TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy.

Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution

was issued against the defendant.

Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to

quash the writ but was denied,

appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in

view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for

recovery. Act placed original exclusive

jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of

interest. CA set aside its earlier

decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which

the jurisdiction of any inferior court

is in issue.

ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.YES RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the

Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A

party may be estopped or barred

from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in

pais, or estoppel by deed or by

record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an

unreasonable and unexplained length of

time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier -

Furthermore, it has also been held

that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it

is too late for the loser to

question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his

case for decision and then

accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its

motion to quash the writ of

execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is

"not intended to be carried on in the

formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a

procedure by which a question is

resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and

regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid,

p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given

an opportunity to hear what is

urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of

the parties - In the case at bar,

the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the

same would be submitted for

consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called,

and it was upon his request that the

court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that

period to lapse without filing an

answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day

in court

The orders appealed from are affirmed. METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION/GOKONGWEI-PE vs PASTORIN (465 SCRA 320) FACTS: Pastorin was an employee of Metromedia tasked for periodic collection of receivables from dealers of petitioner's

newspapers. He terminated from service but was not dismissed due to the intervention of the

labor union, the collective

bargaining agent in the company. Pastorin has a loan from a certain Gloria de Manuel who seek

the help of the petitioner for the

collection of said loan - petitioner sent a letter addressed to respondent, requiring an

explanation for the transaction with De

Manuel, as well as for his failure to pay back the loan - respondent admitted having incurred the

loan, but offered no definitive

explanation for his failure to repay the same.- respondent was suspended – he was transferred

to another department –

respondent stopped reporting to work and sent a letter re refusal to accept the transfer -

Respondent duly filed a complaint for

constructive dismissal – ruled in favour of respondent – Metomedia is ordered to reinstate the

complainant to his former position,

with full backwages from the time his salary was withheld until he is actually reinstated

Petitioner appealed to NLRC raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over

respondent’s complaint – an issue never raised in the Labor Arbiter – NLRC reversed the

decision for lack of jurisdiction – respondent appealed to CA after denial of motion for recon- CA

reversed decision of NLRC – petitioner appealed to SC – SC reversed and set aside decision of

Labor Arbiter and CA.

ISSUE: WON lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, heard and decided by the labor arbiter, may be raised for the first time before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by a litigant who had actively participated in the

proceedings, which it belatedly questioned. YES RATIO: It appears that the issue of validity of complainant’s reassignment stemmed from the exercise of a management

prerogative which is a matter apt for resolution by a Grievance Committee, the parties having

opted to consider such as a

grievable issue. The matter of reassignment is one not directly related to the charge of

complainant’s having committed an act

which is unfavourable to Metromedia’s interest, since the latter had already been addressed to

by complainant’s service of a

suspension order. The transfer, in effect, is one which properly falls under Section the Collective

Bargaining Agreement and, as

such, questions as to the enforcement thereof is one which falls under the jurisdiction of the

labor arbiter – estoppel does not

confer jurisdiction, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter

before the NLRC on appeal –

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2007

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE LTD. VS HON. ASUNCION AND MANUEL UY PO T IONG GR NO. 79937-38 FEBRUARY 13, 1989

Facts:Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid

a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

Issue:Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid?

Ruling:Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect.The Court dismissed petitioner’s motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses the docket fees.

Personal Observation:

The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that the respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of docket fees.

Saturday, November 17, 2007

Manchester Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals GR No. 75919 May 7, 1987

Facts:This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P78.75M damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fees paid was only P410.00. The petitioner then amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P10M only.

Issues:When does a court acquire jurisdiction?Does an amended complaint vest jurisdiction in the court?

Ruling:The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.