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Kantian Autonomy and the Moral SelfAuthor(s): Eric Entrican WilsonReviewed work(s):Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Dec., 2008), pp. 355-381Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40387879 .

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KANTIAN UTONOMYAND THE MORALSELFERIC ENTRICANWILSON

JVant's account of autonomys notdesigned o solvethe tradi-tional roblemffreewill. t s a response o theproblemfheteron-omy atherhan heproblemfdeterminism.nd heformerertainsto concerns boutthe structurefpractical easonrather han hescopeofnature'sausal aws. Sohis heoryfpractical eason, atherthanhismetaphysics,rovidesheproper ontext or nderstandinghis ccount f utonomy.Unfortunatelyantdid notalways ppreciatehisfeature f hisownviews. He saysconflictinghingsbout herelation etween hepractical oncept fautonomyndthe theoreticaloncept f "tran-scendentalreedom."He sometimeslaims hat heformerependson the atter, hichhe characterizess "thefacultyfbeginningstatefromtself,hecausalityfwhich oes not nturn tandunderanotherausedeterminingt ntimenaccordancewith he aw ofna-ture."1n otherwords, e sometimesays hat ur utonomyependsuponourabilityoexempt urselves rom heworkingsf naturenorder o nitiate chain f ventshat oesnot tself unctions a linkto earlier ausal states.Yeton other ccasionshe claims hat uton-omy nd transcendentalreedomretwoseparatessues:"Theques-tion about transcendentalreedom oncernsmerely peculativeknowledge,hichwe can setaside as quite ndifferentfwe are con-cernedwithwhat spractical,nd aboutwhich heres alreadyuffi-cient iscussionntheAntinomyfPureReason."2

Correspondenceo: Loyola College nMaryland,501North harlesStreet,altimore,D 21210-2699.1Immanuelant, ritique fPureReason, ranslatedndedited yPaulGuyerndAllenWood NewYork: ambridgeniversityress, 998),A533/B561,hereafterrV. Exceptfor heKrV,which s cited ccordingo thestandardA/B"agination,ll referencesoKant re to thevolumendpageof Kaufs Gesammeltechriften,d. Kniglichpreusischenkademie erWissenschaftenBerlinndLeipzig:Walter eGruyter,902-).2Ibid. 803/B831-A804/B832.The ReviewofMetaphysics62 (December2008): 35&-381.Copyright 2008 byThe ReviewofMetaphysics

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356 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONKanthimself id notalwaysfollow hroughnthis laim, utpropose hatwe takehim t hiswordhere. Furtheremarks ecom-mend hisnterpretivepproach.Consider,or xample, isreview f

Johann einrichchulz'swork, ttemptt An ntroductiono Doc-trine fMorals orall HumanBeings,whichKantwrote ndpub-lished n 1783, ust before he Groundworkf theMetaphysics fMorals. Afterummarizingchulz'sviews na friendlynd not un-sympatheticanner, ant raws hereader's ttentiono "the eneralfatalism hich s themostprominentrinciplenthiswork nd themostpowerful ne,affectingllmorality,since t]turns ll humanconduct nto merepuppet how andtherebyoesaway ltogetherwith he oncept fobligation."3 hat s interestings thatKant riti-cizes Schulz's osition otby nsistingntherealityffreedom,ut,rather,yarguinghat heviabilitynd egitimacyfourmoral rac-ticesdo notdepend n fatalismrdeterminismeing alse.4Despitehaving laimed n theCritique fPure Reason that utonomye-pendsontranscendentalreedom,nd thus solutionothefreewillproblem, e sayshere that thepractical onceptof freedom asnothingo do with hespeculativeoncept,which s abandoned n-tirelyometaphysicians."5earingnmind hatKant egardsuton-omy s a speciesofpractical reedom,his laim s worthepeatingna waythatmakes tsrelevance o hismoral heoryrystallear: heconcept fautonomy,e tellsus,hasnothingo do with heconceptof ranscendentalreedom.This ineofthought ill urely ot mpresshosewho arecom-mittedo the mportancef he raditionalroblemffreewill.Theywill nsisthat hewill s eitherree rnot nomatterheperspectiveor standpointromwhich ne chooses to examine he ssue. Andwhetherhewill sfree r notdepends ithern the ruth rfalsityfdeterminismronwhetherreedoman bemade ompatible ith e-terminism.n thesamereview fSchulzKant ndicates line of

3Immanuel ant, Review fSchulz'sAttemptt An ntroductionoaDoctrinefMorals or llHuman eings egardlessfdifferenteligions,"nImmanuel ant, ractical hilosophy,ranslatedndedited yMaryGregor(NewYork: ambridgeniversity,996), :13, ereafterchulz.4Kant oesnot, omyknowledge,istinguishetweenatalism ndde-terminism.He seemstotakethethreats ofreedomosedbytheoneasequivalentothose osedby he ther.5Schultz, :13.


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358 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONInstead,hereal ssue s autonomyersusheteronomy. hatKantsmost oncerned bout s theprospect hatpractical eason or thewill) s exclusivelyeteronomousnnature. nthis ssay, intendoshowhow he appealstothenotion fself-respectnorder oargueagainst hisprospect. nKant's iew, urcapacity or utonomye-pendson ourcapacity o identifyith nd feelrespect or n ideal,moralversion f ourselves. Genuine elf-determination,n otherwords, ests n a form f elf-respect.Allowme tobeginwith sketch fKant's heoryfpracticalea-son. Likemost hilosophers,ant akespractical eason obe aboutmeans nd ends. Becausehismoral heorysnormallyategorizeds"nonteleological"r"deontologica!"ycontemporaryaxonomiesfethical hought,his s often verlooked.nfact,t swidely elievedthatKant's iewofmoral easoningasnothingodo with nds tall.But t s easyto show that his s wrong. n the Groundworkantcharacterizes eans, nds, ndtherelation etweenhem s follows:

Now,what erves hewill s theobjective roundf ts elf-determina-tion s anend derZweck],ndthis,f t s given yreason lone,mustholdequally or ll rational eings.What,n theother and ontainsmerelyhegroundfthepossibilityfan action heeffect fwhich san end scalled means das Mittel].8IntheMetaphysics fMoralshe offers more traightforwardhar-acterizationfwhathemeans y end."There esays hat,anend san objectofthechoice ofa rational eing), hroughherepresenta-tionof which hoice s determinedo an action obringhisobjectabout."9 rmore imply:anend s anobject ffree hoice, he epre-sentation f whichdeterminest to action."10The word"object"should otmislead ere. t sbeing sed nas broad sense s possi-bleto indicate hat t which hewill s directed.AllKantmeans sthat he nd ofa decision rchoice s that or he ake ofwhicht sundertaken.t sinthis ensethat he ndof choice serveshewillas theobjective roundf ts elf-determination."

