4416697

8/10/2019 4416697

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/4416697 1/5

India and the US: A Closer Strategic Relationship?Author(s): Surjit MansinghSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 22/23 (May 28 - Jun. 10, 2005), pp. 2221-2223+2225Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4416697 .

Accessed: 20/11/2014 12:23

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Economic and Political Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epw

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4416697?origin=JSTOR-pdf



http://www.jstor.org/stable/4416697?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=epw

8/10/2019 4416697


nevertheless id

not

allow he

disqualified

memberso vote.

A

contempt

etition

was

then moved

against

the

speaker.

The

Supreme

Court

passed

anotherorderaf-

firming

that the authoritiesof the

state

including

he

governor

must ensure that

the court's

order

permitting

members o

participate

n

assembly proceedings

be

implemented.

espite

his,

he

speaker

id

not allow four members o vote - rather

he

announced

hat he

confidence ote

had

been

lost,

and

recommended

resident's

rule

under Article356. Both houses of

Parliament

pproved

he same. The Su-

preme

Court

quashed

the

proclamation

observing

the

unflatteringpisode

shows

in unmistakableterms

(not

only)

the

governor' unnecessary nxiety

o dismiss

the

ministry

and

dissolve the

assembly

(but)...also

his

failureas a constitutional

functionary

to realise

the

binding

legalconsequences

of

and

give

effect

to the ordersof this Court".Thus to be-

lieve that

it

is settled

law

that

whatever

happens

nside he

assembly

s sacrosanct

and

is immune rom the courts'

scrutiny

is neither correct

in

principle

nor

in

precedent.

Anotherjibe

hrownhe

Supreme

ourt's

way

is to

point

o the fact that hecourt's

order

ould

hardly

avebeen

mplemented

if the executive

governor)

adrefused o

implement

t. As a

refutation,

can do

no

better han o

quote

he

stinging

observa-

tion

of the

Supreme

Court.

"It s a matter

of deep regret that the governor of

Meghalaya

did

not

think it his constitu-

tional

duty

to

give

effect to the ordersof

this

court,

not even after

a

specific

direction

o that

effect. He could not

have

beenunaware

f the

obligation

reated

by

Article

144,viz,

the

duty

of all

authorities,

civil and

udicial,

n the

territory

f

India

to

act in aid of the

Supreme

Court and

its orders".

I

feel that

unwisely

he Jharkhandnci-

dent

s

beingunnecessarily rojected

s an

intrusion

by

the

judiciary

in a

domain

reservedexclusivelyfor the legislature.

This is due

to an

incorrect

nderstanding

of

judicial

review and the

power

to

ex-

ercise

this in the actionsof the

legislature

and executive. It

is

not

as if the

courts

consider hemselves

uperior

o theexecu-

tive or the

legislature.

But this has

been

repudiated y

the

Supreme

Court

tself

by

saying

hat

"the

ssue as

to

who

among

he

three

wings

of

democracy

-

judiciary,

legislature

nd executive

-

is

superior

s

a futile exercise.Neither the

legislature

northe executivenor even

the

judiciary

is

superior.

It is the

people

who are

supreme...."

In

the Jharkhand

ase

it is

only

the

restraining

and

of the

judiciary,

which

has

restoredhe

people's

confidence n the

supremacy

f the rule of law. For those

claiming omnipotent privilege

for the

legislature,

et me

quote

the

memorable

words

of

LordCoke o

King

James

nearly

300 yearsback,whenremindinghim of

the

majesty

of

law "the

King

ought

not to

be undera

man,

but underGod

and

aw".

Politiciansneed to heed and act seri-

ously

on

president

A

P

J Abdul

Kalam's

statement

to

parliamentarians

"The

arithmetical

ompulsions

of incremental

numbersand

the

alleged tradability

of

certain

legislative

seats

-

won

perhaps

through

means

allegedly

dubious and

undemocratic have

many

a timecreated

doubtsaboutour democratic

system

in

the

public eye."

