaradicalruptureinthetraditionofthinkingaboutthesubject.Some(non-revisionist)PublicAdministrationhistoriographershavefoundthischangeofattitudestowardsthedichotomystrongenoughtouseitfordividingthehistoryofthefieldintodifferentperiods.Henry(1987),forinstance,used ‘politics-administration dichotomy’ to designate the earliest phase in thedevelopmentof(American)administrativethinking.Likewise,Kaufman(1956)discernedaperiodofsupportfor“neutralcompetence”inthehistoryofPublicAdministration. Finally, Golembiewski (1977: ch.1) distinguished betweenfourphasesandarguedthatthedichotomywasendorsedinphaseI(‘analyticalpolitics-administration’)andII(‘concretepolitics-administration’),andrejectedinphaseIII(‘ascienceofmanagement’)andIV(‘thepublicpolicyapproach’).Inallthesevariants,thereisanimportantdifferenceinadministrativethinkingaboutthedichotomybeforeandaftertheSecondWorldWar.

Within the study of public administration the advent of heterodoxy hadmultiple consequences, some of them positive and others negative. On thepositiveside,onecansaythatthesubfieldofadministrativeethicshasdevelopedrapidly precisely because of the ‘discovery’ of administrative discretion andthe concomitant rejection of the dichotomy (Rohr 1989; Svara 2007). Thisdevelopment can be considered a beneficial effect of the rejection, howevermisinformed,ofthedichotomy.Ontheothersideofthebalancesheet,however,thereareseverecosts:inparticularitcanbearguedthattheheterodoxrejectionofthedichotomyhasthrownPublicAdministrationintoaseriousidentitycrisis,sothatit“couldnotdecidehowitshoulddefineitselfandbywhatprinciplesitshouldact”(Waldo1980:69).

Theheterodoxassaulthasmanagedtoestablishthedichotomyasanextremeandinstrumentalistideainwhichpublicadministrationisexcludedfrompolicymakingandturnedintoapassiveinstrumentinthehandsofitspoliticalsuperiors.Becausemostempiricalandnormativecriticismsofthedichotomyaredirectedagainst this distorted interpretation they usually do not hold much water.AsThayeraptlywrote, “textbookattackson thedichotomyare falseadvertising”(1984: 264).Nevertheless, the extreme interpretation is very persistent.Manyknowledgeable theorists are decidedly prejudiced against the dichotomy and

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deliberately stick to its most untenable understandings. Svara, for instance,has rejectedoutofhandaproposalbyMontjoyandWatson to reinterpret thedichotomyinawaythatallowsadministratorstoparticipateinpolicymakingandonlyisolatesthemfrompartisanpolitics:“The‘strict’definitionis thedichotomymodel. It isnotconceptuallypossible,asMontjoyandWatsonsuggestandasmanypractitionerswouldprefer,tohaveaone-waydichotomythatkeepselectedofficialsoutofadministrationbutallowsadministrators tobeactiveinpolicy-making”(1998:52;cf.p.57).13Itisnotatallclear,however,whythismoderateunderstanding is “not conceptually possible”; Svara simply insists that thedichotomyposes“astrictseparationbetweenelectedofficialsandadministratorsandanarrow,instrumentalroleforadministrators”(SvaraandBrunet2003:202;cf.1999a:678;2004:6).Inits“stricteststatement,”heasserts,the“dichotomymodel”consistsofthefollowingfourpropositions(2007:37):

1. “Electedofficialsdonotgetinvolvedinadministration.2. Administratorshavenoinvolvementinshapingpolicies.3. Administratorsoccupytheroleofaneutralexpertwhoseresponsibilityisre-

strictedtoefficientlyandeffectivelycarryingoutthepoliciesofelectedofficials.4. Presumably,administratorsdonotexercisediscretion.Todosoopensthedoor

tointerpretingpolicyandchoosinghowandtowhatextentitwillbeapplied.”

Thisisaverystrictstatementindeed.Ofthesefourpropositions,onlythefirstcanbereasonablyregardedasanexpressionof(apartof)thepolitics-administrationdichotomy.Theotherthreeareentirelyalientotheclassicalor,forthatmatter,anyothermeaningfulunderstandingofthedichotomy.WecaneasilygrantSvarathat,understoodinthisway,thedichotomyiswhollyindefensibleandthatithasfoundlittleifanysupportinthehistoryofthefield,butfortunatelythisundulystrictviewisnottheonlypossibleunderstandingofthedichotomy.

Althoughtheheterodoxauthorshavebeenveryeffectiveintheirradicalizationandrejectionofthepolitics-administrationdichotomy,theideahasnotcompletelydisappeared.Aftertheheterodoxassaultthefieldhashadproblemsgettingridofthedichotomyanditsabandonment,howeverloudlyproclaimed,hasoftenbeenonlypartialandhalf-hearted(Harmon2006:13-20).14Thegreatdifferencewith

13Asothermoderateunderstandingsof thedichotomy,hementions thoseofO’TooleandRohr(Svara1999a:698n.2and700n.18,respectively).14Harmonhasnotedtheimpossibilityofgettingridoftheidea,giventheAmericanconstitutionalorder,theestablishedadministrativestate,andtheir“concomitantsetofpublicbeliefsabout‘theway things are’”: “No matter how persuasive my critique of public administration’s standardnarrative(…),somenominaldistinctionbetween‘politicians’(policymakers)and‘administrators’willpersistfortheforeseeablefuture,includingcontinuingconcernsabouttheirproperspheresofinfluenceandrelationtooneanother”(2006:7).

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earlierthoughtisthattheideahasentirelylostitsrespectabilityandsupport.Itisnowgenerallybelievedthatthedichotomy,ifnotdead,isatleastirrecoverablyinjuredandthatweshouldridourselvesoftheideaifonlywecould.Convincedthatthedichotomycannolongerbeseriouslyadvocated,severaladministrativetheoristshaveattemptedtodevelopalternativeconceptualconstructstocapturetherelationshipbetweenpoliticsandadministration.Thesealternativesare thesubjectofthenextchapter.