8 bid. :427.9 mmanuelant, heMetaphysicsfMorals,ranslatednd ditedyMary regorNewYork: ambridgeniversityress, 996),:381,ereafterMdS.10Ibid.6:384-5.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORAL SELF 359Contraryothetendency o describehis views as nonteleological,Kantexplicitlylaimsthat, every ction . . has an end."11 nthe sec-ond Critiquehe putsthepoint ikethis:"it s indeed undeniablethat

every olitionmust lso have an object and hence a matter."12his isin fact centralpillarofKant's entire racticalphilosophy, or t s intheseterms hatKant characterizes racticalreason as such. "Ratio-nal nature s distinguishedrom he rest of natureby this, hat tsetsitself n end."13 ntheMetaphysicsofMorals he goes so far s to saythat,pure racticaleasons a facultyf ndsgenerally,ndfort o be indif-ferentoends, hats,to takeno nterestnthem, ould hereforee acontradiction,ince hen twouldnotdetermine axims or ction i-therbecauseeverymaximf ction ontainsnend)andwouldnotbepracticaleason.14

Because of its centrality o rationality, nd-settings the essentialmarkofourhumanity:The capacityto set oneself an end anyendwhatsoever is what characterizeshumanityas distinguished romanimality)."15In ouractualpracticalreasoning herelationship etweenmeansand ends is mediatedby ncentivesTriebfeder).16Weselect what we11Ibid. :385.12mmanuel ant, ritique fPracticalReason, ranslatedndeditedbyMaryGregorNewYork: ambridgeniversityress, 997), :34,hereaf-terKvV.13GMS4:437.14MdS6:395.15Ibid. :392. t s a mistake othink hat hefocus n endsdrops ut nKant'smoral heory. e, nfact, efines thics s "the ystemf he ndsofpurepractical eason"Ibid.6:381). For mportantriticismsfthedeonto-logical eadingfKant'smoral heory,ee BarbaraHerman,hePractice fMoralJudgmentCambridge, ass.:HarvardUniversityress,1993)and

AllenWood, ant'sEthicalThoughtNewYork: ambridgeniversityress,1999).For n nsightfuliscussionf he mportancef nds otheCategori-cal Imperative,ee JensTimmerman,ValueWithout egress:Kant'sFor-mula ofHumanity'evisited,"uropeanJournal fPhilosophy 4,no. 1(2006):69-93.16AtonepointntheGroundworkantdistinguishesetween ncen-tives ndmotives:The ubjectiveroundfdesires an ncentivedieTrie-bfeder];heobjective roundfvolitions a motivederBewegungsgrund];hence hedistinctionetweenubjectivends,which est n ncentives,ndobjectivends,which epend nmotives, hich oldfor very ational e-ing"GMS 4:427). Roughly,tseemsthat motives an incentivehathasbeenendorsedn some ense.Nothingnmy nterpretationurns nthis is-tinction,o itcanbesafelygnoredor hepurposes f hepresentssay.


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360 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONtake obethebestmeans oward rescribednds, utwemust lso nsome ensebe "moved" oadopt hose nds s ourgoals. This sthejob of n ncentive,hichKant haracterizess the subjectiveeter-mining roundf hewillof beingwhosereasondoes notby tsna-turenecessarilyonform ith heobjectiveaw."17 ncentivesigureinto heexplanationf ntentionalctions nthat hey elpaccountforwhyweadopt he ndsthatwe do. To cite nagent'sncentivestocitewhatmovesher o treat omethings her nd. But t s essen-tial to Kant's heoryfagency hatwe are notmerely ushed ndpulledbyour ncentives. heymoveus in a particularortofway.This heoreticalommitmentsexpressedmost learlynwhatHenryAllison allsthe"Incorporationhesis,"whichKantpresentsn thefirstart fReligionWithin he oundaries fMereReason:18Freedom f hepower f hoicehasthe haracteristic,ntirelyeculiarto t, hat t annot edeterminedo action hroughnyncentivexceptsofar as thehumanbeinghas incorporatedt into his maxim hasmade t nto universal ule or imself,ccordingo which e wills oconduct imself.19

There remore nd less plausiblewaysofreading hisclaim.Theleastplausible ersion as Kant ommittedo the dea thathu-manbeings annot e "determinedo act"by ncentivesnless heyincorporatehemnto heirmaxims.This s obviouslyalse. SayIhear scarynoise nthewoods andam moved ymydesire or"in-stinct")or elf-preservationo run s fast s I can back ocamp.Thisdesire an obviouslyunctions an incentive ithoutmehaving ofirstncorporatet nto maxim. t s a goodthing e do nothavetoincorporateur ncentivesntomaximsnorder oact. Wewouldnotsurviveorong fwedid. Surelytmust e the asethat hevastma-jorityfour ctions onotrequirehe ncorporationf ncentives.But his eavesroom or moremodest ndplausible ersion fKant's laim.While tmust etrue hatwedo nothave o ncorporate

17KpV5:72.18Henry llison, ant'sTheory fFreedomNewYork: ambridgeni-versityress,1990). Allison onvincinglyrgues hat heviewcapturednthis hesis snotunique otheReligion ookortoKant'satermoral heory.Onthe ontrary,texpresses lineof houghtbout gencylready resentinGroundworkf heMetaphysicsfMorals.19Immanuel ant, eligionwithin he oundaries fMereReason ndOtherWritings,rans,nded.byAllenWood ndGeorge iGiovanniNewYork: ambridgeniversityress, 998), :23-4, ereaftereligion.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORAL SELF 361our ncentivesnto urmaxims,t lso seems rue hatwe cando this.An mportantange fourbehaviorss based ondeliberation.hat s,many fouractions re the outcome f theprocessofconsideringreasonsand drawing ractical and sometimesmoral)conclusionsabouthow we shouldconduct urselves. Ifwe acceptthismuchabouthuman gency, thinkwe can see thatKant'spoint s simplythat urdesires ndother ensiblempulses onot omeprepackagedas reasons.They ryoyhis tatus nly ybeing reated s reasons,thats, only ybeing aken pand consideredocountnfavor foragainst oing nethingather han nother.As rational eings apa-ble ofreflection,e arecapableofaskingwhether givenncentiveshouldmoveus topursue particularnd. This s nottodeny hatsensiblempulsesfvarious inds an alsooverwhelms,sometimesto thepointwhere hedistance equiredor eflections impossible.Thepoint s only hat t s inprinciplelwayspossibleforus to re-spond o a givenncentiveyaskingwhether e ought o or shouldacton it whatChristineorsgaardalls"thenormativeuestion."20And t s notuntilwepose this uestionhatwe confer he tatus f"reason or ction" n these ncentives.notherwords, n incentivebecomesfor n individualgent reasonfor ctiononlywhen heposesandthen nswers henormativeuestion.An ncentivean cer-tainlyorcetsway nandoverwhelms;thishappens requently,utinsucha case it smovings to act withoutunctionings a reason.Kantdoesnothavetodeny his orhis ncorporationhesis o makesense. Infact, nyplausible eadingftheThesis ccommodateshepoint uite asily.It s importanto bear n mind hat he ncorporationhesisbe-longs oKant's ttempto work uta general rameworkorunder-standinghenature fdeliberatingboutwhat ne should roughtodo and whatmakes uch deliberationossible. It does notexpressany ommitmentoanontologicalistinctionetweenhingshat ancount s reasons or ction ndthingshat annot. tbelongs o histheoryfpractical eason.And mqjor oncern f that heorys toproviden account fthedifferenceetween eingmoved o actionbywhat netakes, pon eflection,ocountnfavor fthat ction ndbeingmoved o action withouthought"r simply by nstinct."

20 hristineorsgaard,ources fNormativityNewYork: ambridgeUniversityress, 996),-21.


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362 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONthink ant's ointhere s deceptivelyimple.Moreover,t seemstoconformo somecommonntuitionsboutwhat s nvolvednconsid-ering owtoact. Under ormalircumstances etake tfor rantedthat here s a genuine ifferenceetween ecidingwhat o do andwonderinghatwillbefall s. The ncorporationhesis s designedtoaccount or his ifferencey rticulatingnecessaryonditionorgenuine eliberation. ccordingoKant,we aredeliberatingnlyfreflectingnwhether givenncentiverovides s with consider-ation hat ounts or ragainst erformingome action.And,nhisterminology,e do this y ncorporatinghe ncentivento ne ofourmaxims.21It is inthiscontext hat heproblem fheteronomyrisesforKant. Mosttheoristsfpractical easonwould be willingo grantsomeversion fthe ncorporationhesis. The dea thatwe are ableto achieve omemeasure fdistance rom ur ncentivesndaskhowthey tandwith espect o ourmoregeneral ractical rinciplesourmaxims)s not erriblyontroversial. ur apacityo ask thenorma-tive uestionndweigh easonsfor ction s notundermuch uspi-cion.Buthowfar owndoes this apacity or eflectionnddistancego? Do the ncentivesrovided y nclinationsnd desires unctionas a limit eyondwhich ractical eason sunable o venture? his spreciselyhe ineof houghthatKantwants o resist.Our ncentivesexplain,npart,whyweadopt he nds hatwe do. Ifyouhold hat llincentivesome from hingsuchas inclinationsnddesires, henyoumust lsomaintainhat he apacityo setends s limitedooper-ating nthesemore r esspassivelyxperiencedncentives. nthiswidelyccepted iew, ractical eason s essentiallymatter frea-soningboutmeans oendsthat rethemselvesimply iven.22he