As it

is,

the current

antics

of

the

Arjun

Munda

overnment

n

Jharkhand s

already turning

to

be a

shoddy repetitionof the samewheeling

and

dealing

as

displayed

by

ShibuSoren.

It s this

amorality

f

politicians

hat

poses

the real

danger

to

democracy

not an

imagined

onfrontation etween

udiciary

and

legislature.

M1

n d i a

a n d

t h e U

A

Closer

StrategicRelationship?

Recent

efforts

by

the

Indian

government

and the

Bush

Administration eed

to be

applaudedfor helping uplift

a

relationship

owards

a more

meaningful

trategic partnership.

But

determination,

ourage

that is essential to

face

up

to the risks that

still

remain

(such

as Pakistan's ties with the

US)

and a

willingness

to shed

oldframeworksof thinking

are needed to sustain the

current

willingness

between the two countries towards

orging

a

closer

relationship.

SURJIT MANSINGH

hrases such

as

'strategic partner-

ship',

'strategic

relations',

'strategic

dialogue',

trip

off

the

tongue

these

days

so

easily

as

to

deprive

them of

signi-

ficance. One or the other

of these

fashionable

phrases

is used

to

describe

di-

verse

relationships,

as between India and

Iran,

India and the

European

Union

(EU),

India

and

China,

the

United States

(US)

and

Russia,

the US and

Uzbekistan,

and

most

recently,

the US and India. The

common threadappears o be one of intent

rather than

of content. Two

governments

agree

to raise the

level of their

regular

interactions

to embrace levels

from

the

lowest to the

highest,

to deal

with

the

great

variety

of

issues that concern each

of

them

in a

cordial

and holistic

manner

seeking

cooperation

or

understanding,

and to make

long-term

commitments

for

mutual benefit

and

furthering

their

respective

goals,

but

do not enter into

alliance. The substance

of

any strategic

relationship,

and its

pos-

sible transformation from

'dialogue'

to

'partnership', owever,dependson the

depth

and

span

of

interactions,

he actual

congruence

of

interests and

objectives,

and the amountof effort

each

party

con-

sistently

devotes to

accommodating

he

other'sconcernsand

winningsupport

or

its own

positions.

The

US

occupies

a

uniqueposition

n

the

contemporary

orldand ven

ts

oldest

and losestallies

ind

t

necessary

o

expend

effort and funds in

maintaining

ood

re-

lations with it. The

US is

the main

sup-

porter

f

the

existing

nternational

ystem

andpossessespreponderant ilitaryand

technological

uperiority.

The

US

has

a

dynamiceconomy

and the

largestsingle

market o whichall others eek access.

Its

population

s

largely gnorant

f

and in-

different o other

parts

of the world but

is

increasingly

f mixed

background.

ts

political

system

has

numerousdecision-

making

sites.

And

the US has

a

deep-

rooted

ense

of its

own

exceptionalism

nd

moral

leadership

hat some have

ques-

tionedbutno one

has

displaced.

These

are

facts

that

cannotbe

ignored;approval

r

Economic

and

Political

Weekly

May

28-June

4,

2005

2221

This content downloaded from 210.212.199.162 on Thu, 20 Nov 2014 12:23:15 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions




8/10/2019 4416697


disapproval

s

irrelevant,

s

is

an obser-

vation hat he

US

appears

o

prefer

assals

rather han

partners

with

impliedequality

in

the international

ystem.

Our nterests

in thereasons or and

possibilities

f

India

and he US

forging

a closer

and

strategic'

relationship,

hat

s,

in the

broad

pectrum

and

long

term.

Successive

prime

ministers ince Indira

Gandhi's1982visit to the US expressed

New

Delhi's

hope

of

overcoming

ecades

of

'estrangement',lespecially

after the

end of the cold

war

and the

beginning

of

economicreforms

n

1991.