21OnAllison's eading,he ncorporationhesis ssumes hatwe aretranscendentallyree. Thought is notwithoutextual upport, do notthinkhisnterpretationsnecessary. heThesis ssumes he ealityf neg-ative" ractical reedom,hat s,the deathat urvolitions "affected"utnot determined"y ensibility.ut his y tself oesnotrequirehe totalindependence"rom ature llegedly rovided ytranscendentalreedom.All trequiressthatwehave he apacityodistance urselves romur n-clinationsnorder oconsider owweshould espondo them.Onsuchviewwearecertainlyonnected onature,ustnot na merelymechanicalway.22AsGilbert arman resentsheview, practicaleasonings alwaysmeans-endseasoning.. ; youcancometowant omethings a means osomethinglseyoualreadywant.But . . youcannot easonyourselfntohavingomethingew s anultimatend, inceyou lways eason romourends othingshat remeans othose nds."TheNature fMoralityNewYork: xford niversityress, 977), 1.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYANDTHE MORAL SELF 363inclinationsnddesires hat ccount or heends,whichmoveus toadopt hem s ourends, re not"upto us." Ifthisweretrue, hencould elect rommong range foptionsfforded eby range finclinationsnddesires.23ut couldnotdistancemyselfrommy e-sires nd nclinationss a whole nd ask whetheromeother ind fincentivehouldmovemeto seta particularnd as that or he akeofwhich amconsideringndertakingomeaction. Kant hinks haton this iewgenuineutonomyouldbeimpossible. here s nogen-uineself-legislationfthe self s limited o respondingo incentivesoverwhich thasno control.To be sure, hecapacityo ncorporateincentivesntomaxims ndthen elect ppropriate eans o desiredendsmanifestsomedegree f elf-controlrfreedom,ut his s notsufficientorKantianutonomy. ccordingo Kant twouldbe suffi-cientmerelyor rudentialeasoning,hich rafficsnlynhypotheti-calimperatives.Kant allsthisview the"empiricismfpractical eason."24 isdislike fempiricismspalpable ntheCritique fPracticalReason,wherehe saysthat mpiricisms "dangerous"n that t threatenso"degrade umanity."25hys theview otroubling,ndeven danger-ous"? Kantworries hat t entailswhatChristine orsgaard alls"skepticismboutpracticaleason."He isworriednparticularbout"motivationalkepticism."26he concernsthat heoriesfpracticalreasonwhichholdthat ll incentivespring romnclinationsnd

23Actually, ushedto extremes, iews that imitpracticalreason to in-strumental easoningabout means seem to rule out even this. ConsiderDavid Hume'sfamousremark: 'Tis notcontraryo reason to prefer hede-structionfthewholeworldto thescratching fmyfinger.Tis notcontrarytoreasonformeto chusemy otalruin, oprevent he eastuneasinessof anIndian orpersonwhollyunknown ome. Tis as little ontraryo reason toprefer venmyownacknowleg'd essergood tomygreater,nd have a moreardent ffectionor heformer han he atter."A TreatiseofHuman Nature(New York:OxfordUniversity ress), 267, hereafterTreatise. The claimseems tobe that fthere s no stronger assion to counteract hepreferenceforworlddestruction,henpracticalreason,being imited o the selectionofmeans,cannotoffer ny considerations hatwould countagainstadoptingsuchan end.24KpV5:70.25Ibid.5:71.26ChristineKorsgaard, SkepticismAboutPracticalReason," in Creat-ing theKingdom ofEnds (New York:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1996),311-34. Mydiscussionof this ssue drawsdirectly romKorsgaard's nfluen-tialessay.


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364 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONother ensible forms f desireautomaticallyxclude thepossibility fgenuinelymoral motivation. For Kant,ofcourse,we have a case ofmoral motivationwhen,and onlywhen, omeone is movedto under-takea particular ourse ofaction for he sake of the moral aw. It isnotenough o act inaccordance with he aw; onehas totakeas one'sreason for action the fact that the law prescribestheaction. Whenthishappenswe do what is morally ight ecause itis morally ight.Weadoptthedemand ofthe aw as our end.Themotivationalkepticdoubtsthat, nthe absence ofsome in-clination-basedncentive, herecould ever be such a reason to fulfillthe demandsof the moral aw. He or she doubts, n otherwords, hatpurelyrational onsiderations ould providegenuinereasons for c-tion. Thisfollows from combination f theassumption hatall in-centives tem from ommonmotivational ources such as inclinationand whatKorsgaardcalls the "internalismequirement"n practicalreason.27According o thisrequirement, is a reason forperformingsome actiononly fR implies hat rational ndividualwouldbe actu-allymotivated,t least to some extent, operformhe action nques-tion. It is easy to see how practicalreasons springing rom ourcessuch as inclinations nd desires meetthisrequirement. ut t s moredifficulto see how purelyrationalconsiderations,whichfind heirsource in deliberation ather han n antecedently iven nclinations,could as well. The empiricist xploitsthisdifficultyyarguing hatpurelyrationalrequirementsannotprovidereasons for actionpre-ciselybecause theycannotmeet the internalism equirement.Andtheycannotdo thisbecause theycannotprovide ncentives, hat s,"subjective rounds" or hedeterminationf the will. Purely ationalconsiderations annotbe reasons, n otherwords,because they an-notevermotivate nyoneto act. AlthoughHutcheson'smoral sensetheorys mostdirectlyn Kant'ssights t thispoint, n extremever-sion ofthisview is crystallizednHume's famousclaimthat, reasonis, and oughtonlyto be theslave ofthepassions,and can neverpre-tendtoanyother ffice han o serve and obeythem."28This is the context n whichtheproblemofautonomy mergesforKant. He is less worried bout determinismhan he is about a

27Korsgaard,Skepticismbout ractical easoning,"17.^Hume,Treatise,66.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORAL SELF 365viewofpractical eason hatwoulddeny hepossibilityfbeingmoti-vatedto act by purely ational onsiderations. ucha view woulddeny hat urepractical eason ould, f tself,eterminehewillbydenyinghatncentivesould pringrom source ther han nclina-tion r otherensible ormsfdesire.AccordingoKant,uch viewofpractical easonwould ondemn stoheteronomy.fwe were n-tirely ependentpon ncentivesiven rior o rational eliberationbyour nclinations,hen hewillwouldbe able to determinetself"only ymeans f n ncentivehat he nticipatedffectf he ctionhasupon hewill," hats,an incentiveasedon a momentaryesireor nclination.29f hiswere he ase,then utonomy ouldbe impos-sible. nstead, e wouldhave always nlyheteronomyf hewill."30Andby ondemningstoheteronomy,otivationalkepticismouldunderminehebasis ofmoralityltogether,ince"autonomyf thewill s the oleprinciplef llmoral awsand ofdutiesnkeeping iththem."31Kant's ccount fautonomys hisresponse othisproblem.Toappreciateurtherisunderstandingf hedifferenceetween uton-omy ndheteronomyn this ontext, e can takeour cue fromhewords hemselves.f can be forgivenor ointinguttheobvious;theprefixftheword heteronomy"omesfromheGreekwordfor"other" heter),ndtheprefixf theword autonomy"omesfromtheGreek or self' auto). Bearinghisnmind,t shardlyurprisingthat he anguageKantuses to characterizeeteronomousolitionandaction eflecthe tymologyf heword tself.f hewillwerere-strictedoheteronomy,eargues,hen thewillwouldnotgive tselfthe awbuta foreignmpulse einfremder ntrieb]wouldgive helawtoitbymeansofthe ubject's ature, hichs attunedo be re-ceptive o it."32Thisnotion fa "foreignmpulse"s indeedquite

29GMS4:444.30bid. :444.31KpV5:33. donotmean osuggesthatKant iewsmotivationalkep-ticism,rthe mpiricismfpracticaleason, s the nly hreatoautonomy.Onthecontrary,e argues hat raditionalationalistoncepts fmoralityandpracticaleason lsoendangerhe utonomyf heperson.Empiricismisonly neversionf heproblem. or concise nd lluminatingiscussionof this ssue, ee AllenWood's TheSupreme rinciplefMorality,"n TheCambridge ompanion oKant and ModemPhilosophy,ditedbyPaulGuyerNewYork: ambridgeniversityress, 006), 42-80.32GMS4:444.


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366 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONcommon to the terms n which he discusses inclinations nd othersources ofsensuous incentives. He repeatedly nd consistently is-tinguishesbetween volition that is determinedby respect forthemoral law and volition hat stems from alien influences" r "aliencauses/33 Thus the obvious contrast: utonomys se(/-determination,whileheteronomys oifter-determination.Thepoint s familiar o anyreaderof Kant. There s a deeperandless obviousconceptualpointhere,however.Namely,t s impossibleto clarifyhe difference etweenautonomy nd heteronomy ithoutclarifyinghe distinction etweenself and other. We cannotmakesense of theconceptofautonomy,n otherwords,without stablish-ingwhat t s thatproperly elongsto the self. As with o manyotherpivotal ssues in modernphilosophy, he distinction etween auton-omyand heteronomyhus rests on a conceptualdistinction etweenwhat s internal and what s externalto the self. This explainswhyKant ometimes haracterizes utonomy s "inner reedom,"n whichthe will is determined ysomething hatspringsfromwithin, s op-posed toheteronomy,nwhich hewill owes its end tosomethinghatcomesfromwithout,omethingalien."34This s byno means a simple ssue. There are of coursemanydif-ferentways to characterize he difference etweenwhat is internaland what is external o the self,or whatproperly elongsto it andwhatdoes not,since these conceptshave manydifferentenses, de-pending n context ndusage. There s,for xample, literal ense inwhicheach and every ne ofmy neezes and itchesbelongsto me. Ifyounotice mesneeze and then ay,"blessyou," understand hatyouare addressingme and thatyouare ascribing he sneeze to me. I ac-knowledgeand endorse thatascriptionwhen I say "thanks" n re-sponse. But it is just as obviousthat fa historianwere to somedaywritemybiography, e or she wouldnot nclude such episodes. Norwould anyonethink hatmystorywould be incomplete ftheyweremissing.Yetone shouldresist hetemptationo infer romhis ortofthing hatphysicalepisodes neverbelongto thepersonin the sensethatthey re not"internal"o her self. Changes npersonalitytruc-turewrought ybrain njuries, or xample,makethisperfectlylear.Similarly, bjects and events located outside one's epidermisare

33GMS4:446, 48.MdS :418-420.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORAL SELF 367externalrforeignn an obvious iteral ense. Yet nother espectsthis s not lways he ase. There s a perfectlyeaningfulnduncon-troversialense n which omethingshathappen omywife rmybest friendlso happen o me,evenpartiallyonstitute ho I am.Analogously,herules, tandards,nd deals hat haracterizehevar-ious institutionsndpracticesnwhichwe participatere outsideeachofusinonesense,yetwe sometimes eaningfullyescribe hemas "ours"n anotherespect. n caseswherewe donot,wesometimessaythatwe are "alienated"r "estranged"romhem,nd such an-guagendicateshat omethings amiss. toftenndicates he ecogni-tion hat ne canexpand heboundariesfone's selfbybelongingosomethinghat xists utside f t. Properlyelongingosomethingexternalan alter he riteriafwhat s to count s internal.35Of ourse, his arelycratcheshe urface. hepoints thatt sdifficultodemarcatehe elf. Perhapst s impossibleo do so in afixedway. Theself xpands ndcontracts,s it nternalizesnd dis-avows, cceptsandrejects sometimesonsciously,ometimesn-consciously. s a resultwedraw he inebetweennside nd outsideina varietyfways or varietyfpurposes.36 hatwe need oknow

35 oran nterestingccount fhowdemarcationelates o socialprac-tices, ee MeirDan-Cohen,Socializing arry,"nHarry rankfurt,akingOurselveseriously,GettingtRight Stanford:tanfordniversityress,2006).36 ommentatorsften ail oappreciateheprevalencefthis ssue nKant'swork s a whole.Hisdiscussionf he elf,ndtheproblemfhow odeterminets tructure,sbyno means imitedo histheoreticalreatmentfcognitionn theCritiqueofPureReason. Throughoutis corpus,Kantseems oncernedoexploreheways nwhich he tructuref he elf s de-terminedya complexnterplayf the ctive nd thepassive, he nternalandexternal,he ndividualnd the ocial. One mportantlacewhere hiscan beseen s his reatmentf he ensus ommunisntheCritique fJudg-ment.RudolfMakkreelrgues onvincinglyhat he dea ofa sensuscom-munishas mplicationsotustfor estheticudgment,ut lsofor eflectivejudgments a whole.AccordingoMakkreel,his dea,which nderwritesthecapacity or eflectiveudgment,llowsus to"abstractrom heprivateempiricalspects four ubjectiveepresentationsnorderogenerate hatmight e called a communal r intersubjectiveerspective."Makkreel,Imagination nd Interpretationn Kant (Chicago:UniversityfChicagoPress, 990), 58.Also ee Stanley avell, TheAesthetic roblemsfMod-ernPhilosophy,"n hisMustWeMean WhatWe ay? (NewYork: ambridgeUniversityress, 002). Kant lsotreatshis ssue nhis discussion f con-science ntheMetaphysicsfMorals.SeeMdS6:437-40, here e seems oargue hat heforce fconsciences explained yourhavingnternalizedsome ort f xternaluthorityigure,uch s God.


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368 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONnow,however,s how Kantdraws his ine. What ersion fthedis-tinctionetween elf nd other nderwritesisconceptionf hedif-ference etweenutonomyndheteronomy?ant oes not fferdi-rect nswer o this uestion. amnot ure hathealways ooked tthe ssuethisway. But, ssumingamrightbout heneedtoclarifythe distinctionetween elf nd othernorder o clarifyhe differ-ence betweenutonomyndheteronomy,ny ttempto understandhisconceptionf utonomyallsfor reconstructionf hedemarca-tion rojecthat nderliest.Historically,hilosophersaveoften istinguishedetweenwhatis internalnd what s external o the elf n thebasis of substancedualism.Thisdoctrinerovides quick ndeasycriterionor emar-catingheboundaries fthe elf n a fixed nd a priorimanner. im-ply ut, ccordingothis artesian trategy,hatwhich elongs o thebody soutside he elf,while hatwhich elongs o themind elongsinside t.37Whateverne thinks f the cartesiantrategy,t s clearthatKantwouldnot ccept t. As we know romheCritique fPureReason, nparticularheRefutationf dealism nd theParalogisms,heregardsubstance ualisms untenable. edoes not uite ejecttas false; nstead, e undermineshephilosophicalnterpriseromwhichtsprings.n tsplaceheputs healthygnosticismegardingthe ssue.We canfind his iew xpressednhispractical hilosophyas well. In theMetaphysicsfMorals, or xample, e argues hat,"neither xperiencenor inferences f reason give us adequategrounds ordecidingwhether hehumanbeinghas a soul (in thesenseof substance wellingnhim, istinctromhebody ndcapa-ble ofthinkingndependentlyf t, hat s a spiritualubstance), rwhetherifemaynotwellbe, nstead, propertyfmatter."38How, hen, oesKant ircumscribeheboundaries f he elf orthepurposes fdevelopingheconcept f utonomy? any assagesinhiswork uggesthat he elifotherr nner/outeristinctioninesupevenlywith henoumenal/phenomenalistinction. orexample,whenhedescribeshehuman eing s a being ndowedwith innerfreedom"echaracterizesach ofusas a "homo oumenon"39 uch