Pokhran I in

May

1998 focused

Washington's harply

negative

attention,

nd

only

the

following

18-month

ialogue

between

pecialenvoy

Jaswant

Singh

and

deputy secretary

of

state StrobeTalbott

produced

"some un-

derstanding

f India's

security

concerns

for

he irst

ime".2President

Clinton ook

an activerole

in

getting

Pakistan

o with-

draw tstroopsacross he Line of Control

(LoC)

in

Jammuand

Kashmir

after

the

Kargil

conflict of

1999,

and then made

a

transformative

ive-day

visit to India

in

February-March

000.

Prime minister

Vajpayee esponding

o Clinton's

address

in

parliament

aid,

"your

visit

marks he

beginning

of a new

voyage

in a new

century

by

two

countries hat

have all the

potential

obecome atural llies."3

hough

no American

alkedof India

as

a natural

ally, president

George

W

Bush

spoke

of

'strategic

partnership'

nd

his national

securityadviser,CondoleezzaRice, had

earlierwritten:

The

US

should

pay

closer

attention

o India's role

in the

regional

balance...India

s

an

element

in

China's

calculation,

and should

be in America's

too.

India is not

a

great power

yet,

but

it

has the

potential

to

emerge

as one."4

Afterconsiderable

eliberation

nside

and

outside

officialdom,

some

public

but

mainly

secret,

he

second Bush

Adminis-

tration has

now

gone

much

further,

announcing

new

strategy

oward

south

Asia as

a

region

"vital o the futureof the

US".

(Hitherto,

he Indian subcontinent

was deemed

to be

only

of

peripheral

r

episodic

interest.)

The

stated

goals

of

this

strategy

are

to

help

"India ecome

a

major

world

power

in the 21st

century,"

o assist

Pakistan

o

move toward

democracy,

"feel

secure",

and

"thus

[be

at]

at

peace

with its

neighbours",

ndto eliminate he

hyphen

in

dealing

with hem.5

Earlier,

heNational

Security

Strategy

Document

of

2002

had

highlighted

he

growing

economic,

mili-

tary,

political

nd

cientific

ignificance

f

India

n the

world.

and was followed

by

establishing oint

forums or

cooperating

on

counter-terrorism,

igh echnology,

nd

various

regional

and

global

issues. Next

Steps

n

Strategic artnership

NSSP)

was

announced

y Vajpayee

ndBush

n

Janu-

ary

2004,

reaffirmed

by

prime

minister

Manmohan

ingh

and

Bush

n

September

2004,

and

is

now

moving

nto its second

phase.The two men talkfrequently,not

only

when the tsunami

trikes,

the

effi-

ciency

of India'sreaction

mpressed

he

US)

and heir

expected.exchange

f visits

this

year

andnext

will

consolidate

arallel

and multifaceted

dialogues

on

defence,

economics,

energy,

nuclear

proliferation,

terrorism,

nd

trategic

ssues.

Keypolicy-

makers in

Washington

ee no intrinsic

conflicts between

US

global

interests

these nclude

defeating

errorism,

revent-

ing proliferation

f

weapons

of

mass de-

struction,

advancing democracy,

and

preservinga stable balanceof powerin

Asia

-

and India's national

aspirations.

They

assess Indiato be a

likely

assetas

a

partner

nd

possible

burden

harer,

nd

want to make sure that

all

independent

locationsof

economic,

military,

nd ech-

nological ynamism,

ncluding

uclear

nd

space proficiency,

uch as

India,

are in-

tegrated

nto

existing

nternational

egimes.

India s

not

categorised

s a

'rogue'

state

to be confronted ndcoerced.

Indian Concerns

New Delhi

welcomes

heBush nitiative

and can

be

said to have

long

sought

such

an

approach

y

theUS as

being

n

keeping

with

India's

elf-image

as

an

ndependent,

'responsible,' ower

with

a

claim

o

great

power

status as a

permanent

member

of

the United Nations

Security

Council.