37 writecartesian"nstead f"Cartesian"norder oavoid ttributingthisviewtoDescarteshimself, hohelda more omplex iewoftheselfthan e soften iven redit or.^MdS 6:419.39Ibid. :418.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORAL SELF 369ofwhat esays uggestshat heKantiantrategyfdemarcations ofa piecewith he"two-worlds"etaphysicshat ometimeseemstounderwriteis moral heorys a whole. In the econdCritique, orexample, e saysthat, causalityhroughreedommust lwaysbesought utside he sensibleworld n the ntelligible orld."40 hispoints oan"intelligibleubstratumnus."41 he patialmageryereisquite omplex:hatwhich s "outside"he ensibleworld sactually"in"us, qua intelligibleharactersr noumenal elves. Because wearerational eingsvernnftige esen),he nternalontentsfthesphereof our inner elves are outside heempiricalworldwithinwhichwe live s empiricalranimal eings.Theinterpretationwant oproposerestson readinguch an-guagefigurativelyndtaking ant this wordwhenhesaysthat theconcept fa world funderstandings ... only standpoint"42must dmit hat he exts ythemselveso notdecideunequivocallyin favor f his nterpretation.here reundeniablyoodtextual ea-sonsfor akinghe alk f worlds"iterally.ut think he xegeticalvirtues f this nterpretationre cancelledoutbyitsphilosophicalvices. Forthisreason, ask thereader o indulgewhat s generallycalled he two-standpoints"nterpretations he orshe examinesheremarksshallmarshalnsupportfmy roposal.43

40KpV5:105,my mphasis.41Ibid. :99,my mphasis.42GMS4:458.43 hanks o theworkof commentatorsuch as Lewis White eck,Henry llison, hristineorsgaard,ndThomasE. Hill,Jr.,t has becomequitecommon, articularlynEnglish-speakingircles, o interpretant'stalk f wo worlds"n terms f he oncept f standpointrpractical er-spective.My eadingwes a significantebt o this raditionf ommentary.To myknowledge,llison's ant'sTheory fFreedom epresentshemostcarefullyndthoroughlyorked-outersion ftheapproach. cannot ojustice ohis nfluentialorkhere, ut shouldnote hatmy ersion fthetwo-standpointsnterpretationiffersrom is nat eastonevery mportantrespect.Allison roposes his eadingnorderooffernonmetaphysicaln-terpretationf thenotion ftranscendentalreedom.He thinksutonomyrests nthe apacity or uchfreedom,ut hatmakingenseof atter oesnotrequire akingiterallyhenotions f"intelligibleorld"nd "noumenalself." n contrastoAllison, adopt he wo-standpointseadingn order odetach hequestion fautonomyrom hat ftranscendentalreedom. hereasonwhys that donot ee thepointnretaininghe atter otion nceweturnway romhemetaphysicshat eems orequiret.My hinkingnAlli-son'saccount wesmuch oKarlAmeriks'sritiquen"Kant ndHegelonFreedom: wo NewInterpretations,"eprintedn his Interpretingant'sCritiquesNewYork: xford niversityress, 003). should dd,however,thatAmeriksnd drawvery ifferentonclusionsbout he imitationsfAllison'spproach.


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370 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONFirst onsider hefollowingassagefrom heGroundwork:So it s that hehuman eing laims or imselfwillwhich etsnothingbeput o his ccount hat elongsmerelyo hisdesires nd nclinations,and onthe ontraryhinkss possible ymeans f t indeed s neces-sary actions hat an be doneonly ydisregardingll desires nd en-sible ncitementssinnliche nreizungen]. hecausalityf such ac-tions ies n him s intelligencend nthe awsof ffectsnd actionsnaccordancewith rinciplesf nintelligibleorld, fwhich e knowsnothingmore han hat nitreason lonegives he aw,and .. it sthere,s intelligencenly,hat e s hisproperelf.44

An mplicitemarcationtrategys clearlyt workhere. Kant rawsthe inebetween elf ndotherharplynddecisively. n the ide ofthe"properelf (das eigentlichelbst)45 e have ntelligence,ea-son, nd will. And n other ide wehavedesires,nclinations,nd all"sensiblencitements."his ouldreasonablye read s ustanotherversion fthecartesiantrategy;nemighterfectlyellexpect neighteenth-centuryhilosophero group nclinations,esires, ndothermpulses nder body"r"extension"ndthen roupwill,ntel-ligence,ndreasonunder mind"r"thought."utwe should esistthis nterpretation. e knowthatKantrejects ubstance ualism.Moreover,hispassageshouldbe read nthecontext f others hatmake lear his snotwhathehas nmind.

Furtherown he amepage,Kant ontinuesy laiminghat:Whatnclinationsnd mpulses . . incite im ocannotnfringeponthe aws ofhisvolitions intelligence;ndeed, edoesnotholdhimselfaccountableorthe ormerrascribe hem ohisproperelfthats,tohiswillfhough edoesascribe o t hiswill] he ndulgencee wouldshow hem fheallowed hem o nfluenceismaxims othedetrimentof herationalaws ofhiswill.46Herewecansee that hedistinctionetweenwhat s internalnd ex-ternalotheproperelf snotmademetaphysically.hat s, t snottheresult fclassifyingnclinationsnddesires, ntheonehand, nd

44GMS4:457,my mphasis.46It is temptingotranslatedaseigentlicheelbst" s "the uthenticself," ut hiswouldmportssues nto hediscussionhat rebest eft sidefor ow.Theresnodoubt, owever,hat he oncepts f utonomynd u-thenticityavemuchncommon,ndthatKant'swork rovides fruitfulp-portunityo exploretheways in whichtheyoverlap. The road fromRousseau oNietzscheertainlyassesthroughhisuncturenKant'smoralphilosophy.46GMS4:457-8,my mphasis.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORAL SELF 371will ndreason, n theother,nterms f heir espectivessentialt-tributesfor xample,extension"nd"thought").nstead,he ine sdrawn rom hefirst-personerspectiveymeans f ctsof dentifica-tion nd disavowal.47t s we as deliberating,udging,ctingndividu-als as agents who draw he ine. We draw heboundaries roundourproperelvesbydisavowinghe ncentivesrovided y"ur ncli-nationsnddesires, yrefusingo endorse hem s sufficienteasonsfor ction rguides oconduct thats,bynot ascribinghem"o our"properelves."To be sure,mydesires nd nclinationsrovidemewithncentives;hey avemotivationalorce ndthey anprovidemewith easons assuming "incorporate"hem ntomymaxims).Butamcapableofquestioningheir irectives,nd amcapableofdeny-ing hat hey elong omy roperelf.When disavow hemhisway,bydenyinghat hey repart fme, constitute,t eastpartially, yproper elfby dentifyingnsteadwith he directivesupplied y myintelligence,y eason,ndmywill.This ct of dentificationsnormativenthe ensethatt s at bot-tom valuative. n dentifyingith hereasons upplied ymyntelli-gence ndwill nddisavowinghose upplied ymynclinationsex-pressmy ommitmentowhat take tobe thegreater alue of theformer. therebyhowthat placegreatertock nwhatmy ntelli-genceprovides easonfor han do inmydesires nd inclinations.ThatKant ubscribeso such normativeemarcationtrategysevi-dent npassagessuch as thefollowing,hich ouchesthe ssues nexplicitlyvaluative erms. Reflectingn whathappenswhen anagentdeliberates bout actionfrom he moralperspective, antwrites:

With willfree rommpulsesfsensibilityetransfersimselfnthoughtnto n orderf hingsltogetherifferentromhat fhisde-siresnthefield f ensibility.. ; [fromhis] e canexpect nlygreaternner orth fhisperson.Thisbettererson DiesebesserePerson],however,e believes imselfobewhenhetransfersimselfto the tandpointfa memberftheworld funderstanding,s theidea offreedom,hat s,of ndependencerom eterminingauses ofthe world fsense,constrainsim nvoluntarilyo do; and from his47My hinkingn the ssues at stakehereowes a gooddeal to HarryFrankfurt'sork n the oncept f identification,developedn numberfessays eprintedn ThemportancefWhatWeCareAboutNewYork: am-bridge niversity,988) ndNecessity, olition,ndLove NewYork: am-

bridge niversityress, 999).