Howeverdissatisfied ndia

might

be with

the

prevailing

world

order,

or

disorder,

t

has notsoughtrevolutionaryhange.The

42nd

ANNUALCONFERENCEOF

THE

INDIAN

ECONOMETRIC OCIETY

TIES)

ANNOUNCEMENT

AND

CALL FOR PAPERS

The 42nd

Annual

Conference of the Indian Econometric

Society

is

scheduled

to

be held

at

Guru

Nanak Dev

University,

Amritsar rom

5th to

7th

January,

2006.

All

those

who

are

interested

in

submittingpapers

for the

Conference should

send

the full

paper

and the abstract of

the

paper (300 words)

along

with

a

diskette

containing

the

abstract

and

paper

to the

Convener,

Programme

Committee at

the following address:

Dr.

K.

R.

Shanmugam

(Convener, Programme

Committee,

TIES)

Madras School

of Economics

Gandhi

Mandapam

Road,

Chennai

-

600

025

Phone

:

044

2230

0304

(0);

2495

6935(R)

Fax

:

044

2235 4847 Email

:

[email protected]

and

1

copy

to the President

of

the

society:

Dr. Atul

Sarma,

Vice

Chancellor,

Arunachal

University,

Rono

Hills,

Itanagar

-

791

111.

More information

can be

obtained

at

http://www.tiesindia.net.

Authors

can submit

papers through

the

website

also.)

The last date

for

submission

of

papers

is 15th October

2005. Communication

bout

the

acceptance

of

papers

will

be

conveyed

to the

authors

in

the first week

of

November 2005.

Members

are

requested

to

communicate

change

of

address,

if

any,

to the

Secretary,

TIES,

at the earliest.

Dr. G.

Ananthapadmanabhan

Secretary,

(TIES)

8/7 Southern Shelters

Fourth

Cross Street

Andal

Nagar,

Adambakkam

Chennai

-

600 088

Phone:

(044)

2253 3943

Mobile: 09884024040

Email:

[email protected]

Dr.

Atul Sarma

President

(TIES)

Vice

Chancellor,

Arunachal

University

Rono

Hills,

Itanagar

-

791

111

Phone: Off:

(0360)

2277252

Res:

(0360)

2277261

Mobile: 09436042078

Fax:

(0360)

2277317

Email:

[email protected]

2222 Economic

and Political

Weekly May

28-June

4,

2005





8/10/2019 4416697


Indian

prime

minister

ave only

a

muted

and

dignified

eaction

f

'disappointment'

to the March

5 announcementhatBush

had

authorised he resumed

ale

of F-16

fighter

planes

to

Pakistan,

which

had

captured ress

reports

n all

three coun-

tries,

to

overshadow uller

statements n

India.Former mbassadoro the

US Lalit

Mansingh ointed

ut that

compared

with

a few F-16s, India was being offereda

"box of chocolates" n the form

of

more

multi-purpose

ombat aircraft

with

co-

production

ights,

nuclear

eactors,

nd

a

broad

ange

of other

desirables.6

Officials

are

busy

with

the

NSSP

and

preparations

for Manmohan

ingh's

state

visit,

andnot

airing

doubtsabout

strategic

partnership

or

attendant isks.7

Yet

doubts

exist

be-

cause

there

areclearrisks hat

he

process

of

achieving trategic

partnership

an

be

derailed,

r

stalled,

or

prove

oo

costly

for

one side

or

the other

n

termsof

compro-

misingsovereignty rcontradictingther

national

objectives.

Pakistan

oses

the most

potent

hreat

o

the

evolving

Indo-US

strategic

relation-

ship.

The

Bush Administration

nd

much

of the

US media

with

notable

xceptions)

has chosen

to

overlook

documented

involvement f the Pakistan

army

in the

very

argets

f US fearand

retaliation,

hat

is, terrorism,

nuclear

proliferation,

Islamisation,

nd

stifling

of

democracy.

Washington

aluesGeneralMusharrafor

what

it believes he can do

and has done

to helpin theUS 'waron terrorism' nd

rewards

im

handsomely

ith

military

nd

economic ssistance. ndiahas

acquiesced.

If theserewards

o

indeedmakePakistan

'feel

secure'

enough

o

adopt

moderation

and realismso

that

t eradicates errorist

networks,

participates

incerely

in the

'peace

process'

f

normalisation

ith

ndia

and

agrees

o a

permanent

ettlementon

Kashmir ithout

erritorial

hanges,

much

good

would

ollow.But

f

US

publicpraise

of its

"major

on-NATO

lly"8

nd

military

assistance

again encourages

Pakistan's

adventurisms tdid nthe1960sand1980s,

boththe Indo-Pakistan

eace process

and

the

opportunity

f

transforming

he

US-

India

elationship

ould

be

derailed.

Wash-

ington

may

want

to

drop

the

hyphen

but

Islamabadould

prevent

t from

doing

so.

Practical isks ie in

trying

o

marrykey

ingredients

f theNSSP

andnew

US

offers

to India

such

as

ensuring nergy ecurity,

co-production

f

advanced efence

equip-

ment,

sales

of

civilian

nuclearand

space

materialsand

high technology,

and

co-

operation

in missile defence

-

with

existing

US

obligations

to

domestic non-

proliferation

and

export

control

laws,

multi-

lateral

nuclear

supplier groups

(NSG),

and

upholding

an

un-amended Nuclear Non-

Proliferation

Treaty

NPT)

presently

under

review at

the United Nations. The Bush

Administration,

which

encourages

research

into new nuclear

weapons

for

US defence

if not

yet

testing

them,

seems

willing

to

'welcome India into the nuclear club',9

but has not

yet

found a

way

of

doing

so

despite lifting

all sanctions

imposed

in

1998.

There is some

intellectual ferment

on the

subject.

Former US

ambassador

to

India

Robert Blackwill

suggests:

"The

US

should

integrate

India into the

evolving

global nonproliferation egime

as a

friendly

nuclear

weapons

state...We

should

end

constraints

on

assistance and

cooperation),

changing

laws and

policy

when

neces-

sary."10

Both the

NDA

and UPA

govern-

ments

in India

have

done more

than

emphasise India's excellent recordin non-

proliferation

and the

minimum

nature of

its nuclear deterrent.

They

have

engaged

in sustained

dialogues

with the

US

and

the

EU

over the last few

years

in order to

harmonise

classifications of dual-use

materialsand

technologies

andhave

passed

laws to

tighten

India's own

export

control

regime.Implementing

ules and

regulations

fairly presents

difficulties for

all

countries,

including

the US and

India,

especially

with

a

multiplication

of

private

firms

in the

market,

and can cause

much

publicised

but

unnecessary friction. The largerdifficulty

in terms of

cementing

US-India

partnership

s thatntra-bureaucraticran-

gling

in

each

country,

he

continuing

n-

fluenceof those ermed

non-proliferation

ayatollahs'

n

the US

governing

stablish-

ment,

and the constant ndian

ensitivity

to

western

lights,

ntrusions,

r

erosions

of

sovereignty,

could

retardthe whole

process.

For

example,

Blackwill's

ugges-

tion of

membership

n the

US-sponsored

Proliferationecurity nitiativePSI) hat

includes

calling

for

spot

check

and nter-

diction

of

suspicious

hips

on the

high

eas

may

or

may

not

attract ndia

as

yet;

verbal

Indian

assurances n

safeguarding

r

not

producing

urtherissile materials

may

not

satisfy

he

US without

xplicit egalagree-

ment on the

subject.

We shoulddemand

skilled

navigation

oward

acknowledged

common

goals

between xtreme

positions

on

either side.

In

any

case,

a

mutually

acceptable

nd

nternationallyecognised

agreement

n the nuclear ssue is

a

pre-

requisite or progress o be madeon the

substantial

proposals

made

at the state

department

riefing

n

March

5,

this

year.

Impediments

Bureaucratic, ultural,

perceptual,

nd

psychological

actors could stall move-

ment toward

partnership.

They

create

impediments

ven in the two

most

suc-

cessful

andfastest

growing

areasof Indo-

US

interaction,

conomicand

military,

ut

spacepermits nly

briefmention f these.