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372 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONstandpointe s consciousf goodwill hat, yhis wn cknowledge-ments,onstituteshe awfor is vilwill s a memberf heworld fsense a law whoseauthoritye is cognizantvenwhilehetransgressest. Themoral ughts then is ownnecessaryill s amemberf n ntelligibleorld,nd sthoughtyhim soughtnlyn-sofarsheregardsimselftthe ame ime s amemberf heworldof ense.48

This ongdense remark aisesmany uestions hatcannotbe an-swered ere. Forourpurposes, hat s mostnterestings theway nwhichtmakeswhat amcallinghenormativetrategyeem o cen-tral o so many undamentalssues nKant'smoral heory, articu-larly o thequestion fautonomy. heVerstandeswelt"intelligibleworld") s "only standpoint"nd I, as a deliberatingnd udgingagent, dopt hat tandpoint hen takemyselfor his betterer-son" hat find rticulatednthe deaof will hat s motivatedy hedemandsf hemoralawratherhan y ncentiveshat tem rom e-sires and inclinations.n doing his, identify yself ith he de-mands fmorality;take hem o be expressionsfmy wnvolition.Moreprecisely,takethem o be expressionsfthe deal towhichaspire nd aboutwhich caredeeply.49hat swhy he mperativefmoralitydas moralischeollen) s notforeignomywill, omethingimposed ponmefrom utside.Accordingothisview, hedistinctionetweenwhat s internalandwhat s externalo the elf snotmetaphysical.t s normativenthat treflects setofcommitmentsoncerningherespectivealuesofthevarious ources fpractical easons. Reasons hat tem romthepurewill orpurepractical eason) re consideredmore aluableor mportanthan hose hat tem rom he ncentivesrovidedyde-sire nd nclination. hey xpress urbetterelves. Kant's erm orthis deal elf s "moral ersonality."50o be a personna moral ense

48 MS :454-5, ymphasis.49 takemyselfere obedevelopingpointmade yKorsgaard.eeThe ources fNormativity.38.50Themoralconcept fpersonalityhouldnotbe confusedwith hepsychologicaloncept.Kant efineshe atter s "the bilityo beconsciousofone's dentityndifferentonditionsfone'sexistence"MdS6:223).Asheputs n theCritique fPureReason, what s conscious f henumericalidentityf ts elf ndifferentimes,s to that xtent person"A361).Thispertainso the enseofpersonhoodhatsso central otraditionaluestionsregardinghe ubstantialityfthe oul,personaldentity,ndso on ques-tions ursued yDescartes, ocke,Hume,ndLeibniz,mong thers.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYANDTHE MORAL SELF 373is topossessseveral haracteristicsndcapacities: persons a "law-giving eing."51n fact, s a "subject fpurepractical eason,"persons "the upremeawgiver."52person, nlike mere hing,salso an"end n tself."53nd moral ersons a being hat s account-ableorresponsiblezurechnungsfhig)orts ctions.54ccordingoKant,whenwe think fan individual uman eing nterms fhismoral ersonality,e think f his"invisibleelf,"55is"freedomndindependenceromhemechanismfthewholeofnature,"56nd his"freedomas]a rational eing ndermoral aws."57WhileKantdefineshumanity"s "the apacityo set oneself nend anyendwhatsoever,"58e thinks f moralpersonalitys "theideaofhumanityonsidered hollyntellectually."59o we can saythat he deaof a moral erson s the dea ofan individual ho setsends nd reasons bouthowto achieve hem nthebasis of"formal"ratherhan material"rinciples,omeonewho decidesandacts onthebasisofwhatpractical easonrecognizess right,atherhan nthebasisof ensuousnclinationsnd diosyncraticnterests. his sthe deaofwho eachofuswouldbe ifwe hadthe trengthndgood-nessofwill virtue)oregardhedemands fmoralitys a sufficientandoverridinguide o conduct. n short,hisbetter ersonwe be-lieveourselveso be whenwe "transferurselvesnthought"othestandpointf he ntelligibleorlds a conceptionfourselves s au-tonomous.This oncept fmoral ersonalityorks ogether ithKant's o-tion f"respect"osolve heproblemfheteronomy.ecallourear-lierdiscussion f the nternalismequirementn reasonsfor ction.Accordingothis dea,R canplay heroleofa practical easonfor

51GMS4:438.52KpV5:75ndGMS4:434-5.53GMS4:428.54MdS 6:223.55 W 5:162.56bid. :87.57MdS 6:223 ndKpV5:87.58MdS6:392 ndGMS4:437. For furtheriscussion f theconcept f"humanity,"eeThomas . Hill, r.,Humanitys anEnd n tself,"nhisDig-nity ndPracticalReason n Kant'sMoralTheoryIthaca:Cornell niver-sity ress, 992), 8-57.Also ee chapterour fAllenWood, anVsEthicalThought.59Religion :27-8.


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374 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONrationalgent, nlyfR could, osomedegree tleast,motivatehatagent o act in light f t. Reasonsfor ction,n otherwords, ancount s genuineeasons nlyf heyncludeomemotivationalom-ponent.Withouthis,R cannot unctions a reasonfor heagent.Typically,hereasons hat haracterizeeteronomousolitionasilymeet his equirement.hey oncern ndsthat re setby ncentivesthat tem rom amiliar otivationalources uch s desire nd ncli-nation. t s nomystery,or xample, owmywantingdrink an fur-nishme with reason o order beer. Nor s it hard osee howmyhoping or a comfortableetirementivesme a reasonto investwisely ow. Thispicture oes not ssume hat esires r nclinationscause thedecision r actionnquestion.Onthe ontrary,t assumesthat he ncorporationhesis s true.We re"affected"utnot deter-mined" your sensiblempulses;60e canstepback from hem ndask whetherhey rovide onsiderationsnfavor foragainst omecourse f ction.But fweareonlyheteronomoushen his s allwecando. I doubt hatwouldmakeus slaves o ourpassions, ut tcer-tainly ould imit ractical eason oa narrowercopethanwemightlike.Accordingo Kant twould ule ut hepossibilityfcategoricalimperativesnd prevent s from ulfillingur "highest ocation."This is the sense in which mpiricismhreatens o "degrade" urhumanity.Thedifficultuestion orKant's iew s whetherhereasons hatcharacterizeutonomous olition an also meet he nternalisme-quirement. hequestion,notherwords,swhetherhere eally anbe reasons fthis ort. Can a considerationfpurepractical easonreally e a reason or omeoneikeyouorme? fnot, henKantian u-tonomys impossible.Recall hat,ccordingo Kant's fficial efini-tion, he utonomyfthewill s "thewill's ropertyfbeing lawtoitself."61ess technically,n individuals autonomousnsofars heorshe is capableofself-legislationrself-determination.personexercises his apacity yacting rdecidingnthebasis ofreasonsthat temfrom urely ational onsiderations-formal"ather han"material"rinciplesregardingowoneoughtobehave.The moti-vationalkeptic oubts hat uchconsiderationsouldpossibly ave