For example, most Americans have a

conceptual

lank

with

respect

o

India;

ld

BOOKS

Newspapers, Magazines

and

Journals

from Indian

and

Foreign

Publishers.

Write or contact us for a free copy of CNA Newsletter

giving

a

comprehensive

list of new books and backlist.

CentralNews

Agency

Pvt. Ltd.

P

-

23,

Connaught

Circus,

New Delhi 110 001

Tel: 2336

4448,

2336

4478 Fax:

2362 6036

E-mail:

[email protected]

Economic

and Political

Weekly

May

28-June

4,

2005

2223





8/10/2019 4416697


images

of a 'closed

economy' persist

despite

acclamationsof

openness

from

leading

American

ompanies;

ew

mages

of Indians

taking way obs'

fromskilled

American

workers

hrough

business

pro-

cesses

outsourcing

BPO)

have

been cre-

ated,;neither

he Indian

Ocean

nor the

Indian ubcontinent

re

eatured s a whole

on standard merican

maps

or n

divisions

of bureaucraticr

military esponsibility.

Thus,

he US PacificCommand

as

gone

much furthern

joint

exercises

with

the

IndianArmed

Forces,

beginning

with the

Navy

in the

early

1990s,

than

has the US

CentralCommand

ealing

with Pakistan

and the western ndian

Ocean and reluc-

tant o include ndia n

policy-making

n

the Persian

Gulf.Lack

of

clarity

on

world

visions and India's

role,

added to mis-

perceptions

and

unequal

expectations,

created

points

of

friction n

early military

interaction. These

mightdisappear

with

increased

and

diversifiedIndo-US mili-

tarycooperation; rovided,

f

course,

hat

'babus'n

the

ministry

f

defence

permit

t

On heeconomic ideIndo-US radehas

grown,

but

ess

impressively

han

India's

tradewiththe EU or

China,

and

exporters

in both India and the

US

complain

of

barriers f one

bureaucratic ind or

an-

other

o

gaining

ccess othe

other's

market.

Air

India's

recentdecision o

purchase

0

Boeing

aircraftwill swell trade

figures,

and

leading

US

producers

of

military

aircraft re determinedo

prove

'reliable

suppliers

ver30

years'

12as

theycompete

for contracts o

augment

he IndianAir

Force.

ndian

xports

f Information

ech-

nology

(IT)

products

and

services com-

mand enormous

respect

in

the

US,

but

would-be

exporters

of

consumer

goods

face stiff

competition

rom other coun-

tries,

specially

China.The

US

is the

argest

single

ource f Direct

Foreign

nvestment

(DFI)

n Indiawhen undsrouted

hrough

Mauritius nd

n

portfolio

nvestment re

counted.Americans

naturally omplain,

as others

do,

of

the difficultiesof

doing

business n Indiaandpushfor morerapid

liberalisation

nd infrastructure

evelop-

ment han ndian

olitical

ealities

permit.

But

what

has

been

accomplished,

nclud-

ing

passage

of the Patents

Act,

is

appre-

ciated. Once

the

benefits of economic

reforms

become

widely

distributed

nd

visible in India and national

self-confi-

dence

grows,perhaps

utdated

omplexes

with

respect

to

globalisation

will

disap-

pear.

The same

applies

to the

realms

of

energy

security

anddefence

cooperation;

US

verbal

promises

hould

be translated

into

tangible

esults oon and

Indian

psy-

chological

nhibitionswith

respect

o the

US

overcome.As that

occursand Indian

capability

and

confidence

grows,

it

will

find

it easier

to

cooperate

with the US as

well as withother

partners

uchas the

EU,

Iran,

apan

nd

China,

nd

hey

with ndia.

After

all,

a

common

objective

among

all

of

them is

finding

honourable

ways

of

avoiding

conflict.

In

short,

Indiacan

act

as a

'strategic'player,

coordinating

nd

employing

different acetsof its

own and

others'

resources

oward

maximumad-

vancement

f

its

considered

bjective:

o

becomeandbe

recognised

s a

developed

country

n the

near future.

Finally,

the

UPA

government

nd the

Bush

Administrationeed

o

be

applauded

for theirreadiness

o

upgrade strategic

dialogue

o a

meaningfultrategic artner-

ship. They

and theirsuccessorswill need

to

display courage,

determination,

nd

patience

n the

coming years

to actualise

goals

and overcome

the

risks

outlined

above.

Given

political

will

and,

impor-

tantly,

extensive

public

relations n both

sides,

this can and

should be done.

[13

Email:

[email protected]

Notes

1

Word used

by

Dennis Kux to describe

US-

India

relations,

Estranged

Democracies,

the

UnitedStates and India

1947-1991,

National

Defence

University

Press,

Washington,

DC,

1993.

2 StrobeTalbottat the India

nternational

entre,

New

Delhi,

January

31,

1999. See also his

Engaging

India,

Brookings

Institution,

Washington,

DC,

2004

(italics mine.)

3

Talbott

op

cit,

p

200.

4

Condoleezza

Rice,

'Promoting

the

National

Interest',

Foreign Affairs,

vol

79,

January-

February2000, pp 45-63.

5

See

background briefing

given by

senior

administrative

fficial

to

reporters

t the

State

Department,Washington,

DC,

March

5,2005.

http://usinfo.state.

ov/xarchives/display.

tml

6

At

the

India International

Centre,

New

Delhi,

April

2,

2005.

7

Ashley

Tellis

surveys

some risks in

'South

Asian

Seesaw:

A

New US

Policy

on

the

Subcontinent',

Policy

Brief,

Carnegie

Endowment for

International

Peace,

Washington,

DC,

No

38,

May

2005.

8 Pakistanwas so

designated

by

US

Secretary

of State

Colin Powell in

March

2004.

9

Michael

Pillsbury

said

this was the

message

conveyed by one of the firsthigh level visits

to

India

n

2000.

Meeting

in

Washington,

DC,

April

26,

2004.

10

Robert

D

Blackwill,

'A New Deal for

New

Delhi',

The Wall

Street

Journal,

March

21,

2005.

11

This

topic

was

explored

well

by

Julie A

MacDonald

n

Indo-US

Military

Relationship:

Expectations

and

Perceptions,

Washington;

DC,

Bruce Allen

Hamilton for

Office

of

the

Secretary

of

Defence,

October

2002.

12

Representative

of

Raytheon

Corporation

n

New

Delhi,

ORF-CSIS

Dialogue,

March

17,

2005.

Centre State

elations

A Return

of Old

Suspicions

The

recent conclave

of

district

magistrates

n

the

capital, organised

at the centre's

behest,

was summoned o

ostensibly

discuss issues

of

development

administration

nd

optimising

he

deliverysystem.

However,

by

its careless

bypassing

of

state

governments,

he

centre's

gesture

has

given

vent

to

old

suspicions,

irst

aired

two

decades ago, to raise their heads once again.

ASHOK

MITRA

he

imperial

style

was

integral

o

Indira

Gandhi's

functioning

as

prime

minister.

During

he

days

she

was at the zenithof

her

power,

one

of her

pet

irritantswas

the

State List under he

Seventh Scheduleof the

Constitution;

t

stopped

her from

making

he states

putty

clay

in her

hands.

If

only

the

stateswere

not

there,

he did not

have

he

east

doubt,

India ouldhave

been

governed

muchmore

effectively.

She had

actually

circulated,

some ime nthe

early

1970s,

a

private

ote

among

her confidantes

abouthow to re-

draw the

country's

administrativetruc-

ture:

f

the states were

allowed

to wither

away;

he

country

ouldbesliced nto

400,

district-sized

nits,

and hese

units

would

be

directly esponsible

o

the centre

which

would n turn nsure

he flow of

resources

to take care of their needs.

Economic

and Political

Weekly May

28-June

4,

2005

2225





4416697

Documents