mMdS6:213 and KrVA534/B562.61GMS4:446.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORALSELF 375a motivationalomponent. heonly hinghat ouldmotivateny-one,evena rationalgent,s a feelingfsome sort. Ourcognitivegrasp f general rinciple,notherwords,willnot ctuallymoveusinanyparticularirection nless t s contains r s accompanied ysomesort f affectiveomponent.What s doubted ere s the deathatwe could ever ctually e moved o do anythingnce we havesubtractedromurdeliberationsll nclinationnddesire. f hemo-tivationalkeptics rightbout his, nd the nternalismequirementistrue, hen,ven fwehavethe apacityograsp he mplicationsfthemoral awfor urbehavior,hat rasp ouldnot ctually rovideuswith enuineeasons or ction.This s where henotion frespect omes n. Kant greeswiththe mpiricistfpracticaleason themotivationalkeptic thatmo-tivationequiresn incentive. ndhe thinks his equires feelingfsome ort.We must eel omethingnorder obe moved o act. Buthe rejects heclaim hat easoncannot laythisrole. AccordingoKant, "feeling"Gefhl)s a modificationf"sensibility"Sinnlich-keit). t s "the ffectf representationVorstellung]. . upon sub-ject."62 owhen ne has a representationf omethingsay, sensa-tion of red thatrepresentation ay produce n the perceiversubjectivelyelt esponse. The sensation fredmay, or xample,triggeromedegree f rritationranger.Kant lsosays hat herep-resentationhat roduces hefeelingmaybe either sensible r ntel-lectual."63hus, isclaim s thatt snotustour rafficith mpiricalobjects ndour ensuous epresentationshat roduce eelingsnus.Onthe ontrary,ven ntellectualpisodes an do this.Respects anexample f his ort ffeeling,nthatt sproduced y purelyntel-lectual rrational rasp fthedemands fmorality.t s difficultocharacterizehis eelingrecisely.Kant aysthat eelingngenerals"the apacityor aving leasure rdispleasurena representation,"64butrespects not clearcase of either. tseems o straddle hebor-derbetweenhe wo;rather,t seems obegin s a feelingfdisplea-sureandthengivewayto a sortofpleasure, ne thatwe "can'tgetenough f."65

62MdS6:212n.63Ibid.64Ibid. 6:211.65pV5:78.


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376 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONForourpurposes,hekey laim s that t s thefeelingfrespect"which onnects ground ordetermininghoice o this ction ub-jectivelywith herepresentationf he aw."66 espect hus unctions

as anincentiveTriebfeder)oadopt hemoral aw as one's maxim.67Respect,nfact,s themoral ncentive. ant's houghtere s that sincentivehefeelingfrespects capableofmotivatingn individual"subjectively"o subordinateheprincipleponwhich he acts hermaxim) o thedemands f hemoral aw. Respect,notherwords,sthe ffectiveomponenthatscapableofmakinghemoralaw a rea-son forme to act na particular ay.68 his s not heplaceto defendthedoctrine frespectnfull, ut fKant srightbout his, hen hisexplainshowpurely ational onsiderationsnamely,hose hat e-sult romrawingonclusionsbout he mplicationsf hemoral awforone's conduct can meetthe nternalismequirementnd thusfunctions genuine easons or ction.For, f hedoctrinefrespectis plausible s a pieceofmoral nthropology,hen texplainshow"formal"onsiderationsan nclude motivationalomponent.Theconcepts frespect nd moral ersonalityohand nhand.The dealself stheobject frespect.This s obscured yKant's alkof"respect or hemoral aw," n expression hichhas settled ntoone of he tock hrases fKantianmoral hilosophy.heproblemsnot hat his swrong,ut hat t spotentially isleading. alkof re-spectfor he aw"tends oencouragehe mpressionhat espect asto do with omethingbstract,mpersonal,ndtranscendent. ndthis annot eright.Whilehemoral aw scertainlyot ubjectiventhe ense ofbeing rivater diosyncratic,tcomesfrom ithin. etusnotforgetne of hemost ft-quotedndmoving assages n all ofKant'swork: Twothings ill hemindwith vernew and ncreasingadmirationndreverence,hemore ften ndmore teadilyne re-flects n them: hestarryheavensabove me and the morallaw

mMdS :218.67KpV5:76.68Kant,tmust e admitted,ouldnotbecomfortableith he ppear-ance of heword affective"nthis ontext.Hedefinesaffects"Affekte)sfeelingshat recede atherhan ollow eliberationberlegung).arfrommotivatingoral ction, ffectsmpedet. SeeMdS6:408-409 ndAnthro-pology rom Pragmatic ointofView, rans, nded.byRobert .Lowden(NewYork: ambridge niversityress, 006), 75.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYAND THE MORAL SELF 377withinme"69 The rhetoricalymmetryf"bermir" nd"in mir"makes t clearwhere he aw resides.This swhyKant xplicitlyaysin theGroundworkhat ourownwill .. is theproper bjectof re-spect."70 et, t s not implyhewill s it s found characterizedyvolition n the basis of prudential r instrumentaleasons,andadopted n responseto ends set by inclination-basedncentives.Rather,t s "our wnwill nsofars itwould ctonly nder he ondi-tionof a possiblegivingf universalawthroughts maxims."71notherwords,t s thewillconsidered s moral ersonality,urbetterself,whichKantdescribes s "this espect-inspiringdea ofpersonal-ity" dieseAchtungrweckendedee derPersnlichkeit).72his deaof n dealversionf he elf scapableof settingefore ur yes hesublimityfournaturein tsvocation)while t the ametime how-ingus the ack of accordof our conductwith espect o itand thusstrikingownself-conceit."73here s an importantense,then,nwhich espect or he aw is really elf-respect,ndself-respectasboth negativenda positive omponent;t motivatesyprovidingboth senseof hame a feelinghat humbles"r"humiliates")74ndanobject f spiration.Thisaccount f therelation etweenmoral ersonalitynd themoral eelingf elf-respectonstitutesant's olutiono theproblemofheteronomy.Whenyouthink fyourselfnterms fyourmoralpersonalityou hink fyourselfs activelyutonomousr self-deter-mining. ant's laim s that hinkingfyourselfn thiswaycanmoti-vateyouto be autonomous.Self-respectrovides he ncentive oadopt hemoral awas thebasis ofone'svolition.t thus rovidesheincentiveo act onthebasisofpurelyformal"r rational onsider-ations, o abstract romensibilitynorder o treat hedemands fmoralitys sufficienteasons or ction. n thismanner,elf-respectmakespossible heexercise fautonomy, herein hewill orpurepractical eason s a law unto tself.Thismeans hat urcapacityoexercise utonomyests nour bilityothink fourselvess autono-mous to imagine urselvesnterms f ourmoralpersonality,nd

69bV5:161.70GMS4:440.71Ibid.4:440.72KpV 5:87.73Ibid. 5:87.74Ibid. 5:74.


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378 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONthendentifyith nd be moved ythe dea ofthat etter ersion fourselves.You cannot ctually e autonomousnlessyoucan firstthink fyourselfhatway.Foronly ydoing his anyou waken hefeelingfrespect or hemoral aw that anprovide ouwith hemo-tivationoobey hataw.Onthisview, hecapacity or utonomyoes not reston tran-scendentalreedomr freedomnthe cosmologicalense."75tdoesnotrequireheabilityo exempt neself rom henatural rder ndthen unctions an uncaused ause. Instead,t rests nthecapacityto identifyith ne's "better erson" nd distance neself rom reven disavow he dictates f one's desires nd inclinations.Onemighteasonablybject hat his iewrests nan a priorindunjusti-fied isparagementffeelingnd sentiment. ant hinkshat all n-clinationndeveryensiblempulses basedonfeeling,"76ndhis at-titudetowardfeelinghas earnedhim a bad reputation mongphilosophers hobelieve hathehasdrasticallynderestimatedhemoralmportancef entiment,assions, esires,nd "affect"ngen-eral. It is temptingo think hat henormativetrategyketchedabovereflectsnunwarrantedisparagementf a valuable ndnec-essary art fmoral ndpracticalife. t s easyto find assages hatseem to encourage hisreading. n theGroundwork,or nstance,Kant laims hat,thenclinationshemselves.. are so far rom av-ing nabsoluteworth . . thattmust nstead e theuniversal ish fevery ational eing obe altogetherree f hem."77na similarein,hedescribes hem ntheCritique fPracticalReason as "blind ndservile,"rguing,na passagethat eems o confirmiscritics' orstsuspicions,hat hefeelingfcompassionnd tenderympathyis t-selfburdensomeo right-thinkingersons"who "wish o be freedfromhem thats, nclinationsltogether]ndsubject o lawgivingreason lone."78

75irVA533/B61.76KpV5:72.77GMS4:428.78KpV5:118.Thiswellknownemark akes t emptingoreadKant sa moderntoic.Compareeneca,whenhewritesf affection"hat the n-emy, say,must e stopped t thevery rontier;henhe has invaded ndrushed nthe ity ates, here s nolimit'which iscaptives anmakehimaccept."See "OnAnger,".26 nSeneca:Moral ndPolitical ssays, rans-lated ndeditedJohnM.Cooper nd J.F.Procop NewYork:CambridgeUniversityress,1995). Butas we shallpresentlyee,this omparisons,while pt n mportantespects,misleadingnothers.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYANDTHE MORALSELF 379But Kant's iew s not so straightforward.e doesnot, nfact,simplyabel inclinationn general s "bad" in contrastwithpurepracticaleason,whichs"good." 9His concernsnotwithnclination

as such. It s with ur ttitudeowards ur nclinationsnd desires.That s,he s interestednhowwe treat he atternourpractical ea-soning, heroles we assign hemduringhe course ofdeliberatingabouthowwe ought o behave. "Consideredn themselves" e ar-gues, naturalnclinationsregood, hat s,notreprehensible,ndtowantto extirpatehemwould notonlybe futile ut harmfulndblameworthyswell."80ndeed,nclinations ould eem obelong o"thepredispositiono animalitynthe human eing"whichKantre-gards s essentialo the originalredispositionogood nhuman a-ture."81hequestionshowwe,as deliberatingnd udgingndividu-als, ncorporatehemnto urmaxims.Thequestion,notherwords,is whatwe do with hem. Infact, orKant, he differenceetweengood ndevil urns reciselyn this uestion.8279For a carefulndthoroughreatmentfthis ssue, ee MarciaBaron,KantianEthicsAlmostWithoutpologyIthaca:CornellUniversityress,1995), 94-226. he draws xtensivelyntheReligion ook ndtheAnthro-pology,n addition o hismainstreamorks nmoral heory,n order o

present picturefKantianmoral sychologyuanced noughodo usticetotheroleoffeelingnourpracticalives. For a discussion f how moralfeelingselate oaestheticeelings,ee RudolfMakkreel,Sublimity,enius,andtheExplicationfAestheticdeas," nKantssthetik/KanVsesthetics/Uesthtiquee Kant,edited yHerman arretBerlin:Walter e Gruyter,1998), 15-29. n maginationnd nterpretationnKant,Makkreelrguesconvincinglyhat eeling,or xample,henotion fLebensgefhl,s muchmore entralo the ntire riticalrojecthan snormallyhought. n mpor-tant essonofMakkreers ork s thatKant's ttitude oth oward espectand towardhe nclinationshouldnotbe surprisingt all. Onceweputhisremarksbout nclinationsntheir roper ontext, hich ncludes heCri-tique fJudgmentndthe ssays nhistoryndorientation,e canappreci-atethefact hatKant arely isparages eelings such. On the ontrary,t sessentialohisprojects a whole. t s true hat e refuses o basemoralityonfeeling,ut hat oesnotmean hathe ever ntendso eliminatet. Thecentralityfrespectmakes hat uiteclear, s does hisdiscussion f the"originalredispositionogood" n theReligion :26-8. For an interestingdiscussionf Kant's ttitudeoward entimentndthe"Age fSensibility,"see Ernst assirer, ant'sLifeand Thought,rans. amesHaden NewHa-ven:YaleUniversityress, 981), 68-70.80Religion :58.81bid. :26-7.82Thismarksn mportantifferenceetweenheKantianndthe toicviews.Compare,gain, o Seneca: The ffectionsreno essevil s subordi-natesthan hey reas commanders."ee "OnAnger,"7. This s not, fcourse,odeny ffinitiesetween ant ndthe toics.


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380 ERIC ENTRICANWILSONI realize hat his esponse oesonly o far. t sundeniablyruethatKant alues hewill practical eason)more hannclinationnddesire, rsensibilityngeneral.He alsoargues hat llrationalgents

do as well.We cannot elpbut aremore boutourreason han urinclinationss sources ofpractical easons. Only he former on-nectsus to our"highestocation" s human eings, ndonly t canfunctions the source of moral bligation,nd, therefore,fduty.These ssuesgo rightotheheart f hisentire ractical hilosophy.Hisdevaluationf ensibilitynfavor freason tems rom isconvic-tion hatmoral equirementsanonly eexpressedntheformfcat-egoricalmperativesndfrom he dea that he utonomyf hewill sthebasis ofmoralityngeneral.This s certainlyot heplacetode-fend ither f thesedeeplyKantian ommitments. can onlyhopethatwhat have said inresponse o the aboveobjectionmaygivesome ritics ause.Accordingo ThomasNagel,wewant o knowwhetherrnotwehavethecapacity or utonomyecause "we want obe able towillthe ources four ctions own o thevery ottom."83y ccount fKantianutonomyoes not cratch his articulartch. have rguedthatKantdoes notrest hecapacity or utonomyn transcendentalfreedom. nstead,trestson thecapacity or dentificationmorespecifically,n theabilityo identifyith nd be motivatedythethoughtf one'sself s a moral erson.However,hisdoes notad-dress he uestion fhowwecome o have his deaofmoral erson-alitynthefirst lace andwhywemight ind urselves isposed oidentify ith ndbe motivatedy t to feelrespect or t. In re-sponse canonly dmithat donothave he nswer o this uestion.Despitehis sense that elf-love suallywinsout in theend,Kantseems onfidenthat hepresence f his dea ofourselvess autono-mousmoral gentsndthe apacityo bemoved y t reuniversal.findt mpossibleoshare hat onfidence. et also thinkhey remore ommonhan widespreadynicismegardingractical easonwouldhaveusbelieve.And thinkhat ny heoryfpracticaleasonthat annot ccommodatehese onceptsshopelesslympoverished.Atanyrate, heir riginsmustbe at least npartpsychologicalndsociological.What s needed s a storybouthowthe dea ofmoral

83Nagel, heViewrom owhereNewYork: xfordniversityress,1986),35.


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KANTIANAUTONOMYANDTHE MORALSELF 381personalityndthedispositiono feelrespect or t can result romthe internalizationf standards rovided arlyon byparents ndother ourcesofauthority.84t is true hat his ortofanswer tillwouldnotgiveus whatNagel ayswe want. But doubt ny ccountofautonomyould do that. Kanthimselfeemed oregardheulti-mateground ffreedom s inscrutable,nd I tend to think e isright.85ut that houldnotprevent s from iggings deepas wecan.86

LoyolaCollegenMaryland

84 ora fascinatingttempttthis, ee J.DavidVelleman,elftoSelf:Selected ssays (NewYork:Cambridge niversityress,2006), speciallychapters, 5,and6.85Nagelhimselfhares hispessimisms well. He differsrom ant,though,n thatKant eems, t leastsometimes,onfidentn his convictionthat he heoreticalssuereally oesnotmatteror hepurposes fpracticalphilosophy. agel hinkshepracticalndtheoreticalerspectivesremorecontinuous ith ach otherhanKant oes. Our endencyoslidefrom heformernto he attersnaturalndunavoidable.86would ike o thank aulAbela,RudolfMakkreel,ndAndrew orrisfor heirnsightfulommentsnthis ssay.

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